withdrawal from the talks put all the negative consequences of the Euromissile deployment on the American Side. It is now clear that the Soviet Side overestimated the potential of the anti-war/anti-missile movement in Europe, which, in fact, failed to decisively influence the American and NATO plans. The Soviets noticed neither the weakness of the anti-missile movement nor the impact of its own SS-20/RSD-10 deployment, which continued apace.
In general, the decision to withdraw from the talks was taken on the spur of the moment, even though that had occurred months in advance of the actual pullout. A serious analysis of its possible implications for the Soviet Union itself was absent. In particular, no specific follow-on steps in the sphere of arms control were foreseen, and no conditions for a resumption of the talks were discussed. The Soviet position was at its least flexible: it was all or nothing.
The USSR suspended the talks without a clear understanding of how they might be resumed. Statements were made to the effect that the Soviet Union considered it impossible to continue the talks while the deployment of American missiles in Europe was on-going. As for the resumption of the talks, at a certain point in time it became clear to the Soviet Union that the pressure tactic, which seemed so promising in 1983, had been exhausted, and that a more realistic course was required.