                             NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
                              To be cited only in accordance with
                                       Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

              United States Court of Appeals
                                     For the Seventh Circuit
                                     Chicago, Illinois 60604

                                      Argued July 8, 2010
                                    Decided August 26, 2010

                                               Before

                               WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

                               KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

                               MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

No. 10‐1493

CATHY A. MOLNAR,                                       Appeal from the United States District
    Plaintiff‐Appellant,                               Court for the Western District of
                                                       Wisconsin.
       v.
                                                       No. 3:09‐cv‐00522‐bbc
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
                                                       Barbara B. Crabb,
Commissioner of Social Security,
                                                       Judge.
    Defendant‐Appellee.

                                             ORDER

        Cathy  Molnar  claims  that  she  is  disabled  by  degenerative  disc  disease.    The  Social
Security Administration denied her application for benefits after an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) concluded that her impairment is severe but not disabling.  Ms. Molnar argues that the
ALJ erroneously concluded that her disc disease is not per se disabling.  Alternatively, she
contends that the ALJ improperly discredited her complaints of pain when determining her
residual functional capacity.  Because the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence
in the record, we uphold the finding that Ms. Molnar is not disabled.
No. 10‐1493                                                                                Page 2

        Ms. Molnar applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income
in February 2006.  She had been laid off from her job as an administrative assistant in March
2005, and she claimed that after September 2005 she could no longer work due to degenerative
disc disease.  Ms. Molnar, who is 54 years old, has a high school education and previous work
experience as a waitress, bartender and car salesperson.

       Ms. Molnar’s medical issues began in 1997 when she injured her neck in a car accident
and had corrective surgery.  She returned to work full time, though in 2002 an MRI revealed
degenerative changes in her lumbar spine and mild slippage of the vertebrae at the L4‐5 level.
Surgery was recommended, but Ms. Molnar declined.  She continued to experience pain, which
over time spread from her lower back to her legs.  Then in September 2005, after she was laid
off, Ms. Molnar sought treatment from Dr. Jamie Pearson, who noted tenderness in her lower
back but observed that she walked without difficulty and retained normal lateral motion and
strength in her lower extremities.  The doctor diagnosed her with degenerative arthritis of the
lumbar  spine  and  prescribed  pain  medication.      Two  epidural  steroid  injections  reduced
inflammation in her lower back, and Ms. Molnar reported that her pain had been cut in half.

       In late 2005, Ms. Molnar also was experiencing increasing pain in her neck and upper
extremities.  An MRI revealed degenerative discopathy in the cervical spine.  A neurosurgeon,
Dr. Robert Roach, observed during a November consultation that Ms. Molnar walked with a
mildly spastic gait yet exhibited normal motor strength in her lower extremities and nearly
normal motor strength in her upper extremities.  He diagnosed cervical myelopathy related to
spinal stenosis and recommended surgery.

        That same month Ms. Molnar had cervical fusion surgery, the same procedure used after
her 1997 accident.  Just a few weeks later she reported to Dr. Roach that the pain in her neck
and  upper  extremities  was  gone.    She  was  walking  normally  and  had  regained  full  motor
strength in her upper and lower extremities.  In December 2005, a month after the surgery,
Ms. Molnar reported to Dr. Thomas Hinck, her primary physician, that she was “doing really
well” with her cervical issues.  A.R. 152.  She noted continuing tenderness in her shoulders, but
said  that  the  numbness  in  her  arms  had  diminished.    The  pain  in  her  lower  back  had  not
subsided completely, but Ms. Molnar declined a refill of her pain medication, which she had
been  taking  only  occasionally.    Just  over  a  month  later,  however,  Ms.  Molnar  applied  for
benefits.

       Ms. Molnar returned to Dr. Hinck in April 2006 and reported that her lower back pain
had worsened.  He reviewed a new MRI and diagnosed her with degenerative lumbar spine
disease, prescribed a pain killer and steroid, and recommended that she consult an orthopedic
surgeon.  Ms. Molnar consulted with two orthopedic surgeons, and both recommended fusion
surgery to repair her lumbar spine.  Both surgeons observed that Ms. Molnar walked with an
No. 10‐1493                                                                                Page 3

abnormal gait and complained of pain when bending forward, but her strength in all muscle
groups, the reflexes in her knees and ankles, and her performance on a straight‐leg raising test
were all normal.  In July 2006, Dr. Joseph Perra performed a spinal fusion in Ms. Molnar’s lower
back.

        That  surgery  was  a  success.    A  month  later  Ms.  Molnar  told  Dr.  Perra  that  she  felt
“wonderful” and could walk without pain for the first time in 15 years.  A.R. 226.  The surgeon
confirmed that she was walking with a normal gait.  He recommended physical therapy, and
at her first session the therapist observed that Ms. Molnar could rise from a chair without
difficulty, was able to move her neck freely and did not have obvious limitations.  She had
diminished strength in her right foot, but otherwise her strength in her lower extremities was
normal.  At her third session, Ms. Molnar expressed satisfaction with her progress and reported
that she was able to do light yard work and function throughout the day.  She added that she
had spent two hours searching for agates in a gravel pit without experiencing any pain.  In
September 2006, she told the therapist that she was driving more and had experienced some
stiffness in her neck as a result, but her lower back remained “quite good,” and she had been
very  active.    A.R.  215.    Ms.  Molnar  saw  Dr.  Perra  in  October  2006  and  was  able  to  move
comfortably  and  had  full  strength  in  her  lower  extremities.    Six  months  after  her  surgery,
Ms. Molnar did not report any pain aside from occasional tenderness at the base of her spine
and was able to bend forward 20 degrees without pain.  Her gait was normal.  One year after
her surgery, in June 2007, Ms. Molnar reported no back pain, walked with a normal gait, and
could bend forward without pain.

        In  November 2007, however, Ms. Molnar complained to Dr. Perra about increasing
levels of pain in her arms and neck with numbness and tingling.  Dr. Perra noted a diminished
range of motion in the neck but also observed that Ms. Molnar retained full strength in her
upper extremities.  An MRI revealed some stenosis and a central disc herniation.  Dr. Perra
recommended a third cervical surgery, but Ms. Molnar decided to wait.

         In December 2007, Dr. Hinck provided a list of work restrictions in connection with
Ms. Molnar’s claim for benefits.  He reported that she could occasionally lift from the floor up
to 20 pounds, frequently lift from a table up to 20 pounds, frequently carry up to 20 pounds for
less than 30 feet and occasionally  carry up to 20 pounds for more than 30 feet.  She could
frequently push, pull and reach below shoulder level, but Dr. Hinck recommended against
bending, climbing, crawling, duck walking, squatting, overhead lifting, or reaching at or above
the  shoulder.    Additionally,  he  believed,  Ms.  Molnar  could  frequently  engage  in  fine
manipulation and simple grasping with both hands.  He opined that Ms. Molnar would not
need to lie down during an eight‐hour day but would miss on average two days of work per
month.  During an eight‐hour day, she would need to change positions frequently and could
sit for five hours at most, stand for no more than three hours, and walk no more than three
No. 10‐1493                                                                                Page 4

hours.  Finally, he restricted Ms. Molnar from all activities involving unprotected heights and
rotation of the head and neck, and limited her to only occasional side‐to‐side bending and
rotation of the upper body.

         Ms. Molnar next saw Dr. Perra for neck pain in April 2008.  She had stable reflexes and
full strength in her upper extremities but diminished range of motion in the neck and increased
misalignment of her cervical vertebrae.  Dr. Perra again recommended surgery, and Ms. Molnar
had  her  third  cervical  surgery  in  May  2008.    In  July  2008,  six  weeks  after  the  surgery,  she
reported  to  Dr.  Perra  that  the  pain  in  her  neck  and  arms  was  gone,  as  was  the  associated
numbness  and  tingling.    Dr.  Perra  concluded  that  she  now  had  full  strength  in  her  upper
extremities  but  still  had  a  limited  range  of  motion  in  her  neck.    He    suggested  isometric
strengthening exercises and home activities such as lawn mowing and easy driving.

        The ALJ conducted an evidentiary hearing in October 2008.  Ms. Molnar testified that
she had tried returning to work as an administrative assistant in 2006 but could not perform
the job because she was unable to reach or tilt her head upward.  She reported a need to move
frequently and stated that she has difficulty bending because of pain in her lower back.  Since
her  third  neck  surgery,  she  continued,  she  had  experienced  numbness  in  her  hands  and
diminished strength in her arms.  She cannot push or pull.  During the day, she said, she lies
down a lot.  She reads, cares for her dogs and cats, shops for groceries, cooks, gardens and
drives limited distances.

        The ALJ called Dr. Harold Mills to testify as a medical expert.  Dr. Mills opined that
Ms. Molnar has severe cervical and, to a lesser extent, lumbar discogenic disease.  Initially he
said that Ms. Molnar’s disc disease met the elements in Listing 1.04(A) for a disabling disorder
of the spine.  But when the ALJ probed Dr. Mills about the criteria for meeting that listing and
asked whether there was evidence of motor loss accompanied by sensory or reflex loss, the
doctor responded that he could not give a specific answer and did not know Ms. Molnar’s
current status.  He conceded that he had “not recorded any specific evidence of motor loss” but
recalled that in November 2005 and May 2008 she had experienced gait problems, which, he
thought, indicated some motor loss.  A.R. 261.  He also noted that in November 2005 she had
reported numbness in her hands.  But all of those instances, he acknowledged, were before
surgery.  Ms. Molnar’s attorney did not follow up with additional questions about the listing
or point out other evidence of motor loss.

       The ALJ also heard from Sidney Bower, a vocational expert.  He testified that a person
with the restrictions imposed by Dr. Hinck could not perform Ms. Molnar’s past work.  At first
Bower said there were no jobs in the national or regional economy for a similarly restricted
person of Ms. Molnar’s age, education and work history.  But when the ALJ iterated that the
hypothetical  allowed  for  occasional  trunk  motion,  frequent  simple  grasping,  and  driving,
No. 10‐1493                                                                                Page 5

Bower revised his opinion to allow for work as a ticket taker, parking‐lot attendant, optical lens
matcher,  or  optical  salvager.    These  jobs,  Bower  said,  exist  in  substantial  numbers  in  the
regional economy.

        The ALJ rejected Ms. Molnar’s claim using the standard five‐step analysis.  See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520, 416.920.  At step one the ALJ determined that she had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since her reported onset, and at step two that her degenerative disc disease of
the  cervical  and  lumbar  spine  with  a  history  of  multiple  surgeries  constitutes  a  severe
impairment.  At step three, the ALJ determined that Ms. Molnar’s impairment does not meet
or equal a listed impairment, explaining that she did not meet Listing 1.04 because Dr. Mills
had “emphasized that there was no evidence of motor loss.”  A.R. 12.  At step four the ALJ
concluded that Ms. Molnar retained the residual functional capacity to do light work with the
additional  restrictions  detailed  by  Dr.  Hinck:  no  bending  forward,  climbing,  crawling,  or
squatting; no rotating of the head or neck and only occasional rotation of the upper body and
side bending; no reaching at or above shoulder level or working at unprotected heights, and
no sitting for more than five hours during an eight‐hour day or standing or walking for more
than  three  hours  in  an  eight‐hour  day.    Here,  the  ALJ  noted  that  medical  evidence  partly
corroborated  Ms.  Molnar’s  complaints  of  pain,  though  several  progress  notes  from  her
physicians verified that she had improved and was doing well after her surgeries and epidural
injections.    The  ALJ  detected  no  evidence  that  Ms.  Molnar’s  condition  had  significantly
worsened since early 2006 when she acknowledged to doctors a significant range of activities.
Ms.  Molnar  had  testified  that  she  must  lie  down  frequently  throughout  the  day,  but  that
testimony, the ALJ observed, was contradicted by the assessment of Dr. Hinck‐‐Ms. Molnar’s
treating physician‐‐that she would not need to lie down during a typical workday.  Finally, at
step five, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Molnar could no longer perform her past work but could
do other jobs and thus was not disabled.  After the Social Security Appeals Council declined
to review the decision, Ms. Molnar sought review in the district court.  The district court upheld
the decision of the ALJ.

        Because the Appeals Council declined review, the ALJ’s ruling is the final decision of
the Commissioner of Social Security.  Getch v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 2008).  We will
uphold that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence and rests on appropriate legal
standards.  See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Ketelboeter v. Astrue, 550 F.3d 620, 624 (7th Cir. 2008).  We will
not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ.  Ketelboeter, 550 F.3d
at 624; Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007).

       Ms.  Molnar  first  challenges  the  ALJ’s  conclusion  that  her  impairments  do  not  meet
Listing 1.04(A) for disorders of the spine.  She contends that the ALJ disregarded an opinion
from Dr. Mills that she did meet this listing and misstated his testimony in concluding that
there was no evidence of motor loss.  A claimant is presumed disabled if she has an impairment
No. 10‐1493                                                                                Page 6

that  meets  or  equals  an  impairment  found  in  the  Listing  of  Impairments.    20  C.F.R.
§§  404.1520(d);  404.1525(a);  20  C.F.R.  Pt.  404,  Subpt.  P,  App.  1.    To  meet  Listing  1.04(A),  a
claimant must present evidence of a spine disorder that results in compromise of a nerve root
or the spinal cord with “[e]vidence of nerve root compression characterized by neuro‐anatomic
distribution of pain, limitation of motion of the spine, motor loss (atrophy with associated
muscle weakness or muscle weakness) accompanied by sensory or reflex loss and, if there is
involvement of the lower back, positive straight‐leg raising test (sitting and supine).”  20 C.F.R.
Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 1.04(A).  The listings note that an “[i]nability to walk on the heels
or toes, to squat, or to arise from a squatting position, when appropriate, may be considered
evidence of significant motor loss” as well as concrete evidence of atrophy in upper and lower
extremities.  20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 1.00(E)(1).

        Whether an impairment meets a listing is a question reserved to the ALJ, and, thus, Dr.
Mills’s  opinion  would  not  be  entitled  to  special  significance  even  if  that  opinion  was  as
described by Ms. Molnar.  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2), (e)(3); Randolph v. Barnhart, 386 F.3d
835,  840  (8th  Cir.  2004);  Clifford  v.  Apfel,  227  F.3d  863,  870  (7th  Cir.  2000).    Regardless,
Ms. Molnar misrepresents the record by insisting that Dr. Mills opined that she met Listing
1.04(A).  Dr. Mills thought so initially but retreated when questioned by the ALJ about the lack
of evidence of motor loss, a key element of the listing.  The purpose of the evidentiary hearing
was to explore and test the medical records and opinions of the expert witnesses, see 20 C.F.R.
§§ 405.320(a); 405.350, and that purpose was served here.  Dr. Mills started with an incomplete
assessment of the relevant evidence and revised his opinion when the ALJ drew his attention
to a weakness in his evaluation.

        Ms. Molnar argues, however, that the ALJ was patently wrong in saying that Dr. Mills
had “emphasized” that there was no evidence of motor loss.  A.R. 12.  She points to Dr. Mills’s
mention of two medical reports showing evidence of gait problems and numbness in her hands
in  2005  and  gait  problems  again  in  2008.    Although  the  ALJ’s  imprecise  characterization
perhaps overstates Dr. Mills’s testimony, the ALJ’s overall analysis on this point is nonetheless
sound.  Dr. Mills said he did not recall “any specific evidence of motor loss” and, recognizing
that  Ms.  Molnar  recently  had  experienced  improvement,  added  that  he  did  not  know  the
current status of her symptoms.  A.R. 261‐62.  Dr. Mills also confirmed that both mentions of
gait problems and numbness in her hands had occurred before Ms. Molnar’s surgeries.  The
listings expressly required the ALJ to consider the effects of Ms. Molnar’s treatment, including
surgery, on her ability to function.  20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 1.00(I).

        We review the ALJ’s opinion as a whole to give it the most sensible reading, Rice v.
Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 369 (7th Cir. 2004); Shramek v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 809, 811 (7th Cir. 2000), and
later in her opinion the ALJ explained that the record shows Ms. Molnar made remarkable
improvement  after  each  surgery  and  epidural  injection.    This  finding  is  supported  by  the
No. 10‐1493                                                                                Page 7

medical  evidence  in  the  record:    following  her  second  cervical  fusion  surgery  in  2005,
Ms. Molnar walked with a normal gait and had full motor strength in her upper and lower
extremities; following her 2006 lumbar fusion surgery, Ms. Molnar reported no back pain, could
walk with a normal gait, had full strength in her lower extremities and could move her neck
freely; and after her third cervical surgery in 2007, she had full strength and sensation in her
upper extremities.  Thus, reading the opinion as a whole, we conclude that the ALJ developed
an “accurate and logical bridge” from the evidence to her conclusion that the medical record
lacked sufficient evidence of motor loss to meet Listing 1.04(A).  See Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d
503, 516‐17 (7th Cir. 2009); Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 544‐45 (7th Cir. 2008).

        Second, Ms. Molnar challenges the ALJ’s decision to discount her complaints of pain
and resulting limitations as not entirely credible and instead credits Dr. Hinck’s appraisal of
her residual functional capacity.  The ALJ was required to determine Ms. Molnar’s residual
functional capacity by evaluating whether the “objective medical evidence and other evidence”
was consistent with her subjective complaints of pain and alleged limitations.  See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1529(a), (d)(3)‐(4); Berger, 516 F.3d at 544.  We will reject an ALJ’s credibility findings only
if they are patently wrong.  Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 843 (7th Cir. 2007); Jens v. Barnhart,
347 F.3d 209, 213 (7th Cir. 2003).  Nonetheless, an ALJ must justify her credibility finding with
specific  reasons  supported  by  the  record  after  considering  the  claimant’s  level  of  pain,
medication, treatment, daily activities and limitations.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); Terry v. Astrue,
580 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 2009).

        Ms. Molnar contends that the ALJ discredited her complaints of pain based solely on the
improvement  she  experienced  after  surgery  and  epidural  injections  and  disregarded  the
possibility  that  her  condition  could  worsen  in  the  future.    But  the  ALJ  was  permitted  to
consider the effectiveness of treatment, including surgery and epidural injections, in making
her credibility determination.  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); Terry, 580 F.3d at 477.  Ms. Molnar
ignores the ALJ’s other reasons for not fully accepting her testimony:  there is no evidence that
her medications were ineffective or caused any debilitating side effects; Ms. Molnar testified
that  she  performs  a  wide  range  of  daily  activities  without  significant  difficulty  given  her
reported level of pain; and the record includes no evidence that her condition had significantly
deteriorated  since  2006,  when  she  first  reported  the  range  of  her  daily  activities.    The  ALJ
further noted that Ms. Molnar’s testimony that she needed to lie down frequently during the
day was contradicted by the assessment of her own treating physician, to whom Dr. Mills
deferred.    The  ALJ  was  permitted  to  consider  whether  Ms.  Molnar’s  daily  activities  are
inconsistent with her alleged inability to work.  See SSR 96‐8p; Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 435
(7th Cir. 2000).  The ALJ did not overstate Ms. Molnar’s ability to perform daily activities but
noted specifically that she was able to do, for example, only light household chores and light
cooking.  See Moss v. Astrue, 555 F.3d 556, 562 (7th Cir. 2009); Powers, 207 F.3d at 435.  Although
the  ALJ’s  conclusion  that  there  was  no  medical  evidence  that  Ms.  Molnar’s  condition  had
No. 10‐1493                                                                                Page 8

significantly deteriorated since early 2006 may overlook Ms. Molnar’s third cervical surgery in
2008, Ms. Molnar’s physical limitations appear to have improved since early 2006 as a result
of her lumbar surgery and, to a degree, her latest cervical surgery.  Moreover, the ALJ was
required  to  determine  whether  Ms.  Molnar  was  under  a  current  disability,  see  20  C.F.R.
§ 416.905(a), and Ms. Molnar points to no medical evidence to support her contention that she
“will likely  require  additional  surgeries  in  the  future.”    Accordingly,  the  ALJ’s  credibility
determination was not patently wrong.

         Finally, as a result of the adverse credibility finding, the ALJ fully credited Dr. Hinck’s
assessment of Ms. Molnar’s residual functional capacity.  Ms. Molnar complains that the ALJ
should  have  credited  Dr.  Mills’s  initial  opinion  that  she  is  disabled  and  should  have
disregarded  the  opinion  of  Dr.  Hinck.    But  Dr.  Hinck  was  her  treating  physician,  and  his
assessment of her work‐related limitations was entitled to controlling weight if supported by
objective medical evidence and consistent with other substantial evidence in the record.  See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Moss, 555 F.3d at 560.  Ms. Molnar does not identify any contradictory
medical evidence or any other record evidence that undermines Dr. Hinck’s opinion.  Nor does
she identify any specific errors in the description of her residual functional capacity that the
ALJ used in her questioning of the vocational expert.  The ALJ appropriately questioned the
vocational expert as to possible jobs that remained open to Ms. Molnar, and after clarification
of  the  relevant  work  limitations,  the  vocational  expert  confirmed  that  four  jobs  exist  in
significant numbers in the regional economy that a person with Ms. Molnar’s limitations can
perform.    Ms.  Molnar  has  thus  failed  to  show  that  the  ALJ’s  residual  functional  capacity
determination is unreasonable.

        Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

                                                                                AFFIRMED


710 S.E.2d 26 (2011)
STATE
v.
Mitchell J. HARB, Jr.
No. 525P08-2.
Supreme Court of North Carolina.
June 15, 2011.
Mitchell J. Harb, Jr., Yanceyville, for Harb, Mitchell Joseph (Jr.).
Catherine F. Jordan, Assistant Attorney General, for State of NC.
Garry W. Frank, District Attorney, for State of N.C.
The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 14th of March 2011 by Defendant for Petition for Discretionary Review:
"Motion Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 15th of June 2011."


706 N.W.2d 446 (2005)
268 Mich. App. 57
ASSET ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Gayla L. HUGHES, Defendant-Appellee, and
Department of Treasury, Garnishee-Defendant.
Docket No. 251798.
Court of Appeals of Michigan.
Submitted April 13, 2005, at Lansing.
Decided September 6, 2005, at 9:00 a.m.
Released for Publication November 29, 2005.
*447 Thomas D. Hocking and David A. Den Houten, Warren, Warren, for the plaintiff.
Lorray S.C. Brown, Ann Arbor, for the defendant.
Before: FORT HOOD, P.J., and METER and SCHUETTE, JJ.
SCHUETTE, J.
In this garnishment action, plaintiff appeals by leave granted from an order granting defendant's objection to garnishment of her state of Michigan homestead property tax credit. We reverse and remand.

I. FACTS
This case arises out of a collections action. Defendant Gayla L. Hughes entered into agreements for credit cards with Montgomery Ward and Saks Fifth Avenue. Defendant then defaulted on each of these cards, owing $535.41 on the Montgomery Ward card and $1,053.30 on the Saks Fifth Avenue card. Plaintiff Asset Acceptance Corporation is the owner and holder of each of these credit accounts.
On March 6, 2000, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant in connection with the past due accounts. A default judgment was entered against defendant on May 8, 2000. The 15th District Court then authorized garnishments against defendant's bank account at the Huron River Credit Union and against defendant's state of Michigan homestead property tax credit.
Defendant filed objections to the latter garnishment on the grounds that the funds plaintiff sought to garnish were exempt from garnishment because defendant paid her rent solely from Social Security disability benefits and adoption support subsidies. A hearing was held on these objections on April 17, 2003. After hearing arguments, the court denied defendant's objections to the garnishment of her homestead property tax credit on the ground that defendant had not provided any legal authority demonstrating that a tax refund or credit was exempt. The court entered an order reflecting this ruling on April 28, 2003. The court also set a hearing date for defendant's objection to the garnishment of her credit union account. The parties subsequently stipulated the entry of an order regarding defendant's objection to the credit union garnishment and that issue is not before this Court.
Defendant appealed in the circuit court the district court's denial of her objection to the garnishment of her tax credit. A hearing was held on this question on September 19, 2003. On October 9, 2003, the circuit court entered an opinion and order vacating the district court's ruling and remanding for entry of an order granting defendant's objection to the garnishment of her tax credit.

*448 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This issue presents a question of law. This Court reviews de novo questions of law. Bennett v. Weitz, 220 Mich.App. 295, 299, 559 N.W.2d 354 (1996).

III. ANALYSIS
Defendant acknowledges that in general, under Michigan law, a homestead property tax credit may be garnished. MCL 205.30a, 600.4061a. However, defendant argues that when, as here, a source of funds itself exempt from garnishment is used to pay rent, which rent subsequently results in a tax credit, then the tax credit should also be exempt from garnishment. We disagree.
The parties to this action do not dispute that the Social Security benefits received by defendant are themselves exempt from garnishment. Moreover, in Philpott v. Essex Co. Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413, 416-417, 93 S.Ct. 590, 34 L.Ed.2d 608 (1973), the Supreme Court held that Social Security funds deposited in a savings and loan association retain their exempt status. The Court based its ruling on the fact that, when deposited in a savings and loan association, the funds retain the "quality of monies." Id. at 416. Funds retain the "quality of monies" when they remain subject to demand and use as the needs of the beneficiary for support and maintenance require. Porter v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 370 U.S. 159, 161, 82 S.Ct. 1231, 8 L.Ed.2d 407 (1962).
In the present case, defendant argues that the tax credit retains the quality of monies because, although separated from defendant for up to a year, the credit, once received, will be subject to demand and use as the needs of defendant require. However, such an assertion is simply incorrect. Without question, the Social Security benefits, when placed in defendant's credit union account, retained the quality of monies. However, once defendant paid the money to her landlord in rent, it no longer retained the quality of monies. Once paid to the landlord, the rent money was in the landlord's control; indeed, it became entirely the landlord's property and was no longer subject to demand and use by the defendant.
Moreover, following defendant's theory, the funds originating from Social Security and paid to defendant then underwent several more changes of hands, from the landlord to the municipality and from the municipality to the state. In each of these instances, the funds became intermingled with other funds and lost any ability to be directly traced back to any one individual. As a result, the funds defendant received as a homestead property tax credit cannot be said to have come from the same source as the original Social Security benefits. The source of the funds had changed entirely. For these reasons, defendant's argument is without merit.
Defendant has also asserted that, even if the homestead property tax credit did not retain its exempt status based on its origination in Social Security benefits, nonetheless the credit should still be found to be exempt on the basis that it constitutes, essentially, a form of public assistance benefit under the Michigan Social Welfare Act, MCL 400.1 et seq. This argument too is without merit.
It is true, as our Supreme Court has recognized, that the homestead property tax credit primarily benefits senior citizens, veterans, the blind or disabled, or those with low incomes. Butcher v. Dep't of Treasury, 425 Mich. 262, 274, 389 N.W.2d 412 (1986). However, even the very wealthy are potentially entitled to some benefit from the homestead property tax credit program. They may claim the credit on their tax returns just as any *449 other property owner or renter may, subject to a limitation on the percentage they may claim depending on their incomes. MCL 206.520(8), 206.522. In light of this fact, the credit cannot be considered a form of public assistance benefit. Thus, this argument, too, is without merit.
In summary, the circuit court committed error mandating reversal when it found that defendant's homestead property tax credit was exempt from garnishment. These funds, although arguably originally derived from Social Security benefits, did not retain their exempt status because their character changed once they were spent. Moreover, a homestead property tax credit is not a form of public assistance relief.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
METER, J., concurred.
FORT HOOD, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that defendant failed to make payments on her Montgomery Ward and Saks Fifth Avenue credit cards. Plaintiff alleged that it purchased the outstanding accounts, and defendant failed to make periodic payments. On May 5, 2000, plaintiff obtained a default judgment against defendant in the amount of $1,738.63 to cover the outstanding balance, interest, and costs. To recover the judgment amount, plaintiff sought writs of garnishment directed to Huron River Credit Union and Michigan's Department of Treasury. Defendant objected to the garnishment, alleging that her only sources of income were exempt from garnishment. Specifically, defendant alleged that she was disabled, had received Social Security disability payments since 1984, and the payments were used to pay her rent. Her other source of income consisted of adoption support subsidies from the state. Defendant alleged that the funds constituted exempt property and that exempt property did not lose its exempt status when deposited into a bank account.
The district court held a hearing and denied the objections to the garnishment directed to the state treasury department.[1] On appeal, the circuit court reversed the district court's holding, concluding that the homestead property tax credit was exempt from garnishment. This Court granted plaintiff's application for leave to appeal.
Issues of statutory construction present questions of law that are reviewed de novo. Cruz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 466 Mich. 588, 594, 648 N.W.2d 591 (2002). The goal of statutory construction is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature by examining the most reliable evidence of its intent, the words of the statute. Neal v. Wilkes, 470 Mich. 661, 665, 685 N.W.2d 648 (2004). If the statutory language is unambiguous, appellate courts presume that the Legislature intended the plainly expressly meaning and further judicial construction is neither permitted nor required. DiBenedetto v. West Shore Hosp., 461 Mich. 394, 402, 605 N.W.2d 300 (2000).
Federal law limits the transfer and acquisition of disability insurance benefits:
The right of any person to any future payment under this subchapter shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this subchapter shall be subject to execution, *450 levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law. [42 USC 407(a).]
Despite the federal statute holding that disability insurance benefits are not subject to garnishment and despite the fact that defendant's rent was paid through receipt of these benefits, plaintiff alleges that it may garnish the Homestead Property Tax Credit on the basis of the following statute:
The state treasurer shall intercept a state tax refund or credit that is subject to a writ of garnishment served upon the state treasurer pursuant to section 4061. [MCL 600.4061a(1).... (Emphasis added).]
Although MCL 600.4061a provides that it is applicable to a state refund or credit, the plain language of the homestead property tax credit statute expressly provides "Only the renter or lessee shall claim a credit on property that is rented or leased as a homestead." MCL 206.520(5). See Neal, supra at 665, 685 N.W.2d 648 (The task in construing a statute is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.).
The tax credit retains its essence or quality as money only if it was not invested or utilized for a subsequent purchase. In Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U.S. 245, 246, 57 S.Ct. 443, 81 L.Ed. 623 (1937), the petitioner was appointed the guardian of a war veteran with claims against the United States for unpaid compensation and insurance. The petitioner initially listed the property of his ward when reporting taxes, but the tax paid was refunded on the basis of a ruling of the state attorney general. Consequently, the petitioner, in subsequent years, did not list or pay taxes on property of the ward. After five years, the respondent tax official assessed the ward's property for that period. The property consisted of deposits in banks and real estate loans, although the issue of the loans was resolved before appeal. The parties stipulated that the "deposits in bank" consisted of collections from warrants or checks drawn and issued by the federal government. Id. at 247, 57 S.Ct. 443. These collections were deposited into the bank by the guardian and constituted "unexpended and uninvested balances." Id. The petitioner paid the taxes under protest and demanded a refund, which demand was refused. Id.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the collection of taxes and, in doing so, made a distinction between a deposit or credit of money and an investment:
The state court found no distinction with respect to taxability "between stocks and bonds, and notes and bank deposits and other solvent credits." Amplifying this position, counsel for respondent at this bar, while conceding that the warrants or checks issued by the Government would be exempt, and that if they were cashed the moneys thus received would likewise be exempt until they were invested, contended that if the guardian instead of cashing the warrants or checks deposited them in bank, the resulting bank credits would be taxable. We think that this contention is inadmissible. Congress has declared that the payments of benefits by the Government shall be exempt not only before but "after receipt by the beneficiary." We cannot conceive that it was the intent of Congress that the veteran should lose the benefit of this immunity, which would attach to the moneys in his hands, by depositing the government warrants or checks in bank to be collected and credited in the usual manner. These payments are intended primarily for the maintenance and support of the veteran. To that end neither he nor his guardian is obliged to keep *451 the moneys on his person or under his roof. As the immunity from taxation is continued after the payments are received, the usual methods of receipt must be deemed available so that the amounts paid by the Government may be properly safeguarded and used as the needs of the veteran may require.

The provision of the [World War Veterans Act as amended in] 1935 that the exemption should not apply to property purchased out of the moneys received from the Government shows the intent to deny exemption to investments, as was ruled in the Trotter case [Trotter v. Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354, 54 S.Ct. 138, 78 L.Ed. 358 (1933)]. It is of course true that deposits in bank may be made under a special agreement by which the deposits assume the character of investments and would lose immunity accordingly. No such agreement is shown here. Nor are the bank balances shown to be the proceeds of investments. They are stipulated to be "uninvested balances" of the government payments. Some reference was made at the bar to the possible effect of an allowance of interest upon bank deposits. It does not appear that there was such an allowance in this instance and we do not suggest that a mere allowance of interest upon deposits would be enough to destroy an immunity where it would otherwise attach. We hold that the immunity from taxation does attach to bank credits of the veteran or his guardian which do not represent or flow from his investments but result from the deposit of the warrants or checks received from the Government when such deposits are made in the ordinary manner so that the proceeds of the collection are subject to draft upon demand for the veteran's use.... [Lawrence, supra at 249-250, 57 S.Ct. 443 (emphasis added).]
In the present case, defendant utilized her Social Security benefits to pay rent and the payment of rent resulted in the homestead property tax credit, a credit issued from the state that was not yet expended by defendant. Defendant did not have other revenue sources with which to commingle her tax credit. Moreover, plaintiff does not allege any entitlement to the adoption subsidies. Defendant did not invest the credit. Therefore, she was not required to keep the money in her hands or under her roof in order to maintain the exemption benefit of 42 USC 407. Consequently, I would affirm the circuit court decision.
NOTES
[1]  The parties resolved the writ of garnishment directed to the credit union account, and it is not at issue on appeal.


200 Cal.App.3d 1375 (1988)
246 Cal. Rptr. 587
JOSEPH GALLO, Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY, Respondent; KIM SHERRY, Real Party in Interest.
Docket No. H004085.
Court of Appeals of California, Sixth District.
May 4, 1988.
*1377 COUNSEL
David J. Stock, Stephen P. McCarthy and Mitchell & Stock for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Devereaux Rendler and Frank A. Jelinch for Real Party in Interest.
OPINION
CAPACCIOLI, J.
(1a) This petition for a writ of mandate or prohibition raises the issue whether a recent statute of limitations, Code of Civil Procedure section 340.3,[1] which extends the time to sue for damages due to commission of a felony offense until one year after judgment of conviction of the crime, applies retroactively to revive personal injury causes that were already barred when the new statute became effective. We conclude that it does not, hence will issue the writ of mandate to direct the respondent court to sustain petitioner's demurrer to that part of real party in interest's complaint which is barred by limitations.
Plaintiff and real party in interest Kim Sherry sued defendant and petitioner Joseph Gallo for assault and battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, premises liability, and conversion. She filed her complaint June 22, 1987. Gallo demurred on the basis of section 340, subdivision (3) (one year) for the personal injury torts, and section 338, subdivision 3 (three years) for the conversion.
Sherry alleged that over a period of several months Gallo beat and sexually abused her and took her property by force and intimidation. These acts occurred at the latest in April 1982.
*1378 On November 13, 1986, Gallo was convicted of multiple felony charges based on the same acts Sherry alleged in her complaint, including assault, criminal attempt to dissuade a witness from testifying, extortion, and false imprisonment. Sherry argued that the convictions of extortion arose from the alleged tortious conversions, and the convictions of forcible offenses similarly arose from the alleged personal injuries.
Sherry contends that section 340.3 has extended the period of limitations within which she must file her claims. Section 340.3, an urgency statute which took effect on September 20, 1983, was enacted in implementation of Proposition 8 (the Victims' Bill of Rights, Cal. Const., art. I, § 28). It provides that the period of limitations for an action for damages based on commission of a felony offense shall be at least one year after judgment of conviction of the crime. Sherry filed her complaint within a year of pronouncement of Gallo's convictions. Holding the action timely within section 340.3, the trial court overruled Gallo's demurrer. Gallo seeks a writ of mandate to dismiss the action.

DISCUSSION
On the date that section 340.3 became effective, the one-year period of limitations had already expired as to Sherry's personal injury and related allegations which are subject to the one-year statute. (The last alleged act occurred in April 1982 and the statute became effective in September 1983.) However, the three-year period for the conversions had not yet expired. When the complaint was filed June 22, 1987, all relevant periods of limitations had elapsed, unless extended by section 340.3.
(2) California law is unsettled regarding whether the Legislature may make a statute of limitations retroactive in the sense that it revives a claim which is already time-barred. (See, e.g., Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Cranston (1962) 58 Cal.2d 462, 465 [24 Cal. Rptr. 851, 374 P.2d 819, 98 A.L.R.2d 298]; Mudd v. McColgan (1947) 30 Cal.2d 463, 467-468 [183 P.2d 10]; Singer Co. v. County of Kings (1975) 46 Cal. App.3d 852, 866-867 [121 Cal. Rptr. 398].) However, as a rule of statutory construction, it is established that an enlargement of limitations operates prospectively unless the statute expressly provides otherwise. (Mudd, supra, and Douglas Aircraft, supra; see also Carr v. State of California (1976) 58 Cal. App.3d 139, 147 [129 Cal. Rptr. 730]; 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Actions, § 332, pp. 361-363.) The reason for this rule is a judicial perception of unfairness in reviving a cause after the prospective defendant has assumed its expiration and has conducted his affairs accordingly. A parallel doctrine, based on similar fairness considerations, applies in construing criminal statutes of limitations; the period to prosecute may only be extended before it expires *1379 and not, to paraphrase Judge Learned Hand, after the chase is over. (See Falter v. United States (2d Cir.1928) 23 F.2d 420, 425-426: "Certainly it is one thing to revive a prosecution already dead, and another to give it a longer lease of life. The question turns upon how much violence is done to our instinctive feelings of justice and fair play. For the state to assure a man that he has become safe from its pursuit, and thereafter to withdraw its assurance, seems to most of us unfair and dishonest. But, while the chase is on, it does not shock us to have it extended beyond the time first set, or, if it does, the stake forgives it.")
(1b) Section 340.3 contains no express language saying whether or not it applies retroactively. Under general principles of California law, discussed above, we must construe it not to apply retroactively to revive already barred causes of action, unless some other principle, such as special rules for applying Proposition 8 (Cal. Const., art I, § 28), changes the general rule.
In general, the courts have not retroactively applied the various statutes enacted to implement Proposition 8. (People v. Smith (1983) 34 Cal.3d 251, 261-262 [193 Cal. Rptr. 692, 667 P.2d 149]; People v. Forster (1985) 169 Cal. App.3d 519, 525 [215 Cal. Rptr. 218].) For example, one decision states that if Proposition 8 imposed a duty on a government entity to respond in tort damages, that duty was not retroactive. (Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Dist. (1986) 186 Cal. App.3d 707, 721-722 [230 Cal. Rptr. 823] [considering whether the "safe schools" provision of Prop. 8 confers liability on a school district to respond in damages for an assault on a student].)
The only decision to date which has applied any statute implementing Proposition 8 retroactively is Wood v. McGovern (1985) 167 Cal. App.3d 772 [213 Cal. Rptr. 498]. That decision considered section 1021.4 which authorizes an award of attorneys fees in a personal injury action arising out of the commission of a felony. That statute, like section 340.3 here, was enacted as an urgency measure in September 1983 in implementation of Proposition 8. (See Wood, supra, fn. 5, at p. 774.) The Wood court held that because section 1021.4 is a statute providing for attorneys fees, it is procedural and applies retroactively. The court based its ruling on the solidly established body of precedent which holds generally that an attorneys' fees statute applies to pending legal proceedings, even when the statute becomes effective after the occurrence of the underlying event. (See Wood v. McGovern, supra, at p. 775, and decisions there cited.) Attorneys' fees statutes create no new causes of action and affect only the amount of damages. (Ibid.) They are viewed as ancillary to the underlying causes. Accordingly such statutes are routinely applied retroactively. The Wood court also determined *1380 that such retroactive application of section 1021.4 in the civil action did not have the effect of an impermissible ex post facto punishment.
Here, however, the underlying general body of precedent regarding changes in periods of limitations does not favor retrospectivity but instead, as stated above, presumes that periods of limitations once expired may not be revived except by express statutory language to that effect.
However, there is some decisional uncertainty in applicable California law. Cases in two areas  (1) elimination of the claims filing requirement in inverse condemnation cases and, (2) postponement of the accrual date of causes arising from asbestos-related injuries  have applied extensions of limitations retroactively. The leading asbestos decision is Nelson v. Flintkote Co. (1985) 172 Cal. App.3d 727 [218 Cal. Rptr. 562]. That case dealt with section 340.2, effective January 1, 1980, a special statute of limitations for asbestos-related injuries, postponing accrual of the cause of action until the later of one year after discovery of the injury or disablement. In Nelson, the plaintiff was not yet disabled when he filed suit. He discovered his injury in 1976, more than one year before enactment of the statute, and did not file his complaint until 1981: within one year of enactment of the statute; before disability; but more than one year after discovery of the injury. The court said the cause was not barred. Specific language in the enacting legislation applied the statute to causes which "have not otherwise been extinguished by operation of law." (Nelson, supra, at p. 730.) The court in Nelson reasoned that extinguishment in this sense does not mean expiration of a limitations period but rather means a court has decided that the matter is barred. The court also presented extensive public policy considerations why the statute should be liberally construed to preserve the rights of asbestos victims, who suffer a slow-acting, insidious process, making application of a one-year statute unfair. The decision concluded that the statute applied to all claims not yet adjudicated before the statutory effective date.
Nelson described its holding as not extending a limitations period, but rather, postponing its commencement. "Since there had been no extinguishment, there is no problem of an impermissible retroactive revival of a barred cause of action impairing defendants' vested rights. Indeed, we note that section 340.2 does not even really involve an extension of the prior statute's one-year period of limitation. Rather, it adopts a different standard for accrual, postponing the commencement of the running of the one-year limitation." (Nelson, supra, 172 Cal. App.3d at pp. 732-733.) This is an argument that only a lawyer could love; it rests on semantics rather than on reason.
Nelson follows other decisions similarly applying the special statute of limitations for asbestosis. (Puckett v. Johns-Manville Corp. (1985) 169 *1381 Cal. App.3d 1010 [215 Cal. Rptr. 726]; Blakey v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App.3d 101 [200 Cal. Rptr. 52].)
It may have been significant to the result in Nelson that the judiciary rather than the Legislature created the doctrine that a cause of action for asbestos-related injury accrues upon discovery of the injury. (See Velasquez v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. (1979) 97 Cal. App.3d 881, 888 [159 Cal. Rptr. 113].) Theoretically nothing prevented other Courts of Appeal from reaching different results. An appellate court could have independently reached the same conclusion ultimately reached by the Legislature, that accrual does not occur until the later of discovery or disablement. Therefore there was some basis for the Nelson court's conclusion that an asbestos victim's cause of action could not be accurately considered to be time-barred until a court had decided the issue as to him. The situation is different here; we deal with a statutory period of limitations, a clear-cut statewide rule which, in the understanding of most reasonable men, extinguishes the cause after the statutory period has elapsed.
The claim-filing cases are City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1977) 73 Cal. App.3d 509 [142 Cal. Rptr. 292], and Wedding v. People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation (1979) 88 Cal. App.3d 719 [152 Cal. Rptr. 181], both retroactively applying Government Code section 905.1 which eliminated the claim-filing requirement in inverse condemnation cases. These decisions hold that a claim-filing requirement is procedural and its elimination operates retroactively. The action is not "barred" when the period to file a claim expires because no judicial determination has yet been made as to the date of the taking in inverse condemnation, which is the crucial event triggering the period to file. Indeed, the uncertainty of that date was a reason why the Legislature decided to eliminate the claim-filing requirement altogether, as the cases cited above point out.
Nelson cited the theoretical rationale of these claim-filing cases in arriving at its conclusion that a cause is not extinguished until it has been judicially adjudicated. However, there are important distinguishing factors between claim-filing requirements and statutes of limitations. Decisions dealing with claim-filing requirements have been far more liberal than limitations cases in permitting exceptions to the rules of timeliness. For example, the decision in Gutierrez v. Mofid (1985) 39 Cal.3d 892 [218 Cal. Rptr. 313, 705 P.2d 886], holding that the "excusable neglect" which would justify relief from the claim statute did not suffice to toll the medical malpractice statute of limitations, had this to say: "However, the claim-statute relief provisions addressed in Ebersol [Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.3d 427 (197 Cal. Rptr. 601, 673 P.2d 271)] are fundamentally distinct from the statute of limitations at issue here. The 100-day government claim requirement is an obstacle *1382 in addition to the normal limitations period applicable to the tort alleged. Because the claim period is so short, and because lay persons may have no idea of its existence, it looms as a trap for the unwary. Realizing this, the Legislature has devised a remedial scheme for relief from this harsh and technical deadline where justice requires.... [¶] By contrast, the one-year limitations period for medical malpractice ... begins to run upon discovery, actual or constructive, of an `injury,' that is, an abnormal condition and its negligent cause. The period expires inexorably one year later, and the Legislature has made no provision for relief on general grounds of `excusable neglect' to file suit on time." (Gutierrez v. Mofid, supra, at pp. 901-902.)
Claim-filing periods are typically short. On the other hand, a statute of limitations traditionally plays a valid role in laying stale causes to rest and providing finality and repose without need for any court adjudication. (See, e.g., Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency (1944) 321 U.S. 342 [88 L.Ed. 788, 64 S.Ct. 582]; Shain v. Sresovich (1894) 104 Cal. 402, 406 [38 P. 51]; Scherer v. Mark (1976) 64 Cal. App.3d 834, 844 [135 Cal. Rptr. 90]; see discussion in 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Actions, § 309, pp. 338-339.) The reasoning of a decision like Nelson undercuts those considerations and rests basically on a desire to avoid time limits at all costs, because the court perceives them as unfair.
An additional distinction between the above-cited claim-filing cases and the present case is that the date of accrual of a personal injury cause is normally not as uncertain as that of an inverse condemnation cause. There is no indication here that any difficulty in ascertaining the accrual date of the crime victim's cause of action played a role in motivating enactment of the statute we consider, section 340.3.
In addition to relying on decisions such as Nelson and Wedding, supra, Sherry also cites the recent decision in Newman v. Newman (1987) 196 Cal. App.3d 255 [241 Cal. Rptr. 712]. However, that decision is not apposite. There an ex-wife shot her husband, later pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity and was committed. The lawsuit was filed more than one year after the injury but within nine months of the enactment of section 340.3. The court held that the ex-husband's cause was barred by the one-year statute. The court said that section 340.3 cannot apply to cases where the defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity because no conviction is possible in such cases. Aside from its refusal to apply section 340.3 across the board in favor of all conceivable crime victims, Newman has no relevance to this case.
Sherry argues the legislative goal in enacting section 340.3 was to provide maximum restitution to felony victims, and therefore retrospectivity must *1383 have been intended here. The enactment of the statute as an urgency measure, she argues, also supports this interpretation. She also quotes at length from the legislative history of the bill. However, none of this material specifically addresses the question of retrospectivity.
It is a jump in logic to argue, as she does, that just because the statute was intended to lengthen the applicable statute of limitations for injuries inflicted by felons, therefore the Legislature also intended to revive already expired causes. These are different matters. Further, the Legislature has used explicit language elsewhere when it intended a limitations period to take effect even for otherwise time-barred lawsuits; see, e.g., section 340.1, subdivision (e)(1), extending the period of limitations for child abuse within a family to, inter alia, actions "which would be barred by application of the period of limitation applicable prior to January 1, 1987." Section 340.3 contains no such express language.
(3) Sherry finally argues there is no constitutional impediment to retrospective application of this statute reviving a civil cause of action. That position is probably correct. (See Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson (1945) 325 U.S. 304 [89 L.Ed. 1628, 65 S.Ct. 1137], discussed in Witkin supra, at § 332, pp. 361-363.) A potential defendant has no vested right in the sense of repose conferred by his knowledge a lawsuit against him appears to be barred. The issue is one of fairness and of statutory construction, rather than constitutional right.
(4) In addition to these legal arguments, Sherry also says Gallo is estopped from raising the bar of limitations because he intimidated her into not filing the lawsuit and she was afraid to sue until after he was convicted. However, that argument is not to be found in the complaint by way of factual allegations or otherwise, nor, in her opposition to the demurrer, did Sherry request leave to amend to allege the basis of an estoppel.
(5) The conversion cause of action is arguably based on acts underlying the convictions of extortion. That cause was still alive when section 340.3 was enacted, since the limitations period is three years for that tort. Accordingly the statutory extension provided by section 340.3 does apply to that cause and the complaint is timely as to those claims. (1c) However, the torts subject to the one-year statute of limitations were barred before the effective date of section 340.3. The trial court should have sustained the demurrer as to those causes.
Real party in interest has been notified that a peremptory writ in the first instance could be issued here, and she has filed opposition. The peremptory writ of mandate will issue in the first instance. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1088; *1384 Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 177-182 [203 Cal. Rptr. 626, 681 P.2d 893].)

DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the respondent court to sustain petitioner's demurrer to those portions of the complaint subject to the one-year statute of limitations. Each party shall bear his or her own costs in this proceeding.
Agliano, P.J., and Brauer, J., concurred.
NOTES
[1]  All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise stated.