235 Minn. 232 (1951)
GEORGE N. ERICKSON
v.
NORTHERN MINNESOTA NATIONAL BANK OF DULUTH.[1]
No. 35,420.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
December 7, 1951.
Smythe & Lindquist, for appellant.
Nye, Montague, Sullivan, Atmore & McMillan and Richard H. Hastings, for respondent.
CHRISTIANSON, JUSTICE.
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment for defendant entered in a personal injury action pursuant to the jury's verdict.
*233 Plaintiff (George N. Erickson), his wife, and three children occupied, as tenants, one of the apartments in an apartment building owned and operated by defendant in the city of Duluth. The building is located at 316 East Second street. The door at its main entrance is about 6 feet 9 inches high, 3 1/2 feet wide, and has a wooden frame 2 1/4 inches thick. There was a plate-glass panel in the door which extended from about knee height to within a few inches from the top of the door, a height of 53 inches. The glass panel was one-quarter of an inch thick and 30 inches wide, with the two top corners of the glass clipped off diagonally. The door opened from the inside. A large-sized Corbin door control was attached to the door to regulate its opening and closing.
On July 27, 1949, plaintiff, his wife, and Mrs. Edith Carlson, another tenant of the building, were sitting just outside of the building on one of two low cement retention walls about six inches wide which extend about six or seven feet out from the building on either side of the main entrance doorway. Just inside the doorway and a few feet from where the Ericksons and Mrs. Carlson were sitting, two daughters of the Ericksons were playing with two other children. The main entrance door was latched open so that it would not close unless released. One of the playmates of the Erickson girls released the latch which held the door open, and at that instant Barbara Erickson, plaintiff's three-year-old daughter, put her hand on the doorframe into which the door was about to close. Plaintiff, upon observing his daughter's peril, immediately arose from where he was seated and proceeded quickly to the doorway. He extended his right arm so as to prevent the door from closing on his daughter's hand. When his hand came in contact with the glass panel, the glass broke and the lower two-thirds of the panel came out of the door. Plaintiff went partially through the door, so that his body straddled the door with the upper half inside the door and the lower half remaining outside. As a result, plaintiff sustained cuts upon his right forearm and knee and other injuries.
The testimony for plaintiff at the trial was to the effect that the glass panel was loose in the door and that for some time prior to *234 July 27, 1949, the Corbin control which hydraulically regulated the closing of the door had not been operating properly; that the door would close very rapidly up to a point about six inches from the frame of the door, when it would stop abruptly, tremble, and then close slowly. However, the testimony in defendant's behalf was that this was a normal and proper action for a door of this size equipped with a Corbin control; that the wooden moldings which held the glass panel in the door were tight and secure; and that there was nothing defective with either the door or the door control at the time of plaintiff's injury.
The issues of negligence and contributory negligence were submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in defendant's favor. Thereafter, plaintiff made a motion in the alternative for a dismissal of his action without prejudice or a new trial. Both motions were denied. At the trial plaintiff had moved for such a dismissal, but his motion was denied. On appeal, plaintiff has assigned as error a number of the court's rulings made at the trial.
1. One of the principal errors assigned is the exclusion of certain expert testimony offered by plaintiff in his case in chief.
John Rossberg, a building contractor, was called as an expert witness by plaintiff. His preliminary testimony disclosed that he had considerable experience in the repair of door controls, and that the evening prior to the trial he had examined the main entrance door to the building in question. Thereafter he was asked: "Did you make a test as to how it works, how it functions?" Defendant objected to the question on the grounds of remoteness and lack of proper foundation. The objection was sustained, although the previous testimony of other witnesses had shown that the door closed in the same manner at the time of trial as it had during the latter part of July 1949. Plaintiff offered to prove by the witness that the control mechanism on the door was defective and that the door did not close properly. Since Rossberg's examination of the door was not made until about six months after the accident, and since no previous showing had been made that the door or the door control was in the same condition as just prior to plaintiff's injury, the *235 trial court was of the opinion that the proof offered was too remote. At most, the reception of such proof was discretionary with the trial court, and it was not error to exclude the proffered testimony for remoteness. Cf. Kugling v. Williamson, 231 Minn. 135, 42 N.W. (2d) 534; Winters v. M. & St. L.R. Co. 131 Minn. 181, 154 N.W. 964. Moreover, Rossberg was later permitted to give his opinion of the cause of the door operating as it had during the latter part of July 1949, according to the preceding witnesses. He attributed the door's irregular movement in closing to a lack of proper hydraulic action in the Corbin control itself, and suggested the probability that the fluid within the control mechanism itself had leaked out. Since the more pertinent proof was later received in the form of opinion evidence from the witness, the ruling complained of would not constitute reversible error in any event.
Later, in his direct examination, Rossberg was shown plaintiff's exhibit A, a piece of broken plate glass about 8 inches long and 3 1/2 inches wide, which previously had been received in evidence. This exhibit was a piece of the glass panel that had been in the door. It had been swept up after the accident by defendant's janitor and thrown into the garbage, where it had been picked up by plaintiff's wife the same day. Although the evidence disclosed that the exhibit was in the same condition as it was when she found it, no showing was made as to what portion of the glass panel it had come from. There were strips of hard putty on the edge and along one side of the exhibit. Rossberg was asked a series of hypothetical questions predicated upon his examination of the exhibit. The questions called for his opinion as to (1) whether putty had been used on both sides of the glass panel when it was originally installed in the door; (2) whether on the day of the accident the glass panel was securely and firmly held in the door; and (3) whether the door at that time was in a good or bad state of repair. Defendant's objections to these questions on the grounds of no proper foundation and that they assumed a state of facts not in evidence were sustained by the trial court. The rulings with respect to the last two questions were obviously correct. Since no offer of proof was made and the record *236 fails to disclose that the location of the putty on the glass panel contributed in any way to the happening of this unfortunate accident, the court's ruling with respect to the first question must also be sustained.
2. Plaintiff further contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a dismissal of his action without prejudice prior to the final submission of the case. Such a motion is authorized by M.S.A. 546.39(3), and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Althen v. Tarbox, 48 Minn. 1, 50 N.W. 828; Lando v. C. St. P.M. & O. Ry. Co. 81 Minn. 279, 83 N.W. 1089. Although plaintiff's motion was made before he had rested his case in chief, the trial had progressed into its second day when the dismissal without prejudice was requested. The only ground urged in support of the motion was surprise at the court's rulings excluding the foregoing expert testimony. In view of defendant's opposition to the motion and all the circumstances presented, the denial of plaintiff's motion was not an abuse of discretion.
3. At the conclusion of all the testimony, plaintiff moved that the jury be permitted to view the premises and particularly the door in question. This was denied. The granting of a jury view is discretionary with the trial court. § 546.12; Carl Lindquist & Carlson, Inc. v. Johanson, 182 Minn. 529, 235 N.W. 267; 6 Dunnell, Dig. § 9721. Clearly, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny this request.
4. Although no objection was made at the trial, and none is urged here, with respect to the trial court's general charge to the jury, objection is made to the supplemental charge given in response to the jury's request for additional instructions. The record discloses that after the jury had been considering the case for some time it returned to the courtroom for further instructions and, in the absence of counsel, the following proceedings took place:
"Juror Pratt: There seem to be some doubt in the minds of quite a number of us as to what extent we have to be reasonably certain that the defendant was negligent. To what extent must we *237 base that opinion on the testimony that was presented or to what extent we can go on what we think the situation was?
"The Court: Probably this will explain it. The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to prove the negligence of the defendant, and he must prove it by the weight of evidence. This is the portion I read this morning: You are instructed that the burden of proving negligence is based [sic placed] on the plaintiff, that is Mr. Erickson. In the event you find the evidence on the issue of the burden of proof is evenly balanced, it is your duty to bring in a verdict for the defendant. If we looked at the scales of justice, as if they were here, and you felt that the evidence was evenly divided, you would have to bring in a verdict for the defendant. The only way you could bring in a verdict for the plaintiff is if you felt that the scales preponderated in favor of the plaintiff on the question of negligence, the weight of the evidence would have to be on the side of the plaintiff before you could bring in a verdict against the defendant. If you felt the scales were even, you would have to bring in a verdict for the defendant. Does that answer your question?
"Juror Pratt: As far as I am concerned. I don't know about the rest of the jury.
"The Court: All right, that is all. You may return to the jury room."
Plaintiff does not contend that the supplemental instructions were not a correct statement of the law on burden of proof. However, he primarily assigns as error what he feels to be undue repetition of the phrase "bring in a verdict for the defendant," or words implying that result. While argumentative instructions are to be condemned, viewing these instructions in light of the court's general charge to the jury and from a practical, common-sense point of view, as we should (Mailand v. Mailand, 83 Minn. 453, 455, 86 N.W. 445; Roach v. Roth, 156 Minn. 107, 110, 194 N.W. 322, 323, 324), we find no reversible error.
It is true that the court failed to directly answer that part of Juror Pratt's question which was concerned with the propriety of determining defendant's negligence on the basis of what the jury *238 thought the situation to be at the time of plaintiff's injury. The court might properly have further instructed the jury that it could consider only the evidence that had been received at the trial. However, since this had been adequately covered in the general charge and was clearly implied by the supplemental instructions given and since it affirmatively appears that the jurors were satisfied with the answer given in response to their questions, the failure to give such an instruction was, at the most, harmless error.
The remaining assignments of error have been carefully considered, but we find no grounds for reversal presented.
Affirmed.
NOTES
[1]  Reported in 50 N.W. (2d) 489.


55 F.2d 851 (1932)
CHAMBERS, Mayor, et al.
v.
BACHTEL.
No. 6228.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
February 5, 1932.
*852 T. D. Cobbs, Jr., C. K. Quin, and W. C. Davis, all of San Antonio, Tex., for appellants.
O. B. Black, of San Antonio, Tex., for appellee.
Before BRYAN, SIBLEY, and HUTCHESON, Circuit Judges.
BRYAN, Circuit Judge.
Appellee, a citizen of Georgia, filed a bill to enjoin appellants from preventing the operation of certain machines known as the "Mills O. K. Mint Venders." Appellants are the district attorney, county attorney, and sheriff of Bexar county, Tex., the mayor and chief of police of the city of San Antonio, which is located within that county, and a number of other county and city law enforcement officers. They moved to dismiss on the ground that this was a suit against the state of Texas, and, upon that motion being denied, they answered that appellee's machines were gambling devices. An injunction as prayed for was issued upon final hearing.
The machines are all alike. When a nickel is placed in a slot and a lever is pressed, three cylinders revolve independently of each other, but side by side, and mint of the value of approximately 5 cents is always automatically delivered, and sometimes, but not always, tokens are also automatically delivered. The machine can also be operated by one of those tokens, and, when it is, the cylinders revolve as before, but it does not deliver any mint; it may or may not deliver more tokens. The tokens are stamped on one side, "Property of O. K. Vender," and on the other, "Loaned for amusement only." There are printed on each of the cylinders the same pictures of fruits and other objects, and whether any more tokens are paid out, and if so how many, depends upon what combinations of printed objects come to rest side by side when the cylinders cease to revolve. The bill alleges that the tokens have no money or exchange value, and that the only object of playing the machines with tokens is the entertainment to be derived from seeing the wheels go round, looking at the pictures, and reading amusing sayings. By the removal of a pin, coins ranging from a nickel to a half-dollar can be substituted for tokens, and then the machine becomes a regular gambling device. The bill further alleges that appellee had contracts by which he had agreed to lease on a profit sharing basis 34 machines to people who operated places of business in San Antonio, and was negotiating contracts for a lease of 86 additional machines on the same basis. Injunction was prayed for on the ground that it was the intention of appellants as law enforcement officers to seize and destroy the machines, in violation of appellee's rights under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Article 619 of the Revised Criminal Statutes of Texas (Penal Code 1925) makes it a criminal offense to keep or exhibit for the purpose of gaming a slot machine or other device. Article 636 (Penal Code 1925) makes it the duty of the sheriff or other peace officer to seize all gambling devices, and after due notice to destroy them. The constitutionality of these statutes is not attacked, but it is claimed that appellants were exceeding the valid authority conferred upon them. In such a case the federal courts have jurisdiction. Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 391, 14 S. Ct. 1047, 38 L. Ed. 1014. Ordinarily, courts of equity will not enjoin proceedings taken in the enforcement of criminal laws, In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 8 S. Ct. 482, 31 L. Ed. 402; but they may do so in extreme cases in order to protect property rights. Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 32 S. Ct. 340, 56 L. Ed. 570.
We are of opinion that the machines in controversy here are gambling devices. 12 R. C. L. 627, and note to State of Rhode Island v. Certain Gambling Instruments in 38 A. L. R. 73. There is much reason for holding them to be so even when tokens are used in operating them. He would be a credulous *853 person indeed who could believe that the customers playing with nothing but tokens expected only amusement and were not actuated by the belief that they could exchange them for money or other thing of value. It is of no significance that there was no agreement to redeem the tokens in cash or in goods. Formal agreements or self-serving statements that nothing approaching gambling will be permitted in the use of gambling rooms or instruments are not unusual and are made for obvious purposes of deception, as is well pointed out by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in Harvie v. Heise, 150 S. C. 277, 148 S. E. 66, where this same kind of machine was held to be a gambling device. But if there is any doubt about the machine being a gambling device when operated by tokens, there can be none when it is played with coins, for then money is won or lost, depending upon the positions in combination of the amusing pictures when the cylinders, after revolving, come to rest. By the easy method of removing the pin the machine becomes a gambling device if it was not one before. Assuming that the machine is an innocent vender of merchandise when the pin is in place and is a gambling machine when it is removed, we are of opinion that the trial court should not have issued the injunction. The ease with which the machine can be converted from one into the other, and the manifest difficulty against which law enforcement officers would have to contend in determining the method of operation at any particular moment, made it the duty of the trial court to deny the injunction. Our decision in Ashcraft v. Healey, 23 F.(2d) 189, is not in conflict with this conclusion. In that case it was held merely that the trial court erred in dismissing the bill of complaint without a hearing on the merits. The police power of a state ought not to be lightly interfered with, even in a case where the complainant bases his claim for relief upon the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 14 S. Ct. 499, 38 L. Ed. 385; North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306, 29 S. Ct. 101, 53 L. Ed. 195, 15 Ann. Cas. 276; House v. Mayes, 219 U. S. 270, 282, 31 S. Ct. 234, 55 L. Ed. 213.
The decree is reversed, and the cause remanded with direction to dismiss the bill of complaint.


141 Ga. App. 362 (1977)
233 S.E.2d 474
WRIGHT et al.
v.
SHONEY'S OF SAVANNAH et al.
53111.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Argued January 10, 1977.
Decided February 23, 1977.
Braziel & Braziel, William F. Braziel, Jr., for appellants.
Bouhan, Williams & Levy, Frank W. Seiler, Falligant, Karsman, Kent & Toporek, Stanley Karsman, for appellees.
SHULMAN, Judge.
The plaintiff appeals from the grant of a summary judgment in favor of defendants.
Plaintiff, a child of 27 months of age, accompanied by her mother and grandmother, had lunch at defendant restaurant where the child and grandmother used the rest room, in which there were two toilet stalls. The grandmother placed the child in one stall and used the other herself. She shut both doors. There was a washbasin with built-in cabinets under the basin. The child apparently finished first, went to the cabinet, took out some gel air freshener and began to eat it.
Even if the child in this case was an invitee, when she *363 undertook an act which went beyond the reason for entering the rest room, she lost that status. Augusta Amusements, Inc. v. Powell, 93 Ga. App. 752 (92 SE2d 720). It would normally be the duty of a parent or other adult to see to it that a child would not be going into a place of obvious danger. Augusta Amusements, Inc. v. Powell, supra. See also Hall v. Lewis, 135 Ga. App. 730 (218 SE2d 706).
Regardless of the age of the injured person, if there is no breach of any legal duty on the part of the defendant toward such person, there can be no legal liability. Atlanta & W. P. R. Co. v. West, 121 Ga. 641, 645 (49 SE 711).
In the case at bar, a restaurant storing disinfectants, air gels and the like in the rest rooms, in a cabinet containing doors, would appear to be a normal and logical act, and it would not be foreseeable that an injury would ensue from such action. "The general rule in such cases is not whether injuries result or the consequences were possible, but whether they were probable, that is, likely to occur according to the usual experience of persons. It is not necessary that a person be required to anticipate or foresee and guard against what is unusual and not likely to happen, but to anticipate and foresee and provide against that which usually happens or is likely to happen. Whitaker v. Jones, McDougald, Smith Pew Co., 69 Ga. App. 711, 716 (26 SE2d 545)." Feldman v. Whipkey's Drug Shop, 121 Ga. App. 580, 581 (174 SE2d 474).
"One is bound to anticipate and provide against what usually happens and what is likely to happen; but it would impose too heavy a responsibility to hold him bound in like manner to guard against what is unusual and unlikely to happen, or what is only remotely and slightly probable. See Powell v. Waters, 55 Ga. App. 307 (190 SE 615); Peggy Ann of Ga. v. Scoggins, 86 Ga. App. 109, 116 (71 SE2d 89); Yarbrough v. Cantex Mfg. Co., 97 Ga. App. 438, 440 (103 SE2d 138).
"... [T]he proprietor of premises is not the insurer of persons thereon against all acts of co-invitees, and when said proprietor has used or exercised ordinary care to keep the premises safe, he is not guilty of negligence. Watson v. McCrory Stores, 97 Ga. App. 516, 518 (103 SE2d 648)." *364 Feldman v. Whipkey's Drug Shop, 121 Ga. App. 580, 581, supra.
The trial court correctly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Judgment affirmed. Bell, C. J., Stolz, Webb, Marshall and McMurray, JJ., concur. Deen, P. J., Quillian, P. J., and Smith, J., dissent.
QUILLIAN, Presiding Judge, dissenting.
I can not agree with the conclusion reached by the majority.
First of all it is held: "Even if the child in this case was an invitee, when she undertook an act which went beyond the reason for entering the rest room, she lost that status." This statement is both erroneous and inapplicable to the present case. Augusta Amusements, Inc. v. Powell, 93 Ga. App. 752 (92 SE2d 720), is not authority for the blanket statement made, for it merely holds: "Such owner's invitation, and the protection due him thereunder, extend to those portions of the premises necessary for ingress and egress and on parts necessary or incidental to the mutual business or purposes of the invitation; but an invitee who leaves such places for others on the premises not included in the invitation and disconnected with the objects of the invitation is, as to such parts of the premises, a mere licensee." 93 Ga. App. p. 756. A built-in cabinet under a washbasin is not "disconnected with the objects of the invitation..."
It should be further observed that the recitation "[i]t would normally be the duty of a parent or other adult to see to it that a child would not be going into a place of obvious danger" is correct as an abstract principle of law. But what relevance does it have to the instant factual *365 situation? Are we prepared to hold a bathroom is a place of obvious danger?
Turning to the principal thrust of the opinion that the occurrence in question was not foreseeable, without a doubt this case is a classic example of the precept that a jury should determine whether the defendant might reasonably have anticipated the consequences of its act. On motion for summary judgment, ordinarily issues of negligence, including reasonable foreseeability, assumption of the risk, lack of ordinary care for one's own safety and comparative negligence are not susceptible of summary adjudication. Malin v. Jaggers, 134 Ga. App. 806 (216 SE2d 666); Lay v. Munford, Inc., 235 Ga. 340 (219 SE2d 416).
In my view, there was not a place of obvious danger but there was a dangerous thing being kept by the defendant. "As to an infant, as in this case, the owner of premises on which a dangerous thing exists may in legal duty be bound to use a greater quantum of precaution in behalf of such infant licensee than he would in behalf of an adult invited guest. The sum of the whole matter is included in the expression that `duties arise out of circumstances.'" Cook v. Southern R. Co., 53 Ga. App. 723, 727 (187 SE 274). Accord Augusta Amusements, Inc. v. Powell, 93 Ga. App. 752, 754, supra. The case sub judice is controlled in principle by Glean v. Smith, 116 Ga. App. 111, 113 (156 SE2d 507), which involved a licensee. The gist of the liability sought to be imposed on the homeowner was negligence in permitting a dangerous instrumentality to be in a place where the incautious hands of a child might come in contact with it. The court held that since the defendant was aware of the child's presence, he would have a duty to anticipate his presence in the playroom and to use ordinary care to avoid injuring him after his presence was known or reasonably should have been anticipated.
Thus, even if the child here was a licensee a jury question would be presented. However, he was not. Thus, the defendant would have a duty to anticipate the presence of children in the bathroom and would be charged with the duty of exercising that degree of care owed a minor invitee.
*366 Applying the often stated factors to be considered in construing the evidence on motion for summary judgment, as well as controlling principles of negligence law, I would reverse the order granting summary judgment for the defendant.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen and Judge Smith join in this dissent.


67 F.Supp.2d 589 (1999)
Pamela CAPPS, Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF LYNCHBURG and Lynchburg School Board, Defendants.
No. Civ.A. 6:990CV0048.
United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Lynchburg Division.
August 12, 1999.
Mary V. Barney, Law Office of Alexander W. Bell, Lynchburg, VA, Alexander Wayne Bell, Law Office of Alexander W. Bell, Lynchburg, VA, Walter C. Erwin, III, City of Lynchburg, Lynchburg, VA, for the City of Lynchburg.
Mary Ellen McGowan, Siciliano, Ellis, Dyer & Boccarosse, Fairfax, VA, for the Lynchburg School Board.
Harrison Benjamin Wilson, III, Richmond, VA, for Pamela Capps.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
MOON, District Judge.
Pamela Capps filed this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., alleging that she was wrongfully discharged by defendants[1] as the result of racial discrimination. Defendant Lynchburg School Board filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction *590 pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), as well as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Alternatively, defendant moves the court for summary judgment under Rule 56. For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motions are DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND
Pamela Capps, an African-American woman, taught pre-kindergarten classes in the Lynchburg School System. Ms. Capps alleges that she was terminated from her job on June 10, 1998 as the culmination of harassment and discrimination against her by the Lynchburg School Board. Specifically, she asserts that she was "discharged in retaliation for her participation in informing the School Board of the City of Lynchburg of shortcomings in the public school system and informing them about discrimination that existed in the public school system." Plaintiff's Complaint, ¶ 3. Ms. Capps puts forth a number of instances which she claims illustrates how her rights were violated under Title VII. She alleges that when she complained to her principal, Darnella Cunningham, about the unprofessional behavior of her teaching assistant, Ms. Capps was harassed and reprimanded for filing such grievances. Another example involved the reporting of an alleged child abuse case to the School Board. Ms. Capps asserts that the Board was displeased with her "washing this dirty linen" in public and again reprimanded her for doing so. Plaintiff's Complaint, ¶ 11. Ms. Capps asserts that as retaliation for complaining to the principal and the Board, she was placed on a Plan of Assistance, which is Lynchburg City School's personnel action for assisting employees in working through potential problems in the workplace. Ms. Capps alleges that a disproportionate number of African-American teachers are placed on a Plan of Assistance and a disproportionate number then subsequently fail to successfully complete the Plan. She also contends that she was purposefully "blackballed" from successful interaction with other teachers and was denied possible promotions or advancement due to the School Board's discriminatory actions.
Ms. Capps timely filed a complaint with the EEOC and received a right-to-sue letter. She promptly initiated this action seeking redress for injuries as a result of alleged violations under Title VII. In response to Ms. Capps' allegations, the School Board asserts that she was terminated for valid reasons, including a documented history of personnel problems in the Lynchburg City School system. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the action under Rule 12 for both lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, or in the alternative, for summary judgment under Rule 56.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Rule 12(b)(1)
Defendant seeks a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to plaintiff's alleged failure to pursue state enforcement proceedings under state law with the Virginia Council on Human Rights (VCHR), which is charged with administering the provisions of the Virginia Human Rights Act, Va.Code § 2.1-714 et seq. Defendant's motion is based on an unpublished opinion by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals which held that a plaintiff had not properly pursued her state claims to satisfy the requirements of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Dodge v. Philip Morris, Inc., 1999 WL 162955 (4th Cir.1999) (unpublished).
The provision of Title VII which is at issue in this case states in pertinent part
[i]n the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice ... no charge may *591 be filed ... by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated ... If any requirement for the commencement of such proceedings is imposed by a State or local authority other than a requirement of the filing of a written and signed statement of the facts upon which the proceeding is based, the proceeding shall be deemed to have been commenced for the purposes of this subsection at the time such statement is sent by registered mail to the appropriate State or local authority.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (emphasis added). Thus, a plaintiff is required to exhaust administrative and state remedies prior to filing an action in federal court. Typically, a plaintiff litigating a claim under Title VII has 180 days from the time of the aggrieved action in which to file a complaint with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Once the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter, the plaintiff may then file suit in federal court. If, however, the plaintiff resides in a "deferral state" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), the plaintiff will have 300 days in which to commence proceedings under the appropriate state or local law. See Davis v. North Carolina Dep't of Correction, 48 F.3d 134, 137-40 (4th Cir.1995) (stating that § 2000e-5 requires plaintiff to commence proceedings under state law before the EEOC can act upon federal discrimination claims). A "deferral state" is one which has a state or local law "prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged" and a state agency authorized "to grant or seek relief" from the practice. Id.; EEOC v. Hansa Products, Inc., 844 F.2d 191, 192 n. 1 (4th Cir.1988).
Virginia is such a "deferral state" and the Virginia Council on Human Rights is a "deferral" agency within the meaning of the statute with primary responsibility for enforcement of Title VII. Tinsley v. First Union National Bank, 155 F.3d 435 (4th Cir.1998); EEOC v. Techalloy Maryland, Inc., 894 F.2d 676, 678 (4th Cir.1990). Although Virginia law does not create a specific cause of action for racial discrimination, the Virginia Human Rights Act (VHRA)[2] broadly prohibits discriminatory employment practices and allows the VCHR to investigate claims of discrimination, bringing it within the parameters of § 2000e-5(c). Tinsley, 155 F.3d at 440.
Thus, for this Court to possess subject matter jurisdiction over Ms. Capp's complaint, she must have filed a discrimination claim with the Virginia Council on Human Rights (the appropriate state agency) alleging discrimination under the Virginia Human Rights Act (state law). While it is clear that Ms. Capps may file with the appropriate state agency either directly or through the EEOC, it is unclear what additional steps, if any, she must take to fulfill the requirement that she commence proceedings "under State or local law" as required by § 2000e-5(c). Therefore the first question to answer is what procedure Ms. Capps needs to follow to ensure her claim is filed with a state agency. The next inquiry is what additional action, if any, she must take to ensure that she commences proceedings under state law.
The Fourth Circuit has recognized that filing with the VCHR can be accomplished at the same time a claimant files an action *592 with the EEOC. Tinsley, 155 F.3d at 439. When a charge of discrimination is sent first to the EEOC instead of the state deferral agency, the EEOC will refer the claim to the state agency. Id. This procedure is the product of a work-sharing agreement between the EEOC and the Virginia Council on Human Rights. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(b). This worksharing agreement states in pertinent part the following:
I. Introduction
A. The Virginia Council on Human Rights, hereinafter referred to as the FEPA [Fair Employment Practice Agency], has jurisdiction over allegations of employment discrimination filed against employers ... within the State of Virginia based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, and physical or mental disability, pursuant to the Virginia Human Rights Act ...
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ... has jurisdiction over allegations of employment discrimination occurring throughout the United States where such charges are based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, all pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ...
B. In recognition of, and to the extent of the common jurisdiction and goals of the two (2) Agencies, and in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants contained herein, the FEPA and the EEOC hereby agree to the terms of this Worksharing Agreement, which is designed to provide individuals with an efficient procedure for obtaining redress for their grievances under appropriate State of Virginia and Federal laws.
II. Filing of Charges of Discrimination
A. In order to facilitate the assertion of employment rights, the EEOC and the FEPA each designate the other as its agent for the purpose of receiving and drafting charges, including those that are not jurisdictional with the agency that initially receives the charges. EEOC's receipt of charges on the FEPA's behalf will automatically initiate the proceedings of both EEOC and the FEPA for purposes of ... Title VII.
Worksharing Agreement Between Virginia Council on Human Rights and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for Fiscal year 1998.
Capps filed her complaint with the EEOC on November 18, 1998. On the EEOC form, Capps provided a short and plain statement of the facts of her case as required to file a claim with the VCHR, concluding with the statement that she "was subject to discrimination (harassment, disciplined, discharged) because of my race (Black) and in retaliation ..." EEOC Form 5 (Rev.06/92), filed 11/18/98; see also 22 VAC 25-10-20 (2/1/99). At the bottom of the form, Capps checked the box located next to the following statement: "I want this charge filed with both the EEOC and the State or local agency, if any. I will advise the agencies if I change my address or telephone number and cooperate fully with them in the processing of my charge in accordance with their procedures." Id. It is apparent that Capps sufficiently filed her complaint with the appropriate state agency. Tinsley, 155 F.3d at 439. Therefore, the next inquiry is whether this unitary filing fulfills the requirement that she commence proceedings "under the State or local law" and meets the criteria for filing a claim in a deferral state as promulgated by § 2000e-5(c).
The Fourth Circuit has held that Title VII requires a plaintiff to exhaust available state law remedies under the Virginia Human Rights Act with the VCHR, but it has refrained from addressing whether a single charge filed with the EEOC satisfies the requirement that plaintiffs commence proceedings under state law. Dodge v. Philip Morris, Inc., 1999 WL 162955 (4th *593 Cir.1999) (unpublished). Moreover, this Court recognizes that a number of opinions have recently been issued which address this matter in varying degrees. See Walker v. Electrolux Corporation, 55 F.Supp.2d 501 (W.D.Va.1999) (holding that plaintiff had no jurisdiction in federal court because she failed to allege a state law claim, but failing to discuss pleading requirement to set forth charge of discrimination); Harris v. The TJX Companies, Inc., 60 F.Supp.2d 562 (W.D.Va.1999) (holding that ADA plaintiff had exhausted state remedies under § 2000e-5(c) where EEOC transmitted charge to VCHR pursuant to the worksharing agreement and VCHR declined to investigate); Grimes v. Canadian American Transportation, C.A.T., Inc., 72 F.Supp.2d 629 (W.D.Va. 1999) (holding that jurisdiction in federal court is proper where plaintiff filed claim of sexual harassment with EEOC and checked appropriate box for state agency to investigate and VCHR declined).
Defendant asserts that Ms. Capps must specifically allege a violation of Virginia law in her EEOC complaint and that merely filing a Title VII claim with the EEOC is not enough to exhaust her remedies under state law. However, this Court finds that to require more would eliminate all meaning behind the worksharing agreement between the EEOC and the VCHR and create a new burden on plaintiffs where none had previously existed. The worksharing agreement contemplates that the VCHR may waive its right of exclusive jurisdiction and allow the EEOC to proceed on investigating the complaint. Worksharing Agreement, ¶ III-A-1. As noted in Grimes, "[t]his provision clearly contemplates that the VCHR deems a charge filed with it when it is filed with the EEOC." Grimes, 72 F.Supp.2d at 632; see also EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 803 F.2d 581, 586 (10th Cir.1986) (stating that filing a complaint with the EEOC constitutes an initial filing with the appropriate state agency in deferral states).
The worksharing agreement states that the VCHR has jurisdiction over employment discrimination occurring within the State of Virginia and that this grant of jurisdiction is pursuant to the Virginia Human Rights Act. Worksharing Agreement, ¶ I-A. What is missing from this agreement, as well as from the VHRA and Title VII, is any mandate that a plaintiff must specifically allege the Virginia state code section which applies to discrimination. In the notice pleading environment of the federal system, all that is needed is an identification of the discrimination and facts sufficient to support the Title VII violation. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. Ms. Capps' EEOC charge clearly states that she believed she was discriminated against based on her race due to certain actions that occurred in her workplace, culminating in her dismissal. Likewise, the VHRA only requires "a written statement by a person ... alleging an act of discrimination prohibited by § 2.1-716 of the Code of Virginia." 22 VAC 25-10-20. Ms. Capps' allegations, if true, would provide a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to the VHRA. See Va.Code § 2.1-715 (stating that "[i]t is the policy of ... Virginia [t]o safeguard all individuals within the Commonwealth from unlawful discrimination because of race ..."). The VHRA does not require a claimant to do anything more than make an allegation of discrimination. 22 VAC 25-10-20.
As previously mentioned, defendants rely on the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Dodge v. Philip Morris, Inc. to stand for the proposition that a unitary filing with the EEOC is not enough to bring a plaintiff's discrimination claim within the parameters set by § 2000e-5(c). That case, however, can be distinguished from the case at hand because the plaintiff in Dodge failed to check any box on the EEOC form. 1999 WL 162955, at *1. Therefore, even if Dodge were a published opinion, it would not control this case because the plaintiff failed to take the requisite steps *594 to contact the appropriate state agency to commence proceedings under state law and the case would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. That is not the situation in Ms. Capps' case.
She filed her EEOC charge on November 18, 1998, spelling out her complaint as well as checking the appropriate box to allow the EEOC to transfer the case to the VCHR. Ms. Capps then received a right-to-sue letter on March 17, 1999, after both the EEOC and the VCHR had an opportunity to investigate the charges. This procedure is all that is required of claimants. Once she checks the box to transfer the case to the VCHR, the VCHR may accept and investigate the complaint. 22 VAC 25, Refs & Annos. (Feb. 1, 1999). Upon investigation, the VCHR may attempt to resolve the complaint through conciliation efforts, or it may refer unsolved complaints to the federal agency with jurisdiction over the complaint. Id. In this case, the EEOC was the federal agency which investigated the complaint and ultimately decided to issue a right-to-sue letter to Ms. Capps. As noted by the Supreme Court in Love v. Pullman Co., there is nothing in Title VII to suggest "that the state proceedings may not be initiated by the EEOC acting on behalf of the complainant rather than by the complainant himself, nor is there any requirement that the complaint to the state agency be made in writing rather than by ... referral." 404 U.S. 522, 525, 92 S.Ct. 616, 30 L.Ed.2d 679 (1972).
Therefore, this Court holds that upon filing with the EEOC and checking the box to refer the claim to the appropriate state agency, Ms. Capps met her burden under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). This Court is persuaded that Ms. Capps has fulfilled all requirements under Virginia law to initiate and prosecute her complaint under state proceedings. Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is DENIED.

B. Other Pending Motions
Finally, in response to defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, plaintiff filed a motion to amend her complaint. The Court will GRANT plaintiff's motion and grant her 14 days from the date of the Order and Memorandum Opinion to file an amended complaint. Consequently, the Court will DENY defendant's motion for summary judgment at this time.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to send a copy of this Order to all parties and counsel of record.

ORDER
Pamela Capps filed this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., alleging that she was wrongfully discharged by defendants as the result of racial discrimination. Defendant Lynchburg School Board filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), as well as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Alternatively, defendant moves the court for summary judgment under Rule 56. For the reasons set forth in the attached Memorandum Opinion, defendant's motions are DENIED.
NOTES
[1]  Plaintiff filed a motion for voluntary dismissal of defendant City of Lynchburg pursuant to F.R.C.P. 41. The Court has granted plaintiff's motion. Therefore, the only defendant remaining is the Lynchburg School Board.
[2]  The VHRA provides in pertinent part that

It is the policy of the Commonwealth of Virginia [t]o safeguard all individuals within the Commonwealth from unlawful discrimination because of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions, age, marital status or disability ... in employment. Va. Code § 2.1-715.
Conduct which violates any Virginia or federal statute or regulation governing discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions, age, marital status, or disability shall be an "unlawful discriminatory practice" for the purposes of this chapter. Va.Code § 2.1-716.