The GATT and gradualism
Zissimos, B., 2007. The GATT and gradualism. Journal of International Economics, 71 (2), pp. 410-33.
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This paper shows how the institutional rules imposed on its signatories by the GATT created a strategic incentive for countries to liberalize gradually. Trade liberalization must be gradual, and free trade can never be achieved, if punishment for deviation from an agreement is limited to a 'withdrawal of equivalent concessions' and if initial deviation from an agreement is also limited. The paper shows how (sufficiently patient) countries have an incentive to deviate in a limited way when operating under GATT dispute settlement procedures.
|Departments||Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Economics|
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