991 S.W.2d 226 (1999)
Nathan BREWER, Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
LINCOLN BRASS WORKS, INC., Defendant/Appellant.
Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Nashville.
April 12, 1999.
Rehearing Denied June 14, 1999.
*227 Mark C. Travis, Cookeville, for Appellant.
Jay R. Slobey, Nashville, for Appellee.

OPINION
HOLDER, J.
We granted this appeal to address whether Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-231 precludes an enlargement of an award under § 50-6-241(a)(2) when the original award was paid in a lump sum. Upon review, we hold that a lump sum award may later be enlarged if the criteria in § 241(a)(2) are satisfied. We further hold that § 241(a)(2) is not applicable when there is either a subsequent injury or an aggravation of the original injury which increases a worker's anatomical disability.

BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Nathan Brewer, began working for the defendant, Lincoln Brass Works, Inc. ("Lincoln"), in 1991. Mr. Brewer sustained a work-related injury to his back in December of 1992. He underwent two laminectomies as the result of the 1992 injury. He returned to work for Lincoln in August of 1993 at a wage equal to or greater than his pre-injury wage.
Mr. Brewer was assessed a 15 percent anatomical disability rating. Mr. Brewer received workers' compensation benefits based on a 37.5 percent permanent partial impairment to the body as a whole, with Lincoln's liability capped by the 2.5 multiplier in Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a)(1).[1] The award was paid in lump sum.
*228 Mr. Brewer continued working at Lincoln for approximately ten months after his return to employment in August of 1993. He initially returned to a line job, which required sitting and repetitive stretching, bending, and twisting. He stated that the line job aggravated his back and caused his "leg to go numb." He then transferred to a janitorial position, but his pain became increasingly unbearable. His last day at work was June 20, 1994. Lincoln, however, stipulated that he was still an employee of Lincoln as of March 20, 1996.
Mr. Brewer was referred to an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Allen. Dr. Allen diagnosed Mr. Brewer in September of 1994 as having a "very large recurring disc rupture at the L4-5 level." Dr. Allen opined that Mr. Brewer's prior surgeries to the L4-5 region rendered the disc "more susceptible to rupture." Dr. Allen, however, further testified that:
I think the natural progression, degeneration takes some trauma to take place, whether it's trauma that is incidental twisting, turning, standing, sitting, rolling over in bed, sneezing, coughing, but presumably some trauma, even if it's noteven if it's not something you can put a finger on and say this is the episode, but some trauma would be necessary to break this piece of disc loose and allow it to come out through the hole.
Dr. Allen performed a laminectomy on Mr. Brewer on January 9, 1995, and a second laminectomy on June 2, 1995. Dr. Allen testified that both the January and the June surgeries increased Mr. Brewer's anatomical impairment.
Mr. Brewer filed a petition for increased workers' compensation benefits pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a)(2).[2] The petition alleged he was no longer "able to function in his previous employment" following the 1994 disc rupture and requested an enlargement of the 1992 award. The trial court awarded Mr. Brewer increased benefits. The workers' compensation panel reversed the trial court, finding:
1. Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-231 provides that lump sum payments shall be final and precludes increased benefits under § 241(a)(2) if the original award was paid in lump sum;
2. the petition for increased benefits was time barred because it was not filed within one year of June 20, 1994, the last day Brewer reported to work; and
3. the trial court failed to render specific findings of fact as required by § 50-6-241(c).
We granted review.

ANALYSIS
An employer's workers' compensation liability is capped at 2.5 times the anatomical impairment rating when the employer returns an injured employee to work at a wage equal to or greater than the wage at the time of the injury. Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a)(1).[3] If, however, *229 the employer's attempts to accommodate an injured worker become futile, the worker may file for increased benefits under Tenn.Code Ann. § 241(a)(2). Pursuant to § 241(a)(2), a court may enlarge a workers' compensation award that was previously capped by the 2.5 multiplier in § 241(a)(1). Among the factors for consideration for enlargement of an award under § 241(a)(2) are the "employee's age, education, skills and training, local job opportunities, and capacity to work at types of employment available in the claimant's disabled condition." Increased anatomical impairments and subsequent injuries are not factors for consideration under § 241(a)(2). The focus is purely on the issue of industrial disability.
A petition to enlarge a previous award under § 50-6-241(a)(2) is not the appropriate vehicle to use when a worker sustains additional injuries or additional anatomical impairment. A § 241(a)(2) petition is proper when the injured worker attempts to return to work but the original work-related disability later renders the injured worker unemployable with the pre-injury employer. Section 241(a)(2) then allows the injured worker to receive a new industrial disability rating when the employer's attempts to accommodate the worker fail. The new disability rating is not limited by the § 241(a)(1) cap and is based on the worker's previous anatomical impairment rating. We hold that if the worker, however, sustains additional impairment, whether caused by a subsequent work-related injury or work-related aggravation injury or aggravation of the original injury, the worker must file a new claim for workers' compensation rather than attempting to enlarge a previous award under § 241(a)(2).
Mr. Brewer received an award of 37.5 percent attributable to his 1992 work-related injury to his lower back. He subsequently aggravated or re-injured his lower back. Expert testimony established that the aggravation or re-injury caused additional anatomical impairment. Accordingly, Mr. Brewer's claim should have been filed as a new and separate action for workers' compensation benefits.

LUMP SUM PROVISION
We granted this appeal to address whether Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-231 prohibits petitions to enlarge previous awards under § 241(a)(2). Pursuant to § 231, "[a]ll amounts paid by the employer and received by the employee ... by lump sum payments, shall be final...." Section 241(a)(2) permits an injured worker whose workers' compensation benefits were capped by § 241(a)(1) to seek an enlargement of the capped award "in appropriate cases where the employee is no longer employed by the pre-injury employer...." Our holding that Mr. Brewer's cause of action cannot be sustained under § 241(a)(2) has rendered this issue moot. We, however, will address this important legal issue.
Initially, we note that statutes shall be construed in light of the purposes the legislature intended to accomplish by their passage. Business Brokerage Ctr. v. Dixon, 874 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tenn.1994). Section 241 was codified to promote uniformity in workers' compensation awards. Brown v. Campbell County Bd. of Educ., 915 S.W.2d 407, 414 (Tenn.1995). Permitting enlargement of awards ordered paid in periodic payments but not lump sum awards is inconsistent with § 241's policy of promoting uniformity of awards.
The language in § 241 provides an avenue for an enlargement of awards without regard to whether the original award was paid in lump sum or periodic payments. Section 241 was codified after the codification of § 231. Where two statutes conflict and cannot be reconciled, the prior act will be repealed or amended by implication to the extent of the inconsistency between the two statutes. Steinhouse v. Neal, 723 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Tenn.1987); State v. Moore, 722 S.W.2d 367, 374 (Tenn.1986). Specific statutory provisions generally *230 prevail over general provisions when there is a conflict between statutes. Tenn.Code Ann. § 1-3-103; see also Moore, 722 S.W.2d at 374; State v. Nelson, 577 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Tenn.Crim.App.1978). Accordingly, we hold that § 241(a)(2) controls over the provisions of § 231 to the extent the two statutes conflict. A petition under § 241(a)(2) is not prohibited in a case where the original workers' compensation award sought to be enlarged was paid in lump sum.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Mr. Brewer suffered increased pain while working and was unable to continue working in June of 1994. He was referred to Dr. Allen who performed a myelogram in September of 1994 The results of the myelogram revealed a "large recurrent disc rupture at the L4-5 level." Accordingly, the full nature and extent of his injury was not manifested until Dr. Allen discovered the ruptured disc. See Union Carbide Corp. v. Cannon, 523 S.W.2d 360 (Tenn.1975) (holding limitations period began to accrue upon discovery of the herniated disc and not from the date of the accident). Mr. Brewer's statute of limitations for a new claim of workers' compensation began to accrue upon the September 1994 discovery date.

CONCLUSION
The plaintiff's petition for an enlargement of a previous award is dismissed. The plaintiff's remaining issue concerning the trial court's findings under § 241(c) has been rendered moot. Our analysis of the application of § 241, however, addressed an issue of first impression, and the defendant has not been prejudiced by lack of timely notice of Mr. Brewer's attempt to obtain additional workers' compensation benefits. The plaintiff's cause of action is, therefore, dismissed without prejudice. Costs of this appeal shall be taxed against the plaintiff for which execution may issue if necessary.
ANDERSON, C.J., BIRCH and BARKER, JJ., and TIPTON, Special Justice, concur.
DROWOTA, J., Not Participating.
NOTES
[1]  "For injuries arising on or after August 1, 1992, in cases where an injured employee is eligible to receive any permanent partial disability benefits, ... and the pre-injury employer returns the employee to employment at a wage equal to or greater than the wage the employee was receiving at the time of injury, the maximum permanent partial disability award that the employee may receive is two and one-half (2½) times the medical impairment rating.... In making determinations, the court shall consider all pertinent factors, including lay and expert testimony, employee's age, education, skills and training, local job opportunities, and capacity to work at types of employment available in claimant's disabled condition."
[2]  "[T]he courts may reconsider upon the filing of a new cause of action the issue of industrial disability. Such reconsideration shall examine all pertinent factors, including lay and expert testimony, employee's age, education, skills and training, local job opportunities, and capacity to work at types of employment available in claimant's disabled condition. Such reconsideration may be made in appropriate cases where the employee is no longer employed by the pre-injury employer and makes application to the appropriate court within one (1) year of the employee's loss of employment...."
[3]  Awards limited by the 2.5 multiplier may or may not be an accurate reflection of vocational disability. For instance, an injured worker may have sustained a 20 percent anatomical impairment. If the injured worker is returned to work at his prior wage, the employer's liability is limited at 50 percent even if expert testimony indicates that the injured worker's vocational disability is 90 percent.


                             UNPUBLISHED

                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                       FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                             No. 01-8076

DONNELL S. BYRD,

                                           Petitioner - Appellant,

          versus

RONALD ANGELONE,

                                            Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. Ellis, III, District
Judge. (CA-01-1666-AM)

Submitted:   June 20, 2002                 Decided:   June 25, 2002

Before MICHAEL and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Donnell S. Byrd, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:

     Donnell S. Byrd seeks to appeal the district court’s order

denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West

1994 & Supp. 2001).   We have reviewed the record and the district

court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny

a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the

reasoning of the district court. Byrd v. Angelone, No. CA-01-1666-

AM (E.D. Va. filed Nov. 13, 2001 & entered Nov. 15, 2001).      We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                         DISMISSED

                                 2


                             UNPUBLISHED

                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                      FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                             No. 08-1463

In Re:   LOUISE BURTON-ALSTON,

                Debtor.

-------------------------------------

FELICIA SPRINCENATU,

                Plaintiff - Appellant,

           v.

RICHARD M. HUTSON, II, Trustee,

                Trustee - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. James A. Beaty, Jr., Chief
District Judge. (1:06-cv-00765-JAB; BK-97-16333)

Submitted:   July 31, 2008                 Decided:   August 7, 2008

Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Felicia Sprincenatu, Appellant Pro Se.     Benjamin Eric Lovell,
CHAPTER 13 OFFICE DURHAM, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

          Felicia Sprincenatu appeals the district court’s order

adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss her

appeal from the bankruptcy court’s orders denying her motion to

reopen the underlying bankruptcy proceeding.   We have reviewed the

record and find no reversible error.   Accordingly, we affirm for

the reasons stated by the district court.   Sprincenatu v. Hutson,

Nos. 1:06-cv-00765-JAB; BK-97-16333 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 19, 2008).   We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                          AFFIRMED

                              - 2 -


487 S.E.2d 447 (1997)
226 Ga. App. 659
CARSON
v.
CARSON.
No. A97A1074.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
June 3, 1997.
Katrina L. Breeding, Atlanta, for appellant.
M.V. Booker, Washington, for appellee.
BIRDSONG, Presiding Judge.
Appellant/defendant Vera Mapp Carson appeals from the final order of divorce, entered by the superior court, as to the limited appellate issues of lack of an award of attorney fees, regarding post-temporary hearing representation, and from the superior court's modification and changing of the terms of a previous order entered for payment of temporary attorney fees. Appellant did not request and the appellate record does not include a transcript of either the temporary hearing at which temporary attorney fees were originally awarded or that portion of the trial record containing the subsequent hearing pertaining to attorney fees.
Appellee/plaintiff Stanley Carson filed for divorce; service initially was not completed. *448 Appellant, through present counsel, filed a motion to dismiss upon special appearance; a hearing was held and the motion denied. Fifteen months after filing the divorce complaint, appellee executed out-of-state service on appellant; appellant filed an answer and a rule nisi was filed setting a date for a temporary hearing. Appellant then filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the out-of-state service had been defective and that a reconciliation of the marital status had occurred. Appellee responded by filing an amendment to divorce and served it on appellant on the day of filing. Appellant filed an amendment to the answer to the complaint for divorce and in the alternative an answer to the amendment to the complaint for divorce, a demand for jury trial and an amendment to the motion to dismiss. Upon hearing on the motion, an order was entered denying appellant's motion. Thereafter, a temporary hearing was held to determine issues of custody, child support, alimony and attorney fees. The hearing judge entered an order which, in part, awarded appellant temporary attorney fees in the amount of $2,000 payable within 60 days. Appellee objected to the award and to other portions of the order and filed a motion for reconsideration; one of the several issues presented therein was the award of attorney fees. Appellant filed a response to the reconsideration motion. The case was tried by jury. Prior to the return of the verdict, appellant moved for additional attorney fees for post-temporary hearing representation. After the verdict but prior to the entry of final judgment, appellant requested a written finding on the issue of the additional attorney fees. Judgment was entered; however, no written finding was made on the issue of additional attorney fees and the award of $2,000 temporary attorney fees was modified to extend the due date to one year and eight months (payable in $100 monthly installments). Held:
1. Appellant's brief contains references to item numbers in the index to the record rather than direct cites to the page of the record to which appellant is referring. Court of Appeals Rule 27(a)(1), requiring "a citation of such parts of the record or transcript essential to a consideration of the errors complained of," means that page citations to the trial record and transcript shall be provided. References to index items do not meet these requirements and diminishes this Court's ability to find rapidly critical documents and testimony in records and transcripts; such practice should be discontinued forthwith.
2. Appellant contends the trial court erred in modifying and changing the terms of the order awarding temporary attorney fees. "This court will not control the discretion of a trial judge in awarding temporary alimony and attorney fees `... unless it can be clearly shown by the appellant that the trial court committed grievous error or a gross abuse of discretion.' [Cit.]" Bowman v. Bowman, 242 Ga. 259, 260, 248 S.E.2d 654; see also Weaver v. Weaver, 263 Ga. 56, 428 S.E.2d 79. Absent the temporary hearing transcript and that portion of the trial transcript pertaining to the award of attorney fees, we cannot determine whether such an abuse occurred. Both error and harm must be shown affirmatively by the record to obtain reversal on appeal. Robinson v. State, 212 Ga.App. 613, 616(2), 442 S.E.2d 901; Whelchel v. Thomas Ford Tractor, 190 Ga. App. 156 (1), 378 S.E.2d 510. Moreover, when a portion of the evidence bearing upon an appellate issue is not brought up so that this Court can make its determination from a consideration of all relevant evidence bearing thereon, an affirmance of that issue must result. Nodvin v. West, 197 Ga.App. 92, 97(3)(c), 397 S.E.2d 581; compare Young v. Young, 227 Ga. 570, 571(1), 181 S.E.2d 867; Marchman v. Head, 135 Ga.App. 475, 477(2), 218 S.E.2d 151, overruled on other grounds, Gen. Recording Corp. v. Chadwick, 136 Ga. App. 213, 214, 220 S.E.2d 697. Appellant has failed to carry her burden as to this enumeration of error.
3. Appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to make findings of fact, as requested, regarding the issue of additional attorney fees (for representation subsequent to the temporary hearing). In view of our holding in Division 2 above, we conclude that had error occurred as asserted in appellant's second enumeration of error that it would be harmless. By failing to provide this Court *449 with the requisite transcripts, we must assume as a matter of law that the trial court's rulings regarding attorney fees were correct and affirm them. See generally Johnson v. State, 261 Ga. 678, 679(2), 409 S.E.2d 500; Nodvin, supra; Attwell v. Heritage Bank, etc., 161 Ga.App. 193, 194, 291 S.E.2d 28; see Young, supra. The mere existence of findings of fact would not change this result. This enumeration as crafted is without merit.
Judgment affirmed.
RUFFIN and ELDRIDGE, JJ., concur.


               NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
                          File Name: 13a1045n.06

                                          No. 12-2627

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT GOSS, Jr.,                )
                                 )                  FILED
     Plaintiff-Appellant,        )                Dec 20, 2013
                                 )           DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
v.                               )
                                 )
ABN AMRO MORTGAGE GROUP, et al., ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
                                 ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
     Defendants-Appellees.       ) EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
                                 )

Before: MOORE, GIBBONS, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.

       JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Robert Lee Goss, Jr. appeals the district court’s

dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the

reasons set forth below, we affirm.

                                                I.

       On July 28, 2005, Goss executed a mortgage loan in the amount of $208,900.00 from ABN

AMRO Mortgage Group, Inc. (“ABN”). As security for the mortgage loan, Goss executed a

promissory note in favor of ABN, secured by a mortgage on real property located at 6263 Malvern,

Troy, Michigan, 48098. The mortgage provided:

       Lender may accept any payment or partial payment insufficient to bring the Loan
       current, without waiver of any rights hereunder or prejudice to its rights to refuse
       such payment or partial payments in the future, but Lender is not obligated to apply
       such payments at the time such payments are accepted.

The mortgage was subsequently serviced by CitiMortgage, Inc. (“CMI”).
       Goss lost his job with an automobile company and fell behind in his mortgage payments.

Goss contacted CMI to seek a loan modification under CMI’s Home Affordable Modification Trial

Program Period Plan (“TPP”). CMI sent Goss a TPP document—“Step One of Two-Step

Documentation Process”—which provided:

       I understand that after I sign and return two copies of this Plan to the Lender, the
       Lender will send me a signed copy of this Plan if I qualify for the Offer or will send
       me written notice that I do not qualify for the Offer. The Plan will not take effect
       unless and until both I and the Lender sign it and Lender provides me with a copy
       of this Plan with the Lender’s signature.

Goss signed the TPP on August 10, 2009; however, CMI never signed the TPP. While the

modification plan was under review, CMI accepted twenty-two payments from Goss for the monthly

payment amount set forth in the TPP. Then, on April 1, 2011, CMI returned a payment for the TPP

payment amount “because it was less than the full amount due to bring [Goss’s] account current.”

CMI determined that Goss did not qualify for a modification and proceeded with foreclosure. On

June 20, 2011, Trott & Trott (Trott), debt collection agents of CMI, sent Goss a letter informing him

of the status of his indebtedness. Goss, through counsel, made a formal request “to engage in

mandatory loss mitigation options . . . pursuant to MCL 600.3205, including an in-person meeting.”

Goss was not afforded an in-person mediation, but rather received a notice of foreclosure from Trott

on September 23, 2011. On October 25, 2011, the mortgaged property was sold at a sheriff’s sale

at the Oakland County Circuit courthouse. The redemption period expired on April 25, 2012. After

the sheriff’s sale, Goss—believing that there was an error given the previous twenty-two payments

he made for the amount in the TPP—made two further payments for that amount in November and

December 2011. CMI accepted these payments.

                                                -2-
       Goss filed a complaint against ABN and CMI on February 2, 2012, in Michigan state court

alleging: that defendants lacked standing and the state court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to

enforce the foreclosure because the subject loan was securitized after origination (Count I); that

ABN defrauded the court by violating Michigan’s recording statutes, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 565.25

and 600.2907a, and wrongfully initiating foreclosure without proper standing to foreclose on the

mortgage (Count II); that Goss had a right to quiet title (Count III); that ABN committed a

fraudulent conveyance in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 565.371 (Count IV); that CMI breached

the contract under the TPP (Count V); that, under promissory estoppel, the court should grant

injunctive relief—to wit, declaring the sheriff’s sale void, enjoining summary proceedings, enforcing

the TPP, and demanding an issuance of a permanent modification (Count VI); that CMI violated

Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3205 by failing to adhere to required conditions before proceeding with

foreclosure (Count VII); and that CMI owed Goss a duty of good faith in servicing Goss’s loan,

breached that duty, and caused Goss to suffer damages such as “the improper default of his mortgage

loan, foreclosure on his home and pain and suffering” (Count VIII).

       CMI removed the case to federal district court and filed a motion to dismiss. Goss filed a

response, and CMI filed a reply. The district court found oral argument unnecessary, resolved the

motion on the briefs, and granted CMI’s motion to dismiss on November 29, 2012. The district

court’s opinion and order is entitled “Opinion and Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment”; however, CMI’s dispositive motion was a motion to dismiss, and the district court

“GRANT[ED] Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss” and made its determination under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6).

       Goss timely filed a notice of appeal.

                                                -3-
                                                   II.

        We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). Top Flight Entm't, Ltd. v. Schuette, 729 F.3d 623, 630 (6th Cir. 2013). Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” “In assessing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), this court construes the complaint

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, and

determines whether the complaint ‘contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Heinrich v. Waiting Angels Adoption Servs., Inc., 668

F.3d 393, 403 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (alteration in

original). “A plaintiff’s complaint must provide ‘more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Courts are not required to accept as true legal conclusions couched as

factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286

(1986)). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level

on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id.

(internal citations omitted). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more

than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that

the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)) (alterations

in original).

        Goss’s complaint raises state-law claims, and CMI removed the action to federal court on

the basis of diversity of citizenship. We therefore apply the substantive law of Michigan and federal

procedural law. Biegas v. Quickway Carriers, Inc., 573 F.3d 365, 374 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Erie

                                                   -4-
R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). In applying Michigan law, we “must ‘follow the decisions

of the state’s highest court when that court has addressed the relevant issue.’” Savedoff v. Access

Grp., Inc., 524 F.3d 754, 762 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Talley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 223

F.3d 323, 326 (6th Cir. 2000)).

        On appeal to this court, Goss has forfeited his claims that defendants lacked standing and that

the state court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce the foreclosure because the subject loan

was securitized after origination (Count I); that ABN committed a fraudulent conveyance in

violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 565.371 (Count IV); and that CMI breached a duty of good faith,

causing Goss’s damages (Count VIII). “Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a) requires that an

appellant’s brief include ‘a statement of the issues presented for review,’ and ‘[a]n argument’ on

each issue presented.” Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 318 (6th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co., 96 F.3d 151, 153 (6th Cir. 1996)) (alteration in original).

“‘An appellant waives an issue when he fails to present it in his initial briefs before this court.’” Id.

(quoting Marks v. Newcourt Credit Grp., Inc., 342 F.3d 444, 462 (6th Cir. 2003)). Because Goss

does not present or argue the claims set forth in Counts I, IV, and VIII of the complaint, he forfeits

them on appeal.

                                                   A.

        In Count V of the complaint, Goss claimed that CMI breached the contract under the TPP.

In Count VI, Goss claimed promissory estoppel and requested injunctive relief. The district court

rejected Goss’s breach of contract claim, citing Voydanoff v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No.

298098, 2011 WL 6757841 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2011), and further held that Goss’s claims for

                                                  -5-
both breach of contract and promissory estoppel are foreclosed by the statute of frauds, Mich. Comp.

Laws § 566.132.

       The TPP is not a binding contract because it was not signed by both Goss and CMI. In

Michigan, a loan modification proposal “d[oes] not ripen into a binding agreement” if the

modification agreement bears the signature of the borrower but not the lender because such a

proposal “does not objectively reflect a meeting of the minds regarding the essential modification

terms.” Voydanoff, 2011 WL 6757841, at *7 (citing Kloian v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 733 N.W.2d

766, 770–71 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006) (stating that “a contract requires mutual assent or a meeting of

the minds on all the essential terms” and that “[a] meeting of the minds is judged by an objective

standard, looking to the express words of the parties and their visible acts”) (internal quotation

marks omitted)). In Voydanoff, the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff’s breach of loan

modification agreement claim because the agreement at issue bore only the plaintiff’s signature. Id.

The district court held that the same rationale and result apply here. We agree and do not find that

Michigan’s highest court would differ from this holding. Cf. City of Grosse Pointe Park v. Mich.

Mun. Liab. & Prop. Pool, 702 N.W.2d 106, 113 (Mich. 2005) (“[I]f the language of the contract is

clear and unambiguous, it is to be construed according to its plain sense and meaning . . .”)

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); Modern Globe, Inc. v. 1425 Lake Drive

Corp., 66 N.W.2d 92, 94 (Mich. 1954) (en banc) (“Considering that the offer made by defendant’s

agent was conditional upon ratification by defendant’s stockholders and that plaintiff, by its agents

. . . , had notice of this fact, the proposed acceptance by [an agent] could not create an enforceable

contract until fulfillment of the condition.”).

                                                  -6-
        This result is consistent with our previous decisions. In Hall v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC,

No. 12-1934, slip op. (6th Cir. May 16, 2013), we distinguished a mortgage-modification agreement

from a Trial Period Plan. See id. at *3. In Hall, the court held that the district court did not err in

dismissing Hall’s breach of contract claim because “the district court correctly concluded that the

TPP that Hall submitted was not a binding contract.” Id. The panel reasoned that “[a]lthough Hall

alleged that he signed the TPP and tendered payment, the TPP was not signed by a representative

from either defendant.” Id. at *3–*4. Several federal district courts have also reached the same

conclusion that trial period plan proposals are not binding modification contracts unless signed by

both the borrower and lender. See, e.g., Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Hassell, No. 11-14564,

2013 WL 823241, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 6, 2013) (“Neither the Trial Plan nor the Partial

Reinstatement Agreement unconditionally promises Plaintiff that her loan would be modified and

neither document is signed by Wells Fargo.”)

        Goss adverts to Bolone v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 858 F. Supp. 2d 825 (E.D. Mich.

2012), Darcy v. CitiFinancial Inc., No. 10-848, 2011 WL 3758805 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2011), and

Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2012), for the proposition that a trial

modification agreement constitutes a contract. These decisions do not bind our determination, and

Bolone and Wigod are distinguishable because the lender signed the Trial Period Plan at issue. See

Wigod, 673 F.3d at 558 (“Wells Fargo then executed the TPP Agreement and sent a copy to [the

borrower]”); Bolone, 858 F. Supp. 2d at 828 (“The representative of Wells Fargo also signed the

TPP . . . .”).

        Furthermore, an initial Trial Period Plan document is not necessarily a promise to modify

a loan. Courts have refused to read such documents as promises to modify a borrower’s loan. See,

                                                 -7-
e.g., Hassell, 2013 WL 823241, at *6; Brady v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. 11-838, 2012 WL

1900606, at *7 (W.D. Mich. May 24, 2012) (“[B]ecause the TPP warns the recipient that it ‘will not

take effect unless and until both [the borrower] and the Lender sign it and Lender provides [the

borrower] with a copy of this Plan with the Lender’s signature,’ no offer is extended until the lender

provides the borrower a copy with the lender’s signature. By providing an executed copy to the

borrower, the lender extends an offer and must provide a modification if the borrower complies with

her obligations. Conversely, no offer exists if the lender fails to provide the borrower a signed

copy.” (alterations in original)); Helmus v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 890 F. Supp. 2d 806, 815 (W.D.

Mich. 2012) (“By its plain terms, the TPP makes it clear that it was not an offer, and would not

become binding on Chase until the contract was signed and returned to Plaintiffs, which it was not.

As a result, there was no offer for Plaintiffs to accept.”).

        The TPP did not furnish Goss with a promise that CMI would modify his loan. When Goss

signed the TPP, he acknowledged that the TPP did not constitute a promise that his mortgage and

note would be modified. Rather, the TPP was only an application for an offer to modify the loan

agreement, provided certain conditions were met. The TPP that Goss signed provides as follows:

        If I have not already done so, I am providing confirmation of the reasons I cannot
        afford my mortgage and documents . . . to determine whether I qualify for the offer
        described in this Plan (the “Offer”). I understand that after I sign and return two
        copies of this Plan to the Lender, the Lender will send me a signed copy of this Plan
        if I qualify for the Offer . . . .

The TPP further provided: “This Plan will not take effect unless and until both I and the Lender sign

it and Lender provides me with a copy of this Plan with the Lender’s signature.” The TPP also

provided:

        I understand that the Plan is not a modification of the Loan Documents and that the
        Loan Documents will not be modified unless and until (i) I meet all of the conditions

                                                  -8-
       required for modification, (ii) I receive a fully executed copy of a Modification
       Agreement, and (iii) the Modification Effective Date has passed.

By its plain terms, the TPP made clear that it is not binding until signed by CMI. Construing the

document according to its plain meaning, as Grosse Pointe instructs, we do not find that the TPP

has “ripen[ed] into a binding agreement.” Voydanoff, 2011 WL 6757841, at *7. Because the TPP

is neither a promise nor a binding contract, Goss cannot make out either his breach of contract claim

or his promissory estoppel claim.

       The district court further held that Goss’s breach of contract claim, as well as his promissory

estoppel claim, are foreclosed by the statute of frauds, Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132. That statute

provides:

       (2) An action shall not be brought against a financial institution to enforce any of the
       following promises or commitments of the financial institution unless the promise
       or commitment is in writing and signed with an authorized signature by the financial
       institution:

               (a) A promise or commitment to lend money, grant or extend credit,
               or make any other financial accommodation.
               (b) A promise or commitment to renew, extend, modify, or permit a
               delay in repayment or performance of a loan, extension of credit, or
               other financial accommodation.
               (c) A promise or commitment to waive a provision of a loan,
               extension of credit, or other financial accommodation.

       (3) As used in subsection (2), “financial institution” means a state or national
       chartered bank, a state or federal chartered savings bank or savings and loan
       association, a state or federal chartered credit union, a person licensed or registered
       under the mortgage brokers, lenders, and servicers licensing act, Act No. 173 of the
       Public Acts of 1987, being sections 445.1651 to 445.1683 of the Michigan Compiled
       Laws, or Act No. 125 of the Public Acts of 1981, being sections 493.51 to 493.81 of
       the Michigan Compiled Laws, or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof.

Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132(2)–(3). As the district court observed, there is no dispute that CMI

is a financial institution, and the premise which forms the basis of Goss’s promissory estoppel claim

                                                 -9-
clearly relates to an alleged promise to modify a loan. Because this alleged promise is not signed

with an authorized signature by CMI, the district court correctly concluded Goss’s promissory

estoppel claim is barred by the statute of frauds.

       Goss’s citations on appeal to Kelly-Stehney & Assocs. v. MacDonald’s Industrial Products

Inc., 693 N.W.2d 394, 399 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005), Gallagher v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P.,

No. 111356, 2012 WL 1952349 (W.D. Mich. May 30, 2012), and Frost v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

901 F. Supp. 2d. 999 (W.D. Mich. 2012), do not dislodge this conclusion. Kelly-Stehney makes

clear that in Michigan “several separate papers and documents, not all of which are signed by the

part to be charged, and none of which is a sufficient memorandum in itself” may satisfy the

requirements of the statute of frauds. 693 N.W.2d at 399 (internal quotation marks omitted). But,

as the Frost court found, “[w]hile multiple documents may together be sufficient to satisfy the

requirements of the statute of frauds, neither the documents in Kelly–Stehney nor the documents in

Gallagher . . . concerned any question regarding the sufficiency of the signatures therein.” Frost,

901 F. Supp. 2d at 1007–08. Frost concerned a set of documents, “along with the signatures

required for Defendant to cash at least six trial period payments by [p]laintffs,” that the plaintiffs

posited collectively satisfied the statute of frauds. Id. at 1007. The Frost court reasoned that

“although the import to be assigned to the payments Plaintiffs tendered is diminished where

Plaintiffs owe Defendant money under the terms of their loan documents, reasonable minds could

also infer that the payments are evidence consistent with an agreement between the parties.” Id. at

1008 (citing Ennis v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 10-751, 2011 WL 1118669, at *4 (W.D. Mich.

Mar. 25, 2011) (rejecting the plaintiffs-homeowners’ argument that “the written offer of a Payment

Relief program, coupled with the payment coupons, tied together with proof of timely payments

                                                -10-
made, survives any Statute of Frauds argument” (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted))).

          Compliance with Michigan’s statute of frauds is decided on a case-by-case basis. Kelly-

Stehney, 693 N.W.2d at 398. And, in this case, the background mortgage agreement suggests that

any signatures by CMI required to receive Goss’s reduced TPP payments should not be interpreted

to satisfy the statute of frauds. Cf. Ennis, 2011 WL 1118669, at *4. Goss’s mortgage states:

          Lender may accept any payment or partial payment insufficient to bring the Loan
          current, without waiver of any rights hereunder or prejudice to its rights to refuse
          such payment or partial payments in the future, but Lender is not obligated to apply
          such payments at the time such payments are accepted.

Further, the complaint’s advertisement to CMI’s acceptance of payments, which it was fully entitled

to accept, does not specifically advert to any signatures that might satisfy the statute of frauds.

Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed Goss’s breach of contract and promissory estoppel

claims.

                                                  B.

          In Count II of the complaint, Goss claims that ABN defrauded the court by violating

Michigan’s recording statutes, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 565.25 and 600.2907a, and wrongfully

initiating foreclosure without proper standing to foreclose on the mortgage. To satisfactorily allege

fraud, the complaint must “‘(1) specify the statements that the plaintiff contends were fraudulent,

(2) identify the speaker, (3) state where and when the statements were made, and (4) explain why

the statements were fraudulent.’” Ind. State Dist. Council of Laborers & Hod Carriers Pension &

Welfare Fund v. Omnicare, Inc., 583 F.3d 935, 942–43 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Frank v. Dana, 547

F.3d 564, 569–70 (6th Cir. 2008)). Further, a plaintiff must allege, at minimum, “‘the time, place,

and content of the alleged misrepresentation on which he or she relied; the fraudulent scheme; the

                                                 -11-
fraudulent intent of the defendants; and the injury resulting from the fraud.’” Coffey v. Foamex L.P.,

2 F.3d 157, 161–62 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Ballan v. Upjohn Co., 814 F. Supp. 1375, 1385 (W.D.

Mich. 1992)). Citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and Bennett v. MIS Corp., 607 F.3d 1076,

1100 (6th Cir. 2010), the district court dismissed Goss’s fraud count, holding that Goss had not

stated with particularity the circumstances constituting the fraud. The district court also held that

ABN “had proper standing to foreclose on the property under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3204(1)(d),

as both the owner of the indebtedness upon its merger with [CMI] and as the original mortgage

servicer.” Goss v. ABN AMRO Mortgage Grp., LLC, 12-11158, 2012 WL 5986783, at *4 (E.D.

Mich. Nov. 29, 2012).

       On appeal, Goss again alleges a violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2907a,

maintaining that “Appellees[] as identified in the foreclosure and the notice of foreclosure, are

improper and do not possess the requisite ownership interest in the indebtedness to effectuate the

foreclosure.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2907a provides:

       A person who violates section 25 of chapter 65 of the Revised Statutes of 1846,
       being section 565.25 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, by encumbering property
       through the recording of a document without lawful cause with the intent to
       harass or intimidate any person is liable to the owner of the property encumbered
       ....

Mich. Comp. Laws § 565.25, in turn, provides:

       (1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), the recording of a levy,
       attachment, lien, lis pendens, sheriff’s certificate, marshal’s certificate, or other
       instrument of encumbrance does not perfect the instrument of encumbrance
       unless both of the following are found by a court of competent jurisdiction to
       have accompanied the instrument when it was delivered to the register under
       section 24(1) of this chapter:

               (a) A full and fair accounting of the facts that support recording of
               the instrument of encumbrance and supporting documentation, as available.
               (b) Proof of service that actual notice has been given to the

                                                -12-
               recorded landowner of the land to which the instrument of
               encumbrance applies.

       Goss’s complaint and attached exhibits belie his fraud and wrongful foreclosure claims.

In the complaint, Goss alleges that his mortgage was “originated by ABN AMRO Mortgage

Group, Inc.” and that “[t]he mortgage loan was subsequently serviced by Citimortgage, Inc.”

The June 20, 2011, letter from Trott to Goss indicates that Trott is the agent of CMI, the creditor

to which Goss’s debt is owed or the servicing agent for the creditor to which the debt is owed.

The Notice of Foreclosure, also issued by Trott, refers to ABN as the original mortgagee. Not

only does Goss allege that ABN was the original mortgagee in the complaint, but also it is a

requirement of Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3212 that “[e]very notice of foreclosure by

advertisement shall include . . . (a) the names of the mortgagor, the original mortgagee, and the

foreclosing assignee, if any.”

       Moreover, Goss’s basic claim—that “Appellees[] as identified in the foreclosure and the

notice of foreclosure, are improper and do not possess the requisite ownership interest in the

indebtedness to effectuate the foreclosure”—is foreclosed as a matter of law. In Residential

Funding Company, L.L.C. v. Saurman, 805 N.W.2d 183 (Mich. 2011), the Michigan Supreme

Court explained that the “category of parties entitled to foreclose by advertisement indicates the

intent to include mortgagees of record . . . along with parties who ‘own[] the indebtedness’ and

parties who act as ‘the servicing agent of the mortgage.’” Id. at 184 (alteration in original)

(quoting Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3204(1)(d)).

       Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that Count II of the complaint does

not “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

                                             C.

                                                  -13-
       In Count III of the complaint, Goss demanded quiet title. In Michigan, a quiet-title action

is governed by Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2932(1), which states:

       Any person, whether he is in possession of the land in question or not, who claims
       any right in, title to, equitable title to, interest in, or right to possession of land,
       may bring an action in the circuit courts against any other person who claims or
       might claim any interest inconsistent with the interest claimed by the plaintiff,
       whether the defendant is in possession of the land or not.

This statute “codifie[s] actions to quiet title and authorizes suits to determine competing parties’

respective interests in land.” Republic Bank v. Modular One LLC, 591 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Mich.

Ct. App. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Stokes v. Millen Roofing Co., 649 N.W.2d 371

(Mich. 2002). In an action to quiet title, the plaintiffs have the burden of proof and must make

out a prima facie case of title. Beulah Hoagland Appleton Qualified Pers. Residence Trust v.

Emmet Cnty. Rd. Comm’n, 600 N.W.2d 698, 700 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Stinebaugh v.

Bristol, 347 N.W.2d 219, 221 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)). If the plaintiffs make out a prima facie

case, the defendants then have the burden of proving superior right of title in themselves. Id.

(citing Boekeloo v. Kuschinski, 324 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)). If the defendant

cannot carry its burden, then “the defendant shall be ordered to release to the plaintiff all claims

thereto.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2932(3).

       Under Michigan law, “[i]f a mortgagor does not redeem his or her property within the

appropriate redemption period, the purchaser of the sheriff’s deed is vested with ‘all the right,

title, and interest’ in the property.” Kheder v. Seterus, Inc., No. 308227, 2013 WL 1286020, at

*9 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2013) (quoting Piotrowski v. State Land Office Bd., 4 N.W.2d 514,

517 (Mich. 1942)). “Stated differently, if the mortgagor does not redeem his or her property

within the appropriate redemption period, all of the mortgagor’s rights in and to the property are

                                                -14-
extinguished.” Id. If a plaintiff wishes to set aside a foreclosure sale, the plaintiff must show

that fraud, accident, or mistake occurred. See Freeman v. Wozniak, 617 N.W.2d 46, 48–49

(Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Senters v. Ottawa Sav. Bank, 503 N.W.2d 639, 643 (Mich. 1993)).

“Moreover, the fraud, accident, or mistake must relate to the foreclosure proceeding itself.”

Stein v. U.S. Bancorp, No. 10-14026, 2011 WL 740537, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 24, 2011).

       As discussed above, Goss cannot establish that CMI, as the servicer of the mortgage,

improperly foreclosed on his mortgage; accordingly, he cannot make out his fraud claim. And

Goss has not alleged any irregularity in the foreclosure process. Accordingly, the district court

properly dismissed Goss’s quiet-title claim.

                                                 D.

       In Count VII, Goss claimed that CMI violated Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3205a by failing

to adhere to that statute’s conditions before proceeding with foreclosure. Before amendment by

Public Act No. 302 on December 22, 2011, Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3205a, in pertinent part,

provided:

       (1) Subject to subsection (6), before proceeding with a sale under this chapter of
       property claimed as a principal residence . . . ., the foreclosing party shall serve a
       written notice on the borrower that contains all of the following information:

               (a) The reasons that the mortgage loan is in default and the amount
               that is due and owing under the mortgage loan.

               (b) The names, addresses, and telephone numbers of the mortgage
               holder, the mortgage servicer, or any agent designated by the
               mortgage holder or mortgage servicer.

               (c) A designation of 1 of the persons named in subdivision (b) as
               the person to contact and that has the authority to make agreements
               under sections 3205b and 3205c.

                (d) That enclosed with the notice is a list of housing counselors

                                                -15-
               prepared by the [MSHDA] and that within 14 days after the notice
               is sent, the borrower may, either by contacting the person directly
               or by contacting a housing counselor from the list enclosed with
               the notice, request a meeting with the person designated under
               subdivision (c) to attempt to work out a modification of the
               mortgage loan to avoid foreclosure.

               (e) That if the borrower requests a meeting with the person designated
               under subdivision (c), foreclosure proceedings will not be commenced
               until 90 days after the date the notice is mailed to the borrower.

               (f) That if the borrower and the person designated under subdivision (c)
               reach an agreement to modify the mortgage loan, the mortgage will not be
               foreclosed if the borrower abides by the terms of the agreement.

               (g) That if the borrower and the person designated under subdivision (c)
               do not agree to modify the mortgage loan but it is determined that the
               borrower meets criteria for a modification under section 3205c(1) and
               foreclosure under this chapter is not allowed under section 3205c(7), the
               foreclosure of the mortgage will proceed before a judge instead of by
               advertisement.

               (h) That the borrower has the right to contact an attorney, and the
               telephone numbers of the state bar of Michigan’s lawyer referral service
               and of a local legal aid office serving the area in which the property is
               situated.

Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3205a (amended by P.A. 2011, No. 302, effective December 22, 2011,

and repealed by Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3205e, effective January 9, 2014); see also Vasilakis

v. Trott & Trott P.C., No. 306122, 2012 WL 5854363, at *2–*3 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2012)

(“The foreclosure by advertisement statutes were amended in 2011.”).

       Goss’s complaint alleges a violation of § 600.3205a(1)(e). On June 23, 2011, Goss made

a formal request through his counsel, Vanessa Fluker, “to engage in mandatory loss mitigation

options . . . pursuant to Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3205 et seq.” In the complaint, Goss alleges

that CMI did not set a meeting with his counsel to negotiate a modification and “proceeded to

sheriff’s sale before the statutory time period of ninety (90) days.”

                                                -16-
       The district court held that, accepting Goss’s factual allegations as true, he could not

make out a violation of the Michigan foreclosure-by-advertisement statutes. Mich. Comp. Laws

§ 600.3205b(1) (2011) provided:

       [a] borrower . . . [that] wishes to participate in negotiations to attempt to work out
       a modification of a mortgage loan shall contact a housing counselor from the list
       provided under section 3205a . . . the housing counselor shall inform the person
       designated under section 3205a(1)(c) in writing of the borrower’s request.

Id.1 This statute imposed a duty on Goss if he wished to negotiate a modification agreement.

See Vasilakis, 2012 WL 5854363, at *4 (“‘Shall’ is a mandatory term.” (citing Manuel v. Gill,

753 N.W.2d. 48, 55 (Mich. 2008))). The district court found that Goss did not contact an

authorized housing counselor and no housing counselor from the list provided under section

600.3205a contacted CMI or its agent on Goss’s behalf within fourteen days after a list was

mailed to the borrower. As such, the district court held that the foreclosure sale was conducted

pursuant to the foreclosure-by-advertisement statute.

       The district court based its conclusion on Vasilakis. In Vasilakis, the plaintiffs, like

Goss, lost their home to foreclosure. Id. at *1. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that

because plaintiffs “failed to follow the clear procedures delineated in the 2010 version of the

foreclosure by advertisement statutes,” Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3204 et seq., the foreclosure

sale was valid. Id. In Vasilakis, the plaintiffs were notified that their mortgage loan was in

default. Id. Instead of contacting a housing counselor as required by Mich. Comp. Laws §

600.3205b(1), the plaintiffs personally telephoned Trott, who handled the foreclosure, and

       1
         “The statute was amended in 2011, and now permits a homeowner to personally contact
the lender’s designated agent to request a loan modification meeting.” Vasilakis, 2012 WL 5854363,
at *4 n.2 (citing Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3205b(1), as amended by P.A. 2011, No. 302).

                                                -17-
retained an attorney, who also contacted Trott. Id. The Michigan Court of Appeals found that

“[a]ccording to the plain language of the statute, plaintiffs could not request a meeting

personally, through a retained attorney or through a retained financial consultant.” Id. at *4.

The court then held that because plaintiffs did not request a meeting through a housing

counselor, “defendants were free under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3204 to advertise the

foreclosure and conduct the sale.” Id. Following Vasilakis, the district court dismissed Goss’s

claim that CMI violated Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3205 because Goss did not contact an

authorized housing counselor and no housing counselor contacted Trott or CMI on Goss’s

behalf. By not contacting Trott or CMI through a housing counselor, Goss did not trigger the

requirement under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3205a(1)(e) that he alleges CMI violated.

       On appeal, Goss stresses that Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3205a(1)(h) provides the

borrower with a right to an attorney; that his attorney made a request for loss mitigation options;

and that Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3204(4)(e) provides that “[a] party shall not commence

[foreclosure] proceedings . . . if . . . [t]he mortgagor has requested a meeting under section 3205b

with the person designated under section 3205a(1)(c), the mortgagor has provided documents as

required under section 3205b(2), and the person designated under section 3205a(1)(c) has not

met or negotiated with the mortgagor under this chapter.” Goss also points to Mich. Comp.

Laws § 600.3205(d)(5), which makes clear that an attorney who is licensed to practice law in the

state of Michigan and who provides mortgage assistance relief services as part of his or her

practice of law can perform the duties of a housing counselor under Mich. Comp. Laws §§

3205a–c.

                                                -18-
       Goss’s arguments on appeal are precluded by Vasilakis. First, section 600.3205(d)(5)

was part of the amendments made by Public Act No. 302 on December 22, 2011, which was

after the September 23, 2011, notice of foreclosure and the October 25, 2011, foreclosure sale.

The Michigan Court of Appeals decided Vasilakis after the amendments made by Public Act No.

302 and did not suggest that section 600.3205(d)(5) has retroactive effect such that an attorney

could have performed the duties of a housing counselor before its enactment. See Vasilakis,

2012 WL 5854363, at *1–*4. Nor did the court read section 600.3205a(1)(h), which provides

the borrower with a right to an attorney, to enable an attorney to perform the role reserved to

housing counselors under the statute. See id. As such, by contacting Trott through his attorney,

Goss did not meet his section 600.3205b(1) obligation to contact Trott through a housing

counselor. Hence, the foreclosure sale did not violate Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3205a(1)(e).

There is little reason to believe that the Supreme Court of Michigan would disagree with this

result. See Vasilakis v. Trott & Trott, P.C., 836 N.W.2d 165, 165 (Mich. 2013) (“On order of the

Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 15, 2012 judgment of the Court of

Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions

presented should be reviewed by this Court.”).

       Goss made twenty-two payments at the TPP amount hoping that his mortgage would be

modified; yet CMI foreclosed on his residence. He reasonably attempted to save his house by

retaining an attorney to negotiate a modification. If he, or his attorney, had read the foreclosure-

by-advertisement statute, then perhaps he would have contacted Trott through a housing

counselor. He did not and was without remedy for the foreclosure. The state of Michigan has

since amended its foreclosure-by-advertisement statutes. But the dispositions of the Michigan

                                                 -19-
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in Vasilakis show that Goss does not benefit from those

amendments.

       Therefore, the district court correctly dismissed Goss’s allegation that CMI violated

Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3205.

                                                 III.

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Goss’s complaint for

failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.

                                                 -20-


Order                                                                                Michigan Supreme Court
                                                                                Lansing, Michigan

  March 4, 2020                                                                                Bridget M. McCormack,
                                                                                Chief Justice

                                                                                David F. Viviano,
                                                                                Chief Justice Pro Tem
  160907-8(84)(85)(86)
                                                                                Stephen J. Markman
                                                                                Brian K. Zahra
  LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF                                                                            Richard H. Bernstein
  MICHIGAN, MICHIGANDERS FOR FAIR                                                                      Elizabeth T. Clement
  AND TRANSPARENT ELECTIONS,                                                                           Megan K. Cavanagh,
                                                                                Justices
  HENRY MAYERS, VALERIYA
  EPSHTEYN, and BARRY RUBIN,
            Plaintiffs-Appellees,
  and
  SENATE and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
            Intervenors-Appellants,
                                                                    SC: 160907
  v                                                                 COA: 350938
                                                                    Ct of Claims: 19-000084-MM
  SECRETARY OF STATE,
  Defendant-Appellee.
  __________________________________________

  SENATE and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
            Plaintiffs-Appellants,
                                                                    SC: 160908
  v                                                                 COA: 351073
                                                                    Ct of Claims: 19-000092-MZ
  SECRETARY OF STATE,
             Defendant-Appellee.
  ___________________________________________/

        On order of the Chief Justice, the separate motions of the American Civil Liberties
  Union of Michigan, the Michigan Manufacturers Association, and the State Government
  Leadership Foundation to file briefs amicus curiae are GRANTED. The amicus briefs
  submitted by those groups on January 28, 2020, are accepted for filing.

                           I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
                     foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
                                  March 4, 2020

                                                                               Clerk


978 So.2d 80 (2006)
JOHNATHAN WESLEY BAGLEY
v.
STATE.
No. CR-05-0557.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
June 9, 2006.
Decision of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeal Without Opinion. Affirmed.


585 F.Supp. 362 (1984)
Arvon WINSTON, Plaintiff,
v.
Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant.
Civ. No. 83-3845.
United States District Court, D. New Jersey.
April 25, 1984.
*363 William J. Scherman, Freeman & Bass, Newark, N.J., for plaintiff.
John W. O'Farrell, Asst. U.S. Atty., Newark, N.J., for defendant.

OPINION
LACEY, District Judge.
Plaintiff Arvon Winston filed an application for disability insurance benefits on October 30, 1981 and for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) on November 1, 1981. Plaintiff claimed disability resulting from injuries sustained in a 1979 automobile accident. He claimed that the period of disability began in August 1980, when he was fired from his job. The application was denied initially and on reconsideration. A hearing was held on October 26, 1982. The ALJ, in a decision dated June 20, 1983, found that plaintiff's insured status had expired on December 31, 1982, and that plaintiff had not suffered any impairment that significantly limited his ability to perform work-related functions. The Appeals Council confirmed the ALJ's decision on September 22, 1983, rendering it the final decision of the Secretary. Plaintiff now seeks review of the Secretary's decision under Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Disability is defined identically for the purposes of disability insurance and SSI benefits as inability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A); 1382c(a)(3)(A). If the applicant is presently engaged in substantial activity, or does not have an impairment severe enough to limit significantly his ability to perform basic work activities, a finding of nondisability is justified. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520; 404.1526.

MEDICAL EVIDENCE
The earliest medical evidence of record is a report from the Hospital Center at Orange, dated November 24 and 25, 1979. It shows degenerative disc disease at C5-6 of the cervical spine and mild levoscoliosis with degenerative disease at L1-2 of the lumbosacral spine. The doctor found tenderness, but no fracture or malalignment. Plaintiff's injuries were sustained in an automobile accident.
An outpatient report from Beth Israel Medical Center, dated January 8, 1981, noted narrowing of the disc space between C5 and 6, with anterior and posterior spur formation and subchondral sclerosis involving the lower half of C5. The doctor also noted the possibility of chronic bronchitis. A January 7, 1982 report from Beth Israel found narrowing of the intervertebral disc space at L4-5 on the left side with some reactive sclerosis in the lower portion of the body of L4. The radiologist also found slight scoliosis of the dorsal spine to the right and the lumbar spine to the left. He found some mild depression of the superior plate of L2 and osteophyte formation at the lower margin of L1. The diagnosis was mild scoliotic deformity, and degenerative changes in the lumbar spine.
Dr. Ahmad, an orthopedist, examined plaintiff on June 25, 1982. He diagnosed plaintiff as suffering from cervical and lumbosacral sprain, and fibromyositis. Flexion of the lower back was restricted 30 degrees, and extension 15 degrees. He noted tenderness and pain, particularly when bending or squatting. The report, apparently prepared with Workers' Compensation in mind, found 35% disability.
Dr. Choudhury examined plaintiff on October 26, 1982 at the request of defendant. The doctor found essentially that plaintiff could bend and function normally and without pain. He found only mild degenerative symptoms in the spine and narrowing of the C5-6 disc space. He stated that plaintiff did not have "any functional limitations in his musculoskeletal system." He did opine, however, that plaintiff should "never" *364 carry more than 25 pounds, though the reason was not given.
Dr. J.C. Carr, plaintiff's treating physician after the accident, submitted a report dated December 16, 1980. He found continued headaches, pain and neck stiffness. Plaintiff showed multiple fine tremors. Romberg's sign was moderately positive. There was tenderness and muscle guarding of the neck, and tenderness over C-3 and 4. Neck motion was limited. Carr opined that there would be some permanent damage to the neck and nervous system. Plaintiff had made some 27 office visits to Carr between November 1979 and March 1980.
On December 22, 1981 Dr. Somberg performed a neurological examination at the request of defendant. The doctor found no limitation of motion of the cervical or lumbar spine, but did not elaborate beyond stating that plaintiff could touch his toes. Other than diminished sensation over the left half of the body, plaintiff showed no other abnormalities.
Dr. Pollock conducted a neuropsychiatric examination on June 24, 1982. Plaintiff complained of coughing, chest pains, back and neck pain, etc. The doctor found hyperactive deep tendon reflexes, tremors, depression of corneal and pharyngeal reflexes, and a positive Romberg test. He diagnosed "neurological residuals of exposure to noxious fumes and dust and loud noise, also sciatic neuritis, and traumatic anxiety psychoneurosis, attributable to exposure at work."[1] He estimated "permanent neuropsychiatric disability to be 25% of partial total."
Dr. Scannapiego, an ophthalmologist, examined plaintiff on June 28, 1982. He found chronic conjunctivitis, blepharitis and pingueculas of both eyes.
On June 28, 1982, Dr. Ghander, a specialist in otorhinolaryngology, examined plaintiff. He found a 35% hearing impairment, tinnitus, rhinosinusitis, and nasopharyngitis. He estimated a 7½% permanent partial total disability.
Dr. Hermele examined plaintiff on July 12, 1982. He found bronchovascular markings in the lower lung fields, extending outward with diffuse fibrosis and fibronodularities scattered throughout the mid and lower lung fields. He also found increased heart size and hilar vascular markings. The diagnosis was chronic bronchitis and pneumoconiosis, hypertension, and hypertensive cardiovascular disease. (Blood pressure was 150/100).
Dr. Dyer, a psychologist, examined plaintiff on November 8, 1982. He found as follows:
The severe angulation problems, perceptual rotations, fragmentations, and other gross distortions observed in this subject's Bender Gestalt Test record are suggestive of a very severe visual-motor integration problem associated with mental retardation, organic brain damage, or both conditions. The anxious overworking of dots, bizarre distortions, and compression of all figures into the upper left quadrant of the page were also suggestive of an emotional disorder. Total testing time was significantly above average at 10½ minutes.
The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale yielded a verbal scale IQ of 58. Cognitive and perceptual tests placed plaintiff below the first percentile. Woodcock-Johnson tests placed plaintiff below the first grade level in reading, applied problems, and written language. Dyer found that plaintiff was in the lower mildly retarded range. He opined that plaintiff could not do jobs requiring processing of information, reading, or other mental skills tested for.[2]
Plaintiff's medication form shows that he takes Lofressor twice a day for hypertension; Esidrix for kidney problems; Zaroxolyn *365 for kidney problems; and Motrin for arthritis.

PLAINTIFF'S TESTIMONY
Plaintiff was born in 1925. He claims to have received an eighth grade education. He testifies to extremely limited reading ability.
Plaintiff worked as a binder at Art Metals for some period of time until he was fired in August 1980. He previously worked for many years as a paint mixer. From August 1980 until May 1981 he received unemployment compensation. He states that he fell while on the job at Art Metals and injured his arm. He stated that he ordinarily uses a cane, and cannot walk longer than a short block. He testified that he could not sit longer than a half hour or stand longer than 10 minutes. He continues to visit Beth Israel Hospital once a month as an outpatient, for treatment of high blood pressure, arthritis, and miscellaneous symptoms.
Plaintiff testifies that he stays home most of the time. He owns a dog but does not walk it. He receives help in cooking, cleaning, dressing, etc. from a friend who lives downstairs.

THE ALJ'S DECISION
The ALJ found that plaintiff had not suffered from a severe impairment before his insured status expired on December 31, 1982. The ALJ noted that plaintiff was taking only Motrin, a mild analgesic, for his back pain. He also found that plaintiff's failure to seek any medical treatment from August 1980 until January 1982 reflected negatively on the severity of his condition. The ALJ stated that plaintiff had returned to work after his 1979 accident until August 1980, the alleged onset date of his disability. The ALJ also relied on the reports of Drs. Somberg and Choudhury to support his statement that there were no "significant positive orthopedic and neurological findings." The ALJ dealt with conflicting evidence by stating that the "medical reports from Drs. Klein, Pollack, Ghander, Ahmad and Hermele ... which suggest that the claimant is permanently partially disabled are hereby rejected since they are apparently formulated in connection with state workmen's compensation proceedings governed by standards of disability which differ significantly from the definition of disability under the Social Security Act, as amended. The conclusion offered by Dr. Dyer ... that the claimant's psychological deficits would prevent him from performing [certain] jobs is irrelevant and moot since the claimant managed for many years to function adequately as a machine operator, binder, factory laborer and paint mixer."
Finally, the ALJ noted that plaintiff received unemployment compensation after the alleged onset of disability. In accordance with an Appeals Council guideline, the ALJ drew an inference that plaintiff was not disabled from that fact. The ALJ then concluded that plaintiff's date of disability, if any, was advanced until April 1981, when he ceased receiving unemployment benefits.
The ALJ's decision concluded with the following findings:
1. The claimant met the special earnings requirements of the Act on August 21, 1980, the date that the claimant stated he became unable to work, and continues to meet them through December 31, 1982, but not thereafter.
2. The claimant had the following impairments on or before December 31, 1982: status post cervical and lumbosacral muscle sprain.
3. The claimant's allegations of severe pain are not credible and such pain either in itself or in conjunction with other impairments was not of such severity as to constitute the claimant disabled within the meaning of the Act, on or before his insured status expired on December 31, 1982.
4. The claimant does not have any impairment or impairments which significantly limit the ability to perform basic work-related functions; therefore, the claimant did not have a severe *366 impairment, on or before December 31, 1982.
5. Since the claimant does not have a severe impairment, he was not under a "disability," as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time on or before December 31, 1982.
6. The claimant was not under a "disability" for purposes of Title XVI of the Social Security Act, as amended.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing the Secretary's decision, this court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the Secretary's findings. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Supp. V 1981); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir.1979). That standard is deferential, but not meaningless; the court "retains a responsibility to scrutinize the entire record and to reverse or remand if the Secretary's decision is not supported by substantial evidence." Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 970 (3d Cir.1981). Accord, Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 313 (3d Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931, 95 S.Ct. 1135, 43 L.Ed.2d 403 (1975).
Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). Accord, Stewart v. Secretary of HEW, 714 F.2d 287, 290 (3d Cir.1983). Substantial evidence may fall short of a preponderance, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the record does not preclude a finding of substantial evidence in support of one. Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm., 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 1026, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966); Port Norris v. I.C.C., 697 F.2d 497, 502 (3d Cir.1982). But the evidence "must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established. ... [I]t must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury." Port Norris, supra, at 807, quoting Labor Board v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300, 59 S.Ct. 501, 505, 83 L.Ed. 660 (1939). The substantial evidence standard applies not only to administrative determinations of basic facts, but to inferences drawn therefrom. Reading v. Mathews, 542 F.2d 993, 997 (7th Cir.1976); Jolley v. Weinberger, 537 F.2d 1179, 1181 (4th Cir.1976); Reyes v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 476 F.2d 910, 914 (D.C.Cir.1973); Beane v. Richardson, 457 F.2d 758, 759 (9th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 859, 93 S.Ct. 144, 34 L.Ed.2d 105 (1973).
I must also review the ALJ's decision for errors of law. Nettles v. Schweiker, 714 F.2d 833, 836 (8th Cir.1983); Dellolio v. Heckler, 705 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1983); Doran v. Schweiker, 681 F.2d 605, 609 (9th Cir.1982); Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir.1982); Aubeuf v. Schweiker, 649 F.2d 107, 112 (2d Cir.1981).[2a] The legal findings of the ALJ are not entitled to the deference given findings of fact. Allison v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 145, 147 n. 5 (10th Cir.1983); Wiggins, supra, 679 F.2d at 1389 & n. 3. Evidence cannot be "substantial," or even relevant, except in light of the correct legal standard.

DISCUSSION

A. Workers' Compensation Reports

Several of the medical reports submitted by plaintiff contradict the ALJ's conclusion that there were no significant negative *367 neurological or orthopedic findings. The ALJ is permitted to accept some parts of the evidence and reject others. He must, however, consider all the evidence, and show some basis for discounting the rejected evidence. See Stewart v. Sec'y of HEW, 714 F.2d 287, 290 (3d Cir.1983); Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir.1981). The question, then, is whether the ALJ's ground for rejecting the reports in their entiretythat they were obviously prepared in connection with workers' compensation claimsis sufficient.
To be sure, workers' compensation law applies totally different standards from those under the Social Security Act. The use of such reports for Social Security purposes has thus been criticized in this district. See Minitee v. Harris, 510 F.Supp. 1216, 1218-19 (D.N.J.1980) (Biunno, J.). I agree that the doctors' ultimate conclusions, e.g., "7½% partial total disability," are grounded in a different statute and have no relevance to the Social Security Act. I also note that the reports rejected by the ALJ are exactly the kind of reports criticized in the Minitee case, which was argued by the same firm that represents plaintiff here. Indeed, Dr. Pollock's report duplicates verbatim a passage from an unattributed report quoted in the Minitee opinion. See 510 F.Supp. at 1218. I note also that the doctors' reports in the case of Glover v. Heckler, No. 83-3168, argued by the same law firm[3] and also before me today, duplicate Mr. Winston's reports in many respects. Echoing the language in Minitee and in Dr. Pollock's report in this case, Dr. Pollock in Glover found that plaintiff suffered from sciatic neuritis, traumatic anxiety psychoneurosis and "neurological residuals of exposure to noxious fumes dust and loud noise." The other reports, by virtually the same list of doctors called upon by plaintiff in this case, also fall into a repetitive pattern.
An ALJ could rationally conclude that workers' compensation reports are in some cases less reliable, especially as to their ultimate conclusions on the plaintiff's ability to work. In this case, an ALJ could discount the reports based on internal inconsistency; the fact that the "exposure" to dust, loud noise, etc. is in no way documented; or conflicting reports from other doctors. To the extent that the workers' compensation legal standards are reflected in the doctors' findings, the reports are rendered less applicable to a Social Security proceeding.
I do not believe, however, that such reports may be totally ignored because they contain conclusory language suggestive of workers' compensation.[4] The reports also contain test results, medical diagnoses, and conclusions that are not, or should not be, related to any particular statutory standard. I note also that one of the reports rejected was that of plaintiff's treating physician. Such reports are ordinarily entitled to some weight. Wallace v. Sec'y of HHS, 722 F.2d 1150, 1155 (3d Cir.1983); Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir.1981). Evidence is not substantial if the ALJ fails to resolve a conflict with other evidence, "particularly certain types of evidence (e.g. that offered by treating physicians) ...." Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir.1983). The ALJ may legitimately reject medical testimony, but he must weigh it. The record is equivocal at best as to plaintiff's physical problems, but I find that the ALJ failed to weigh the evidence.

B. Mental Disability

Mental disabilities are perhaps the most difficult to evaluate. Stokes v. Schweiker, *368 729 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.1984). The only psychological or psychiatric testimony offered was in plaintiff's favor. Dr. Dyer found mental retardation and serious emotional problems, based on test results reproduced in his report. Given the lack of contrary evidence, the temptation is strong to find that the ALJ impermissibly set his own expertise against that of the physician. See Van Horn v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 871, 874 (3d Cir.1983); Fowler v. Califano, 596 F.2d 600, 603 (3d Cir.1979). "Recently, this Court reversed an ALJ who ignored competent medical evidence regarding psychological disability in favor of his own contrary conclusion." Wallace, supra, 722 F.2d at 1154-55 (referring to Van Horn, supra). The ALJ dealt only with Dyer's ultimate conclusion as to plaintiff's inability to perform certain mentally taxing jobs. He discounted the observation as irrelevant and moot because plaintiff had worked before. The ALJ did not discuss, or even mention in his summary of evidence, Dyer's medical findings as to plaintiff's IQ, mental capacity, and emotional disorder. In fact a verbal IQ score of 58 falls within the standards of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, App. 1, § 12.05 (1983). Dyer applied the Wechsler test recommended in the regulations. (Where both the verbal and performance scores are obtained, the lower of the two is used. Id. § 12.00) The other tests administered placed plaintiff in the lowest percentile, well below the 2d percentile level specified in the Appendix. Id. Test reports are not, of course, irrebuttable. Other test reports, articulated doubts as to plaintiff's credibility or the validity of the testing process, etc. may furnish substantial evidence for a contrary conclusion.[5]
The issue is a close one. The ALJ noted that plaintiff had worked, and test results may be evaluated in light of plaintiff's activities. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, App. 1, § 12.00. He did not state that he assumed that the condition was not of recent origin. There is no evidence to the contrary, however, and it seems extremely likely that plaintiff's level of intelligence has remained constant over the years. There would probably be a rational basis for the ALJ's discounting of the test results, and I probably would not remand on this ground alone. Since the matter must be remanded on other grounds, however, the ALJ should take the opportunity to deal more explicitly with the evidence of mental retardation and severe emotional problems.

C. Miscellaneous Issues

Most of the other issues raised by plaintiff would be mooted or considerably altered by the ALJ's full consideration of the rejected medical reports. Subjective pain, for example, must be evaluated in light of plaintiff's credibility and the medical evidence. Thus I do not comment on it here.
Plaintiff claims that the ALJ failed to consider evidence from the period after December 31, 1982. While disability benefits flow only from a disability during the insured period, SSI benefits depend only on a current disability. I find no error in this regard. The ALJ's decision is consistent with a proper application of the standards for the two classes of benefits. Moreover, *369 there is no proffered evidence in the record for the period after December 31, 1982, and plaintiff does not contend that his condition has worsened since then.
In light of the foregoing, and in accordance with an order filed this date, this matter is remanded to the ALJ for further proceedings.
NOTES
[1]  There is no evidence as to what, if anything, in plaintiff's former work resulted in the claimed exposure.
[2]  Dr. Dyer's report, submitted after the hearing, was the first evidence of mental retardation. The application had been based on injuries received in the car accident. The reports of Hermele and Chaudhory were also submitted after the hearing.
[2a]  See Wallace v. Secretary of HHS, 722 F.2d 1150, 1155-56 (3d Cir.1983) (remanding, in part because Secretary misapplied regulations); Burnam v. Schweiker, 682 F.2d 456 (3d Cir.1982) (same); Fowler v. Califano, 596 F.2d 600, 602 (3d Cir.1979) (decision of ALJ "fails to observe the appropriate legal standard"); Farley v. Celebrezze, 315 F.2d 704, 706 (3d Cir.1963) (ALJ's decision must have "reasonable basis in law"). Recent District Court cases have recognized outright our duty to reverse for legal error. Axe v. Dept. of HHS, 564 F.Supp. 789, 791 (E.D.Pa. 1983); Curtin v. Harris, 508 F.Supp. 791, 793 (D.N.J.1981). Accord, Friedberg v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 445, app. at 447 (3d Cir.1983) (reprinting with approval the district court opinion).
[3]  The firm is Freeman & Bass of Newark, New Jersey. Another Freeman & Bass case before me today, Rosado v. Heckler, No. 83-3050 contains medical reports from many of the same doctors. These, too, duplicate much of the language in the reports of the other cases, and apply Workers' Compensation standards.
[4]  Nor did Minitee, supra, suggest that an ALJ may do what was done here. To the extent that they are valid medical diagnoses, reports must be considered by the ALJ regardless of the original purpose for which they are prepared. The absence of the original opposing reports is not significant in my view, since the agency may adduce its own reports.
[5]  Dr. Dyer's report does not, I believe, directly advert to Workers' Compensation standards. But Dr. Dyer's reports are frequently seen in the company of those of Drs. Ghander, Ahmad, Pollock, Hermele, and Klein. They share with those reports the feature of a routine conclusion (as opposed to a diagnosis) that need not be given much weight. As it happens, all three of the Social Security appeals before me today contain reports from Dr. Dyer. All three note that the "perceptual rotations, fragmentations, simplifications, integration problems, and other gross distortions observed in this client's Bender Gestalt Test record are suggestive of a very severe visual-motor integration problem ...." All three state that "[b]ased on the above findings, it is felt that [plaintiff's] prospects for success would be virtually nil in any employment requiring complex oral communication, fine perceptual motor skills, rapid cognitive processing of large amounts of information, or basic reading, arithmetic, and written language skills. This would include virtually all administrative, secretarial, clerical, and computer related jobs."

Here, as in the case of the earlier reports, the ALJ need not credit the doctor's conclusion as to the ultimate issue of disability. But the doctor's diagnosis suffices to create a factual issue that should be addressed by the ALJ.


                            UNPUBLISHED

                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                      FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                            No. 00-7155

In Re: WAYNE THOMAS JOHNSON,

                                                          Petitioner.

                On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

Submitted:   November 30, 2000            Decided:   December 7, 2000

Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Wayne Thomas Johnson, Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:

     Wayne T. Johnson petitions this court for a writ of mandamus

directing a North Carolina state court to act on Johnson’s Motion

for Appropriate Relief.   Federal courts have no general power to

compel action by state courts.   See Davis v. Lansing, 851 F.2d 72,

74 (2d Cir. 1988); Gurley v. Superior Court of Mecklenburg County,

411 F.2d 586, 587 (4th Cir. 1969).     Accordingly, while we grant

Johnson’s motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis, we deny

his petition for a writ of mandamus, his motion for general relief,

and his motion to compel a ruling.   We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

                                                   PETITION DENIED

                                 2