The Russians sure are feeling frisky these days. For the second time in a matter of months, they are threatening pre-emptive military strikes on NATO facilities unless the U.S. agrees to cancel the deployment of components of its anti-ballistic missile defence system. Specifically, Russia fears that long-range radars and interceptor rockets located in Poland and Romania might serve to weaken its ability to bombard North America with nuclear weapons. While about 30 years behind the times, there is some small measure of method to this madness. Russia remains a great power essentially because of two things: It has petroleum that it can ship to Europe, and nuclear warheads it can fire at North America.
Not exactly the heady days of Sputnik and Yuri Gagarin, but better than nothing. And it’s no surprise that Russia feels a little insecure about its diminished stature. But threatening to start a war with NATO is no way to feel better about yourself. Not only is it counterproductive, it’s also a bluff the Russians dare not escalate into action.
Recall — the two nations that Russia is particularly cranky about are Poland and Romania. Both of those nations were subjugated after the Second World War and turned into Soviet client states, part of the grudging Eastern Bloc. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, both nations — along with many others — rushed to join NATO, both to politically distance themselves from the era of Moscow’s rule and as a guarantor that the Soviets, by any other name, wouldn’t be back. Poland joined NATO in 1999, Romania followed five years later. Both nations contributed troops to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
They are eager to be in the West, and if that means hosting NATO missiles and radars, they’re up for it. Given the history of the 20th century, they are unlikely to be cowed by Russian threats. Indeed, the more Moscow blusters about launching missiles, the closer Poland and Romania will want to be to NATO. From a strategic perspective, hosting an important component of U.S. missile defences actually becomes an advantage in such a scenario, as it would reassure Poland and Romania that the U.S. had skin in the game. America might not want to go to war with Russia to protect the notion of Polish sovereignty, but it’s not about to allow its military sites to be attacked. The military sites in eastern Europe fulfill the same strategic role as the U.S. forces along the Korean Demilitarized Zone do — as much as providing actual military might, they offer political reassurance to the local governments that the U.S. is committed to their security.
The Russians know this. They also know that the complex web of U.S. basing agreements and security guarantees, the things that allow the U.S. to function as a global superpower, would unravel if America very publicly left a major NATO ally to hang while refusing to honour its treaty commitments. Washington won’t permit that.
Yet the Russians threaten to attack, anyway, knowing that the U.S. would be forced to respond, and that in such a contest, the U.S. military has the advantages. Neither nation has nearly the weight of firepower they could have brought to bear on each other during the Cold War, but the United States Air Force and Navy is still more than capable of answering every Russian missile with one (or more) of their own. Fear of mutually assured destruction would hopefully prevent such a war from spiralling completely out of control, but even a largely symbolic exchange of missiles would be insane beyond reckoning. It would disrupt decades of improving relations, leave the economies of both Europe and Russia in chaos and, despite our best hopes, would present a risk of catastrophic escalation.
The Russians are no doubt hoping that the mere threat of such an act will convince the Americans that deploying their missiles elsewhere might be a good idea. They have likely miscalculated. The U.S. has already plainly said that Russian fears about the defence system are misplaced, and the selection of eastern Europe was a very deliberate one — it gives the U.S. the best possible chance to intercept any missile attack originating in the Middle East. The U.S. values its NATO allies, and fears rogue missile attack, far too much to submit to Russian demands. Even if those demands are backed by the unlikely threat of force.