9 Cal.Rptr.3d 687 (2004)
32 Cal.4th 445
84 P.3d 374
Craig K. MARTIN, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Richard SZETO et al., Defendants and Appellants.
No. S103417.
Supreme Court of California.
February 19, 2004.
*688 Law Offices of Mattaniah Eytan, Mattaniah Eytan, Corte Madera, Eric Schenk and Andrea R. Widburg for Defendants and Appellants.
Craig K. Martin, in pro. per.; and Melissa L. Foster for Plaintiff and Respondent.
WERDEGAR, J.
We granted review to resolve a conflict in the lower courts over the proper interpretation of Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.7.[1] The section permits a court *689 to award attorneys' fees to a peace officer, or to a public entity employing a peace officer, that successfully defends an action for damages arising out of the performance of the officer's duties if the action was not filed or maintained in good faith and with reasonable cause. The section also authorizes an award of fees "in an action for libel or slander." (Ibid.) In Planned Protective Services v. Gorton (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1, 245 Cal.Rptr. 790, the Court of Appeal held that section 1021.7 authorizes an award of fees in an action for libel or slander only if a peace officer or an officer's public employer is a party. (Id., at p. 15, 245 Cal.Rptr. 790.) In the case before us, the Court of Appeal rejected Gorton and awarded fees to the successful defendants in a case not involving a peace officer. We reverse.

I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Craig K. Martin sued defendants Richard Szeto and Anthony Lincoln for slander. Plaintiff, an attorney, alleged that defendants falsely told others he was "doing cocaine," thus accusing him of a crime and injuring him in his profession. (See Civ.Code, § 46.) Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds (among others) that the statement was privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivisions (b) and (c), because defendants had made the statement to business associates with whom they shared a common interest in plaintiff's ability to provide competent legal representation in an official proceeding before a local planning commission. The superior court granted defendants' motion on these grounds and also because plaintiff filed no opposition.
After the superior court granted summary judgment, defendants moved for attorneys' fees under section 1021.7, as well as under other statutes not here at issue. The superior court denied defendants' motion for failure to show that plaintiff had not filed or maintained the action in good faith and with reasonable cause, as section 1021.7 requires. The Court of Appeal reversed. We granted plaintiff's petition for review.

II. DISCUSSION
The single question before us is whether section 1021.7 authorizes courts to award attorneys' fees in actions for libel and slander generally, or only in actions involving peace officers.[2] We conclude the latter interpretation is correct.
Section 1021.7 provides as follows: "In any action for damages arising out of the performance of a peace officer's duties, brought against a peace officer, as defined in Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 830) of Title 3 of Part 2 of the Penal Code, or against a public entity employing a peace officer or in an action for libel or slander brought pursuant to Section 45 or 46 of the Civil Code, the court may, in its discretion, award reasonable attorney's fees to the defendant or defendants as part of the costs, upon a finding by the court that the action was not filed or maintained in good faith and with reasonable cause." (§ 1021.7, italics added.) Defendants claim the italicized language permits the superior court to award them attorneys' fees even though the case does not involve a peace officer. Read literally and in its grammatical context, the italicized language might support that interpretation. Plaintiff, however, contends the statute's legislative history demonstrates the Legislature intended to permit courts to award *690 attorneys' fees only in those libel and slander cases to which a peace officer or an officer's public employer is a party.
Defendants argue we may not consult the legislative history because section 1021.7 is not ambiguous. (See, e.g., Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 272, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 457, 19 P.3d 1196.) We disagree. The statute is ambiguous. If the section had the meaning defendants claim, it would likely violate article IV, section 9, of the California Constitution, which provides that "[a] statute shall embrace but one subject, which shall be expressed in its title."[3] This constitutional provision, by preventing misleading or inaccurate titles, serves the important purpose of ensuring that legislators and the public have reasonable notice of the scope and content of proposed statutes. (Harbor v. Deukmejian (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1078, 1096, 240 Cal.Rptr. 569, 742 P.2d 1290.) The title of the act that became section 1021.7 is "[a]n act to add Section 1021.7 to the Code of Civil Procedure, relating to peace officers, and making an appropriation therefore." (Stats.1981, ch. 980, p. 3806, italics added.) Because we presume the Legislature intended to comply with the state Constitution, we must at least consider the possibility that all parts of section 1021.7, consistently with its title, relate to peace officers. This apparent inconsistency between the section's language and title creates an ambiguity that justifies resort to the legislative history.
Defendants' interpretation of section 1021.7 would, moreover, create a significant and heretofore unrecognized[4] exception to the general rule that all parties to litigation must pay their own attorneys' fees. (§ 1021.)[5] Certainly the Legislature may adopt exceptions to the general rule. Indeed, it has done so in order to further a variety of policy goals. (See, e.g., § 1021.1 et seq.) The rule plaintiff proposes would, presumably, serve the hypothetical policy goal of deterring unmeritorious lawsuits for libel and slander. But a decision by this court that section 1021.7 was, or was not, intended to serve that goal in cases not involving peace officers deserves any additional certainty the legislative history can afford.
Accordingly, the plain language rule does not dispose of this case. We therefore consider the legislative history of section 1021.7 in order to identify the construction *691 that comports most closely with the Legislature's actual intent. (See Day v. City of Fontana, supra, 25 Cal.4th 268, 272, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 457, 19 P.3d 1196; see also Palmer v. GTE California, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1265, 1271, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 70 P.3d 1067 ["If the statutory language on its face answers [a] question, that answer is binding unless we conclude the language is ambiguous or it does not accurately reflect the Legislature's intent."].) In fact, the statute's well-documented history leaves no serious doubt that the Legislature intended to adopt a rule that would affect only cases involving peace officers.
Senator John Doolittle introduced Senate Bill No. 229 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) on February 5, 1981, at the request of the Peace Officers Research Association of California (PORAC), in order to deter unwarranted lawsuits against peace officers and to reimburse their public employers for the cost of defending such lawsuits. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Background Information on Sen. Bill No. 229 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 10, 1981, p. 1.) As introduced, the bill covered "any action brought against a peace officer...." Subsequent amendments to the bill on April 20, 1981, and May 28, 1981, clarified the Legislature's intent to reach only "actions for damages arising out of the performance of a peace officer's duties" that have not been "filed or maintained in good faith and with reasonable cause."
Assemblywoman Maxine Waters added the words, "or in an action for libel or slander brought pursuant to Section 45 or 46 of the Civil Code," on the floor of the Assembly, immediately before Senate Bill No. 229 passed that house. (5 Assem. J. (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) pp. 8101, 8150.) Consequently, the various reports on the bill prepared for Senate and Assembly committees do not discuss the amendment. The amendment is discussed, however, in letters to the Governor by the bill's Senate sponsor and others, urging that the legislation be signed or vetoed. These letters consistently explain that the amendment was offered to make the bill reciprocal, by providing that anyone defending against a frivolous action for libel or slander brought by a peace officer would also be able to receive an award of attorney fees. (See Sen. John Doolittle, letter to Governor Edmund Brown, Sept. 22, 1981, p. 1; see also Joe Aceto, Director, Legislative Division, PRAC, letter to Governor Edmund Brown, Sept. 22, 1981, p. 2.) The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which opposed the bill, nevertheless recounted the amendment's history in precisely the same way.[6] These statements about pending legislation are entitled to consideration to the extent they constitute "a reiteration of legislative discussion and events leading *692 to adoption of proposed amendments rather than merely an expression of personal opinion." (California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 700, 170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856.)
In summary, while the Legislature wished to make section 1021.7 reciprocal, in the sense of deterring baseless actions for libel or slander filed against citizens in retaliation for complaints about the manner in which peace officers have performed their duties, nothing in the legislative history suggests a broader intent to make attorneys' fees available in libel and slander actions generally.[7]
 As additional support for interpreting section 1021.7 to authorize attorneys' fees only in actions involving peace officers, plaintiff cites a variety of documents written by members of the Legislature, and by the Legislative Counsel, years after section 1021.7 took effect. The authors of these documents explain the origin and meaning of the section's reference to actions for libel and slander consistently with the previously mentioned letters to Governor Brown, and conclude that the section affects only actions involving peace officers. We do not, however, attribute any weight to these later writings because they have little probative value on the Legislature's contemporaneous understanding of the bill that became section 1021.7.
For the same reason, we attach little value to the Legislature's subsequent failure to pass a bill (Assem. Bill No. 95 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.)) that would have amended section 1021.7 to clarify its reference to actions for libel and slander.[8] We have repeatedly observed that the Legislature's failure to enact a proposed amendment to an existing statutory scheme offers only limited guidance, if any, concerning the Legislature's original intent. (E.g., People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 921, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 431, 4 P.3d 265; Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, 735, fn. 7, 180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115.) Here, to undertake the problematic exercise of inferring legislative intent from subsequent, failed legislation seems especially inappropriate because the original intent behind section 1021.7 is clear.[9]
Defendant argues that to interpret section 1021.7 as affecting only actions involving peace officers would render surplusage the statutory language referring to "action[s] for libel or slander." The argument lacks merit. To be sure, even without that language, the section would authorize a court to award attorneys' fees "[i]n any action for damages"  including presumably an action for libel or slander  "arising out of the performance of a peace officer's duties, [and] brought against a peace officer ... or against a public entity *693 employing a peace officer...." (§ 1021.7, italics added.) As the legislative history shows, however, the additional language about "action [s] for libel or slander" was thought necessary to make the statute reciprocal, in part, by permitting the recovery of attorneys' fees by citizens sued for libel or slander by peace officers in retaliation for complaining about the manner in which peace officers had performed their duties. Thus, to interpret section 1021.7 as affecting only actions involving peace officers does not render surplusage the section's reference to "action[s] for libel or slander."
For these reasons, we conclude that section 1021.7 authorizes courts to award attorneys' fees in actions for libel or slander only when a peace officer or an officer's public employer is a party, and when the action arises out of the performance of an officer's duties. Section 1021.7 does not authorize fee awards in libel and slander actions generally. In holding to the contrary, the Court of Appeal erred.

III. DISPOSITION
The decision of the Court of Appeal is reversed.
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C.J., KENNARD, BAXTER, CHIN, BROWN, and MORENO, JJ.
NOTES
[1]  All further citations to statutes are to the Code of Civil Procedure, except as noted.
[2]  We have no occasion to review the superior court's order granting summary judgment or the Court of Appeal's decision that plaintiff did not file or maintain his action in good faith and with reasonable cause.
[3]  "A statute shall embrace but one subject, which shall be expressed in its title. If a statute embraces a subject not expressed in its title, only the part not expressed is void. A statute may not be amended by reference to its title. A section of a statute may not be amended unless the section is re-enacted as amended." (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 9.)
[4]  Prior to the case on review, the only decision on point held that section 1021.7 authorized courts to award attorneys' fees in libel and slander actions only when a peace officer is involved. (Planned Protective Services, Inc. v. Gorton, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d 1, 11-16, 245 Cal.Rptr. 790.) Since that decision, two appellate courts have mentioned the issue without deciding it. (California Casualty Management Co. v. Martocchio (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1527, 1530, fn. 3, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 277; Kahn v. Bower (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1599, 1615-1616, 284 Cal.Rptr. 244.)

Although the Ninth Circuit in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. (9th Cir.1989) 895 F.2d 1535, 1547-1548, appears to have assumed that section 1021.7 makes attorneys' fees available in libel and slander actions generally, the court did not recognize the issue we address in this case, note the authority contradicting its assumption (Planned Protective Services, Inc. v. Gorton, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d 1, 11-16, 245 Cal.Rptr. 790), or actually award fees under section 1021.7.
[5]  "Except as attorney's fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties...." (§ 1021.)
[6]  The ACLU wrote: "We should also point out another effect of [Senate Bill No.] 229. When it became clear that the bill could not be stopped in the Legislature, [Assemblywoman] Maxine Waters urged the author to take certain amendments providing defense attorneys fees where defamation actions are brought without reasonable cause and not in good faith. While we deplore the precedent that [Senate Bill No.] 229 sets, if defense attorneys fees are to become state policy, it seems clear that the use of defamation lawsuits as a political weapon should bear the same price. [¶] Where, e.g., the NAACP was sued by Oakland police officers for their public condemnation of police shootings, or where a former juror was sued for writing the Mayor of Culver City about the conduct of one of its officers in dealing with Hispanics, attorneys fees should be available. In each case the speech was clearly privileged, and the only reason for the defamation action was to punish the defendants, to shut them up, and to discourage like-minded persons from speaking out." (Brent Barnhart and  Beth Meador, ACLU Legislative Advocates, letter to Governor Edmund Brown, Sept. 23, 1981, pp. 1-2.)
[7]  Contradicting the legislative history, dictum in Planned Protective Services v. Gorton, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d 1, 245 Cal.Rptr. 790, suggests that section 1021.7 applies only to actions in which a peace officer or a peace officer's public employer is a defendant. (Id., at p. 15, 245 Cal.Rptr. 790.) In this one respect only, we disapprove Planned Protective Services v. Gorton, supra.
[8]  Assembly Bill No. 95 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) would have added the following italicized language to section 1021.7: "any action for libel  or slander brought by or on behalf of a peace officer or a public entity employing a peace officer pursuant to Section 45 or 46 of the Civil Code based upon a statement or publication alleging that a peace officer has not properly performed his or her duties...." (Italics added.)
[9]  Plaintiff's motion for judicial notice of the legislative history of Assembly Bill No. 95 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) is granted. As explained above, however, we do not find the legislative history of that unenacted bill useful in construing section 1021.7.


[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In
re Application of Wammes, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-3906.]

                                         NOTICE
     This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
     advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
     promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
     South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
     formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
     the opinion is published.

                          SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-3906
                          IN RE APPLICATION OF WAMMES.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
         may be cited as In re Application of Wammes, Slip Opinion No.
                                    2018-Ohio-3906.]
Attorneys—Character and Fitness—Application to register as a candidate for
        admission to the practice of law—Delinquent-child adjudication—Pending
        application to take the bar exam approved—Applicant may apply to take
        the February 2019 bar exam.
   (No. 2018-0494—Submitted May 22, 2018—Decided September 27, 2018.)
   ON REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Character and Fitness of the
                                Supreme Court, No. 697.
                              _______________________
        Per Curiam.
        {¶ 1} Applicant, Brison Deverick Wammes, of Cincinnati, Ohio, applied in
November 2016 to register as a candidate for admission to the practice of law in
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Ohio and to take the July 2018 bar examination. He was expected to graduate from
the Salmon P. Chase College of Law at Northern Kentucky University in May 2018.
       {¶ 2} Two members of the Cincinnati Bar Association admissions
committee interviewed Wammes in September 2017, and the committee issued a
provisional report recommending that his character and fitness be approved.
Because Wammes had been adjudicated a delinquent child for conduct that would
be a felony if committed by an adult, his application was submitted to the Board of
Commissioners on Character and Fitness for review in accordance with Gov.Bar R.
I(11)(D)(5)(a) and I(12).
       {¶ 3} A three-member panel appointed by the board conducted a hearing on
January 18, 2018. At the hearing, Wammes testified that in the fall of 2007, when
he was 15 years old, he struck a peer after the peer had expressed interest in
Wammes’s girlfriend. The peer suffered a broken jaw. Wammes testified that
when he saw the young man bleeding from the mouth, he immediately felt remorse
and apologized. Wammes called his parents to confess what he had done. He also
spoke to the victim’s mother on the phone and apologized. Based on this incident,
Wammes was adjudicated a delinquent child. He performed community service,
completed an anger-management assessment, and served only one year of a three-
year period of probation before he was released.
       {¶ 4} An applicant to the Ohio bar must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that he or she “possesses the requisite character, fitness, and moral
qualifications for admission to the practice of law.” Gov.Bar R. I(11)(D)(1). The
applicant’s record of conduct must justify “the trust of clients, adversaries, courts,
and others with respect to the professional duties owed to them.” Gov.Bar R.
I(11)(D)(3). In considering whether Wammes had satisfied his burden, the panel
noted that he (1) did not forfeit any rights or privileges as a result of the
adjudication, (2) has learned never to respond with violence and to think before
acting, and (3) has demonstrated that he is no longer the immature teenager he was

                                          2
                                January Term, 2018

more than 10 years ago. See Gov.Bar R. I(11)(D)(3)(a), (4)(a) through (j), and
(5)(a). Therefore, the panel determined that Wammes had met his burden of
proving his character, fitness, and moral qualifications for admission to the practice
of law and recommended that we approve his registration application. The board
unanimously adopted the panel’s report and recommendation, and there are no
objections. Having thoroughly reviewed the record and applicable rules, we agree
that Wammes has established that he possesses the requisite character, fitness, and
moral qualifications for admission to the practice of law in Ohio.
       {¶ 5} Accordingly, we adopt the board’s report and approve Wammes’s
pending application and permit him to sit for the February 2019 bar exam, provided
that he satisfies the remaining registration requirements.
                                                              Judgment accordingly.
       O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE,
and DEGENARO, JJ., concur.
                               _________________
       Brison Deverick Wammes, pro se.
       Raymond W. Lembke, for the Cincinnati Bar Association.
                               _________________

                                          3


             IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                               AT JACKSON
                                 Assigned on Briefs January 11, 2005

             STATE OF TENNESSEE v. KENDRICK LAMONT BROOKS

                          Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County
                              No. 97-374    Roy B. Morgan, Jr., Judge

                        No. W2004-00475-CCA-R3-CD - Filed April 28, 2005

The Appellant, Kendrick Lamont Brooks, appeals the revocation of his probation by the Madison
County Circuit Court. On appeal, Brooks argues that the trial court was without authority to revoke
his probation because the violation warrant was issued after his sentence had expired. Finding this
argument without merit, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

   Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed; Remanded for Corrected
                                Judgments of Conviction

DAVID G. HAYES, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS and
J. C. MCLIN , JJ., joined.

George Morton Googe, District Public Defender; and Stephen P. Spracher, Assistant Public
Defender, Jackson, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Kendrick Lamont Brooks.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; David E. Coenen, Assistant Attorney General;
Jerry Woodall, District Attorney General; and Jody S. Pickens, Assistant District Attorney General,
for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                                     OPINION

       On January 7, 1998, the Appellant pled guilty to robbery and misdemeanor possession of
cocaine. He received concurrent sentences of six years for the robbery conviction, which was
ordered suspended, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the possession conviction, to be
served in the county jail.1 No pretrial jail credit is reflected on the judgment form for either

         1
          W ith regard to the robbery conviction, the judgment form signed by the trial judge states that the Appellant
was placed on probation for six years. The probation order entered by the trial judge recites that the Appellant was
“placed on probation for a period of 5 years and 1 day (after serving 11 months and 29 days).” Moreover, the probation
                                                                                (continued...)
conviction; however, the appellate record was supplemented with a “mittimus” which reflects that
the Appellant was credited with “320 days jail time” for both sentences.2 Although the record is
silent on this point, we presume, based upon the number of pretrial jail credits, that the Appellant
was released to supervised probation on the date the guilty pleas were entered.

        On June 19, 2003, a probation violation warrant was issued alleging that the Appellant had
violated the conditions of probation based upon new arrests and convictions for DUI, driving on a
suspended license, disobeying a traffic sign, not having proof of insurance, leaving the scene of an
accident, and domestic assault. Additionally, the warrant charged failure to report to his probation
officer and failure to inform of a change in employment. A revocation hearing was held on February
17, 2004, at which time the Appellant conceded the alleged violations. He argued, however, that the
three hundred twenty days of pretrial jail credit reduced his six-year sentence by the same number
of days; thus, he asserted that his sentence had expired in February 2003, prior to the issuance of the
probation warrant in June 2003, and that the trial court was without jurisdiction to revoke. The trial
court rejected this argument and reinstated the original six-year sentence, granting the Appellant jail
credit of three hundred twenty days against the sentence. The Appellant appeals this ruling.

                                                        Analysis

         On appeal, the Appellant raises the legal question of whether the detention period awaiting
trial, or in this case the period prior to entry of the guilty plea, proportionally reduces the
probationary sentence. In effect, the Appellant contends that his probationary period had expired
prior to the issuance of the revocation warrant “because of the three hundred twenty days credit due
for his pre-plea incarceration.” It is fundamental that a trial court has no authority to cause
revocation of a suspended sentence after the sentence has expired. State v. Steven B. Mangrum, No.
01C01-9007-CC-00176 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Feb. 21, 1991).

        The Appellant cites as authority State v. Watkins, 972 S.W.2d 703 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)
to support his argument that his probationary sentence had expired. The holding in Watkins did not
decide the underlying issue presented in the instant case and is, thus, not dispositive. Watkins
involved the probation revocation of two consecutive eleven month and twenty-nine day
misdemeanor sentences. Central to the Watkins holding was that “the trial court may not impose a
period of probation that exceeds the sentence authorized by law.” 972 S.W.2d at 705. The Watkins
court concluded that because the imposed probationary period extended beyond the maximum time
allowed for the conviction, i.e., eleven months and twenty-nine days, the sentence had expired before
the violation warrant issued. Id. at 705-706. Moreover, although the Appellant argues that his

         1
            (...continued)
order provides, “The expiration date of this probationary sentence is the 7 th day of January, 2004 . . . Ordered . . . this
the 7 th day of January 1998.”

         2
           Because no jail credit is shown on either judgment form, a remand is necessary for correction of the forms for
an accurate record of the proceedings below with regard to jail credits and for Department of Correction purposes with
regard to the felony conviction.

                                                            -2-
service of three hundred twenty days in jail proportionally reduced the expiration date of his
probationary sentence, two opinions of this court have reached contrary conclusions. See State v.
William A. Marshall, No. M2001-02954-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Oct. 14,
2002) (pretrial jail credits do not accelerate the expiration date of a defendant’s probationary
sentence); State v. Dennis R. Jacks, No. E2000-00643-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville,
May 7, 2001), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. 2001) (pretrial jail credit did not affect the expiration date
of the probationary sentence).

      The expiration date of a sentence of probation is expressly governed by the provisions of
Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-310 (2003) which provide:

       The trial judge shall possess the power, at any time within the maximum time which
       was directed and ordered by the court for such suspension, after proceeding as
       provided in § 40-35-311, to revoke and annul such suspension, and in such cases the
       original judgment so rendered by the trial judge shall be in full force and effect from
       the date of the revocation of such suspension, and shall be executed accordingly . .
       ..

(emphasis added); See also State v. Taylor, 992 S.W.2d 941, 944-45 (Tenn. 1999). In Taylor, the
Appellant received a four-year sentence which was suspended after he had served a period of
incarceration. On appeal, he argued that his sentence had expired prior to the institution of
revocation proceedings. Deciding adversely to the Appellant, the court reasoned:

       A four-year sentence will expire after service of 1460 days . . . . [Taylor had] 549
       days of sentencing credits. . . . He did successfully complete a term of three years and
       186 days probation. However, he had not completed an entire four-year term of
       probation prior to the revocation proceedings. . . . Therefore, [Taylor’s] sentence had
       not expired because he had neither served the entire four years nor successfully
       completed a four-year term of probation.

Id.

         It is manifest from a reading of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-310 that the trial
court in this case possessed the power at any time within six years from the date the sentence was
imposed to revoke suspension of the sentence. The probationary period of six years is clearly within
the fifteen-year statutory maximum time for the class C conviction offense of robbery. The trial
court imposed a six-year suspended sentence and placed the Appellant on probation for six years on
January 7, 1998; thus, the Appellant remained on probation until January 7, 2004. Because the
probation violation warrant issued in June 2003, the trial court possessed the power to revoke.

                                          CONCLUSION

                                                 -3-
       Based upon the foregoing, the trial court was within its authority to revoke the Appellant’s
suspended sentence. The judgment is affirmed.

                                                      ___________________________________
                                                      DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE

                                                -4-


88 N.W.2d 657 (1958)
166 Neb. 203
Lloyd PUEPPKA and Cleo Pueppka, husband and wife, et al., Appellees,
v.
IOWA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a mutual company, Appellant,
Lydia O. Gerken et al., Intervener-Appellee.
No. 34111.
Supreme Court of Nebraska.
March 14, 1958.
Beatty, Clarke, Murphy & Morgan, Donald W. Pederson, Frank E. Piccolo, Jr., North Platte, for appellant.
*658 Maupin, Dent, Kay & Satterfield, Crosby, Crosby & Nielsen, Halligan & Mullikin, William E. Morrow, Jr., North Platte, for appellees.
E. H. Evans, North Platte, for Gerken, intervener-appellee.
Heard before SIMMONS, C. J., and CARTER, MESSMORE, CHAPPELL, WENKE, and BOSLAUGH, JJ.
CARTER, Justice.
Subsequent to the filing of the former opinion in this case, Pueppka v. Iowa Mutual Ins. Co., 165 Neb. 781, 87 N.W.2d 410, appellees filed a motion for a rehearing. In addition thereto a plain error in the assessment of costs, which was not assigned, has been noted as authorized by Rule 8, subd. a(2, 4) of the rules of this court. An opinion is deemed necessary to dispose of the question raised.
The record shows that the amount charged for the preparation of the bill of exceptions was $930. This item is chargeable as costs to the unsuccessful party. The five volumes of the bill of exceptions contain 1,429 pages of evidence. The bill of exceptions contains 269,819 words by actual count. The amount to be charged for the preparation of the bill is fixed by section 24-342, R.R.S.1943, the pertinent part of which provides: "It shall be the duty of such reporter to furnish on the application of the county attorney, or any party to a suit in which a stenographic report of the proceedings has been made, a transcribed copy of the proceedings so recorded, or any part thereof. The reporter shall be entitled to receive in addition to his salary, a fee of fifteen cents per hundred words, to be paid by the party requesting the same; * * *." On the basis of this provision of the statute, the proper charge for the bill of exceptions in the instant case is $404.85. The overcharge for the preparation of the bill of exceptions is $525.15.
The bill was properly prepared and it includes no material not proper to be included in it. There is no question of opinion or judgment involved. It is purely a matter of calculation in accordance with the cited statutory provision. The cost of preparation of a bill of exceptions is controlled by section 24-342, R.R.S.1943, as this court has previously held. Barton v. Barton, 126 Neb. 835, 254 N.W. 561, 566.
It is the function of courts to handle litigation expeditiously and at a minimum cost. The fixing of fees and charges for the services of administrative officers of the court is a legislative matter. If the charges fixed by the statute are deemed inadequate, the remedy is an appeal to the Legislature and not by the overcharge of litigants. It is the duty of courts to see that its administrative officers adhere to statutory provisions as to fees and charges which are to be taxed as costs.
The cost of preparation of the bill of exceptions in the instant case is hereby fixed at $404.85, and the district court is directed to retax the cost of preparation of the bill of exceptions in that amount.
We hereby promulgate a rule of court with reference to bills of exceptions, effective on the filing date of this opinion, as follows: The certificate of the official court reporter shall include a statement of the cost of the bill of exceptions and an averment that such amount is one permitted to be charged by section 24-342, R.R.S. 1943.
The former opinion of the court has been reexamined in the light of the objections thereto raised by the motion for a rehearing. We find no material error in the statement of the facts of the case or in the principles of law applicable thereto. The motion for a rehearing is therefore overruled.
Costs retaxed and motion for rehearing overruled.


43 F.3d 1470
NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit.Kattie E. WHITED, Petitioner,v.DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITEDSTATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Respondent.
No. 94-1774.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Submitted Dec. 6, 1994.Decided Dec. 19, 1994.

Kattie E. Whited, Petitioner pro se.
Patricia May Nece, Helen Hart Cox, United States Department of Labor, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Before HAMILTON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:

1
Appellant seeks review of the Benefits Review Board's decision and order affirming the administrative law judge's denial of black lung benefits pursuant to 30 U.S.C.A. Secs. 901-945 (West 1986 & Supp.1994).  Our review of the record discloses that the Board's decision is based upon substantial evidence and that this appeal is without merit.  Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the Board.  Whited v. Director, Office of Workers's Comp. Programs, No. 92-2223-BLA (B.R.B. May 16, 1994).  We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

2
AFFIRMED.


20 F.2d 394 (1927)
MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO.
v.
DREEBEN.
No. 3158.
District Court, N. D. Texas, Dallas Division.
June 20, 1927.
Thompson, Knight, Baker & Harris and George S. Wright, all of Dallas, Tex., for the motion.
Locke, Locke, Stroud & Randolph and Albert Sidney Johnson, all of Dallas, Tex., opposed.
ATWELL, District Judge.
The spouse of the defendant was insured by the Mutual Life Insurance Company. The insurance was interrupted by failure to pay a premium. The policy contained a reinstatement clause. Among other requisites was the good health of the insured. After the reinstatement the insured died. The policy contained the usual incontestability clause after two years. The beneficiary, the insured's widow, brought a suit upon the policy and later dismissed it. After its dismissal, and a day or two before two years after its reinstatement had run, the company brought this suit to cancel because of alleged false and fraudulent representations in the reinstatement application.
It is argued by the respondent that the insurance company will have, if its contention is true, a complete defense at law if and when she brings a suit upon the policy. She contends that the clause which makes the policy incontestable after two years relates only and solely to the original contract upon which it was issued, and that it does not apply to the reinstatement feature, which she contends is a new contract, and that the company's defense may be urged at any time and is not limited by the two years period. The case of State Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Rosenberry, 213 S. W. 245, by the Supreme Court of Texas, is cited as authority for this position.
1. The existence of a legal remedy in the defense of an action at law on the policy, as shown in Cable v. United States Life Insurance Co., 191 U. S. 302, 24 S. Ct. 74, 48 L. Ed. 188, which was approved in American Mills Co. v. American Surety Co., in 260 U. S. 360, 43 S. Ct. 149, 67 L. Ed. 306, does not preclude the insurer, bounden by a contract with an incontestable clause in it, from proceeding at equity to cancel. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Keeton (C. C. A.) 292 F. 53; Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. McIntyre (C. C. A.) 294 F. 886; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Renault (D. C.) 11 F. *395 (2d) 281. The incontestable clause is also recognized as valuable for the beneficiary. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hurni Packing Co., 263 U. S. 167, 44 S. Ct. 90, 68 L. Ed. 235, 31 A. L. R. 102.
2. Are false and fraudulent representations, made in an application for reinstatement, subject to the incontestability clause? The Texas case holds that they are not. The reasoning of the opinion in support of that position would be equally applicable to the incontestability of the policy with reference to any fraud or misrepresentation in its inception. The vice in the reasoning, it seems to me, is that a reinstatement gives an added element of uncertainty in the payment of the insurance, and erases from the original contract at least two of its provisions, namely, cash and loan values, and the incontestability after the lapse of a certain period.
The Texas case was also based somewhat upon the Texas statute (Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. 1925, art. 5050), which provides that a policy of insurance shall contain the entire contract between the parties, and since the reinstatement was not in the original policy reconcilement was necessary. It seems to me that a more substantial rule would be to give effect to all of the provisions of the contract between the parties, because there is the same underlying reason for incontestability as to the representations for reinstatement that there is for representations as to the original contract. A party contracts with an insurance company for an incontestable clause. This clause is of value to him. He knows that after two years his beneficiary will get the insurance, if he dies, without going through a contest. If representations made as the basis for reinstatement may be left open to contest for 10 or 20 years, and then be attacked, the insured does not have this satisfaction. This certainly was not the intention of the parties. They evidenced a desire to limit the time within which the company might contest the payment of its obligation.
I do not think that the contract, after reinstatement, is a new contract. That position is mythical. The contract begun a few years before, and nothing that is thereafter done to reinstate it makes it begin as of the date of reinstatement. The right of reinstatement itself is found in the contract. It is the spark that was not extinguished. Reinstatement gave it more life. It gave it additional life. It then lived, wholly, again; that which was almost dead was renewed into full vigor. While the position is not in all degrees satisfactory, it is more satisfactory, I think, if incontestability is read into all representations that the insured makes to the insurer, whether those representations be with reference to a reinstatement or with reference to the original representations that were made when the contract was issued.
This position makes the two years begin to run as to reinstatement representations when they were made. Two years after reinstatement their falseness may not be advantaged by the company. This reading gives the company ample time to make investigation as to what the insured represented. It also gives a settled value to the policy. This reading lends the original stability to the contract. Great Western Life Insurance Co. v. Snavely (C. C. A.) 206 F. 20, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1056; Teeter v. United Life Ins. Association, 159 N. Y. 411, 54 N. E. 72; Joyce on Insurance, p. 6122; McCormack v. Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., 161 App. Div. 33, 146 N. Y. S. 613; Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Galbraith, 115 Tenn. 471, 91 S. W. 204, 112 Am. St. Rep. 862.
Having reached this point in our study, it follows, of course, that, two years having nearly elapsed since reinstatement, the insurer was bound to protect itself against the running of that new two years. This it has done by the institution of this suit.
The motion to dismiss is overruled.


158 Conn. 117 (1969)
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
v.
QUEENIE ENGLEHART
Supreme Court of Connecticut.
Argued March 11, 1969.
Decided April 1, 1969.
KING, C. J., ALCORN, HOUSE, COTTER and THIM, JS.
*118 John A. Spector, for the appellant (defendant).
James N. Oliver, Jr., prosecuting attorney, for the appellee (state).
ALCORN, J.
The defendant was charged, in the Circuit Court, with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The state presented evidence and rested its case. The defendant offered no evidence. A jury of twelve found her guilty. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict and rendered judgment *119 on the verdict. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Division of the Circuit Court on the sole ground that the state had failed to prove that she had operated the vehicle. The Appellate Division sustained the conviction, and, on the defendant's petition, we granted certification.
The only issue presented is whether the jury could, on the evidence offered by the state, reasonably conclude that the defendant, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, was guilty of operating the vehicle.
Section 14-227a of the General Statutes, so far as material, provides that: "No person shall operate a motor vehicle upon a public highway of this state... while under the influence of intoxicating liquor...." The burden which rested on the state in order to establish the crime charged was to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, (2) the defendant operated a motor vehicle on a public highway. State v. McDonough, 129 Conn. 483, 484, 29 A.2d 582. It is not disputed that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Our concern is only with the second element of the crime charged. The burden of proof of that element of the crime could be met by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. "The law recognizes no distinction between circumstantial evidence and direct evidence so far as probative force is concerned. If evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, should convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that an accused is guilty, that is all that is required for a conviction." State v. Smith, 138 Conn. 196, 200, 82 A.2d 816; State v. Kreske, 130 Conn. 558, 563, 36 A.2d 389.
It is clear that the state's case concerning the operation of this motor vehicle by the defendant *120 rested on circumstantial evidence to the extent that no witness was produced who actually saw her drive the vehicle along the road. The jury could reasonably have found from the evidence before them, in summary, as follows: On January 3, 1967, a state trooper was patrolling Babcock Hill Road, a public highway in Lebanon. The road, described as a "back" road, is eighteen feet wide and has a "blacktop" surface. The weather was clear and the road surface was dry. At about 8 p.m., the trooper came upon an automobile stationary in about the center of the road. The taillights and the bright headlights of the car were on, and the defendant was seated in the driver's seat, slumped over the steering wheel. She was unconscious, "dead drunk", and drooling at the mouth. The key was in the ignition switch, which was turned to the "on" position, the gear shift lever was in the "drive" position, and the emergency brake was on. The motor was not running. No person other than the defendant was in the car. After a delay of ten or fifteen minutes while waiting for assistance to arrive, the trooper, with another trooper who was called to help him, lifted the defendant from the car in which she was seated to a police cruiser, drove to a police barracks and carried her inside. After she was removed from the car to the cruiser, one of the troopers started the car, which was in good operating condition, and drove it about 2000 feet down the road to a location where it was parked. For a period of about an hour and a half from the time she was first discovered, the defendant was unable to walk or to talk coherently.
There was no suggestion of the presence of any person, houses, or buildings of any sort in the vicinity of the spot where the defendant was found *121 seated, alone, in the driver's seat of the car. There was no evidence as to who owned the car or how long it had stood in the center of the road. There was no evidence that the defendant was a licensed driver.
From the evidence before them, it is obvious that the jury, by their verdict, inferred that the defendant, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, had either driven the vehicle to the point at which it stopped or had attempted to start it after it had stopped, thereby giving rise to a situation such as that in State v. Swift, 125 Conn. 399, 403, 6 A.2d 359. The question before us is whether this inference is so unreasonable that the verdict cannot be supported.
It was unquestionably within the province of the jury to draw a reasonable and logical inference from the facts proved. The inference may be drawn as long as it comes only from, and bears a logical relation to, the other facts which have been proved and not from facts which are merely surmised. State v. Foord, 142 Conn. 285, 294, 113 A.2d 591. Moreover, the inference which the jury in the present case obviously drew had to be wholly consistent with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any other rational conclusion. State v. DeCoster, 147 Conn. 502, 505, 162 A.2d 704.
Emphasis needs to be placed on the distinction between the word "reasonable" and the word "possible." State v. Smith, 156 Conn. 378, 382, 242 A.2d 763. Proof of guilt must exclude every reasonable supposition of innocence. It need not exclude every possible supposition of innocence. "A conclusion of guilt requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and proof to that extent is proof which precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it *122 tends to support, and is consistent with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any other rational conclusion." State v. Annunziato, 145 Conn. 124, 136, 139 A.2d 612; State v. Foord, supra, 295. "[A] mere `possible hypothesis' of innocence will not suffice." State v. Tomassi, 137 Conn. 113, 129, 75 A.2d 67.
The question presented, then, is whether this court must, as a matter of law, conclude that the verdict is not supported by proof, including reasonable inferences which the jury could draw, which is consistent with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any other rational conclusion.
There would appear to be but three explanations for the situation in which the trooper found the defendant other than that she, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, had operated the car: (1) the car in which she sat was not operated by anyone; (2) it was operated by someone else; or (3) it was operated by the defendant but before she became under the influence of intoxicating liquor. There can be no reasonable doubt that, in order to get to the spot where it was found, the car had to be driven, towed or pushed there. Since the car was found to be in good operating condition and since there were no facts indicating that it had been towed or pushed, there was no reasonable basis for an inference that it had not been operated by someone.
Was there a reasonable basis, then, for an inference that it had been operated by someone other than the defendant? In State v. McDonough, 129 Conn. 483, 486, 29 A.2d 582, this court held that the evidence did not exclude every reasonable supposition of innocence when the defendant was found, intoxicated, seated in the middle of the front seat *123 of a car, one front wheel of which was entangled with the wire of a highway fence. This court said that a rational and reasonable conclusion could be that another person had driven the car and had gone for assistance to extricate it from the wire. The contrast between that case and the present one, in which the car was found in the middle of the road, in good operating condition, with no apparent need for assistance, and with the defendant in the driver's seat, is clear. If resort is had to the possibility that another person drove the car to where it was stopped, placed the defendant in the driver's seat and then departed, such pure speculation would seem to require the assumption that the other person was, for some unknown reason, too bereft of his senses to move the car out of the road but still calculating enough to move the defendant into the driver's seat.
In State v. DeCoster, 147 Conn. 502, 505, 162 A.2d 704, this court found the time element to be of importance and concluded that proof that the defendant had operated the car in that case while under the influence of intoxicating liquor was not satisfied by proof that he was found, in the stopped car, intoxicated. The additional evidence in that case, in contrast to the present case, was that the car's ignition was turned off, both tires on the right side were flat, and, although the defendant was slumped over the steering wheel, there was no evidence that he was seated in the driver's seat. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the car's lights were on when it was discovered at 12:30 a.m. and no evidence that it was not safely parked away from traffic. In the present case, however, not only was the defendant "dead drunk" when found but no sober driver would likely brake an operable vehicle to a stop in the *124 middle of a public highway at night and leave the ignition turned on and the gears in the drive position.
We conclude that it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that the jury could not reasonably have concluded that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
There is no error.
In this opinion KING, C. J., HOUSE and THIM, Js., concurred; COTTER, J., dissented.


                                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                Fifth Circuit
                                                                                F I L E D
                                                                                December 22, 2003
                         IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                Charles R. Fulbruge III
                                                                                Clerk
                                       FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

                                         ______________________

                                              No. 03-60161
                                        _______________________

ANTHONY CHARLES BULLEY, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS NATURAL FATHER, NEXT FRIEND
AND GUARDIAN OF THE PERSON AND ESTATE
OF ANTWAN BULLEY,

                                                                       Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                            versus

TOASTMASTER, INC.; DEFENDANTS A - G,
                                                                       Defendant-Appellee.

                           _________________________________________

                              Appeal from the United States District Court
                                 for the Southern District of Mississippi
                                       (USDC No. 02-CV-00255)
                            ________________________________________

Before DAVIS, WIENER, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

        Plaintiff-Appellant, Anthony Bulley (“Bulley”) appeals the decision of the district court which

granted Defendant-Appellee, Toastmaster Inc.’s (“Toastmaster”) motion for summary judgment

dismissing Bulley’s claims on behalf of himself and his son Antwan Bulley (“Antwan”) for the

wrongful deaths of Bulley’s wife and Antwan’s natural mother, and Bulley’s stepdaughter and

        *
         Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not
precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Antwan’s half-sister, that resulted from a fire allegedly caused by a defective Toastmaster product.

We affirm the district court’s decision and decline to certify the issues raised on this appeal.

                                           DISCUSSION

I.     Statement of facts

       On January 10, 1999, a fire destroyed the home of Bulley and his wife Gaida Bulley

(“Gaida”). Gaida and her minor daughter Kiara Hubbs (“Kiara”) died in the fire. Kelvin Hubbs

(“Kelvin”) and Antwan survived the fire. Kelvin is the son of Gaida and the brother of Kiara. Antwan

is the son of Bulley and Gaida, and the half-brother of Kiara and Kelvin.

       Bulley was advised, after an inspection of the fire scene by Roger Owens (“Owens”), an

expert witness retained by Bulley, that the cause of the fire was an electrical malfunction of a space

heater manufactured by Arvin Industries, Inc. (“Arvin”). On February 1, 1999, Bulley filed suit

against Arvin. Around June, 1999, during discovery, representatives of Arvin inspected the space

heater and provided Owens with information that it had been manufactured not by Arvin, but by

Toastmaster, Inc, (“Toastmaster”). Subsequent to Arvin’s filing a motion for summary judgment

dismissal on October 12, 2000, Bulley filed a motion for voluntary dismissal, which the district court

denied. On February 5, 2001, Arvin and Bulley agreed to a voluntary dismissal with prejudice.

       Almost a year later, on February 1, 2002 Bulley filed suit against Toastmaster, naming it as

the manufacturer of the allegedly defective heater. On October, 8, 2002, Toastmaster filed a motion

for summary judgment, claiming that Bulley’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations.

       The district court held that Bulley’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations because

neither of the Mississippi savings statutes, Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-69 (“§ 15-1-69") nor Miss. Code

                                                  2
Ann. § 15-1-59 (“§ 15-1-59"), was applicable, and therefore granted Toastmaster summary judgment

dismissing Bulley’s claims. Bulley now appeals this decision.

II.     Jurisdiction

        This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) and 28 U.S.C. §

1291. In re Topco, Inc., 894 F.2d 727, 734 (5th Cir. 1990).

III.     Standard of Review

        This Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Am. States Ins.

Co. v. Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, 335 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2003).

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56

(c); Tango Transp. v. Healthcare Fin. Servs. LLC, 322 F.3d 888, 890 (5th Cir. 2003). A genuine

issue of material fact exists if the record, taken as a whole, could lead a rational trier of fact to find

for the non-moving party. Id. Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.          The plain language of

Rule 56 (c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

IV.     Law and Analysis

        The district court initially noted that the parties agreed that Bulley’s action was governed by

the three-year statute of limitations pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49. Because Bulley did not

file the suit against Toastmaster until February 1, 2002, more than three years after the January 10,

                                                    3
1999 fire, the district court stated that his claim was outside the statute of limitations.

        Miss. Code. Ann. § 15-1-69

        The issue of whether a plaint iff, who timely sues the wrong party initially, subsequently

voluntarily dismisses with prejudice that party, and then refiles his suit against the proper party after

the statute of limitations has expired, can utilize § 15-1-69 to tol l the running of the statute of

limitations is a matter of first impression for this Court. The district court rejected Bulley’s assertion

that the one-year savings period under Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-69 (“§ 15-1-69") applied here to toll

the running of the three-year statute of limitations.1                   The district court relied on established

Mississippi Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit law in finding that the circumstances of Bulley’s

voluntary dismissal against Arvin and subsequent suit against Toastmaster did not fall within the

scope of § 15-1-69 because his initial action had not (1) been abated, avoided, or defeated by the

death of any party to the action; (2) been abated, avoided, or defeated for any “matter of form,” such

as for lack of jurisdiction; and (3) resulted in a verdict for him, nor a reversal thereof. See, Ryan v.

Wardlaw, 382 So. 2d 1078 (Miss. 1980) and Lowry v. International Broth. of Boilermakers, Iron

Ship Builders and Helpers of America, 220 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1955) (§ 15-1-69 generally provides

a one-year savings period for refiling actions which have been abated, avoided, or defeated for

        1
            § 15-1-69 provides:

              If in any action, duly commenced within the time allowed, the writ shall be abated,
              or the action otherwise avoided or defeated, by the death of any party thereto, or
              for any matter of form, or if, after verdict for the plaintiff, the judgment shall be
              arrested, or if a judgment for the plaintiff shall be reversed on appeal, the plaintiff
              may commence a new action for the same cause, at any time within one year after
              the abatement or other determination of the original suit, or after reversal of the
              judgment therein, and his executor or administrator may, in case of the plaintiff’s
              death, commence new action, within the said year.

                                                             4
reasons of form, such as lack of jurisdiction).

        Finding no error in the district court’s analysis of this issue we affirm its resolution.

        Good Faith/Misnomer of Party

        Bulley also argues that he proceeded initially against Arvin in good faith based upon the

advice and recommendation of his expert witness, Owen, that his subsequent dismissal of Arvin was

as a result of a misnomer of party, and therefore § 15-1-69 worked to give him one-year from the

voluntary dismissal of February 5, 2001 to refile his suit against Toastmaster.

        The district court found that Bulley’s failure to bring his initial suit against the correct party

here was neither the result of good faith nor a misnomer of party.

        The district court relied on the Mississippi Supreme Court’s holding in W.T. Raleigh Co. v.

Barnes, 109 So. 8 (Miss. 1926), in determining that Bulley failed to show good faith in not bringing

suit against Toastmaster until after the statute of limitations had run. Bulley, the district court noted,

simply sued the wrong defendant initially, and the record was devoid of evidence indicating any

connection between Arvin and Toastmaster. Additionally, the district court noted that Bulley knew

as early as June, 1999, that Arvin had not manufactured the heater in question and that Bulley had

admitted that he knew that Toastmaster had manufactured the heater sometime prior to entering into

the voluntary dismissal with Arvin. Finally, the district court concluded, Bulley had until January 10,

2002 to file suit against Toastmaster and failed to do so, therefore requiring that his suit against it be

dismissed.

        A good faith intent for invoking the savings statute “involves a finding of fact by the trial

court, which must be accepted if supported by substantial evidence.” Wertz v. Ingalls Shipbuilding,

Inc., 790 So.2d 841, 845 (Miss. App. 2000) citing Herring Gas Co. v. Whiddon, 616 So.2d 892, 893

                                                    5
(Miss. 1993).

         The district court fully considered Bulley’s claim of good faith, and its finding of a lack of

such was based on substantial evidence. Having reviewed the record we agree with the district court’s

resolution of this issue.

         Furthermore, this Court’s holdings in Honeycutt v. Long, 861 F.2d 1346, 1349, 1351 (5th

Cir. 1988), and Montalvo v. Tower Life Building, 426 F.2d 1135, 1146-47, 1151 (5th Cir. 1970)

have established that a misnomer of party situation exists only where the named defendant and the

correct defendant are connected in some way, such as sharing the same general co unsel or office

space.       Bulley has not argued, nor can he show, that Arvin and Toastmaster are connected in

anyway. We therefore also agree with the district court that Bulley’s initial suit against the wrong

party, Arvin, was not a misnomer of party entitling him to an extended period of time beyond the

statute of limitations to file suit against Toastmaster.

         Miss. Code. Ann. § 15-1-59

         The district court rejected Bulley’s assertion that the one-year savings period under Miss.

Code Ann. § 15-1-59 applied to toll the statute of limitations for his minor son Antwan’s wrongful

death suits because it found that Bulley was available to protect Antwan’s rights,2 thus precluding the

applicability of this savings statute.

         The district court, relying on Curry v. Turner, 2002 WL 31829166 (Miss. 2002) and Arender

         2
             § 15-1-59 provides:

               If any person entitled to bring any of the personal actions mentioned shall, at the
               time at which the cause of action accrued, be under the disability of infancy or
               unsoundness of mind, he may bring the actions within the times in this chapter
               respectively limited, after his disability shall be removed as provided by law.

                                                            6
v. Smith County Hosp., 431 So.2d 491, 493-94 (Miss. 1983), concluded that as long as there is a

responsible party who is acting or could act on behalf of a minor child, a person in esse, the statute

of limitations will run from the time the cause of action accrues, and § 15-1-59 will not apply. The

district court held that because Mississippi’s wrongful death statute, Miss Code Ann. § 11-7-13,3

clearly provided that Bulley could bring a suit on Antwan’s behalf, a person in esse exists thus

precluding the application of § 15-1-59 to save Antwan’s suits for the wrongful deaths of both Gaida

and Kiara.

       We conclude that the district court did not err in resolving this issue.

       Issue Certification/Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 46

       Bulley finally argues that if this Court finds that Mississippi law is unsettled, vague or

ambiguous on the issues presented in this case, then he requests that this Court seek certification on

the issues to the Mississippi Supreme Court pursuant to M.R.A.P. 46. (citing Walters v. Inexco Oil

Company, 670 F.2d 476, 477 n.2 (5th Cir. 1982); Government Employees Insurance Company v.

Brown, 675 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1982)).

       However, certification is appropriate only when Mississippi precedents as to the issues to be

resolved are insufficiently clear, and the certification procedure may be the only means of allowing

       3
           Miss Code Ann. § 11-7-13 provides in pertinent part:

             The action for such damages may be brought in the name of the personal
             representative of the deceased person for the benefit of all persons entitled under
             the law to recover, or by widow for the death of her husband, or by the husband for
             the death of the wife, or by the parent for the death of a child, or in the name of
             a child, or in the name of a child for the death of a parent, or by a brother for the
             death of a sister, or by a sister for the death of a brother, or by a sister for the death
             of a sister, or a brother for the death of a brother, or all parties interested may join
             in the suit, and there shall be but one (1) suit for the same death which shall ensue
             for the benefit of all parties concerned, but the determination of such suit shall not
             bar another action unless it be decided on the merits.

                                                              7
the Mississippi Supreme Court to authoritatively establish the rule of law. Brown, 675 F.2d at 646.

        The district court’s resolution of the issues in this case was based on clearly established

Mississippi Supreme Court precedent, and therefore no vagueness or ambiguity exists in the settled

principles of law that were applied by the district court.

        Therefore, because Mississippi law is neither unsettled, vague or ambiguous, we DENY

Bulley’s request for certification of these issues.

                                           CONCLUSION

        Because the district court did not err in finding that neither § 15-1-69 nor § 15-1-59 applied

in this case, and that Bulley failed to show that his delay in bringing suit against the correct party,

Toastmaster, was in good faith, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment to

Toastmaster dismissing Bulley’s claims. Furthermore, because the Mississippi law as to these issues

is well settled and unambiguous, Bulley’s request for certification is DENIED.

                                                      8
9


632 So.2d 24 (1993)
R.S.B.
v.
STATE.
CR-91-1286.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
March 5, 1993.
*25 Al Vreeland, Tuscaloosa, for appellant.
James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Gregory Griffin, Sr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

ON RETURN TO REMAND
TAYLOR, Judge.
The appellant, R.S.B., a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent by the Juvenile Court of Tuscaloosa County on the underlying misdemeanor offenses of hunting without permission on the lands of another, in violation of § 9-11-241, Code of Alabama 1975, and of failing to wear a blaze orange cap or vest, as required by Rule 220-2-.85(1) of the Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural Resources. The juvenile court fined the appellant $50 for hunting on the lands of another without permission and $25 for failing to wear blaze orange, and also assessed court costs, but found the appellant not in need of care or rehabilitation.
We remanded this cause to the juvenile court so that that court could clarify its order on the status of the appellant. 632 So.2d 23 (Ala.Cr.App.1992). The juvenile court has filed a return of its order, but we find that the court did not comply with our directions.
In its order on return to remand, the juvenile court found that the appellant was delinquent but that he was not in need of care or rehabilitation at state expense. As we stated in our original opinion, this finding is contrary to the applicable statutes, which require the court, if it finds the appellant delinquent, to find the appellant in need of care or rehabilitation.
The juvenile court expressed concerns in its order on remand that to hold that a juvenile is "in need of care or rehabilitation" requires that the juvenile "would have to be court ordered at State expense into probation, detention, etc. in order to support the imposition of any sanction, be it fine, costs, fees or restitution." Our reading of the pertinent statutes leads us to a different conclusion. Code of Alabama 1975, § 12-15-71, provides several avenues pursuant to which the court may dispose of the juvenile's case upon finding the juvenile in need of care or rehabilitation. This includes, as the court did in this case, permitting the juvenile to remain with his parents or guardian, § 12-15-71(c)(1), and assessing a fine against the juvenile, § 12-15-71(c)(5). A court does not have to remand a delinquent child to the care of the state. This option available to the juvenile court under § 12-15-71(c)(1), i.e., permitting the child to remain with his parents, provides for disposition of the case without state expense.
However, § 12-15-65(d) states:
"If the court finds that the child is not in need of care or rehabilitation, it shall dismiss the proceedings and discharge the *26 child from any detention or other temporary care therefore ordered."
(Emphasis added.)
From a reading of the juvenile court's order on remand, it appears that the court found the child to be delinquent but did not want to use the resources of the state to dispose of the case. The trial court here intended that the appellant's rehabilitation be attempted under the supervision of his parents. The statute provides for this option. § 12-15-71(c)(1). However, before this option may be taken, the court must first make a finding that the child is in need of care or rehabilitation.
This case is, therefore, again remanded to the Juvenile Court for Tuscaloosa County, for that court to correct its order concerning the status of the appellant. If the court finds the child delinquent, then it must also find the child in need of care or rehabilitation and may remand the child to the custody of his parents. If the court does not find the appellant in need of care or rehabilitation, we have no choice but to reverse the juvenile court's finding.
In the interest of judicial economy, we will address the other issues presented by the appellant.
The state's evidence tended to show that, on December 15, 1991, Ralph Dorroh saw the appellant and the appellant's hunting partner enter his property. Both youths were carrying hunting rifles, and had entered Dorroh's property from adjacent property owned by Gulf States Paper Company that was being used as a hunting club. Dorroh watched the youths for approximately one hour before he approached the appellant's partner, who had by then walked back onto Gulf State's property. The appellant's partner indicated to Dorroh that the appellant was "on the other side of the pipeline," i.e., that he was still on Dorroh's property. Dorroh found the appellant on his property. The appellant told Dorroh that he thought that he could hunt on Dorroh's property, so long as he stayed within 100 yards of Gulf State's property line. Dorroh testified that neither youth had permission to hunt on his property. Dorroh presented photographs of the property line, showing trees marked with yellow paint, which indicated the property line between the Gulf States property and his property. He testified that his property was clear-cut and that there was a distinct line between the two parcels of property. Dorroh further testified that, while the appellant had been wearing an orange hat when he entered Dorroh's property, he was not wearing it when Dorroh talked to him.

I
First, the appellant contends that the state's evidence was insufficient to find that he was intentionally hunting on the lands of another without permission. Section 9-11-241, Code of Alabama 1975, states, in pertinent part:
"Any person who hunts, traps, captures, injures, kills or destroys or attempts to hunt, trap, injure, kill or destroy any wild game on the lands of another between the hours of daylight and sunset without the written permission of or accompanied by the landowner or person in possession or control of said lands shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction, shall be punished for the first offense by a fine of not less than $250.00...."
The referee found as a fact that the appellant was intentionally hunting on the lands of another without permission, in violation of § 9-11-241, Code of Alabama 1975. The testimony of the complaining witness, Ralph Dorroh, was legally sufficient to support this finding. Further, the appellant testified that he knew he was not on Gulf State's property at that time, but further testified that he misperceived the law as to where he was permitted to hunt. Ignorance of the law is no excuse.
Further, "it is not the province of this court to reweigh the evidence presented at trial." Watkins v. State, 565 So.2d 1227, 1231 (Ala.Cr.App.1990). There was ample evidence presented from which the referee could have found the juvenile guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of hunting on the lands of another without permission.

II
Next, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to *27 dismiss count two of the petition, which charges failure to wear "hunter orange," in violation of Rule 220-2-.85(1) of the Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural Resources. He specifically argues that the commissioner of the Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural Resources exceeded his legislative authority when he enacted the requirement that all hunters wear "hunter orange." Rule 220-2-.85(1) states:
"All persons hunting any wildlife species (except waterfowl, turkey, and mourning dove and while hunting legally designated species during legal nighttime hours) during dates and in areas open by regulation to gun deer season are required to wear an outer garment above the waist with a minimum of 144 square inches of hunter orange or either a full size hunter orange hat or cap. Hunters are not required to wear hunter orange when hunting from a stand elevated 12 feet or more from the ground; however, hunter orange must be worn when traveling to or from the elevated stand. A small logo and/or printing is permitted on the front of hunter orange caps; otherwise, hunter orange must be of solid color and visible from any angle. Only hunter orange, commonly called blaze orange, ten mile cloth, etc., is legal. The various shades of red are not legal."
Section 9-2-2, Code of Alabama 1975, states, pertinent part:
"The general functions and duties of the department of conservation and natural resources shall be as follows:
"(1) To protect, conserve and increase the wildlife of the state and to administer all laws relating to wildlife and the protection, conservation and increase thereof.."
(Emphasis added.)
"The commissioner of conservation and natural resources shall have all power and authority necessary or convenient to carry out the functions and duties of the department of conservation and natural resources." § 9-2-6, Code of Alabama 1975. Further, § 9-2-7, Code of Alabama 1975 states, in pertinent part:
"(a) The commissioner of conservation and natural resources is hereby vested with the power to enforce and administer all laws providing for the preservation, protection, propagation and development of wild birds, wild fur-bearing animals, game fish, saltwater fish, shrimp, oysters and other shellfish, crustaceans and all other species of wildlife within the state or within the territorial jurisdiction of the state which have not been reduced to private ownership, except as otherwise provided.
"(b) The commissioner of conservation and natural resources is empowered:
". . . .
"(6) To regulate the manner, means and devices for catching or taking game fishes, game birds, game and fur-bearing animals and the manner, means and devices for catching or taking all other species of fish not designated as game fish;
". . . .
"(8) To designate by name what animals shall be classed as game or furbearing animals and the time, manner, means and devices for taking same...."
(Emphasis added.)
Last, § 9-2-12, Code of Alabama 1975, states:
"The commissioner of conservation and natural resources shall have and exercise all rule-making powers of any division of the department of conservation and natural resources subject to the provisions of section 9-2-15. The commissioner of conservation and natural resources shall have power and authority to establish and promulgate rules and regulation, including amendments and repeals thereof, with respect to the manner of performance of all functions and duties of the department of conservation and natural resources, which rules and regulations shall be reasonably calculated to effect the expeditious and efficient performance of such functions and duties and shall not be in conflict with applicable statutes. The rule-making power of the commissioner of conservation and natural resources shall not be delegated, except as otherwise expressly provided."
*28 The Alabama Supreme Court, in Ex parte Jones Mfg. Co., 589 So.2d 208 (Ala.1991), set forth the general rules concerning administrative regulations:
"An administrative regulation must be consistent with the statutes under which its promulgation is authorized. Ex parte City of Florence, 417 So.2d 191 (Ala.1982). An administrative agency cannot usurp legislative powers or contravene a statute. Alabama State Milk Control Bd. v. Graham, 250 Ala. 49, 33 So.2d 11 (1947). A regulation cannot subvert or enlarge upon statutory policy. Jefferson County Bd. of Ed. v. Alabama Bd. of Cosmetology, 380 So.2d 913 (Ala.Civ.App.1980)."
589 So.2d at 210.
We agree that departments of the executive branch of government must not arrogate powers vested exclusively in the legislative branch of government by the state constitution. We hold that the commissioner did not exceed his authority when he enacted the "hunter orange" requirement for hunters. Adoption of regulations for hunting is a reasonable exercise of the rule-making authority granted the commissioner of conservation and natural resources and the regulation requiring hunters to wear blaze orange is consistent with the statute discussed above.
"All reasonable rules and regulations of the State Department of Conservation have the force and effect of law, and courts may take judicial notice of the same." West v. State, 30 Ala.App. 318, 6 So.2d 434 (1941), cert. denied, 242 Ala. 369, 6 So.2d 436 (1942). See also Sanders v. State, 53 Ala.App. 534, 302 So.2d 117 (1974).
The trial court did not err in denying the appellant's motion to dismiss count two of the petition.

III
Last, the appellant argues that the state failed to prove two elements of the violation of the "hunter orange" rulethat the violation occurred "during dates and in areas open by regulation to gun deer season." However, a careful review of the record indicates that this issue has not been preserved for our review. Our jurisdiction is appellate only. Trawick v. State, 431 So.2d 574 (Ala.Cr.App.1983). We will not consider matters on appeal that have not first been presented to the trial court. Harris v. State, 420 So.2d 812 (Ala.Cr.App.1982).
This cause is remanded to the Juvenile Court for Tuscaloosa County for correction of its ruling concerning the status of the appellant in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Due return shall be filed with this court no later than 28 days from the date of this opinion.
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
PATTERSON and McMILLAN, JJ., concur.
BOWEN, P.J., concurs in result only.
MONTIEL, J., concurs in part, dissents in part with opinion.
MONTIEL, Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority's holding in Parts I and III of the opinion. However, I must dissent from the majority's holding in Part II of the opinion.
"As a general rule, the legislature may delegate to its own appointed administrative agencies the authority to make such minor rules and regulations as are necessary or appropriate for administration or enforcement of its general statutes."
Evers v. Board of Medical Examiners, 516 So.2d 650, 655 (Ala.Civ.App.1987) (emphasis added). The offense of failure to wear hunter orange, which is a violation of Rule 220-2.85 of the Conservation Department, constitutes a misdemeanor. The designation of conduct as a criminal offense is not a minor rule or regulation. "[T]he law making power, invested exclusively in the Legislature, cannot be delegated to any other department of the government, or to any other agency, either public or private.... Official action cannot be made a rule or regulation merely by calling it a rule or regulation." State v. Vaughan, 30 Ala.App. 201, 203, 4 So.2d 5 (1941) (holding that a rule made by the conservation department was unconstitutional because the rule accomplished results which could only be enacted by the Legislature).
*29 The designation of conduct as a criminal offense can only be done by the Legislature.
I believe that Rule 220-2-.85 is an unconstitutional usurpation of the power of the legislature. Therefore, I must dissent.


268 P.3d 943 (2012)
STATE
v.
GANTT.
No. 86504-3.
Supreme Court of Washington, Department II.
January 5, 2012.
Disposition of Petition for Review Denied.


47 F.3d 433
Kirby (Vernon)v.Tennessee Valley Authority
NO. 94-6506
United States Court of Appeals,Eleventh Circuit.
Jan 31, 1995
N.D.Ala., 41 F.3d 669

1
DENIALS OF REHEARING EN BANC.


                                                                            FILED
                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             JAN 27 2016

                                                                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

                             FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOAQUIN SOTELO-ESPINOZA,                         No. 14-71229

               Petitioner,                       Agency No. A092-729-546

 v.
                                                 MEMORANDUM*
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

               Respondent.

                      On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                          Board of Immigration Appeals

                             Submitted January 20, 2016**

Before:        CANBY, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

      Joaquin Sotelo-Espinoza, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an

immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision determining that Sotelo-Espinoza had

abandoned his application for cancellation of removal for failure to comply with

          *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
          **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
the fingerprinting deadline, and declining to grant a continuance to allow him to

submit his fingerprints. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review

for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion for a continuance. See Cui v.

Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1289, 1290 (9th Cir. 2008). We deny the petition for review.

      The agency did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant Sotelo-Espinoza

a further continuance to allow him to submit his fingerprints for biometric analysis,

where the IJ informed Sotelo-Espinoza orally of the deadline for being

fingerprinted and of the consequences of failure to meet the deadline, but Sotelo-

Espinoza failed to comply or present good cause for his failure to comply. See 8

C.F.R. § 1003.47(c) (“Failure to file necessary documentation and comply with the

requirements to provide biometrics . . . within the time allowed by the immigration

judge’s order, constitutes abandonment of the application and the immigration

judge may enter an appropriate order dismissing the application unless the

applicant demonstrates that such failure was the result of good cause.”); cf. Cui,

538 F.3d at 1293-95 (requiring a continuance where the alien had no notice of the

requirement).

      In light of this disposition, we do not reach Sotelo-Espinoza’s remaining

contentions.

      PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

                                          2                                    14-71229


952 F.2d 397
NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit.Johnny Kimbert STEPHENS, Petitioner-Appellant,v.Fred W. GREENE;  Mary Sue Terry, Respondents-Appellees.
No. 91-7716.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Submitted Dec. 5, 1991.Decided Dec. 30, 1991.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.  (CA-91-302-3), James R. Spencer, District Judge;  David G. Lowe, Magistrate Judge.
Johnny Kimbert Stephens, appellant pro se.
Katherine Baldwin Toone, Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, Va., for appellees.
E.D.Va.
DISMISSED.
Before DONALD RUSSELL, MURNAGHAN and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:

1
Johnny Kimbert Stephens appeals from the district court's order refusing habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988).   Our review of the record and the district court's opinion discloses that this appeal is without merit.   Accordingly, we deny a certificate of probable cause and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court.   Stephens v. Greene, No. CA-91-302-3 (E.D.Va. Oct. 16, 1991).   We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

2
DISMISSED.