251 F.Supp. 833 (1965)
UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND, Libellant,
v.
S/S NORDSTERN, her boilers, engines, etc., Sabre Shipping Corporation, Sabre Line and C. Mackprang, Jr., Respondents.
United States District Court S. D. New York.
November 23, 1965.
Supplemental Opinion April 1, 1966.
*834 Zock, Petrie, Sheneman & Reid, New York City, for libellant; Francis J. O'Brien, Howard M. McCormack, New York City, Advocates.
Kirlin, Campbell & Keating, New York City, for claimant-respondent, C. Mackprang, Jr.; Walter P. Hickey, New York City, Advocate.
Dougherty, Ryan, Mahoney & Pellegrino, New York City, for respondents *835 Sabre Shipping Corporation and Sabre Line; Robert J. Giuffra, New York City, Advocate.
LEVET, District Judge.
This is a libel in admiralty growing out of an alleged deviation by the S/S Nordstern, owned by C. Mackprang, Jr. (Mackprang) and under time charter to Sabre Shipping Corporation (Sabre). Libellant, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), a shipper of goods on the S/S Nordstern, has libelled the ship in rem, and respondents Mackprang and Sabre in personam. Mackprang cross-claims against Sabre, the charterer, should Mackprang be held liable to libellant.
Respondent Sabre is currently undergoing an arrangement pursuant to Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.). On December 18, 1964, Hon. Edward J. Ryan, Referee in Bankruptcy, signed an order in that proceeding which provided, inter alia:
"ORDERED, that any and all persons hereby are stayed, restrained, and enjoined from proceeding in any Court wherein the above named debtor [Sabre Shipping Corporation] is a defendant until final decree in the above entitled proceedings or until further order of this Court * * *."
This order was pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 714.
Libellant now moves for summary judgment against all respondents. Respondent Mackprang moves for summary judgment on its cross-claim against Sabre, in the event it is held liable.
No application for a modification of the restraining order has been made to Referee Ryan, though this is the procedure implicitly approved in In re Laufer, 230 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1956). This court, therefore, feels constrained to respect the Referee's order, and to decline to entertain the motions for summary judgment against Sabre. The only motions properly before the court, therefore, are motions for summary judgment by UNICEF against the S/S Nordstern in rem, and against Mackprang, the owner, in personam.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
1. At all times herein relevant the S/S Nordstern was owned by Mackprang.
2. At all times herein relevant the S/S Nordstern was under time charter to Sabre. This time charter was for a period of from eight to twelve months.
3. The time charter provided that the vessel was to be employed in carrying lawful merchandise "between safe port and/or ports in Worldwide trading within [certain broad territorial limits not relevant here] as the Charterers or their Agents shall direct," on the following conditions, among others:
"8. * * * The Captain (although appointed by the Owners), shall be under the orders and directions of the Charterers as regards employment and agency, and Charterers are to load, stow and trim the cargo at their expense under the supervision of the Captain, who is to sign Bills of Lading for cargo as presented, in conformity with Mate's or Tally Clerk's receipts."
"9. That if the Charterers shall have reason to be dissatisfied with the conduct of the Captain, Officers, or Engineers, the Owners shall on receiving particulars of the complaint, investigate the same, and, if necessary, make a change in the appointments."
"11. That the Charterers shall furnish the Captain from time to time with all requisite instructions and sailing directions, in writing * * *."[1]
*836 4. On or about June 30, 1961 there were delivered at Baltimore, Maryland to the S/S Nordstern certain shipments of DDT belonging to UNICEF, libellant herein.
5. In return for these goods a printed bill of lading under the heading and insignia of "Sabre Line" was issued to UNICEF. The bill of lading provided that the port of discharge from the S/S Nordstern of the DDT was to be Karachi (Pakistan). The bill of lading closed with the following recital:
"In witness whereof, the carrier by its agent has signed 3 (three) bills of lading, all of the same tenor and date, one of which being accomplished, the others to stand void.
                      SABRE LINE
                       Division of
         Sabre Shipping Corporation
         By TERMINAL SHIPPING
              CO.AGENTS
         By W. BOLDOWSKY"
It is to be noted that the Captain did not sign the bill of lading.
6. The S/S Nordstern sailed from Baltimore with the aforesaid cargo aboard.
7. The DDT was not discharged at Karachi, but rather at Calcutta, where the voyage was terminated. This was done pursuant to order of Sabre sent by cable to Sabre's agent in Calcutta, and relayed by him to the ship. The owner of the vessel was not consulted with regard to the termination or the discharge of the cargo. The decision to terminate and discharge the cargo is admitted to have been made by Sabre solely for business purposes and not as a result of stress of weather or damage to the vessel.
It is clear from the statement of facts that there was a deviation by the vessel from the voyage agreed upon. The ship never went to Karachi and the goods were unloaded at Calcutta. However, not all deviations carry with them liability for damages. It is only "unreasonable" deviations which carry with them such damages. The Wildwood, 133 F.2d 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 319 U.S. 771, 63 S.Ct. 1436, 87 L.Ed. 1719 (1943); Surrendra (Overseas) Private, Ltd. v. S.S. Hellenic Hero, 213 F.Supp. 97 (S.D. N.Y.), aff'd per curiam 324 F.2d 955 (2nd Cir. 1963). The deviation herein was prima facie unreasonable. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1300 et seq. (§ 1304(4)).[2] The undisputed facts of this case, with the deviation admitted to have been made solely for "business reasons," clearly show the deviation to have been unreasonable. The question becomes, then, whether the ship and the owner, or either of them, is liable for the damage thereby sustained.
Considerable research has led us to the conclusion that the ship is liable in rem for the damages sustained as a result of the deviation, even though her master did not sign the bill of lading.
It was early said:
"A charter-party is the hiring of the whole or a part of a vessel, for the transportation of merchandise or passengers; and if it does not, ex vi termini, convey a proprietary interest, it certainly does pass a claim or interest in the vessel, recognized by the maritime law, the privilege to look upon her as answerable for the goods placed on board. That she is answerable for them, and they to her, is a well-settled and universal rule of law; and the parties, when they enter into the contract, are presumed to do so with knowledge of the lien implied by law from the terms and character of the instrument they make. * * *"[3]
Only a few cases in which the factual situation herein has arisen have been *837 found. All held the ship liable. The first of these is The Blandon, 287 F. 722 (S.D.N.Y.1922). There Judge Learned Hand held that the ship was liable in rem to a shipper for the delay in the arrival of goods at the port of destination occasioned by a deviation. This was held in spite of the fact that the bill of lading under which the goods were shipped was signed by the time charterer of the vessel, not by the master or owner. Judge Hand held that once the voyage has commenced, the bill of lading, though signed by the charterer only, is "the measure of the ship's duty."
Again, in The G. A. Tomlinson, 293 F. 51 (W.D.N.Y.1923), it was held that libellant, a shipper of goods, could recover in rem against the ship where the ship delivered the goods at a location in Buffalo other than that specified in the bill of lading under which the goods were carried. The bills of lading had been signed by the charterer, "The Tomlinson Company, Agents." It was held that the master having accepted the goods over the rail of the ship, the ship was bound by the terms of the bills of lading, regardless of the fact that neither master nor owner had signed them.
Finally, in The Muskegon, 10 F.2d 817 (S.D.N.Y.1924), Judge Goddard held the ship bound by bills of lading issued by a charterer, although neither master nor owner had signed them. Once the ship left with the cargo, there was a ratification of the bills of lading. See also The Poznan, 276 F. 418 (S.D.N.Y.1921) (L. Hand, J.), discussed below.
It is true that most of the cases above cited Judge Manton's discussion of the subject in The Esrom, 272 F. 266 (2nd Cir. 1921). There Judge Manton, in one of three opinions for the court, spoke at 272 F. 266, 271, 272 of "a ratification and adoption by the ship of the charterer's contract with the shipper" once the ship has "broken ground." The court held there, however, that the ship was not liable for delay in sailing. There was no single opinion for the majority, one judge basing his opinion on the reasonableness of the delay, another on the binding character of the charter contract to sail "[when] a full cargo was secured." Judge Ward dissented. Later, in The Capitaine Faure, 10 F.2d 950, 967 (2nd Cir. 1926), the Second Circuit pointed out that in The Esrom, supra, the goods had been removed before sailing, and that therefore Judge Manton's words were dictum. The court concluded, 10 F.2d at 967:
"In saying what we have in reference to that portion of Judge Manton's opinion relating to the ratification of the charterer's bill of lading by the ship's breaking ground with the goods on board, we do not wish to be understood as expressing any opinion either favorable or unfavorable thereto. That question simply was not in this case, and it was not in the Esrom Case."
The court then went on to hold the ship liable in rem to shippers whose bills of lading were signed by the charterer and ratified either in writing or orally by the master, for the nonsailing of the ship. This was held although the ship never "broke ground," in Judge Manton's language.
To the court's knowledge, no further cases have dealt with the point herein concerned. The decisions in the district court discussed above, however, were, as we have said, closely in point. They did impose liability in rem. And in this court's opinion, those decisions make good sense. Once the voyage has begun, the goods are beyond the shipper's control. It seems eminently reasonable to hold that the ship has a duty to deliver them to the destination provided in the bill of lading being carried by the ship.[4] Nor does this conflict with other admiralty *838 practice. See generally Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty (1957 ed.), Chapter IX; 1 Benedict on Admiralty (6th ed. 1940; Knauth ed.), Chapter III. Cf. Turner v. United States, 27 F.2d 134 (2nd Cir. 1928). Indeed, the maritime lien and the proceeding against the ship itself do seem "the best and surest pledge for the compensation and indemnity to the injured party."[5] We hold the S/S Nordstern liable in rem for the damages suffered by libellant as a result of the deviation.
This brings us to the final point in the case, the in personam liability of the shipowner for the deviation. No cases have been found which impose such liability on the shipowner under the circumstances herein. It is all very well to say, as in The Themis, 275 F. 254, 262 (2nd Cir. 1921):
"* * * But when (Barbar & Co.'s authority to sign for the master being undisputed) the master of a ship chartered but not demised, which was the condition of Themis, issues bills of lading, we hold that the contract evidenced thereby is not only the ship's contract, and that of the time or other charterer who caused their issue, but that of the owner, whose master (i. e., authorized agent) issued the same."
However, no signature "for the master" appears in this case. The case seems somewhat similar to The Poznan, 276 F. 418 (S.D.N.Y.1921) (L. Hand, J.), in which liability in rem was imposed on the ship, liability in personam was imposed on the charterer, but no liability was imposed upon the owner, who had not purported to sign. All bills had been issued in the charterer's name. And, in that case, the charter was for even a more limited period than here, being only a voyage and return charter. The case is, however, distinguishable from the present one in that the master there was not authorized to sign bills of lading, though he in fact did sign a few in the charterer's name.
The provision in the charter party in the present case, providing for the master's signature on bills of lading, should not, it seems to us, affect the outcome when the bill of lading was not executed by the master. No one was here misled. The libellant well knew that it was dealing with a time charterer. (See affidavit of T.A.D. Adamowski, p. 2) It accepted a bill of lading from the charterer,[6] obtaining neither the owner's bill nor that of the master. As is said in Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading (17th ed. 1964), p. 51, speaking of the relationship between *839 shippers of goods and owners of the ships under time charter:
"* * * In some cases there will be no contract with the shipowner, but only with the time chartererd; * * *."
"d. [Citations omitted.] This may well be so where the time charterers are proprietors of a line of steamers and issue a bill of lading in the form of their line signed by themselves; cf. Herman v. Royal Exchange Shipping Co. (1884) C. & E. 413; The Okehampton [1913] P. 173; and Bathgate v. Letricheux, Lloyd's List, March 18, 1919."
This we believe is the situation here.[7] Cf. Samuel v. West Hartlepool Steam Nav. Co., 11 Com.Cas. 115 (1906); 1 Carver, Carriage by Sea, § 414 (11th ed. 1963). Upon the facts of this case, with no implication as to the outcome of other cases with different facts, we hold that no in personam liability extends to the shipowner for the deviation.
No genuine issues of material fact exist.
Libellant's motion for summary judgment against the S/S Nordstern is granted.
Libellant's motion for summary judgment against C. Mackprang, Jr. is denied.
Summary judgment is granted in favor of C. Mackprang, Jr. on the libel of United Nations Children's Fund against C. Mackprang, Jr.[8]
No action is taken on libellant's motion for summary judgment against Sabre Shipping Corporation, or upon respondent C. Mackprang Jr.'s motion for summary judgment against Sabre Shipping Corporation, and no determination of the rights of the parties thereon is made.
The case is to be referred to a Commissioner for a determination of damages.
Settle order and judgment on notice.

Supplemental opinion
Now before the court are motions for summary judgment by libellant, United Nations Children's Fund, against Sabre Shipping Corporation (hereinafter "Sabre"), also sued as Sabre Line, and by C. Mackprang, Jr., owner and claimant of the S/S Nordstern, on his cross-claim against Sabre.
On a previous motion in this case, the court granted summary judgment in favor of libellant against the S/S Nordstern by reason of damages caused by the failure to discharge libellant's goods at Karachi, Pakistan, as required by the bill of lading. While my previous decision placed liability on the ship for the above deviation, no determination was made on libellant's motion for summary judgment against Sabre, the charterer, or on Mackprang's motion for summary judgment on his cross-claim against Sabre because at the time of the previous motion, proceedings against Sabre were stayed by an order, dated December 18, 1964, of Edward J. Ryan, Referee in Bankruptcy. This stay has now been lifted so that the action may proceed against Sabre, although no proceedings *840 may be taken against any property of Sabre nor is execution to issue herein without order of the court. (See order of Edward J. Ryan, Referee in Bankruptcy, dated January 31, 1966, In the Matter of Sabre Shipping Corporation.)
The only opposition to libellant's original motion and to Mackprang's motion on his cross-claim was based on the above-mentioned stay, rather than on the merits. Proctors for Sabre in an affidavit of Robert J. Guiffra, sworn to February 14, 1966, have conceded "that there is no valid defense to the Motion of the libellant [United Nations Children's Fund] seeking summary judgment."
As to libellant's motion, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and libellant's motion for summary judgment against Sabre is granted.
Sabre now raises against Mackprang the defense that the matter involved in Mackprang's cross-claim against Sabre should be referred to arbitration in New York under Clause 17 of the Charter Party executed between Sabre and Mackprang. Mackprang asserts in reply that Sabre has waived its right to arbitrate.
The right to arbitrate and to stay trial of an action may be waived by dilatory conduct, and the trial judge has discretion to refuse to stay an action pending arbitration if he is of the opinion that the party seeking arbitration is in default. Radiator Speciality Co. v. Cannon Mills, Inc., 97 F.2d 318, 117 A.L.R. 299 (4th Cir. 1938); Cargo Carriers, Inc. v. Erie & St. Lawrence Corp., 105 F.Supp. 638 (W.D.N.Y.1952).
Here Sabre has waited until the resubmission of Mackprang's motion for summary judgment on his cross-claim to seek to enforce arbitration. The original libel in this suit was filed on May 16, 1962, and Mackprang's cross-claim was filed on July 31, 1963. Sabre never answered that cross-claim, nor did it assert any right to arbitration until this motion was brought on for determination by Mackprang on February 4, 1966. Sabre has thus let more than two and one-half years pass without doing anything to assert its rights to arbitration. In my opinion, Sabre's dilatory conduct is inconsistent with an intention to rely on arbitration and constitutes a waiver of its right to arbitrate.
I, thus, reach consideration of the merits of Mackprang's motion for summary judgment on his cross-claim against Sabre, which seeks to impose liability on Sabre both to indemnify Mackprang for the full amount of any liability to libellant of Mackprang or of his vessel, S/S Nordstern, and to pay Mackprang his attorneys' fees, costs and expenses incurred in defending the libel. Since I previously held the S/S Nordstern liable to libellant, liability on the cross-claim is in issue in this case.
The undisputed facts, as detailed in my opinion in this case, filed November 26, 1965, show
(1) that the S/S Nordstern was under time charter to Sabre at all times relevant herein,
(2) that on July 30, 1961 Sabre, the charterer, issued a bill of lading for certain shipments of DDT, belonging to libellant, to be discharged at Karachi, Pakistan,
(3) that the DDT was not discharged at Karachi, but, rather, at Calcutta, India, where the voyage terminated,
(4) that such deviation was ordered by Sabre solely for business purposes and not as a result of stress of weather or damage to the vessel, and
(5) that Mackprang was not consulted with regard to the deviation.
It is clear that an obligation on the part of the charterer to indemnify the owner may be implied. Scrutton, Charterparties and Bills of Lading, 360 (17th ed. 1964); Carver, Carriage of Goods by Sea, 259 (10th ed. 1957). Cf. Lawlor v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, 275 F.2d 599, 84 A.L.R.2d 613 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied 363 U.S. 844, 80 S.Ct. 1614, 4 L.Ed.2d 1728 (1960). Since the deviation here occurred by reason of the express direction of Sabre, the *841 charterer, and since it is in no way primarily attributable to Mackprang or his ship, Mackprang is entitled to indemnity from Sabre. The present case is very similar to Strathlorne S.S. Co. v. Andrew Weir & Co., 40 Com. Cas. 168, 50 Lloyd's List L.R. 187 (C.A.1934). There, a charterer was held liable to indemnify the shipowner at common law irrespective of any provisions in the charter party where the charterer's agents instructed the Master to deliver cargo without production of the bill of lading, and Lord Hanworth said, quoting from Dugdale v. Lovering, L.R. 10 C.P. 196:
"We think this evidence brings the case before us within the principle laid down in Betts v. Gibbins, (1834) 2 Ad. & E. 57, that when an act has been done by the plaintiff under the express directions of the defendant which occasions an injury to the rights of third persons, yet if such an act is not apparently illegal in itself, but is done honestly and bona fide in compliance with the defendant's directions, he shall be bound to indemnify the plaintiff against the consequences thereof."
Strathlorne S.S. Co. v. Andrew Weir & Co., supra, 40 Com. Cas. at 178, 50 Lloyd's List L.R. at 193. The same principles apply here.
As to Mackprang's cross-claim against Sabre, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and Mackprang's motion for summary judgment against Sabre is granted. Mackprang as claimant to the S/S Nordstern is entitled to indemnity from Sabre for any liability he has to libellant and for his attorneys' fees, costs and expenses in defending the libel.
An interlocutory decree will issue in favor of United Nations Children's Fund on its libel against the S/S Nordstern and Sabre Shipping Corporation. An interlocutory decree will also issue in favor of C. Mackprang, Jr. as claimant to the S/S Nordstern granting judgment on his cross-claim for indemnity against Sabre Shipping Corporation. The decree will provide for the appointment of a Commissioner to ascertain and compute the amount of damages of libellant, United Nations Children's Fund, and of respondent-claimant, C. Mackprang, Jr.
Submit interlocutory decree on notice in accordance herewith.
NOTES
[1]  The time charter, denominated as such, was a standard form, approved by the New York Produce Exchange, November 6, 1913, as amended through October 3, 1946, with some additions by the parties. For the standard form, see Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty (1957 ed.), Appendix C.
[2]  The goods herein were transported subject to this Act both under the explicit terms of the statute, 46 U.S.C. § 1300, and under the terms of the bill of lading covering the goods.
[3]  Vandewater v. The Yankee Blade, 28 Fed.Cas. 980 (No. 16,847) (C.C.S.D.Cal. 1855), aff'd 60 U.S. (19 How.) 82, 15 L.Ed. 554 (1856).
[4]  This is even more reasonable where, as here, the master knew that under the bill of lading he was to proceed to Karachi. See deposition of Focke Eidtmann, pp. 15, 16, 25.

Of course, my statement above excepts "reasonable" deviations. See discussion, p. 836, supra.
[5]  1 Benedict, supra, p. 20. And the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1300 et seq., enacted in 1936, does not appear to have changed the law with respect to the liability of the ship. Cf. Compagnie De Navigation Fraissinei & Cyprien Fabre, S.A. v. Mondial United Corp., 316 F.2d 163, 172-173 (5th Cir. 1963).
[6]  The allegations in libellant's libel and statement pursuant to Rule 9(g) of this Court, though somewhat ambiguous, may allege that the signer of the bill of lading had authority to sign for the owner and/or the master. No specific facts or affidavits are produced to substantiate this, however. (The affidavit of libellant's New York attorney, while made on "personal knowledge," is conclusory and unenlightening on this point. And the libellant's Notice to Admit sent to both Sabre and Mackprang in pertinent part provided:

"2. In return for receipt of the goods and as the contract of carriage, the respondents Sabre Shipping Corporation and Sabre Line issued a bill of lading dated June 30, 1961 numbered Karachi 2, a true copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A."
"4. The owner of the S.S. NORDSTERN at the time of these shipments was C. Mackprang, Jr."
Both Sabre and Mackprang admitted these matters in all material part.) In the face of the bill of lading which was executed as set forth in the opinion, the libellant's mere allegations, if they are so intended, are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact on this point. See Dressler v. MV Sandpiper, 331 F.2d 130 (2nd Cir. 1964).
[7]  Nor does the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, supra, require any different result. In the first place it has been said: "The fundamental character of the bill of lading is not changed by incorporation of the statutory provisions of the Act," Weinfeld, J. in Jones v. The Flying Clipper, 116 F.Supp. 386, 388 (S.D. N.Y.1953). Secondly, the Act itself provides in 46 U.S.C. § 1301:

"§ 1301. Definitions
"When used in this chapter
"(a) The term `carrier' includes the owner or the charterer who enters into a contract of carriage with a shipper." (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the Act does not require us to hold that this was the owner's contract.
[8]  All the facts being before the court, it is unnecessary to wait for a formal motion for summary judgment by Mackprang. See Local 33, Int. Hod Carriers et al. v. Mason Tenders et al., 291 F. 2d 496 (2nd Cir. 1961); 6 Moore, Federal Practice (1953 ed.) ¶ 56.12 and cases cited therein. These authorities, dealing with Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P., are equally applicable to the analogous Admiralty Rule, Rule 58.


807 F.2d 87
42 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas.  971,41 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,695James MATHEWSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.NATIONAL AUTOMATIC TOOL CO., INC., Defendant-Appellee.
No. 85-2480.
United States Court of Appeals,Seventh Circuit.
Argued March 31, 1986.Decided Sept. 4, 1986.*Opinion Dec. 9, 1986.

Nora L. Macey, Segal & Macey, Indianapolis, Ind., for plaintiff-appellant.
Michael V. Abcarian, Johnson, Bromberg & Leeds, Dallas, Tex., for defendant-appellee.
Before CUMMINGS, CUDAHY, and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.
CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge.

1
Plaintiff James Mathewson ("plaintiff") brought this suit pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 621-634, against defendant National Automatic Tool Company ("the Company").  The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $52,824 and found that defendant's action was willful.  The district court therefore doubled the award to $105,648 and also awarded plaintiff attorney's fees and costs.  However, the court subsequently granted the Company's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  On appeal, plaintiff contends that the district court erred in entering judgment for the Company notwithstanding the verdict.

2
* Plaintiff was hired by the Company in 1975 and in 1981 was 61 years old.  Plaintiff held the title of director of industrial relations at the Company.  The president of the Company, Allan McCrea, testified that plaintiff did a good job, and neither McCrea nor any other officer gave a negative evaluation directly to plaintiff.

3
The Company was acquired in May 1981 by UNC Resources, Inc.  ("UNC").  Just prior to this acquisition, Walter Baer, director of employee relations for a subsidiary of UNC, evaluated the labor and human resources situation at the Company for UNC.  Baer met individually with each of the Company's top five corporate officers.  According to Baer, they unanimously held a negative opinion of plaintiff's performance at the Company;  none of them told Baer that plaintiff was doing an acceptable job.  Baer said that all five officers essentially told him that plaintiff should be replaced.

4
However, three of these five officers contradicted Baer's version of the facts in their testimony at trial.  Jack Hunt, executive vice president of operations, testified that he never even talked to Baer about plaintiff.  Dick Norman, vice president of engineering, said that he never told Baer to terminate plaintiff.  Norman said that he criticized plaintiff only after UNC's acquisition of the Company, and that even then his only criticism concerned plaintiff's failure to recruit qualified engineers.  Norman added that there were other factors involved in this problem besides plaintiff's competence.  Nelson Hardin, controller, also said that although he did complain about plaintiff's recruiting, he never recommended that he be terminated.

5
Nevertheless, as soon as the acquisition of the Company by UNC was completed in May 1981, Baer began to recruit a new director of industrial relations for the Company.  Baer told plaintiff that at his age, he should not have to put up with the day-to-day irritations of dealing with union grievances or employee problems.  Baer created the new position of director of human relations for plaintiff.  Plaintiff spent most of his time in this new position writing job descriptions and conducting a pre-retirement program.  Baer hired Thomas Bancroft, age 29, to replace plaintiff as director of industrial relations.

6
Plaintiff was not the only older employee at the Company who was displaced from his position after the acquisition.  Bill Hawks, age 57, was formerly the vice president of manufacturing, but was moved to a newly created position heading a repair function.  Norman, age 61, was formerly the vice president of engineering, but was moved into a support job and was replaced by someone who was 38 years old.  Paul Smith, age 62, was formerly chief assistant in the industrial engineering department, but was moved to a "special assignment" where in his words he did "practically nothing," and was replaced in his former position by someone in his early thirties.

7
The Company's business began to decline in the late fall of 1981.  Layoffs of employees became necessary.  The Company determined that the layoff of non-union employees, such as plaintiff, would be according to performance, with the poorest performers being laid off first.  The Company further decided that it was necessary to eliminate one job in the Human Resources Department.  Baer decided that plaintiff was the person who would be terminated, and he was laid off in May 1982.  Baer told plaintiff that his position was being eliminated, and that Bancroft was also being laid off.  When plaintiff asked Baer why he could not get back his old position that Bancroft had taken, Baer told plaintiff that all the vice presidents and managers he had talked to when Baer first began to evaluate the Company had recommended that plaintiff be terminated.

8
Bancroft was not laid off until six months later in November 1982.  In October 1983, he was recalled by the Company but he declined to return.  Plaintiff was never recalled.

II

9
In an age discrimination suit, plaintiff has the ultimate burden of proving that his age was "a determining factor" in defendant's decision to terminate him.   Dorsch v. L.B. Foster Co., 782 F.2d 1421, 1423-1424 (7th Cir.1986);  LaMontagne v. American Convenience Products, Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1409 (7th Cir.1984).  Plaintiff may meet this burden in one of two ways.  Plaintiff may try to meet his burden directly by presenting direct or circumstantial evidence that age was a determining factor in his termination.   Johnson v. University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 783 F.2d 59, 63 (7th Cir.1986);  Dorsch, 782 F.2d at 1424;  LaMontagne, 750 F.2d at 1409.  Alternatively, plaintiff may meet his burden indirectly by using the shifting burdens of production method articulated by the Supreme Court in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668.   Johnson, 783 F.2d at 63;  Dorsch, 782 F.2d at 1424;  LaMontagne, 750 F.2d at 1409.  Under either method, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff at all times.   Johnson, 783 F.2d at 63;  LaMontagne, 750 F.2d at 1409.  At this stage of the case, after a full trial on the merits, the particular method of proof used is irrelevant;  the main focus is simply on the ultimate question whether plaintiff's age was "a determining factor" in defendant's decision to terminate him.   United States Postal Service v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715-716, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1482, 75 L.Ed.2d 403;  Morgan v. South Bend Community School Corp., 797 F.2d 471, 480 (7th Cir.1986).

10
A court of appeals reviews de novo a district court's grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict and applies the same standard as the district court.   Tice v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 761 F.2d 1210, 1213 (7th Cir.1985);  LaMontagne, 750 F.2d at 1410.  This standard is whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict;  i.e., whether the evidence presented, combined with all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it, is sufficient to support the verdict when viewed in the light most favorable to the party winning the verdict.   Yarbrough v. Tower Oldsmobile, Inc., 789 F.2d 508, 512-513 (7th Cir.1986);  Christie v. Foremost Insurance Co., 785 F.2d 584 (7th Cir.1986);  Christensen v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 767 F.2d 340 (7th Cir.1985), certiorari denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 885, 88 L.Ed.2d 920;  Tice, 761 F.2d at 1213;  LaMontagne, 750 F.2d at 1410.  Any conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the party winning the verdict.   Yarbrough, 789 F.2d at 513;  Christie, 785 F.2d at 586;  Tice, 761 F.2d at 1213;  LaMontagne, 750 F.2d at 1410.  Every permissible inference must be drawn in favor of that party.   Tice, 761 F.2d at 1213;  LaMontagne, 750 F.2d at 1410.  The reviewing court of course does not judge the credibility of witnesses.   Yarbrough, 789 F.2d at 513;  LaMontagne, 750 F.2d at 1410.  This last standard is particularly crucial in an employment discrimination case, where the result frequently turns on sensitive and difficult factual questions involving motive, thus often making the credibility of the witnesses decisive.   Yarbrough, 789 F.2d at 513;  Christie, 785 F.2d at 586.

11
Applying the above-described standards of review to the ultimate question of whether plaintiff's age was a determining factor in the Company's decision to terminate plaintiff, it is clear that there was sufficiently substantial evidence to support the verdict.  Baer's remarks to plaintiff upon his initial demotion indicate that age played a role in that decision.  Baer also claims that five officers told him that plaintiff should be terminated, yet three of the officers deny such statements (one denies even having talked to Baer), and plaintiff had never received a negative evaluation in his six years at the Company.  The displacement of similarly situated older employees, often in favor of younger employees, also supports plaintiff's claim.  Additionally, Bancroft, age 29, took over plaintiff's old job when plaintiff was moved to his newly created job, and when plaintiff was subsequently terminated from this new job, Bancroft remained with the Company.  See Stumph v. Thomas & Skinner, 770 F.2d 93 (7th Cir.1985) (finding of age discrimination on somewhat analogous facts).  Although Bancroft was later laid off as well, he, and not plaintiff, was subsequently asked back by the Company.  When all conflicts in the evidence are resolved in plaintiff's favor and every permissible inference is drawn in his favor, as required, the verdict in favor of plaintiff must be sustained.

12
The Company's main contention is that much of plaintiff's case is related to his demotion, which is time-barred and therefore not in issue in the instant case.  The district court similarly noted that while plaintiff produced sufficient direct evidence to sustain a verdict finding a discriminatory demotion, that was not at issue, and plaintiff had produced no direct evidence of a discriminatory discharge.  Although much of plaintiff's evidence relates to circumstances surrounding his demotion, it is well settled that evidence of earlier discriminatory conduct by an employer that is time-barred is nevertheless entirely appropriate evidence to help prove a timely claim based on subsequent discriminatory conduct by the employer.   United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 1889, 52 L.Ed.2d 571;  Allen v. Montgomery County, 788 F.2d 1485, 1488 (11th Cir.1986);  Caldwell v. National Association of Home Builders, 771 F.2d 1051, 1057 (7th Cir.1985);  Downey v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 649 F.2d 302, 305 (5th Cir.1981);  James v. KID Broadcasting Corp., 559 F.Supp. 1153, 1155 (D.Idaho 1983).  Employment discrimination is difficult to prove, and this difficulty often makes it necessary to use circumstantial evidence.   Allen, 788 F.2d at 1488.  The linkage between evidence surrounding plaintiff's demotion and his termination claim at issue is strengthened by the fact that when Baer terminated plaintiff, Baer mentioned the negative comments he had received a year earlier from plaintiff's fellow officers.  These same negative comments had played a role in Baer's demotion of plaintiff, and these negative comments were partially contradicted by the testimony at trial of three of these officers.  While the lapse of time between plaintiff's evidence relating to his demotion and the time of plaintiff's termination may reduce the weight of the evidence relating to his demotion, the overall evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury verdict.

13
For the above reasons, the district court's grant of the Company's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is reversed with directions to reinstate the March 13, 1985, judgment in favor of plaintiff.

*
 This appeal was originally decided by unreported order on September 4, 1986.  See Circuit Rule 35.  The Court has subsequently decided to issue the decision as an opinion


183 Mich. App. 281 (1990)
454 N.W.2d 148
O'NEAL
v.
ANNAPOLIS HOSPITAL
Docket Nos. 112910, 112911.
Michigan Court of Appeals.
Decided February 12, 1990.
Thurswell, Chayet & Weiner (by Gerald E. Thurswell, Nancy Saitta and Tammy J. Reiss), for plaintiffs.
Kitch, Saurbier, Drutchas, Wagner & Kenney, P.C. (by Susan Healy Zitterman), for defendants.
Before: NEFF, P.J., and WAHLS and T.G. KAVANAGH,[*] JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this medical malpractice case, plaintiff Gerald O'Neal and his mother, plaintiff Pauline Murray, alleged in their complaint filed in 1986 that defendants' negligence at plaintiff O'Neal's birth in 1963 caused his permanent mental retardation. Plaintiffs' cause of action against the hospital and nurses involved in O'Neal's delivery was dismissed in 1987 on the ground that it was barred by governmental immunity, leaving only plaintiffs' claims against the doctors to be resolved. On January 13, 1988, following plaintiffs' interlocutory applications for leave to appeal, this Court vacated the orders of the circuit court because "(t)here was ... neither common law nor statutory governmental immunity at the time this cause of action accrued" in 1963. On March 11, 1988, this Court, on rehearing, vacated its previous order and denied plaintiffs' applications for leave to appeal "for failure to persuade the Court of the need for immediate appellate review." On October 31, 1988, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case to this Court "for consideration as on leave granted with respect to the plaintifbs' tort claims in light of ... Canon *283 v Thumudo, 430 Mich 326 [422 NW2d 688] (1988)." 431 Mich 882 (1988). We now reverse the trial court's decision.
The sole issue argued in plaintiffs' brief relates to claims of negligence against defendant nurses, F. Jeannin and J. Williams. Specifically, plaintiffs allege in their complaint that defendants "(f)ailed to take and record the fetal heart tone periodically and timely during the labor ... so that if fetal distress occurred, Gerald O'Neal could be delivered expeditiously." Plaintiffs argue that under Canon v Thumudo, 430 Mich 326; 422 NW2d 688 (1988), the nurses' duties with respect to monitoring fetal heart tones were ministerial, and, therefore, not protected by governmental immunity. We agree.
According to Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 633-634; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), lower level governmental employees are immune from tort liability when they are acting during the course of their employment, within the scope of their authority and in good faith, and performing discretionary, as opposed to ministerial acts. Ross explained that "discretionary-decisional" acts protected by immunity are those acts "which require personal deliberation, decision, and judgment," but do "not encompass every trivial decision ... which may be involved in performing an activity." On the other hand, "ministerial-operational" acts are those acts which constitute "obedience to orders or the performance of a duty in which the individual has little or no choice." But the fact that a person's acts "entail some minor decision-making" does not mean that the acts are discretionary-operational. It is only when the acts involve "significant decision-making" that they are protected as discretionary-decisional. Id., pp 634-635; Canon, supra, pp 333-334, emphasis added.
In this case, documents produced by defendants, *284 defendants' answers to plaintiffs' requests for admissions, and deposition testimony show that labor and delivery nurses at Annapolis Hospital in 1963 were required, after admission of the mother to the labor and delivery area, to monitor fetal heart tones routinely, i.e., whenever they examined the mother, which was approximately four times "an evening." We interpret this to mean that, although there may have been discretion on how often the mother would be examined, there was no discretion on whether to monitor fetal heart tones when the mother was, in fact, examined. The medical records indicate that fetal heart tones were not monitored during a seven hour period although the mother was examined twice.
Documents, admissions, and deposition testimony also show that nurses were required to monitor fetal heart tones more frequently when the mother entered "active labor." While the determination of whether the mother has entered active labor undoubtedly involves some medical judgment, we do not believe that it involves significant decision-making in the circumstances presented here to be protected by governmental immunity. Medical records and deposition testimony indicate that the mother was in active labor for approximately three hours before delivery.
We believe that the specific acts, or failures to act, complained of by plaintiffs are in the nature of care and supervision which, under Canon, should be considered to be ministerial. See Canon, supra, pp 338-340. Once the decision was made to admit the mother to labor and delivery, the nurses' duty with respect to the monitoring of fetal heart tones was defined for them; and once the mother entered active labor, the nurses' duty was redefined. We believe that the determination of whether a particular stage had been reached, which in turn gave *285 rise to defined duties, involved no decision-making in the former case and no significant decision-making in the latter. See Canon, supra, pp 349-352. Thus, we conclude that the specific acts complained of were ministerial, and defendant nurses are not immune from tort liability if the acts were negligently performed and proximately caused plaintiffs' damages.
Reversed.
NOTES
[*]  Former Supreme Court justice, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.


125 F.3d 702
97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7099, 97 Daily JournalD.A.R. 11,464MONTEREY MECHANICAL CO., Plaintiff-Appellant,v.Pete WILSON;  Gray Davis;  Curt Pringle;  Delaine Easton;Barry Munitz;  Roland E. Arnall;  Marian Bagdasarian;William D. Campbell;  Ronald L. Cedillos;  Jim Considine;Martha C. Fallgatter;  Bernard Goldstein, Jr.;  James H.Gray;  William Hauck;  Joan Otomo-Corgel, Dr.;  Ralph R.Pesqueira;  Ali C. Razi;  Ted J. Saenger;  Michael D.Stennis;  Anthony M. Vitti;  Stanley T. Wang;  Frank Y.Wada, Individually and as Trustee of the California StateUniversity;  Swinerton and Walberg Co., a CaliforniaCorporation, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 96-16729.
United States Court of Appeals,Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Feb. 10, 1997.Decided Sept. 3, 1997.

Marcia L. Augsburger, McDonough, Holland & Allen, Sacramento, CA, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Karen L. Robinson, California State University, Legal Division, Long Beach, CA, for defendants-appellees.
Dana M. Rudnick and Barbara Gadbois Gibbs, Giden, Locher & Acret, Los Angeles, CA, for defendants-appellees.
Anthony T. Caso, Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, CA, for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California;  Edward J. Garcia, District Judge, Presiding.  D.C. No. CV-96-01279-EJG.
Before:  O'SCANNLAIN, LEAVY and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges.
KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge:

1
We review denial of a preliminary injunction, regarding a state program setting goals for ethnic and sex characteristics of construction subcontractors.FACTS

2
California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo (the University) solicited bids for a utilities upgrade.  This construction project, expected to take almost two years, will connect all buildings to a central heating and air conditioning plant and install a new electrical distribution system.  Monterey Mechanical, the plaintiff-appellant, submitted the low bid, $21,698,000.00, but did not get the job.  The second lowest bidder, Swinerton and Walberg, won the contract, with a bid $318,000 higher than Monterey Mechanical's.

3
Monterey Mechanical's bid was disqualified because the company did not comply with a state statute.  The statute requires general contractors to subcontract percentages of the work to minority, women, and disabled veteran owned subcontractors, or demonstrate good faith efforts to do so.  The required "goals" are "not less than" 15% for minority business enterprises, 5% women, 3% disabled veteran.  Cal. Public Contract Code § 10115(c).  To count towards fulfilling the goal, a subcontractor must be at least 51% owned and controlled by members of those classes.  Cal. Public Contract Code § 10115.1(e).

4
There were two ways Monterey Mechanical might have complied with the statute.  It could have used minority, women and disabled veteran business enterprises for the designated 23% (15% plus 5% plus 3%) "of the contract dollar amount."   Its bid was $21,698,000, so compliance by this means would require subcontracting $4,990,540 to subcontractors of the designated classes.

5
Alternatively, Monterey Mechanical could comply by demonstrating "good faith effort" to meet the "goals."   The statute requires a bidder using "good faith" as its means of qualifying to contact government agencies and organizations to identify potential subcontractors in the designated classes, advertise in papers "focusing on M/W/DVBEs,"1 and solicit bids from "potential M/W/DVBE subcontractors and suppliers."   The contractor must document its efforts within two days following the opening of the bids, so as a practical matter the solicitation must be fully accomplished prior to bidding.  Dates, times, organizations contacted, contact names, and phone numbers are "needed to corroborate the information."

6
Monterey Mechanical did not fully comply with the statute by either method.  Its President acknowledges that "Monterey is not eligible for classification as an MBE or a WBE."  It did not subcontract out the required 23% of the contract amount.2  Nor did Monterey Mechanical fully comply with the "good faith" requirement.  Monterey Mechanical contacted state and federal agencies and minority and women organizations, advertised to minority and women owned firms, and invited and considered bids from them.  But it did not document contact with the University physical planning and development office to identify minority, women, and disabled veteran business enterprises.

7
Swinerton and Walberg, which won the contract, did not subcontract out at least 23% of the work to firms in the designated classes (and does not claim to be a minority, women, or disabled veteran enterprise).  It differed materially from Monterey Mechanical only in that it fully complied with the "good faith" requirement.  Unlike Monterey Mechanical, it provided documentation of its contact with the University physical planning and development office to identify minority, women, and disabled veteran business enterprises.

8
When the University rejected Monterey Mechanical's bid as non-responsive, Monterey Mechanical requested whatever disparity study California State University had used to justify the goals for the designated classes.  The University replied that there was no such study.  It took the position that because the "goal requirements" of the scheme "do not involve racial or gender quotas, set-asides or preferences," the University needed no such disparity documentation.

9
Monterey Mechanical protested the contract award, then sued the University's trustees and Swinerton and Walberg for a declaratory judgment, injunction, and damages.  The theory of the lawsuit is that the statute that caused Monterey Mechanical to lose the contract violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.

10
The district judge denied the preliminary injunction.  Monterey Mechanical has appealed.  The denial was based on a legal conclusion that Monterey Mechanical had a low probability of success on the merits.3  No findings of fact were made, nor were any necessary, because there was no dispute as to any of the facts.  The facts recited above, from the documents submitted by the parties, are uncontested.

ANALYSIS

11
We have jurisdiction to review "[i]nterlocutory orders ... refusing ... injunctions" under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  While we review its decision not to enter a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion, the district court is deemed to abuse its discretion when it "bases its decision on an erroneous legal standard."  American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1062 (9th Cir.1995).  Thus an abuse of discretion is established if the district court applied the incorrect substantive law.  International Molders' and Allied Workers' Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 799 F.2d 547, 551 (9th Cir.1986).4A. Standing.

12
The district court concluded that Monterey Mechanical lacked standing.  Because Swinerton and Walberg was not a women or minority business enterprise,5 and all general contractors, not just non-minority non-women contractors, were bound by the same requirements, the district court concluded that unconstitutional discrimination, even if it existed, did not cause Monterey Mechanical to lose the contract.  The idea is that if the government does not discriminate against A, but requires that A discriminate against B, B has standing but A does not.  Appellees6 do not argue that Monterey Mechanical lacked standing.  We nevertheless consider standing sua sponte, because it goes to jurisdiction.  "Standing is a question of law reviewed de novo."  Snake River Farmers' Assn. v. Department of Labor, 9 F.3d 792, 795 (9th Cir.1993).

13
The issue of standing is controlled by Northeastern Florida Contractors v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993).  That was another contracting set-aside case.  The plaintiff made no showing that it or any of its members would have received particular contracts but for the challenged set-aside ordinance.  The Court held that to establish standing in challenges to set-aside laws, a bidder need only demonstrate that a discriminatory policy prevents it from competing on an equal footing, not that the discrimination caused its failure to win a contract:

14
When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another group, a member of the former group seeking to challenge the barrier need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but for the barrier to establish standing.  The "injury in fact" in an equal protection case of this variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit....  And in the context of a challenge to a set-aside program, the "injury in fact" is the inability to compete on an equal footing in the bidding process, not the loss of a contract....  To establish standing, therefore, a party challenging a set-aside program like Jacksonville's need only demonstrate that it is able and ready to bid on contracts and that a discriminatory policy prevents it from doing so on an equal basis.5

15
Id. at 666, 113 S.Ct. at 2303.

16
Monterey Mechanical was prevented by the statute from competing on an equal footing with general contractors in the designated classes.  Had it been a minority or women business enterprise (or both), and proposed to keep those classes' work rather than subcontract it out, it would have been excused to that extent from both the subcontracting and "good faith" requirements.  See Cal.  Public Contract Code §§ 10115(c), 10115.2.

17
We construed Northeastern Florida Contractors in Bras v. California Public Utilities Commission, 59 F.3d 869 (9th Cir.1995).  We held that in a challenge to an affirmative action program, "plaintiffs did not have to prove that they would lose any bids or identifiable contracts in order to sustain actual injury."  Id. at 873.  "An injury results not only when [the bidder] actually loses a bid, but every time the company simply places a bid."  Id. at 873, quoting Coral Construction Company v. King County, 941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir.1991).   Our analysis of standing in Coral Construction was approved of by the Court in Northeastern Florida Contractors, 508 U.S. at 660, 113 S.Ct. at 2300.   A bidder need not establish that the discriminatory policy caused it to lose the contract.  To establish standing bidders "need only show that they are forced to compete on an unequal basis."  Bras, 59 F.3d at 873.   Being forced to compete on an unequal basis because of race (or sex) is an injury under the Equal Protection Clause.  See Northeastern Florida Contractors, 508 U.S. at 665-67, 113 S.Ct. at 2303.

18
The Tenth Circuit applied Northeastern Florida Contractors to standing under an ordinance substantially similar to the statute before us in Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir.1994).  Concrete Works held that because minority and women business enterprises could use their own work to satisfy goals for their classes while firms not in these classes would have to subcontract the work out or show "good faith," a non-minority and non-women bidder satisfied all elements of the standing requirement.  The injury in fact was that "the extra requirements imposed costs and burdens on non-minority firms that preclude them from competing with MBEs and WBEs on an equal basis."  Id. at 1518, 1519.   The case at bar is indistinguishable from Concrete Works, and there is no justification for creating an intercircuit split of authority on this point.

19
Monterey Mechanical established injury in fact traceable to the challenged statute, and established redressability, for several reasons.  One is that a minority-owned or women-owned bidder could keep the work for its class (and a firm owned and controlled by women who were minorities could keep the work for both classes).  Keeping the work would avoid the loss of profits to subcontractors, and the time and expense of complying with the "good faith" requirements.  Though Swinerton and Walberg subsequently won the contract, Monterey Mechanical did not know that when it submitted its bid.  The time of bidding was the relevant time for determining whether Monterey Mechanical was unable "to compete on an equal footing in the bidding process."  Northeastern Florida Contractors, 508 U.S. at 666, 113 S.Ct. at 2303.   When it prepared and submitted its bid, Monterey Mechanical had to do so in the face of a statute conferring advantages on whatever competing bidders might be in groups identified by ethnicity and sex.  The burden of bidding in a discriminatory context established by statute is, under Northeastern Florida Contractors, injury in fact caused by the challenged statute.

20
Standing is also established in this case independently of whether minority or female competitors, if there were any, would have competed against Monterey Mechanical on a privileged basis.  Standing doctrine "requires us to ask ... 'Was this person hurt by the claimed wrongs?' "  Snake River Farmers' Assn. v. Department of Labor, 9 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir.1993).  Even if a general contractor suffers no discrimination itself, it is hurt by a law requiring it to discriminate, or try to discriminate, against others on the basis of their ethnicity or sex.  A person required by the government to discriminate by ethnicity or sex against others has standing to challenge the validity of the requirement, even though the government does not discriminate against him.

21
A person suffers injury in fact if the government requires or encourages as a condition of granting him a benefit that he discriminate against others based on their race or sex.  Americans view ethnic or sex discrimination as "odious," Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 214, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2106, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995).  The principle that ethnic discrimination is wrong is what makes discrimination against groups of which we are not members wrong, and by that principle, discrimination is wrong even if the beneficiaries are members of groups whose fortunes we would like to advance.  The person required by government to engage in discrimination suffers injury in fact, albeit of a different kind, as does the person suffering the discrimination.  A "law compelling persons to discriminate against other persons because of race" is a "palpable violation of the Fourteenth Amendment," regardless of whether the persons required to discriminate would have acted the same way regardless of the law.  Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 248, 83 S.Ct. 1119, 1121, 10 L.Ed.2d 323 (1963).

22
The contractor required to discriminate also suffers injury in fact because the statute exposes him to risk of liability for the discrimination.  A private actor may be subject to section 1983 liability for discriminating against persons based on their ethnicity or sex pursuant to a state law requiring it.  Adickes v. S.H. Kress and Company, 398 U.S. 144, 148, 152, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1603, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970).  For example, the plaintiff in Bras v. California Public Utilities Commission, 59 F.3d 869 (9th Cir.1995), brought a section 1983 claim for damages against Pacific Bell for discriminating against the plaintiff in the course of complying with a state statutory scheme to increase minority and women owned businesses shares of utility contracting.

23
The contractor required to discriminate also suffers injury in fact because of the increased expense and difficulty of performing the contract.  A construction contract is not completed when the winning bid is announced.  The work must be done.  A general contractor often uses the same specialty subcontractors on many jobs, because of successful past experience with them, so it would be a waste of time and money to solicit bids from strangers, and risky to accept them.  The statute allows a women- and minority-owned contractor to subcontract out a fifth of the work to whomever it chooses, or keep the work itself, but denies this flexibility to contractors not in those groups.

24
Appellees have not argued absence of redressability.  But for the minority and women enterprise goals and "good faith" requirements, Monterey Mechanical would have won the contract.  The statute imposed injury in fact on Monterey Mechanical.  Monterey Mechanical has standing to challenge the statute pursuant to which its bid was rejected.

25
B. Classification.

26
Appellees argue that Monterey Mechanical's equal protection challenge has to fail, because the statute treats all general contractors bidding on state jobs alike.  They argue that because general contractors are treated alike, there is no unequal treatment to which any scrutiny need be applied, that is, no classification.  There are two aspects to this argument.  One is that all general contractors are treated alike.  To the extent that minority or women contractors could avoid the subcontracting and good faith requirements for their groups, the argument goes, the difference is de minimis.  The second is that the scheme has enough flexibility, because a contractor can avoid the percentages by "good faith" efforts, so that its ethnicity and sex aspects cannot violate the Equal Protection Clause.  The district court adopted the first of these arguments.  Appellees' argument that the statute does not classify general contractors by ethnicity or sex is in some respects the standing argument in a slightly different form.  Because it is made separately, and addresses the Equal Protection Clause rather than the case or controversy requirement in Article III, we discuss classification independently of standing.

27
1. Different treatment.

28
The argument that all general contractors are treated alike, regardless of sex or ethnicity, is mistaken.  They are not.  The statute requires that state contracts have "participation goals" of at least 15% minority, 5% women, and 3% disabled veteran enterprises:

29
[C]ontracts awarded by any state agency, department, officer, or other state governmental entity for construction, professional services ..., materials, supplies, equipment, alteration, repair, or improvement shall have statewide participation goals of not less than 15 percent for minority business enterprises, not less than 5 percent for women business enterprises and 3 percent for disabled veteran business enterprises.  These goals apply to the overall dollar amount expended each year by the awarding department....

30
Cal.  Public Contract Code § 10115(c).  A state agency making a contract award is required to award the contract to the low bidder "meeting or making good faith efforts to meet these goals":

31
(a) In awarding contracts to the lowest responsible bidder, the awarding department shall consider the efforts of a bidder to meet minority business enterprise, women business enterprise, and disabled veteran business enterprise goals set forth in this article.  The awarding department shall award the contract to the lowest responsible bidder meeting or making good faith efforts to meet these goals.

32
(b) A bidder shall be deemed to have made good faith efforts upon submittal, within time limits specified by the awarding department, of documentary evidence that all of the following actions were taken:

33
(1) Contact was made with the awarding department to identify minority, women, and disabled veteran business enterprises.

34
(2) Contact was made with other state and federal agencies, and with local minority, women, and disabled veteran business enterprise organizations to identify minority, women, and disabled veteran business enterprises.

35
(3) Advertising was published in trade papers and papers focusing on minority, women, and disabled veteran business enterprises, unless time limits imposed by the awarding department do not permit that advertising.

36
(4) Invitations to bid were submitted to potential minority, women, and disabled veteran business enterprise contractors.

37
(5) Available minority, women, and disabled veteran business enterprises were considered.

38
Cal. Public Contract Code § 10115.2(a).

39
The statute allows a minority or women business enterprise to satisfy the goals by allocating the percentage of work for its group to itself.  The statute requires the state to award the contract to the "bidder meeting ... the goals," Cal.  Public Contract Code § 10115.2(a).  It does not say that the "bidder" should meet the goals by subcontracting the work to someone else instead of keeping it for itself.  It would be nonsensical to disqualify, for example, a minority enterprise's bid for not meeting the 15% minority goal, when the minority bidder proposed to do at least 15% of the work itself.  The university bid documents accordingly say that one way to meet the goals is that, "[t]he bidder is an MBE and committed to performing not less that 15% of the contract dollar amount with its own forces or in combination with those of other MBEs and is committed to using WBEs for not less than five (5) percent of the contract dollar amount, and DVBEs for not less than three (3) percent of the contract dollar amount."   Supplementary General Conditions § 1(b) (emphasis added).  Likewise for women and disabled veteran bidders.

40
Under these provisions, a bidder not in any of the designated groups must subcontract out at least 23% of the job, or make good faith efforts to do so, to subcontractors in the designated groups.  But a minority or female bidder can avoid that requirement by keeping that group's work for itself.  Thus not all general contractors bidding on state projects are treated the same way.  An enterprise in all the designated categories can, by keeping at least 23% of the work for itself, avoid any of the requirements of the statute.

41
The district court considered this difference, but concluded that it was de minimis.  De minimis non curat lex means that the law does not concern itself with trifles.  Black's Law Dictionary 482 (4th ed.1957);  Ballentine's Law Dict. 330 (3d ed.1969).  On this $21,698,000 job, it would be worth $3,254,700 of the gross to be a minority as compared with a non-minority bidder, if the bidder were to keep as much as possible of the work for itself.  A bidder in all three categories could keep $4,990,540 that a bidder in none would have to subcontract out or demonstrate a good faith effort to do so.  There is nothing de minimis about that kind of money.

42
2. Good faith efforts.

43
Appellees argue that the classifications the statute makes are not subject to heightened levels of scrutiny, because they require only good faith attempts to satisfy goals, and do not impose rigid quotas.  Thus a bidder may satisfy the goals without being in one of the designated classes, and without subcontracting 23% of the work to businesses in the designated classes, so long as it shows good faith.

44
Analysis of this argument requires that a distinction be drawn between whether the classifications themselves are permissible, considered in section D, and whether a softer system of discrimination avoids the Equal Protection Clause.  For now, we are discussing only the latter proposition, whether there is a classification at all, not the former, whether the classification is permissible.

45
Appellees are correct in their argument that the statute does not impose rigid quotas.  A bidder in none of the designated classes can get a contract even though it subcontracts none of the work whatsoever to anyone in the designated classes.  Indeed, the University's analysis says that Swinerton and Walberg's winning bid had this breakdown, well under 23%:

MWDVBE

46
Minority Participation                Breakdown

47
African American:  $    19,980          MBE:   13.92%

48
Pacific Asian:     $ 3,000,000          WBE:    1.25%

49
Anglo:             $18,678,000          DVBE:   0.00%

Total Contract Amount: $21,698,0007
MWDVBE

50
Minority Participation                Breakdown

51
African American   $   262,000          MBE:    3.49%

52
Hispanic           $   306,700          WBE:    1.29%

53
Native American    $    15,788          DVBE:    0.0%

Asian Indian       $   162,000

54
"Anglo"            $20,633,512

Total Contract Amount: $21,380,000

55
But the statute still has firm requirements, enforced by rejection of low bids like Monterey Mechanical's, unless all the requirements are met.  State agencies "shall award the contract to the lowest responsible bidder meeting or making good faith efforts to meet" the percentage "goals."  Cal. Public Contract Code § 10115.2(a).  That means that the state will not award a contract to a bidder which does neither.  The "good faith efforts" have specific content.  They require documented efforts to identify, focus advertising on, and solicit and consider bids from, firms in the designated classes:

56
(b) A bidder shall be deemed to have made good faith efforts upon submittal within time limits specified by the awarding department of documentary evidence that all of the following actions were taken:

57
(1) Contact was made with the awarding department to identify minority, women, and disabled veteran business enterprises.

58
(2) Contact was made with other state and federal agencies, and with local minority, women, and disabled veteran business enterprise organizations to identify minority, women, and disabled veteran business enterprises.

59
(3) Advertising was published in trade papers and papers focusing on minority, women, and disabled veteran business enterprises, unless time limits imposed by the awarding department do not permit that advertising.

60
(4) Invitations to bid were submitted to potential minority, women, and disabled veteran business enterprise contractors.

61
(5) Available minority, women, and disabled veteran business enterprises were considered.

62
Cal. Public Contract Code § 10115.2(b).  Adherence is monitored, Calif.  Public Contract Code § 10115.3(a).  Though the requirements allow for awards to bidders who do not meet the percentage goals, they are rigid in requiring precisely described and monitored efforts to attain those goals.

63
The question whether a non-rigid system of goals and good faith efforts, as opposed to rigid quotas, is treated as a classification under the Equal Protection Clause, is settled by existing precedent.  Bras v. California Public Utilities Commission, 59 F.3d 869 (9th Cir.1995), dealt with a similar law, providing for "goals" and "methods for encouraging" minority and women subcontracts, and expressly abjuring "quotas."  Cal. Pub. Util.Code § 8283(b).  The state argued that a challenger lacked standing because of the absence of rigid requirements.  We held that the provisions were not "immunized from scrutiny because they purport to establish goals rather than quotas."  Bras, 59 F.3d at 874.   We construed Northeastern Florida Contractors to mean that "the relevant question is not whether a statue requires the use of such measures, but whether it authorizes or encourages them."  Bras, 59 F.3d at 875.

64
Bras controls.  In the case at bar, the statute does not require set-asides, but it encourages them.  A bidder can avoid disqualification by seeing to it that 23% of the work goes to the designated classes, or showing that it tried to bring about that result.  The Tenth Circuit has reached the same conclusion in an indistinguishable case, Concrete Works of Colorado v. Denver, 36 F.3d, 1513 (10th Cir.1994).  The Denver ordinance at issue in that case was almost identical in material respects to the statute at issue here.  It provided only for "goals" and "good faith" efforts to meet them, not quotas or rigid set-asides.  Appellees do not cite any cases going the other way.  We have no basis for setting up an intercircuit conflict on this settled issue.

65
It is much easier to imagine that good faith compliance, as opposed to meeting the goals by subcontracting out 23% of the work, might be de minimis.   Good faith compliance does not cost millions of dollars.  It does not seem much to ask of a bidder that it get the names of firms in the designated classes, advertise to them, and consider their bids.  There is much appeal to enlarging the participation of minority-owned and women-owned firms by assuring that they as well as others receive full information on opportunities to bid.

66
But the question we are considering in this section of our opinion is whether the statute classifies, that is, whether it treats people differently by ethnicity or sex, not whether the purpose of the classification is attractive.  The statute treats contractors differently according to their ethnicity and sex, with respect to the "good faith" requirement.  It does not say that all contractors must assure that the opportunity to bid is advertised to all prospective subcontractors, including minority-owned and women-owned firms.  Only those firms not minority or women owned must advertise to those respective groups, and only minority and women owned firms are entitled to receive the bid solicitation.  A firm which is both minority and women owned, and keeps at least a fifth of the work, does not have to solicit any bids from firms identified by ethnicity or sex.  If a minority and women owned firm does solicit bids from subcontractors, the firm is free under the statute before us to exclude non-minority, non-women owned firms from the solicitation.

67
We are not faced with a non-discriminatory outreach program, requiring that advertisements for bids be distributed in such a manner as to assure that all persons, including women-owned and minority-owned firms, have a fair opportunity to bid.  The Equal Protection Clause as construed in Adarand applies only when the government subjects a "person to unequal treatment."   There might be a non-discriminatory outreach program which did not subject anyone to unequal treatment.  But this statute is not of that type.

68
Though worded in terms of goals and good faith, the statute imposes mandatory requirements with concreteness.  The scheme requires the bid solicitation in the context of requiring "good faith efforts to meet [percentage] goals."  Cal. Public Contract Code § 10115.2(a).  It requires distribution of information only to members of designated groups, without any requirement or condition that persons in other groups receive the same information.  Thus the statute may be satisfied by distribution of information exclusively to persons in the designated groups.  Bidders in the designated groups are relieved, to the extent they keep the required percentages of work, of the obligation to advertise to people in their groups.  The outreach the statute requires is not from all equally, or to all equally.

69
It is heuristically useful, in sorting out the question of whether a classification is made from the question whether the classification is permissible, to hypothesize the same provision in favor of white male firms.  That way we can separate the question of whether the discrimination is permissible, which it would not be for white male firms, from the question whether there is discrimination at all.  If the statute required solicitation of subcontract bids only to white male-owned firms, and did not require that white-male-owned firms make any solicitation if they kept the work, a court might well find that the scheme "discriminate[d] against MBEs and WBEs and continued to operate under 'the old boy network' in awarding contracts."  Associated General Contractors v. Coalition for Economic Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1414 (9th Cir.1991).  We would certainly conclude that the statute classified by ethnicity and sex.

70
The statutory classification also imposes higher compliance expenses on some firms than others, according to ethnicity and sex.  To demonstrate "good faith," the bidder must contact the awarding department, state agencies, federal agencies, and minority and women organizations, to identify prospective subcontractors, locate and prepare advertisements for advertisements in papers focusing on those groups, and distribute invitations to bid to potential minority and women subcontractors.  Cal. Public Contract Code § 10115.2(b).  These efforts require time, which must be paid for, effort, and expense--they do not happen by themselves.  The expenses--perhaps a few hundred or a few thousand dollars for wages and salaries, communications, and advertisements--are avoidable for firms in the designated classes to the extent they keep the required percentages of work for themselves.

71
More important, we can find no authority, and appellees have cited none, for a de minimis exception to the Equal Protection Clause.  The Supreme Court has held that, "any person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny."  Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224, 115 S.Ct. at 2111 (emphasis added).  We conclude that there is no de minimis exception to the Equal Protection Clause.  Race discrimination is never a "trifle."

72
C. Heightened Scrutiny.

73
We have concluded so far that Monterey Mechanical had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute, and that the statute makes a classification subject to Equal Protection analysis.  That does not end the inquiry into probability of success on the merits.  The next question is whether the classification is permissible.

74
The Equal Protection Clause protects "persons, not groups, so group classifications are in most circumstances prohibited, and are subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to insure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed."  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2112-13, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995).  Likewise, "parties who seek to defend gender based government action must demonstrate an exceedingly persuasive justification for that action."  United States v. Virginia, --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 2274, 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (1996).

75
The Constitution entitles "any person" to equal protection of the laws.  U.S. Const.  Amend. 14, § 1.  It draws no distinction by ethnicity or sex.  The scrutiny applied to racial classifications "is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefitted."  Adarand, 515 U.S. at 222, 115 S.Ct. at 2110.   An "exceedingly persuasive justification" must be presented for a sex classification, even if it "discriminates against males rather than against females."  Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3335, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982).

76
Racial classifications are subject to "strict scrutiny," and "are Constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests."  Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226, 115 S.Ct. at 2113.   Classifications based on sex must be justified by an "exceedingly persuasive justification," serve "important governmental objectives" and the means must be "substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."  United States v. Virginia, --- U.S. ----, ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 2274, 2275, 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (1996).

77
The statute benefits bidders and subcontractors who fit the classification "minority business enterprise" and "women business enterprise."  Cal. Public Contract Code § 10115.2(a).  A "women business enterprise" must be "at least 51% owned by one or more women," "whose management and daily operations are controlled by one or more women who own the business."  Cal. Public Contract Code § 10115.1(f).  A "minority business enterprise" must meet the same criteria with respect to the designated minorities.  Cal. Public Contract Code § 10115.1(e).

78
For a racial classification to survive strict scrutiny in the context before us, it must be a narrowly tailored remedy for past discrimination, active or passive, by the governmental entity making the classification.  City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 482-84, 490-91, 109 S.Ct. 706, 716, 720, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989).  "Findings of societal discrimination will not suffice;  the findings must concern prior discrimination by the government unit involved."  Id. at 485, 109 S.Ct. at 716-17;  and see Associated General Contractors v. City and County of San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922, 930 (9th Cir.1987).

79
The burden of justifying different treatment by ethnicity or sex is always on the government.  "[A]ny person of whatever race has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny."  Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224, 115 S.Ct. at 2111.   For laws that classify by sex, "The burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State."  United States v. Virginia, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2275.

80
In the case before us, the University offered no evidence whatsoever to justify the race and sex discrimination.  When asked by Monterey Mechanical for statistics, the University said there were none.  In their opposition papers to Monterey Mechanical's motion for preliminary injunction, the University and Swinerton & Walberg offered no evidence whatsoever that the University or the state had previously discriminated, actively or passively, against the groups benefitted by the statute.  They never proposed to offer evidence of past discrimination in any form at any time.  There are legislative findings, but they do not say that California State University, or the California state government, has in the past actively or passively discriminated against the benefitted groups.  Cal. Public Contract Code § 10115(a).  There are no legislative findings, and no fact findings by the district court, of past discrimination against the benefitted groups by the state or the University.

81
Instead, the legislative findings say that markets, prices and personal opportunities will be advanced by "the policy of the state to aid the interests of minority, women and disabled veteran business enterprises."  Id. Phrases in the legislative findings say and imply that these enterprises have an "economically disadvantaged position."  Cal. Public Contract Code § 10115(a)(4).  But the legislative findings do not say whether the "economically disadvantaged position" has to do with past active or passive discrimination by the State, other entities, general societal discrimination, or factors other than discrimination.

82
Because the state made absolutely no attempt to justify the ethnic and sex discrimination it imposed, we do not reach the questions of how much proof, or what kinds of legislative findings, suffice.  Unlike Associated General Contractors v. Coalition for Economic Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1414 (9th Cir.1991), there were no "detailed findings of prior discrimination" and no extensive evidence of discrimination submitted.  Because appellees offered no evidence or argument justifying discrimination, we do not reach the question whether a more tolerant constitutional regime for sex discrimination would permit the part of the statute favoring women owned businesses to survive constitutional analysis if the part favoring minority businesses does not.  See United States v. Virginia, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 135 L.Ed.2d 735;  Associated General Contractors v. City and County of San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922, 940-41 (9th Cir.1987).  Even sex discrimination against males requires the state to bear the burden of justification.  Likewise, because no justification has been offered for the group classifications at issue, we do not reach the question whether group discrimination ipso facto violates individuals' rights to equal protection of the laws.  See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239, 240, 115 S.Ct. at 2118, 2119 (Scalia, concurring, and Thomas, concurring).

83
Even if the purpose of a discriminatory scheme is legitimate, the scheme can survive strict scrutiny only if it is "narrowly tailored" to serve a compelling governmental interest.  Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 283, 106 S.Ct. 1842, 1852, 90 L.Ed.2d 260 (1986);  Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235-37, 115 S.Ct. at 2117.   The statute at issue is not "narrowly tailored."   That it is not is shown by the same overbreadth in its definition of "minority" that the Supreme Court has noted for years in similar statutes.  Wygant, 476 U.S. at 284 n. 13, 106 S.Ct. at 1852 n. 13;  City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. at 505-06, 109 S.Ct. at 728:

84
(d) "Minority," for purposes of this section, means a citizen or lawful permanent resident of the United States is an ethnic person of color and who is:  Black (a person having origins in any of the Black racial groups of Africa);  Hispanic (a person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South American, or other Spanish or Portuguese culture or origin, regardless of race);  Native American (an American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, or Native Hawaiian);  Pacific-Asian (a person whose origins are from Japan, China, Taiwan, Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, the Philippines, Samoa, Guam, or the United States Trust Territories of the Pacific including the Northern Marianas);  Asian-Indian (a person whose origins are from India, Pakistan, or Bangladesh);  or any other group of natural persons identified as minorities in the respective project specifications of an awarding department or participating local agency.

85
Cal. Public Contract Code § 10115.1(d).

86
In Croson, 488 U.S. at 505-06, 109 S.Ct. at 728, the Court was struck by the inclusion of Aleuts and Eskimos in a Richmond, Virginia, ordinance.  Likewise, in Wygant the court said that the inclusion of groups highly unlikely to have been the victims of past discrimination by the school board "illustrate[ ] the undifferentiated nature of the plan."  Wygant, 476 U.S. at 284 n. 13, 106 S.Ct. at 1852 n. 13.   The statute before us also lists groups highly unlikely to have been discriminated against in the California construction industry.  The Aleuts, for example, a distinct people native to the western part of the Alaska peninsula and the Aleutian Islands, have suffered brutal oppression repeatedly in their history.  But it would be frivolous to suggest that California State Polytechnic University at San Luis Obispo, or the State of California, have actively or passively discriminated against Aleuts in the award of construction contracts.  In Croson, the Court observed in reference to Aleuts and Eskimos that "the gross overinclusiveness of Richmond's racial preference strongly impugns the city's claim of remedial motivation."  Id. at 506, 109 S.Ct. at 728.   Likewise here, some of the groups designated are, in the context of a California construction industry statute, red flags signalling that the statute is not, as the Equal Protection Clause requires, narrowly tailored.

87
The list in the statute before us might be explained by a laudable desire to improve the social position of various groups perceived to be less well off.  Or conceivably those who drafted the statute for the legislature copied from a model form and neglected to strike its inapplicable portions.  One explanation which is not plausible is the one needed as a justification, that the list is narrowly tailored to remedy past discrimination, active or passive, by the State of California.  Appellees submitted no evidence and offer no argument to the contrary.  "A broad program that sweeps in all minorities with a remedy that is in no way related to past harms cannot survive constitutional scrutiny."  Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 951 (5th Cir.1996).

88
We are compelled by firmly established law to conclude that the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause.  The state has not even attempted to show that the statute is narrowly tailored to remedy past discrimination.  The laudable legislative goal, that "the actual and potential capacity of minority, women, and disabled veteran business enterprises [be] encouraged and developed," Calif.  Public Contract Code § 10115(a)(1), cannot be achieved by ethnic and sex discrimination against individuals excluded by ethnicity or sex from these groups, in the absence of Constitutionally required justification.

89
D. Irreparable Harm.

90
The district court concluded that Monterey Mechanical's probable success on the merits was low, so gave very limited consideration to whether it would suffer irreparable harm if interlocutory equitable relief were denied, and whether granting a preliminary injunction would impose hardship on the University and Swinerton and Walberg.  See Stanley v. University of Southern California, 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir.1994);  Martin v. International Olympic Committee, 740 F.2d 670, 674-75 (9th Cir.1984).  The district court found that the balance of hardships did not tip "sufficiently" in favor of Monterey Mechanical, "especially in view of the possibility of loss of funding if the construction contract is not completed speedily."

91
The University argues that Monterey Mechanical was properly denied a preliminary injunction, even if its probability of success on the merits was high, because Monterey Mechanical demonstrated no irreparable harm, and the balance of hardships tipped in the University's favor.  The University's evidence of hardship was that if a preliminary injunction stopped the project from proceeding while the litigation was pending, completion would probably be delayed until past the date when unencumbered funding would revert to a state bond reserve.  Further, the University filed evidence that faculty and staff would be delayed in obtaining the benefits of the project, and the University would be delayed in enjoying the benefits of saving money on electricity because of the project.  Monterey Mechanical showed two kinds of harm:  (1) loss of the contract, and (2) unconstitutional discrimination in the bidding process based on race and sex.  While money damages might remedy the first harm, it is not apparent to us how they would remedy the second.

92
"We have stated that an alleged constitutional infringement will often alone constitute irreparable harm."  Associated General Contractors v. Coalition For Economic Equity, 950 F.2d, 1401, 1412 (9th Cir.1991).  We have been compelled to conclude that the statute, insofar as it classifies by ethnicity and sex, is unconstitutional.  That makes Monterey's probability of success much higher than it was when preliminary injunctive relief was considered in district court.  We therefore remand so that the district court may reconsider preliminary equitable relief in light of our determination of unconstitutionality.

CONCLUSION

93
All persons, of either sex and any ethnicity, are entitled to equal protection of the law.  That principle, and only that principle, guarantees individuals that their ethnicity or sex will not turn into legal disadvantages as the political power of one or another group waxes or wanes.  The statute at issue in this case violates the Equal Protection Clause, so the plaintiff's probability of success on the merits in their challenge to the ethnic and sex provisions of the statute is high.  The district court must therefore reconsider the motion for preliminary injunction in light of the unconstitutionality of the statute.

94
REVERSED AND REMANDED.

1
 "M/W/DVBEs" is the designation on the University's forms for "Minority/Woman/Disabled Veteran Business Enterprises."

2
 Monterey Mechanical put in 13 times as much money for black subcontractors as Swinerton and Walberg, and a slightly higher amount for women subcontractors, though the total percentages were not very high for either of them.  Neither company proposed to subcontract anything to disabled veteran subcontractors.  Swinerton and Walberg had a higher total for total minority participation because of a $3,000,000 item for "Pacific Asian" minority participation

3
 Here is the relevant portion of the district court decision:
The motion for preliminary injunction will be denied.  I find that plaintiff has little likelihood of success on the merits on the equal protection claim as pled.  The Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause requires the State to justify the differential treatment of similarly situated individuals.
On its motion plaintiff argues that California has not made sufficient findings of past discrimination to support Minority Women Enterprise participation goal requirements.  In so arguing plaintiff immediately focuses on strict scrutiny analysis without considering what I believe a necessary first step.
By that I mean that plaintiff apparently assume without analysis that California's Minority and Women Enterprise participation goals treat general contractors differently on the basis of race and gender.  I'm not satisfied that this is the case.  In fact, it's plain that the participation goals require all general contractors, regardless of race or gender, to either submit bids with a set percentage of Minority Women Enterprise participation or to actively seek out and solicit bids from Minority Women Enterprise subcontractors.
Thus the statute does not appear to treat general contractors differently.  It might be argued that the statute does treat non-minority women enterprise general contractors differently in one respect.  A minority business enterprises that will perform 15% of the contract with its own labor and equipment is under no obligation to seek out minority business enterprises subcontractors since it already meets the minority business participation goal.
The same is true of women business enterprises general contractors who intend to perform five percent of the contract themselves.  However, this possible difference in treatment appears to me to be de minimis.  In fact, the extra step of soliciting bids from minority business enterprises where a minority business enterprise general contractor might not have to seems hardly worth mentioning.
This is especially so, given that the minority business enterprise would still be required to solicit bids from women business enterprises, nor is there any showing that this possible extra step which might have to be performed by non-minority women enterprises makes it more likely that a minority women business enterprise will be awarded a contract over a non-minority women business enterprise.  More importantly, however, even if it is conceded that this possible difference in treatment among general contractors is sufficient to confer standing upon plaintiff to challenge the constitutionality of California's minority women business enterprise participation goal requirements, that possible difference in treatment would not entitle plaintiff to the relief he seeks here.
The record shows that the state let the contract to a non-minority women business enterprise general contractor who solicited bids from minority women business enterprise contractors, but did not meet the participation goals.  Accordingly, there is no causal relationship between the manner in which the statute might treat general contractors differently and plaintiff's failure to win the contract.  Here in fact, the statute treated plaintiff and defendant Swinerton exactly the same.

4
 California's Proposition 209, see Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431, 1997 WL 160667 (9th Cir.  April 8, 1997), was passed after Monterey Mechanical was disqualified and the contract was awarded to Swinerton and Walberg, and after the district court denied Monterey Mechanical a preliminary injunction.  The parties have not argued that the subsequent change in state law affects this case.  They have not made any arguments regarding Proposition 209.  We therefore do not consider what effect if any Proposition 209 or Coalition for Economic Equity might have on this case

5
 None of the parties have presented any arguments regarding the statutory provision relating to disabled veterans, Cal.  Public Contract Code § 10115 et. seq., so we disregard it in our discussion.  Monterey Mechanical does not challenge its constitutionality, and the University does not make any arguments relating to it.  Accordingly, we do not consider the disabled veterans provisions of the statute, and our decision has no bearing on the provisions of the statute regarding disabled veterans

6
 Governor Pete Wilson was nominally a defendant in the case, and as such prevailed in district court.  He has accordingly filed an appellee's brief rather than an appellant's brief.  But his position is the same as appellant's, that the statute is unconstitutional.  Though nominally an appellee, Governor Wilson is in substance an appellant.  Our references to appellees arguments do not include the arguments made by Governor Wilson

5
 It follows from our definition of "injury in fact" that petitioner has sufficiently alleged both that the city's ordinance is the "cause" of its injury and that a judicial decree directing the city to discontinue its program would "redress" the injury

7
 Here are the University's categories and numbers for Monterey Mechanical: