Causality As Soteriology: An Analysis of The Central Philosophy of Buddhism
Hsueh-Li Cheng, University of Hawaii at Hilo
Journal of Chinese Philosophy Vol.9 1982
Copyright © 1982 by Dialogue Publishing Company, Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A.
| The central message of the Buddha—suffering, its origin, its cessation and the way leading to its cessation—is directly concerned with causality. Therefore, causality has been the
central issue in Buddhist thought.(1) The Buddha is reported
to have said, "He who sees the pratiityasamutpaada (causality
or dependent co-arising) sees the Dharma (Truth), and he who
sees the Dharma, sees the pratiityasamutpaada.''(2) Many
people hold that all Buddhists have accepted the principle of
causality as the objective law governing the constituents
of the universe although they have different expressions of
the meaning of the pratiityasamutpaada. Some scholars even
claim that the Buddha and his disciples believed causality is
"necesarily," "eternally," and "universally," as well as
But in fact, not all Buddhists regard causality as the objective law of the world. It is debatable that the Buddha believed in the absolute validity of the principle of causation. According to Naagaarjuna, the father of Mahaayaana Buddhism, pratiityasamutpaada is sunyataa (empty); causality is neither rationally nor empirically verificable. For the Maadhyamikas, the concept of causality as the cosmic principle or reality of all things is as untenable as the concepts of aatman and dharmas. The Buddha's use of causality is soteriological in character; his teaching of pratityasamutpaada did not aim to give a description or an explanation of the universe,but to"empty" one's attachments.
Once all illusions are cleared up, causality should be discarded. Naagaarjuna's school of thought is known as the San-lun Tsung(a) (the Three Treatises School) in China, Korea and Japan, for it is based upon three main texts; namely, (1) the Middle Treatise (Chung-lun), (2) the Twelve Gate Treatise. (Shih-erh-men-lun), and (3) the Hundred Treatise (Pai-lun). According to Chinese San-lun masters, one should study these texts together in order to gain a broad philosophical understanding of Buddhist thought.(4) But contemporary Buddhist scholars have seldom studied them together(5) and hence inadequately hold that the Maadhyamikas accept causality as the governing principle of all phenomena(6) or "the nature of reality."(7) Naagaajuna is even said to be "Hiinayaanistic" or "Abhidharmic" in asserting the validity of the chain of twelve causal conditions.(8) Other scholars claim that the Maadhyamikas "raise causality (pratiityasamutpaada) to the level of the transcendental."(9) But in fact the Maadhyamikas accept neither empirical nor transcendental justification of the principle of causality. The first thing Naagaarjuna wanted to do in the Twelve Gate Treatise was to criticize various views of causality, and the first point he wanted to make was that the chain of twelve causal conditions and all other causal relations are not justifiable. For the Madhyamikas, pratiityasamutpaada is not a metaphysical theory nor specualtion on the world. Like Emptiness and the Middle Way, it is primarily a pedagogic tool (chiao-ti); it has no intellectual validity, merely practical value, helping sentient beings rid themselves of ignorance and illusions. If any one fails to see the "empty" nature of this device, he cannot see the Buddha's Dharma.
The main purpose of this paper is to present from Chinese sources the San-lun Madhyamika treatment of the problem of causality. In what follows, I will first show how the San-lun Madhyamikas repudiate the intellectual justification of causality as the ultimate principle of the universe and clarify Nagarjuna's standpoint concerning the chain of twelve causal conditions. I will then expound the San-lun Madhyamika teaching of pratiityasamutpaada as Emptiness and the Middle Way, and reveal how they use causality as a soteriological device to refute various erroneous views. Finally, the central message of Buddhism will be briefly re-examined in the light of the Maadhyamika teaching of causality as soteriology.
The so-called pratityasamupada is traditionally given in the following formula:
Most people interpret this principle as saying:
They give ontic status to the principle, interpreting the terms "this" and "that" in the formula as referring to entities or objects which possess essential nature or self-nature. The principle of causal relation is the objective law governing the constituents of the universe. This is the onotological interpretation of causal relation, which most early scholastic Buddhists seemed to follow. For them, this principle gives "the real description" of the reality of the universe. Whatsoever exists is a cause; cause and existence are synonymous.
The notion of causation is used by Hinayana Buddhists to describe both moral and physical phenomena. The principle of causal relations shows necessary connections between various events and can be stated as a moral law and a physical law. When the principle is enunciated as a moral law, it means that there are good deeds and rewards for them; and there are bad deeds and punishments.(11) When the principle is stated as a physical law, it means that every individual fact is conditioned by or dependent on something else; pratiityasamutpaada is the causal law regulating the rise and fall of all factors or elements (dharmas).(12) There are four "external" causal conditions (wai-yin-yuuan)(13) and twelve "internal" causal conditions (nei-yin-yuuan)(14) which are usually enumerated in early Buddhist treatises. Each of these is conditioned (paticcasamuppanna) as well as conditioning (paticcasamuppaada) .(15) When viewed from the antecedent cause, each is an effect, but when viewed from the effect, each is a cause. The chain or cycle of twelve causal conditions is the true picture of the wheel of existence. The principle of causality was believed by early Buddhists to be "objectively," "necessarily," and "eternally" as well as "universally" valid.(16) But according to Nagarjuna, the thesis that pratiityasamuttpaada is the objective law governing the constituents of the world can be stated and known only from the standpoint of conventional truth. Ordinary experience seems to show that a thing or event is never found by itself alone, but always together With others which stand around it and constitute its circumstances and "causal conditions." Causality is useful in our ordinary life. However, were we to try to find out intellectually what a causal relation or a causal process actually is, we would be baffled.
Naagaarjuna argued that it is impossible to explain the relationship between a cause and an effect and to relate entities. Any view of causation leads to certain contradictions or absurdities. In his writings, he critically examined many possible relationships between cause and effect. (17) Naagaarjuna used the tetralemma as the main logical apparatus to investigate the rational explanation of causal relationships. The so-called tetralemma states that there are four possible views for every aspect of reality: (1) thesis, (2) antithesis, (3) both thesis and antithesis, and (4) neither thesis nor antithesis. If there is a causal relation among things in the universe, Naagaarjuna asked, what is that relation? Is an effect already real in a cause and then is produced by the cause? Is an effect at the outset unreal in a cause and yet is produced by the cause? Is an effect both real and unreal in a cause and then is produced by the cause? Is an effect neither real nor unreal in a cause and yet is produced by the cause?(18) By showing that all these causal relations cannot be established, Naagaarjuna argued that causal production is really impossible.
"An effect is real in a cause and then is produced by the cause," for the Maadhyamikas, this is an absurd statement. For the so-called effect is that which is caused, made or produced. But before causal making or production, there is not that which is made or produced. How can there be any effect in the cause? If the so-called effect is not that which is made, but that which is yet to be made, an effect cannot be real in a cause either, for that which is yet to be made is not yet real. How can it be real in a cause? Furthermore, if an effect is already real in a cause, why must it be produced again? It is like that which has been done does not need to be done, and that which has been achieved does not need to be achieved. Nothing new is produced and hence there cannot be a causal production in this case. If there were causal production, then there would be sons, grandsons, great-grandsons and great-great-grandsons in the womb of a mother, for effects are, in principle, already real in a cause;but this is absurd. Besides if an effect is already real in a cause, the so-called "cause" would be only a location and cannot be called a cause. It may be argued that the claim that "an effect is real in a cause and then is produced by the case" means that an effect is "potentially real" in a cause and becomes "actually real" later on. But, for the Maadhyamikas, this is unintelligible. For how can one and the same thing or entity be potential and actual in that way? If it were real in that way, it would have two opposite or different essences or natures, and hence would not be "one" and the "same" thing. Moreover, if an effect were potentially real in a cause, it should be observable, for whatever can be conceived to exist can be perceived to exist. But the effect is not perceivable before production. So the thesis that an effect is real in a cause and then is produced by the cause cannot be established.(19)
On the other hand, one cannot claim that an effect is at the outset unreal in a cause and yet is produced by the cause. Nagarjuna argued that if an effect is unreal in a cause and yet is produced by the cause, then, in principle, anything should be capable of being produced from anything else. For example, carts, horses, food and other things would be produced from strings. If "something" can be produced from "nothing," why are only rugs produced from strings? Actually, if an effect were at the outset unreal in a cause, there would be no "particular or distinct" relation between the two and hence the one would not be the "real cause" of the other.(20) Thus in Madhyamika thought, the denial of the thesis that an effect is real in a cause does not entail the validity of the antithesis that an effect is unreal in a cause. Nagarjuna's critical analysis of causality was not meant to establish any view of causation but to refute all possible views. For him, the third view that an effect is both real and unreal in a cause is also untenable. "For 'real' and 'unreal' are contradictory in nature. How can those that are contradictory in nature be together?"(21) The third view may mean that an effect is partially real and partially unreal in a cause, and hence it does not involve a contradiction.However, this viewpoint implies (1) that an effect can be real in a cause and then is produced by the cause and (2) that an effect can be unreal in a cause and yet is produced by the cause. But both (1) and (2) have already been shown to be untenable. So the third viewpoint is also unten able. According to Naagaarjuna, to say that an effect is neither real nor unreal in a cause is tantamount to accepting that there is no causal relation between the cause and the effect. If there is no causal relation, how can one be called a cause, and the other an effect? So one cannot say that an effect is neither real nor unreal in a cause.(22)
Thus Naagaarjuna refuted all possible rational explanations of causal relation and thereby showed that causal relations are empty. Since causal relations cannot be established, it makes no sense to say that all things an "causally related" and that there is a "necessary connection" between cause and effect. Naagaarjuna also argued that causality as such cannot be established. Hence it also makes no sense to assert that causation is universal and uniform. If there is a reality of casuality or an act of causal production, it must be "self-caused, " "other-caused, " "both self-caused and other-caused," or "noncaused." A thing cannot cause itself. If a thing causes itself, it is the subject and the object at the same time. But this is impossible because the subject and the object are two different things. A thing cannot be said to be caused by another either. If a thing is caused by another, it has the other as its substance. But how can they have the same substance? If they have the same substance, they are one and the same thing. The so-called other cannot be called "other." And one cannot say that a thing is both self-caused and other-caused either, for this implies that there can be the acts of self-caused production and other-caused production. But this is impossible because there can be neither self-caused nor other-caused production. For Naagaarjuna, the act of non-caused production is not possible because "a thing is caused by no cause" is a contradiction in terms and hence makes no sense. If something can come from no cause, anything can be the cause of anything else;but this is absurd. A cause is often defined or described as either a necessary condition or a sufficient condition or as both necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of an event. As pointed out, early Buddhists held that all things are conditioned by four causal conditions. The Maadhyamikas contented that these conceptual and other ontological interpretations of causation cannot be the right description of the occurrence of real events or entities in the world. They argued that it is unintelligible to hold that there are real events or entities in causal conditions, or that real events or entities are con ditioned or dependent upon something else. Naagaarjuna asked, "How is it possible for a real event or an entity which has essential nature to be something which is caused?"(23) According to him, it involves contradiction, for "to be caused" is "to be conditioned"or "to be dependent upon something else." But a real event is supposed to have a certain definite or essential nature; and a thing which has essential nature is not something which is produced, but something which is independent of other things.(24) If an entity is caused, it is something which is dependent upon something else. But this is impossible. So the causal principle cannot be the causal principle of entities or real events.
People might argue that, although causal relation or causality cannot be established on rational or logical grounds, it can be established by experience.Our past experience shows us that there is a causal relation between thing. For example, when we examine our empirical facts we see that sesame oil is always produced out of sesame, but we have never seen sesame oil produced out of sand. So our experiences justify our claim that there is a causal relation between oil and sesame, but not between oil and sand. Hence we seek oil in sesame, not in sand. But, for Naagaarjuna, the principle of causation cannot be justified even by experience. The observation of the constant conjunction of events does not justify the principle of causation. To say that we do observe is not a good answer, but rather it just begs the question. Why? If causation had been established, then one could say that since we have seen that sesame produces oil but have never seen sand produce oil, we seek oil in sesame but not in sand. However, whether there is such a thing as causation or production has not yet been established, and hence one cannot legitimately make that claim. Therefore, the example that we have seen sesame produce oil is based upon the very notion of causation which is to be established. In short, according to Naagaarjuna, any "empirical" justification of the principle of causation assumes the very principle it tries to prove.(25) One of the main reasons why Buddhists have spent so much time in discussing causality is that they want to know the nature of human life. The so-called chain of twelve causal conditions (shih-erh-yin-yuan)(h) is often given to explain the causal process of human existence. Naagaarjuna's position about the reality of the chain of twelve causal conditions is not clearly presented in the Sanskrit Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa and the Chinese Middje Treatise.(26) This has made many Madhyamika scholars perplexed about Nagarjuna's viewpoint and even led them to think that his position is Hinayanistic. For example, Kenneth K. Inada says,
It seems that the question whether Naagaarjuna's standpoint is Hinayaanistic can be solved by study of the first chapter of the Twelve Gate Treatise in which he has clearly presented his view of the chain of twelve causal conditions, and demonstrated that the chain of twelve causal conditions cannot be conceived as the causal law of the, world. He even used a scriptural passage from the Seventy Treatise to support his standpoint:
The chain of twelve causal conditions are supposed to be the internal causal phenomena of the world (nei-yin-yuan-fa).(i) Naagaarjuna argued that if they are the real causal law of the world, they must happen or be produced (a) in one mind-moment, or (b) in many mind-moments. But one cannot say that all twelve causal factors appear in one mind-moment, for if they occur in one mind-moment, then causes and effects happen at the same time. This is impossible because a cause is supposed to be prior to an effect. Nor can one say that the twelve causal factors appear in many mind-moments, for if they occur in many different mind-moments, they are distinct from one another and have no particular relation to each other. Each would occur within a certain particular mind-moment and then disappear within that mind-moment. If this is the case, how can anyone of them be a causal condition? Thus, the cases, (a) and (b) , cannot be established, and hence the chain of twelve causal conditions cannot conceivably be the real internal causal law: they are empty.
As pointed out, early Buddhists considered that the principle of causation was a moral law as well as a physical law: for any good deed, there must be a reward; and for any bad deed, there must be a punishment. But the Madhyamikas argue that the "necessary connection" between a good deed and a reward and between a bad deed and punishment cannot be rationally explained and justified.(29) They are not "objective laws" in the world nor in society, but just the subjective projection of the mind. Naagaarjuna said, "Defilements, karmas, doers, rewards, and punishments are all similar to mirages,dreams, shadows and echoes."(30)
According to the San-lun Maadhyamikas, the Buddha is a pragmatic teacher. The chief aim of his teachings is not to make a report about the world but to help people to get rid of ignorance and illusions so as to obtain salvation. In order to save all sentient beings, the Buddha has presented different teachings to different people in compliance with their abilities. All statements given by the Buddha are simply skillful means (fang-pien, upaaya). In the strict sense, they are nothing but words and letters, and should not be considered as standing for any definite entities or realities in the world. Actually, the entities which the words are supposed to denote are empty. They are "utterly empty, like a dream, like a phantom, nothing but the thoughts of deluded worldings."(31) Kumaarajiva (344-413 A.D.), who introduced Maadhyamika Buddhism to China,(32) said, "Not apprehending and not craving the dharma is my Buddha-Dharma."(33)
Although all verbal and conceptual teachings and
doctrines of the Buddha are empty, without absolute
intellectual validity, they have practical value. They can
help people to gain enlightenment. According to Chi-tsang(k)
(549-623 A.D.), the greatest Chinese San-lun Maadhyamika
master, they serve as
"convenient means to lead sentient beings and to enable
Naagaarjuna seemed to find that while people are searching for the knowledge of the true-nature of things, they tend to describe the true state of things as "real" or "unreal" and advocate absolutism or nihilism. The Buddha's teaching of pratiityasmutpaada serves to keep one from falling into these extreme views. The true state of things cannot be absolutely real, because all things appear to be impermanent and are dependent upon causes and conditions. If a thing is absolutely existent, it should be self-existent and is not subject to causal change. But things seem to be dependennt upon something else and are subject to change. So the true nature of things cannot be absolutely real. Nor can the true nature of things be absolutely unreal. If all things are absolutely non-existent, there would be no changing phenomena and sensible appearances would not arise. But myriad things do appear to arise from various causal conditions and hence cannot be absolutely non-existent. This point was succinctly stated by Seng-chao(1)(374-414 A.D.) as follows:
Thus, pratiityasamutpaada performs the same "soteriological" function as the Middle Way and Emptiness in avoiding the extreme views of absolutism and nihilism:hence Nagarjuna once said, "It is pratiityasamutpaada that we call Emptiness;it is a provisionary name; it is also the Middle Way."(37) In Madhyamika thought, Emptiness, the Middle Way and pratiityasamutpaada are interchangeable. The word "empty" or "emptiness," for the Maadhyamikas, has no meaning by itself but obtains a meaning in the process of salvation. The doctrine of emptiness is not a metaphysical theory;it is, instead, primarily a soteriological device for eliminating extreme views so that one may be "empty" of any attachment. The doctrine was first expressed as the doctrine of the Middle Way in the Buddha's First Sermon.(38) The so-called Middle Way is a way of emptiness as it is a path refuting all speculative reasonings. Like the Middle Way, pratiityasamutpaada is essentially a way of emptiness; it is a path for freeing one from conceptual speculation. Naagaarjuna opened the Middle Treatise with these words:
The Buddha's teachings of Emptiness, the Middle Way and pratiityasamutpaada all have the same purpose, namely, the liberation of one's mind from metaphysical speculation. Conceptual reasoning, for the Maadhyamikas, is often the svabhaavic or substantive way of thinking. When one is engaged in philosophical reasoning he tends to ascribe a definite nature or essence to an object, thing or event. The object is believed to possess a determinate or substantial nature,and is regared as the ultimate reality or basic element of the universe. Traditional Hindu philosophers employed this way of thinking and held that AAtman is the ultimate reality of the universe. Early scholastic Buddhists also used the svabhaavic way of thinking and held that dharmas are the real constituents of the world. For the Maadhyamikas, the monistic philosophy of traditional Hinduism is an extreme view, and the pluralistic philosophy of scholastic Buddhism is another extreme view. All those philosophers have the same error, namely, the svabhaavic way of reasoning. Pratiitysamutpaada has been used by the Madhyamikas to refute this. The concept of a definite nature or real essence (whether it is ascribed to AAtman, dharmas or other ontological entities) is contradictory to or at least incompatible with the empirical phenomena that things are subject to causal change. So it cannot be used to describe the true state of our experience. Consequently, it is unintelligible to use Atman, dharmas or other ontological entities to explain the reality of the universe. Naagaarjuna said, "Things are produced from various conditions, and hence have no self-nature (tzu-hsing,(m) svabhaava). If they have no self-nature, how can there be such things?''(40) Thus causality serves as a means to refute the concept of self-nature and thereb to eliminate the ontologization of any entiey or object.
The Buddha's teaching of pratiityasamutpaada, according
to the Maadhyamikas, is concerned not only with the
conceptual description of the reality of the universe but
also with the conceptual explanation of human behavior. The
fatalist claims that all things are causally determined and
man cannot shape his future, while the fortuitist argues that
everything happens by chance and man is not responsible for
his actions. For the Buddha, fatalism and fortuitism were two
extreme views: either one could make human responsibility and
religious discipline impossible. He refuted them by teaching
pratiityasamutpaada. Fatalism is untenable because it is
contradictory to the empirical fact that the existence of
everything is conditional and subject to change. Moreover,
the absolute "necessary connection" beween events cannot be
established and hence it makes no sense to hold that all
things are absolutely predetermined and man cannot change his
future. Fortuitism is also untenable because it is also
contradictory to the fact that all things are dependent upon
causal conditions. Thus, pratityasamutpada is, again, used
as a way of avoiding the extreme views of fatalism. and
fortuitism, and hence makes human responsibility and reigious
possible. So pratiityasamutpaada is given to "save" or to
The way of pratiityasamutpaada as Emptiness and the Middle
Way is essentially the way of salvation. To see
pratiityasamutpaada is to have the unattached insight that
all things are empty and that all speculative reasonings are
unintelligible and should be eliminated. This unattached
insight is enlightenment. It, for the Maadhyamikas, is the
central message of the Buddha's Dharma. So, the Buddha said,
"He who sees the pratiityasamutpaada sees the Dharma, and he
The so-called Four Noble Truths, according to San-lun Buddhists, were given by the Buddha from the practical, conventional standpoint. Ordinary people believe in the "reality" of suffering and the "universal" and "objective" validity of causality. In order to help sentient beings to obtain enlightenment, the Buddha used words, such as "suffering" and "happiness," "the origin of suffering" and "the cessation of suffering," "cause" and "effect," "true" and "false," to expound his Dharma. Actually, all the words and statements he made are empty. Naagaarjuna said, "Words have no essence. Whatever is expressed by them is also without essence."(43)
The Buddha's verbal teachings, for Naagaarjuna and his San-lun followers, are merely instruments to assist people in eliminating conceptualization so that they may be "empty" of all intellectual and emotional attachments. Once one realizes this "empty" nature of the Buddha's Dharma, he will have abandoned conceptual speculation of everything, even the Four Noble Truths. Naagaarjuna said,