374 P.2d 231 (1962)
Dan FULTON, John C. Alley and E.J. Byrne, as Members of the State Board of Equalization of the State of Montana, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
FARMERS UNION GRAIN TERMINAL ASSOCIATION, a Minnesota Corporation, Farmers Co-op Supply, Inc., of Lake County, a Montana Corporation, and Associated Food Stores, Inc., a Utah Corporation, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 10445.
Supreme Court of Montana.
Submitted June 14, 1962.
Decided August 28, 1962.
*232 A.W. Scribner (argued orally), John R. Kline (argued orally), Helena, for appellants.
A.L. Libra (argued orally), and Carl G. Smithwick, Hubert J. Massman (argued orally), and Laverne V. Harris, Helena, for respondents.
JAMES T. HARRISON, Chief Justice.
Appeal by plaintiffs from a judgment entered in the district court of Lewis and Clark County upon an order granting motions to dismiss without leave to amend.
The action was instituted seeking a declaratory judgment. In brief, the complaint alleged the enactment of Chapter 155 of the 1961 Session Laws; that the plaintiff State Board of Equalization, and its members, hereinafter referred to as the Board, issued amendments to its regulations to implement the amendments to the Corporation License Tax Law effected by the enactment of Chapter 155; that the defendants, Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, Farmers Co-op Supply Inc. of Lake County and Associated Food Stores, Inc., hereinafter referred to as defendants, in filing their tax returns, deducted from their gross income patronage dividends or patronage refunds, such action not being permitted under the amended Board regulations; that the action was brought against the defendants as members of a class, being cooperative corporations, and such defendants adequately and fairly represent all members of the class; that the action was brought to secure a speedy determination of the issues in dispute and to avoid the necessity of separate actions to enforce the law and its regulations. The complaint prayed:
"WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray judgment of this Court declaring and adjudging that the Amendments to Regulations *233 of the State Board of Equalization of the State of Montana promulgated by said Board on the 2nd day of May, 1961, are valid and enforceable in all respects; that cooperative corporations doing business in the State of Montana and subject to Corporation License Tax may not exclude or deduct from gross income any amounts paid as dividends on capital stock, patronage dividends, or otherwise, whether paid in cash, merchandise or scrip, or however allocated, and for such other and further relief as to the Court may seem just and equitable in the premises."
Many exhibits were annexed to the complaint, including the amendments to the regulations which had been promulgated by the State Board of Equalization.
Chapter 155, Laws of 1961, amended section 84-1501, R.C.M. 1947, as amended by section 1, Chapter 232, Laws of 1957, and section 1, Chapter 264, Laws of 1959, so far as pertinent to this decision, by substituting for subparagraph Eleventh a subparagraph designated (i).
Subparagraph Eleventh of section 84-1501, R.C.M. 1947, as amended by Laws of 1957 and 1959, had previously read:
"Eleventh. Labor, agricultural or horticultural cooperatives organized and operated on a cooperative basis; (a) for the purpose of marketing the products of members or other producers, and turning back to them the proceeds of sales, less the necessary marketing expenses, on the basis of either the quantity or the value of the products furnished by them, or (b) for the purpose of purchasing supplies and equipment for the use of members or other persons, and turning over such supplies and equipment to them at actual cost, plus necessary expenses. Exemption shall not be denied any such association because it has capital stock, if the dividend rate of such stock is fixed at not to exceed the legal rate of interest in the state of incorporation or 6 per centum per annum, whichever is the greater on the value of the consideration for which the stock was issued, and if substantially all such stock (other than non-voting preferred stock, the owners of which are not entitled or permitted to participate, directly or indirectly, in the profits of the association, upon dissolution or otherwise, beyond the fixed dividends) is owned by producers who market their products or purchase their supplies and equipment through the association; nor shall exemption be denied any such association because there is accumulated and maintained by it a reserve required by state law or a reasonable reserve for any necessary purpose. Such an association may market the products of non-members in an amount the value of which does not exceed the value of the products marketed for members, and may purchase supplies and equipment for nonmembers in an amount the value of which does not exceed the value of the supplies and equipment purchased for members, provided the value of the purchases made for persons who are neither members nor producers does not exceed 15 per centum of the value of all its purchases. Business done with the United States, state of Montana or its political subdivisions shall be exempt under this act. Any cooperative association or corporation engaged in the business of operating a rural electrification system or systems for the transmission or distribution of electrical energy on a cooperative basis."
Subparagraph (i) of section 84-1501, as amended by Laws of 1961, reads:
"(i) Any cooperative association or corporation engaged in the business of operating a rural electrification system or systems for the transmission or distribution of electrical energy on a cooperative basis;"
Section 84-1501 before amendment in 1961, provided for payment of a corporation license tax to this state and the subparagraphs covered organizations which were exempted from such tax. The effect of the amendment by Chapter 155, Session Laws of 1961, was to remove the exemption previously granted to labor, agricultural or horticultural cooperatives.
At the same 1961 Session, the Legislature enacted Chapter 235, Laws of 1961, which amended section 84-1504, R.C.M. *234 1947, which statute provides the method of computing corporation license tax. Before its amendment, and so far as pertinent here, section 84-1504, subd. (2), carried this wording:
"The term `net income' means the gross income of the corporation less the allowable deductions. The term `fiscal year' means an accounting period of twelve (12) months ending on the last day of any month other than December."
As amended by Chapter 235, Laws of 1961, section 84-1504, subd. (2) so far as pertinent, now reads:
"The term gross income means the income from all sources within the state of Montana recognized in the determination of the corporation's federal income tax liability; but shall include interest exempt from federal income tax. The term `net income' means the gross income of the corporation less the allowable deductions. However, the definitions of gross income and net income set forth in this section shall not be construed as allowing the deductions set forth in Section 243 of the Federal Internal Revenue Code as now written, or as that section shall be labeled or amended. The term `fiscal year' means an accounting period of twelve (12) months ending on the last day of any month other than December."
The regulations and amendments to 702(b), 702(e) and 705 which the Board prays the court to hold valid are as follows:
Originally Section 702 of the regulations read:
"702. Gross Income. Gross income means all income derived from sources within Montana, including (but not limited to) the following items: * * *
"(b) Gross income from trade or business."
Such subsection was amended to read:
"(b) Gross income from trade or business.
"In arriving at gross income of a cooperative, no reduction shall be made for any amounts paid as dividends on capital stock, nor any amounts allocated as patronage dividends or otherwise, during the taxable year to patrons of such a cooperative organization, whether paid in cash, merchandise, capital stock, revolving fund certificates, retained certificates, certificates of indebtedness, letters of advice or in some other manner that discloses to each patron the dollar amount allocated to him." Before amendment Regulation 702(e) read:
"(e) Gains from the sale by a corporation of its assets, whether or not in connection with its liquidation. However, no gain or loss is recognized to a corporation from the distribution of its assets in kind in partial or complete liquidation." After amendment such subsection read:
"(e) Gains from the sale by a corporation of its assets, whether or not in connection with its liquidation. Provided, however, gains or losses resulting from corporate reorganizations, and gains or losses incurred during the course of liquidation of the corporation, where such gains or losses occur within twelve calendar months from the date of adoption of the plan of liquidation and the liquidation is completed within such twelve month period, will not be regarded as items of gross income. No gain or loss is recognized to a corporation from the distribution of its assets in kind in partial or complete liquidation."
Regulation 705, before amendment, in part, read:
"Items Not Deductible. In computing net income, deductions may be claimed only for items specifically recognized by the law as deductible. The following are examples of the more common items not allowed as deductions: * * *"
Then followed various lettered paragraphs. This regulation was then amended by adding a new paragraph lettered (j) which reads:
"No deduction shall be allowed for any amounts paid as dividends on capital stock, nor any amounts allocated as patronage dividends or otherwise, during the taxable year to patrons of a cooperative organization, whether paid in cash, merchandise, *235 capital stock, revolving fund certificates, retained certificates, certificates of indebtedness, letters of advice or in some other manner that discloses to each patron the dollar amount allocated to him."
Defendants filed motions to dismiss, and following a hearing thereon the district court granted such motions without leave to amend the complaint.
The order entered by the district court granting the motions read:
"The above entitled action was brought for the purpose of securing an adjudication of the question of whether patronage dividends paid by cooperatives are deductible as an item of gross income in tax returns to the State of Montana. The question hinges upon an interpretation of the amendments contained in Chapters 155 and 235 of the 1961 Session Laws. Prior to these enactments, section 85-1501, R.C.M. 1947, contained subparagraph 11 which specifically exempt cooperatives from the requirement of filing a return based upon their gross income. Chapter 155 mentioned herein does not contain such an exemption so that the implication would necessarily follow that it was the intention of the Legislature that cooperatives would be subject to such taxation. However, section 85-1504, R.C.M. 1947, which provides for the computation of the tax was amended by the same Legislative Assembly in Chapter 235 to read as follows:
"`The term gross income means the income from all sources within the State of Montana recognized in the determination of the corporation's Federal income tax liability.'" This immediately poses the question as to what the Federal income tax liability is with reference to patronage dividends. Neither plaintiffs nor defendants argue before this Court that the Federal Government does not exclude such items from gross income and, in fact, this is admitted. Under the circumstances present here it appears that while the Legislature on one hand took something away, it immediately gave it back with the other.
"Taxing statutes are construed strictly as to the liability and courts are not concerned with the wisdom or desirability of the taxing or non-taxing of any facet of our body politic or economic structures. It appears to this Court that if it were the wish of the Legislature to tax patronage dividends of cooperatives it would have been a relatively simple matter to have said so in just so many words.
"Counsel for the plaintiffs devotes some pages of his brief on the subject of the need for taxing cooperatives and cites an article in the Michigan Law Review on the subject. With equal force might be cited an article by John C. Satterfield, President of the American Bar Association who, in the March 1962 issue of Rural Electrification sets forth, at length, reasons why cooperatives should not be taxed. Whether they should be taxed or should not be taxed seems to this Court to be a matter solely for the Legislature to determine and in language which clearly evidences its intent to do so.
"Under the circumstances here present the Motions to Dismiss of the respective defendants are granted, without leave on the part of the plaintiffs to amend. Let judgment be entered accordingly."
Judgment was duly entered and this appeal was taken.
The Board by specifications of error contend that the court erred in granting the motions to dismiss, in dismissing the complaint, rendering judgment for the defendants, and in holding that cooperative corporations may deduct or exclude from gross income all accounts paid as patronage dividends whether paid in cash or scrip, and however allocated.
In actual fact, the sole question involved is whether or not the amendments to the regulations adopted by the Board can be sustained as within their power and authority by virtue of the amendatory acts hereinbefore quoted.
We shall deal with the arguments of the Board in support of its position in the order they are raised.
*236 We concede that since the action was taken upon motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b) of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, the allegations of the complaint must be viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, admitting and accepting as true all facts well-pleaded.
We likewise agree that in construing a statute the paramount rule is to give effect to the intention of its makers or, as declared by this court: "The intention of the Legislature in enacting a statute is the consideration which must control in its construction." McNair v. School Dist. No. 1, 87 Mont. 423, 288 P. 188, 69 A.L.R. 866; Campbell v. City of Helena, 92 Mont. 366, 16 P.2d 1, and other authorities cited therein.
We must likewise keep in mind: "The intention is to be sought in the language employed and the apparent purpose to be subserved. Johnson v. Butte & Superior Copper Co., 41 Mont. 158, 108 P. 1057, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 938." State ex rel. Carter v. Kall, 53 Mont. 162, 162 P. 385, 5 A.L.R. 1309. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is contended by the Board that the district court applied a general statute, being section 84-1504, to a specific subject (cooperatives) and thereby nullified the intent, object and purpose of an amendment on the specific subject, being section 84-1501. We find it difficult to concur in this contention. Section 84-1501 provides for the tax; section 84-1504 provides the method of computing the same tax.
Historically, at the Fifth Session of the Legislature, an Act was passed and approved on March 6, 1897, levying a license tax upon telephone, telegraph, electric light, gas and water companies. This Act appears as section 2773, the Rev. Codes 1907. At the Twelfth Session in 1911, this Act was amended by Chapter 61, Laws of 1911. At the Fifteenth Session, Chapter 79, Laws of 1917, provided for a corporation license tax upon all corporations except those specifically listed as exempt, and repealed section 2773, Rev. Codes 1907, as amended. Section 1 of Chapter 79, Laws of 1917, except for subsequent amendments, is section 84-1501; section 2 of Chapter 79, except for subsequent amendments, is section 84-1502; section 4 of Chapter 79, except for subsequent amendments, is section 84-1504. Thus, it is at once apparent that one section could not be labeled a general law and the other a special law since they were both enacted as subdivisions of the same law.
The Board asserts that respondents rely upon the amendment to subdivision (2) of section 84-1504, heretofore quoted, and by reason thereof take the position that the Board must incorporate all of the exemptions granted to cooperatives under the Internal Revenue Code and the regulations of the Internal Revenue Bureau.
The Board contends that such view is not correct in that while the Federal Law grants specific exemptions to some types of cooperatives, under section 84-1501, as amended, the exemption to cooperatives has been deleted and therefore in determining gross income under section 84-1504 that part of the Internal Revenue Code dealing with exemptions to cooperatives must be disregarded, thus leaving nothing in the I.R.C. that would authorize deduction of patronage dividends.
Examining now the amendment to subdivision (2) of section 84-1504, effected by Chapter 235, Laws of 1961. It provides that "gross income means income from all sources within the state of Montana recognized in the determination of the corporation's federal income tax liability." Emphasis supplied.
In order to ascertain what a corporation's federal income tax liability is we must consult the I.R.C., being title 26 U.S.C.A. A tax is imposed upon corporations under section 11 thereof. Section 61 defines gross income as:
"(a) General definition.  Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the following items: * * *." Then *237 follows a list of such items. The subtitle referred to is "Income Taxes", and without making a complete list we find many sections providing that gross income does not include certain income or that certain income shall be exempt from taxation. As examples we refer to sections 103, 108, 110, 111, 118, 521 and 522 of the I.R.C. The last two sections refer specifically to the exemption of farmers' cooperatives from tax, section 521 provides that farmers' cooperative organizations, as therein defined, "shall be exempt from taxation * * * except as otherwise provided in section 522."
Section 522 provides:
"(a) Imposition of tax.  An organization exempt from taxation under section 521 shall be subject to the taxes imposed by section 11 or section 1201.
"(b) Computation of taxable income.
"(1) General rule.  In computing the taxable income of such an organization there shall be allowed as deductions from gross income (in addition to other deductions allowable under this chapter)
"(A) amounts paid as dividends during the taxable year on its capital stock, and
"(B) amounts allocated during the taxable year to patrons with respect to its income not derived from patronage (whether or not such income was derived during such taxable year) whether paid in cash, merchandise, capital stock, revolving fund certificates, retain certificates, certificates of indebtedness, letters of advice, or in some other manner that discloses to each patron the dollar amount allocated to him. Allocations made after the close of the taxable year and on or before the 15th day of the 9th month following the close of such year shall be considered as made on the last day of such taxable year to the extent the allocations are attributable to income derived before the close of such year.
"(2) Patronage dividends, etc.  Patronage dividends, refunds, and rebates to patrons with respect to their patronage in the same or preceding years (whether paid in cash, merchandise, capital stock, revolving fund certificates, retain certificates, certificates of indebtedness, letters of advice, or in some other manner that discloses to each patron the dollar amount of such dividend, refund, or rebate) shall be taken into account in computing taxable income in the same manner as in the case of a cooperative organization not exempt under section 521. Such dividends, refunds, and rebates made after the close of the taxable year and on or before the 15th day of the 9th month following the close of such year shall be considered as made on the last day of such taxable year to the extent the dividends, refunds, or rebates, are attributable to patronage occurring before the close of such year. Aug. 16, 1954, 9:45 a.m., E.D.T., c. 736, 68A Stat. 177."
It would appear quite clear that in the determination of a cooperative corporation's federal income tax liability, that patronage dividends as above-described are excluded from gross income.
We would like at this point to call attention to the exception carried in the amendment to section 84-1504 in these words: "However, the definitions of gross income and net income set forth in this section shall not be construed as allowing the deductions set forth in Section 243 of the Federal Internal Revenue Code as now written, or as that section shall be labeled or amended."
Section 243 af the I.R.C., in part, reads:
"(a) General rule.  In the case of a corporation (other than a small business investment company operating under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958), there shall be allowed as a deduction an amount equal to 85 percent of the amount received as dividends (other than dividends described in paragraph (1) of section 244, relating to dividends on the preferred stock of a public utility) from a domestic corporation which is subject to taxation under this chapter.
"(b) Small business investment companies.  In the case of a small business investment company operating under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, there shall be allowed as a deduction an amount equal to 100 percent of the amount received as dividends (other than dividends described in paragraph (1) of section 244, relating to dividends on preferred stock of a public utility) from a domestic corporation which is subject to taxation under this chapter.
"(c) Special rules for certain distributions.  For purposes of subsections (a) and (b)
"(1) Any amount allowed as a deduction under section 591 (relating to deduction for dividends paid by mutual savings banks, etc.) shall not be treated as a dividend.
"(2) A dividend received from a regulated investment company shall be subject to the limitations prescribed in section 854.
"(3) Any dividend received from a real estate investment trust which, for the taxable year of the trust in which the dividend is paid, qualifies under part II of subchapter M (sec. 856 and following) shall not be treated as a dividend.
"(d) Certain dividends from foreign corporations.  For purposes of subsections (a) and (b) of this section and for purposes of section 245, any dividend from a foreign corporation from earnings and profits accumulated by a domestic corporation during a period with respect to which such domestic corporation was subject to taxation under this chapter (or corresponding provisions of prior law) shall be treated as a dividend from a domestic corporation which is subject to taxation under this chapter."
Thus did the Legislature by this exception refuse to permit a corporation to deduct an amount equal to 85 percent and in the case of a small business investment *238 company 100 percent of the amount received as dividends as permitted in determining a corporation's federal income tax liability.
The Board argues that to accept the interpretation of section 84-1504, contended for by the cooperatives, would include not only acceptance of the I.R.C. but also the Internal Revenue Bureau's Regulations. We might ask how is federal income tax liability determined except under the I.R.C. and the Regulations of the Bureau?
The foregoing discussion of the I.R.C. and Internal Revenue Bureau's Regulations is not meant to be anything more than a demonstration of what the legislative language used in the amendments enacted by the 1961 Legislative Session actually adopted. This discussion points up the danger inherent in such legislative language whereby Federal laws and Bureau regulations are attempted to be incorporated in state laws.
It was this situation that confronted the district court on the motions to dismiss, and prompted the order hereinbefore quoted. The Legislature very specifically removed section 243 of the I.R.C. from the definition of gross income or net income, but it did not see fit to remove the provisions of section 522 of the I.R.C. Both sections refer to deductions in determining federal income tax liability.
Where the language is clear and unambiguous we cannot be guided by what is asserted to have been intended. To do so we would substitute our judgment for the action taken by the Legislature in enacting the amendments here involved.
The judgment based upon the order sustaining the motions to dismiss was justified and must be sustained.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICES ADAIR, DOYLE, CASTLES, and JOHN C. HARRISON, concur.


902 F.Supp. 1 (1995)
Wayne PRAY, Plaintiff,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 94-0072 (JR).
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
October 11, 1995.
*2 Wayne Pray, White Deer, PA, Plaintiff pro se.
Serafina M. Esposito, Office of Information and Privacy, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM
ROBERTSON, District Judge.
This Freedom of Information Act case is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons at Allenwood, Pennsylvania, appears pro se. He wrote to the FBI in 1990 requesting all records at FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C., pertaining to himself. His request was acknowledged, but he was subsequently told that there would be a delay because of the large number of requests received by the FBI and the diminished resources available to respond to his request. In due course, plaintiff was advised of the existence of a file responsive to his request, and the FBI released 23 of 540 responsive pages. Plaintiff took an administrative appeal. Following the appeal, in 1994, the FBI released an additional 261 pages, after rereviewing the withheld documents in accordance with U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Landano, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2014, 124 L.Ed.2d 84 (1993). The FBI maintained its position in withholding certain information pursuant to Exemptions 2, 7(C), 7(D), 7(E) and 7(F) of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2), (7)(C), (7)(D), (7)(E) and (7)(F).
In responding to the FBI motion for summary judgment, and in his own motion for summary judgment, plaintiff complains that the government has not searched the files or responded with respect to the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Newark Field Office of the FBI. Plaintiff's complaint focuses particularly on the subject of electronic surveillance records maintained by the DEA.
For reasons set forth below, the motion of the government for summary judgment will be granted, and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment will be denied.
As a preliminary matter, this lawsuit is properly limited to records maintained at FBI Headquarters. That was the scope of plaintiff's FOIA request, the content of his complaint in this action, and the subject of his administrative appeal. The request for information from the Newark Field Office was made only in response to the government's *3 motion for summary judgment. It was never considered or responded to by the government, and it is not part of this lawsuit.
By the same token, plaintiff's late-filed attempt to include in this action his request for files of the Drug Enforcement Administration, including its electronic surveillance records, cannot succeed. It is undisputed that the Drug Enforcement Administration has never received a FOIA request from the plaintiff. Plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to the DEA. See Oglesby v. United States Department of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 61-62 (D.C.Cir.1990).
The substance of the remaining dispute between the government and plaintiff concerns a series of exemptions whose use by criminal law enforcement agencies is well established and has been approved in many district court and court of appeals decisions.
Exemption 2 of the FOIA exempts disclosure of material "related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2). In this case, the information withheld under that exemption was permanent "source symbol numbers" of confidential sources of the FBI who report on a regular basis and the file numbers associated with those confidential sources. Release of the numbers would give some indication of the geographic area where a source was developed or operated, the date of the source's recruitment, and how many informants have been recruited for a particular case. According to the affidavit of Special Agent Moran, disclosure of the source symbols and file numbers would facilitate improper access to sensitive information and impede the effectiveness of law enforcement investigations. It was clearly proper for the FBI to invoke Exemption 2 for the stated purpose. Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, 1074 (D.C.Cir.1981) (en banc); Lesar v. United States Department of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 485 (D.C.Cir.1980).
Exemption 7 of the FOIA covers "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes," but "only to the extent" that production would cause the types of harm enumerated in subsections (A) through (F). Here, the FBI has invoked four of those subsections, all of them properly.
 Exemption 7(C) relates to "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Here the FBI invoked it to protect names and/or identifying data relating to FBI and DEA special agents and support personnel, a non-federal law enforcement person, third parties who are of investigative interest to the FBI, third parties merely mentioned in FBI files, and third parties who provided information to the FBI. The use of Exemption 7(C) is amply substantiated by affidavit and by the case law. U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 1476, 103 L.Ed.2d 774 (1989); Davis v. United States Department of Justice, 968 F.2d 1276, 1281 (D.C.Cir.1992). Here the possibilities, articulated by the FBI, of animosity or grudges toward special agents or prejudice to the effectiveness of individuals in the conduct of other cases to which they are assigned and the potential that individuals could be targeted for inquiries for unauthorized access to information or be subjected to unofficial inquiries not anticipated by their contact with the FBI, among other things, clearly outweigh any possible benefit that could accrue from the public access to information in these government files.
 Exemption 7(D) relates to the identity of confidential sources and/or information furnished by such sources. Here the FBI resorted to Exemption 7(D) as a sort of "belt and suspenders" approach to the protection of permanent source symbol numbers, which were also withheld under Exemption 2. The affidavit support proffered by the FBI amply establishes that the sources sought to be protected provided information under the express assurance of confidentiality or under circumstances where such an assurance can be implied, U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Landano, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2019.
 Exemption 7(E) relates to techniques used in law enforcement investigations. *4 Here, in four specific instances identified by the FBI's affiant, the FBI resorted to Exemption 7(e) to withhold sections from an FBI form "accomplishment report," because of its belief that release of that information could assist a potential criminal in correlating the use of a particular investigative technique with its corresponding accomplishment in the investigation, enabling him to employ countermeasures to neutralize them. The use of the exception is approved.
 Exemption 7(F) relates to information whose release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel. Here again, an overlap is found between the use of this exemption and Exemption 2, among others. The investigations to which all of the information sought in this case apply are, first, an investigation of the possible kidnaping of the plaintiff himself, and, second, a broader investigation into organized crime and its involvement in the distribution of illegal narcotics. Plaintiff was convicted of criminal charges involving drug trafficking and organized crime, and, according to the FBI affiant, plaintiff and his criminal associates "have a documented history of and a known propensity for threats of violence, retaliation and actual violence against those who cooperated with law enforcement authorities." The FBI affiant also states that "it is known to the FBI that plaintiff and his criminal associates have in the past attempted to have murdered certain individuals who cooperate with law enforcement agencies." The FBI's invocation of Exemption 7(F) under those circumstances is not a close question.
There is no genuine issue of material fact, and the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. An appropriate order accompanies this memorandum.

ORDER
For reasons stated in a memorandum issued today, summary judgment is entered on behalf of the defendants and against plaintiff. This 10th day of October 1995.


                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                   No. 18-1131
                             Filed December 5, 2018

IN THE INTEREST OF M.C.,
Minor Child,

D.Z., Mother,
       Appellant,

N.C., Father,
       Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

       Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Susan Cox, District

Associate Judge.

       A mother and father appeal the termination of their parental rights to their

minor child. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

       Daniel M. Northfield, Urbandale, for appellant mother.

       Amy K. Davis, Des Moines, for appellant father.

       Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathryn K. Lang, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee State.

       Erin E. Mayfield of Youth Law Center, Des Moines, guardian ad litem for

minor child.

       Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and McDonald, JJ.
                                          2

VAITHESWARAN, Judge.

       A mother and father appeal the termination of their parental rights to their

child, born in 2014. Both parents argue termination is not in the child’s best

interests. See In re L.M., 904 N.W.2d 835, 840 (Iowa 2018). On our de novo

review, we disagree.

       The department of human services removed the child from the parents’ care

following mutual domestic violence and parental use of methamphetamine. The

department issued two founded child-abuse reports determining both parents

failed to properly supervise the child. In one of the reports, the department also

found the presence of illegal drugs in the child. The child remained out of the

parents’ care throughout the proceedings, with the parents never progressing

beyond supervised visits.

       The State’s petition to terminate parental rights proceeded to a lengthy

hearing over multiple days. Both parents essentially conceded the child could not

be returned to their custody at the time of the hearing.            See Iowa Code

§ 232.116(1)(h) (2018). The mother agreed she was using methamphetamine at

the time of removal and she last used the drug a week before the hearing. She

further agreed the department offered substance-abuse treatment services,

including intensive outpatient treatment and she was on the waiting list for inpatient

treatment. The father similarly testified “drug addiction” and “domestic violence”

precipitated the child’s removal, he was a drug addict, and his most recent drug of

choice was methamphetamine. Although he testified to a year of sobriety, a urine

sample he provided was diluted and urine cleanser was found in his apartment.
                                         3

       The department social worker assigned to the case conceded the parents

shared a strong bond with their child. But she reported neither had “gained the

insight needed for [the child] to be safely returned to their care today” and they

would not likely “be at a place of reunification within the next six months given the

lack of follow through thus far.”

       We agree with the district court that termination is in the child’s best

interests.

       AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.


                                                                  NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 ____________

                                      No. 11-1245
                                     ____________

                           UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                                            v.

                                LAWRENCE MURRAY,

                                           Appellant
                                     ____________

                    On Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
                             (D.C. No. 2-10-cr-00016-001)
                     District Judge: Honorable Petrese B. Tucker
                                    ____________

                    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
                                   January 23, 2012

Before: FISHER and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges, and JONES, * District Judge.

                                 (Filed: March 8, 2012)
                                      ____________

                              OPINION OF THE COURT
                                   ____________

      *
       The Honorable John E. Jones, III, District Judge for the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
FISHER, Circuit Judge.

       Lawrence Murray appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence of the U.S.

District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. For the following reasons, we

will affirm the judgment of conviction and remand for resentencing.

                                             I.

       We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and

legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our

analysis.

       On January 7, 2000, a federal grand jury returned a nineteen-count indictment

charging Lawrence Murray (“Murray”) with conspiracy to defraud the Internal Revenue

Service (“IRS”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count 1); aiding, assisting and

counseling the filing of false tax returns, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) (Counts

2-14); bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (Count 15); wire fraud and aiding and

abetting wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1349, and 2 (Count 16); making

false statements to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“CIS”), in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1001 (Count 17); and filing false tax returns, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)

(Counts 18 and 19). 1 The following facts were elicited at trial, which commenced on

October 13, 2010.

       1
         Co-defendant Ingrid Guthrie was also charged in Counts 1 through 14. Guthrie
did not appeal.

                                              2
       Between 2005 and 2010, Murray operated a tax consulting business, the Tax

Doctor Corporation (“TDC”). According to testimony of TDC clients and employees,

Murray advised high-income taxpayers how to fraudulently structure personal and

business finances to maximize tax deductions and minimize tax burdens. Among other

services, TDC would form shell corporations for its clients, and Murray would advise

clients in deducting personal living expenses as business expenses of these corporations

and in moving money between shell corporations in order to fabricate “expenses” for

“contracted services” or “management fees.” Murray also advised clients in the creation

of false corporate board minutes for the shell corporations. Murray’s goal for his clients

was to reduce their taxable income to zero by using these strategies, and he charged his

clients between 20 and 35 percent of the tax savings they could expect to realize in the

first year. He used the same techniques to reduce his own tax burden.

       Murray also aided clients who, because their tax returns showed zero income,

encountered difficulties in obtaining loans. For two clients, Murray created false tax

returns showing higher income than the returns filed with the IRS so that they could use

the false returns in applying for mortgage and business loans. Though Murray prepared

and sent these returns to his clients, the clients never used them in their loan applications.

       In 2007, Murray applied for a visa for his Chinese fiancée to join him in the

United States. To demonstrate that he would be able to financially support his foreign

spouse, Murray submitted false tax returns and a letter that purported to be from an

                                              3
independent accountant who had prepared the returns. In reality, Murray had prepared

the returns and the letter was written by one of his employees.

       Murray was convicted on all charges, and the District Court denied his subsequent

motions for judgment of acquittal or a new trial. Murray was sentenced to 170 months’

imprisonment and five years of supervised release. The District Court also ordered

Murray to pay restitution of $3,331,825.53 and a special assessment of $1,900. Murray

timely appealed.

                                            II.

       The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have

jurisdiction to review the conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the sentence

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742.

       Murray challenges his convictions on grounds of evidentiary error and sufficiency

of the evidence. We review a district court’s decision to admit evidence for abuse of

discretion, United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 768 n.14 (3d Cir. 2000), including

where such admission implicates the Confrontation Clause. United States v. Williams,

464 F.3d 443, 448 (3d Cir. 2006). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we “view

the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and will sustain the verdict if

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal

marks and quotation omitted). In considering Murray’s sentencing arguments, we

                                             4
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s interpretation of the Sentencing

Guidelines, and review factual findings for clear error. United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d

556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007). We review sentences for both procedural and substantive

reasonableness, applying an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Tomko, 562

F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).

                                            III.

                                            A.

       We begin with Murray’s evidentiary challenges. Murray first submits that the

prosecution improperly vouched for several government witnesses by examining them on

immunity letters from the U.S. Attorney’s Office. This argument is meritless.

“Vouching constitutes an assurance by the prosecuting attorney of the credibility of a

Government witness through personal knowledge or by other information outside of the

testimony before the jury.” United States v. Walker, 155 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 1998)

(citations omitted). Here, the prosecutor did not refer to information or personal

knowledge outside of the evidence, but simply introduced and examined witnesses on

immunity agreements to aid the jury in evaluating witness credibility. It is well

established that a prosecutor may introduce evidence of plea agreements with the

government to inform the jury’s assessment of witness credibility and bias, United States

v. Universal Rehab. Servs., Inc., 205 F.3d 657, 665 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc), and we see

no substantive difference between plea agreements and the immunity agreements at issue

                                             5
here. See, e.g., United States v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 92, 101 (1st Cir. 2006). Further, the

prosecution need not wait for the defendant to impeach a witness to introduce such

agreements. Universal Rehab., 205 F.3d at 666. We reject this argument accordingly.

       Murray next submits that the testimony by two of his former attorneys in

reviewing the contents of letters they had prepared for an IRS audit violated his rights

under the Confrontation Clause. He contends that he lacked a meaningful opportunity to

cross-examine the attorneys because doing so would have entailed a waiver of his

attorney-client privilege. However, the privilege did not extend to the representations

made in these letters, which comprised the sole topic of their testimony. “The privilege

‘protects only those disclosures – necessary to obtain informed legal advice – which

might not have been made absent the privilege.’” Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rep. of

Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1423-24 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425

U.S. 391, 403 (1976)). Absent certain exceptions, “it is well-settled that when a client

voluntarily discloses privileged communications to a third party, the privilege is waived

[as to those communications].” Id. at 1424. We have rejected the notion that voluntary

disclosure to government agencies qualifies as an exception to this waiver rule, see id. at

1424-27, and therefore the contents of these letters were not protected. And because the

government only introduced these letters to review the contents with the attorneys,

Murray was free to cross-examine these witnesses on the full scope of their direct

testimony without fear of waiver. This opportunity was more than sufficient to satisfy

                                             6
the Confrontation Clause. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)

(“[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination,

not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the

defense might wish.” (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per

curiam)). Accordingly, this claim is baseless.

       Murray also submits that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for

bank fraud and wire fraud (Counts 15 and 16) and false statements (Count 17). Neither

argument is persuasive. First, Murray argues that his conduct in preparing false tax

returns for his clients’ loan applications did not evince an intent to defraud the bank, as is

required for bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344. See United States v. Khorozian, 333

F.3d 498, 503 (3d Cir. 2003). Murray observes that he never directly presented the false

tax returns to any bank, but rather emailed them to his clients, who never used them. He

argues accordingly that his conduct did not expose the banks to a “risk of loss,” proof of

which is sufficient to satisfy § 1344’s intent requirement. See id. at 505.

       Murray’s argument is misplaced because § 1344 does not require that the

defendant make direct representations to the bank, just that the defendant “engaged in a

scheme to defraud,” United States v. Goldblatt, 813 F.2d 619, 624 (3d Cir. 1987), which

targets a bank. See United States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 646-48 (3d Cir. 2006).

Moreover, only “where the bank is not the ‘target of deception,’ but rather merely an

‘unwitting instrumentality,’” does § 1344 require that the defendant’s conduct expose the

                                              7
bank to a risk of loss. Id. (emphasis added). Murray’s scheme satisfies the intent

requirement under either standard: he prepared false tax returns that overstated his

clients’ incomes to assist them in obtaining loans on more advantageous terms, thereby

targeting the bank and increasing the lenders’ risk of loss. That his fraudulent

representations did not come to fruition – because his clients never submitted the returns

with their loan applications – is immaterial. See Khorozian, 333 F.3d at 505 n.6. The

evidence was therefore sufficient to support his conviction. 2

       Finally, the evidence was sufficient to convict Murray for false statements, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, based on his letter to CIS. A conviction for false

statements under § 1001 requires, in part, that the false statement was “material.” United

States v. Barr, 963 F.2d 641, 645 (3d Cir. 1992). Murray argues that the letter was

“extraneous” to the visa application, and therefore does not meet § 1001’s materiality

requirement. Whether the letter was required for the application, however, is irrelevant.

Rather, to qualify as material, “[t]he statement must have a natural tendency to influence,

or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was

addressed.” United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (quotation marks and

       2
          Murray was also properly convicted on Count 16 for wire fraud and attempted
wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1349, for emailing the false tax returns
to his clients. Murray erroneously treats his conviction on Count 16 as a bank fraud
offense, and contests this conviction on the grounds that the false returns were never
actually submitted to the bank. He misses the mark here as well: the scheme to defraud
need not come to fruition so long as the defendant had the intent to defraud. United
States v. Frey, 42 F.3d 795, 800 (3d Cir. 1994).

                                             8
citation omitted). Moreover, an agency need not actually rely on the statement in making

a decision. United States v. McBane, 433 F.3d 344, 350 (3d Cir. 2005). In this instance,

the false statements in the letter, including representations that the letter was written by

Murray’s accountants and that it was truthful, were “capable of influencing” CIS.

Indeed, the entire purpose of the letter was to assure CIS that an independent party could

vouch for Murray’s financial capabilities, and a CIS agent testified that, had CIS been

aware that the letter was fraudulent, CIS would have rejected the application outright.

Accordingly, the false statements at issue were material.

                                              B.

       Murray also contests his sentence on three grounds: the application of a U.S.S.G.

§ 2T1.1(b)(1) enhancement for criminally derived income; the propriety of the

extrapolation used to estimate the tax loss from the fraud; and the reasonableness of the

downward departure based on Murray’s age and health.

       We review a criminal sentence in “two stages.” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567. We first

review for procedural error, “such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the

Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a)

factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately

explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the

Guidelines range.” Id. (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). Absent

procedural error, we then review for substantive reasonableness, and “will affirm [the

                                              9
sentence] unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence

on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” Id. at 568.

       First, we agree with the parties that the § 2T1.1(b)(1) enhancement for criminally

derived income was erroneously applied in this case. A two-level enhancement under

§ 2T1.1(b)(1) is called for “[i]f the defendant failed to report or to correctly identify the

source of income exceeding $10,000 in any year from criminal activity . . . .” (emphasis

added). This enhancement compensates for offenses where the amount of criminally

derived income is “difficult to establish” and “substantially understated.” U.S.S.G.

§ 2T1.1 background. The PSR applied the enhancement because the TDC tax returns

“include deductions totaling $428,521 and $792,439,” and therefore, did not correctly

identify the income generated by TDC. However, as the Government observes, although

Murray filed false tax returns, he did not fail to identify TDC as the source of criminally

derived income. Rather, he claimed improper deductions under “contracting services” to

reduce taxable income, which protected the income from taxation, but did not make it

difficult to ascertain. Accordingly, the enhancement was not applicable.

       We reject, however, Murray’s argument that the estimate of tax loss did not

qualify as “reasonable ” under U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1. Murray contends that the Government

should have calculated the actual tax loss by auditing each tax return filed by TDC’s

clients, and that the sample returns on which the extrapolation was based were not

representative of the entire body of TDC clients. Murray’s initial attack is misplaced,

                                              10
because, as the Sentencing Guidelines readily acknowledge, “in some instances, . . . the

amount of the tax loss may be uncertain,” in which case, “the guidelines contemplate that

the court will simply make a reasonable estimate based on the available facts.” U.S.S.G.

§ 2T1.1 app. note 1. The government is “not obligated to pore through the tax returns of

all of the participants” in the scheme to calculate the most precise estimate of tax loss, as

long as its estimate is “reasonable and based on reliable facts.” United States v. Gricco,

277 F.3d 339, 356 (3d Cir. 2002). Accordingly, reliable extrapolations from

representative sample data may be used to estimate the tax loss. Compare United States

v. Bryant, 128 F.3d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1997) (extrapolation from sample returns reliably

estimated total tax loss), with United States v. Mehta, 594 F.3d 277, 283 (4th Cir. 2010)

(extrapolation not reliable because sample not representative of remaining returns).

       In this case, the PSR provided three estimates of the tax loss, of which the District

Court adopted the most conservative – the extrapolation of 46 returns by 20 TDC clients

audited by the IRS. The fraudulent returns filed by these 20 clients resulted in a tax loss

of $955,077. A multiplier of three was then used to estimate the total tax loss from at

least 107 clients – over five times the number of clients in the sample – to yield

$2,865,231. 3 These calculations provided a “coherent factual basis” for the extrapolation,

thereby meeting the government’s burden in establishing a “reasonable estimate.”

       3
         Murray does not dispute the estimate of tax losses from false returns filed by
Murray and his co-defendant, Guthrie, which, together with the extrapolated losses from
the false client returns, yielded a total tax loss of $3,331,825.53.

                                             11
Gricco, 277 F.3d at 358. And aside from Murray’s speculation, there is no indication that

these returns were “flagged” for any characteristic that would distort the resulting

calculations, see Mehta, 594 F.3d at 283, because the clients were of the same income

class, Murray gave the same advice and used the same techniques in structuring these

returns, and the goal for each client was to show zero taxable income. Moreover, a

multiplier of three for 20 clients was “highly generous,” Bryant, 128 F.3d at 76,

considering that over 100 TDC were clients involved in the scheme. Accordingly, the

government established a reasonable estimate of the tax loss.

       Murray next argues that the District Court did not impose a reasonable sentence in

light of Murray’s age and health status. The District Court expressly considered age and

health as factors under § 3553(a), thereby satisfying our procedural review. See Tomko,

562 F.3d at 568. We are therefore left to review the sentence on these grounds for

substantive reasonableness. See id. at 568-69. However, having determined that the

District Court procedurally erred in applying a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G.

§ 2T1.1(b)(1), it is unnecessary to consider the substantive reasonableness of Murray’s

sentence at this juncture in light of the fact that he will be resentenced. See United States

v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 213-15 (3d Cir. 2008).

                                             IV.

       For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction, and remand

for resentencing.

                                             12


387 F.2d 379
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner,v.VIRGINIA METALCRAFTERS, INCORPORATED, Respondent.
No. 11270.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
Argued Nov. 10, 1967.Decided Dec. 6, 1967.

Fred R. Kimmel, Atty., N.L.R.B.  (Arnold Ordman, Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate Gen. Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, and Gary Green, Atty., N.L.R.B., on brief) for petitioner.
George V. Gardner, Washington, D.C.  (Asa Ambrister, on brief) for respondent.
Before SOBELOFF, BOREMAN and BRYAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

1
This case is before us upon the petition of the National Labor Relations Board for enforcement of its order against Virginia Metalcrafters, Inc.  The order arises out of a complaint filed by Garland McVey charging that he had been discharged because of his union activities, in violation of 8(a)(3) and (1).

2
The employer insists that the evidence belies the Board's finding, essential to an 8(a)(3) violation, that the Company knew of McVey's union activity.  It presented no countervailing evidence at the hearing.

3
The testimony indicates that McVey, an employee with an excellent record extending over eight years, was abruptly discharged only a few hours after he had engaged in a heated discussion with an ex-foreman over the benefits of unionization.  The Company was aware of the union activity in the plant and had vigorously opposed it.  McVey received no warning and while the reason offered was his 'bad attitude,' Company officials were evasive and contradictory when pressed for a more acceptable explanation.

4
We are convinced that the undisputed facts constitute a sufficient basis for the Board's finding.  Its order will be

5
Enforced.