23 F.3d 78
44 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 381
Susan C. VOGEL, Committee for Kara Jae Vogel, anIncompetent, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.Richard E. LINDE, M.D.;  INOVA Health System Hospitals,d/b/a Fairfax Hospital, Defendants-Appellees.American Hospital Association, Amicus Curiae.Susan C. VOGEL, Committee for Kara Jae Vogel, anIncompetent, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Richard E. LINDE, M.D., Defendant-Appellant,andINOVA Health System Hospitals, d/b/a Fairfax Hospital, Defendant.American Hospital Association, Amicus Curiae.Susan C. VOGEL, Committee for Kara Jae Vogel, anIncompetent, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.INOVA HEALTH SYSTEM HOSPITALS, d/b/a Fairfax Hospital,Defendant-Appellant,andRichard E. Linde, M.D., Defendant.American Hospital Association, Amicus Curiae.
Nos. 93-2040, 93-2069 and 93-2088.
United States Court of Appeals,Fourth Circuit.
Argued March 7, 1994.Decided April 28, 1994.

ARGUED:  Steven Mark Garver, Reston, VA, for appellant.
William Daniel Cremins, Walsh & Cremins, P.C., Fairfax, VA, for appellee INOVA;  Judith Bowles Henry, Crews & Hancock, Richmond, VA, for appellee Linde.  ON BRIEF:  Gerald R. Walsh, Randolph H. Perry, Walsh & Cremins, P.C., Fairfax, VA, for appellee INOVA;  Thomas G. Smith, Richard L. Nagle, Crews & Hancock, Richmond, VA, for appellee Linde.  Gregory M. Luce, James E. Anklam, Heather Lowry, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Washington, DC;  Fredric J. Entin, James A. Henderson, Maureen D. Mudron, American Hospital Association, Chicago, IL, for amicus curiae.
Before HALL, MURNAGHAN, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion.  Judge K.K. HALL wrote the opinion, in which Judge MURNAGHAN and Judge LUTTIG joined.
OPINION
K.K. HALL, Circuit Judge:

1
Susan Vogel appeals an order of the district court granting summary judgment to the defendant hospital in Vogel's action for violation of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1395dd, and dismissing without prejudice her medical malpractice claim against the defendant doctor.  Because we find that the EMTALA claim is barred by the statute of limitations, we affirm.

I.

2
Kara Jae Vogel, seventeen years old and mentally retarded because of Down's Syndrome, went to Fairfax Hospital on June 20, 1990, to have a tube put in her right ear.  This procedure was performed on an outpatient basis by Dr. Richard Linde, an otolaryngologist.

3
In the recovery room, Kara's mother, Susan Vogel, noticed that Kara was moaning and exhibiting signs of extreme pain.  She did not know what was wrong, but after some pleading1 she prevailed upon the hospital to admit Kara overnight for observation.  Dr. Linde ordered the overnight admission, but his order called for discharge the following morning without examination or treatment by a physician.

4
Kara was released the next morning.  She was suffering from a dislocation of her cervical spine, and because the condition was not immediately diagnosed and treated, she had to have two cervical vertebrae fused.  Her mother alleges that Dr. Linde somehow injured Kara during the surgery and then negligently failed to diagnose her condition.

5
In April, 1992, Kara invoked a Virginia administrative procedure for medical malpractice claims2;  a review panel ruled against her on February 12, 1993.  On April 9, 1993, Kara's mother was appointed her committee by a state trial court.  On April 12, 1993, Susan Vogel, as committee for Kara, filed this suit in district court.  She pled a claim for violation of EMTALA against Inova Health System Hospitals d/b/a Fairfax Hospital.  She appended a state claim for medical malpractice against Dr. Linde.

6
Fairfax Hospital moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and Linde moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  These motions were denied.  Fairfax then moved for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations.  Finding that the express statute of limitations in EMTALA is not tolled by infancy or incompetency, the district court granted Fairfax's motion.  The court then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the medical malpractice claim against Dr. Linde, and it dismissed the rest of the case without prejudice.

7
Vogel appeals.  The Hospital and Linde noted cross-appeals, though they merely assert alternative bases to affirm.3II.

8
In EMTALA, Congress attempted to prohibit the so-called "dumping" of indigent persons facing "emergency medical conditions."  Brooks v. Maryland General Hospital, 996 F.2d 708, 710 (4th Cir.1993).  Violations of EMTALA may be redressed in district courts, but there is a clear statute of limitations:

9
No action may be brought under this paragraph more than two years after the date of the violation with respect to which the action is brought.

10
42 U.S.C. Sec. 1395dd(d)(2)(C).  The complaint was filed here two years and ten months after the date of the alleged violation.  Under the plain language of the statute, the claim is barred.

11
Vogel nonetheless urges us to toll the statute of limitations from the date of the violation until she was appointed committee for Kara on account of Kara's infancy and incompetency.  We cannot do so.  Exceptions to the running of a limitations period because of the would-be plaintiff's disability, though common, are nonetheless exceptions.   The blackletter rule, recognized by the Supreme Court since at least 1883,4 is that a statute of limitations runs against all persons, even those under a disability, unless the statute expressly provides otherwise.  See 54 C.J.S. Limitation of Actions Sec. 105;  51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions Sec. 186.  This rule is regularly applied to federal statutes that contain a limitations period but no exception for disability.  E.g., Jastremski v. United States, 737 F.2d 666, 669 (7th Cir.1984) (Federal Tort Claims Act);  Williams v. United States, 228 F.2d 129, 132 (4th Cir.1955) (Suits in Admiralty Act), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 986, 76 S.Ct. 1054, 100 L.Ed. 1499 (1956).

12
It is our duty to apply, rather than attempt to improve upon, the clear commands of Acts of Congress.  Vogel's EMTALA action is time-barred.

13
The judgment is affirmed.

14
AFFIRMED.

1
 Both Dr. Linde and hospital personnel apparently feared that Vogel's insurance would not pay for an unnecessary admission, but they relented when Mrs. Vogel guaranteed that she would pay for the stay personally

2
 Va.Code Ann. Secs. 8.01-581.1 et seq

3
 "[W]e review judgments, not opinions."  Hyatt v. Sullivan, 899 F.2d 329, 337 n. 10 (4th Cir.1990).  Because the appellees seek nothing more than to preserve the judgments in their favor, their cross-appeals were not necessary.  "It is well accepted ... that without filing a cross-appeal or cross-petition, an appellee may rely upon any matter appearing in the record in support of the judgment below."  Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 137 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 2355, 2359 n. 5, 72 L.Ed.2d 728 (1982)
In its cross-appeal, the Hospital argues that 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1395dd(c) does not apply to patients discharged from a hospital's general population and who do not present themselves for treatment at the hospital's emergency department.  Linde's cross-appeal contends that the claim against him was not part of the same Article III "case or controversy" as the EMTALA claim or that, in any event, the district court should have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(c)(2), because the state claim substantially predominates over the federal claim.  Because we affirm the judgment for the reasons on which the district court relied, we need not address these issues.

4
 In Vance v. Vance, 108 U.S. 514, 521, 2 S.Ct. 854, 859, 27 L.Ed. 808 (1883), the Court observed:
The exceptions from the operation of statutes of limitations, usually accorded to infants and married women, do not rest upon any general doctrine of the law that they cannot be subjected to their action, but in every instance upon express language in those statutes giving them time, after majority or after cessation of coverture, to assert their rights.


250 P.2d 188 (1952)
126 Colo. 385
HAZLET et al.
v.
GAUNT et al.
No. 16890.
Supreme Court of Colorado, en Banc.
October 14, 1952.
*189 Maurice W. Konkel, Sterling, Isaac Mellman, Denver, for plaintiffs in error.
Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., H. Lawrence Hinkley, Deputy Atty. Gen., Wilbur Rocchio, Asst. Atty. Gen., for State Commissioner of Education.
Lyman P. Weld, Longmont, Emory L. O'Connell, Denver, for all defendants in error except State Commissioner of Education.
MOORE, Justice.
We will herein refer to the parties as they appeared in the trial court, where plaintiffs in error were plaintiffs and defendants in error were defendants.
Plaintiffs are citizens and taxpayers residing in Adams county, and their places of residence are within school districts which were added, in whole or in part, to School District No. 27 under procedures authorized by The School District Reorganization Act of 1949. Chapter 224, page 636, Session Laws of Colorado 1949. In their complaint, the legality of the reorganization of the new district was questioned upon constitutional, and other, grounds. They alleged that the defendant members of the school board for the new district were proceeding under the purported powers designated to them by said Act to issue bonds in the sum of $936,000 for school purposes, and that the contemplated bond issue would be illegal and without authority of law.
The prayer of plaintiffs' complaint was for judgment that all acts of defendants performed in the capacity of the County Committee on school reorganization, together with all acts of defendants performed in the capacity of members of the newly created school district and as public officials in furtherance of said reorganization, be declared null and void, and that defendants be enjoined from further acts based upon the validity of said reorganization.
Defendants in their answer placed all material questions of fact in issue. Trial was to the court and resulted in judgment in their favor. Plaintiffs seeking a reversal of this judgment bring the case here by writ of error.
The School District Reorganization Act of 1949 establishes procedures for the reorganization of school districts and defines in detail the steps to be taken in the accomplishment of that objective. The selection of a County Committee is authorized and this body is empowered to set in motion a chain of events which ultimately leads to an election to determine whether the plan of reorganization, which the committee and State Commissioner of Education approve, shall become effective. These procedures were followed in the instant case. An election was held in conformity with the statute, whereby the proposed reorganization of school districts was approved by a majority of the voters casting ballots under the qualifications fixed by the Act.
Section 14 of the Act provides, inter alia:
"The plan for reorganization shall contain a specific proposal for the equitable adjustment and distribution of all, or any part, of the properties and cash assets of the districts involved."
Section 22 of the Act provides, inter alia:
"Electors voting in said election shall be taxpaying electors, shall be of the age of twenty-one years, citizens of the United States, and shall have resided in the State for twelve months immediately preceding the election and shall have resided in the area of the `proposed district' for at least ninety days immediately preceding said election."
Section 25 of the Act provides, inter alia:
"If a majority of the votes cast in the area of the `proposed new district' shall vote in favor of said reorganization the same `new district' shall upon the sixtieth day after certification *190 of the results of said election to the County Superintendent, be and become a body corporate under the name, style and number in the plan, and in that name may take, hold and convey property, both real and personal, and be a party to suits and contracts in the same manner and to the same extent as municipal corporations of this state; * * *."
The said Act further provides that, in determining the boundaries of a new district, "present district boundaries may be disregarded, and districts, or parts of districts may be included in a new district proposed to be organized, * * *." Section 15. In those instances where the new district embraces all the area of a former district, the school funds, except those for the retirement of bonded indebtedness, and assets of the old district become the property of the new district. Where only a portion of an old district is included within the area of the new district the moneys of the former are apportioned as provided by section 66, chapter 146, '35 C.S.A. Section 29.
Section 30 of the Act provides, inter alia, that:
"When a `new district' formed under this Act shall embrace all of a Union or County High School district such Union or County High School District shall be automatically dissolved and the properties and funds, except funds then on hand or to be received under existing tax levies, after providing for all outstanding indebtedness and obligations, except bonded indebtedness, shall become the property of the `new district'".
The new district involved in this cause is described as District No. 27. It extends the old District No. 27 to include all of three former separate districts and portions of four others. Old District No. 27 included the city of Brighton and surrounding area, most of which is heavily populated, whereas the districts absorbed in whole or in part are for the most part rural areas with comparatively few inhabitants. By the reorganization, the area of District No. 27 was doubled and the assessed valuation of included properties was increased from $7,980,230 to $9,360,440.
Plaintiffs contend that the provisions of the statute, fixing the qualifications of voters and authorizing formation of the new district upon majority vote of the qualified electors within the entire district, result in the sparsely inhabited rural districts being forced against the will of a majority of the inhabitants thereof to become part of the new district. It is argued by counsel for plaintiffs that this amounts to a violation of their constitutional right to due process of law. They further assert that the Act contravenes sections 2 and 15 of Article IX of the Constitution of Colorado, which read as follows:
Section 2: "The general assembly shall, as soon as practicable, provide for the establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free public schools throughout the state, wherein all residents of the state, between the ages of six and twenty-one years, may be educated gratuitously. One or more public schools shall be maintained in each school district within the state, at least three months in each year; any school district failing to have such school shall not be entitled to receive any portion of the school fund for that year."
Section 15: "The general assembly shall, by law, provide for organization of school districts of convenient size, in each of which shall be established a board of education, to consist of three or more directors to be elected by the qualified electors of the district. Said directors shall have control of instruction in the public schools of their respective districts."
It further is argued that since the area included within the new district is nearly doubled, children are not provided a "thorough and uniform system of free public schools", and that the enlarged district is not designed to serve a particular community in that it is not compact and is not of "convenient size" as required by section 15 of Article IX above quoted. Finally, it *191 is contended that the Act in question amounts to unlawful delegation of legislative power to the County Committee.

Questions to be Determined
First: In authorizing procedures for the reorganization of school districts, does the legislature have the power to provide for the inclusion of existing districts, or portions thereof, in a new proposed district, and to direct transfer of assets of the existing districts to the new one, notwithstanding the fact that the existing districts and a majority of the electors residing therein may in fact oppose the reorganization and the resultant transfer of assets?
This question is answered in the affirmative. We direct attention to the fact that plaintiffs in this action appear as individual citizens and taxpayers living in areas included within school districts affected by the reorganization plan in question. They allege that they have paid taxes in support of public school districts and that said districts have been abolished by the action of the defendants. No school district, through its authorized officers, appears in objection to the proposed reorganization. Before an individual taxpayer could successfully contend that he was denied property without due process of law, because of the inclusion or exclusion of the area occupied by him from a reorganization of school districts, it would be necessary to accept as a premise the proposition that an individual taxpayer has an interest in school property which is protected by the constitution against deprivation thereof without due process of law. We think it is well established that an individual taxpayer has no such property interest in assets devoted to school purposes.
In Gorrell v. Bevans, 66 Colo. 67, 179 P. 337, we said:
"The territory of the district is not its property, but merely within its `jurisdiction,' if we may so use that word. The Legislature changes the boundaries of counties and other quasi municipal corporations at will, without violating anybody's constitutional rights, which it could not do if the land were property. There is, therefore, no question of due process of law concerning the transfer of the territory.
"The argument that the schoolhouse or some interest therein is the property of the directors or individual taxpayers, and that by its transfer the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs as school directors or as individuals have been invaded, we do not regard as sound. The directors have no interest as such. The property is not theirs, but the district's. Rev.St. §§ 5913, 5914. The individuals [taxpayers] do not own the property, nor have they any legal or equitable interest in it."
In Newt Olson Lumber Co. v. School District, 83 Colo. 272, 263 P. 723, 724, we quoted with approval from Florman v. School District, 6 Colo.App. 319, 322, 40 P. 469, 470, as follows:
"A school district is a subdivision of the state for educational purposes. The several officers charged with the supervision of the schools, from the state board of education down to the directors of the school district, are merely the instruments of the state government, chosen for the purpose of effectuating its policy in relation to schools. * * * The school district is created as a means for the more convenient and effective carrying out of the educational policy of the state. The entire control of schools and school property is in the state, to be exercised as it may see fit, subject to the requirements and restrictions contained in the Constitution; and school officers and school districts are merely the agencies through which it acts in the performance of duties with which it is charged by that instrument."
In People ex rel. Elder v. Sours, 31 Colo. 369, 74 P. 167, 171, the 20th Amendment to the Constitution of Colorado was attacked upon the ground that it violated the provisions of the Constitution of the United States in that it took property from some existing towns and gave it to the City *192 and County of Denver, without due process of law. We there said:
"Under the first objection it is said that some of the adjoining towns have by this amendment lost their public property  that, as the people of these towns had erected town buildings, these town buildings will be taken from them, because the towns themselves are consolidated with Denver; that the people of other towns, excluded from the city and county of Denver, have contributed to the erection of public buildings in Arapahoe county, and that they will lose their share or interest in such public buildings, and be required to contribute to the erection of public buildings in a new county. These are incidental and unavoidable conditions, which exist whenever the boundaries of counties are changed or municipalities are consolidated. These municipalities exist for the public convenience. Their property is the property of the public, and is held, not as private property, but subject to the changing conditions and requirements of local government."
We believe the law to be well settled that consent of particular districts, or the inhabitants thereof, is not necessary as a constitutional prerequisite to the changing of boundaries, dissolution or division of school districts, or to the transfer of assets from an existing school district to the larger reorganized district of which it becomes a part. Whether such consent should be required before reorganization is effected is a question of legislative policy. There is nothing in our constitution which prohibits the legislature from authorizing the reorganization upon majority vote of all the electors in the proposed new district, even though it might not be desired by an included school district or by the electors in some particular district included within the reorganization plan. The questions raised involve expediency, propriety and efficiency of methods in providing education through the public schools, and as such are addressed to the legislative branch of government.
In School District No. 68, Yamhill County v. Hoskins, Or., 240 P.2d 949, 954, the Supreme Court of Oregon said:
"The formation, dissolution, and change in boundaries of school districts are legislative matters. School districts may be abolished or dissolved at the will of the legislature, subject, of course, to constitutional limitations, if any. It is not necessary that the districts affected give their consent to such action, except as otherwise provided by statute. A change of boundaries of school districts may occur in a variety of instances, as in the case of consolidation of districts, division to create new districts, taking from one district and adding to another, cutting off a part of a district, annexing unorganized territory to a district, etc. In 47 Am.Jur., Schools, 310, § 18, it is stated:
"`* * * The Legislature has full power to change boundaries of districts without the consent of the districts affected, except so far as it may be limited by the state constitution.
"`Whatever the nature of the change, it is settled that the boundaries of school districts may be changed at the will of the legislature. In the exercise of its power, the legislature may act directly, or it may delegate its power to subordinate authorities without violating the general rule against the delegation of legislative power.'"
To like effect are the opinions in the following cases: Prosper Independent School District v. County School Trustees, Tex. Com.App., 58 S.W.2d 5; State ex rel. Miller v. Common School District No. 87, 163 Kan. 650, 185 P.2d 677; and Wheeler School District No. 152 v. Hawley, 18 Wash.2d 37, 137 P.2d 1010. The reason for the conclusion of these authorities is well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 28 S.Ct. 40, 46, 52 L.Ed. 151, as follows:
"Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created as *193 convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the state as may be intrusted to them. For the purpose of executing these powers properly and efficiently they usually are given the power to acquire, hold, and manage personal and real property. The number, nature, and duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the state. Neither their charters, nor any law conferring governmental powers, or vesting in them property to be used for governmental purposes, or authorizing them to hold or manage such property, or exempting them from taxation upon it, constitutes a contract wtih the state within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. The state, therefore, at its pleasure may modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these respects the state is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state Constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States. Although the inhabitants and property owners may, by such changes, suffer inconvenience, and their property may be lessened in value by the burden of increased taxation, or for any other reason, they have no right, by contract or otherwise, in the unaltered or continued existence of the corporation or its powers, * * *. The power is in the state, and those who legislate for the state are alone responsible for any unjust or oppressive exercise of it."
The above quotation is applicable to school districts as well as to municipal corporations. Kies, Attorney General v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233, 26 S.Ct. 27, 50 L.Ed. 167.
Second: Does the School District Reorganization Act of 1949 violate the Constitution of the State of Colorado in that it provides for an illegal delegation of legislative power to administrative officers or to individuals?
This question is answered in the negative. We think it a sufficient answer to the argument made by plaintiffs' counsel on this question to direct attention to the opinion of this court in Sapero v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 90 Colo. 568, 11 P.2d 555, 557. In that case we said:
"The General Assembly may not delegate the power to make a law; but it may delegate power to determine some fact or a state of things upon which the law, as prescribed, depends. Colorado & Southern Railway Co. v. State Railroad Commission, 54 Colo. 64, 84, 129 P. 506; Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 694, 12 S.Ct. 495, 36 L.Ed. 294. See also 48 C.J., page 1096, § 64, as applied to physicians and surgeons.
"The subject of nondelegable powers covers a wide range, but we adopt the concise statement employed by our highest court in Field v. Clark, supra, at pages 693, 694, of 143 U.S., 12 S. Ct. 495, 505, which reads: `"The true distinction * * * is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." Cincinnati, Wilmington, etc., Railroad v. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. [77] 88. In Moers v. City of Reading, 21 Pa. 188, 202, the language of the court was: "Half the statutes on our books are in the alternative, depending on the discretion of some person or persons to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing them. But it cannot be said that *194 the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law."'"
The contention urged before us in the instant case was argued before the Supreme Court of Washington in the case of Wheeler School District No. 152 v. Hawley, supra [18 Wash.2d 37, 137 P.2d 1015]. We quote from that opinion as follows :
"Nor do we find any unlawful delegation of legislative power. The act sets up the machinery and fixes the standards by which the county committee and the state committee shall be controlled. It commits no legislative power to them. It simply entrusts to them the administration of the act."
Numerous citations of authority follow the above quotation. Section 12 of the Act sets up sufficient standards for the guidance and direction of those authorized to administer the law. It is argued that those standards are not definite enough. We cannot agree.
In 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 351, § 138a, we find the rule stated in part as follows:
"The legislature is not required to legislate for the guidance of executive agencies further than is practicable, and, if the circumstances require, may express the policy or standard in merely general terms."
In 11 American Jurisprudence, section 240, page 957, we find the following statement:
"As far as the actual terms of the standard laid down are concerned, there seems to be considerable leeway, because the courts have indicated that the policy of the lawmaking body and the standard to guide the administrative agency may be laid down in broad and general terms."
School districts are subdivisions of the state and are created only through legislative authority. Because few, if any, restrictions are placed upon the legislative power in school affairs, by the constitution, the legislature has almost unlimited power to abolish, divide or alter school districts. It has been generally recognized that this broad discretionary power to change the boundaries of school districts may be delegated by the legislature to administrative bodies to be exercised under certain conditions, and in agreement with certain standards. 135 A.L.R. 1098 (note).
We have carefully considered the arguments made by counsel for plaintiffs in support of the proposition that the School Reorganization Act violates sections 2 and 15 of Article IX of the Constitution of Colorado, and we do not find sufficient merit in these arguments to warrant detailed analysis or discussion.
The judgment accordingly is affirmed.
ALTER and HOLLAND, JJ., dissent.


539 S.E.2d 621 (2000)
353 N.C. 220
Gladys BROWN
v.
Caroll M. BROWN.
No. 77A00.
Supreme Court of North Carolina.
December 21, 2000.
Max L. Childers, Mount Holly, for plaintiff-appellee.
*622 Michelle D. Reingold, Clemmons, for defendant-appellant.
ORR, Justice.
Defendant presents a single argument for our consideration: Did the Court of Appeals err in concluding that equitable distribution does not abate if one of the parties dies after filing for equitable distribution and divorce, but before receiving an equitable distribution judgment or an absolute divorce decree? We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in its decision.
We begin by explaining the unique procedural posture of this case. Plaintiff Gladys Brown died shortly after filing the lawsuit out of which this appeal arises. The administratrix of her estate, Martha T. Russell, moved to be "substituted as [p]laintiff" and "allowed to proceed as [p]laintiff in this matter." The trial court denied this motion and dismissed plaintiff's action on 6 August 1998.
Plaintiff's counsel filed a notice of appeal on 13 August 1998, stating that "[p]laintiff, through counsel, ... gives Notice of Appeal." The Court of Appeals treated this appeal as a petition for a writ of certiorari and allowed it so that it could review the order of the trial court. However, utilization of a writ of certiorari is not appropriate under these facts. See Bailey v. State, 353 N.C. 142, 157, 540 S.E.2d 313, 322 (2000).
As a result, this Court faces a procedural dilemma in that the appeal to the Court of Appeals was made on behalf of a deceased party, and the appearance in this Court in response to defendant's appeal was likewise made on behalf of a deceased party. Therefore, in order to address the merits of the issues brought forward, we deem it necessary to use the provisions of Rule 2 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure to vary the requirements of Rule 38 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Rule 2 allows the Court "[t]o prevent manifest injustice to a party ... [by varying] the requirements or provisions of any of [the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure] in a case pending before it ... upon its own initiative." N.C. R.App. P. 2.
Rule 38 provides: "If a party entitled to appeal dies before filing a notice of appeal, appeal may be taken by his personal representative or if he has no personal representative, by his attorney of record...." N.C. R.App. P. 38. We acknowledge that Rule 38 does not address the unusual circumstances of this case. Here, plaintiff died before she was entitled to an appeal. We believe, however, that the specific facts of this case and Rule 2 allow us to vary Rule 38 so that plaintiff may take the appeal by plaintiff's attorney of record. Therefore, we deem the appeal properly before us and proceed to address the merits.
The relevant facts in this case show that plaintiff Gladys Brown and defendant Carroll M. Brown married in 1976 and separated in 1997. Six days after they separated, plaintiff filed a complaint requesting equitable distribution and related collateral relief, a divorce from bed and board, alimony pendente lite, and permanent alimony. Plaintiff, however, died before the trial court entered either a divorce decree or a final equitable distribution judgment. Her administratrix filed a motion on 19 February 1998 requesting "that she be substituted as [p]laintiff in the place of Gladys Brown, deceased, and that she be allowed to proceed as [p]laintiff in this matter." The trial court denied that motion and dismissed all of plaintiff's claims because it found that "[e]ach claim filed by the [p]laintiff abated upon [p]laintiff's death." Plaintiff, through counsel of record, appealed the trial court's decision, claiming in part that the trial court improperly dismissed the equitable distribution action and that the trial court should have substituted the administratrix for the plaintiff in the equitable distribution action. A divided Court of Appeals reversed the trial court on both issues. The Court of Appeals did so because the majority held that equitable distribution actions survive even if one of the parties dies before a court enters an absolute divorce decree.
It is settled law in North Carolina that the death of one of the parties abates an action for divorce. Elmore v. Elmore, 67 *623 N.C.App. 661, 313 S.E.2d 904 (1984). The original version of the Equitable Distribution Act provided in N.C.G.S. § 50-21 provides that "[a] judgment for equitable distribution shall not be entered prior to the entry of a decree of absolute divorce." Thus, as held in Caldwell v. Caldwell, 93 N.C.App. 740, 379 S.E.2d 271, disc. rev. denied, 325 N.C. 270, 384 S.E.2d 513 (1989), equitable distribution and divorce were inextricably linked, and if the possibility of divorce was eliminated by the death of a party, there was no question that the ability to continue an equitable distribution action would abate. However, as a result of an amendment to N.C.G.S. § 50-21 in 1995, plaintiff argues and the Court of Appeals majority held, an equitable distribution action would not abate, even where, as here, a party dies prior to either an equitable distribution judgment being entered or a divorce granted.
We first look to N.C.G.S. §§ 50-20 and -21 because these statutory provisions articulate the right to equitable distribution and the procedure to be followed. In fact, prior to the 1981 passage of the Equitable Distribution of Marital Property Act, North Carolina courts, quite literally, lacked the power to transfer real property, or any interest therein, upon divorce. See Sally Sharp, The Partnership Ideal: The Development of Equitable Distribution in North Carolina, 65 N.C. L.Rev. 195, 196-97 (1987). We therefore must look to the intent of the legislature to determine if equitable distribution is available when divorce is not. State v. Oliver, 343 N.C. 202, 212, 470 S.E.2d 16, 22 (1996) (holding that the cardinal principle of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature controls). We conclude that a careful consideration of N.C.G.S. §§ 50-20 and -21 indicates that the General Assembly intended equitable distribution actions to be available only when there has been a divorce or when there is anticipation of the parties getting a divorce.
We acknowledge that the language of N.C.G.S. §§ 50-20 and -21 does not specifically address the issue before us. N.C.G.S. § 50-21(a) provides in part that "[a]t any time after a husband and wife begin to live separate and apart from each other, a claim for equitable distribution may be filed." N.C.G.S. § 50-21(a) (1999) (emphasis added). That statute addresses the filing of an equitable distribution action but does not address the relationship of an equitable distribution judgment to divorce or the possibility of divorce.
The context and legislative history of N.C.G.S. §§ 50-20 and -21, however, show that equitable distribution actions invariably contemplate divorce. Courts may refer to the context of an act to infer legislative intent when the meaning of a statute is in doubt. Sykes v. Clayton, 274 N.C. 398, 406, 163 S.E.2d 775, 781 (1968). Discussion of equitable distribution is limited nearly completely to chapter 50 of the General Statutes, a chapter titled "Divorce and Alimony," and all issues addressed in chapter 50 concern the dissolution of marriage. N.C.G.S. §§ 50-1 to -60 (1999). Discussion of equitable distribution is further limited to article 1 of that chapter, an article titled, "Divorce, Alimony, and Child Support, Generally." N.C.G.S. §§ 50-1 to -23. The substantive rights provided by equitable distribution are described in N.C.G.S. § 50-20, a section titled, "Distribution by court of marital and divisible property upon divorce." N.C.G.S. § 50-20 (emphasis added). It is reasonable to thus infer that the General Assembly intended equitable distribution to be linked with divorce and did not intend equitable distribution to proceed where there is no divorce and no possibility of a final divorce decree, such as we have in this case.
The General Assembly's intent to link equitable distribution and divorce can also be seen in the title of the act that most recently amended N.C.G.S. § 50-21(a). Although the title of an act cannot control when the text is clear, In re Appeal of Forsyth County, 285 N.C. 64, 71, 203 S.E.2d 51, 55 (1974), the title is an indication of legislative intent, Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham, 350 N.C. 805, 812, 517 S.E.2d 874, 879 (1999). The General Assembly titled the act that amended N.C.G.S. § 50-21(a), "An Act to Allow Claims for Equitable Distribution to be Resolved Either Before or After an Absolute Divorce is Granted...." Act of June 14, 1995, ch. 245, 1995 N.C. Sess. *624 Laws 510 (emphasis added). This title makes clear that the General Assembly did not intend its amendment to completely sever equitable distribution claims from divorce proceedings; it meant only to expand the timing in which an equitable distribution action may be filed and judgment entered. This legislative history and the context of the statute convince us that equitable distribution actions are so related to divorce proceedings that when death ends all chance for divorce, any equitable distribution action then pending must abate.
N.C.G.S. § 50-20, which addresses the procedure for a court to distribute "marital and divisible property upon divorce," provides additional support for our conclusion. N.C.G.S. § 50-20 (emphasis added). This statute carefully describes the factors the trial court should consider, weigh, and balance when it equitably distributes marital property. In evaluating these factors, the trial court must consider the contemplated or prior divorce of the parties. Otherwise, the factors would be senseless. The trial court does not simply distribute the property between the parties, but considers, for example, their estates, income, and financial liabilities. When the court is asked to equitably distribute marital and divisible property, it must anticipate that the parties will at some time be independent, divorced individuals.[1] This responsibility reinforces our perception that the General Assembly intended to link equitable distribution and divorce so closely that the death of one party before the entry of a divorce decree requires the abatement of any pending equitable distribution action.
The premise of plaintiff's argument and the Court of Appeals' decision is that the most recent amendment of N.C.G.S. § 50-21 mandates a contrary conclusion. See ch. 245, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 510. In 1995, the General Assembly deleted the following text from N.C.G.S. § 50-21(a):
A judgment for equitable distribution shall not be entered prior to entry of a decree of absolute divorce, except for a consent judgment, which may be entered at any time during the pendency of the action, or except if the parties have been separated for at least six months and they consent, in a pleading or other writing filed with the court, to an equitable distribution trial prior to the entry of the decree for absolute divorce.
Ch. 245, sec. 1, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws at 511.
We believe the General Assembly never meant this change to remove the link between equitable distribution and divorce. The changes the General Assembly made to N.C.G.S. § 50-21 between 1981 and 1995 indicate that the legislators meant this most recent change to place no limit on the time in which a court could enter an equitable distribution judgment. The original version of N.C.G.S. § 50-21 provided that "[a] judgment for equitable distribution shall not be entered prior to the entry of a decree of absolute divorce." N.C.G.S. § 50-21(a) (1981) (amended 1989). The 1989 amendment to the statute allowed courts to enter equitable distribution judgments before a final divorce decree upon entry of a consent judgment. N.C.G.S. § 50-21(a) (1989) (amended 1991). The 1991 amendment allowed courts to enter equitable distribution judgments before entering a divorce decree, either through a consent judgment or when an incompetent spouse was involved. N.C.G.S. § 50-21(a) (1991) (amended 1995). The 1992 amendment again expanded the time in which a court could enter a judgment of equitable distribution; it allowed a court to enter an equitable distribution judgment before a divorce decree through a consent judgment, when an incompetent spouse was involved, or when the parties were separated for six months and consented in writing to allow the court to determine equitable distribution. N.C.G.S. § 50-21(a) (1992) (amended 1995). Because each of these amendments aimed to change only when a court could enter an equitable distribution judgment in relationship to a divorce being granted, we believe the most recent amendment of N.C.G.S. § 50-21 was similarly intended.
*625 By deleting the provision previously noted, the General Assembly eliminated the exceptions that had been engrafted over the years on the original mandate that equitable distribution could not be ordered until a divorce decree was entered. The amendment thus removes all limitations on the timing of an equitable distribution judgment, vis-a-vis the granting of divorce. We find no indication, however, that this deletion was intended to remove the link between a divorce proceeding and a request to the court to distribute property acquired during the marriage. Therefore, we conclude that the 1995 amendment to N.C.G.S. § 50-21 did not change the relationship between equitable distribution and divorce. Instead, the amendment continued the legislative trend for equitable distribution to occur at any time prior to or after an absolute divorce.
The Court of Appeals also relied in part on the provisions of N.C.G.S. § 50-20(k). The General Assembly passed N.C.G.S. § 50-20(k) in 1981. Act of July 3, 1981, ch. 815, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1184. At the same time, and in the same act, it also passed the original version of N.C.G.S. § 50-21(a), ch. 815, sec. 6, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1186, which provided, in pertinent part, that "[a] judgment for equitable distribution shall not be entered prior to the entry of a decree of absolute divorce," see N.C.G.S. § 50-21(a) (1981) (amended 1989) (emphasis added), and clearly indicated that equitable distribution depended on divorce, Caldwell, 93 N.C.App. 740, 379 S.E.2d 271. Thus, the General Assembly cannot have intended N.C.G.S. § 50-20(k) to mean that equitable distribution could proceed without divorce unless it meant to directly contradict itself in N.C.G.S. § 50-21(a). Courts, of course, presume that the General Assembly would not intend something so absurd as contradicting itself in the same statute. In re Brake, 347 N.C. 339, 341, 493 S.E.2d 418, 420 (1997) (holding that when the Supreme Court construes statutes, it presumes that the legislature acted in accordance with reason and common sense). N.C.G.S. § 50-20(k), therefore, did not indicate that equitable distribution was independent of the possibility of divorce in 1981, nor does it indicate that now. N.C.G.S. § 50-20(k) does not contradict our holding that the General Assembly did not intend a trial court to be able to enter an equitable distribution judgment when there is no divorce and no possibility of divorce.
In sum, equitable distribution is a statutory right defined by N.C.G.S. §§ 50-20 and -21 and is inextricably linked with divorce proceedings. Because death ends any chance for divorce and because plaintiff in the instant case died before the trial court entered a divorce decree, plaintiff's claim for equitable distribution abated, and the trial court correctly dismissed plaintiff's case. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the holding of the trial court.
REVERSED.
NOTES
[1]  This reasoning does not contradict Tucker v. Miller, 113 N.C.App. 785, 440 S.E.2d 315 (1994), in which the Court of Appeals held that an equitable distribution action survived a party's death when the trial court had already entered a decree of absolute divorce. Id. at 788, 440 S.E.2d at 317. In this case, however, the trial court had not entered a divorce decree.


977 So.2d 8 (2007)
James L. DENDY, Executor of the Succession of Bernard R. Kannon, Sr.
v.
CITY NATIONAL BANK and Jimmy Johnston.
No. 2006 CA 2436.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
October 17, 2007.
*9 Dennis R. Whalen, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, for Plaintiff/Appellant, James L. Dendy, Executor.
Rebecca Kittok Wisbar, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, for Defendant/Appellee, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
Stephen F. Chiccarelli, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, for Defendant/Appellee, Regions Bank.
Before GAIDRY, McDONALD, and McCLENDON, JJ.
GAIDRY, J.
A succession executor appeals a judgment recognizing his civil action against a bank as abandoned and formally dismissing the action as of the date of abandonment. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiff, James L. Dendy, is the executor of the succession of Bernard R. Kannon, Sr. In that capacity, he filed two separate lawsuits in the 19th Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge on January 5, 1999, seeking reimbursement of the amounts of checks cashed by Jimmy Johnston, who allegedly forged the payees' endorsements. The two actions relate to the negotiation of different checks through different banks. The first action, assigned civil case number 956,915, named as defendants Jimmy Johnston and Bank One, Louisiana, N.A. (formerly City National Bank and now JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.). Bank One, Louisiana, N.A. (Bank One) answered the petition in the first action, denying its liability. Mr. Johnston did not answer the petition, and a preliminary judgment by default was entered against him in the first action on July 6, 1999.
The second action, assigned civil case number 956,916, also named Mr. Johnston as a defendant, as well as Regions Bank (Regions). Regions filed a combined answer, cross-claim, and third-party demand. One third-party defendant, Bank of West Baton Rouge, filed its answer to the third-party demand on May 19, 1999.
On October 11, 2000, plaintiff filed a motion to consolidate his two actions for trial. The motion bore the captions of both actions. The trial court ordered a contradictory hearing on the motion for December 4, 2000. In the meantime, on November 16, 2000, the other third-party defendant in the second action, Snapy's, Inc., filed its answer to Regions's third-party demand, combined with its own third-party demand against plaintiff. That pleading bore the captions of both actions, but was filed only in the record of the first action. On December 4, 2000, plaintiff filed his answer to the third-party demand of Snapy's, Inc. in the record of the second action. Although the trial court's minute entry for December 4, 2000, reflects that plaintiffs motion to consolidate the actions was granted that day, no order was signed, and for some reason, plaintiff filed a second motion to consolidate the actions on June 11, 2002. That motion was heard on August 12, 2002 and granted, and the trial *10 court finally signed a judgment of consolidation on August 21, 2002.
Subsequent to the order of consolidation, on September 9, 2002, Bank One filed an amended answer in the first action, combined with a cross-claim against Mr. Johnston and a third-party demand against the Bank of West Baton Rouge and Snapy's. The record shows, and the parties concede, that Bank One's filing of that combined pleading was the last formal step taken in the prosecution of the first action until November 23, 2005.
On August 29, 2005, southeastern Louisiana was struck by Hurricane Katrina, which devastated the New Orleans area. On September 6, 2005, Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco issued Executive Order KBB 2005-32, following her earlier proclamation of a state of emergency for the entire state. Executive Order KBB 2005-32 ordered that "[a]ll deadlines in legal proceedings, including liberative prescriptive and peremptive periods in all courts" were suspended "until at least September 25, 2005," and that the order applied retroactively from August 29, 2005. By Executive Order KBB 2005-48, issued on September 23, 2005, Governor Blanco extended the suspension of all deadlines in legal proceedings until October 25, 2005, again applicable statewide.
The disastrous effects of Hurricane Katrina were followed by those of Hurricane Rita, which made landfall on September 24, 2005, devastating the southwestern area of the state. On October 19, 2005, Governor Blanco issued Executive Order KBB 2005-67, extending the suspension of "[l]iberative prescriptive and peremptive periods" statewide until November 25, 2005. However, the suspension of all other deadlines in legal proceedings was to end on October 25, 2005, as provided in Executive Order KBB 2005-48, except for those parishes affected by Hurricane Rita.[1]
The legislature was called into special session from November 6 to November 18, 2005, and enacted legislation ratifying the governor's action in issuing the executive orders and further extending the suspension of prescriptive and peremptive periods from August 26, 2005 through January 3, 2006.[2]
On November 23, 2005, plaintiff filed a request for "a status conference in these consolidated cases" in the first action, for the express purposes of "settling pleadings, fixing discovery deadlines, fixing a pre-trial conference, and setting a trial date." The request bore the suit captions of both consolidated cases, named the parties in both cases and their respective counsel, but no order was submitted with the request. There is no indication in the record that the trial court took any action in response to the request.
On February 9, 2006, Bank One filed an ex parte motion in the first action, seeking an order of dismissal on the grounds of abandonment. In its motion, Bank One contended that no action was taken in the prosecution or defense of the first action from September 9, 2002 through November 28, 2005. On February 17, 2006, the trial court assigned the motion for hearing on April 3, 2006, on a contradictory basis.
On March 15, 2006, Regions filed an ex parte motion to dismiss both consolidated actions, contending that no steps in the *11 prosecution or defense had been taken since November 27, 2002, when plaintiff served responses to discovery propounded by Regions in the second action. On March 21, 2006, the trial court signed an order denying Regions's motion, reciting the fact that plaintiff filed his request for a status conference on November 23, 2005.
On April 3, 2006, the trial court heard Bank One's motion to recognize abandonment in the first action. It ruled in favor of Bank One, assigning oral reasons. Its judgment granting Bank One's motion was signed May 1,2006.
Plaintiff instituted a devolutive appeal. This court issued a show cause order on January 25, 2007, ordering the parties to show cause by briefs why the appeal should not be dismissed, on the grounds that the judgment did not contain appropriate decretal language of formal dismissal, as required by La. C.C.P. art. 561(A)(2). On March 6, 2007, we issued an interim order, ordering the remand of the case for the limited purpose of having the trial court sign a corrected judgment dismissing the first action as of the date of abandonment. The corrected judgment was signed on April 23, 2007, dismissing the first action as of November 22, 2005. Written findings of fact and reasons for judgment were issued on May 1, 2007.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in finding that the filing of his request for a status conference was not a step in the prosecution of the first action, sufficient to interrupt abandonment, and in failing to apply the doctrine of contra non valentem to defeat the claim of abandonment.

PRELIMINARY PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS
Consolidation of actions pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1561 is a procedural convenience designed to avoid multiplicity of actions and does not cause a case to lose its status as a procedural entity. Howard v. Hercules-Gallion Co., 417 So.2d 508, 511 (La.App. 1st Cir.1982). Procedural rights peculiar to one case are not rendered applicable to a companion case by the mere fact of consolidation; each case must stand on its own merits. Id. The filing of a pleading or motion in one of several consolidated cases does not procedurally affect the others. In re Miller, 95-1051, p. 5 (La.App. 1st Cir. 12/15/95), 665 So.2d 774, 776, writ denied, 96-0166 (La.2/9/96), 667 So.2d 541.
Because consolidation of actions for trial does not procedurally merge the actions for all purposes, the mere fact that a pleading, a discovery response, or correspondence bears the suit captions of the consolidated actions does not render the pleading or document applicable to all of the consolidated actions. The substance and purpose of such a pleading, the cause of action to which it relates, the parties actually affected, and the particular suit record or records in which it was filed must be considered to determine if it applies to only one or more of the consolidated actions. This issue is particularly significant as it relates to abandonment under La. C.C.P. art. 561. In some circumstances, a pleading or procedural step may clearly apply to all of several actions consolidated for trial, if it was intended to hasten all of those actions to judgment in a common trial. See Reed v. Pittman, 257 La. 389, 398-99, 242 So.2d 554, 557-58 (La.1970).
This appeal was taken from the judgment in the first action only. Regions has submitted briefs in its purported capacity as an appellee in this appeal, but Regions is not a party to the first action. As *12 plaintiff correctly emphasizes, Regions did not seek review of the order denying its ex parte motion to dismiss the consolidated second action, so that order is not properly before us. Accordingly, we will not indulge in discussion of the merits of that order or the procedural status of the second action.[3]

ANALYSIS
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 561(A) provides, in pertinent part:
A. (1) An action is abandoned when the parties fail to take any step in its prosecution or defense in the trial court for a period of three years
(2) This provision shall be operative without formal order, but, on ex parte motion of any party or other interested person by affidavit which provides that no step has been taken for a period of three years in the prosecution or defense of the action, the trial court shall enter a formal order of dismissal as of the date of its abandonment
(3) A motion to set aside a dismissal may be made only within thirty days of the date of the sheriffs service of the order of dismissal. If the trial court denies a timely motion to set aside the dismissal, the clerk of court shall give notice of the order of denial pursuant to Article 1913(A) and shall file a certificate pursuant to Article 1913(D).
(4) An appeal of an order of dismissal may be taken only within sixty days of the date of the sheriffs service of the order of dismissal. An appeal of an order of denial may be taken only within sixty days of the date of the clerk's mailing of the order of denial.
A "step" in the prosecution or defense of an action has been defined as "taking formal action before the court," appearing in the record of the suit, that "is intended to hasten the suit toward judgment," with the exception of formal discovery that need not appear in the record. Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 00-3010, p. 6 (La.5/15/01), 785 So.2d 779, 784. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 561 is to be liberally construed in favor of maintaining a plaintiffs suit. Id., 00-3010 at p. 8, 785 So.2d at 784.
The trial court's written reasons for judgment of May 1, 2007 essentially track its earlier oral reasons for judgment issued on April 3, 2006. The trial court accepted Bank One's position that the suspension of the abandonment period began on August 29, 2005, the effective date of the suspension of all deadlines in legal proceedings in Executive Order KBB 2005-32, and ended on October 25, 2005, as provided for all deadlines other than liberative prescription and peremption in Executive Order KBB 2005-67. Bank One contended that the last step taken in the first action occurred on September 9, 2002, and that discovery propounded by plaintiff on September 26, 2002 was not properly served, making it informal discovery insufficient to constitute a step in the action's prosecution. It further contended that even if the latter date was accepted as the commencement date of the abandonment period, the suspension of the deadline only served to give plaintiff twenty-nine additional days from October 25, 2005, or until November 22, 2005, to *13 interrupt the accrual of abandonment. In its oral reasons, the trial court found that plaintiffs request for a status conference did not constitute a step in the prosecution of the action, without expressly stating its finding as to the commencement date of abandonment. In its corrected judgment and later written reasons, however, the trial court additionally held that abandonment accrued on November 22, 2005, one day prior to the filing of plaintiff's request.
That the requested conference was referred to as a "status conference" in the request is not determinative of the issue of its character for purposes of abandonment. In determining the issue of abandonment, "the intent and substance of a party's actions matter far more than technical compliance." Thibaut Oil Co., Inc. v. Holly, 06-0313, p. 5 (La.App. 1st Cir.2/14/07), 961 So.2d 1170, 1172-73. Form or caption should not prevail over substance. See Clark, 00-3010 at p. 9, 785 So.2d at 786. By means of his request filed in the record of the first action, plaintiffs counsel sought a conference with the court and other counsel in both consolidated actions for the purposes of "settling pleadings, fixing discovery deadlines, fixing a pre-trial conference, and setting a trial date." The first three listed items clearly fall within the purposes of a scheduling conference authorized by La. C.C.P. art. 1551(A).[4] Bank One argues that a "status conference" would "not require the court to implement any sort of scheduling order requiring the parties to do certain things before trial as would a pre-trial conference/order." (Emphasis supplied.) While this may technically be true, plaintiffs intent and the substantive purpose of the requested conference are more relevant than subtle distinctions in the nomenclature or finality of the conference.
This court was recently confronted with the issue of "whether a proper request for a status and/or scheduling conference is . . . sufficient to interrupt the three-year period for abandonment." Hidalgo v. Catfish Queen P'ship in Commendam, 06-1531, p. 5 (La.App. 1st Cir.5/4/07), 961 So.2d 434, 437. The case arose in the same trial court as that of the present action. We held that the filing of requests by letter for "scheduling conferences" were "procedurally proper and timely," and comported with La. C.C.P. art. 1551 and Rule 9.14 of the Louisiana Rules for District Courts. That the trial court's local rule technically requires a formal pretrial conference to actually set a trial date, as opposed to a motion to set for trial or a "scheduling" or "status" conference, is not determinative on this point. Here, as in Hidalgo, "the ultimate purpose of the conference was to hasten the matter to judgment by selecting deadlines for the parties to conclude all pretrial matters." Id., 06-1531 at p. 6, 961 So.2d at 438. The trial court erred in ruling that plaintiffs request for a status conference was not a step in the prosecution of his action. The remaining question is whether that step was timely.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5822(A) provides:

All prescriptions, including liberative, acquisitive, and the prescription of nonuse, and all peremptive periods shall be subject to a limited suspension and/or extension during the time period of August 26, 2005, through January 3, 2006; *14 however, the suspension and/or extension of these periods shall be limited and shall apply only if these periods would have otherwise lapsed during the time period of August 26, 2005, through January 3, 2006. This limited suspension and/or extension shall terminate on January 3, 2006, and any right, claim, or action which would have expired during the time period of August 26, 2005, through January 3, 2006, shall lapse on January 4, 2006. (Emphasis supplied.)
This statute operated to extend prescriptive and peremptive periods only. Other legal deadlines affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita are governed by La. R.S. 9:5823, which provides:
A. All deadlines in legal proceedings, which were suspended by Executive Orders KBB 2005-32, 48, and 67, shall be subject to a limited suspension and/or extension during the time period of November 25, 2005, through January 3, 2006; however, the suspension and/or extension of these deadlines shall be limited and shall apply only if these deadlines would have otherwise lapsed during the time period of November 25, 2005, through January 3, 2006. This limited suspension and/or extension shall terminate on January 3, 2006, and any deadline in legal proceedings which would have expired during the time period of November 25, 2005, through January 3, 2006, shall lapse on January 4, 2006.
B. Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsection A and to the extent that deadlines in legal proceedings were not suspended by Executive Orders KBB 2005-48 and 67, if a deadline in a legal proceeding lapsed during the time period of October 25, 2005, through November 25, 2005, a party shall have the right to seek an extension or suspension of that deadline by contradictory motion or declaratory judgment. The party seeking the extension shall bear the burden of proving that either the party or his attorney was adversely affected by Hurricane Katrina or Rita and but for the catastrophic effects of Hurricane Katrina or Rita, the legal deadline would have been timely met. For good cause shown, the court shall extend the deadline in the legal proceeding, but in no instance shall the extension be later than January 3, 2006. (Emphasis supplied.)
The resolution of this matter ultimately hinges upon whether the governor's executive orders and the corresponding legislation extending prescriptive and peremptive periods apply to abandonment, or whether the three-year abandonment period is properly considered a legal deadline other than a prescriptive or peremptive period. If the former, abandonment was interrupted by the filing of the request for a status conference. If the latter, abandonment accrued during the one-month suspension "gap" of October 25 through November 25, 2005. See La. R.S. 9:5823(B) and Executive Order KBB 2005-67, § 1(B).
Because the Louisiana Civil Code does not provide guidance on how to determine whether a particular time limitation is prescriptive or peremptive, the supreme court "has resorted to an exploration of the legislative intent and public policy underlying a particular time limitation." State of La., Div. of Admin, v. Mclnnis Bros. Constr., 97-0742, p. 4 (La.10/21/97), 701 So.2d 937, 940. Thus, courts look to the language of the statute, the purpose behind the statute, and the public policy mitigating for or against suspension, interruption, or renunciation of that time limit to determine its nature as prescriptive or peremptive. State Bd. of Ethics v. Ourso, 02-1978, p. 5 (La.4/9/03), 842 So.2d 346, 349. The same rationale should apply in *15 determining whether abandonment falls into either category, or neither.
Abandonment is essentially self-operative; it occurs automatically upon the passing of three years without a step being taken by either party, and it is effective without court order. La. C.C.P. art. 561(A)(2). In those respects, it more closely resembles peremption rather than prescription, which must be affirmatively pleaded as a defense and cannot be noticed by a court on its own motion. See La. C.C.P. arts. 927(B) and 1005. But unlike peremption, the right to plead abandonment can be waived by a defendant, as the defense of prescription can be waived by the failure to affirmatively plead it or through acknowledgment. It has also been held that the doctrine of contra non valentem may apply to defeat a claim of abandonment, as it may also defeat a claim of prescription. See Clark, 00-3010 at p. 7, 785 So.2d at 784-85; Akyar v. Lee, 99-806, p. 4 (La.App. 5th Cir.1/25/00), 751 So.2d 411, 413, writ denied, 00-0616 (La.4/20/00), 760 So.2d 348. In these respects, then, it more closely resembles prescription than peremption.
Fortunately, the supreme court has provided guidance on the issue. Clark unequivocally recognized that "[abandonment is both historically and theoretically a form of liberative prescription that exists independent from the prescription that governs the underlying substantive claim." Clark, 00-3010 at p. 11, 785 So.2d at 787. (Emphasis supplied.) It further observed that "[t]he historical and theoretical nature of abandonment as a species of prescription renders it appropriate to consider prescriptive principles in analyzing res nova abandonment issues. . . ." Clark, 00-3010 at p. 19, 785 So.2d at 791. The issue before us is res nova.
Since the legislature intended that even the strict time limitation of peremption should be suspended pursuant to La. R.S. 9:5822(A) due to the 2005 hurricane crisis, it is logical to conclude that it also intended that abandonment, a species of the less-strict time limitation of prescription, should likewise be suspended. We are also guided by the legislature's express directive that La. R.S. 9:5821, et seq., "shall be liberally construed" to effect the purposes stated. Accordingly, we hold that Executive Orders KBB 2005-32, 2005-48, and 2005-67 and La. R.S. 9:5822(A) apply to abandonment as well as to other forms of liberative prescription.
The abandonment period in this case "would have otherwise lapsed" on September 9 (or, alternatively, September 26), 2005 ("during the time period of August 26, 2005, through January 3, 2006"). See La. R.S. 9:5822(A). It was therefore suspended "through January 3, 2006" and "lapse[d] on January 4, 2006." Id. Plaintiffs request for a status conference on November 23, 2005 was therefore timely.
In summary, we hold that the abandonment period that would have ordinarily accrued on September 9, 2005 was statutorily suspended from August 26, 2005 through January 3, 2006, and that the filing of plaintiff's request for a status conference on November 23, 2005, given its express purposes, constituted a step in the prosecution of the action, sufficient to interrupt abandonment. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings. All costs of this appeal are assessed to the defendant-appellee, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (formerly Bank One, Louisiana, N.A.).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
NOTES
[1]  Executive Order KBB 2005-67 provided that deadlines in legal proceedings in the parishes of Calcasieu, Cameron, Jefferson Davis, and Vermilion were suspended until November 25, 2005.
[2]  See La. R.S. 9:5821(B) and 9:5822(A), enacted by Acts 2005, 1st Ex.Sess., No. 6, § 1, effective November 23, 2005. The statutes were expressly declared to be applicable "retroactively as well as prospectively." Acts 2005, 1st Ex.Sess., No. 6, § 4.
[3]  The denial of Regions's motion in the second consolidated action was an interlocutory judgment and not appealable. Not being a party to the first action, Regions likewise cannot properly be considered an appellee in this appeal. To the extent that Regions's brief discusses issues relating to the judgment in the first action, it might conceivably be construed as an amicus curiae brief. However, as Regions did not move for leave to submit its brief, we also will not consider it in that respect. Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.11.
[4]  Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1551 authorizes a trial court to set "conferences" of counsel for the purposes of considering "[t]he necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings"; "[t]he control and scheduling of discovery"; and "other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action." The article specifically authorizes the trial court in its discretion to conduct multiple conferences.


                            UNPUBLISHED

                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                       FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                            No. 00-2522

ORVILLE LEWIS, JR.,

                                              Plaintiff - Appellant,

          versus

EQUIFAX CREDIT INFORMATION SERVICES; HEALTH-
SOUTH SPORTS MEDICINE AND REHABILITATION
CENTER, a/k/a Healthsouth of Virginia, a/k/a
Healthsouth of Richmond II,

                                           Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia, at Richmond. David G. Lowe, Magistrate Judge.
(CA-00-295)

Submitted:   May 31, 2001             Decided:   September 10, 2001

Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Orville Lewis, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Bradley J. Miller, KILPATRICK
STOCKTON, L.L.P., Atlanta, Georgia; Barrett Erskine Pope, DURRETTE,
IRVIN & BRADSHAW, P.L.C., Richmond, Virginia; Stephen Atherton
Northup, Megan Conway Rahman, TROUTMAN, SANDERS, MAYS & VALENTINE,
L.L.P., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:

     Orville Lewis, Jr., appeals the magistrate judge’s order

granting summary judgment to defendants in this action arising

under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.   We have reviewed the record

and the magistrate judge’s opinion and find no reversible error.

Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the magistrate judge.

See Lewis v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., No. CA-00-295 (E.D. Va.

Oct. 17, 2000).   We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                          AFFIRMED

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