<s>
Cross-site	B-Protocol
cooking	I-Protocol
is	O
a	O
type	O
of	O
browser	B-Protocol
exploit	I-Protocol
which	O
allows	O
a	O
site	O
attacker	O
to	O
set	O
a	O
cookie	B-Application
for	O
a	O
browser	B-Application
into	O
the	O
cookie	B-Application
domain	O
of	O
another	O
site	O
server	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
Cross-site	B-Protocol
cooking	I-Protocol
can	O
be	O
used	O
to	O
perform	O
session	B-Protocol
fixation	I-Protocol
attacks	O
,	O
as	O
a	O
malicious	O
site	O
can	O
fixate	O
the	O
session	O
identifier	O
cookie	B-Application
of	O
another	O
site	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
Other	O
attack	O
scenarios	O
may	O
also	O
be	O
possible	O
,	O
for	O
example	O
:	O
attacker	O
may	O
know	O
of	O
a	O
security	O
vulnerability	O
in	O
server	O
,	O
which	O
is	O
exploitable	O
using	O
a	O
cookie	B-Application
.	O
</s>
<s>
an	O
administrator	O
password	O
which	O
attacker	O
does	O
not	O
know	O
,	O
cross-site	B-Protocol
cooking	I-Protocol
could	O
be	O
used	O
to	O
fool	O
innocent	O
users	O
to	O
unintentionally	O
perform	O
the	O
attack	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
Cross-site	B-Protocol
cooking	I-Protocol
is	O
similar	O
in	O
concept	O
to	O
cross-site	O
scripting	O
,	O
cross-site	B-Protocol
request	I-Protocol
forgery	I-Protocol
,	O
cross-site	B-Protocol
tracing	I-Protocol
,	O
cross-zone	B-Protocol
scripting	I-Protocol
etc.	O
,	O
in	O
that	O
it	O
involves	O
the	O
ability	O
to	O
move	O
data	O
or	O
code	O
between	O
different	O
web	O
sites	O
(	O
or	O
in	O
some	O
cases	O
,	O
between	O
e-mail	O
/	O
instant	O
messages	O
and	O
sites	O
)	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
These	O
problems	O
are	O
linked	O
to	O
the	O
fact	O
that	O
a	O
web	B-Application
browser	I-Application
is	O
a	O
shared	O
platform	O
for	O
different	O
information	O
/	O
applications	O
/	O
sites	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
Only	O
logical	O
security	O
boundaries	O
maintained	O
by	O
browsers	B-Application
ensures	O
that	O
one	O
site	O
cannot	O
corrupt	O
or	O
steal	O
data	O
from	O
another	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
However	O
a	O
browser	B-Protocol
exploit	I-Protocol
such	O
as	O
cross-site	B-Protocol
cooking	I-Protocol
can	O
be	O
used	O
to	O
move	O
things	O
across	O
the	O
logical	O
security	O
boundaries	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
The	O
name	O
cross-site	B-Protocol
cooking	I-Protocol
and	O
concept	O
was	O
presented	O
by	O
Michał	O
Zalewski	O
in	O
2006	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
The	O
name	O
is	O
a	O
mix	O
of	O
"	B-Application
cookie	I-Application
"	I-Application
and	O
"	O
cross-site	O
"	O
,	O
attempting	O
to	O
describe	O
the	O
nature	O
of	O
cookies	B-Application
being	O
set	O
across	O
sites	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
In	O
Michał	O
Zalewski	O
's	O
article	O
of	O
2006	O
,	O
was	O
credited	O
for	O
his	O
discovery	O
,	O
who	O
in	O
May	O
1998	O
reported	O
a	O
cookie	B-Application
domain	O
related	O
vulnerability	O
to	O
vendors	O
.	O
</s>
<s>
Benjamin	O
Franz	O
published	O
the	O
vulnerability	O
and	O
discussed	O
it	O
mainly	O
as	O
a	O
way	O
to	O
circumvent	O
"	O
privacy	O
protection	O
"	O
mechanisms	O
in	O
popular	O
browsers	B-Application
.	O
</s>
<s>
Michał	O
Zalewski	O
concluded	O
that	O
the	O
bug	O
,	O
8	O
years	O
later	O
,	O
was	O
still	O
present	O
(	O
unresolved	O
)	O
in	O
some	O
browsers	B-Application
and	O
could	O
be	O
exploited	O
for	O
cross-site	B-Protocol
cooking	I-Protocol
.	O
</s>
