Anatomy of a Failed Occupation: The U.S. Army in the Former Confederate States, 1865-1877
by Louis A. DiMarco (Land Warfare Paper No. 66W, November 2007)
Discusses post-Civil War Reconstruction, its mismanagement and the resulting failure or subversion of most of its strategic political objectives. After the war, the Confederate capital and most of its major cities were under U.S. control, but a vicious insurgency, shrewd political maneuvering, partisan domestic politics, insufficient resources and a lack of political, military and popular will resulted in the failure of U.S. postwar policy. Today's Army must learn from the lessons of this occupation; if the Army is to win the nation's wars, it must have a robust post-conflict capability.
Confrontation at Anacostia Flats: The Bonus Army of 1932
by Kendall D. Gott (Land Warfare Paper No. 63W, April 2007)
Describes the Bonus Expeditionary Force's march on Washington, D.C., and the government's efforts to control the disgruntled veterans swarming the city. These veterans of World War I were demanding that Congress pay early the bonus for their military service that was scheduled for disbursement in 1945. The men refused to disperse, and the frustrated Hoover administration finally cleared the capital of the protesters with federal troops. Although the Bonus March occurred more than 70 years ago, the story yields relevant points for today’s leaders. Given the current global environment, employment of American forces in homeland security operations, in civil disturbances or in response to natural or man-made calamities is a probability that the government will face in the foreseeable future. Learning lessons from the Bonus March may well prevent another disaster.
Military Intervention in Iran: Why and How
by Stephen Blanchette, Jr. (Land Warfare Paper No. 62W, March 2007)
Discusses the current conflict the United States faces with Iran's nuclear enrichment program, a crisis that is making many nations nervous. Israel and the United States have strong motives to strike unilaterally against Iran's nuclear facilities, but unilateral action presents many risks while offering less than certain outcomes. This Land Warfare Paper argues that multinational military intervention will be required to resolve the situation. Military intervention has its limits; such actions would be difficult, says the author, but preferable to nonmilitary alternatives that are likely to fall short of U.S. goals.
The Texas Militia: National and Local Implications
(Land Warfare Paper No. 61W, January 2007)
Examines the origins of the Texas Militia as a National Guard unit to better understand the National Guard's federal and state roles in current operations. Historically, the question was how could we raise a large force on short notice to defend the country while adapting to the traditional opposition to a large standing army? Today, the opposition has long since disappeared, but a major element of the ongoing debate over U.S. military policy is the balance among regular, National Guard and Reserve troops and how best to use them. Both the need to plan for a future that can never be fully predictable and the need to have a military able to meet expected and unexpected realities and challenges existed in the 19th century when the Texas militia was established, and those issues are still with us in the 21st century.
Conceptual Underpinnings of the Air Assault Concept: The Hogaboom, Rogers and Howze Boards
(Land Warfare Paper No. 60W, December 2006)
This paper assesses the boards used by the Army and Marine Corps in the development of air assault forces between the Korean War and July 1965. First, it discusses the strategic environment and how the services were influenced by it. Second, it briefly outlines the growth of the air assault concept after the Korean War. Third is a series of discussions on the boards used by the services; an outline of the force structure and an analysis of the boards as potential models of transformation are also presented. Finally, an analysis of the applicable theories and the strategic implications of air assault forces and their long-term efficacy concludes the paper.
No Defense Appropriations Bill--What That Means for the Soldier and the Army
(Defense Report 06-2, PDF, August 2006)
Briefly summarizes the stalemate in Congress over the Defense budget and analyzes some of the reasons for the pause in progress. The Senate began its traditional late-summer recess on 4 August 2006 without passing the Fiscal Year 2007 Defense Appropriations bill. If the budget is not signed into law by 1 October 2006, the military will again have to operate under a continuing resolution, which provides funding at the same level as the previous fiscal year's budget, without allowance for new requirements or new contracts.
Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky: Practitioner and Theorist of War
(Land Warfare Paper No. 56W, August 2006)
Examines Tukhachevsky’s life on a personal level, as a practitioner of war and as a military theorist, revealing an officer who was able to practice and convey in writing an uncanny conceptualization and prescient vision of modern warfare at the tactical, strategic and operational levels. His military prowess and writings on warfare significantly affected the Soviet military in the interwar years, Soviet operations on the Eastern Front versus the Germans, and the development of operational thinking for the remainder of the 20th century and well beyond the borders of the Soviet Union. Tukhachevsky’s displayed military prowess in his writing on warfare and in practice merit him significant recognition for his contribution to the understanding, conceptualization and vision of Soviet warfare and all levels of modern warfare in the 20th century.
The Fall of France and the Summer of 1940
by Thomas D. Morgan (Land Warfare Paper 55W, April 2006)
"The Fall of France and the Summer of 1940" briefly describes the fateful summer of 1940 that saw Germany victorious on the continent of Europe, which established the reason for the eventual Allied Liberation of France in 1944.
Over By Christmas: Campaigning, Delusions and Force Requirements
by J. B. A. Bailey (Land Warfare Paper 51W, September 2005)
Major General J. B. A. Bailey, British Army Retired, examines the evidence that over the last hundred years military establishments and their political masters have underestimated the length and costs of their campaigns and have frequently had little idea of the actual nature of their undertakings.
The Effects of Operations Other Than War-Fighting on the Participants
This keynote address from the RUSI conference in Paris June 2005 describes the complexity and lack of clear conventional military distinctions of enemy, objective and missions that affect the "outside" military forces deployed for duty in foreign and dangerous locations.
Future Combat Systems: Taking the Current Force into the Future
(Background Brief 103W, June 2005)
Examines the Army's primary initiative to reduce or eliminate capability gaps in the Future Force. FCS, the centerpiece of DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel and facilities) solutions for the Future Force, is tied directly to achieving concepts and capabilities to meet the needs of the future Joint Force.
Improving Tactical PSYOP Video Dissemination in Media-Austere Operating Environments
by Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Tulák (Land Warfare Paper 50W, January 2005)
Examines the importance to psychological operations of modern and versatile tactical video dissemination that complements tactical operations and adheres to force-protection constraints to bring video products directly to the target audience.
Nonlinear, Noncontiguous Operations and the Control of Indirect Fires and Close Air Support
By Donald F. Wilkins (Landpower Essay 04-8W, December 2004)
Examines the Joint Observer Controller (JOC), a proposed system using an integrated design comprising readily available technologies to simplify and improve observation and control of indirect fires (IF) and close air support (CAS), making joint fires available to small units and logistics units.
TTHS is Not a Four-Letter Word
By Major Scott T. Nestler (Landpower Essay 04-7W, November 2004)
The author expresses the opinion that while TTHS is often viewed in a negative light and seen as the reason the Army cannot have more units in the force structure, it may be more appropriate to consider TTHS as the investment required for the Army to have trained and educated leaders and Soldiers ready and available to perform their missions.
Special Operators: A Key Ingredient for Successful Peacekeeping Operations Management
By Joseph L. Homza (Landpower Essay 04-6W, October 2004)
Author presents MOMEP as an example of a regional mutlinational peacekeeping effort, conducted by conventional forces from various nations with influence and guidance from U.S. special operations forces, that succeeded without reliance upon the United Nations.
Army Reserve Expeditionary Forces
By Mark Gerner (Landpower Essay 04-5W, September 2004)
As the U.S. Army moves toward an "expeditionary mind-set," the author describes a concept and method, originally proposed within the Army Reserve, to organize the force into modular capabilities operating in a predictable pattern of employment and help develop a sustainable force.
Suicide Bombings in Operation Iraqi Freedom
By Dr. Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan (Land Warfare Paper 46W, September 2004)
The authors' research details about the historical and strategic context of this form of warfare, how it has affected coalition forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom and how the U.S. Army needs to adapt to the enemy’s continuing use of suicide attacks in the future.