465 F.Supp. 1233 (1979)
Sol SIEDMAN, Plaintiff,
v.
MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INCORPORATED, Defendant.
No. 75 Civ. 6316 (GLG).
United States District Court, S. D. New York.
February 28, 1979.
*1234 Julien, Schlesinger & Finz, P.C., New York City, for plaintiff by David Jaroslawicz, New York City, of counsel.
Brown, Wood, Ivey, Mitchell & Petty, New York City, for defendant by E. Michael Bradley, A. Robert Pietrzak, New York City, of counsel.

OPINION
GOETTEL, District Judge:
In this case, which has already been the subject of proceedings in this Court and extended arbitration hearings, the defendant moves for summary judgment.
As set forth in an earlier opinion of this Court, the plaintiff, Siedman, a man experienced in the brokerage field, had been a customer of Weis Securities, Inc. ("Weis") and had maintained a margin account there. Seidman was advised by Weis in May of 1973 to transfer the account to defendant, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. ("Merrill Lynch"). Upon opening this new account with Merrill Lynch, *1235 plaintiff was required to enter into a "Customer's Agreement," in which he agreed to be bound by certain "Lending Agreement" provisions, one of which stipulated that the parties would arbitrate customer disputes before the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"). (The terms of this agreement were contained on a "Customer Agreement" card which the plaintiff signed.)
The complaint herein concerns 5,500 shares of American Home Products Company which were to be part of the transferred account. However, because a three to one stock dividend had been declared on May 11, 1973, certain clerical steps were required which delayed the transfer of these certificates. These shares never reached Merrill Lynch since Weis was placed in Securities Investor Protection Corporation receivership before the "due bill" for the securities could be cleared through the NYSE. Plaintiff pursued his SIPA (Securities Investor Protection Act) remedies and made a substantial, though not a full, recovery. A suit was then commenced against the SIPA trustees for the entire value of the shares, which was rejected by the Bankruptcy Court. (That decision was subsequently affirmed in district court.)
This action was commenced against Merrill Lynch for negligence in failing to proceed expeditiously with regard to the transfer of the entire margin account. The complaint also alleged various violations of Regulation T and rule 15c3-3(b) of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Rules of the NYSE. Defendant in response moved to dismiss the complaint or, alternatively, to stay the action pending arbitration pursuant to the Customer Agreement. (In light of a clearly arbitrable common law claim, the question of whether plaintiff stated a federal cause of action was not then decided.) As the plaintiff denied that he had ever signed such an agreement, the matter was referred to a Magistrate who conducted an evidentiary hearing, concluding that the agreement had been signed by him. This decision was confirmed by this Court and a motion for reargument denied. Arbitration of the dispute was then directed.
Plaintiff then moved to have the arbitration take place before the American Arbitration Association, rather than the NYSE, because of the alleged bias and partiality of the latter. That application was denied in a Memorandum Endorsement of August 18, 1976.
The arbitration finally proceeded. Nine sessions of hearings were held commencing February 27, 1978 and ending June 15, 1978. On June 28, 1978, the arbitration panel awarded Siedman $134,833 on his claims, less $5,933 awarded to Merrill Lynch on a counterclaim. (Siedman was also ordered to pay over to Merrill Lynch any further amounts that he may receive from the SIPA trustee on his claim.) This Court confirmed the award on September 25, 1978.
The plaintiff contends that despite the arbitration proceedings and award he still retains valid federal securities claims which may be adjudicated by this Court. He alleges that recovery can be had for the defendant's violation of rules 412 and 255-259 of the NYSE, of rule 15c3-3(b) promulgated under section 15(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) et seq., and of Regulation T promulgated under section 7 of the Exchange Act, and asserts that an implied private right of action for damages exists under each of those provisions.

Rules 412 and 255-259 of the New York Stock Exchange
The violation of a stock exchange rule, promulgated pursuant to section 6(b) of the Exchange Act, it has been held, does not per se give rise to a private right of action for damages under federal law. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache, 358 F.2d 178, 181 (2d Cir. 1966) cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817, 87 S.Ct. 40, 17 L.Ed.2d 56 (1966); Schonholtz v. American Stock Exchange, 376 F.Supp. 1089 (S.D.N.Y.1974). Rather, a court in deciding whether such right of action exists must "look to the nature of the particular rule and its place in the regulatory scheme, . . . [with] [t]he case *1236 for implication . . . strongest when the rule imposes an explicit duty unknown to the common law." Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache, supra at 182.[1] In so deciding the Court must utilize the guidelines set down in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2088, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), which require determination of:
"First, is the plaintiff `one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted.' . . . that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? . . . Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?"
Rule 412 of the NYSE which deals with "Customer Account Transfer Contracts" provides for the coordinated transfer of accounts between the receiving and carrying brokers so that the customer suffers no loss as a result.[2] Rules 255-259 of the NYSE relate to "Due-Bills" and provide for the manner in which such bills shall be presented.[3] These rules have been promulgated by the Exchange so as to give brokers a standard of conduct to which they should adhere. While these rules arguably can be said to be primarily intended for the protection of investors (although they also would have the effect of insuring the orderly and efficient operation of the Exchange) the Court does not believe that implication of a private right of action for violation of these rules would be appropriate. These rules do not contain the type of precise directive which the courts have found necessary in order to imply such a remedy. Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 141-143 (7th Cir. 1969) cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838, 90 S.Ct. 98, 24 L.Ed.2d 88 (1969); Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F.Supp. 518 (S.D.N.Y.1974). See Van Alen v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 560 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1977). Rather, as noted in Jenny v. Shearson, Hammill & Co. [1974-75] Fed.Sec. L.Rep. (CCH) ¶ 95,021 at 97,582 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), these rules use language "commonly associated with misconduct amounting to negligence." But implication of liability for negligence or nonfeasance is clearly contrary to the scheme of federal securities laws and the principles established in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 47 L.Ed.2d 668 (1976) both of which aim to prevent deceptive, manipulative and fraudulent conduct. Action by brokers taken in violation of these NYSE rules are subject to state common law contract and negligence rules, and can be adequately remedied in such state proceedings. The Court believes that implication of a private right of action in this context would run counter to Congressional intent, see Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache, 358 F.2d at 182, and would unnecessarily infringe upon an area (negligence) "traditionally relegated to state law." Accordingly, this Court declines to imply such a remedy.

Rule 15c3-3(b)
The plaintiff next asserts that the defendant violated Securities and Exchange *1237 Commission rule 15c3-3(b)[4] and that damages were suffered as a result. Since rule 15c3-3(b) does not provide for a private right of action for damages it again becomes necessary for the Court to determine whether a right of action should be implied.
It has been held that a private right of action should be implied to a statute not otherwise providing for one only when implication would serve to promote the primary purpose of the legislation. Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 25, 97 S.Ct. 926, 51 L.Ed.2d 124 (1977). If such purpose is served then the availability of a private remedy may provide "a necessary supplement to Commission action." J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432, 84 S.Ct. 1555, 1560, 12 L.Ed.2d 423 (1964).
No cases have been cited by the parties, nor has the Court found any, which have previously implied, or supported implication of, a private right of action to rule 15c3-3(b). Upon careful analysis the Court now concludes that implication of such a remedy would be inappropriate. Unlike rule 10b-5, see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975), which is aimed at preventing fraud upon the customer, rule 15c3-3(b) provides a standard of conduct to be followed by a broker or dealer for the purpose of insuring the orderly operation of the exchange. While both the brokerage industry and brokerage house customers are benefitted by this provision, it is clear that the plaintiff is not as required by Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78, 95 S.Ct. at 2088, one "for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted." Implication of a private right of action would not further the legislative scheme since it would serve to benefit individual investors and not the market as a whole. It should also be noted that rule 15c3-3(b), which utilizes such terms as "good faith" effort, aims at preventing negligent conduct, the failure to act promptly, and not the type of fraudulent conduct found necessary for implication of a right of action in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 47 L.Ed.2d 668. The remedies presently available seem adequate to insure compliance with this rule, and there appears to be no reason why the Congressional purpose would be undermined in any way by failure to allow private enforcement. The Court therefore finds that no private right of action exists for violations of rule 15c3-3(b).

Regulation T
The Court is also presented with the question of whether the plaintiff may maintain his action against the defendant for the defendant's alleged violations of the margin requirements of Regulation T.[5] (The margin violation alleged arose only when Weis collapsed and the American Home Products securities were not delivered.) In Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970) cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013, 91 S.Ct. 1250, 28 L.Ed.2d 550 *1238 (1971) it was held that an implied right of action under Regulation T existed on behalf of a customer against his broker. In reaching this conclusion the court noted that "private actions by market investors are a highly effective means of protecting the economy as a whole from margin violations." Id. at 1140.
Since Pearlstein, however, much has occurred to place the current validity of that decision into doubt. Enactment by Congress in 1970 of section 7(f) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78g(f), and promulgation of Regulation X thereunder, has now established that it is unlawful for any person, whether buyer or broker, to extend or receive credit in violation of the margin requirements. As noted by the Tenth Circuit in Utah State University of Agriculture and Applied Sciences v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164, 170 (10th Cir. 1977) "[t]he statement in Pearlstein, 429 F.2d at 1141, that `Congress has placed the responsibility for observing margins on the broker' no longer applies."
In light of these developments the Second Circuit, after remand in Pearlstein, noted that "[t]he effect of these developments is to cast doubt on the continued viability of the rationale of our prior holding." Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 527 F.2d 1141, 1145, n.3 (2d Cir. 1975) ("Pearlstein II"). The court in Pearlstein II, however, did not actually face the question of whether a private right of action under Regulation T existed, and thus did not have an opportunity to modify their prior holding. Other courts have reached this issue and, after some initial attempts to reconcile Pearlstein with Regulation X by giving Pearlstein a limited reading, see e. g. Newman v. Pershing & Co., Inc., 412 F.Supp. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), Bell v. J. D. Winer & Co., Inc., 392 F.Supp. 646 (S.D.N.Y.1975), have recently held that no private right of action for damages under Regulation T exists. Utah State University of Agriculture and Applied Sciences v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d at 170; Establissement Tomis v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 459 F.Supp. 1355, 1360 (S.D.N.Y.1978); Nussbacher v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 444 F.Supp. 973, 980 (S.D.N.Y.1978); Schy v. FDIC [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed.Sec.L.Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,242, 465 F.Supp. 766 (E.D.N.Y.1977). See also Drasner v. Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc., 433 F.Supp. 485, 498-501 (S.D. N.Y.1977). Contra Palmer v. Thomson & McKinnon Auchincloss, Inc., 427 F.Supp. 915 (D.Conn.1977).
Once more utilizing the criteria set down in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26, it is clear that the purpose of section 7 of the Exchange Act and Regulation T is to provide protection for the economy as a whole from excessive market speculation, and is not for the "especial benefit" of individual investors. Utah State University of Agriculture and Applied Sciences v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d at 170 ("Congress imposed the margin requirements to protect the general economy, not to give the customer a free ride at the expense of the broker"); Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d at 1140. This purpose would not be furthered by implication of a private right of action on behalf of an investor. Nor can the Court find any Congressional intent to provide such a remedy. As was noted by Chief Judge Mishler in Schy v. FDIC, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed.Sec.L. Rep. (CCH) at 92,630 at 774, "the fact that Congress considered the need to protect the small investor and expressly failed to provide a right of action impliedly suggests an intent to deny such relief." See Establissement Tomis v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 459 F.Supp. at 1360. And it may well be, as has been stated in Schy and Establissement Tomis, that implication of such a remedy would be inconsistent with the legislative scheme as it would serve the individual investor without benefitting the overall economy. As Judge Friendly noted in his dissent in Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d at 1148 (Friendly, J., dissenting), such a remedy might actually have a detrimental effect on the economy as "[a]ny deterrent effect of threatened liability on the broker may well be more than offset by the inducement to violations inherent in the prospect of a free ride for the customer who, under the majority's view, is *1239 placed in the enviable position of `heads-I-win tails-you-lose.'" See also Drasner v. Thomson McKinnon Securities, 433 F.Supp. at 500.
Accordingly, it appears that no implied private right of action for damages exists to remedy violations by brokers of Regulation T.

The Arbitration Award
More significant than the legal niceties of whether plaintiff can state a federal claim is the fact that the plaintiff suffered a single wrong, has been to arbitration concerning it, and has been granted a substantial award.
Plaintiff, of course, argues that the award was not adequate and that his total recovery of approximately $470,000 (from SIPA and the defendant) is about $7,000 less than he contends his direct loss was. Moreover, he claims he is entitled to interest. The valuation of the stock transfer loss will vary depending upon the exact time chosen for pricing the stock and whether the bid or asked price is based. Whether interest is recoverable, on what is essentially a negligence claim, is another matter of serious doubt. But the plaintiff made these claims before the arbitrators and he is not free to relitigate them here. Saxis S.S. Co. v. Multifacs International Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1967).
Plaintiff also contends that his securities claims were not cognizable in arbitration. Clearly the claim of violation of the NYSE's own rules were a matter it could determine. There is also authority for the proposition that claims made under securities regulations (such as regulation T) are referable to arbitration. Macchiavelli v. Shearson, Hammill & Co. Inc., 384 F.Supp. 21, 30 (E.D.Cal.1974); Robinson v. Bache & Co., 227 F.Supp. 456 (S.D.N.Y.1964).
In the final analysis, plaintiff seeks to pursue these claims in this court since, as he unabashedly admits, a jury may award greater damages than did the arbitrators. His attorney graciously offers to subtract the prior award from the ultimate jury verdict. He does not, however, offer to refund any monies in the event that the jury award is less.
Plaintiff suffered a single wrong. At best, he had several legal remedies by which to vindicate that wrong. He has pursued (albeit reluctantly and under the directions of the Court) the remedy he agreed to when he entered into a relationship with the defendant. The wrong was remedied.

Conclusion
None of the rules or regulations presented in the instant action would appear to provide an appropriate area in which to imply a private right of action. This is particularly so when it is considered that an agreed upon arbitration remedy was readily available, it was pursued, and a judgment resulting from it has already been obtained.
Accordingly, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted and the action is dismissed.
NOTES
[1]  It was noted in Colonial that a court should be more hesitant to imply a right of action to an exchange rule than they would be if dealing with a statute or Securities and Exchange Commission Rule. Id.
[2]  Rule 412 provides, in pertinent part:

"Coordination of activities with respect to the account by both receiving and carrying organizations should be to the end that the customer shall not incur any loss in respect to improper execution, or failure to execute open orders, or on account of dividends of cash and securities and other similar distributions (rights, warrants, stock splits, etc.), interest, bond or preferred stock calls for redemption and tenders as a result of his account having been transferred."
[3]  Rule 255 is a definitional provision, defining the terms "due-bill" and "due-bill check."

Rule 256 provides for the forms of due-bills. Rule 257 provides for deliveries after "ex" date. Rule 258 provides for the guaranty of due bills. Rule 259 provides for the redemption of due bills.
[4]  Rule 15c3-3(b) provides:

(b) Physical possession or control of securities. (1) A broker or dealer shall promptly obtain and shall thereafter maintain the physical possession or control of all fully paid securities and excess margin securities carried by a broker or dealer for the account of customers.
(2) A broker or dealer shall not be deemed to be in violation of the provisions of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph regarding physical possession or control of customers' securities if, solely as a result of normal business operations, temporary lags occur between the time when a security is required to be in the possession or control of the broker or dealer and the time that it is placed in his physical possession or under his control, provided that the broker or dealer takes timely steps in good faith to establish prompt physical possession or control. The burden of proof shall be on the broker or dealer to establish that the failure to obtain physical possession or control of securities carried for the account of customers as required by subparagraph (1) of this paragraph is merely temporary and solely the result of normal business operations including same day receipt and redelivery (turn-around), and to establish that he has taken timely steps in good faith to place them in his physical possession or control.
[5]  Regulation T promulgated under section 7 of the Exchange Act, regulates the extension of credit by brokers and dealers and provides for the minimum margin requirements which must exist at the initiation of a transaction.


565 P.2d 858 (1977)
Vernon S. PRICE, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Alaska, Appellee.
No. 2794.
Supreme Court of Alaska.
July 1, 1977.
John Hagey, Asst. Public Defender, Fairbanks and Brian Shortell, Public Defender, Anchorage, for appellant.
Natalie K. Finn, Asst. Dist. Atty. and Harry L. Davis, Dist. Atty., Fairbanks, for appellee.
Before BOOCHEVER, C.J., RABINOWITZ, CONNOR and BURKE, JJ., and DIMOND, J. Pro Tem.

*859 OPINION
RABINOWITZ, Justice.
After separate jury trials in the superior court, Vernon Price was found guilty of the crime of attempting to procure a female for prostitution, a violation of AS 11.40.350,[1] and two separate counts of burglary in a dwelling, a violation of AS 11.20.080.[2] In February of 1973, Price was sentenced to a term of 10 years imprisonment for the offense of procuring for prostitution and to 10 years on each of the burglary convictions. The 10-year terms for the burglary convictions were made to run consecutively to each other, as well as consecutively to the 10-year sentence which was imposed on the offense of attempting to procure a female for prostitution. Thus, appellant Vernon Price was sentenced to a total of 30 years imprisonment.
Price's trial counsel filed a notice of appeal on February 5, 1973 and notice of sentence appeal on February 13, 1973. Thereafter, on June 22, 1973, Price's appeal and sentence appeal from his three felony convictions were dismissed for failure to file a brief within the prescribed time. In December 1976, the Public Defender Agency *860 filed a "Motion to Reinstate Appeal and Sentence Appeal" which was opposed by the state. Upon consideration of the motion and the state's opposition, this court entered an order denying the motion to reinstate the merit appeals and granting the motion to reinstate the sentence appeals.[3] This sentence appeal followed.
At the time of sentencing appellant Vernon Price was 33 years old, married and was supporting two stepsons. Price's troubles began at the age of 12 when his father died. Unable to get along with his stepfather, Price began to skip school and became difficult to manage. Due to disagreements with a second stepfather, Price and his younger brother Kenneth moved about the western states seeking employment during the 1950's. Price dropped out of the 10th grade at North Bend High School in Oregon at the age of 15, but eventually completed the GED examination while confined in the Oregon State Correctional Institution.
The presentence report indicates that Price has had difficulty with alcohol; that he has an IQ level of "bright normal"; that his psychological evaluation established a pattern which was described "as a psychopathic personality characterized by immaturity, impulsiveness, difficulty in profiting from experience, and a lack of mature judgment or forethought"; that he had been married three times; and that he had worked as a logger, faller, catskinner, and auto body worker.
Of particular significance to this sentence appeal is Price's past adult criminal record. From the presentence report the following picture emerges: In 1959 Price was convicted of disorderly conduct in Reno, Nevada;[4] in 1959 in Grants Pass, Oregon, Price was convicted of forgery and sentenced to a term of 3 years, and was paroled;[5] in 1961 for violation of his parole, Price was sentenced to a term of 2 years and approximately 2 months; in March of 1961 Price was convicted in Salem, Oregon, of two counts of receiving and concealing for which he received a sentence of 3 years;[6] and in 1963 at Empire, Oregon, Price was convicted of receiving and concealing and received a 4-year sentence;[7] in 1966 Price was convicted of his fifth felony, namely, burglary, and received a sentence from 6 months to 15 years;[8] and in Fairbanks, *861 Alaska, in 1970 Price was convicted of assault and battery and was sentenced to 90 days imprisonment with 60 suspended.[9]
The presentence report also dealt with the appellant's most recent convictions. Concerning the two convictions for burglary in a dwelling which are now on appeal to this court, the presentence report indicates that on April 1, 1972, Price had obtained the services of two offenders who were on work release
for the alleged purpose of assisting him with home remodeling activities. Instead, on that particular day, they spend a good part of their time drinking. That afternoon they drove around. They first visited a home on 1/2 Mile Brock Road, and then later at 4 1/2 Mile Steel Creek Road. According to the statement of one of the codefendants, it was Mr. Price's idea.
As to the attempting to procure a female for prostitution conviction, which is also part of the instant sentence appeal, the presentence report states, in part:
This conviction arose out of reports made by persons who were approached approximately August 31, 1972, at the City Bar in Fairbanks. At that time, two females at the City Bar were offered employment to work as prostitutes at the Evergreen in Delta and that it would be worth approximately $1,000.00 to the girls to come along.
The author of the presentence report concluded:
From the standpoint of probationary possibilities, this officer feels that there are none whatsoever at this time. It appears that this defendant will repeat himself in some antisocial manner upon his release despite reasonable controls and requirements made by his conditions of parole.
The author of the presentence report further noted that rehabilitation had been attempted in the past and had not been successful.[10] He opined, "The subject has been more dehabilitated then rehabilitated while institutionalized." In the view of the probation-parole officer, isolation of Price was the most important element to consider "in order to prevent future conduct ... so that society may be properly protected." Thus, the presentence report concluded with the recommendation that Price be sentenced to a period of 20 years incarceration for the three felonies in question.
At the sentencing hearing the prosecution recommended consecutive sentences of 10 years on each conviction for a total of 30 years incarceration, placing primary emphasis on the belief that Price was not amenable to rehabilitation. In articulating the reasons for imposition of these consecutive 10-year sentences, the superior court stated that it was compelled to give primacy to the consideration of the need to protect the public. In elaborating on this theme, the sentencing court stated:
Four cases of receiving and concealing, two cases of burglary, a forgery case, assault and battery  certainly this isn't a situation where I'm ... concerned about the public's safety from violence or physical harm, but I'm certainly considering  am taking into account the fact that they have a right also to be secure in their possessions, which is a right that you [Price] have not, in my opinion, afforded *862 to the people of this community or the communities you lived in.[11]
Additionally, we think it of significance that the superior court took a rather dim view of Price's chances of rehabilitation.[12]
In this appeal Price points out that the superior court imposed the maximum possible sentence authorized by AS 11.20.080[13] for the crime of burglary in a dwelling, and that the sentence imposed for the crime of attempting to procure a female for prostitution,[14] "in many ways ... also represented a maximum sentence." Price argues that the superior court's imposition of consecutive maximum sentences for the three felonies involved was impermissible absent a characterization of Mr. Price as the worse offender in his class.[15] The state counters, arguing:
Although the Court did not use the words `worst offender,' Galaktionoff v. State, 486 P.2d 919, 924 (Alaska 1971), requires only `some foundation for characterizing a defendant as the worst type of offender.' The magic words were not said in the case at bar, but the foundation for that conclusion was clearly stated by the court at sentencing.
Our review of the record in the case at bar has led us to the conclusion that the superior court's imposition of consecutive 10-year sentences for the burglaries was not excessive. In light of the sentencing objectives articulated by this court in State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1970), and its progeny, we hold that the superior court was not clearly mistaken in imposing two consecutive 10-year sentences for the burglaries. Inherent in our holding is the belief that Price's prior criminal record provided ample justification for imposition of consecutive maximum sentences for the two burglary in a dwelling convictions. For Price's prior criminal record furnishes sufficient foundation for characterization of Price as the worst type of offender within the class designated by the legislature.[16]
Our difficulty with the superior court's sentence centers on the imposition of a consecutive 10-year term of imprisonment for the offense of attempting to procure a female for prostitution. Given the circumstances of this particular offense, we are of the opinion that the superior court was clearly mistaken in imposing a consecutive sentence of 10 years imprisonment. Here the record shows a peripheral type of attempt which only involved solicitation and nothing more. Given the severity of *863 the consecutive 10-year term, we have concluded that the matter should be remanded for resentencing as to this particular offense.
Thus, we conclude that the sentences imposed by the superior court for the crimes of burglary are not excessive and are Affirmed. The sentence of 10 years for the crime of attempting to procure a female for prostitution is held excessive in the circumstances of this case, and is therefore vacated and the matter remanded for further sentencing proceedings.
NOTES
[1]  AS 11.40.350 reads:

A person who induces, entices or procures, or attempts to induce, entice or procure a female for the purpose of prostitution or concubinage, or for other immoral purpose, or to enter a house of prostitution in the state, is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a period of not less than two years nor more than 20 years, or by a fine of not less than $1,000, or by both.
[2]  AS 11.20.080 provides:

A person who breaks and enters a dwelling house with intent to commit a crime in it, or having entered with that intent, breaks a dwelling house or is armed with a dangerous weapon in it, or assaults a person lawfully in it is guilty of burglary, and upon conviction is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than 10 years. However, if the burglary is committed at nighttime, it is punishable by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than 15 years. If a human being is within the dwelling at the time of the burglary during the nighttime or daytime, it is punishable by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than 20 years.
[3]  Justice RABINOWITZ and Justice DIMOND, Pro Tem., dissented from the portion of the order denying the motion to reinstate the substantive appeals. Justices CONNOR and BURKE dissented from the portion of the order granting the motion to reinstate the sentence appeals.
[4]  The circumstances of this offense as related by the presentence report are as follows:

A group of three were attempting to cash checks around Reno and became belligerent when being questioned about the same, and would not give proper account of themselves. Apparently released twelve hours later.
[5]  With respect to this conviction, the presentence report states, "The subject and his wife cashed bad checks. Paroled for detainer November 10, 1960, which was dropped the same day."
[6]  The presentence report states Price "[w]ith use of a car rental on February 10th, became involved with stolen merchandise. Made a signed statement to having broken into a grocery store among several varied written statements."
[7]  As to this offense the presentence report states:

On April 6, 1963 a market was burglarized of $2,000.00 worth of merchandise, and later that morning Price gave a stolen radio from that market to an acquaintance, absconded to Fairbanks to live with his brother and was arrested by the FBI on July 20, 1963 for unlawful flight; extradited, returned, and found not guilty of burglary. Was subsequently charged with receiving and concealing and found guilty by jury and was sentenced on November 4, 1963. Paroled May 18, 1966. While awaiting trial at Coos County Jail, apparently made two escape attempts. On one occasion, the bars in his cell were sawed and he tried to remove the bars from the ventilator the night before being transferred.
[8]  Here the presentence report reads:

Burglarized an inn, presumably for money and drinks. The subject and codefendant were apparently quite drunk. He jumped bail August 27th and traveled with his wife to Jackson Hole, Wyoming where he became employed until he felt authorities were moving in. Then he moved west and was arrested in Idaho and returned to Eureka on August 7, 1967. Convicted of second degree burglary. Paroled May 10, 1970 to Alaska. Allegedly involved in offenses in Idaho and Wyoming, but no extradition proceedings taken.
[9]  In connection with his conviction, the presentence report states:

While working as a bartender he became jealous over conversations of wife-to-be and customer, she received two swollen blackened eyes, swollen cheek, mouth and chin; with cuts inside her mouth.
[10]  This section of the presentence report reads:

This officer, in considering that the defendant appears to be far beyond rehabilitative considerations feels that he should be isolated for the protection of society; respectfully recommends that the defendant be committed to the department of Health and Social Services or its authorized representative in the Division of Corrections for a combined period of twenty years for the several crimes of attempting to procure females for prostitution and for the several crimes of burglary. This officer is unable to suggest parole consideration at any time in the near future.
[11]  The record also indicates that the superior court made the following observations during the sentencing proceedings:

I'm not concerned with whether the D.A. elects to take you and to prosecute you for an habitual criminal or not. That's the district attorney's problem; not mine. But whether he does or not, this record is pretty clear that your existence outside of an institutional placement has been pretty clear that your existence outside of an institutional placement has been pretty unsuccessful. Except as pointed out in the report ... this two-year period of time prior to the commission of the crimes for which you stand before the court now, seems to be the longest period of time that you've gone without problems since you attained your majority.
[12]  More particularly, the superior court stated, "But considering your past record and the evidence I have before me, which  it pretty well demonstrates the rehabilitation of the offender is not the paramount consideration in this case."
[13]  The text of AS 11.20.080 is set out at note 2, supra.
[14]  See note 1, supra, for the text of AS 11.40.350.
[15]  In support of this argument Price cites Galaktionoff v. State, 486 P.2d 919, 924 (Alaska 1971), and Waters v. State, 483 P.2d 199, 201 (Alaska 1971).
[16]  Admittedly, the cumulative term of imprisonment for 20 years is very lengthy for crimes not involving physical danger to other persons. On the other hand, the record clearly portrays an individual who had acquired a criminal record of five felony convictions during the 7-year period from 1959 through 1966. Thus, the superior court was presented with the factual circumstances that the accused had committed eight serious felonies at the time the sentences in question were imposed. Given Price's recidivous behaviour, we cannot fault the superior court for concluding that the need for protection of society was to be accorded primacy in fashioning appropriate sanctions. It is clear that Price had consistently failed to abide by society's norms, and had demonstrated that he could not live unrestrained in a free society. Less restrictive sentences for Price's past felony convictions had been frequently applied with relatively little success in terms of protecting the public or guiding Price to conform his conduct to society's laws.


598 S.E.2d 65 (2004)
266 Ga.App. 679
JONES
v.
The STATE.
No. A04A0224.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
March 30, 2004.
*66 Jonathan P. Waters, Macon, for appellant.
Howard Z. Simms, District Attorney, Graham A. Thorpe, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
RUFFIN, Presiding Judge.
A jury found Tommie Jones, Jr., guilty of two counts of armed robbery. Jones appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. He also asserts that the trial court erred in prohibiting him from presenting alibi testimony, refusing to charge on an alibi defense, and admitting certain evidence. Finally, he claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. For reasons that follow, we affirm.
1. On appeal from a criminal conviction, a defendant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence, and we must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.[1] "We neither weigh the evidence nor determine witness credibility, but merely ascertain whether the evidence is sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."[2]
Viewed in this manner, the evidence shows that, just before noon on January 15, 2002, a SunTrust Bank in Macon was robbed. A man walked into the branch, placed a white bag on the counter in front of teller Tamiki Denson, and handed Denson a note. The note stated: "This is a bomb. Please comply or it will go off. If you do anything wrong, the whole building will come down. You have twenty-four minutes." The robber, who was holding an object that appeared to be a remote control, told Denson to fill the white bag with money or he would detonate the bomb. Denson immediately began placing money in the bag, which contained an orange Nike shoe box wrapped in gray duct tape.
Believing that the box contained a bomb, Denson put approximately $6,000 in the bag. The robber informed her that she had a certain amount of time to get everyone out of the bank before the bomb went off, then fled, leaving the box on the counter. Denson reported the robbery, and the bank was *67 evacuated. The police eventually determined that the box did not contain a bomb. Footage from the bank's security cameras showed that the robber was wearing a two-toned windsuit, a knit cap, and sunglasses.
Earlier that same day, a man wearing similar clothing and holding an orange Nike shoe box entered Security Bank, which is located seven or eight miles from the SunTrust. The man walked past a uniformed police officer, looked around, asked a teller an "unusual" question, and left. Concerned that the man was "casing" the bank, a Security employee "logged" the frame number where the security camera showed the man. When the Security employee later heard about the SunTrust robbery, she informed police about the incident at her bank and showed authorities the video footage from the bank's security camera. Based on the video evidence from the two banks, authorities concluded that the same individual who robbed the SunTrust had earlier entered Security Bank with a Nike shoe box.
Two weeks later, at approximately 2:00 p.m. on January 30, 2002, the Colonial Bank in Macon was robbed. A man wearing a Tommy Hilfiger cap entered the bank, informed teller Christine Dumas that he had a bomb in a box he was carrying, and instructed her to give him money. He also handed Dumas a note that stated:" `This is a bomb. Don't be stupid or we all die. No one leave in [sic] twenty minutes.'" Dumas took the bomb threat seriously and gave the robber money from her cash drawer. The robber placed the cash in a bag, then fled after leaving the box on the counter.
As the bank employees and customers evacuated to a restaurant next to the bank, Dumas and others spotted the robber in the passenger seat of a car exiting the restaurant parking lot. Someone from the bank recorded the car's tag number. Bank personnel reported the robbery and described the get-away car to Detective Willie Gordon, who happened to be eating lunch at the restaurant when the robbery occurred.
Gordon testified that he saw the car described by the bank employees parked in the restaurant parking lot while he was eating. He recalled that a man got out of the car's passenger seat, walked toward the back of the restaurant, then returned ten to fifteen minutes later. Just after the car left the restaurant parking lot, the bank employees reported the robbery to him.
Authorities discovered that the box left by the robber contained an automobile part and an Advance alarm clock, rather than a bomb. The clock had one Panasonic double-A battery inside it, but no battery cover. A short time later, police located the get-away car in back of a nearby house. Inside a trash can behind the house, police found a Family Dollar bag filled with an empty box for an Advance alarm clock, a plastic battery cover that fit the clock in the "bomb" box, and the wrapper for a four-pack of Panasonic double-A batteries that still held three batteries. Police also discovered a red Tommy Hilfiger cap in the trash can. Fingerprints lifted from the car, the Family Dollar bag, and the alarm clock box matched Jones' fingerprints.
Inside the car, officers also found fingerprints belonging to Bernard Dean, the vehicle's owner. Dean admitted that he drove Jones to Colonial Bank on January 30, 2002. According to Dean, Jones asked him for a ride to the Family Dollar store, and Dean agreed. When Jones got into the car, he had with him a plastic bag containing the "bomb" box used in the Colonial Bank robbery. Jones also was wearing a red Tommy Hilfiger cap. Dean took Jones to the Family Dollar, where Jones purchased a clock and batteries. At Jones' request, Dean then drove him to Colonial Bank. While Dean waited in the restaurant parking lot, Jones entered the bank with the box and the items he had purchased at the Family Dollar. Jones returned sometime later, told Dean to "pull off," and scooted down in the passenger seat. Dean testified that he did not know exactly what had happened in the bank, but he suspected that something was amiss.
Dean drove to a nearby house, parked in the backyard, and the two men went their separate ways. Before Dean left, however, he saw Jones with a bag of money, and he concluded that Jones had robbed the bank. Dean also observed Jones place something in a trash can near the parked car.
*68 Dumas positively identified Jones at trial as the Colonial Bank robber. In addition, Dean and his girlfriend, who also knew Jones, reviewed security-camera footage from the Colonial Bank robbery. Both identified Jones as the robber in the photographs. They also recognized Jones as the suspicious individual carrying a Nike shoe box pictured in the January 15, 2002 photographs from Security Bank. The evidence further showed that, when arrested by police, Jones had on shoes that resembled the shoes worn by the SunTrust robber and the individual who entered Security Bank.
Based on this and other evidence, the jury found that Jones committed the Colonial Bank and SunTrust Bank armed robberies. On appeal, Jones argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. We disagree.
"A person commits the offense of armed robbery when, with intent to commit theft, he or she takes property of another from the person or the immediate presence of another by use of an offensive weapon, or any replica, article, or device having the appearance of such weapon."[3] The State presented overwhelming evidence that Jones robbed Colonial Bank using a replica of a bomb. That evidence, including identifications by the victim, Dean, and Dean's girlfriend, fingerprints linking Jones to the get-away car and the materials used to assemble the fake bomb, and Dean's testimony, authorized the jury to find him guilty of armed robbery with respect to that bank.[4] Furthermore, although the evidence regarding the SunTrust Bank robbery was not as strong, a reasonable jury could have found, based on Jones' identification as the individual who entered Security Bank, the similarities between that individual and the SunTrust robber, and the shoes worn by Jones at the time of his arrest, that Jones also robbed the SunTrust Bank using a replica bomb.[5]
2. Jones argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, he claims that counsel failed to properly notify the prosecution of his alibi defense, resulting in the exclusion of alibi testimony at trial. To succeed in this claim, Jones "must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced him such that a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel's errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different."[6] A trial court's determination that a defendant received effective assistance of counsel will be upheld unless it is clearly erroneous.[7]
The record shows that, four days before trial began on January 6, 2003, defense counsel served the State with a list of witnesses who would present an alibi defense. The State objected to these witnesses, asserting that the alibi notice was neither timely nor sufficient under OCGA § 17-16-5(a).
At a hearing prior to trial, defense counsel explained that in November 2002, Jones provided him with information regarding potential alibi witnesses for January 30, 2002, the date of the Colonial Bank robbery. Counsel, however, did not begin investigating the alibi defense until January 1, 2003, and he provided the State with no information regarding Jones' alibi until the following day. According to counsel, if allowed to testify, two of the alibi witnesses would have stated that they either saw or were with Jones at his home around 2:00 p.m. on a particular afternoon in January 2002, although they could not pinpoint the exact date. The third alibi witness, Jones' live-in girlfriend, would have established that these witnesses saw or visited with Jones on January 30.
The trial court excluded the alibi testimony after determining that Jones failed, in bad faith, to comply with the notice requirements *69 of OCGA § 17-16-5(a) and that this noncompliance prejudiced the State.[8] On motion for new trial, Jones argued that trial counsel was ineffective in not meeting the notice requirements for presenting an alibi defense. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that even if counsel performed deficiently, the deficiency did not prejudice Jones, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. We find no error.
We note that Jones' alibi evidence went only to the charge involving Colonial Bank. He had no alibi for the SunTrust Bank robbery. And the proof linking Jones to the Colonial Bank robbery, including identification testimony, Dean's statements regarding Jones' conduct, and fingerprint evidence, was overwhelming. Furthermore, the only witness who could connect the alibi evidence to the date of the robbery was Jones' live-in girlfriend, who testified at trial that she still loved Jones, was "standing by him," and did not "want to see anything bad happen to him," thus raising credibility issues.[9] Under these circumstances, Jones cannot show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had counsel met the notice requirements of OCGA § 17-16-5(a) and presented the alibi defense.[10]
3. Jones also argues that the record contains no evidence that his failure to comply with OCGA § 17-16-5(a) resulted from bad faith. Thus, he contends, the trial court erred in excluding the alibi testimony. Pretermitting whether the trial court erred, however, this claim of error presents no basis for reversal. Given the nature of the proposed alibi testimony, as well as the overwhelming evidence that Jones robbed the Colonial Bank, it is highly probable that the alleged error did not contribute to the jury's verdict and, therefore, was harmless.[11]
4. Jones further argues that the trial court erred in failing to give his requested jury instruction on alibi. As noted above, however, the trial court excluded Jones' alibi evidence.
"It is well settled that where the evidence in support of the defense of alibi does not show the impossibility of the defendant's presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, the failure of the court to charge the law of alibi is not error."[12] In this case, the jury heard no evidence supporting an alibi defense, much less evidence of such impossibility. It follows that the trial court properly refused to give this requested charge.[13]
5. Finally, Jones asserts that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to introduce evidence regarding his incarceration prior to trial. Following his arrest, Jones apparently was not released on bond and remained in jail while awaiting trial. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Jones' girlfriend whether Jones had been in jail for "the past eleven months, plus a little bit" and also queried whether she continued to stand by Jones. In Jones' view, such questions improperly placed his character in issue. The record shows, however, that Jones did not object to these questions at *70 trial. Accordingly, he has waived this claim of error.[14]
Judgment affirmed.
ELDRIDGE and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
NOTES
[1]  See Williams v. State, 259 Ga.App. 742, 743(1), 578 S.E.2d 128 (2003).
[2]  Id.
[3]  OCGA § 16-8-41(a).
[4]  See id.; Mitchell v. State, 250 Ga.App. 292, 297(4), 551 S.E.2d 404 (2001); McCluskey v. State, 211 Ga.App. 205, 207-208(2), 438 S.E.2d 679 (1993).
[5]  See OCGA § 16-8-41(a); Mitchell, supra; McCluskey, supra.
[6]  Morris v. State, 257 Ga.App. 169, 172(2), 570 S.E.2d 619 (2002).
[7]  Petty v. State, 260 Ga.App. 38, 40(2), 579 S.E.2d 23 (2003).
[8]  See OCGA § 17-16-6 ("If ... it is brought to the attention of the court that the defendant has failed to comply with the [discovery] requirements, the court may ... upon a showing of prejudice and bad faith, prohibit the defendant from introducing the evidence not disclosed or presenting the witness not disclosed.").
[9]  Although the trial court excluded the girlfriend's alibi testimony, Jones called her as a witness to testify about other matters.
[10]  See Morris, supra at 173, 570 S.E.2d 619; Brown v. State, 192 Ga.App. 867, 868(2), 386 S.E.2d 673 (1989). Cf. Richardson v. State, 189 Ga.App. 113, 114, 375 S.E.2d 59 (1988) (trial counsel's deficiency in failing to call alibi witnesses prejudiced the defense in case where evidence against defendant, which rested largely upon the identification testimony of one witness, was not overwhelming).
[11]  See Blair v. State, 273 Ga. 668, 670(4), 543 S.E.2d 685 (2001); Blige v. State, 264 Ga. 166, 168(3), 441 S.E.2d 752 (1994); Tanksley v. State, 248 Ga.App. 102, 105(2), 545 S.E.2d 652 (2001).
[12]  (Punctuation omitted.) Hulett v. State, 262 Ga. 194, 195(2), 415 S.E.2d 642 (1992).
[13]  See id.; Hendrick v. State, 257 Ga. 514(1), 361 S.E.2d 169 (1987).
[14]  See Rupert v. State, 239 Ga.App. 128, 131(1), 520 S.E.2d 695 (1999) ("`It is well-settled in this state that it is too late to urge objections to the admission of evidence after it has been admitted without objection.'").