End of Class Question
September 26, 2013: (a) What is Theaetetus’s proposed logical analysis of Knowledge? (b) Divide the logical analysis into two parts and explain each part (i) using the word “implies”; (i) without using the word implies (Hint: Use II-P.) (3) Which part of the proposed logical analysis is the example of the impression able juror a counterexample to? (4) Explain why it is a counterexample.
Oct. 1, 2013: Explain how, on Chisholm’s account, it could be evident to me that AM(AP(W) even though I am not justified in believing that the memory is veridical.
Oct. 3, 2013: Why is it inaccurate to describe coherence theorists as epistemologists who like big circles of reasoning?
Oct. 8, 2013: A child is sitting in the garden and sees a bird fly by. Use Haack’s Foundherentist theory to explain how the child could come to be justified in believing that a bird is flying by (when it is). In your answer you must give the content of the child’s experiential C-evidence and explain how that content can help to justify the belief that a bird is flying by.
Oct. 10, 2013: Use an example to illustrate Annis’s contextualist theory of justification and in your discussion identify at least one contextually basic belief and explain why it is contextually basic.
Oct. 15, 2013: (1) All bodies are extended.
(2) All bodies have weight.
For each of (1) and (2) above, would Kant say that it is analytic a priori? If so, explain why. Would Kant say that it is synthetic a priori? If so, explain why.
Oct. 17, 2013: (a) What is BonJour’s most important agreement with Quine?
(b) What is BonJour’s most important disagreement with Quine?
Oct. 22, 2013: A Priori Quiz
Oct. 24, 2013: Midterm Vote
Oct. 29, 2013: Midterm Exam
October 31, 2013: Use examples to explain World-to-Belief reliability and Belief-to-World reliability.
November 5, 2013: Use examples to explain the difference between unconditional and conditional Belief-to-World reliability. [Hint: In your answer, you must use the distinction between belief independent and belief dependent cognitive processes.]
Nov. 7, 2013: (1) Explain why, if access internalism is true, we should be able to distinguish, on reflection, between our epistemically justified and unjustified beliefs.
(2) Can you do it? If so, list five of your unjustified beliefs; if not, explain why not.
November 12, 2013: Explain Alston’s objection to Z’s claim that AIVB is necessary for knowledge. In your answer, you must show that you understand Z’s analysis of knowledge as AIVB and why the example is a counterexample to the necessity of AIVB.
November 14, 2013: Explain Zagzebski’s location in the diagram that I put on the board (her epistemology is contingent/parochial, naturalist, and has truth as the primary epistemic value.)
November 19, 2013: Why does BonJour think that naturalized epistemology is self-referentially inconsistent?
November 21, 2013: (1) There is a planet.
(2) “There is a planet” is properly assertible by me now.
How, on Brandom’s account, can we explain the difference in meaning between (1) and (2)? [In your answer, you must distinguish between assertibility conditions and truth conditions.]
November 26, 2013: Explain the illustration I used in lecture of explicit sensitivity, implicit sensitivity, and no sensitivity to objective norms of rational belief change.
December 3, 2013: Why does Haack disagree with Code/Longino [Pick one to discuss]?