We discussed atlantic-community.org's two memos on increasing transatlantic cooperation regarding Iran's nuclear program in our international relations seminar at New York University's Center for Global Affairs: "Engaging Tehran with Concrete Reciprocity" and "Consistent Regime-Change Policy in Iran"
After a Skype conference call with Joerg Wolf and the authors of the second memo, we would like stress in our response to the memos the importance of identifying common interests with Iran despite the difficulties posed for each side given the respective leaders in Tehran and Washington. The stalemate with Iran on the nuclear issue demonstrates the limits of an isolationist policy, particularly for the United States given its interests in the Middle East. Isolation and regime change are not viable options in the present or future when considering the dynamics in the Middle East region.
P5 + 1 sanctions specifically aimed to influence the strong position of the Revolutionary Guards are, by most accounts, having an impact. More than a billion dollars a day in revenue is being lost to the Iranians. We do consider that ordinary Iranians, particularly the majority of its population that is under 30, are being hurt. Since the 2009 election, the population has suffered much already at the hands of the regime in Tehran. Many Iranians are not likely to blame UN sanctions for the economic conditions they face. As the sanctions continue, we aim to assess their impact on factions within the Revolutionary Guards. These factions, which impact on the regime from inside, include the older generation of the Guards, which is opposed to violence against the populace in the post-2009 era, and the newer generation that is supported increasingly by the present government. If and when change is to come, it is the factions within Iran's elite, coupled with the youth bulge in a country noted for its highly intelligent and tech savvy populace, that will bring about a transformation on its own terms within Iran’s borders. The Obama Administration has set a tone to engage with Iran when conditions allow this to occur. The support of regime change by the West through cooperation with the Iranian diaspora in different parts of the world is not likely to succeed given the leadership vacuum in Iran's opposition movement at present. It is also dangerous for the millions still living in Iran, many of whom residing in rural areas continue to support the present regime after the 2009 elections.
Where does this complex situation within Iran leave the nuclear diplomacy of the P5+ 1 as we think about engagement with concrete reciprocity? The ball is clearly very much in Iran's court to demonstrate its interest to engage concretely on the nuclear dossier. Iran’s strategy of ‘playing for time’ in the negotiations leads us to weigh carefully and agree with the proposal of our NYU colleague, Dr. Alon Ben-Meir, to set a timetable in nuclear diplomacy of several months. A direct bilateral relationship between the US and Iran is necessary on a broad array of issues in the Middle East, particularly in those areas of immediate security concern, Afghanistan and Iraq. The US-Iran relationship can be defined across a spectrum of issues that are in each country’s interest, of which the nuclear agenda is one important component. The current domestic political context in Washington complicates the diplomatic agenda. Any substantial change or improvement in US relations with Iran's present regime will require bi-partisan support from Republicans and Democrats alike. Challenges to ratify the START Treaty with Russia illustrate the necessity and the difficulty to achieve bi-partisan support on a critical issue of US foreign policy.
The need to work with allies to address Iran’s nuclear technology program raises concerns in the learning community about the importance of EUrope’s relations with Turkey. The idea that Turkey ‘is lost’ to EUrope is refuted in favor of an emphasis on the opportunities different member states have to offer Turkey concrete prospects to join the Union in the future. P5 + 1 initiatives to maintain Turkish engagement with Brazil in nuclear diplomacy with Iran are viewed as positive along the lines analyzed by our colleague Dr. Sebnem Udum. Turkish EU membership is a sensitive issue owing to the growing Muslim presence within Union member states, which is likely to increase in the next generation, and as EU enlargement proceeds to include Muslim countries in the Western Balkans. In terms of E3 foreign policy toward Iran, however, the necessity to keep both Turkey and Russia on board to address Europe’s security concerns is imperative. Here Iran and Russia have the energy trump card to play as the transatlantic relationship is defined more in terms of specific issues, particularly energy security. As the Union engages in Asia post-Lisbon, the Iran dossier pushes EUrope to keep the Chinese on board as P5 +1 sanctions are implemented. This diplomacy is crucial given China’s growing trade relations with Iran. The Union is just as likely to weigh options in its evolving relations with India in view of developments in the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) Peace Pipeline to deliver natural gas, which over time will transform relations in a region critical to EUrope’s security concerns.
Prof. Colette Mazzucelli and the members of the International Relations Learning Community, Center for Global Affairs at New York University.
Dr. Colette Mazzucelli is Adjunct Associate Professor in the Center for Global Affairs at New York University and in the Department of Political Science at Hofstra University and also a WFI Fellow at Citizens for Global Solutions.