<s>
In	O
cryptography	O
,	O
the	O
open	B-Protocol
vote	I-Protocol
network	I-Protocol
(	O
or	O
OV-net	B-Protocol
)	O
is	O
a	O
secure	B-Protocol
multi-party	I-Protocol
computation	I-Protocol
protocol	O
to	O
compute	O
the	O
boolean-count	O
function	O
:	O
namely	O
,	O
given	O
a	O
set	O
of	O
binary	O
values	O
0/1	O
in	O
the	O
input	O
,	O
compute	O
the	O
total	O
count	O
of	O
ones	O
without	O
revealing	O
each	O
individual	O
value	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
It	O
extends	O
Hao	O
and	O
Zieliński	O
's	O
anonymous	B-Protocol
veto	I-Protocol
network	I-Protocol
protocol	O
by	O
allowing	O
each	O
participant	O
to	O
count	O
the	O
number	O
of	O
veto	O
votes	O
(	O
i.e.	O
,	O
input	O
one	O
in	O
a	O
boolean-OR	O
function	O
)	O
while	O
preserving	O
the	O
anonymity	O
of	O
those	O
who	O
have	O
voted	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
For	O
example	O
,	O
a	O
Schnorr	B-Algorithm
group	I-Algorithm
can	O
be	O
used	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
Unlike	O
other	O
secure	B-Protocol
multi-party	I-Protocol
computation	I-Protocol
protocols	O
that	O
typically	O
require	O
pairwise	O
secret	O
and	O
authenticated	O
channels	O
between	O
participants	O
in	O
addition	O
to	O
an	O
authenticated	O
public	O
channel	O
,	O
OV-net	B-Protocol
only	O
requires	O
an	O
authenticated	O
public	O
channel	O
available	O
to	O
every	O
participant	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
Round	O
1	O
:	O
each	O
participant	O
selects	O
a	O
random	O
value	O
and	O
publishes	O
the	O
ephemeral	O
public	O
key	O
together	O
with	O
a	O
zero-knowledge	B-Protocol
proof	I-Protocol
for	O
the	O
proof	O
of	O
the	O
knowledge	O
of	O
the	O
exponent	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
Such	O
proofs	O
may	O
be	O
realized	O
by	O
using	O
Schnorr	O
non-interactive	O
zero-knowledge	B-Protocol
proofs	I-Protocol
as	O
described	O
in	O
RFC	O
8235	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
Round	O
2	O
:	O
each	O
participant	O
publishes	O
where	O
is	O
either	O
0	O
or	O
1	O
,	O
together	O
with	O
a	O
1-out-of-2	O
zero	B-Protocol
knowledge	I-Protocol
proof	I-Protocol
for	O
the	O
proof	O
that	O
is	O
one	O
of	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
Such	O
1-out-of-2	O
proofs	O
may	O
be	O
realized	O
by	O
using	O
Cramer	O
,	O
Gennaro	O
,	O
and	O
Schoenmakers	O
 '	O
zero-knowledge	B-Protocol
proof	I-Protocol
technique	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
In	O
terms	O
of	O
the	O
computational	O
load	O
and	O
bandwidth	O
usage	O
,	O
OV-net	B-Protocol
is	O
also	O
the	O
most	O
efficient	O
among	O
related	O
techniques	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
The	O
OV-net	B-Protocol
protocol	O
guarantees	O
the	O
secrecy	O
of	O
an	O
input	O
bit	O
unless	O
all	O
other	O
input	O
bits	O
are	O
known	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
A	O
straightforward	O
application	O
of	O
OV-net	B-Protocol
is	O
to	O
build	O
a	O
boardroom	O
voting	O
system	O
,	O
where	O
the	O
election	O
is	O
run	O
by	O
voters	O
themselves	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
Additional	O
zero-knowledge	B-Protocol
proofs	I-Protocol
are	O
needed	O
if	O
the	O
voter	O
is	O
limited	O
to	O
vote	O
for	O
only	O
one	O
candidate	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
In	O
this	O
case	O
,	O
a	O
more	O
general	O
1-out-of-n	O
zero-knowledge	B-Protocol
proof	I-Protocol
is	O
used	O
instead	O
where	O
n	O
is	O
the	O
number	O
of	O
candidates	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
A	O
prototype	O
implementation	O
of	O
OV-net	B-Protocol
was	O
presented	O
by	O
McCorry	O
,	O
Shahandashti	O
,	O
and	O
Hao	O
at	O
Financial	O
Cryptography'17	O
as	O
a	O
smart	O
contract	O
over	O
Ethereum	O
's	O
blockchain	O
.	O
</s>
