86 P.3d 1259 (2004)
STATE of Washington, Respondent,
v.
Misty JUSTESEN, Appellant.
No. 50442-8-I.
Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.
April 5, 2004.
*1260 Gregory Link, Cheryl Aza, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.
Thomas Seguine, Skagit County Prosecutor, Mount Vernon, WA, Kimberly Anne Thulin, Whatcom County Prosecutor, Bellingham, WA, for Respondent.

AMENDED OPINION
BECKER, C.J.
Appellant Misty Justesen concealed her daughter in Massachusetts for 18 months and was convicted of custodial interference. Her defense was a claim that she believed the girl's father was sexually molesting her. Justesen knew the father had passed a polygraph test in which he denied sexual misconduct, and the trial court allowed the jury to consider the polygraph evidence in deciding whether it was reasonable for Justesen to maintain a belief that the father was a molester.
The polygraph is not a reliable indicator of truth for purposes of court proceedings. Because the polygraph evidence was used to prove that the father's denial was truthful, it should not have been admitted without a stipulation. Finding that the error was prejudicial, we reverse the conviction.
Testimony at trial established that KS was the father of a daughter born to Misty Justesen in 1994. They soon separated, and informally arranged to share parenting responsibilities. KS initiated a paternity action.
Before the child was three years old, Justesen had her examined for signs of sexual abuse several different times. The examinations were inconclusive. Justesen reported to local police and Child Protective Services that she suspected KS of molesting the child. These agencies investigated but found Justesen's suspicions to be unsubstantiated.
A temporary court order issued when the child was three years old provided for Justesen and KS to share custody on an alternating weekly basis. Their relationship remained acrimonious. In summer of 1999, shortly after meeting with a court-appointed mediator in regard to the need for a permanent parenting plan, Justesen took her daughter and left the state. A police investigation located the two of them 18 months later in Massachusetts, where they were living under assumed names.
The State charged Justesen with one count of custodial interference in the first degree.[1] A jury found Justesen guilty as charged.

THE POLYGRAPH RULING
The primary issue on appeal is whether the court erred in admitting evidence that KS passed a polygraph examination when the police were investigating him.
Before trial, Justesen moved to exclude any evidence regarding the polygraph examination or its results. She also served notice of her intent to present a statutory defense. A defendant who can prove by a preponderance *1261 of the evidence that, among other things, she reasonably believed the child was in danger of imminent physical harm, has a complete defense to a charge of custodial interference. RCW 9A.40.020(2)(a).
Ordinarily, evidence that a polygraph test has been taken or passed is inadmissible absent stipulation by both parties because the polygraph has not attained general scientific acceptability. State v. Descoteaux, 94 Wash.2d 31, 38, 614 P.2d 179 (1980), overruled on other grounds, State v. Danforth, 97 Wash.2d 255, 643 P.2d 882 (1982). In deciding to admit the polygraph evidence without a stipulation, the trial court relied on State ex rel. Taylor v. Reay, 61 Wash.App. 141, 810 P.2d 512, review denied, 117 Wash.2d 1012, 816 P.2d 1225 (1991).
Reay, a civil case, arose from a mandamus action brought by parents who believed their daughter had been murdered by her husband. They sought to compel a medical examiner to change his determination that the young woman's death had been a suicide. The issue for the jury was whether the examiner had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in classifying the death as a suicide. Over the parents' objection, the jury was permitted to learn that the evidence considered by the examiner during his investigation included the results of the husband's polygraph test indicating that he was being truthful when he denied causing the death. The trial court believed it would be improper and artificial not to allow the jury to hear that the examiner considered this evidence. The evidence came in with a limiting instruction, cautioning that the polygraph was not sufficiently reliable to be an indicator of truthfulness in court proceedings. "However, the polygraph is used by law enforcement as an investigatory tool and you may consider its use here in evaluating the conduct and investigation carried out by the Medical Examiner." Reay, 61 Wash.App. at 148, 810 P.2d 512.
The Reay jury brought in a verdict deciding that the examiner did not act arbitrarily or capriciously. The reviewing court, affirming the verdict, concluded that admission of the polygraph evidence was not an abuse of discretion because it was offered to prove that the examiner was thorough, not to prove that the husband was innocent. The potential for prejudice "was negligible in light of the purpose for which the polygraph was admitted, as well as the limiting instruction given to the jury." Reay, 61 Wash.App. at 150, 810 P.2d 512.
Viewing the present case as analogous to Reay, the trial court stated that the prosecutor
is not offering the polygraph to convince the jury that [KS] did not sexually assault his daughter. He is offering it to show that it is another piece of information which Miss Justesen should have considered and which should have helped to convince her that there was no sexual assault going on. In other words, it goes to the reasonableness of her belief in this danger to the child, doesn't it?[[2]]
The court decided the evidence would be admissible, with a limiting instruction, "because it was something that was told to Miss Justesen and something which she should have considered in making her determination".[3]

THE TRIAL
The State's case in chief quickly established the elements of the charge by showing KS was entitled by court order to have custody of the child, and that Justesen disappeared with the child and kept her in another state for a protracted period of time.
Justesen, testifying in her own defense, described the events that led her to believe KS was sexually abusing the child. She said that after returning from her stays with KS, the child would resist washing her genital area, her genitals were red and irritated, she uncharacteristically wet her pants, and appeared to be traumatized. She described this behavior as ongoing from 1996 through 1999. She testified that the child, at age two and a half, came up to her with a stick and said "I'm going to put this in your hole ... *1262 it's okay, it won't hurt you".[4] On one occasion the child reportedly said her father gave her cake "when I let him fingernail me."[5] On another occasion, while taking a bath, the child reportedly told Justesen "daddy ... puts oil on his pee-pee and massages inside me".[6] A woman who lived with Justesen at the time testified that she too overheard the child make this statement.
A pastor with a local women's shelter testified that the child returned from a visit with KS and appeared to have some sort of discharge in her underwear. She said she advised Justesen to take the girl to the emergency room for a sexual assault examination. The emergency room pediatrician who examined the child at that time testified that he observed a small red spot on the girl's labia and noted that her hymenal opening was a little larger than normal. The doctor said that given the mother's fears of sexual abuse, he too was concerned. He checked the child for indications of semen, but found none. Justesen also told the jury about an incident when she saw what she described as a "bloody tear" on the child's labia. According to Justesen, the girl told her that "dad put his face in her bottom."[7]
Justesen and her former housemates testified that the child was reluctant to go to the residence of KS and would appear upset upon coming back. Justesen's former boyfriend described the child as being non-communicative, withdrawn, "floppy"[8], and having frequent nightmares on these occasions. Justesen said she considered these behaviors to be additional signs of ongoing sexual abuse.
The topic of the polygraph test first emerged during Justesen's testimony on direct examination. She explained that in January 1997, she refused to turn her daughter over to KS for a visit because of her concerns about sexual abuse. She said the police responded to this incident by telling her KS had passed a polygraph examination and that she must comply with the parenting schedule. She said she again spoke to police about her fears in October 1997. According to Justesen, the officer "mentioned the polygraph and he mentioned all that had been done to investigate the case and he was saying that they've done what they can."[9]
The prosecutor's cross-examination of Justesen implied that she was unreasonable in being unwilling to accept the results of the polygraph:
[The prosecutor]: What do you know about polygraphs?
[Justesen]: Not much.
[The prosecutor]: You got that information, though, and you were willing to disregard it; is that correct?
[Justesen]: I turned her over and I never stopped believing my child over a polygraph or two or three vague questions that could have been construed in one's mind in one way or the other.
...
[The prosecutor]: At that point in time you realized that it was something that might indicate that [KS] was being truthful?
[Justesen]: I did not regard the polygraph. I complied with Detective Johnston's orders as well as the judge's and I never stopped believing my daughter.
[The prosecutor]: You've never run into somebody who had been subjected to a polygraph; isn't that correct?
[Justesen]: No.
[The prosecutor]: And you were aware of the fact that [KS], as soon as he learned of the new allegations, volunteered to take the polygraph?
[Justesen]: Yes.
[The prosecutor]: In fact, as soon as he became aware of them, it was just a matter *1263 of days before he reported to the Bellingham Police Department and subjected himself to that?
[Justesen]: Apparently.
[The prosecutor]: And you realize that was in fact the Bellingham Police Department that administered the polygraph?
[Justesen]: Yes.
[The prosecutor]: And did you have any reason to believe that it had been administered by anyone other than a trained polygraph examiner?
[Justesen]: No because I was informed by Detective Johnston that he had passed and therefore
...
[The prosecutor]: So you didn't have any reason to believe that the process which was followed in administering the polygraph was flawed?
[Justesen]: I had reasons to believe that it was.
[The prosecutor]: That the process which was followed in administering the polygraph was flawed?
[Justesen]: It was sometime later that I read the questions on the polygraph and I didn't believe that they addressed probable cause.[[10]]
The State presented a number of rebuttal witnesses, including Detective Hutchings, the polygraph examiner for the Bellingham Police Department. Hutchings testified to his training and experience in administering polygraph examinations. He explained how the polygraph equipment works, describing at length the method of questioning and how it is used to evaluate the truthfulness of the subject. He testified that computer analysis of the polygraph charts reported "as low a probability of deception as the computer program chart evaluations will allow."[11] The trial court admitted the computer-generated report as an exhibit over Justesen's objection.
The State completed its rebuttal case with testimony by KS. He described incidents that suggested Justesen was making up allegations of sexual abuse in order to avoid having to cooperate with him in a parenting plan. The last two questions the prosecutor asked KS went directly to whether the allegations of sexual abuse were true: "Have you ever put your hand on [the child's] vaginal area for sexual gratification?" and "Have you ever, for other than parental reasons, touched [the child's] vaginal area?" KS answered "No" to both questions.[12]
The prosecutor did not mention the polygraph in the initial closing argument. Justesen, in her closing statement, argued that the evidence of past sexual abuse supported a finding that at the time she left with her daughter, she had a reasonable fear that further sexual abuse was imminent. The prosecutor in rebuttal acknowledged that "the heart of the case"[13] lay in whether or not KS had actually had sexual contact with his daughter. The prosecutor, summarizing the evidence at length, argued that it cast doubt on Justesen's motives and showed KS to be credible when he denied committing acts of sexual abuse.
The polygraph, the prosecutor claimed, "is a tool, is something that can be used to sort of decide whether someone is telling the truth."[14] The prosecutor reminded the jury that KS voluntarily and promptly subjected himself to the polygraph examination, and the results unambiguously showed no deception. Justesen, the prosecutor argued, unreasonably disregarded this information:
The very next morning [KS] is down there, he's got his arms hooked up to the wires of this thing, the indignity of this is amazing but it shows the humbleness of this man, the willingness of this man to do whatever he needs to do to try to clear his name.

*1264 ...
But when we get to this part of the case, Miss Justesen would have you believe that it's meaningless, that's what she testified to, it doesn't mean a darn thing. So what that the guy goes down and takes a polygraph. Everybody knows people can fail polygraphs. Well, why wouldn't Miss Justesen as a reasonable person, that's what she wants you to believe, she's a reasonable person, what would be so hard about finding out a little bit more? What would be so hard about calling up Detective Hutchings and saying gosh ... I have had the child in for ... all these things, that is ambiguous, what did you do? What did you ask him? What did he say? Isn't it possible that maybe if I learned some more about this I will be able to understand the situation? But she would have none of it and this is a great example about how she's very consciously disregarding information and that goes into your equation of reasonable. What she says is good liars can pass it anyway.[[15]]
The prosecutor asked the jury to conclude, based on all the evidence, that "there was no real true belief in harm going on to the child."[16]
The jury brought in a verdict of guilty. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION
The State argues that because Justesen was first to elicit evidence of KS's polygraph test, she waived the right to complain of it on appeal. This argument fails. Waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a right. "A defense lawyer who introduces preemptive testimony only after losing a battle to exclude it cannot be said to introduce the evidence voluntarily." State v. Vy Thang, 145 Wash.2d 630, 648, 41 P.3d 1159 (2002). Having preserved the issue through her unsuccessful pretrial motion, Justesen was entitled to introduce the evidence herself as a preemptive strategy.
Polygraph evidence is liable to be prejudicial and therefore should be admitted only when clearly relevant and unmistakably nonprejudicial. Descoteaux, 94 Wash.2d at 38-39, 614 P.2d 179. The prejudicial effect of polygraph evidence in a criminal prosecution is illustrated in a murder case, State v. Sutherland, 94 Wash.2d 527, 617 P.2d 1010 (1980). Brian Gjerde, the State's principal witness against the defendant, was initially the prime suspect in the investigation of the murder at issue. Defense cross-examination of the investigating officer raised questions about the quality of the officer's work on the case and implied he had not been thorough in his investigation of Gjerde. Over the defendant's objection, the State was allowed to elicit on redirect the officer's testimony that he had given Gjerde two lie detector tests during the course of the investigation.
The reviewing court reversed the conviction on the basis that the polygraph evidence impermissibly fortified the testimony of the witness. Sutherland, 94 Wash.2d at 530, 617 P.2d 1010. "The jury could scarcely conclude other than that Gjerde was telling the truth and that the police investigators believed him.... The error was compounded by the prosecution's reference to the polygraph tests during its closing argument." Sutherland, 94 Wash.2d at 531, 617 P.2d 1010.
The State, arguing that Reay rather than Sutherland is the applicable precedent, compares Justesen to the medical examiner in Reay who considered polygraph evidence along with many other pieces of evidence before deciding that the decedent was not a murder victim. But this is not a case where the central issue was the thoroughness of a professional investigation. Like Sutherland, it is a criminal case where the ultimate issue was guilt. KS was a critical witness against Justesen and the jury had to decide whether or not he was telling the truth. An obvious inference was that KS, by taking the polygraph, had satisfied police investigators that he was not guilty of child molestation. This inference strongly, and impermissibly, fortified his testimony.
*1265 The court attempted to neutralize the polygraph evidence by giving the following limiting instruction:
You have heard testimony concerning the use of a polygraph in this case. There is scientific dispute about the reliability of the polygraph. The polygraph is not generally accepted in the scientific community as reliable.
Based on the current scientific data supplied to the court of this state, the polygraph has not been shown to be sufficiently reliable as an indicator of truthfulness to be admissible in court proceedings.
However, the polygraph is used by law enforcement as an investigatory tool and you may consider its use here in evaluating the conduct and investigation carried out by law enforcement. You may also consider it in evaluating the reasonableness of the defendant's beliefs.
You are instructed that the result of the polygraph of [KS] may not be considered as reliable evidence that [KS] did or did not subject [his daughter] to sexual abuse.
You may accept or reject the polygraph evidence in whole or in part in accordance with your views as to the persuasive character of that evidence.[[17]]
The limiting instruction was ineffective. It told the jury not to consider the polygraph as reliable evidence that KS did or did not commit sexual abuse, but at the same time it explicitly invited the jury to consider the polygraph in evaluating the reasonableness of Justesen's belief. These two messages were inconsistent. The jury's evaluation of the reasonableness of Justesen's belief, as the State's argument recognized, depended in large part on their evaluation of whether KS was credible when he denied having sexual contact with his daughter. As the Reay court recognized, polygraph evidence cannot be used to establish that one party's version of events is the truth:
If the polygraph evidence is being introduced because it is relevant that a polygraph was administered regardless of the results, ... then the polygraph evidence may be admissible as an operative fact. If, on the other hand, the polygraph evidence is offered to establish that one party's version of the events is the truth, the polygraph evidence is being introduced for its substantive value and is inadmissible absent a stipulation....
Reay, 61 Wash.App. at 149-50, 810 P.2d 512 (quoting Brown v. Darcy, 783 F.2d 1389, 1397 (9th Cir.1986)).
We conclude the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the polygraph evidence.
As in Sutherland, the prejudice was compounded by the State's cross-examination and closing argument. The limiting instruction inspired the prosecutor to argue that the polygraph can be used to decide whether someone is telling the truth. This is exactly what the law rejects. Polygraph evidence is inherently unreliable as an indicator of deception. Inherently unreliable evidence is not relevant, and this "is especially true where the evidence is as seductive as the polygraph; a machine that purports to test truthfulness." State v. Ahlfinger, 50 Wash. App. 466, 472-73, 749 P.2d 190, review denied, 110 Wash.2d 1035, 1988 WL 632428 (1988).
The State suggests that Justesen exacerbated the prejudice of which she now complains, by eliciting unnecessary details about the mechanics of the polygraph. But the bare fact that KS took and passed the polygraph test was the primary source of prejudice; once that information was in, it would have been very difficult to minimize. Having procured the improper admission of polygraph evidence over Justesen's objection, the State is not in a position to argue that she caused the prejudice.
An evidentiary error which is not of constitutional magnitude requires reversal only if the error, within reasonable probability, materially affected the outcome. State v. Halstien, 122 Wash.2d 109, 127, 857 P.2d 270 (1993). In this case the error was not harmless. Justesen and other witnesses reported observing troubling behavior and comments *1266 by the child. Medical professionals and other investigators took the allegations seriously despite the lack of conclusive physical evidence. The State did present sufficient evidence apart from the polygraph tending to rebut Justesen's defense. For example, the child told a therapist her father had not molested her, and "my mom thinks my dad did. But he didn't."[18] But much of this evidence involves credibility determinations or is circumstantial, and we cannot be sure that the jury would have rejected Justesen's defense if the polygraph evidence had not come in. Under these circumstances, there is a reasonable probability that the admission of the polygraph evidence materially affected the outcome of the trial.
Justesen raises a number of issues pro se. To the extent that she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict, we find the evidence sufficient. It is unnecessary to reach the other issues at this time.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
BAKER and COLEMAN, JJ., concur.
NOTES
[1]  The State charged Justesen with custodial interference in violation of RCW 9A.40.060(2)(a) and (2)(c). Custodial interference in the first degree occurs when a person takes, entices, retains, detains, or conceals a child from a parent, guardian, institution, agency, or other person having a lawful right to physical custody with the intent to deny access and either (a) Intends to hold the child or incompetent person permanently or for a protracted period; or ... (c) Causes the child or incompetent person to be removed from the state of usual residence. RCW 9A.40.060(2)(a), (c).
[2]  Verbatim Report of Proceedings, March 4, 2002 at 11.
[3]  Verbatim Report of Proceedings, March 4, 2002 at 19-20.
[4]  Verbatim Report of Proceedings, March 8, 2002 at 254.
[5]  Verbatim Report of Proceedings, March 8, 2002 at 261.
[6]  Verbatim Report of Proceedings, March 8, 2002 at 254.
[7]  Verbatim Report of Proceedings, March 8, 2002 at 321.
[8]  Verbatim Report of Proceedings, March 6, 2002 at 56.
[9]  Verbatim Report of Proceedings, March 8, 2002 at 324.
[10]  Verbatim Report of Proceedings, March 11, 2002 at 489-91.
[11]  Verbatim Report of Proceedings, March 14, 2002 at 855.
[12]  Verbatim Report of Proceedings, March 15, 2002 at 1120.
[13]  Verbatim Report of Proceedings, March 18, 2002 at 1211.
[14]  Verbatim Report of Proceedings, March 18, 2002 at 1241.
[15]  Verbatim Report of Proceedings, March 18, 2002 at 1242-43.
[16]  Verbatim Report of Proceedings, March 18, 2002 at 1261.
[17]  Instruction 12; Clerk's Papers at 62.
[18]  Verbatim Report of Proceedings, March 14, 2002 at 880.


881 F.2d 1081
Engelkenv.Federal Land Bank of Omaha
NO. 89-1262
United States Court of Appeals,Eighth Circuit.
JUN 27, 1989
Appeal From:  N.D.Iowa

1
AFFIRMED.


868 F.2d 644
M. Joseph ROCKS, Frank A. Salvatore, Christopher R. Wogan,Joan L. Krajewski and John L. Kelly, Appellants,v.CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, W. Wilson Goode, Curtis Jones, Jr.,Minority Business Enterprise Council, Benjamin F.Ellis and Angela Dowd-Burton, Appellees.
No. 88-1616.
United States Court of Appeals,Third Circuit.
Argued Jan. 11, 1989.Decided March 1, 1989.

Hugh J. Bracken (argued), Richard A. Sprague, Randi J. Vladimer, Sprague, Higgins & Creamer, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellants.
Seymour Kurland (argued), Carl Oxholm, III, Office of the City Solicitor, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellees.
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, COWEN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.

1
The appellants are five Philadelphia residents and taxpayers.  They are not now, nor will they in the future be, involved in the construction business.  They have appealed from a district court judgment dismissing their complaint against the city and its officials for lack of standing.  The complaint asserted an equal protection violation resulting from the application of minority business enterprise participation requirements ("MBE") to a city construction project.  The question for decision is whether, as contended, the appellants have standing to assert this equal protection claim based upon their status as residents and taxpayers.  They rely on the teachings of Bowen v. Kendrick, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 2562, 101 L.Ed.2d 520 (1988) and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968).  We agree with the district court and will affirm.

2
Jurisdiction was proper in the trial court based on 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331.  Jurisdiction on appeal is proper based on 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291.  Appeal was timely filed under Rule 4(a), F.R.App.P.

3
The court is reviewing the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.  Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P.  The applicable standard of review requires the court to accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.  Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 271, 273 (3d Cir.1985);  Rogin v. Bensalem Twp., 616 F.2d 680, 685 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied sub nom., Mark-Garner Assocs., Inc. v. Bensalem Twp., 450 U.S. 1029, 101 S.Ct. 1737, 68 L.Ed.2d 223 (1981);  Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974).

I.

4
In February of 1988, the City of Philadelphia issued invitations to bid on a portion of the construction of the Criminal Justice Center.  The bid specifications required 15% minority owned business enterprise participation and 10% female owned business enterprise participation.  App. at 52.  On March 4, 1988, the Department of Public Property issued Addendum No. 1, giving notice to all prospective bidders that, for this project, the required minority business enterprise participation was increased to 35%, and "at least 45% of the employment hours for the work performed on-site for this bid package shall be performed by qualified minority and female workers, made up of 35% minority and 10% female."    App. at 53;  see Philadelphia Code, ch. 17-500 to 504 (giving the City of Philadelphia discretion to set minority business enterprise participation requirements).

5
Addendum No. 1 was circulated to potential contractors.  There is no evidence in the record that any objections were raised by the appellants or by any potential contractor at any time prior to bid opening.  Three bids were submitted and the city announced the project would be awarded to Cornell/Coastal Steel.  It was at this time that appellants filed a complaint in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas.  The case was then removed to the federal district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

6
In the complaint, Rocks, and the other plaintiffs claimed that:  (1) the increased minority participation requirements were violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution;  (2) the increased requirements violated the constitutional guarantee of substantive due process;  (3) as a matter of state law, the mayor and the city agencies lacked the power to increase the minority business enterprise participation requirements;  and (4) the agency proceeding to increase minority participation did not comply with the procedural requirements of state law.

7
The district court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the MBEs on equal protection grounds.  The court acknowledged that Rocks and the other plaintiffs possessed what has been described as article III or "pure" standing.  App. at 125.  However, the court found that the nonconstitutional, prudential limitations on standing had not been satisfied.  App. at 126;  see Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 471, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982);  Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72-82, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2630-35, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978);  Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2873, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976);  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 495, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2203, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).  The court stated that the appellants were "attempt[ing] to raise the equal protection rights of non-minority businessowners and workers with whom they have no special relationship."    App. at 126.

8
The district court also found that appellants failed to state a claim for violation of substantive due process.  App. at 131-33.  Relying on Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Twp., 808 F.2d 1023 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906, 107 S.Ct. 2482, 96 L.Ed.2d 375 (1987), the court held that plaintiffs had not met the pleading requirements necessary to pursue such a claim.  See Rogin, 616 F.2d at 689 (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 75 S.Ct. 461, 464, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955)).  The court said that the complaint raised conclusory allegations only, and that without more, the complaint did not qualify as a substantive due process attack.  App. at 132.  Appellants have not challenged this ruling before us.  Having disposed of the federal issues, the district court then remanded the proceeding to the state court.  Rocks and the other plaintiffs appealed the district court's decision denying them standing.

II.

9
Before addressing appellants' main contentions, based on Flast v. Cohen and Bowen v. Kendrick, it is necessary to consider satellite contentions that have been raised, but not strenuously pressed by the parties.

A.

10
In their brief appellees suggested that this case may be moot.  Yet at the beginning of oral argument, the City Solicitor candidly explained to the court:

11
I think I should address myself to the mootness issue quickly.  The principle involves the one of capable of repetition, yet evading review.

12
And we raised that point to the Court so that you would have all the facts in front of you.

13
It is my basic position, however, that on the narrow test, on that extreme requirement, that this case probably is not moot, Your Honor.

14
Tr. of Oral Argument at 17.  This proposition is supported by the case law.  See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 1383, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979);  Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Lacey Twp., 772 F.2d 1103, 1108 (3rd Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1013, 106 S.Ct. 1190, 89 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986).  Accordingly, we proceed on the assumption that this case is not moot.

B.

15
Appellants also seem to suggest, at least at oral argument, that we should apply Pennsylvania case law respecting the broad rights of municipal taxpayers to sue local government agencies, and that this case may fall "within the ambit of the well-defined rule that a taxpayer may challenge 'wrongful expenditure of tax monies and the wasting of assets.'    Loewen v. Shapiro, 389 Pa. 610, 613, 133 A.2d 525, 527 (1957)."    Price v. Philadelphia Parking Auth., 422 Pa. 317, 221 A.2d 138, 143 (1966);  see also Page v. King, 285 Pa. 153, 156, 131 A. 707, 708 (1926) ("[a]ppellant's right as a taxpayer, having an interest in public funds, to maintain a bill to prevent an unauthorized or unlawful expenditure of state money cannot now be questioned.  Frame v. Felix, 167 Pa. 47, 49, 31 A. 375, 27 L.R.A. 802 [ (1895) ].  It is immaterial whether the individual loss is great or small:  the court will not stop to inquire into that.")    Notwithstanding the force of this argument in a state court proceeding, it has been foreclosed here.

16
The Supreme Court has emphasized that irrespective of whether the complaint is against municipal or federal agencies, federal standing propositions apply in federal court, including, inter alia, whether the party has "a personal stake in the outcome of the controversies," Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), and whether the dispute touches upon "the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests."    Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41, 57 S.Ct. 461, 464, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937);  see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1953, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968).  "In a federal trial court ... standing to sue is determined by federal law."    Frissell v. Rizzo, 597 F.2d 840, 850 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 841, 100 S.Ct. 82, 62 L.Ed.2d 54 (1979) (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 204, 82 S.Ct. at 703).

17
Accordingly, the standing issue in this case will be decided by federal law and not that of Pennsylvania.  We now address the main contention presented by the appellants in this appeal.  Because the complaint was dismissed on the pleadings, we must, and do, accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and construe them in favor of the complaining party.  Warth, 422 U.S. at 501, 95 S.Ct. at 2206;  Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).

III.

18
There are two inquiries to federal court standing.  The first is the "pure" article III requirement.  This requirement is related to the constitutional limitation of judicial power to "cases and controversies."    It reflects the traditional notion that "article III judicial power exists only to redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining party."    Warth, 422 U.S. at 499, 95 S.Ct. at 2205.    The legislative and coercive powers of an article III court are therefore properly involved only in aid of that remedial function, not as an independent justification for the exercise of jurisdiction.

19
The second requirement is the prudential limitation on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.

20
Beyond the constitutional requirements, the federal judiciary has also adhered to a set of prudential principles that bear on the question of standing.  Thus, the Court has held that "the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties."

21
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474, 102 S.Ct. at 760 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 499, 95 S.Ct. at 2205).    It was on this basis that the plaintiffs in this case were denied standing.  The district court held that prudential considerations militated against permitting these plaintiffs to assert the rights of non-minority contractors and workers.  The court stated that the prudential requirements had not been satisfied because appellants were asserting the rights of "non-minority business owners and workers with thom they had no special relationship."    App. at 126.

22
We agree with the district court that the appellants have established article III standing.  As municipal taxpayers suing a municipality and not as federal taxpayers suing a federal agency, they have alleged that someone could "show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant," Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1608, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979), and that injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action" and "is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision."    Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1924, 1926, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976);  see also Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472, 102 S.Ct. at 758.    Contemplating the appellants' allegation, we think that an article III injury to contractors and bidders at large has been made out.

23
But the critical inquiry here is whether these particular appellants satisfy the prudential requirements as well.  The question is whether these appellants have sustained a proximate, individual, and addressable injury, based solely upon their status as municipal residents and taxpayers.

24
Again, we agree with the district court.  Abundant Supreme Court case law supports the district court's determination that the prudential requirements for standing were not satisfied.  See Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46, 63 S.Ct. 493, 494, 87 L.Ed. 603 (1943) (denying standing to a plaintiff raising a claim under the fourteenth amendment, because his rights were not directly affected by the state statute in question);  United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22, 80 S.Ct. 519, 523, 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960) (a litigant must generally assert his own constitutional rights and immunities).

25
But the situation here does not dictate an extended discussion of this proposition, because Chief Judge (then Judge) Gibbons has already thoroughly ploughed this field in his comprehensive opinion treating another claim of a Philadelphia taxpayer against the city's mayor.  In Frissell v. Rizzo, 597 F.2d 840 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 841, 100 S.Ct. 82, 62 L.Ed.2d 54 (1979), a citizen and taxpayer brought a first amendment claim to enjoin the mayor from denying customary public advertising to the Philadelphia Bulletin, a daily newspaper, as a reprisal for publication of unfavorable news articles.  (Whatever may be the decisions of other courts on first amendment issues, see Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203, 1211 n. 4 (5th Cir.1983) we believe that Frissell is better reasoned.)    We are satisfied that the reasoning and the result set forth in Frissell adequately control the prudential standing issue presented here.  In Frissell, the court noted that the Philadelphia Bulletin, the injured party, had not joined as a party plaintiff or brought suit to enjoin the city.  The plaintiff was solely a taxpayer resting his claim for relief on the legal rights and interests of a third party.  Similarly, in this case no business enterprise or construction worker, those most likely to have suffered injury under the challenged bid specifications, has joined the complaint or brought suit to enjoin the city.  The appellants here are solely taxpayers, resting their claim on the legal rights and interests of third parties, to-wit, those business entities and workers not qualifying under the MBE requirements.IV.

26
Appellants argue that the court erred in denying them standing because they clearly qualify under the facts and holdings of Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968) and Bowen v. Kendrick, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 2562, 101 L.Ed.2d 520 (1988).  We conclude that the facts here do not bring this case within the limited precedential authority of those cases.

27
Flast and Bowen are extremely limited holdings.  They hold that federal taxpayers have standing to raise establishment clause claims against exercises of congressional power under the taxing and spending power of article I, section 8 of the constitution.  Flast was an establishment clause attack on the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which allowed federal funds to be used to finance instruction, and purchase textbooks for reading, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious schools.  Flast, 392 U.S. at 85-86, 88 S.Ct. at 1945.    Bowen, also relying on the establishment clause, attacked the Adolescent Family Life Act which authorized grants to public and non-public private organizations and agencies and provided, inter alia, that a grantee must furnish types of counsel in, and education relating to, family life and problems associated with adolescent premarital sexual relations, a complex problem that requires the involvement of religious and charitable organizations.  Bowen, --- U.S. at ----, 108 S.Ct. at 2566-67.

28
Because the establishment and free exercise clauses and article I, section 8 taxing and spending power are not involved here, Flast and Bowen do not serve as precedential authority.  Without rehearsing the myriad standing cases since Flast, we note that the leading commentators in federal courts and jurisdiction have succinctly stated:  "Fate has not been kind to the Flast decision.  In the field of taxpayer standing, it has been limited to very narrow confines."    13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 3531.1 (1984);  see also Bowen, --- U.S. at ----, 108 S.Ct. at 2579;  Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 479, 102 S.Ct. at 762.

V.

29
Appellants have not satisfied the prudential requirements of standing dictated by Valley Forge, Warth v. Seldin, and Frissell v. Rizzo.    Accordingly, we are satisfied with the district court's dismissal of the complaint for the reasons stated.  Those reasons have been summarized in Warth v. Seldin and deserve repetition here:

30
Apart from the minimum constitutional mandate, this Court has recognized other limits on the class of persons who may invoke the courts' decisional and remedial powers.  First, the Court has held that when the asserted harm is a "generalized grievance" shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction.  Second, even when the plaintiff has alleged injury sufficient to meet the "case or controversy" requirement, this Court has held that the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interest of third parties.  Without such limitations--closely related to Art. III concerns but essentially matters of judicial self-governance--the courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public significance even though other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights.

31
422 U.S. at 499-500, 95 S.Ct. at 2205-06 (footnotes and citations omitted).  We believe that the appellants here assert only a "generalized grievance" that may be shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens.

VI.

32
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.


677 N.W.2d 333 (2003)
260 Mich. App. 189
BRANCH COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Respondent, and
Branch County Clerk, Branch County Register of Deeds, and Branch County Treasurer, Respondents-Appellees,
v.
INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE & AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, UAW, Charging Party-Appellant.
Docket No. 241189.
Court of Appeals of Michigan.
Submitted December 3, 2003, at Lansing.
Decided December 23, 2003, at 9:15 a.m.
Released for Publication March 19, 2004.
*334 Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, P.L.C. (by Louis B. Reinwasser), Lansing, for Branch County Clerk, Branch County Register of Deeds, and Branch County Treasurer.
Dan Sherrick and Georgi-Ann Bargamian, Detroit, for the UAW.
*335 Michael R. Kluck & Associates (by Michael R. Kluck), Okemos, for United County Officers Association and Michigan Association of County Clerks.
White, Schneider, Young & Chiodini, P.C. (by Michael M. Shoudy), Okemos, for Michigan Association of Register of Deeds.
Dykema Gossett PLLC (by Bruce G. Davis, Phyliss G. Donaldson Adams, and Steven C. Liedel), Lansing, for Michigan Association of County Treasurers.
Before: WHITBECK, C.J., and HOEKSTRA and DONOFRIO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Charging party International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW appeals as of right from an order entered by the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC) dismissing its unfair labor practice charges against respondents Branch County Clerk, Branch County Register of Deeds, and Branch County Treasurer, and determining that such elected officials were coemployers with Branch County of all their respective deputies, and therefore did not violate § 10(1)(e) of the public employment relations act (PERA), MCL 423.210(1)(e), by attempting to require the charging party to bargain with them. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The charging party is the collective bargaining representative of Branch County employees. When bargaining commenced, respondents asserted coemployer status of their chief deputies, and all other deputies in their respective offices, and demanded that the charging party bargain with them. The charging party filed a complaint with MERC, alleging that respondents violated § 10(1)(e) of PERA by failing to bargain in good faith by demanding that it recognize them as coemployers of all deputies in their respective offices. Section 10(1)(e) provides: "It shall be unlawful for a public employer or an officer or agent of a public employer ... to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of its public employees." After conducting a hearing on the complaint, and without engaging in a separate analysis of each of the relevant statutory provisions, MCL 50.63, MCL 48.37, and MCL 53.91, that delineate the powers of appointment of county clerks, treasurers, and registers of deeds, the hearing officer determined that each of these elected officials was a coemployer only of its chief deputy, and not a coemployer of other deputies in its office. The hearing officer stated:
[I]t is clear that by statute, each elected official at issue may appoint a deputy to serve in his/her absence and that appointment may be revoked at any time. The clear intent of the statute is to restrict this power to one employee, i.e., the chief deputy, not to all employees in the official's office. The fact that these officials choose to deputize other employees is not significant, given the clear language of their designated statutory powers. I therefore find that the Clerk, Treasurer, and Register of Deeds are coemployers only as to their chief deputies, and are not coemployers of other employees in their respective offices. By attempting to require the Union to bargain with these officials over all employees in their offices, I find that Branch County, including the Clerk, Treasurer, and Register of Deeds, has violated Section 10(1)(e) of PERA. [Emphasis in original.]
Respondents filed an exception to the hearing officer's recommended order, objecting to the determination that they were not coemployers of all deputies in their respective offices. In its decision and order, MERC concluded that the elected officials *336 were coemployers of all deputies in their respective offices and thus did not violate § 10(1)(e) of PERA, and dismissed the unfair labor practice charges against the elected officials. This appeal ensued.
We review MERC decisions "pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 28, and MCL 423.216(e)." Grandville Municipal Executive Ass'n v. Grandville, 453 Mich. 428, 436, 553 N.W.2d 917 (1996). MERC's "findings of fact are conclusive if they are supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole." Id. MERC's "legal determinations may not be disturbed unless they violate a constitutional or statutory provision or they are based on a substantial and material error of law." Id., citing MCL 24.306(1)(a), (f). "In contrast to [ ] MERC's factual findings, its legal rulings `are afforded a lesser degree of deference' because review of legal questions remains de novo, even in MERC cases." St Clair Co. Ed. Ass'n v. St. Clair Co. Intermediate School Dist., 245 Mich.App. 498, 513, 630 N.W.2d 909 (2001), quoting Grand Rapids Employees Independent Union v. Grand Rapids, 235 Mich.App. 398, 403, 597 N.W.2d 284 (1999), and citing Kent Co. Deputy Sheriff's Ass'n v. Kent Co. Sheriff, 463 Mich. 353, 357 n. 8, 616 N.W.2d 677 (2000).
To determine whether an elected official is a coemployer, we look to see whether the elected official "possesses coemployer status by virtue of his statutory authority to hire and discharge his employees at his pleasure." Genesee Co. Social Services Workers Union v. Genesee Co., 199 Mich.App. 717, 720, 502 N.W.2d 701 (1993). This Court explained: "`[W]here [a] statute gives an elected official the power both to appoint an employee and to revoke that appointment at pleasure, or at any time, under St Clair County Prosecutor [v AFSCME, 425 Mich. 204, 388 N.W.2d 231 (1986)] that official becomes the coemployer of that employee.' (Emphasis added.)" Id., quoting Berrien Co v. Teamsters, Local 214, 1987 MERC Lab Op 306, 314.
Because a different statute exists for each elected official and each statute is worded differently, we must examine each statute in turn to determine whether MERC's ruling that each elected official was a coemployer of all its deputies constituted a substantial and material error of law. We begin by examining the office of the county clerk.
MCL 50.63 addresses the duties and powers of the county clerk, and provides in pertinent part:
Each county clerk shall appoint one [1] or more deputies, to be approved by the circuit judge, one [1] of whom shall be designated in the appointment as the successor of such clerk in case of vacancy from any cause, and may revoke such appointment at his pleasure, which appointment and revocation shall be in writing, under his hand, and filed in the office of the county treasurer, and the deputy or deputies, may perform the duties of such clerks.
MERC determined that a careful reading of MCL 50.63 does not support the charging party's contention that the county clerk is a coemployer of only the chief deputy, and commented that "nothing in this language suggests that a county clerk is limited to appointing one deputy." MERC reasoned:
In Lapeer County, 1995 MERC Lab Op 181, this Commission cited Berrien County in holding that the county clerk is the co-employer with the county of his or her appointed deputies. Charging Party argues that the statute allows a county clerk to appoint one or more deputies, but that it specifically limits *337 the clerk's revocation power to a single "such appointment," suggesting that such reference goes to the appointment of her successor only.
It seems clear that one of the deputies must be designated as the clerk's successor. That designation may be removed at the pleasure of the clerk but such designation or removal thereof does not require the revocation of the appointment of such person as a deputy. However, it is equally evident that the appointment of a deputy who has not been designated as the clerk's successor may also be revoked. To suggest that once deputies have been appointed, they may not be removed by revocation of the appointment by the clerk would seem to run contrary to the whole appointment scheme of the statute. Such a holding would consequently render the appointment power meaningless, since under Charging Party's interpretation, once the appointment has been made it would be irrevocable. We believe that such interpretation is contrary to law. [Emphasis in original.]
In its decision, MERC relied on its opinion in Lapeer Co, supra, which cited Berrien Co, supra, for its holding that a county clerk is a coemployer of its appointed deputies. We agree that nothing in the language of MCL 50.63 suggests that the county clerk is limited to appointing just one deputy. The charging party argues that even though MCL 50.63 allows the clerk to appoint one or more deputies, it also specifically limits the clerk's revocation power to the chief deputy and consequently the clerk cannot be the coemployer of all the deputies. However, although "it is a general rule of grammar and of statutory construction that a modifying word or clause is confined solely to the last antecedent ...," this rule does not apply if a contrary intention appears. Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Ward, 460 Mich. 230, 237, 596 N.W.2d 119 (1999). The clerk's mandate to appoint one or more deputies is modified by the phrase "one of whom shall be designated in the appointment as the successor." By limiting this phrase to the clerk's mandate to appoint one or more deputies, the clerk's authority to "revoke such appointment" refers to the initial appointment of one or more deputies. We therefore believe that MCL 50.63 requires the clerk to appoint one or more deputies, designate a chief deputy as the clerk's successor, and permits the clerk to revoke the appointment of all deputies at the clerk's pleasure. Because MCL 50.63 gives the clerk the power to appoint deputies and to revoke such appointments at the clerk's pleasure, we find no substantial and material error of law in MERC's conclusion that the Branch County Clerk is a coemployer of all its deputies, not just the chief deputy.
Next, we address the duties and powers of the county treasurer, found in MCL 48.37, which provides in pertinent part:
The county treasurer shall appoint a deputy, who, in the absence of the treasurer from the office, or in case of a vacancy in the office, or a disability of the treasurer to perform the duties of the office, may perform all the duties of the office of treasurer, until the vacancy is filled or the disability is removed. The county treasurer may revoke those appointments at any time. The deputy shall qualify by taking the constitutional oath of office and filing a bond, if the county board of commissioners determines that an individual bond is necessary. The treasurer may employ personnel necessary and approved by the county board of commissioners.... All appointments and revocations of appointments shall be in writing. A treasurer *338 shall not be responsible for the act, defaults, and misconduct in office of a deputy or any other employee in the treasurer's office accruing without the knowledge or negligence of the treasurer. Each employee, before entering upon the duties of office, shall execute and file an individual bond, for the faithful performance of duties.... The deputy or other employee shall be liable for the deputy's or the employee's acts, defaults, and misconduct in office in the same manner as the treasurer or the treasurer's executors and administrators would otherwise be liable, and actions for those acts, defaults, and misconduct shall be prosecuted directly against the deputy or other employee, and the appropriate surety.
MERC determined:
The language of MCL 48.37 is replete with the use of plural phrases indicating an expectation that a county treasurer might make multiple appointments. It states: "those appointments" may be revoked at any time; that the treasurer shall not be responsible for the misconduct of "a deputy" and not "the deputy," and finally, "all appointments and revocations of appointments" shall be in writing. All of these plural phrases lead one to the reasonable conclusion that the county treasurer is authorized to appoint and revoke the appointments of multiple deputies at his or her pleasure. Moreover, in Berrien County, 1987 MERC Lab Op 306, 314, we interpreted the same statute as "giving the treasurer the right to appoint deputies whose appointments may be revoked at any time." [Emphasis in original.]
Thus, MERC relied on the language of the statute and its opinion in Berrien Co, supra, for its holding that a county treasurer is a coemployer of its appointed deputies. The charging party argues that MCL 48.37 allows the treasurer to appoint one deputy as the treasurer's successor, and specifically limits the treasurer's revocation power to that chief deputy. However, we agree with MERC that if the Legislature intended to limit the treasurer to appointing "a [single] deputy," it likely would not have stated that "those appointments" may be revoked at any time; that the treasurer shall not be responsible for the misconduct of "a deputy," as opposed to "the deputy"; and that "all appointments and revocations of appointments" shall be in writing. We therefore find no substantial and material error of law in MERC's conclusion that the Branch County Treasurer is a coemployer of all its deputies.
Finally, we take up the duties and powers of the county register of deeds set forth in MCL 53.91, which provides in pertinent part:
The register of deeds shall appoint a deputy, to hold his office during the pleasure of the register; such appointment and the revocation thereof to be in writing, and filed in the office of the county clerk; and before such deputy shall enter upon the duties of his office, he shall take the oath prescribed by the twelfth [12th] article of the constitution, and for the faithful performance of his duties by such deputy, the register and his sureties shall be responsible.
The charging party argues that MCL 53.91 mandates that the register of deeds appoint a single deputy as successor. MERC determined that the language of MCL 53.91 was not intended to limit the register of deeds to the appointment and removal of a single deputy. MERC supported its conclusion by stating:
However, we note that the language of the statute authorizing the Register of Deeds to appoint a deputy is mandatory language, stating that the "register *339 of deeds shall appoint a deputy." The statute does not say the register of deeds "may appoint a deputy," as such language would clearly imply a limitation on the register of deeds's [sic] authority to appoint deputies. The mandatory language requiring the register of deeds to appoint a deputy implies no such limitation. Instead, it appears likely that the language was designed to be consistent with the language of MCL 45.41, which permits the treasurers, clerks and registers of deeds in counties of populations in excess of 50,000 to each appoint one or more deputies. Moreover, we are persuaded by Lockwood v. Stoll [264 Mich. 598, 250 N.W. 321 (1933)] that the statutory language was not intended to be a limitation on the number of deputies that could be appointed, but was intended to confer the power of appointment and revocation with regard to the office, not a particular holder of such office. In Lockwood v. Stoll, in rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that they were employees of the county and not subject to termination by the newly elected register of deeds, the court held that the appointment or employment of the register of deeds's [sic] clerks and deputies expired with the term of the register of deeds. The court did not limit the register of deeds's [sic] power to make or revoke appointments to a single deputy, but instead spoke of "deputies." Therefore, we disagree with the ALJ that the language of the statute is intended to limit the register of deeds to the appointment and removal of just one deputy. [Emphasis in original.]
We believe that MERC erred in determining that the county register of deeds is a co-employer of all its deputies. We find that MERC's reliance on the mandatory language of MCL 53.91 read in conjunction with MCL 45.41 does not support the conclusion that a county register of deeds is a coemployer of all its deputies. The language of MCL 53.91 that makes the appointment of a deputy mandatory neither supports nor undermines either party's position. Further, MCL 45.41[1] is not instructive on the issue of coemployer status because nothing in that statute indicates that the Legislature intended that it should be read together with MCL 53.91 for purposes of determining whether the register of deeds or any other named county officer is a co-employer. Moreover, we find Lockwood, supra, on which MERC relied, inapposite because that case did not require the court to interpret MCL 53.91.
Alternatively, we are urged to apply MCL 8.3b, which provides that "[e]very word importing the singular number only may extend to and embrace the plural number" and conclude that the reference to a singular deputy in MCL 53.91 means the plural and therefore allows for the appointment of multiple deputies and revocation of such appointments. But application of MCL 8.3b is not mandatory and should not be adopted if inconsistent with the Legislature's intent. Sclafani v. Domestic Violence Escape, 255 Mich.App. 260, 267, 660 N.W.2d 97 (2003). Here, we find that MCL 8.3b is not applicable because neither plural language nor indication of an intent by the Legislature to permit the register of deeds to appoint or *340 revoke the appointment of more than one deputy is contained within the language of MCL 53.91. Accordingly, we believe MERC made a substantial and material error of law in its determination that the Branch County Register of Deeds is a coemployer of all its deputies, and find that the Branch County Register of Deeds is a coemployer only of the chief deputy.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
NOTES
[1]  MCL 45.51 provides:

In all counties of this state having a population of more than fifty thousand [50,000] where it is provided by law that the county treasurer, county clerk and register of deeds shall receive salaries in lieu of fees, each of said officers may appoint a deputy or deputies who may perform all the official acts which the officer making such appointment might legally do, and who shall be paid therefor from the general fund of the county, such salaries as the board of supervisors of the county shall determine.


19 F.3d 20
NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit.UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Avon Anderson FLETCHER, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 93-5552.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
March 11, 1994.

1
Before:  KENNEDY and MILBURN, Circuit Judges, and ALDRICH, District Judge.*

ORDER

2
Avon Anderson Fletcher appeals her conviction for arson, conspiracy to commit arson, and mail fraud and the sentence imposed by the district court.  The case has been referred to a panel of the court pursuant to Rule 9(a), Rules of the Sixth Circuit.  Counsel for the parties have expressly waived oral argument, and this panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed.  Fed.R.App.P. 34(a).

3
Fletcher was convicted following a jury trial.  She was sentenced to serve 51 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release and to make restitution in the amount of $42,227.89.  On appeal, Fletcher argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.  She also contends that her sentence was improperly enhanced for obstruction of justice.

4
Upon review, we conclude that the appeal lacks merit.  In evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must weigh the evidence in a light favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.   See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).  Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence are accorded the same weight, and uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice may support a conviction under federal law.   United States v. Frost, 914 F.2d 756, 762 (6th Cir.1990).  Fletcher's assertion that her conviction was based on the testimony of a co-conspirator, Jimmy Kimbrell, is unavailing.  Moreover, portions of Kimbrell's testimony were corroborated by other witnesses.

5
Fletcher's challenge to the enhancement of her sentence also lacks merit.  An enhancement for obstruction of justice is authorized under U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1 based on the district court's finding of perjury.   United States v. Dunnigan, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1116 (1993).  The district court's determination that enhancement is required is sufficient if the district court's finding encompasses the factual predicates for a finding of perjury.   Id. at 1117.  The district court's finding that a defendant was untruthful with respect to material matters in the case that were designed to substantially affect the outcome, especially when the defendant's testimony is contradicted by that of other witnesses, meets this standard.  Id.  Contrary to Fletcher's argument, an enhancement under this section does not undermine a defendant's right to testify.  See id. at 1117-18.

6
In the present case, the district court determined that the enhancement was warranted "by virtue of [the defendant's] failure to give truthful testimony in material matters that were designed to substantially affect the outcome of the case," and that Fletcher's testimony was contradicted by that of other witnesses.  Because the district court's finding of perjury is supported by the record, an enhancement under U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1 was authorized.

7
Accordingly, the district court's judgment of conviction and sentence is affirmed.  Rule 9(b)(3), Rules of the Sixth Circuit.

*
 The Honorable Ann Aldrich, U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation