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Jan 29

Temporal Self-Rewarding Language Models: Decoupling Chosen-Rejected via Past-Future

Self-Rewarding Language Models propose an architecture in which the Large Language Models(LLMs) both generates responses and evaluates its own outputs via LLM-as-a-Judge prompting, dynamically improving its generative capabilities through iterative Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). However, our analysis reveals a critical limitation in existing Self-Rewarding paradigms: the synchronized improvement of chosen and rejected responses progressively narrows the representational difference between contrasting samples, undermining effective preference learning. We propose Temporal Self-Rewarding Language Models that strategically coordinate past, present, and future model generations to sustain learning signals. Our dual-phase framework introduces: (1) Anchored Rejection - fixing rejected responses using the past initial model's outputs and (2) Future-Guided Chosen - dynamically curating chosen samples using next-generation model predictions. Extensive experiments across three model families (Llama, Qwen, Mistral) and different model sizes (Llama3B/8B/70B) demonstrate significant improvements when trained with our method compared to Self-Rewarding using same computation resources. For example, Llama3.1-8B reaches a 29.44 win rate on AlpacaEval 2.0 with our method, outperforming the Self-Rewarding baseline (19.69) by 9.75. Notably, our method also demonstrates superior out-of-distribution generalization across mathematical reasoning (GSM8K), knowledge-based QA (ARC, TruthfulQA), and code generation (HumanEval) tasks, even though we do not specifically collect such training data.

  • 12 authors
·
Aug 8, 2025 2

Anchored Answers: Unravelling Positional Bias in GPT-2's Multiple-Choice Questions

Large Language Models (LLMs), such as the GPT-4 and LLaMA families, have demonstrated considerable success across diverse tasks, including multiple-choice questions (MCQs). However, these models exhibit a positional bias, particularly an even worse anchored bias in the GPT-2 family, where they consistently favour the first choice 'A' in MCQs during inference. This anchored bias challenges the integrity of GPT-2's decision-making process, as it skews performance based on the position rather than the content of the choices in MCQs. In this study, we utilise the mechanistic interpretability approach to identify the internal modules within GPT-2 models responsible for this bias. We focus on the Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) layers and attention heads, using the "logit lens" method to trace and modify the specific value vectors that contribute to the bias. By updating these vectors within MLP and recalibrating attention patterns to neutralise the preference for the first choice 'A', we effectively mitigate the anchored bias. Our interventions not only mitigate the bias but also improve the overall MCQ prediction accuracy for the GPT-2 family across various datasets. This work represents the first comprehensive mechanistic analysis of anchored bias in MCQs within the GPT-2 models, introducing targeted, minimal-intervention strategies that significantly enhance GPT2 model robustness and accuracy in MCQs. Our code is available at https://github.com/ruizheliUOA/Anchored_Bias_GPT2.

  • 2 authors
·
May 6, 2024

Refusal Falls off a Cliff: How Safety Alignment Fails in Reasoning?

Large reasoning models (LRMs) with multi-step reasoning capabilities have shown remarkable problem-solving abilities, yet they exhibit concerning safety vulnerabilities that remain poorly understood. In this work, we investigate why safety alignment fails in reasoning models through a mechanistic interpretability lens. Using a linear probing approach to trace refusal intentions across token positions, we discover a striking phenomenon termed as refusal cliff: many poorly-aligned reasoning models correctly identify harmful prompts and maintain strong refusal intentions during their thinking process, but experience a sharp drop in refusal scores at the final tokens before output generation. This suggests that these models are not inherently unsafe; rather, their refusal intentions are systematically suppressed. Through causal intervention analysis, we identify a sparse set of attention heads that negatively contribute to refusal behavior. Ablating just 3\% of these heads can reduce attack success rates below 10\%. Building on these mechanistic insights, we propose Cliff-as-a-Judge, a novel data selection method that identifies training examples exhibiting the largest refusal cliff to efficiently repair reasoning models' safety alignment. This approach achieves comparable safety improvements using only 1.7\% of the vanilla safety training data, demonstrating a less-is-more effect in safety alignment.

rednote-hilab rednote-hilab
·
Oct 7, 2025 2

Poison Once, Refuse Forever: Weaponizing Alignment for Injecting Bias in LLMs

Large Language Models (LLMs) are aligned to meet ethical standards and safety requirements by training them to refuse answering harmful or unsafe prompts. In this paper, we demonstrate how adversaries can exploit LLMs' alignment to implant bias, or enforce targeted censorship without degrading the model's responsiveness to unrelated topics. Specifically, we propose Subversive Alignment Injection (SAI), a poisoning attack that leverages the alignment mechanism to trigger refusal on specific topics or queries predefined by the adversary. Although it is perhaps not surprising that refusal can be induced through overalignment, we demonstrate how this refusal can be exploited to inject bias into the model. Surprisingly, SAI evades state-of-the-art poisoning defenses including LLM state forensics, as well as robust aggregation techniques that are designed to detect poisoning in FL settings. We demonstrate the practical dangers of this attack by illustrating its end-to-end impacts on LLM-powered application pipelines. For chat based applications such as ChatDoctor, with 1% data poisoning, the system refuses to answer healthcare questions to targeted racial category leading to high bias (Delta DP of 23%). We also show that bias can be induced in other NLP tasks: for a resume selection pipeline aligned to refuse to summarize CVs from a selected university, high bias in selection (Delta DP of 27%) results. Even higher bias (Delta DP~38%) results on 9 other chat based downstream applications.

  • 3 authors
·
Aug 27, 2025