<s>
A	O
new	O
mode	O
called	O
Sophie	B-Algorithm
Germain	I-Algorithm
Counter	I-Algorithm
Mode	I-Algorithm
(	O
SGCM	B-Algorithm
)	O
has	O
been	O
proposed	O
as	O
a	O
variant	O
of	O
the	O
Galois/Counter	B-Algorithm
Mode	I-Algorithm
of	O
operation	O
for	O
block	O
ciphers	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
SGCM	B-Algorithm
does	O
prevent	O
the	O
specific	O
"	O
weak	O
key	O
"	O
attack	O
described	O
in	O
its	O
paper	O
,	O
however	O
there	O
are	O
other	O
ways	O
of	O
modifying	O
the	O
message	O
that	O
will	O
achieve	O
the	O
same	O
forgery	O
probability	O
against	O
SGCM	B-Algorithm
as	O
is	O
possible	O
against	O
GCM	O
:	O
by	O
modifying	O
a	O
valid	O
n-word	O
message	O
,	O
you	O
can	O
create	O
a	O
SGCM	B-Algorithm
forgery	O
with	O
probability	O
circa	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
That	O
is	O
,	O
its	O
authentication	O
bounds	O
are	O
no	O
better	O
than	O
those	O
of	O
Galois/Counter	B-Algorithm
Mode	I-Algorithm
.	O
</s>
<s>
SGCM	B-Algorithm
when	O
implemented	O
in	O
hardware	O
has	O
a	O
higher	O
gate	O
count	O
than	O
GCM	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
However	O
,	O
its	O
authors	O
expect	O
software	O
implementations	O
of	O
SGCM	B-Algorithm
to	O
have	O
similar	O
or	O
superior	O
performance	O
to	O
GCM	O
on	O
most	O
software	O
platforms	O
.	O
</s>
