Daily Papers

A common evaluation practice in the vector space models (VSMs) literature is to measure the models' ability to predict human judgments about lexical semantic relations between word pairs. Most existing evaluation sets, however, consist of scores collected for English word pairs only, ignoring the potential impact of the judgment language in which word pairs are presented on the human scores. In this paper we translate two prominent evaluation sets, wordsim353 (association) and SimLex999 (similarity), from English to Italian, German and Russian and collect scores for each dataset from crowdworkers fluent in its language. Our analysis reveals that human judgments are strongly impacted by the judgment language. Moreover, we show that the predictions of monolingual VSMs do not necessarily best correlate with human judgments made with the language used for model training, suggesting that models and humans are affected differently by the language they use when making semantic judgments. Finally, we show that in a large number of setups, multilingual VSM combination results in improved correlations with human judgments, suggesting that multilingualism may partially compensate for the judgment language effect on human judgments.

Bilingual lexical processing is shaped by the complex interplay of phonological, orthographic, and semantic features of two languages within an integrated mental lexicon. In humans, this is evident in the ease with which cognate words - words similar in both orthographic form and meaning (e.g., blind, meaning "sightless" in both English and German) - are processed, compared to the challenges posed by interlingual homographs, which share orthographic form but differ in meaning (e.g., gift, meaning "present" in English but "poison" in German). We investigate how multilingual Large Language Models (LLMs) handle such phenomena, focusing on English-Spanish, English-French, and English-German cognates, non-cognate, and interlingual homographs. Specifically, we evaluate their ability to disambiguate meanings and make semantic judgments, both when these word types are presented in isolation or within sentence contexts. Our findings reveal that while certain LLMs demonstrate strong performance in recognizing cognates and non-cognates in isolation, they exhibit significant difficulty in disambiguating interlingual homographs, often performing below random baselines. This suggests LLMs tend to rely heavily on orthographic similarities rather than semantic understanding when interpreting interlingual homographs. Further, we find LLMs exhibit difficulty in retrieving word meanings, with performance in isolative disambiguation tasks having no correlation with semantic understanding. Finally, we study how the LLM processes interlingual homographs in incongruent sentences. We find models to opt for different strategies in understanding English and non-English homographs, highlighting a lack of a unified approach to handling cross-lingual ambiguities.

Document Visual Question Answering (DocVQA) is a fundamental task for multimodal document understanding and a key testbed for vision language reasoning. However, most existing DocVQA datasets are limited to the page level and lack fine grained spatial grounding, constraining the interpretability and reasoning capability of Vision Language Models (VLMs). To address this gap, we introduce BBox DocVQA a large scale, bounding box grounded dataset designed to enhance spatial reasoning and evidence localization in visual documents. We further present an automated construction pipeline, Segment Judge and Generate, which integrates a segment model for region segmentation, a VLM for semantic judgment, and another advanced VLM for question answer generation, followed by human verification for quality assurance. The resulting dataset contains 3.6 K diverse documents and 32 K QA pairs, encompassing single and multi region as well as single and multi page scenarios. Each QA instance is grounded on explicit bounding boxes, enabling fine grained evaluation of spatial semantic alignment. Benchmarking multiple state of the art VLMs (e.g., GPT 5, Qwen2.5 VL, and InternVL) on BBox DocVQA reveals persistent challenges in spatial grounding and reasoning accuracy. Furthermore, fine tuning on BBox DocVQA substantially improves both bounding box localization and answer generation, validating its effectiveness for enhancing the reasoning ability of VLMs. Our dataset and code will be publicly released to advance research on interpretable and spatially grounded vision language reasoning.

We evaluate the reasoning abilities of large language models in multilingual settings. We introduce the Multilingual Grade School Math (MGSM) benchmark, by manually translating 250 grade-school math problems from the GSM8K dataset (Cobbe et al., 2021) into ten typologically diverse languages. We find that the ability to solve MGSM problems via chain-of-thought prompting emerges with increasing model scale, and that models have strikingly strong multilingual reasoning abilities, even in underrepresented languages such as Bengali and Swahili. Finally, we show that the multilingual reasoning abilities of language models extend to other tasks such as commonsense reasoning and word-in-context semantic judgment. The MGSM benchmark is publicly available at https://github.com/google-research/url-nlp.

Zero-shot Composed Image Retrieval (ZS-CIR) aims to retrieve a target image given a reference image and a relative text, without relying on costly triplet annotations. Existing CLIP-based methods face two core challenges: (1) union-based feature fusion indiscriminately aggregates all visual cues, carrying over irrelevant background details that dilute the intended modification, and (2) global cosine similarity from CLIP embeddings lacks the ability to resolve fine-grained semantic relations. To address these issues, we propose SETR (Semantic-enhanced Two-Stage Retrieval). In the coarse retrieval stage, SETR introduces an intersection-driven strategy that retains only the overlapping semantics between the reference image and relative text, thereby filtering out distractors inherent to union-based fusion and producing a cleaner, high-precision candidate set. In the fine-grained re-ranking stage, we adapt a pretrained multimodal LLM with Low-Rank Adaptation to conduct binary semantic relevance judgments ("Yes/No"), which goes beyond CLIP's global feature matching by explicitly verifying relational and attribute-level consistency. Together, these two stages form a complementary pipeline: coarse retrieval narrows the candidate pool with high recall, while re-ranking ensures precise alignment with nuanced textual modifications. Experiments on CIRR, Fashion-IQ, and CIRCO show that SETR achieves new state-of-the-art performance, improving Recall@1 on CIRR by up to 15.15 points. Our results establish two-stage reasoning as a general paradigm for robust and portable ZS-CIR.

A characteristic feature of human semantic cognition is its ability to not only store and retrieve the properties of concepts observed through experience, but to also facilitate the inheritance of properties (can breathe) from superordinate concepts (animal) to their subordinates (dog) -- i.e. demonstrate property inheritance. In this paper, we present COMPS, a collection of minimal pair sentences that jointly tests pre-trained language models (PLMs) on their ability to attribute properties to concepts and their ability to demonstrate property inheritance behavior. Analyses of 22 different PLMs on COMPS reveal that they can easily distinguish between concepts on the basis of a property when they are trivially different, but find it relatively difficult when concepts are related on the basis of nuanced knowledge representations. Furthermore, we find that PLMs can demonstrate behavior consistent with property inheritance to a great extent, but fail in the presence of distracting information, which decreases the performance of many models, sometimes even below chance. This lack of robustness in demonstrating simple reasoning raises important questions about PLMs' capacity to make correct inferences even when they appear to possess the prerequisite knowledge.

Distributional word representation methods exploit word co-occurrences to build compact vector encodings of words. While these representations enjoy widespread use in modern natural language processing, it is unclear whether they accurately encode all necessary facets of conceptual meaning. In this paper, we evaluate how well these representations can predict perceptual and conceptual features of concrete concepts, drawing on two semantic norm datasets sourced from human participants. We find that several standard word representations fail to encode many salient perceptual features of concepts, and show that these deficits correlate with word-word similarity prediction errors. Our analyses provide motivation for grounded and embodied language learning approaches, which may help to remedy these deficits.

Psychological research consistently finds that human ratings of words across diverse semantic scales can be reduced to a low-dimensional form with relatively little information loss. We find that the semantic associations encoded in the embedding matrices of large language models (LLMs) exhibit a similar structure. We show that the projections of words on semantic directions defined by antonym pairs (e.g. kind - cruel) correlate highly with human ratings, and further find that these projections effectively reduce to a 3-dimensional subspace within LLM embeddings, closely resembling the patterns derived from human survey responses. Moreover, we find that shifting tokens along one semantic direction causes off-target effects on geometrically aligned features proportional to their cosine similarity. These findings suggest that semantic features are entangled within LLMs similarly to how they are interconnected in human language, and a great deal of semantic information, despite its apparent complexity, is surprisingly low-dimensional. Furthermore, accounting for this semantic structure may prove essential for avoiding unintended consequences when steering features.

When language models correctly parse "The cat that the dog chased meowed," are they analyzing syntax or simply familiar with dogs chasing cats? Despite extensive benchmarking, we lack methods to distinguish structural understanding from semantic pattern matching. We introduce CenterBench, a dataset of 9,720 comprehension questions on center-embedded sentences (like "The cat [that the dog chased] meowed") where relative clauses nest recursively, creating processing demands from simple to deeply nested structures. Each sentence has a syntactically identical but semantically implausible counterpart (e.g., mailmen prescribe medicine, doctors deliver mail) and six comprehension questions testing surface understanding, syntactic dependencies, and causal reasoning. Testing six models reveals that performance gaps between plausible and implausible sentences widen systematically with complexity, with models showing median gaps up to 26.8 percentage points, quantifying when they abandon structural analysis for semantic associations. Notably, semantic plausibility harms performance on questions about resulting actions, where following causal relationships matters more than semantic coherence. Reasoning models improve accuracy but their traces show semantic shortcuts, overthinking, and answer refusal. Unlike models whose plausibility advantage systematically widens with complexity, humans shows variable semantic effects. CenterBench provides the first framework to identify when models shift from structural analysis to pattern matching.

People can categorize the same entity at multiple taxonomic levels, such as basic (bear), superordinate (animal), and subordinate (grizzly bear). While prior research has focused on basic-level categories, this study is the first attempt to examine the organization of categories by analyzing exemplars produced at the subordinate level. We present a new Italian psycholinguistic dataset of human-generated exemplars for 187 concrete words. We then use these data to evaluate whether textual and vision LLMs produce meaningful exemplars that align with human category organization across three key tasks: exemplar generation, category induction, and typicality judgment. Our findings show a low alignment between humans and LLMs, consistent with previous studies. However, their performance varies notably across different semantic domains. Ultimately, this study highlights both the promises and the constraints of using AI-generated exemplars to support psychological and linguistic research.

Modern language models can process inputs across diverse languages and modalities. We hypothesize that models acquire this capability through learning a shared representation space across heterogeneous data types (e.g., different languages and modalities), which places semantically similar inputs near one another, even if they are from different modalities/languages. We term this the semantic hub hypothesis, following the hub-and-spoke model from neuroscience (Patterson et al., 2007) which posits that semantic knowledge in the human brain is organized through a transmodal semantic "hub" which integrates information from various modality-specific "spokes" regions. We first show that model representations for semantically equivalent inputs in different languages are similar in the intermediate layers, and that this space can be interpreted using the model's dominant pretraining language via the logit lens. This tendency extends to other data types, including arithmetic expressions, code, and visual/audio inputs. Interventions in the shared representation space in one data type also predictably affect model outputs in other data types, suggesting that this shared representations space is not simply a vestigial byproduct of large-scale training on broad data, but something that is actively utilized by the model during input processing.

Abstract reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect, and depends on our knowledge and beliefs about the content of the reasoning problem. For example, humans reason much more reliably about logical rules that are grounded in everyday situations than arbitrary rules about abstract attributes. The training experiences of language models similarly endow them with prior expectations that reflect human knowledge and beliefs. We therefore hypothesized that language models would show human-like content effects on abstract reasoning problems. We explored this hypothesis across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968). We find that state of the art large language models (with 7 or 70 billion parameters; Hoffman et al., 2022) reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks -- like humans, models reason more effectively about believable situations than unrealistic or abstract ones. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects, and the factors that contribute to language model performance.

In the rapidly evolving field of Large Language Models (LLMs), there is a critical need to thoroughly analyze their capabilities and risks. Central to our investigation are two novel elements. Firstly, it is the innovative parallels between the statistical patterns of word relationships within LLMs and Martin Heidegger's concepts of "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand," which encapsulate the utilitarian and scientific altitudes humans employ in interacting with the world. This comparison lays the groundwork for positioning LLMs as the digital counterpart to the Faculty of Verbal Knowledge, shedding light on their capacity to emulate certain facets of human reasoning. Secondly, a structural analysis of human reasoning, viewed through Heidegger's notion of truth as "unconcealment" is conducted This foundational principle enables us to map out the inputs and outputs of the reasoning system and divide reasoning into four distinct categories. Respective cognitive faculties are delineated, allowing us to place LLMs within the broader schema of human reasoning, thus clarifying their strengths and inherent limitations. Our findings reveal that while LLMs possess the capability for Direct Explicative Reasoning and Pseudo Rational Reasoning, they fall short in authentic rational reasoning and have no creative reasoning capabilities, due to the current lack of many analogous AI models such as the Faculty of Judgement. The potential and risks of LLMs when they are augmented with other AI technologies are also evaluated. The results indicate that although LLMs have achieved proficiency in some reasoning abilities, the aspiration to match or exceed human intellectual capabilities is yet unattained. This research not only enriches our comprehension of LLMs but also propels forward the discourse on AI's potential and its bounds, paving the way for future explorations into AI's evolving landscape.

Humans organize knowledge into compact categories through semantic compression by mapping diverse instances to abstract representations while preserving meaning (e.g., robin and blue jay are both birds; most birds can fly). These concepts reflect a trade-off between expressive fidelity and representational simplicity. Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate remarkable linguistic abilities, yet whether their internal representations strike a human-like trade-off between compression and semantic fidelity is unclear. We introduce a novel information-theoretic framework, drawing from Rate-Distortion Theory and the Information Bottleneck principle, to quantitatively compare these strategies. Analyzing token embeddings from a diverse suite of LLMs against seminal human categorization benchmarks, we uncover key divergences. While LLMs form broad conceptual categories that align with human judgment, they struggle to capture the fine-grained semantic distinctions crucial for human understanding. More fundamentally, LLMs demonstrate a strong bias towards aggressive statistical compression, whereas human conceptual systems appear to prioritize adaptive nuance and contextual richness, even if this results in lower compressional efficiency by our measures. These findings illuminate critical differences between current AI and human cognitive architectures, guiding pathways toward LLMs with more human-aligned conceptual representations.

Formal and distributional semantic models offer complementary benefits in modeling meaning. The categorical compositional distributional (DisCoCat) model of meaning of Coecke et al. (arXiv:1003.4394v1 [cs.CL]) combines aspected of both to provide a general framework in which meanings of words, obtained distributionally, are composed using methods from the logical setting to form sentence meaning. Concrete consequences of this general abstract setting and applications to empirical data are under active study (Grefenstette et al., arxiv:1101.0309; Grefenstette and Sadrzadeh, arXiv:1106.4058v1 [cs.CL]). . In this paper, we extend this study by examining transitive verbs, represented as matrices in a DisCoCat. We discuss three ways of constructing such matrices, and evaluate each method in a disambiguation task developed by Grefenstette and Sadrzadeh (arXiv:1106.4058v1 [cs.CL]).

In natural language processing, most models try to learn semantic representations merely from texts. The learned representations encode the distributional semantics but fail to connect to any knowledge about the physical world. In contrast, humans learn language by grounding concepts in perception and action and the brain encodes grounded semantics for cognition. Inspired by this notion and recent work in vision-language learning, we design a two-stream model for grounding language learning in vision. The model includes a VGG-based visual stream and a Bert-based language stream. The two streams merge into a joint representational space. Through cross-modal contrastive learning, the model first learns to align visual and language representations with the MS COCO dataset. The model further learns to retrieve visual objects with language queries through a cross-modal attention module and to infer the visual relations between the retrieved objects through a bilinear operator with the Visual Genome dataset. After training, the language stream of this model is a stand-alone language model capable of embedding concepts in a visually grounded semantic space. This semantic space manifests principal dimensions explainable with human intuition and neurobiological knowledge. Word embeddings in this semantic space are predictive of human-defined norms of semantic features and are segregated into perceptually distinctive clusters. Furthermore, the visually grounded language model also enables compositional language understanding based on visual knowledge and multimodal image search with queries based on images, texts, or their combinations.

This paper presents a systematic defense of large language model (LLM) hallucinations or 'confabulations' as a potential resource instead of a categorically negative pitfall. The standard view is that confabulations are inherently problematic and AI research should eliminate this flaw. In this paper, we argue and empirically demonstrate that measurable semantic characteristics of LLM confabulations mirror a human propensity to utilize increased narrativity as a cognitive resource for sense-making and communication. In other words, it has potential value. Specifically, we analyze popular hallucination benchmarks and reveal that hallucinated outputs display increased levels of narrativity and semantic coherence relative to veridical outputs. This finding reveals a tension in our usually dismissive understandings of confabulation. It suggests, counter-intuitively, that the tendency for LLMs to confabulate may be intimately associated with a positive capacity for coherent narrative-text generation.

We analyse perception and memory, using mathematical models for knowledge graphs and tensors, to gain insights into the corresponding functionalities of the human mind. Our discussion is based on the concept of propositional sentences consisting of subject-predicate-object (SPO) triples for expressing elementary facts. SPO sentences are the basis for most natural languages but might also be important for explicit perception and declarative memories, as well as intra-brain communication and the ability to argue and reason. A set of SPO sentences can be described as a knowledge graph, which can be transformed into an adjacency tensor. We introduce tensor models, where concepts have dual representations as indices and associated embeddings, two constructs we believe are essential for the understanding of implicit and explicit perception and memory in the brain. We argue that a biological realization of perception and memory imposes constraints on information processing. In particular, we propose that explicit perception and declarative memories require a semantic decoder, which, in a simple realization, is based on four layers: First, a sensory memory layer, as a buffer for sensory input, second, an index layer representing concepts, third, a memoryless representation layer for the broadcasting of information ---the "blackboard", or the "canvas" of the brain--- and fourth, a working memory layer as a processing center and data buffer. We discuss the operations of the four layers and relate them to the global workspace theory. In a Bayesian brain interpretation, semantic memory defines the prior for observable triple statements. We propose that ---in evolution and during development--- semantic memory, episodic memory, and natural language evolved as emergent properties in agents' process to gain a deeper understanding of sensory information.

Inference, especially those derived from inductive processes, is a crucial component in our conversation to complement the information implicitly or explicitly conveyed by a speaker. While recent large language models show remarkable advances in inference tasks, their performance in inductive reasoning, where not all information is present in the context, is far behind deductive reasoning. In this paper, we analyze the behavior of the models based on the task difficulty defined by the semantic information gap -- which distinguishes inductive and deductive reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1988, 1993). Our analysis reveals that the disparity in information between dialogue contexts and desired inferences poses a significant challenge to the inductive inference process. To mitigate this information gap, we investigate a contrastive learning approach by feeding negative samples. Our experiments suggest negative samples help models understand what is wrong and improve their inference generations.

Modeling semantic plausibility requires commonsense knowledge about the world and has been used as a testbed for exploring various knowledge representations. Previous work has focused specifically on modeling physical plausibility and shown that distributional methods fail when tested in a supervised setting. At the same time, distributional models, namely large pretrained language models, have led to improved results for many natural language understanding tasks. In this work, we show that these pretrained language models are in fact effective at modeling physical plausibility in the supervised setting. We therefore present the more difficult problem of learning to model physical plausibility directly from text. We create a training set by extracting attested events from a large corpus, and we provide a baseline for training on these attested events in a self-supervised manner and testing on a physical plausibility task. We believe results could be further improved by injecting explicit commonsense knowledge into a distributional model.

Artificial intelligence and machine learning are in a period of astounding growth. However, there are concerns that these technologies may be used, either with or without intention, to perpetuate the prejudice and unfairness that unfortunately characterizes many human institutions. Here we show for the first time that human-like semantic biases result from the application of standard machine learning to ordinary language---the same sort of language humans are exposed to every day. We replicate a spectrum of standard human biases as exposed by the Implicit Association Test and other well-known psychological studies. We replicate these using a widely used, purely statistical machine-learning model---namely, the GloVe word embedding---trained on a corpus of text from the Web. Our results indicate that language itself contains recoverable and accurate imprints of our historic biases, whether these are morally neutral as towards insects or flowers, problematic as towards race or gender, or even simply veridical, reflecting the {\em status quo} for the distribution of gender with respect to careers or first names. These regularities are captured by machine learning along with the rest of semantics. In addition to our empirical findings concerning language, we also contribute new methods for evaluating bias in text, the Word Embedding Association Test (WEAT) and the Word Embedding Factual Association Test (WEFAT). Our results have implications not only for AI and machine learning, but also for the fields of psychology, sociology, and human ethics, since they raise the possibility that mere exposure to everyday language can account for the biases we replicate here.

The emergent few-shot reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) have excited the natural language and machine learning community over recent years. Despite of numerous successful applications, the underlying mechanism of such in-context capabilities still remains unclear. In this work, we hypothesize that the learned semantics of language tokens do the most heavy lifting during the reasoning process. Different from human's symbolic reasoning process, the semantic representations of LLMs could create strong connections among tokens, thus composing a superficial logical chain. To test our hypothesis, we decouple semantics from the language reasoning process and evaluate three kinds of reasoning abilities, i.e., deduction, induction and abduction. Our findings reveal that semantics play a vital role in LLMs' in-context reasoning -- LLMs perform significantly better when semantics are consistent with commonsense but struggle to solve symbolic or counter-commonsense reasoning tasks by leveraging in-context new knowledge. The surprising observations question whether modern LLMs have mastered the inductive, deductive and abductive reasoning abilities as in human intelligence, and motivate research on unveiling the magic existing within the black-box LLMs. On the whole, our analysis provides a novel perspective on the role of semantics in developing and evaluating language models' reasoning abilities. Code is available at {https://github.com/XiaojuanTang/ICSR}.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are prone to hallucination, the generation of plausible yet factually incorrect statements. This work investigates the intrinsic, architectural origins of this failure mode through three primary contributions.First, to enable the reliable tracing of internal semantic failures, we propose Distributional Semantics Tracing (DST), a unified framework that integrates established interpretability techniques to produce a causal map of a model's reasoning, treating meaning as a function of context (distributional semantics). Second, we pinpoint the model's layer at which a hallucination becomes inevitable, identifying a specific commitment layer where a model's internal representations irreversibly diverge from factuality. Third, we identify the underlying mechanism for these failures. We observe a conflict between distinct computational pathways, which we interpret using the lens of dual-process theory: a fast, heuristic associative pathway (akin to System 1) and a slow, deliberate contextual pathway (akin to System 2), leading to predictable failure modes such as Reasoning Shortcut Hijacks. Our framework's ability to quantify the coherence of the contextual pathway reveals a strong negative correlation (rho = -0.863) with hallucination rates, implying that these failures are predictable consequences of internal semantic weakness. The result is a mechanistic account of how, when, and why hallucinations occur within the Transformer architecture.

Many current NLP systems are built from language models trained to optimize unsupervised objectives on large amounts of raw text. Under what conditions might such a procedure acquire meaning? Our systematic experiments with synthetic data reveal that, with languages where all expressions have context-independent denotations (i.e., languages with strong transparency), both autoregressive and masked language models successfully learn to emulate semantic relations between expressions. However, when denotations are changed to be context-dependent with the language otherwise unmodified, this ability degrades. Turning to natural language, our experiments with a specific phenomenon -- referential opacity -- add to the growing body of evidence that current language models do not represent natural language semantics well. We show this failure relates to the context-dependent nature of natural language form-meaning mappings.

Human commonsense understanding of the physical and social world is organized around intuitive theories. These theories support making causal and moral judgments. When something bad happens, we naturally ask: who did what, and why? A rich literature in cognitive science has studied people's causal and moral intuitions. This work has revealed a number of factors that systematically influence people's judgments, such as the violation of norms and whether the harm is avoidable or inevitable. We collected a dataset of stories from 24 cognitive science papers and developed a system to annotate each story with the factors they investigated. Using this dataset, we test whether large language models (LLMs) make causal and moral judgments about text-based scenarios that align with those of human participants. On the aggregate level, alignment has improved with more recent LLMs. However, using statistical analyses, we find that LLMs weigh the different factors quite differently from human participants. These results show how curated, challenge datasets combined with insights from cognitive science can help us go beyond comparisons based merely on aggregate metrics: we uncover LLMs implicit tendencies and show to what extent these align with human intuitions.

We define deriving semantic class targets as a novel multi-modal task. By doing so, we aim to improve classification schemes in the physical sciences which can be severely abstracted and obfuscating. We address this task for upcoming radio astronomy surveys and present the derived semantic radio galaxy morphology class targets.

Driven by vast and diverse textual data, large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive performance across numerous natural language processing (NLP) tasks. Yet, a critical question persists: does their generalization arise from mere memorization of training data or from deep semantic understanding? To investigate this, we propose a bi-perspective evaluation framework to assess LLMs' scenario cognition - the ability to link semantic scenario elements with their arguments in context. Specifically, we introduce a novel scenario-based dataset comprising diverse textual descriptions of fictional facts, annotated with scenario elements. LLMs are evaluated through their capacity to answer scenario-related questions (model output perspective) and via probing their internal representations for encoded scenario elements-argument associations (internal representation perspective). Our experiments reveal that current LLMs predominantly rely on superficial memorization, failing to achieve robust semantic scenario cognition, even in simple cases. These findings expose critical limitations in LLMs' semantic understanding and offer cognitive insights for advancing their capabilities.

We introduce a new language learning setting relevant to building adaptive natural language interfaces. It is inspired by Wittgenstein's language games: a human wishes to accomplish some task (e.g., achieving a certain configuration of blocks), but can only communicate with a computer, who performs the actual actions (e.g., removing all red blocks). The computer initially knows nothing about language and therefore must learn it from scratch through interaction, while the human adapts to the computer's capabilities. We created a game in a blocks world and collected interactions from 100 people playing it. First, we analyze the humans' strategies, showing that using compositionality and avoiding synonyms correlates positively with task performance. Second, we compare computer strategies, showing how to quickly learn a semantic parsing model from scratch, and that modeling pragmatics further accelerates learning for successful players.

Recent studies of the emergent capabilities of transformer-based Natural Language Understanding (NLU) models have indicated that they have an understanding of lexical and compositional semantics. We provide evidence that suggests these claims should be taken with a grain of salt: we find that state-of-the-art Natural Language Inference (NLI) models are sensitive towards minor semantics preserving surface-form variations, which lead to sizable inconsistent model decisions during inference. Notably, this behaviour differs from valid and in-depth comprehension of compositional semantics, however does neither emerge when evaluating model accuracy on standard benchmarks nor when probing for syntactic, monotonic, and logically robust reasoning. We propose a novel framework to measure the extent of semantic sensitivity. To this end, we evaluate NLI models on adversarially generated examples containing minor semantics-preserving surface-form input noise. This is achieved using conditional text generation, with the explicit condition that the NLI model predicts the relationship between the original and adversarial inputs as a symmetric equivalence entailment. We systematically study the effects of the phenomenon across NLI models for in- and out-of- domain settings. Our experiments show that semantic sensitivity causes performance degradations of 12.92% and 23.71% average over in- and out-of- domain settings, respectively. We further perform ablation studies, analysing this phenomenon across models, datasets, and variations in inference and show that semantic sensitivity can lead to major inconsistency within model predictions.

Most large language models are trained on linguistic input alone, yet humans appear to ground their understanding of words in sensorimotor experience. A natural solution is to augment LM representations with human judgments of a word's sensorimotor associations (e.g., the Lancaster Sensorimotor Norms), but this raises another challenge: most words are ambiguous, and judgments of words in isolation fail to account for this multiplicity of meaning (e.g., "wooden table" vs. "data table"). We attempted to address this problem by building a new lexical resource of contextualized sensorimotor judgments for 112 English words, each rated in four different contexts (448 sentences total). We show that these ratings encode overlapping but distinct information from the Lancaster Sensorimotor Norms, and that they also predict other measures of interest (e.g., relatedness), above and beyond measures derived from BERT. Beyond shedding light on theoretical questions, we suggest that these ratings could be of use as a "challenge set" for researchers building grounded language models.

Today's large language models (LLMs) routinely generate coherent, grammatical and seemingly meaningful paragraphs of text. This achievement has led to speculation that these networks are -- or will soon become -- "thinking machines", capable of performing tasks that require abstract knowledge and reasoning. Here, we review the capabilities of LLMs by considering their performance on two different aspects of language use: 'formal linguistic competence', which includes knowledge of rules and patterns of a given language, and 'functional linguistic competence', a host of cognitive abilities required for language understanding and use in the real world. Drawing on evidence from cognitive neuroscience, we show that formal competence in humans relies on specialized language processing mechanisms, whereas functional competence recruits multiple extralinguistic capacities that comprise human thought, such as formal reasoning, world knowledge, situation modeling, and social cognition. In line with this distinction, LLMs show impressive (although imperfect) performance on tasks requiring formal linguistic competence, but fail on many tests requiring functional competence. Based on this evidence, we argue that (1) contemporary LLMs should be taken seriously as models of formal linguistic skills; (2) models that master real-life language use would need to incorporate or develop not only a core language module, but also multiple non-language-specific cognitive capacities required for modeling thought. Overall, a distinction between formal and functional linguistic competence helps clarify the discourse surrounding LLMs' potential and provides a path toward building models that understand and use language in human-like ways.

This paper explores the moral judgment and moral reasoning abilities exhibited by Large Language Models (LLMs) across languages through the Defining Issues Test. It is a well known fact that moral judgment depends on the language in which the question is asked. We extend the work of beyond English, to 5 new languages (Chinese, Hindi, Russian, Spanish and Swahili), and probe three LLMs -- ChatGPT, GPT-4 and Llama2Chat-70B -- that shows substantial multilingual text processing and generation abilities. Our study shows that the moral reasoning ability for all models, as indicated by the post-conventional score, is substantially inferior for Hindi and Swahili, compared to Spanish, Russian, Chinese and English, while there is no clear trend for the performance of the latter four languages. The moral judgments too vary considerably by the language.

Representational spaces learned via language modeling are fundamental to Natural Language Processing (NLP), however there has been limited understanding regarding how and when during training various types of linguistic information emerge and interact. Leveraging a novel information theoretic probing suite, which enables direct comparisons of not just task performance, but their representational subspaces, we analyze nine tasks covering syntax, semantics and reasoning, across 2M pre-training steps and five seeds. We identify critical learning phases across tasks and time, during which subspaces emerge, share information, and later disentangle to specialize. Across these phases, syntactic knowledge is acquired rapidly after 0.5% of full training. Continued performance improvements primarily stem from the acquisition of open-domain knowledge, while semantics and reasoning tasks benefit from later boosts to long-range contextualization and higher specialization. Measuring cross-task similarity further reveals that linguistically related tasks share information throughout training, and do so more during the critical phase of learning than before or after. Our findings have implications for model interpretability, multi-task learning, and learning from limited data.

Probing and enhancing large language models' reasoning capacity remains a crucial open question. Here we re-purpose the reverse dictionary task as a case study to probe LLMs' capacity for conceptual inference. We use in-context learning to guide the models to generate the term for an object concept implied in a linguistic description. Models robustly achieve high accuracy in this task, and their representation space encodes information about object categories and fine-grained features. Further experiments suggest that the conceptual inference ability as probed by the reverse-dictionary task predicts model's general reasoning performance across multiple benchmarks, despite similar syntactic generalization behaviors across models. Explorative analyses suggest that prompting LLMs with descriptionRightarrowword examples may induce generalization beyond surface-level differences in task construals and facilitate models on broader commonsense reasoning problems.

Network interpretation as an effort to reveal the features learned by a network remains largely visualization-based. In this paper, our goal is to tackle semantic network interpretation at both filter and decision level. For filter-level interpretation, we represent the concepts a filter encodes with a probability distribution of visual attributes. The decision-level interpretation is achieved by textual summarization that generates an explanatory sentence containing clues behind a network's decision. A Bayesian inference algorithm is proposed to automatically associate filters and network decisions with visual attributes. Human study confirms that the semantic interpretation is a beneficial alternative or complement to visualization methods. We demonstrate the crucial role that semantic network interpretation can play in understanding a network's failure patterns. More importantly, semantic network interpretation enables a better understanding of the correlation between a model's performance and its distribution metrics like filter selectivity and concept sparseness.

This work explores the hypothesis that subjectively attributed meaning constitutes the phenomenal content of conscious experience. That is, phenomenal content is semantic. This form of subjective meaning manifests as an intrinsic and non-representational character of qualia. Empirically, subjective meaning is ubiquitous in conscious experiences. We point to phenomenological studies that lend evidence to support this. Furthermore, this notion of meaning closely relates to what Frege refers to as "sense", in metaphysics and philosophy of language. It also aligns with Peirce's "interpretant", in semiotics. We discuss how Frege's sense can also be extended to the raw feels of consciousness. Sense and reference both play a role in phenomenal experience. Moreover, within the context of the mind-matter relation, we provide a formalization of subjective meaning associated to one's mental representations. Identifying the precise maps between the physical and mental domains, we argue that syntactic and semantic structures transcend language, and are realized within each of these domains. Formally, meaning is a relational attribute, realized via a map that interprets syntactic structures of a formal system within an appropriate semantic space. The image of this map within the mental domain is what is relevant for experience, and thus comprises the phenomenal content of qualia. We conclude with possible implications this may have for experience-based theories of consciousness.

The multimedia community has shown a significant interest in perceiving and representing the physical world with multimodal pretrained neural network models, and among them, the visual-language pertaining (VLP) is, currently, the most captivating topic. However, there have been few endeavors dedicated to the exploration of 1) whether essential linguistic knowledge (e.g., semantics and syntax) can be extracted during VLP, and 2) how such linguistic knowledge impact or enhance the multimodal alignment. In response, here we aim to elucidate the impact of comprehensive linguistic knowledge, including semantic expression and syntactic structure, on multimodal alignment. Specifically, we design and release the SNARE, the first large-scale multimodal alignment probing benchmark, to detect the vital linguistic components, e.g., lexical, semantic, and syntax knowledge, containing four tasks: Semantic structure, Negation logic, Attribute ownership, and Relationship composition. Based on our proposed probing benchmarks, our holistic analyses of five advanced VLP models illustrate that the VLP model: i) shows insensitivity towards complex syntax structures and relies on content words for sentence comprehension; ii) demonstrates limited comprehension of combinations between sentences and negations; iii) faces challenges in determining the presence of actions or spatial relationships within visual information and struggles with verifying the correctness of triple combinations. We make our benchmark and code available at https://github.com/WangFei-2019/SNARE/.

Recent works have extended notions of feature importance to semantic concepts that are inherently interpretable to the users interacting with a black-box predictive model. Yet, precise statistical guarantees, such as false positive rate control, are needed to communicate findings transparently and to avoid unintended consequences in real-world scenarios. In this paper, we formalize the global (i.e., over a population) and local (i.e., for a sample) statistical importance of semantic concepts for the predictions of opaque models, by means of conditional independence, which allows for rigorous testing. We use recent ideas of sequential kernelized testing (SKIT) to induce a rank of importance across concepts, and showcase the effectiveness and flexibility of our framework on synthetic datasets as well as on image classification tasks using vision-language models such as CLIP.

Natural Language Inference (NLI) relies heavily on adequately parsing the semantic content of the premise and hypothesis. In this work, we investigate whether adding semantic information in the form of an Abstract Meaning Representation (AMR) helps pretrained language models better generalize in NLI. Our experiments integrating AMR into NLI in both fine-tuning and prompting settings show that the presence of AMR in fine-tuning hinders model generalization while prompting with AMR leads to slight gains in GPT-4o. However, an ablation study reveals that the improvement comes from amplifying surface-level differences rather than aiding semantic reasoning. This amplification can mislead models to predict non-entailment even when the core meaning is preserved.

We introduce semantic towers, an extrinsic knowledge representation method, and compare it to intrinsic knowledge in large language models for ontology learning. Our experiments show a trade-off between performance and semantic grounding for extrinsic knowledge compared to a fine-tuned model intrinsic knowledge. We report our findings on the Large Language Models for Ontology Learning (LLMs4OL) 2024 challenge.

When asked, current large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT claim that they can assist us with relevance judgments. Many researchers think this would not lead to credible IR research. In this perspective paper, we discuss possible ways for LLMs to assist human experts along with concerns and issues that arise. We devise a human-machine collaboration spectrum that allows categorizing different relevance judgment strategies, based on how much the human relies on the machine. For the extreme point of "fully automated assessment", we further include a pilot experiment on whether LLM-based relevance judgments correlate with judgments from trained human assessors. We conclude the paper by providing two opposing perspectives - for and against the use of LLMs for automatic relevance judgments - and a compromise perspective, informed by our analyses of the literature, our preliminary experimental evidence, and our experience as IR researchers. We hope to start a constructive discussion within the community to avoid a stale-mate during review, where work is dammed if is uses LLMs for evaluation and dammed if it doesn't.

Speech language models align with human brain responses to natural language to an impressive degree. However, current models rely heavily on low-level speech features, indicating they lack brain-relevant semantics which limits their utility as model organisms of semantic processing in the brain. In this work, we address this limitation by inducing brain-relevant bias directly into the models via fine-tuning with fMRI recordings of people listening to natural stories, a process we name brain-tuning. After testing it on 3 different pretrained model families, we show that brain-tuning not only improves overall alignment with new brain recordings in semantic language regions, but also reduces the reliance on low-level speech features for this alignment. Excitingly, we further show that brain-tuning leads to 1) consistent improvements in performance on a range of downstream tasks and 2) a representational space with increased semantic preference. Our results provide converging evidence, for the first time, that incorporating brain signals into the training of language models improves the models' semantic understanding.

Modern large language models (LLMs) employ various forms of logical inference, both implicitly and explicitly, when addressing reasoning tasks. Understanding how to optimally leverage these inference paradigms is critical for advancing LLMs' reasoning capabilities. This paper adopts an exploratory approach by introducing a controlled evaluation environment for analogical reasoning -- a fundamental cognitive task -- that is systematically parameterized across three dimensions: modality (textual, visual, symbolic), difficulty (easy, medium, hard), and task format (multiple-choice or free-text generation). We analyze the comparative dynamics of inductive, abductive, and deductive inference pipelines across these dimensions, and demonstrate that our findings generalize to broader in-context learning tasks. Additionally, we investigate advanced paradigms such as hypothesis selection, verification, and refinement, revealing their potential to scale up logical inference in LLM reasoning. This exploratory study provides a foundation for future research in enhancing LLM reasoning through systematic logical inference strategies.

We present SeaEval, a benchmark for multilingual foundation models. In addition to characterizing how these models understand and reason with natural language, we also investigate how well they comprehend cultural practices, nuances, and values. Alongside standard accuracy metrics, we investigate the brittleness of foundation models in the dimensions of semantics and multilinguality. Our analyses span both open-sourced and closed models, leading to empirical results across classic NLP tasks, reasoning, and cultural comprehension. Key findings indicate (1) Most models exhibit varied behavior when given paraphrased instructions. (2) Many models still suffer from exposure bias (e.g., positional bias, majority label bias). (3) For questions rooted in factual, scientific, and commonsense knowledge, consistent responses are expected across multilingual queries that are semantically equivalent. Yet, most models surprisingly demonstrate inconsistent performance on these queries. (4) Multilingually-trained models have not attained "balanced multilingual" capabilities. Our endeavors underscore the need for more generalizable semantic representations and enhanced multilingual contextualization. SeaEval can serve as a launchpad for more thorough investigations and evaluations for multilingual and multicultural scenarios.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

The growing popularity of data mining catalyses the researchers to explore various exciting aspects of education. Early prediction of student performance is an emerging area among them. The researchers have used various predictors in performance modelling studies. Although prior cognition can affect student performance, establishing their relationship is still an open research challenge. Quantifying the knowledge from readily available data is the major challenge here. We have proposed a semantic approach for this purpose. Association mining on nearly 0.35 million observations establishes that prior cognition impacts the student performance. The proposed approach of measuring domain knowledge can help the early performance modelling studies to use it as a predictor.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly utilized in autonomous decision-making, where they sample options from vast action spaces. However, the heuristics that guide this sampling process remain under-explored. We study this sampling behavior and show that this underlying heuristics resembles that of human decision-making: comprising a descriptive component (reflecting statistical norm) and a prescriptive component (implicit ideal encoded in the LLM) of a concept. We show that this deviation of a sample from the statistical norm towards a prescriptive component consistently appears in concepts across diverse real-world domains like public health, and economic trends. To further illustrate the theory, we demonstrate that concept prototypes in LLMs are affected by prescriptive norms, similar to the concept of normality in humans. Through case studies and comparison with human studies, we illustrate that in real-world applications, the shift of samples toward an ideal value in LLMs' outputs can result in significantly biased decision-making, raising ethical concerns.

Humans have a natural ability to perform semantic associations with the surrounding objects in the environment. This allows them to create a mental map of the environment, allowing them to navigate on-demand when given linguistic instructions. A natural goal in Vision Language Navigation (VLN) research is to impart autonomous agents with similar capabilities. Recent works take a step towards this goal by creating a semantic spatial map representation of the environment without any labeled data. However, their representations are limited for practical applicability as they do not distinguish between different instances of the same object. In this work, we address this limitation by integrating instance-level information into spatial map representation using a community detection algorithm and utilizing word ontology learned by large language models (LLMs) to perform open-set semantic associations in the mapping representation. The resulting map representation improves the navigation performance by two-fold (233%) on realistic language commands with instance-specific descriptions compared to the baseline. We validate the practicality and effectiveness of our approach through extensive qualitative and quantitative experiments.

The evaluation of LLMs has so far focused primarily on how well they can perform different tasks such as reasoning, question-answering, paraphrasing, or translating. For most of these tasks, performance can be measured with objective metrics, such as the number of correct answers. However, other language features are not easily quantified. For example, arousal, concreteness, or gender associated with a given word, as well as the extent to which we experience words with senses and relate them to a specific sense. Those features have been studied for many years by psycholinguistics, conducting large-scale experiments with humans to produce ratings for thousands of words. This opens an opportunity to evaluate how well LLMs align with human ratings on these word features, taking advantage of existing studies that cover many different language features in a large number of words. In this paper, we evaluate the alignment of a representative group of LLMs with human ratings on two psycholinguistic datasets: the Glasgow and Lancaster norms. These datasets cover thirteen features over thousands of words. The results show that alignment is black{generally} better in the Glasgow norms evaluated (arousal, valence, dominance, concreteness, imageability, familiarity, and gender) than on the Lancaster norms evaluated (introceptive, gustatory, olfactory, haptic, auditory, and visual). This suggests a potential limitation of current LLMs in aligning with human sensory associations for words, which may be due to their lack of embodied cognition present in humans and illustrates the usefulness of evaluating LLMs with psycholinguistic datasets.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

Understanding how semantic meaning is encoded in the representation spaces of large language models is a fundamental problem in interpretability. In this paper, we study the two foundational questions in this area. First, how are categorical concepts, such as {'mammal', 'bird', 'reptile', 'fish'}, represented? Second, how are hierarchical relations between concepts encoded? For example, how is the fact that 'dog' is a kind of 'mammal' encoded? We show how to extend the linear representation hypothesis to answer these questions. We find a remarkably simple structure: simple categorical concepts are represented as simplices, hierarchically related concepts are orthogonal in a sense we make precise, and (in consequence) complex concepts are represented as polytopes constructed from direct sums of simplices, reflecting the hierarchical structure. We validate these theoretical results on the Gemma large language model, estimating representations for 957 hierarchically related concepts using data from WordNet.

Language understanding entails not just extracting the surface-level meaning of the linguistic input, but constructing rich mental models of the situation it describes. Here we propose that because processing within the brain's core language system is fundamentally limited, deeply understanding language requires exporting information from the language system to other brain regions that compute perceptual and motor representations, construct mental models, and store our world knowledge and autobiographical memories. We review the existing evidence for this hypothesis, and argue that recent progress in cognitive neuroscience provides both the conceptual foundation and the methods to directly test it, thus opening up a new strategy to reveal what it means, cognitively and neurally, to understand language.

Commonsense causality reasoning (CCR) aims at identifying plausible causes and effects in natural language descriptions that are deemed reasonable by an average person. Although being of great academic and practical interest, this problem is still shadowed by the lack of a well-posed theoretical framework; existing work usually relies on deep language models wholeheartedly, and is potentially susceptible to confounding co-occurrences. Motivated by classical causal principles, we articulate the central question of CCR and draw parallels between human subjects in observational studies and natural languages to adopt CCR to the potential-outcomes framework, which is the first such attempt for commonsense tasks. We propose a novel framework, ROCK, to Reason O(A)bout Commonsense K(C)ausality, which utilizes temporal signals as incidental supervision, and balances confounding effects using temporal propensities that are analogous to propensity scores. The ROCK implementation is modular and zero-shot, and demonstrates good CCR capabilities.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) provide a new opportunity to address the long-standing question of how concepts are represented and organized in the mind, which is central to unravelling the nature of human cognition. Here, we reframed the classic reverse dictionary task to simulate human concept inference in context and investigated the emergence of human-like conceptual representations within LLMs. We found that LLMs were able to infer concepts from definitional descriptions and construct representation spaces that converge towards a shared, context-independent structure. These representations effectively predicted human behavioural judgments and aligned well with neural activity patterns in the human brain, offering evidence for biological plausibility. These findings demonstrate that human-like conceptual representations and organization can naturally emerge from language prediction, even without real-world grounding. Our work supports the view that LLMs serve as valuable tools for understanding complex human cognition and paves the way for better alignment between artificial and human intelligence.

Reasoning is a fundamental aspect of human intelligence that plays a crucial role in activities such as problem solving, decision making, and critical thinking. In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have made significant progress in natural language processing, and there is observation that these models may exhibit reasoning abilities when they are sufficiently large. However, it is not yet clear to what extent LLMs are capable of reasoning. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the current state of knowledge on reasoning in LLMs, including techniques for improving and eliciting reasoning in these models, methods and benchmarks for evaluating reasoning abilities, findings and implications of previous research in this field, and suggestions on future directions. Our aim is to provide a detailed and up-to-date review of this topic and stimulate meaningful discussion and future work.

Understanding natural language requires common sense, one aspect of which is the ability to discern the plausibility of events. While distributional models -- most recently pre-trained, Transformer language models -- have demonstrated improvements in modeling event plausibility, their performance still falls short of humans'. In this work, we show that Transformer-based plausibility models are markedly inconsistent across the conceptual classes of a lexical hierarchy, inferring that "a person breathing" is plausible while "a dentist breathing" is not, for example. We find this inconsistency persists even when models are softly injected with lexical knowledge, and we present a simple post-hoc method of forcing model consistency that improves correlation with human plausibility judgements.

Word-level psycholinguistic norms lend empirical support to theories of language processing. However, obtaining such human-based measures is not always feasible or straightforward. One promising approach is to augment human norming datasets by using Large Language Models (LLMs) to predict these characteristics directly, a practice that is rapidly gaining popularity in psycholinguistics and cognitive science. However, the novelty of this approach (and the relative inscrutability of LLMs) necessitates the adoption of rigorous methodologies that guide researchers through this process, present the range of possible approaches, and clarify limitations that are not immediately apparent, but may, in some cases, render the use of LLMs impractical. In this work, we present a comprehensive methodology for estimating word characteristics with LLMs, enriched with practical advice and lessons learned from our own experience. Our approach covers both the direct use of base LLMs and the fine-tuning of models, an alternative that can yield substantial performance gains in certain scenarios. A major emphasis in the guide is the validation of LLM-generated data with human "gold standard" norms. We also present a software framework that implements our methodology and supports both commercial and open-weight models. We illustrate the proposed approach with a case study on estimating word familiarity in English. Using base models, we achieved a Spearman correlation of 0.8 with human ratings, which increased to 0.9 when employing fine-tuned models. This methodology, framework, and set of best practices aim to serve as a reference for future research on leveraging LLMs for psycholinguistic and lexical studies.

State-of-the-art visual grounding models can achieve high detection accuracy, but they are not designed to distinguish between all objects versus only certain objects of interest. In natural language, in order to specify a particular object or set of objects of interest, humans use determiners such as "my", "either" and "those". Determiners, as an important word class, are a type of schema in natural language about the reference or quantity of the noun. Existing grounded referencing datasets place much less emphasis on determiners, compared to other word classes such as nouns, verbs and adjectives. This makes it difficult to develop models that understand the full variety and complexity of object referencing. Thus, we have developed and released the DetermiNet dataset , which comprises 250,000 synthetically generated images and captions based on 25 determiners. The task is to predict bounding boxes to identify objects of interest, constrained by the semantics of the given determiner. We find that current state-of-the-art visual grounding models do not perform well on the dataset, highlighting the limitations of existing models on reference and quantification tasks.

Although we have witnessed impressive progress in Semantic Role Labeling (SRL), most of the research in the area is carried out assuming that the majority of predicates are verbs. Conversely, predicates can also be expressed using other parts of speech, e.g., nouns and adjectives. However, non-verbal predicates appear in the benchmarks we commonly use to measure progress in SRL less frequently than in some real-world settings -- newspaper headlines, dialogues, and tweets, among others. In this paper, we put forward a new PropBank dataset which boasts wide coverage of multiple predicate types. Thanks to it, we demonstrate empirically that standard benchmarks do not provide an accurate picture of the current situation in SRL and that state-of-the-art systems are still incapable of transferring knowledge across different predicate types. Having observed these issues, we also present a novel, manually-annotated challenge set designed to give equal importance to verbal, nominal, and adjectival predicate-argument structures. We use such dataset to investigate whether we can leverage different linguistic resources to promote knowledge transfer. In conclusion, we claim that SRL is far from "solved", and its integration with other semantic tasks might enable significant improvements in the future, especially for the long tail of non-verbal predicates, thereby facilitating further research on SRL for non-verbal predicates.

The web provides a rich, open-domain environment with textual, structural, and spatial properties. We propose a new task for grounding language in this environment: given a natural language command (e.g., "click on the second article"), choose the correct element on the web page (e.g., a hyperlink or text box). We collected a dataset of over 50,000 commands that capture various phenomena such as functional references (e.g. "find who made this site"), relational reasoning (e.g. "article by john"), and visual reasoning (e.g. "top-most article"). We also implemented and analyzed three baseline models that capture different phenomena present in the dataset.

Do machines and humans process language in similar ways? A recent line of research has hinted in the affirmative, demonstrating that human brain signals can be effectively predicted using the internal representations of language models (LMs). This is thought to reflect shared computational principles between LMs and human language processing. However, there are also clear differences in how LMs and humans acquire and use language, even if the final task they are performing is the same. Despite this, there is little work exploring systematic differences between human and machine language processing using brain data. To address this question, we examine the differences between LM representations and the human brain's responses to language, specifically by examining a dataset of Magnetoencephalography (MEG) responses to a written narrative. In doing so we identify three phenomena that, in prior work, LMs have been found to not capture well: emotional understanding, figurative language processing, and physical commonsense. By fine-tuning LMs on datasets related to these phenomena, we observe that fine-tuned LMs show improved alignment with human brain responses across these tasks. Our study implies that the observed divergences between LMs and human brains may stem from LMs' inadequate representation of these specific types of knowledge.

Humanities scholars commonly provide evidence for claims that they make about a work of literature (e.g., a novel) in the form of quotations from the work. We collect a large-scale dataset (RELiC) of 78K literary quotations and surrounding critical analysis and use it to formulate the novel task of literary evidence retrieval, in which models are given an excerpt of literary analysis surrounding a masked quotation and asked to retrieve the quoted passage from the set of all passages in the work. Solving this retrieval task requires a deep understanding of complex literary and linguistic phenomena, which proves challenging to methods that overwhelmingly rely on lexical and semantic similarity matching. We implement a RoBERTa-based dense passage retriever for this task that outperforms existing pretrained information retrieval baselines; however, experiments and analysis by human domain experts indicate that there is substantial room for improvement over our dense retriever.

Recent works have argued that high-level semantic concepts are encoded "linearly" in the representation space of large language models. In this work, we study the origins of such linear representations. To that end, we introduce a simple latent variable model to abstract and formalize the concept dynamics of the next token prediction. We use this formalism to show that the next token prediction objective (softmax with cross-entropy) and the implicit bias of gradient descent together promote the linear representation of concepts. Experiments show that linear representations emerge when learning from data matching the latent variable model, confirming that this simple structure already suffices to yield linear representations. We additionally confirm some predictions of the theory using the LLaMA-2 large language model, giving evidence that the simplified model yields generalizable insights.

We present evidence that language models can learn meaning despite being trained only to perform next token prediction on text, specifically a corpus of programs. Each program is preceded by a specification in the form of (textual) input-output examples. Working with programs enables us to precisely define concepts relevant to meaning in language (e.g., correctness and semantics), making program synthesis well-suited as an intermediate testbed for characterizing the presence (or absence) of meaning in language models. We first train a Transformer model on the corpus of programs, then probe the trained model's hidden states as it completes a program given a specification. Despite providing no inductive bias toward learning the semantics of the language, we find that a linear probe is able to extract abstractions of both current and future program states from the model states. Moreover, there is a strong, statistically significant correlation between the accuracy of the probe and the model's ability to generate a program that implements the specification. To evaluate whether the semantics are represented in the model states rather than learned by the probe, we design a novel experimental procedure that intervenes on the semantics of the language while preserving the lexicon and syntax. We also demonstrate that the model learns to generate correct programs that are, on average, shorter than those in the training set, which is evidence that language model outputs may differ from the training distribution in semantically meaningful ways. In summary, this paper does not propose any new techniques for training language models, but develops an experimental framework for and provides insights into the acquisition and representation of (formal) meaning in language models.

When faced with novel situations, people are able to marshal relevant considerations from a wide range of background knowledge and put these to use in inferences and predictions. What permits us to draw in globally relevant information and reason over it coherently? Here, we explore the hypothesis that people use a combination of distributed and symbolic representations to construct bespoke mental models tailored to novel situations. We propose a computational implementation of this idea -- a ``Model Synthesis Architecture'' (MSA) -- using language models to implement global relevance-based retrieval and model synthesis and probabilistic programs to implement bespoke, coherent world models. We evaluate our MSA as a model of human judgments on a novel reasoning dataset. The dataset -- built around a `Model Olympics` domain of sports vignettes -- tests models' capacity for human-like, open-ended reasoning by requiring (i) judgments about novel causal structures described in language; (ii) drawing on large bodies of background knowledge; and (iii) doing both in light of observations that introduce arbitrary novel variables. Our MSA approach captures human judgments better than language model-only baselines, under both direct and chain-of-thought generations from the LM that supports model synthesis. These results suggest that MSAs can be implemented in a way that mirrors people's ability to deliver locally coherent reasoning over globally relevant variables, offering a path to understanding and replicating human reasoning in open-ended domains.

We introduce the Probabilistic Worldbuilding Model (PWM), a new fully-symbolic Bayesian model of semantic parsing and reasoning, as a first step in a research program toward more domain- and task-general NLU and AI. Humans create internal mental models of their observations which greatly aid in their ability to understand and reason about a large variety of problems. In PWM, the meanings of sentences, acquired facts about the world, and intermediate steps in reasoning are all expressed in a human-readable formal language, with the design goal of interpretability. PWM is Bayesian, designed specifically to be able to generalize to new domains and new tasks. We derive and implement an inference algorithm that reads sentences by parsing and abducing updates to its latent world model that capture the semantics of those sentences, and evaluate it on two out-of-domain question-answering datasets: (1) ProofWriter and (2) a new dataset we call FictionalGeoQA, designed to be more representative of real language but still simple enough to focus on evaluating reasoning ability, while being robust against heuristics. Our method outperforms baselines on both, thereby demonstrating its value as a proof-of-concept.

Do state-of-the-art models for language understanding already have, or can they easily learn, abilities such as boolean coordination, quantification, conditionals, comparatives, and monotonicity reasoning (i.e., reasoning about word substitutions in sentential contexts)? While such phenomena are involved in natural language inference (NLI) and go beyond basic linguistic understanding, it is unclear the extent to which they are captured in existing NLI benchmarks and effectively learned by models. To investigate this, we propose the use of semantic fragments---systematically generated datasets that each target a different semantic phenomenon---for probing, and efficiently improving, such capabilities of linguistic models. This approach to creating challenge datasets allows direct control over the semantic diversity and complexity of the targeted linguistic phenomena, and results in a more precise characterization of a model's linguistic behavior. Our experiments, using a library of 8 such semantic fragments, reveal two remarkable findings: (a) State-of-the-art models, including BERT, that are pre-trained on existing NLI benchmark datasets perform poorly on these new fragments, even though the phenomena probed here are central to the NLI task. (b) On the other hand, with only a few minutes of additional fine-tuning---with a carefully selected learning rate and a novel variation of "inoculation"---a BERT-based model can master all of these logic and monotonicity fragments while retaining its performance on established NLI benchmarks.

How does language inform our downstream thinking? In particular, how do humans make meaning from language -- and how can we leverage a theory of linguistic meaning to build machines that think in more human-like ways? In this paper, we propose rational meaning construction, a computational framework for language-informed thinking that combines neural models of language with probabilistic models for rational inference. We frame linguistic meaning as a context-sensitive mapping from natural language into a probabilistic language of thought (PLoT) -- a general-purpose symbolic substrate for probabilistic, generative world modeling. Our architecture integrates two powerful computational tools that have not previously come together: we model thinking with probabilistic programs, an expressive representation for flexible commonsense reasoning; and we model meaning construction with large language models (LLMs), which support broad-coverage translation from natural language utterances to code expressions in a probabilistic programming language. We illustrate our framework in action through examples covering four core domains from cognitive science: probabilistic reasoning, logical and relational reasoning, visual and physical reasoning, and social reasoning about agents and their plans. In each, we show that LLMs can generate context-sensitive translations that capture pragmatically-appropriate linguistic meanings, while Bayesian inference with the generated programs supports coherent and robust commonsense reasoning. We extend our framework to integrate cognitively-motivated symbolic modules to provide a unified commonsense thinking interface from language. Finally, we explore how language can drive the construction of world models themselves.

We study how large language models (LLMs) ``think'' through their representation space. We propose a novel geometric framework that models an LLM's reasoning as flows -- embedding trajectories evolving where logic goes. We disentangle logical structure from semantics by employing the same natural deduction propositions with varied semantic carriers, allowing us to test whether LLMs internalize logic beyond surface form. This perspective connects reasoning with geometric quantities such as position, velocity, and curvature, enabling formal analysis in representation and concept spaces. Our theory establishes: (1) LLM reasoning corresponds to smooth flows in representation space, and (2) logical statements act as local controllers of these flows' velocities. Using learned representation proxies, we design controlled experiments to visualize and quantify reasoning flows, providing empirical validation of our theoretical framework. Our work serves as both a conceptual foundation and practical tools for studying reasoning phenomenon, offering a new lens for interpretability and formal analysis of LLMs' behavior.

The rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) like ChatGPT has advanced natural language processing, yet concerns about cognitive biases are growing. In this paper, we investigate the anchoring effect, a cognitive bias where the mind relies heavily on the first information as anchors to make affected judgments. We explore whether LLMs are affected by anchoring, the underlying mechanisms, and potential mitigation strategies. To facilitate studies at scale on the anchoring effect, we introduce a new dataset, SynAnchors. Combining refined evaluation metrics, we benchmark current widely used LLMs. Our findings show that LLMs' anchoring bias exists commonly with shallow-layer acting and is not eliminated by conventional strategies, while reasoning can offer some mitigation. This recontextualization via cognitive psychology urges that LLM evaluations focus not on standard benchmarks or over-optimized robustness tests, but on cognitive-bias-aware trustworthy evaluation.

One characteristic that makes humans superior to modern artificially intelligent models is the ability to interpret images beyond what is visually apparent. Consider the following two natural language search queries - (i) "a queue of customers patiently waiting to buy ice cream" and (ii) "a queue of tourists going to see a famous Mughal architecture in India." Interpreting these queries requires one to reason with (i) Commonsense such as interpreting people as customers or tourists, actions as waiting to buy or going to see; and (ii) Fact or world knowledge associated with named visual entities, for example, whether the store in the image sells ice cream or whether the landmark in the image is a Mughal architecture located in India. Such reasoning goes beyond just visual recognition. To enable both commonsense and factual reasoning in the image search, we present a unified framework, namely Knowledge Retrieval-Augmented Multimodal Transformer (KRAMT), that treats the named visual entities in an image as a gateway to encyclopedic knowledge and leverages them along with natural language query to ground relevant knowledge. Further, KRAMT seamlessly integrates visual content and grounded knowledge to learn alignment between images and search queries. This unified framework is then used to perform image search requiring commonsense and factual reasoning. The retrieval performance of KRAMT is evaluated and compared with related approaches on a new dataset we introduce - namely COFAR. We make our code and dataset available at https://vl2g.github.io/projects/cofar

Natural language inference (NLI) is a fundamental NLP task, investigating the entailment relationship between two texts. Popular NLI datasets present the task at sentence-level. While adequate for testing semantic representations, they fall short for testing contextual reasoning over long texts, which is a natural part of the human inference process. We introduce ConTRoL, a new dataset for ConTextual Reasoning over Long texts. Consisting of 8,325 expert-designed "context-hypothesis" pairs with gold labels, ConTRoL is a passage-level NLI dataset with a focus on complex contextual reasoning types such as logical reasoning. It is derived from competitive selection and recruitment test (verbal reasoning test) for police recruitment, with expert level quality. Compared with previous NLI benchmarks, the materials in ConTRoL are much more challenging, involving a range of reasoning types. Empirical results show that state-of-the-art language models perform by far worse than educated humans. Our dataset can also serve as a testing-set for downstream tasks like Checking Factual Correctness of Summaries.

Thanks to rapid progress in artificial intelligence, we have entered an era when technology and philosophy intersect in interesting ways. Sitting squarely at the centre of this intersection are large language models (LLMs). The more adept LLMs become at mimicking human language, the more vulnerable we become to anthropomorphism, to seeing the systems in which they are embedded as more human-like than they really are. This trend is amplified by the natural tendency to use philosophically loaded terms, such as "knows", "believes", and "thinks", when describing these systems. To mitigate this trend, this paper advocates the practice of repeatedly stepping back to remind ourselves of how LLMs, and the systems of which they form a part, actually work. The hope is that increased scientific precision will encourage more philosophical nuance in the discourse around artificial intelligence, both within the field and in the public sphere.

Semantic code search is the task of retrieving a code snippet given a textual description of its functionality. Recent work has been focused on using similarity metrics between neural embeddings of text and code. However, current language models are known to struggle with longer, compositional text, and multi-step reasoning. To overcome this limitation, we propose supplementing the query sentence with a layout of its semantic structure. The semantic layout is used to break down the final reasoning decision into a series of lower-level decisions. We use a Neural Module Network architecture to implement this idea. We compare our model - NS3 (Neuro-Symbolic Semantic Search) - to a number of baselines, including state-of-the-art semantic code retrieval methods, and evaluate on two datasets - CodeSearchNet and Code Search and Question Answering. We demonstrate that our approach results in more precise code retrieval, and we study the effectiveness of our modular design when handling compositional queries.

Language models can store vast amounts of factual knowledge, but their ability to use this knowledge for logical reasoning remains questionable. This paper explores a language model's ability to manipulate its stored knowledge during inference. We focus on four manipulation types: retrieval (e.g., "What is person A's attribute X"), classification (e.g., "Is A's attribute X even or odd?"), comparison (e.g., "Is A greater than B in attribute X?") and inverse search (e.g., "Which person's attribute X equals T?") We observe that pre-trained language models like GPT2/3/4 excel in knowledge retrieval but struggle with simple classification or comparison tasks unless Chain of Thoughts (CoTs) are employed during both training and inference. They also perform poorly in inverse knowledge search, irrespective of the prompts. Our primary contribution is a synthetic dataset for a controlled experiment that confirms these inherent weaknesses: a language model cannot efficiently manipulate knowledge from pre-training data, even when such knowledge is perfectly stored and fully extractable in the models, and despite adequate instruct fine-tuning.

Understanding how humans conceptualize and categorize natural objects offers critical insights into perception and cognition. With the advent of Large Language Models (LLMs), a key question arises: can these models develop human-like object representations from linguistic and multimodal data? In this study, we combined behavioral and neuroimaging analyses to explore the relationship between object concept representations in LLMs and human cognition. We collected 4.7 million triplet judgments from LLMs and Multimodal LLMs (MLLMs) to derive low-dimensional embeddings that capture the similarity structure of 1,854 natural objects. The resulting 66-dimensional embeddings were stable, predictive, and exhibited semantic clustering similar to human mental representations. Remarkably, the dimensions underlying these embeddings were interpretable, suggesting that LLMs and MLLMs develop human-like conceptual representations of objects. Further analysis showed strong alignment between model embeddings and neural activity patterns in brain regions such as EBA, PPA, RSC, and FFA. This provides compelling evidence that the object representations in LLMs, while not identical to human ones, share fundamental similarities that reflect key aspects of human conceptual knowledge. Our findings advance the understanding of machine intelligence and inform the development of more human-like artificial cognitive systems.

Code-switching is a common phenomenon of alternating between different languages in the same utterance, thought, or conversation. We posit that humans code-switch because they feel more comfortable talking about certain topics and domains in one language than another. With the rise of knowledge-intensive language models, we ask ourselves the next, natural question: Could models hold more knowledge on some topics in some language X? More importantly, could we improve reasoning by changing the language that reasoning is performed in? We coin the term Language Specific Knowledge (LSK) to represent this phenomenon. As ethnic cultures tend to develop alongside different languages, we employ culture-specific datasets (that contain knowledge about cultural and social behavioral norms). We find that language models can perform better when using chain-of-thought reasoning in some languages other than English, sometimes even better in low-resource languages. Paired with previous works showing that semantic similarity does not equate to representational similarity, we hypothesize that culturally specific texts occur more abundantly in corresponding languages, enabling specific knowledge to occur only in specific "expert" languages. Motivated by our initial results, we design a simple methodology called LSKExtractor to benchmark the language-specific knowledge present in a language model and, then, exploit it during inference. We show our results on various models and datasets, showing an average relative improvement of 10% in accuracy. Our research contributes to the open-source development of language models that are inclusive and more aligned with the cultural and linguistic contexts in which they are deployed.

Language serves as a vehicle for conveying thought, enabling communication among individuals. The ability to distinguish between diverse concepts, identify fairness and injustice, and comprehend a range of legal notions fundamentally relies on logical reasoning. Large Language Models (LLMs) attempt to emulate human language understanding and generation, but their competency in logical reasoning remains limited. This paper seeks to address the philosophical question: How can we effectively teach logical reasoning to LLMs while maintaining a deep understanding of the intricate relationship between language and logic? By focusing on bolstering LLMs' capabilities in logical reasoning, we aim to expand their applicability in law and other logic-intensive disciplines. To this end, we propose a Reinforcement Learning from Logical Feedback (RLLF) approach, which serves as a potential framework for refining LLMs' reasoning capacities. Through RLLF and a revised evaluation methodology, we explore new avenues for research in this domain and contribute to the development of LLMs capable of handling complex legal reasoning tasks while acknowledging the fundamental connection between language and logic.

Current Large Language Models (LLMs) are unparalleled in their ability to generate grammatically correct, fluent text. LLMs are appearing rapidly, and debates on LLM capacities have taken off, but reflection is lagging behind. Thus, in this position paper, we first zoom in on the debate and critically assess three points recurring in critiques of LLM capacities: i) that LLMs only parrot statistical patterns in the training data; ii) that LLMs master formal but not functional language competence; and iii) that language learning in LLMs cannot inform human language learning. Drawing on empirical and theoretical arguments, we show that these points need more nuance. Second, we outline a pragmatic perspective on the issue of `real' understanding and intentionality in LLMs. Understanding and intentionality pertain to unobservable mental states we attribute to other humans because they have pragmatic value: they allow us to abstract away from complex underlying mechanics and predict behaviour effectively. We reflect on the circumstances under which it would make sense for humans to similarly attribute mental states to LLMs, thereby outlining a pragmatic philosophical context for LLMs as an increasingly prominent technology in society.

Recent work has demonstrated that semantics specified by pretraining data influence how representations of different concepts are organized in a large language model (LLM). However, given the open-ended nature of LLMs, e.g., their ability to in-context learn, we can ask whether models alter these pretraining semantics to adopt alternative, context-specified ones. Specifically, if we provide in-context exemplars wherein a concept plays a different role than what the pretraining data suggests, do models reorganize their representations in accordance with these novel semantics? To answer this question, we take inspiration from the theory of conceptual role semantics and define a toy "graph tracing" task wherein the nodes of the graph are referenced via concepts seen during training (e.g., apple, bird, etc.) and the connectivity of the graph is defined via some predefined structure (e.g., a square grid). Given exemplars that indicate traces of random walks on the graph, we analyze intermediate representations of the model and find that as the amount of context is scaled, there is a sudden re-organization from pretrained semantic representations to in-context representations aligned with the graph structure. Further, we find that when reference concepts have correlations in their semantics (e.g., Monday, Tuesday, etc.), the context-specified graph structure is still present in the representations, but is unable to dominate the pretrained structure. To explain these results, we analogize our task to energy minimization for a predefined graph topology, providing evidence towards an implicit optimization process to infer context-specified semantics. Overall, our findings indicate scaling context-size can flexibly re-organize model representations, possibly unlocking novel capabilities.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into society, their alignment with human morals is crucial. To better understand this alignment, we created a large corpus of human- and LLM-generated responses to various moral scenarios. We found a misalignment between human and LLM moral assessments; although both LLMs and humans tended to reject morally complex utilitarian dilemmas, LLMs were more sensitive to personal framing. We then conducted a quantitative user study involving 230 participants (N=230), who evaluated these responses by determining whether they were AI-generated and assessed their agreement with the responses. Human evaluators preferred LLMs' assessments in moral scenarios, though a systematic anti-AI bias was observed: participants were less likely to agree with judgments they believed to be machine-generated. Statistical and NLP-based analyses revealed subtle linguistic differences in responses, influencing detection and agreement. Overall, our findings highlight the complexities of human-AI perception in morally charged decision-making.

We present a large-scale study of gender bias in occupation classification, a task where the use of machine learning may lead to negative outcomes on peoples' lives. We analyze the potential allocation harms that can result from semantic representation bias. To do so, we study the impact on occupation classification of including explicit gender indicators---such as first names and pronouns---in different semantic representations of online biographies. Additionally, we quantify the bias that remains when these indicators are "scrubbed," and describe proxy behavior that occurs in the absence of explicit gender indicators. As we demonstrate, differences in true positive rates between genders are correlated with existing gender imbalances in occupations, which may compound these imbalances.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) often struggle to ground reasoning in perceptual evidence. We present a systematic study of perception strategies-explicit, implicit, visual, and textual-across four multimodal benchmarks and two MLLMs. Our findings show that explicit perception, especially when paired with textual cues, consistently yields the best improvements, particularly for smaller models. Based on this insight, we propose VTPerception-R1, a unified two-stage framework that decouples perception from reasoning. Stage 1 introduces perception-augmented fine-tuning, and Stage 2 applies perception-aware reinforcement learning with novel visual, textual, and consistency rewards. Experiments demonstrate that VTPerception-R1 significantly improves reasoning accuracy and robustness across diverse tasks, offering a scalable and auditable solution for perception-grounded multimodal reasoning. Our code is available at: https://github.com/yizhuoDi/VTPerceprion-R1.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across diverse tasks by encoding vast amounts of factual knowledge. However, they are still prone to hallucinations, generating incorrect or misleading information, often accompanied by high uncertainty. Existing methods for hallucination detection primarily focus on quantifying internal uncertainty, which arises from missing or conflicting knowledge within the model. However, hallucinations can also stem from external uncertainty, where ambiguous user queries lead to multiple possible interpretations. In this work, we introduce Semantic Volume, a novel mathematical measure for quantifying both external and internal uncertainty in LLMs. Our approach perturbs queries and responses, embeds them in a semantic space, and computes the determinant of the Gram matrix of the embedding vectors, capturing their dispersion as a measure of uncertainty. Our framework provides a generalizable and unsupervised uncertainty detection method without requiring white-box access to LLMs. We conduct extensive experiments on both external and internal uncertainty detection, demonstrating that our Semantic Volume method consistently outperforms existing baselines in both tasks. Additionally, we provide theoretical insights linking our measure to differential entropy, unifying and extending previous sampling-based uncertainty measures such as the semantic entropy. Semantic Volume is shown to be a robust and interpretable approach to improving the reliability of LLMs by systematically detecting uncertainty in both user queries and model responses.

The recent phenomenal success of language models has reinvigorated machine learning research, and large sequence models such as transformers are being applied to a variety of domains. One important problem class that has remained relatively elusive however is purposeful adaptive behavior. Currently there is a common perception that sequence models "lack the understanding of the cause and effect of their actions" leading them to draw incorrect inferences due to auto-suggestive delusions. In this report we explain where this mismatch originates, and show that it can be resolved by treating actions as causal interventions. Finally, we show that in supervised learning, one can teach a system to condition or intervene on data by training with factual and counterfactual error signals respectively.

We present a study on how and where personas -- defined by distinct sets of human characteristics, values, and beliefs -- are encoded in the representation space of large language models (LLMs). Using a range of dimension reduction and pattern recognition methods, we first identify the model layers that show the greatest divergence in encoding these representations. We then analyze the activations within a selected layer to examine how specific personas are encoded relative to others, including their shared and distinct embedding spaces. We find that, across multiple pre-trained decoder-only LLMs, the analyzed personas show large differences in representation space only within the final third of the decoder layers. We observe overlapping activations for specific ethical perspectives -- such as moral nihilism and utilitarianism -- suggesting a degree of polysemy. In contrast, political ideologies like conservatism and liberalism appear to be represented in more distinct regions. These findings help to improve our understanding of how LLMs internally represent information and can inform future efforts in refining the modulation of specific human traits in LLM outputs. Warning: This paper includes potentially offensive sample statements.

Recent reinforcement-learning frameworks for visual perception policy have begun to incorporate intermediate reasoning chains expressed in natural language. Empirical observations indicate that such purely linguistic intermediate reasoning often reduces performance on perception tasks. We argue that the core issue lies not in reasoning per se but in the form of reasoning: while these chains perform semantic reasoning in an unstructured linguistic space, visual perception requires reasoning in a spatial and object-centric space. In response, we introduce Artemis, a perception-policy learning framework that performs structured proposal-based reasoning, where each intermediate step is represented as a (label, bounding-box) pair capturing a verifiable visual state. This design enables explicit tracking of intermediate states, direct supervision for proposal quality, and avoids ambiguity introduced by language-based reasoning. Artemis is built on Qwen2.5-VL-3B, achieves strong performance on grounding and detection task and exhibits substantial generalization to counting and geometric-perception tasks. The consistent improvements across these diverse settings confirm that aligning reasoning with spatial representations enhances perception-policy learning. Owing to its strengthened visual reasoning, Artemis also achieves competitive performance on general MLLM benchmarks, illustrating that spatially grounded reasoning provides a principled route toward scalable and general perception policies.

Superlatives are used to single out elements with a maximal/minimal property. Semantically, superlatives perform a set comparison: something (or some things) has the min/max property out of a set. As such, superlatives provide an ideal phenomenon for studying implicit phenomena and discourse restrictions. While this comparison set is often not explicitly defined, its (implicit) restrictions can be inferred from the discourse context the expression appears in. In this work we provide an extensive computational study on the semantics of superlatives. We propose a unified account of superlative semantics which allows us to derive a broad-coverage annotation schema. Using this unified schema we annotated a multi-domain dataset of superlatives and their semantic interpretations. We specifically focus on interpreting implicit or ambiguous superlative expressions, by analyzing how the discourse context restricts the set of interpretations. In a set of experiments we then analyze how well models perform at variations of predicting superlative semantics, with and without context. We show that the fine-grained semantics of superlatives in context can be challenging for contemporary models, including GPT-4.

Conceptual knowledge is fundamental to human cognition and knowledge bases. However, existing knowledge probing works only focus on evaluating factual knowledge of pre-trained language models (PLMs) and ignore conceptual knowledge. Since conceptual knowledge often appears as implicit commonsense behind texts, designing probes for conceptual knowledge is hard. Inspired by knowledge representation schemata, we comprehensively evaluate conceptual knowledge of PLMs by designing three tasks to probe whether PLMs organize entities by conceptual similarities, learn conceptual properties, and conceptualize entities in contexts, respectively. For the tasks, we collect and annotate 24k data instances covering 393 concepts, which is COPEN, a COnceptual knowledge Probing bENchmark. Extensive experiments on different sizes and types of PLMs show that existing PLMs systematically lack conceptual knowledge and suffer from various spurious correlations. We believe this is a critical bottleneck for realizing human-like cognition in PLMs. COPEN and our codes are publicly released at https://github.com/THU-KEG/COPEN.

Reasoning large language models have recently achieved state-of-the-art performance in many fields. However, their long-form chain-of-thought reasoning creates interpretability challenges as each generated token depends on all previous ones, making the computation harder to decompose. We argue that analyzing reasoning traces at the sentence level is a promising approach to understanding reasoning processes. We present three complementary attribution methods: (1) a black-box method measuring each sentence's counterfactual importance by comparing final answers across 100 rollouts conditioned on the model generating that sentence or one with a different meaning; (2) a white-box method of aggregating attention patterns between pairs of sentences, which identified ``broadcasting'' sentences that receive disproportionate attention from all future sentences via ``receiver'' attention heads; (3) a causal attribution method measuring logical connections between sentences by suppressing attention toward one sentence and measuring the effect on each future sentence's tokens. Each method provides evidence for the existence of thought anchors, reasoning steps that have outsized importance and that disproportionately influence the subsequent reasoning process. These thought anchors are typically planning or backtracking sentences. We provide an open-source tool (www.thought-anchors.com) for visualizing the outputs of our methods, and present a case study showing converging patterns across methods that map how a model performs multi-step reasoning. The consistency across methods demonstrates the potential of sentence-level analysis for a deeper understanding of reasoning models.

Implicit bias refers to automatic or spontaneous mental processes that shape perceptions, judgments, and behaviors. Previous research examining `implicit bias' in large language models (LLMs) has often approached the phenomenon differently than how it is studied in humans by focusing primarily on model outputs rather than on model processing. To examine model processing, we present a method called the Reasoning Model Implicit Association Test (RM-IAT) for studying implicit bias-like patterns in reasoning models: LLMs that employ step-by-step reasoning to solve complex tasks. Using this method, we find that reasoning models require more tokens when processing association-incompatible information compared to association-compatible information. These findings suggest AI systems harbor patterns in processing information that are analogous to human implicit bias. We consider the implications of these implicit bias-like patterns for their deployment in real-world applications.

Linguistic commentary on LLMs, heavily influenced by the theoretical frameworks of de Saussure and Chomsky, is often speculative and unproductive. Critics challenge whether LLMs can legitimately model language, citing the need for "deep structure" or "grounding" to achieve an idealized linguistic "competence." We argue for a radical shift in perspective towards the empiricist principles of Witold Ma\'nczak, a prominent general and historical linguist. He defines language not as a "system of signs" or a "computational system of the brain" but as the totality of all that is said and written. Above all, he identifies frequency of use of particular language elements as language's primary governing principle. Using his framework, we challenge prior critiques of LLMs and provide a constructive guide for designing, evaluating, and interpreting language models.

Many computer scientists use the aggregated answers of online workers to represent ground truth. Prior work has shown that aggregation methods such as majority voting are effective for measuring relatively objective features. For subjective features such as semantic connotation, online workers, known for optimizing their hourly earnings, tend to deteriorate in the quality of their responses as they work longer. In this paper, we aim to address this issue by proposing a quality-aware semantic data annotation system. We observe that with timely feedback on workers' performance quantified by quality scores, better informed online workers can maintain the quality of their labeling throughout an extended period of time. We validate the effectiveness of the proposed annotation system through i) evaluating performance based on an expert-labeled dataset, and ii) demonstrating machine learning tasks that can lead to consistent learning behavior with 70%-80% accuracy. Our results suggest that with our system, researchers can collect high-quality answers of subjective semantic features at a large scale.

Current captioning datasets, focus on object-centric captions, describing the visible objects in the image, often ending up stating the obvious (for humans), e.g. "people eating food in a park". Although these datasets are useful to evaluate the ability of Vision & Language models to recognize the visual content, they lack in expressing trivial abstract concepts, e.g. "people having a picnic". Such concepts are licensed by human's personal experience and contribute to forming common sense assumptions. We present the High-Level Dataset; a dataset extending 14997 images of the COCO dataset with 134973 human-annotated (high-level) abstract captions collected along three axes: scenes, actions and rationales. We describe and release such dataset and we show how it can be used to assess models' multimodal grounding of abstract concepts and enrich models' visio-lingusitic representations. Moreover, we describe potential tasks enabled by this dataset involving high- and low-level concepts interactions.

Large language models (LLMs) are currently at the forefront of intertwining AI systems with human communication and everyday life. Therefore, it is of great importance to evaluate their emerging abilities. In this study, we show that LLMs like GPT-3 exhibit behavior that strikingly resembles human-like intuition - and the cognitive errors that come with it. However, LLMs with higher cognitive capabilities, in particular ChatGPT and GPT-4, learned to avoid succumbing to these errors and perform in a hyperrational manner. For our experiments, we probe LLMs with the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) as well as semantic illusions that were originally designed to investigate intuitive decision-making in humans. Our study demonstrates that investigating LLMs with methods from psychology has the potential to reveal otherwise unknown emergent traits.

As humans, we consistently engage in interactions with our peers and receive feedback in the form of natural language. This language feedback allows us to reflect on our actions, maintain appropriate behavior, and rectify our errors. The question arises naturally: can we use language feedback to align large language models (LLMs)? In contrast to previous research that aligns LLMs with reward or preference data, we present the first systematic exploration of alignment through the lens of language feedback (i.e., judgment). We commence with an in-depth investigation of potential methods that can be adapted for aligning LLMs with judgments, revealing that these methods are unable to fully capitalize on the judgments. To facilitate more effective utilization of judgments, we propose a novel framework, Contrastive Unlikelihood Training (CUT), that allows for fine-grained inappropriate content detection and correction based on judgments. Our offline alignment results show that, with merely 1317 off-the-shelf judgment data, CUT (LLaMA2-13b) can beat the 175B DaVinci003 and surpass the best baseline by 52.34 points on AlpacaEval. The online alignment results demonstrate that CUT can align LLMs (LLaMA2-chat-13b) in an iterative fashion using model-specific judgment data, with a steady performance improvement from 81.09 to 91.36 points on AlpacaEval. Our analysis further suggests that judgments exhibit greater potential than rewards for LLM alignment and warrant future research.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) strive to achieve a profound, human-like understanding of and interaction with the physical world, but often exhibit a shallow and incoherent integration when acquiring information (Perception) and conducting reasoning (Cognition). This disconnect leads to a spectrum of reasoning failures, with hallucination being the most prominent. Collectively, these issues expose a fundamental challenge: the ability to process pixels does not yet confer the ability to construct a coherent, credible internal world model. To systematically dissect and address this challenge, this survey introduces a novel and unified analytical framework: ``From Perception to Cognition." We deconstruct the complex process of vision-language interactive understanding into two interdependent layers: Perception, the foundational ability to accurately extract visual information and achieve fine-grained alignment with textual instructions; and Cognition, the higher-order capability for proactive, multi-step, goal-oriented reasoning built upon this perceptual foundation, the core of which is the formation of a dynamic observe-think-verify reasoning loop. Guided by this framework, this paper systematically analyzes the key bottlenecks of current MLLMs at both layers. It surveys the landscape of cutting-edge methods designed to address these challenges, spanning from techniques that enhance low-level visual representations to those that improve high-level reasoning paradigms. Furthermore, we review critical benchmarks and delineate future research directions. This survey aims to provide the research community with a clear, structured perspective for understanding the intrinsic limitations of current MLLMs and to illuminate the path toward building next-generation models capable of deep reasoning and a genuine understanding of the world.

We propose using automatically generated natural language definitions of contextualised word usages as interpretable word and word sense representations. Given a collection of usage examples for a target word, and the corresponding data-driven usage clusters (i.e., word senses), a definition is generated for each usage with a specialised Flan-T5 language model, and the most prototypical definition in a usage cluster is chosen as the sense label. We demonstrate how the resulting sense labels can make existing approaches to semantic change analysis more interpretable, and how they can allow users -- historical linguists, lexicographers, or social scientists -- to explore and intuitively explain diachronic trajectories of word meaning. Semantic change analysis is only one of many possible applications of the `definitions as representations' paradigm. Beyond being human-readable, contextualised definitions also outperform token or usage sentence embeddings in word-in-context semantic similarity judgements, making them a new promising type of lexical representation for NLP.

Reviewing the progress in artificial intelligence over the past decade, various significant advances (e.g. object detection, image generation, large language models) have enabled AI systems to produce more semantically meaningful outputs and achieve widespread adoption in internet scenarios. Nevertheless, AI systems still struggle when it comes to understanding and interacting with the physical world. This reveals an important issue: relying solely on semantic-level concepts learned from internet data (e.g. texts, images) to understand the physical world is far from sufficient -- machine intelligence currently lacks an effective way to learn about the physical world. This research introduces the idea of analytic concept -- representing the concepts related to the physical world through programs of mathematical procedures, providing machine intelligence a portal to perceive, reason about, and interact with the physical world. Except for detailing the design philosophy and providing guidelines for the application of analytic concepts, this research also introduce about the infrastructure that has been built around analytic concepts. I aim for my research to contribute to addressing these questions: What is a proper abstraction of general concepts in the physical world for machine intelligence? How to systematically integrate structured priors with neural networks to constrain AI systems to comply with physical laws?

In this paper we argue that key, often sensational and misleading, claims regarding linguistic capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) are based on at least two unfounded assumptions; the assumption of language completeness and the assumption of data completeness. Language completeness assumes that a distinct and complete thing such as `a natural language' exists, the essential characteristics of which can be effectively and comprehensively modelled by an LLM. The assumption of data completeness relies on the belief that a language can be quantified and wholly captured by data. Work within the enactive approach to cognitive science makes clear that, rather than a distinct and complete thing, language is a means or way of acting. Languaging is not the kind of thing that can admit of a complete or comprehensive modelling. From an enactive perspective we identify three key characteristics of enacted language; embodiment, participation, and precariousness, that are absent in LLMs, and likely incompatible in principle with current architectures. We argue that these absences imply that LLMs are not now and cannot in their present form be linguistic agents the way humans are. We illustrate the point in particular through the phenomenon of `algospeak', a recently described pattern of high stakes human language activity in heavily controlled online environments. On the basis of these points, we conclude that sensational and misleading claims about LLM agency and capabilities emerge from a deep misconception of both what human language is and what LLMs are.

Fairness and environmental impact are important research directions for the sustainable development of artificial intelligence. However, while each topic is an active research area in natural language processing (NLP), there is a surprising lack of research on the interplay between the two fields. This lacuna is highly problematic, since there is increasing evidence that an exclusive focus on fairness can actually hinder environmental sustainability, and vice versa. In this work, we shed light on this crucial intersection in NLP by (1) investigating the efficiency of current fairness approaches through surveying example methods for reducing unfair stereotypical bias from the literature, and (2) evaluating a common technique to reduce energy consumption (and thus environmental impact) of English NLP models, knowledge distillation (KD), for its impact on fairness. In this case study, we evaluate the effect of important KD factors, including layer and dimensionality reduction, with respect to: (a) performance on the distillation task (natural language inference and semantic similarity prediction), and (b) multiple measures and dimensions of stereotypical bias (e.g., gender bias measured via the Word Embedding Association Test). Our results lead us to clarify current assumptions regarding the effect of KD on unfair bias: contrary to other findings, we show that KD can actually decrease model fairness.

Large Language Model (LLM)-based judgments leverage powerful LLMs to efficiently evaluate candidate content and provide judgment scores. However, the inherent biases and vulnerabilities of LLM-generated judgments raise concerns, underscoring the urgent need for distinguishing them in sensitive scenarios like academic peer reviewing. In this work, we propose and formalize the task of judgment detection and systematically investigate the detectability of LLM-generated judgments. Unlike LLM-generated text detection, judgment detection relies solely on judgment scores and candidates, reflecting real-world scenarios where textual feedback is often unavailable in the detection process. Our preliminary analysis shows that existing LLM-generated text detection methods perform poorly given their incapability to capture the interaction between judgment scores and candidate content -- an aspect crucial for effective judgment detection. Inspired by this, we introduce J-Detector, a lightweight and transparent neural detector augmented with explicitly extracted linguistic and LLM-enhanced features to link LLM judges' biases with candidates' properties for accurate detection. Experiments across diverse datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of J-Detector and show how its interpretability enables quantifying biases in LLM judges. Finally, we analyze key factors affecting the detectability of LLM-generated judgments and validate the practical utility of judgment detection in real-world scenarios.

Large language models (LLMs) solve complex problems yet fail on simpler variants, suggesting they achieve correct outputs through mechanisms fundamentally different from human reasoning. To understand this gap, we synthesize cognitive science research into a taxonomy of 28 cognitive elements spanning reasoning invariants, meta-cognitive controls, representations for organizing reasoning & knowledge, and transformation operations. We introduce a fine-grained evaluation framework and conduct the first large-scale empirical analysis of 192K traces from 18 models across text, vision, and audio, complemented by 54 human think-aloud traces, which we make publicly available. We find that models under-utilize cognitive elements correlated with success, narrowing to rigid sequential processing on ill-structured problems where diverse representations and meta-cognitive monitoring are critical. Human traces show more abstraction and conceptual processing, while models default to surface-level enumeration. Meta-analysis of 1.6K LLM reasoning papers reveals the research community concentrates on easily quantifiable elements (sequential organization: 55%, decomposition: 60%) but neglecting meta-cognitive controls (self-awareness: 16%) that correlate with success. Models possess behavioral repertoires associated with success but fail to deploy them spontaneously. Leveraging these patterns, we develop test-time reasoning guidance that automatically scaffold successful structures, improving performance by up to 66.7% on complex problems. By establishing a shared vocabulary between cognitive science and LLM research, our framework enables systematic diagnosis of reasoning failures and principled development of models that reason through robust cognitive mechanisms rather than spurious shortcuts, while providing tools to test theories of human cognition at scale.

Dense retrieval has become a prominent method to obtain relevant context or world knowledge in open-domain NLP tasks. When we use a learned dense retriever on a retrieval corpus at inference time, an often-overlooked design choice is the retrieval unit in which the corpus is indexed, e.g. document, passage, or sentence. We discover that the retrieval unit choice significantly impacts the performance of both retrieval and downstream tasks. Distinct from the typical approach of using passages or sentences, we introduce a novel retrieval unit, proposition, for dense retrieval. Propositions are defined as atomic expressions within text, each encapsulating a distinct factoid and presented in a concise, self-contained natural language format. We conduct an empirical comparison of different retrieval granularity. Our results reveal that proposition-based retrieval significantly outperforms traditional passage or sentence-based methods in dense retrieval. Moreover, retrieval by proposition also enhances the performance of downstream QA tasks, since the retrieved texts are more condensed with question-relevant information, reducing the need for lengthy input tokens and minimizing the inclusion of extraneous, irrelevant information.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback serves as a crucial bridge, aligning large language models with human and societal values. This alignment requires a vast corpus of human feedback to learn a reward model, which is subsequently used to finetune language models. However, we have identified that the reward model often finds shortcuts to bypass its intended objectives, misleadingly assuming that humans prefer longer responses. The emergence of length bias often induces the model to favor longer outputs, yet it doesn't equate to an increase in helpful information within these outputs. In this paper, we propose an innovative solution, applying the Product-of-Experts (PoE) technique to separate reward modeling from the influence of sequence length. In our framework, the main expert concentrates on understanding human intents, while the biased expert targets the identification and capture of length bias. To further enhance the learning of bias, we introduce perturbations into the bias-focused expert, disrupting the flow of semantic information. Experimental results validate the effectiveness of our approach, indicating that language model performance is improved, irrespective of sequence length.

The ability to acquire latent semantics is one of the key properties that determines the performance of language models. One convenient approach to invoke this ability is to prepend metadata (e.g. URLs, domains, and styles) at the beginning of texts in the pre-training data, making it easier for the model to access latent semantics before observing the entire text. Previous studies have reported that this technique actually improves the performance of trained models in downstream tasks; however, this improvement has been observed only in specific downstream tasks, without consistent enhancement in average next-token prediction loss. To understand this phenomenon, we closely investigate how prepending metadata during pre-training affects model performance by examining its behavior using artificial data. Interestingly, we found that this approach produces both positive and negative effects on the downstream tasks. We demonstrate that the effectiveness of the approach depends on whether latent semantics can be inferred from the downstream task's prompt. Specifically, through investigations using data generated by probabilistic context-free grammars, we show that training with metadata helps improve model's performance when the given context is long enough to infer the latent semantics. In contrast, the technique negatively impacts performance when the context lacks the necessary information to make an accurate posterior inference.

In this paper, we investigate whether Large Language Models (LLMs) actively recall or retrieve their internal repositories of factual knowledge when faced with reasoning tasks. Through an analysis of LLMs' internal factual recall at each reasoning step via Knowledge Neurons, we reveal that LLMs fail to harness the critical factual associations under certain circumstances. Instead, they tend to opt for alternative, shortcut-like pathways to answer reasoning questions. By manually manipulating the recall process of parametric knowledge in LLMs, we demonstrate that enhancing this recall process directly improves reasoning performance whereas suppressing it leads to notable degradation. Furthermore, we assess the effect of Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, a powerful technique for addressing complex reasoning tasks. Our findings indicate that CoT can intensify the recall of factual knowledge by encouraging LLMs to engage in orderly and reliable reasoning. Furthermore, we explored how contextual conflicts affect the retrieval of facts during the reasoning process to gain a comprehensive understanding of the factual recall behaviors of LLMs. Code and data will be available soon.

To enable Large Language Models (LLMs) to function as conscious agents with generalizable reasoning capabilities, it is crucial that they possess the reasoning ability to comprehend situational changes (transitions) in distribution triggered by environmental factors or actions from other agents. Despite its fundamental significance, this ability remains underexplored due to the complexity of modeling infinite possible changes in an event and their associated distributions, coupled with the lack of benchmark data with situational transitions. Addressing these gaps, we propose a novel formulation of reasoning with distributional changes as a three-step discriminative process, termed as MetAphysical ReaSoning. We then introduce the first-ever benchmark, MARS, comprising three tasks corresponding to each step. These tasks systematically assess LLMs' capabilities in reasoning the plausibility of (i) changes in actions, (ii) states caused by changed actions, and (iii) situational transitions driven by changes in action. Extensive evaluations with 20 (L)LMs of varying sizes and methods indicate that all three tasks in this process pose significant challenges, even for state-of-the-art LLMs and LMs after fine-tuning. Further analyses reveal potential causes for the underperformance of LLMs and demonstrate that pre-training them on large-scale conceptualization taxonomies can potentially enhance their metaphysical reasoning capabilities. Our data and models are publicly accessible at https://github.com/HKUST-KnowComp/MARS.

A diversity of tasks use language models trained on semantic similarity data. While there are a variety of datasets that capture semantic similarity, they are either constructed from modern web data or are relatively small datasets created in the past decade by human annotators. This study utilizes a novel source, newly digitized articles from off-copyright, local U.S. newspapers, to assemble a massive-scale semantic similarity dataset spanning 70 years from 1920 to 1989 and containing nearly 400M positive semantic similarity pairs. Historically, around half of articles in U.S. local newspapers came from newswires like the Associated Press. While local papers reproduced articles from the newswire, they wrote their own headlines, which form abstractive summaries of the associated articles. We associate articles and their headlines by exploiting document layouts and language understanding. We then use deep neural methods to detect which articles are from the same underlying source, in the presence of substantial noise and abridgement. The headlines of reproduced articles form positive semantic similarity pairs. The resulting publicly available HEADLINES dataset is significantly larger than most existing semantic similarity datasets and covers a much longer span of time. It will facilitate the application of contrastively trained semantic similarity models to a variety of tasks, including the study of semantic change across space and time.

Drawing on contemporary pragmatist philosophy and linguistic theories on cognition, meaning, and communication, this paper presents a dynamic, metasemantic-metapragmatic taxonomy for grounding and conceptualizing human-like multimodal communicative alignment. The framework is rooted in contemporary developments of the three basic communicative capacities initially identified by American logician and pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce: iconic (sensory and perceptual qualities), indexical (contextual and sociocultural associations), and rule-like (symbolic and intuitive reasoning). Expanding on these developments, I introduce the concept of indexical contextualization and propose the principle of "contextualization directionality" for characterizing the crucial metapragmatic capacity for maintaining, navigating, or transitioning between semantic and pragmatic modes of multimodal communication. I contend that current cognitive-social computational and engineering methodologies disproportionately emphasize the semantic/metasemantic domain, overlooking the pivotal role of metapragmatic indexicality in traversing the semantic-pragmatic spectrum of communication. The framework's broader implications for intentionality, identity, affect, and ethics in within-modal and cross-modal human-machine alignment are also discussed.

The degree of semantic relatedness of two units of language has long been considered fundamental to understanding meaning. Additionally, automatically determining relatedness has many applications such as question answering and summarization. However, prior NLP work has largely focused on semantic similarity, a subset of relatedness, because of a lack of relatedness datasets. In this paper, we introduce a dataset for Semantic Textual Relatedness, STR-2022, that has 5,500 English sentence pairs manually annotated using a comparative annotation framework, resulting in fine-grained scores. We show that human intuition regarding relatedness of sentence pairs is highly reliable, with a repeat annotation correlation of 0.84. We use the dataset to explore questions on what makes sentences semantically related. We also show the utility of STR-2022 for evaluating automatic methods of sentence representation and for various downstream NLP tasks. Our dataset, data statement, and annotation questionnaire can be found at: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7599667

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

A key component of in-context reasoning is the ability of language models (LMs) to bind entities for later retrieval. For example, an LM might represent "Ann loves pie" by binding "Ann" to "pie", allowing it to later retrieve "Ann" when asked "Who loves pie?" Prior research on short lists of bound entities found strong evidence that LMs implement such retrieval via a positional mechanism, where "Ann" is retrieved based on its position in context. In this work, we find that this mechanism generalizes poorly to more complex settings; as the number of bound entities in context increases, the positional mechanism becomes noisy and unreliable in middle positions. To compensate for this, we find that LMs supplement the positional mechanism with a lexical mechanism (retrieving "Ann" using its bound counterpart "pie") and a reflexive mechanism (retrieving "Ann" through a direct pointer). Through extensive experiments on nine models and ten binding tasks, we uncover a consistent pattern in how LMs mix these mechanisms to drive model behavior. We leverage these insights to develop a causal model combining all three mechanisms that estimates next token distributions with 95% agreement. Finally, we show that our model generalizes to substantially longer inputs of open-ended text interleaved with entity groups, further demonstrating the robustness of our findings in more natural settings. Overall, our study establishes a more complete picture of how LMs bind and retrieve entities in-context.

Large language models (LLMs) can acquire new knowledge through fine-tuning, but this process exhibits a puzzling duality: models can generalize remarkably from new facts, yet are also prone to hallucinating incorrect information. However, the reasons for this phenomenon remain poorly understood. In this work, we argue that both behaviors stem from a single mechanism known as out-of-context reasoning (OCR): the ability to deduce implications by associating concepts, even those without a causal link. Our experiments across five prominent LLMs confirm that OCR indeed drives both generalization and hallucination, depending on whether the associated concepts are causally related. To build a rigorous theoretical understanding of this phenomenon, we then formalize OCR as a synthetic factual recall task. We empirically show that a one-layer single-head attention-only transformer with factorized output and value matrices can learn to solve this task, while a model with combined weights cannot, highlighting the crucial role of matrix factorization. Our theoretical analysis shows that the OCR capability can be attributed to the implicit bias of gradient descent, which favors solutions that minimize the nuclear norm of the combined output-value matrix. This mathematical structure explains why the model learns to associate facts and implications with high sample efficiency, regardless of whether the correlation is causal or merely spurious. Ultimately, our work provides a theoretical foundation for understanding the OCR phenomenon, offering a new lens for analyzing and mitigating undesirable behaviors from knowledge injection.

Language Models are the core for almost any Natural Language Processing system nowadays. One of their particularities is their contextualized representations, a game changer feature when a disambiguation between word senses is necessary. In this paper we aim to explore to what extent language models are capable of discerning among senses at inference time. We performed this analysis by prompting commonly used Languages Models such as BERT or RoBERTa to perform the task of Word Sense Disambiguation (WSD). We leverage the relation between word senses and domains, and cast WSD as a textual entailment problem, where the different hypothesis refer to the domains of the word senses. Our results show that this approach is indeed effective, close to supervised systems.

Recent studies show that instruction tuning and learning from human feedback improve the abilities of large language models (LMs) dramatically. While these tuning methods can make models generate high-quality text, we conjecture that more implicit cognitive biases may arise in these fine-tuned models. Our work provides evidence that these fine-tuned models exhibit biases that were absent or less pronounced in their pretrained predecessors. We examine the extent of this phenomenon in three cognitive biases - the decoy effect, the certainty effect, and the belief bias - all of which are known to influence human decision-making and reasoning. Our findings highlight the presence of these biases in various models, especially those that have undergone instruction tuning, such as Flan-T5, GPT3.5, and GPT4. This research constitutes a step toward comprehending cognitive biases in instruction-tuned LMs, which is crucial for the development of more reliable and unbiased language models.

This paper reviews the architecture and implementation methods of agents powered by large language models (LLMs). Motivated by the limitations of traditional LLMs in real-world tasks, the research aims to explore patterns to develop "agentic" LLMs that can automate complex tasks and bridge the performance gap with human capabilities. Key components include a perception system that converts environmental percepts into meaningful representations; a reasoning system that formulates plans, adapts to feedback, and evaluates actions through different techniques like Chain-of-Thought and Tree-of-Thought; a memory system that retains knowledge through both short-term and long-term mechanisms; and an execution system that translates internal decisions into concrete actions. This paper shows how integrating these systems leads to more capable and generalized software bots that mimic human cognitive processes for autonomous and intelligent behavior.