<s>
NOEKEON	B-Algorithm
is	O
a	O
family	O
of	O
two	O
block	O
ciphers	O
designed	O
by	O
Joan	O
Daemen	O
,	O
Michaël	O
Peeters	O
,	O
Gilles	O
Van	O
Assche	O
and	O
Vincent	O
Rijmen	O
and	O
submitted	O
to	O
the	O
NESSIE	O
project	O
in	O
September	O
2000	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
The	O
two	O
ciphers	O
are	O
"	O
direct	O
mode	O
"	O
NOEKEON	B-Algorithm
,	O
to	O
be	O
used	O
for	O
maximum	O
efficiency	O
where	O
related-key	O
attacks	O
are	O
not	O
possible	O
,	O
and	O
"	O
indirect	O
mode	O
"	O
NOEKEON	B-Algorithm
where	O
they	O
are	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
NOEKEON	B-Algorithm
has	O
a	O
128-bit	O
block	O
and	O
key	O
size	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
Each	O
round	O
of	O
NOEKEON	B-Algorithm
employs	O
a	O
sequence	O
of	O
self-inverse	O
transformations	O
which	O
can	O
be	O
implemented	O
easily	O
in	O
hardware	O
or	O
software	O
,	O
even	O
where	O
differential	O
power	O
analysis	O
is	O
a	O
concern	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
Cryptanalysis	O
by	O
Lars	O
Knudsen	O
and	O
Håvard	O
Raddum	O
in	O
April	O
2001	O
showed	O
that	O
"	O
indirect	O
mode	O
"	O
NOEKEON	B-Algorithm
was	O
still	O
vulnerable	O
to	O
certain	O
peculiar	O
kinds	O
of	O
related-key	O
cryptanalysis	O
,	O
and	O
showed	O
weaknesses	O
in	O
NOEKEON-variant	O
ciphers	O
which	O
cast	O
doubt	O
on	O
the	O
design	O
strategy	O
behind	O
NOEKEON	B-Algorithm
and	O
thus	O
on	O
its	O
security	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
that	O
the	O
related-key	O
attacks	O
required	O
to	O
break	O
"	O
indirect	O
mode	O
"	O
NOEKEON	B-Algorithm
are	O
not	O
a	O
practical	O
concern	O
,	O
and	O
that	O
it	O
is	O
as	O
a	O
result	O
of	O
deliberate	O
design	O
that	O
NOEKEON	B-Algorithm
is	O
not	O
vulnerable	O
to	O
the	O
attacks	O
that	O
break	O
the	O
variant	O
ciphers	O
;	O
they	O
assert	O
that	O
NOEKEON	B-Algorithm
is	O
still	O
a	O
good	O
and	O
useful	O
cipher	O
.	O
</s>
