Soviet National Strategy AUTHOR Major Royce D. Zant, USMC CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - General EXECUTIVE SUMMARY SOVIET NATIONAL STRATEGY The Soviet Union is a country vast in size and diverse in its population. While this is a country where the people have a history of autocratic rule, centralized bureaucracy, it is also a country where Soviet national and strategic policy is undeniably offensive to the point of being preemptive in nature, and where this policy has been developed by less than six percent of the population. All the major powers felt compelled in 1914 to go on the offense but by 1917 the tyranny of the offense, which often led to disaster, was reverberating throughout the international community. Defensive preparation and war of position were thought by many to have won the war. Despite this acceptance the Communist did not follow this, as a matter of fact Marxism as a dynamic theory, saw defense only as a temporary condition until the offense could be seized. In 1917 when Lenin established the communist regime, he did not feel the communist would play a decisive role in the coming world order.Instead he looked at it as an essential link for strengthening the revolutionary movement in other countries. After the death of Lenin, Stalin's foreign policy concentrated on the public pursuit of peace and the undercover development of the Communist international conspiracy.This was designed to lull the west during a period in which the Soviet state considered itself vulnerable. It was also during this period that Stalin applied inside the party the terror policies that lenin applied outside. Deception and surprise have always been an integral part of Soviet military strategy.Yet it was not until after World War II that this became central themes in their doctrine. Afghanistan in 1979 and Poland in 1981 are examples of the degree to which surprise is valued. After the death of Stalin in 1953, a previously unknown emerged as the new party leader, Nikita Khrushchev was a volatile leader who was active in in the area of communist theory. Probably his greatest impact on the development of relations with the west, was his doctrine that war was no longer inevitable with the capitalist society. During the 1970's, the Soviets realized there existed a coalition of nuclear parity and recognized neither strategic nor conventional forces were by themselves decisive but had to be used in concert to have maximum effectiveness. This combined arms doctrine shows that the offense is still the preferred method of waging warfare. The 1980's have been turbulent years for the Soviet Union and the West.Since coming to power in March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev has attempted to refine certain aspects of Soviet military doctrine. He continues to emphasize a reduction in both conventional and nuclear forces that will ensure a continued declining "balance of reasonable sufficiency". Make no mistake, while the leadership may advocate a reduction in the size of their conventional and nuclear forces, their ultimate desire to dominate and convert the world to Communism is as strong as ever. SOVIET NATIONAL STRATEGY OUTLINE Thesis: This is a country where Soviet national and strategic policy is undeniably offensive, offensive to the point of being preemptive in nature, and where this policy has been developed by less than six percent of the population. I. Introduction: A. Marx and Engels influence on military strategy: B. Marxist-Leninist ideology: C. Defensive verses offensive operations during World War I: II. Post World War I to 1945: A. The influence of Lenin on todays leaders: B. Lenin's policy of peaceful coexsistence: C. Stalin's foreign policy: D. Stalin, Hitler and World War II: III. Post World War II: A. Krushchev's role in the making of Soviet policy: B. The emergence of the term" coexistence C. The arms race starts : IV. 1964 to Gorbachev: A. Nuclear vs. conventional forces: B. Nuclear pariity: C. The incorporation of defensive operations into offensive strategy: V. The Gorbachev era: A. The phrase "reasonable sufficiency" is termed: B. Spending on the Soviet Military has increased by as much as 3% a year: C. Gorbachev recognizes a need for true arms reductions: SOVIET NATIONAL STRATEGY Soviet National Strategy is a complex topic. To begin to understand how it is derived or what motivates the development of the policy, you have to understand the culture, politics, ideology, history and military capabilities of the country. Military capabilities have been included because the soviet economic system and military hierarchy are so interconnected that failure of one could conceivably lead to the failure of the other. The Soviet Union is a country vast in size and diverse in its population. This is a country where the Russian people have a history of autocratic rule, centralized bureaucracy,and control by intimidation.1 This is also a country where Soviet national and strategic policy is undeniably offensive, offensive to the point of being preemptive in nature, and where this policy has been developed by less than six percent of the population.2 Because of this tight regimented political and social system, the Russian people have been unable to assimilate basic western concepts such as constitutionalism, democratic rule, rights of the individual, and the concept of a free entrepreneurial market.3 They are a people who take great pride in what they believe to be a vastly superior political and economic system, but are at times prone to feel inferior because of the Western worlds unwillingness to accept them as full and equal partners in world affairs.4 When the communist seized power in October 1917, there was no doubt in their minds that war, revolution, politics and society were inseparable.5 This can be directly attributable to the writings of Marx and Engels who early in their careers wrote for the publication Neue Rheinische Zeitung about the inseparability of foreign policy, war and internal affairs.6 Basic misconceptions regarding the teachings and writings of Marx and Engels have played an important role in the lack of attention to their military concerns. Many people feel the concepts of military strategy and tactics were alien to Marx and Engels whose declared policy was one of enmity toward the military machine, the military caste, and the military state. In fact Marx and Engels gave unremitting attention to tactical problems and military considerations in their writings. Marx and Engels can rightly be classed among the ancestors of modern total war.7 Marxist-Leninist ideology teaches that the Soviets are engaged in a long term struggle between two basically different political, economic, and social systems. As a result, the Soviet Union has been able to justify their expansionist policies over the past three centuries by asserting that the Russian people have had a long and painful history of repeated invasion and occupation. As a result of this repeated invasion and occupation most of Russia's wars have been primarily of a defensive nature against other European powers on Russian territory. Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 and the German-Russian confrontation of 1914-18 and 1941-45 are the best examples. During these three wars the Soviet strategy has been to take advantage of her vast land area and austere weather conditions, slowly immobilize the invaders and then drive them out of the country, thereby transforming a defensive operation into that of an offensive one 8. In 1914 all major powers favored or felt compelled to go on the offense. The experiences of the First World War, in which the tyranny of the offensive had led to disaster, was by 1917 reverberating throughout the international military community. Defensive preparation and war of position were thought by many to have won the war. In spite of this thinking, the notion of "defensive" operations was foreign to communist thinkers; Marxism as a dynamic theory of historical progress saw defense only as a temporary condition until the offensive could be seized 9. Trotsky on the other hand, who was at the time, the People's Commissar for War, found worship of the offense repugnant, having drawn his conclusions from the world war as well as being influenced by such former imperial officers as Tukhachevsky, Shaposhnikov, and his close confident A. A. Svechin.10 While this debate survived Trotsky, a version of this unresolved dichotomy still lingers in Soviet thought today. Soviet political doctrine is explicitly defensive, but Soviet military strategy is undeniably offensive, even preemptive in character. There is a peculiar wedding of a defensive political doctrine and an offensive military strategy that would seek to gain the upper hand by initiating attack 11. This was a period when the Soviet leadership took great pride in a political and economic system in which they believed was vastly superior to the western system. The Soviet regime claims to be the instrument of a necessary historical and social development. The Soviet Union regards itself as the accelerator of the evolution of mankind towards socialism and communism. The official Soviet Textbook, The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. (New York: International Pub. 1939) states: The power of the Marxist-Leninist theory lies in the fact that it enables the party to find the right orientation in any situation, to understand the inner connection of current events, to foresee their course and to perceive not only how and in what direction they are developing in the present, but how and in what direction they are bound to develop in the future.12 As can be seen by the preceding, Marxist-Leninist doctrine has always had a profound influence on Soviet policies. Lenin did not believe the Soviet regime, when established in 1917, would play a decisive role in the coming world order 13. Instead, he looked at it as an essential link for strengthening the revolutionary movement in the countries of the west and the east,an essential link if victory for the working people of the world over capitalism was to be realized. It is apparent that through the years and up to his death he formulated many opinions and policies that continue to have a profound influence on todays leaders. Lenin never regarded the Republic of Soviets as an end in itself. He always looked on it as an essential link for strengthening the revolutionary movement in the countries of the West and the East, an essential link for facilitating the victory of the world over capitalism 14. During the leadership of Lenin, the new Soviet regime developed and propagandized the idea that dedication and hard work for the regime were essential from all Soviet citizens. This was because the Soviets felt they were in constant danger of attack from the malevolent capitalist world. "Capitalist encirclement" as it was termed was embodied in the new Soviet Constitution of December 30,1922 15. According to Lenin, Utopianism makes the Soviet regime appear to be always right; only evil forces oppose it, and these must be destroyed as soon as the power conditions make it possible. He believed the world was divided into two camps. The camp of the angels or the leaders of the Soviet Union and the camp of the devils or those not associated with the Soviet Union 16. Probably one of Lenins boldest strokes and proof of his power of foresight and capacity for clear thinking, was his insistence of the German terms at the signing of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk during March 1918 14.This treaty in the short term cost the Soviet Union 1.3 million square miles of territory and included the Baltic States, the Ukraine, and the Transcaucasion states.17 This treaty effectively got Russia out of the war and cleared the way for the ultimate communist victory in the revolution. The left-communist, as Lenin referred to them, rejected the humiliating conditions of the treaty, Lenin in order to justify the acceptance of the Brest-Litovsk treaty said "So long as we remain weaker than the rest of the capitalist world so long as we shall keep to that rule: we must know how to exploit the contradictions and antagonisms among the capitalists." 18 While Lenin as a result of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, had a policy of peaceful coexistence, Stalin on the other hand argued that the Soviet Union had no choice but to become as strong as possible, arm, and await the next war. Feeling that Lenin's peaceful coexistence policy had left the Soviet Union weak and resulted in needless suffering,Stalin declared, "The Soviet Union must never be toothless and groveling before the west again." 19 To ensure the Soviet Union as a whole country was prepared for total and decisive war, Stalin in 1926, adapted the rationale originally put forth by M.V. Frunze in 1920 of, "socialism in one country". With the approval of Stalin the military began to advocate the mobilization of the entire economy to support the military and its role of diplomacy in positioning the Red Army for military success.20 It is this thought, as it evolved from the uncertain days of 1917 to the victory over Germany in 1945, that is the basis on which Soviet military power is built. After the death of Lenin, Stalin's foreign policy concentrated on the public pursuit of peace and the undercover development of the Communist international conspiracy. This public pursuit of peace was designed to lull the west during a period in which the Soviet state considered itself especially vulnerable.21 During a meeting of the 18th Party Congress Stalin gave the following clear and explicit report which is based upon Lenin's foreign policy of the Soviet Union: 1. We stand for peace and the strengthening of business relations with all countries, that is our position; and we shall adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass on the interests of our country. 2. We stand for peaceful,close and friendly relations with all the neighboring countries. 3. We stand for the support of nations which are the victims of aggression. 4. We are not afraid of threats of aggressors and are ready to deal two blows for every blow delivered by instigators of war who attempt to violate Soviet borders.22 Many people believe there were substantial differences between Lenin and Stalin. Unfortunately, nothing could be further from the truth. Both were totally committed to the revolution, and both used every means available in order to accomplish their goals. Lenin has been portrayed as the loving, kind father of the Soviet regime while Stalin has been portrayed as the ruthless, tyrannical, totalitarian leader.In fact both men were ruthless and tyrannical. What distinguishes Stalin from Lenin is the fact that Stalin, after some initial hesitation, applied inside the party the terror policies which Lenin applied outside the party.23 In spite of or perhaps because of the ruthless way Stalin dealt with his people, Soviet life transformed significantly in two ways relative to the west, they are a vast program of industrialization aimed at matching and exceeding the accomplishments of the western societies, and the development of a Soviet foreign policy which culminated in World War II.24 By 1939 Stalin had grown fearful of the growing power of Hitler. Realizing that the western powers were reluctant to halt Hitler's expansionist dreams, Stalin decided to remove himself from involvement, at least in the early stages,in any future war. In August 1939, Stalin signed the Nazi-Soviet pact, which ensured Stalin that Hitler's war would be with the west. At the time the Soviet leadership preferred a pact with Hitler to an alliance with the western powers for many reasons, but in large part because the pact allowed the Soviets to recover those territories lost as a result of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Stalin felt that any treaty with the western powers would make the recovery of this territory extremely difficult if not impossible.25 When war with the Axis powers erupted in December 1940, Stalin observed an apparent return to a traditional Russian patriotism by the people. Stalin was able to use this love of the motherland to defeat the Germans at Stalingrad and later at Kursk.By the end of the war he also saw the party was in danger of being pushed into the background and in true Stalin fashion counterbalanced any further decline of the parties power, by a general tightening of party control over Soviet life.26 From the Tsars to the Bolsheviks, deception and surprise have always been an integral part of Soviet military strategy. Yet it was not until after World War II that this strategic surprise and deception became central themes in Soviet military doctrine. The Soviet Union learned the value of surprise and deception from the German Blitzkrieg Strategy, particularly the German attack on the Soviet Union of 22 June 1941, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the British practice of Stratagem during World War II. The direct Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, Afghanistan in 1979, as well as the direct intervention in Poland in 1981, are examples of the degree to which surprise is valued by Soviet leaders.27 With the death of Stalin in 1953, a new and somewhat flamboyant leader, at least as Soviet leaders go, emerged. Nikita Khrushchev as the new party leader, was a volatile individual who up until now, had been underrated by the party and virtually unknown to western leaders. Active in the area of Communist theory, Khrushchev, in a speech given February 1956 to the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, attacked the "cult of personality" which had developed around Stalin.28 Not surprisingly this had tremendous repercussions among the Communist parties of the west as well as the world. Probably the greatest impact he had on the development of relations with the west came in his doctrines that war was no longer inevitable with the capitalist society, and that "coexistence" was possible between "societies of varying social systems." Khrushchev maintained that these views were possible because the world socialist camp controlled sufficient world power to deter any capitalist war, and that economic warfare was now the weapon for capitalist defeat.29 Despite these statements, the arms race between the two superpowers started during this period and can be directly attributed to the continued Soviet military and political thinking that stipulates Soviet military strategy aims to prepare for war in order to defend the achievements of the workers and crush aggressors.This is unlike the strategy of the imperialist west which is directed toward preparing for war as a means of solving international problems.30 Until late in 1964 when Khrushchev was removed from power, the Soviet leadership acknowledged and expected the next war, if in fact there was one, would begin with a nuclear exchange. This exchange would be followed by the use of conventional forces that would be used to exploit the early success of nuclear strikes and would seize and hold enemy territory.31 The mid 1960's brought statement form the Soviets that discussed the growing possibility of brief conventional phases of what is now referred to as low intensity conflict. It is during this period that the West saw a wide ranging modernization of Soviet conventional forces as well as a continued build up of nuclear forces. This assured the Soviet leadership that they had the ability to fight on either a conventional of nuclear battlefield. During the 1970's the Soviets realized there existed a coalition of nuclear parity and considered that the next conflict would be conventional with the possibility of it escalating to the nuclear level to be extremely remote.32 The primary reason for the shift in this thinking was mainly due to a rapid increase in the sophistication in the conventional forces of both sides. Soviet military doctrine recognized that neither strategic nor conventional forces are by themselves decisive, but that they can only achieve their maximum effectiveness in concert. This combined-arms doctrine has pervaded Soviet thinking which reveals that the offense is still the preferred method of waging warfare. Surprise, the offensive and the acceptance of necessary preemption form the doctrine that is contradictory with current soviet political statements that they would use weapons (especially nuclear) only in response to provocation.33 The 1980's have been both turbulent and fruitful years for the soviet Union and the West. During this period the Soviet military, despite their hidden feelings about defense, have felt compelled to incorporate defensive operations into offensive strategy. This is due to NATO's offensive concepts of Follow-on-Forces Attack, and AirLand Battle combined with the improvement of NATO's conventional forces.34 While they have publicly stated that they are a defensive people, the Soviet leadership has realized that short term defensive operations would have to be fought prior to commencing the offense, which has always been their primary strategy. Since coming to power in March of 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev has attempted to further refine certain aspects of Soviet military doctrine. During his 27th party congress speech in February 1986, he phrased, without any real explanation the concept of "reasonable sufficiency".35 As evidenced by the signing of the recent INF treaty, Gorbachev continues to emphasize a reduction in both conventional and nuclear forces that will ensure a continued declining "balance of reasonable sufficiency".36 There is not, at least at the present, any real justification to believe that the term "reasonable sufficiency" means the backing away or detour of the offensive minded Soviet leadership. In fact the term "sufficiency" as defined, at least on the surface, by the military leadership determines the extent of the threat from the western powers. It also appears that any reduction of Soviet military effort and military forces would occur only when an East-West negotiated agreement occurred. Gorbachev and the leaders of the Warsaw pact have no misguided illusions that the powerbase and superpower status they enjoy, is derived from its military power. If anything the Soviet Union has continued on a commitment to modernize its conventional and nuclear forces. This commitment has been verified, at least in part, by General John Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. During a speech to parliamentarians from NATO and in a essay in the Washington Quarterly, he acknowledges that Gorbachev has initiated significant domestic changes but adds "is external policy really changing?"37 Galvin has noted that despite the rhetoric about how the shift from offensive strategy to defensive strategy is taking place, the Soviets have not really changed. Spending on the Soviet military has not experienced any reduction at all. In fact, the military expenditures continue to run between 15 and 17 percent of the Gross National Product and has been estimated that over the last several years, spending has increased by as much as 3 percent a year.38 He has backed up his statement by detailing how armaments production has remained virtually unchanged since Gorbachev came to power, the Soviets under Gorbachev have or are producing 700 combat aircraft per year, launching a nuclear submarine every 37 days and are producing 280 tanks a month.39 Gorbachev perhaps recognizing that the will of the people has dictated a profound renewal of their entire Socialist system and acknowledging that a one sided reliance on military power ultimately weakens other components of national security, has promised to cut back the military. During a historic speech to the United Nations General Assembly on December 7, 1988, he said the cuts would be made to reorganize the forces currently in Eastern Europe and that these cuts would transform these troops from the offensive to the defensive mode. He further stated that "their structure will be different from what it is now, and that after a major cut back of tanks their purpose will become clearly defensive".40 While many continue to question this move, Michael McGuin, an analyst of Soviet national security policy for the Brookings Institute said "this is the color of their money and they are going to stop preparing for world war, these unilateral cuts are a first step.41 What is not being said is that while these cuts are in fact real, they are for the most part, old and technologically inferior weapons systems. A lot can be said about what is or is not Soviet strategy. Soviet strategy is that strategy which will strengthen the present system both militarily and economically. We have been witness to this by a military build-up of vast proportions which has taken place over the years and by the route Gorbachev has embarked on with his Glasnot which is intended to give publicity to problems and Perestroika which is designed to rebuild a stagnate economy. Much has been reported in recent weeks about Gorbachev losing political stature and power within the hierarchy of the party and with the people. This is due primarily to the continued economic problems and the recent policy of military reductions in Western Europe. Despite these problems the Soviet military may be supporting these reforms because they will strengthen the military and enhance defense modernization in the long run. These powerful Generals have stated that the technologies that contribute to overall "scientific-technical progress" will also contribute to "military-technical progress", the end result is a Soviet state that is stronger than the West.42 Gorbachev will also preserve the rule by whatever means are available. The results of this has been a replacement of the old hardliners with younger men who follow his way of thinking. While Gorbachev and the leadership will avoid war unless it is to their advantage to initiate, they also strive to maintain a strong dominance over their Communist and non-Communist neighbors in order to extend their influence world wide. Make no mistake, while the leadership may advocate a reduction in the size of their conventional and nuclear forces, their ultimate desire to dominate and convert the world to Communism is as strong as ever. FOOTNOTES 1Soviet Military Power (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,1988), P.8. 2W. J. Manthrope, A Background for Understanding Soviet Strategy N.P., N.D. 3Soviet Military Power (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), p.8. 4Ibid. p.8. 5P. Paret, ed., Makers Modern of Strategy (Princeton: University Press Princeton, 1986), p.648. 6Ibid. p.264. 7Ibid. pp.262-263. 8G. E. Thibault, ed., The Art and Practice of Military Strategy ( Washington D.C.: National Defence University, 1984), p.737. 9P. Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton: University Press Princeton, 1986), p.657. 10Ibid. p.657 11Ibid. pp.657-658 12W. Gurian, ed.,The Soviet Union, Background, Ideology, Reality (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1951), p.1. 13W. Gurian, ed., Soviet Imperialism, Its_Origins and Tactics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1953), p.6. 14W. G. Andrews, ed., Soviet Institutions and Policies, Inside Views (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc., 1966), p.65 15L. J. Oliva, ed., Russia and the West from Peter to Khrushchev ( Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1965), p.185 16W. Gurian, ed., Soviet Imperialism, its Origins and Tactics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1953), pp.4-5. 17M. T. Florinsky, Russia, A History and an Interpretation (New York: The Macmillian Co., 1953), p.1473. 18W. Gurian, ed., Soviet Imperialism, its Origins and Tactics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1953), p.6. 19P. Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton: University Press Princeton, 1986), p.661. 20Ibid. p.661. 21L. J. Oliva, ed., Russia and the West, From Peter to Khrushchev (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1965), p.195. 22J. Stalin, Leninism, Selected Writings (New York: International Publishers, 1942), p.443. 23W. Gurian, ed., The Soviet Union. Brackground, Ideology, Reality (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1951), pp.5-7. 24L. J. Oliva, ed., Russia and the West, from Peter to Khrushchev (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1965), p.195. 25W. Gurian, ed., Soviet Imperialism, Its origins and Tactics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1953), p.30. 26W. Gurian, ed., The Soviet Union, Background, Ideaology, Reality (Notre Dame: Universtiy of Notre Dame, 1951), p.10. 27G. E. Thibault, ed., The Art and Practice of Military Strategy (Washington D.C.: National Defence University, 1984), p.748. 28L. J. Oliva, ed., Russia and the West, from Peter to Krushchev (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1965), p.258. 29Ibid. p.258. 30W. G. Andrews, ed., Soviet Institutions and Policies, inside Views (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc., 1966), p.403. 31Soviet Military Power (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), p.11. 32Ibid. p.11. 33Ibid. pp.11-12. 34Ibid. p.12. 35Ibid. p.12. 36Ibid. p.8. 37George F. Will, Real Iron From the USSR,The Washington Post, December 4, 1988. 38Defense 89, January/February (Government Printing Office, 1989), p11. 39George F. Will, Real Iron from the USSR, The Washington Post, December 4, 1988. 40Margaret Roth, Soviet Troop Cuts Could Vastly Change East-West Relations, the Navy Times, December 19,1988, p.14. 41Ibid. p.14. 42Defense 89, January/February (Government Printing Office, 1989), p.11. BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS Andrews, W.G. (ed.). Soviet Institutions and Policies, inside views. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc., 1966. Florinsky, M.T. Russia, A History and an Interpretation. New York: The Macmillan Company,1953 Gurian, W. (ed.). Soviet Imperialism, its origins and tactics. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1953. Gurian, W. (ed.). The Soviet Union, Background, Ideology, Reality. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1951. Oliva, L.J. (ed.). Russia and the West, from Peter to Khrushchev. Boston:D.C, Heath and Company, 1965. Paret, P. (ed.). Makers of Modern Strategy. Princeton: Universtiy Press Princeton, 1986. Stalin, J. Leninism Selected Writings. New York: International Publishers, 1942. Thibault, G.E. (ed.). The Art and Practice of Military Strategy. Washington,D.C.: National Defense University, 1984. Wheeler-Bennet, J. W. Brest-Litovsk, the Forgotten War. New York: W.W. Norton and Company Inc., 1938. NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS Lehman, R.F. Defense 89,January/February. Government Printing Office, 1989. Evens, Robert. Soviet ideology signals change, The Washington Post, October 6, 1988, Section A, p.1. Middleton,Drew.Taming the Soviets will not be an easy task, The Army Times, January 30,1989, p. 27. Oberdorfer, Don. Military resisted_cuts,Soviet official says, The Washington Post, March 11, 1989. Roth, Margaret.Soviet troop cuts could vastly change East-West relations, The Navy Times, December 19, 1988, p. 14. Summers, Harry.Beware of coy Russians bearing suspicious gifts,The Army Times, January 30,1989, p. 27 U.S. Department of Defense. Soviet Military Power, an Assessment of the Threat,1988. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1988. Will, George F.Real Iron From the U.S.S.R, The Washington Post, December 4, 1988.
|Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list|