940 A.2d 947 (2008)
FARMERS FOR FAIRNESS, an unincorporated association of landowners, Delaware State Farm Bureau, Inc., John Carey, Henry Carey, Mary Moore, Agnes Heather, Cartanza Farms Limited Partnership, Sandra L. Cartanza, E.Z. Farms, Inc., Harman Brothers, LLC, Joseph A. Messina, Jr., Janet Messina, John Messina, Maureen Messina, and Thomas E. Webb, Plaintiffs,
v.
KENT COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Delaware, Kent County Levy Court, the governing body of Kent County, Delaware, David R. Burris, Ronald D. Smith, Allan F. Angel, P. Brooks Banta, Donald A. Blakely, Richard E. Ennis, and Harold J. Peterman, in their official capacities as members of the Kent County Levy Court, Defendants.
C.A. No. 2429-VCS.
Court of Chancery of Delaware.
Submitted: November 27, 2007.
Decided: February 5, 2008.
*949 William E. Manning, Esquire, Richard A. Forsten, Esquire, James D. Taylor, Jr., Esquire, Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
Daniel A. Griffith, Esquire, Joseph Scott Shannon, Esquire, Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Defendants.

OPINION
STRINE, Vice Chancellor.

I. Introduction

In this case, the plaintiffs, a collection of organizations and individuals interested in protecting their ability to develop land in Kent County, are suing the defendants, Kent County, its Levy. Court, and the Levy Court's members (whom I will refer to collectively as "Kent County"), in an attempt to invalidate the "Bulk Utilities Ordinance." The plaintiffs' primary concern about the Bulk Utilities Ordinance is that it, if validly adopted, would limit the density of development on parcels of land outside Kent County's designated "Growth Zone" by requiring, among other things, conditional use approval for community wastewater systems and that community wastewater systems serve entire community sewer basins rather than just individual subdivisions. But the present means by which they seek to achieve the invalidation of the Ordinance is to claim that the Ordinance, as finally adopted with amendments, had a title that did not fairly describe the subject matter that the Ordinance addressed. That problem, the *950 plaintiffs said, resulted in a violation of 9 Del. C. § 4110, the Delaware Code section addressing the procedures Kent County must use to adopt legislation. Relatedly, the plaintiffs argue that the Ordinance, as ultimately enacted, amended Kent County's Zoning Code. In 9 Del. C. § 4911, the General Assembly sets forth additional procedural requirements that Kent County must use in amending its Zoning Code, requirements that were not met in the process used to adopt the Bulk Utilities Ordinance.
In this decision, I conclude that the title of the Bulk Utilities Ordinance satisfied the requirement in § 4110 that the title of a bill fairly identify the subject matter it addressed. Although the title contained some linguistic infelicity, the title clearly led any reasonable reader to, understand that the bill would amend the pre-existing sections of the Kent County Code that regulated the type of wastewater systems that could be placed on land and where different types of such systems could be used. Moreover, the County gave notice of the subject matter of the bill to citizens in advance of key public hearings on the bill, notice that included the bill's synopsis, a synopsis that provided clear notice that the bill, if enacted, would put into place important restrictions on the use of certain types of wastewater systems outside of the Growth Zone. That notice was clearly effective, as it is undisputed that affected landowners, including several of the plaintiffs, showed up at hearings to oppose the bill and suggest narrowing amendments. Therefore, I reject the plaintiffs' attempt to invalidate the Bulk Utilities Ordinance on the ground that Kent County violated § 4110.
By contrast, I find that the Bulk Utilities Ordinance amended Kent County's Zoning Code. Section § 4911 of Title 9 contains clear requirements for the procedures that must be used when Kent County amends its Zoning Code. Kent County did not follow those procedures. As a result, the portion of the Ordinance amending the Zoning Code is invalid and stricken. Because of the Ordinance's severability provision, I do not invalidate the entire Ordinance but only the portion of the Ordinance that amended the Zoning Code.

II. Factual Background

A. The Title Of The Bulk Utilities Ordinance

The Bulk Utilities Ordinance, which was designated Ordinance LC-05-20 at that time, was introduced by Kent County Levy Court Commissioner P. Brooks Banta on December 20, 2005.[1] The Bulk Utilities Ordinance was later enacted by the Kent County Levy Court on July 18, 2006 as Ordinance 06-24.[2] Despite the change in ordinance number, the title of the Bulk Utilities Ordinance remained the same throughout the entire process. That title states: "An Ordinance to amend Kent County Code, Vol. II, Chapter 187, Subdivision and Land Development, § 187-5. Definitions, to revise the definition of `Sanitary Sewage Disposal, Community' and to add a definition for `Sanitary Sewage Disposal with Spray Irrigation', and § 187-53 Minimum Requirements."[3] The portion of that title at issue in this case is "§ 187-53 Minimum Requirements."[4] Because the title was infelicitously drafted, it is not perfectly clear which verb applies to *951 "§ 187-53 Minimum Requirements." The plaintiffs, however, agree that when read in the context of the whole title that portion of the title indicates that the Ordinance includes amendments to § 187-53 Minimum Requirements.[5]
The notice that Kent County published in advance of both the public hearing before the Regional Planning Commission on January 26, 2006 and the public hearing before the Levy. Court on April 11, 2006 contained the title of the Ordinance and the synopsis at the end of the Ordinance. That synopsis plainly stated:
This Ordinance would establish siting and bulk standard requirements for utility infrastructure to be established within new residential developments in Kent County. This Ordinance would also establish an area outside of, and adjoining, the growth zone within which development could be permitted at a density of one (1) dwelling unit per acre with community wastewater treatment systems. This Ordinance would also have the effect of eliminating rapid infiltration wastewater treatment systems from the list of community wastewater system options within residential subdivisions.[6]

B. The Pre-Existing § 187-53 Minimum Requirements

Because the title of the Bulk Utilities Ordinance references § 187-53, the scope of pre-existing § 187-53 plays an important role in understanding the title. Section 187-53 sets the "minimum requirements for the installation of improvements in subdivisions."[7] Section 187-53 addresses a bevy of improvements, including things such as streets, water supply facilities, underground utilities, and sanitary sewage facilities. I have no difficulty in concluding, as a factual matter, that any interested citizen who saw the notices of the public hearings on the Bulk Utilities Ordinance was on notice that Kent County was planning to amend § 187-53 in a manner that would affect sanitary sewage disposal. That the Ordinance focused on sewage disposal was clear from the title's references to sewage disposal definitions and the additional information in the notices describing its effect on community wastewater systems.
The subsection of pre-existing § 187-53 that dealt with sanitary sewage facilities contained detailed requirements for wastewater disposal. Among those requirements was that community on-site sewage treatment and disposal systems had to comply with all applicable requirements of the Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control ("DNREC").[8] In addition, § 187-53 required certain types of sanitary sewage disposal for certain subdivisions. The type of sanitary sewage disposal required for a subdivision varied based on two factors the number of lots in the subdivision and whether the subdivision was located within Kent County's Growth Zone.[9] Subdivisions *952 outside the Growth Zone could have individual on-site septic, but as the number of lots grew, the required acreage for each lot also grew. The allowed density decreased in a graduated scale from one dwelling unit per acre for subdivisions with ten or less lots to one dwelling unit per four acres for subdivisions with fifty-one or more lots. This requirement would, one presumes, encourage subdivision developers to use community wastewater systems. Community wastewater systems were permissible for subdivisions outside the Growth Zone. The permissible types of community wastewater system for subdivisions outside the Growth Zone also varied by the number of lots in the subdivision. For subdivisions with twenty-six to fifty lots, the community wastewater system had to use subsurface disposal or County sewer service if it was legally available. For subdivisions with fifty-one or more lots, the community wastewater system could use spray irrigation disposal, rapid infiltration beds, deep well injection, drip irrigation, another DNREC-approved system, or County sewer service if it was legally available.

C. The Original Draft Of The Bulk Utilities Ordinance

The original draft of the Bulk Utilities Ordinancethe draft introduced on December 20, 2005made several changes to § 187-53 Minimum Requirements. The Ordinance made two material amendments to the existing subsection on sanitary sewage facilities. First, the Ordinance eliminated the use of rapid infiltration beds as a community wastewater system option.[10] Second, the Ordinance eliminated the use of community wastewater systems for areas outside the Growth Zone and farther than a quarter-mile from the Growth Zone boundary.[11] That proposed change was substantial because it meant that any subdivision located more than a quarter-mile outside the Growth Zone would be required to use on-site septic and would have to comply with the low density requirements for on-site septic.
The original draft of the Bulk Utilities Ordinance also added a new subsection to § 187-53. That new subsection, entitled "Utility Infrastructure Bulk Standards," stated that "[p]arcels established or proposed for the, purpose of occupancy by utility structures and uses shall be considered `nonresidential use properties' and as such shall be subject to the opaque buffer and landscape screening requirements of § 187-79."[12] The new subsection also established setbacks and noise and height limitations for community sanitary sewer disposal system components.[13]

D. The Public Hearings On The Bulk Utilities Ordinance

After the original draft Ordinance was introduced in December 2005, the Kent County Regional Planning Commission held a public hearing on the Ordinance on January 26, 2006. Notice for that meeting was provided on January 11.[14] There was public comment both for and against the Ordinance at the January 26 hearing.[15] Additional public comment took place at later Regional Planning Commission Public Hearings on March 2[16] and March 9.[17]*953 At the end of the March 9 Regional Planning Commission meeting, the Commission voted 5-1 to recommend approval of the Bulk Utilities Ordinance as originally drafted.
After the Regional Planning Commission recommended approval of the Ordinance, the Levy Court scheduled a public hearing on the Ordinance for April 11, 2006 and published advanced notice of that public hearing on March 26. The April 11 public meeting was well-attended by individuals both for and against the Ordinance, including several of the plaintiffs in this case.[18] In fact, there were so many interested citizens at the meeting that the President of the Levy Court had to ask attendees standing in the back of the room to find seats in the hall where they would be able to watch video of the hearing.[19] After taking comments for over five hours, the Levy Court tabled the Ordinance.[20]

E. The Amendments To The Bulk Utilities Ordinance

A week later, the Ordinance was lifted from the table and amended at a Levy Court meeting on April 18.[21] After being tabled at the end of the April 18 meeting, the Ordinance was again lifted from the table and amended at a Levy Court meeting on July 18.[22] At the end of that July 18 meeting, the Levy Court voted 5-2 to approve the Ordinance.[23]
Two of the amendments made at the April 18 meeting are particularly relevant. The "Transition Zone Amendment" removed the outright prohibition on community wastewater systems beyond a quarter-mile outside the Growth Zone and replaced it with a mandate to "consider the establishment of a Transition Zone extending a defined distance west of the existing Growth Zone . . . for the purpose of creating graduated density between the Growth Zone . . . and the remaining areas in western Kent County" in subsequent Kent County Comprehensive Plans.[24] The "Regionalization Amendment" amended the new Utility Infrastructure Bulk Standards subsection of § 187-53 by requiring that community wastewater systems be regionalized meaning that those systems would be required to serve more than one subdivisionand defining community wastewater systems as public utilities that would therefore be subject to conditional use approval under other pre-existing provisions of the Kent County Code.[25]
Two additional amendments to the Bulk Utilities Ordinance were made before it was approved at the July 18 meeting. One amendment added rapid infiltration beds back to the Ordinance as a permissible type of community wastewater system.[26] A second amendment modified the language of the Regionalization Amendment *954 to define regionalization.[27] As adopted, the relevant portion of the Regionalization Amendment stated:
Community sanitary sewer treatment and disposal systems must serve all properties of a public utility as defined under Delaware Code Title 26, which received a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity from the Public Service Commission, located in a community sewer basin as delineated in the Kent County Comprehensive Plan. These systems must be sited on separate tax parcels established for the sole purpose of occupancy by utility structures and disposal systems. Community sanitary sewer treatment and disposal systems shall be considered public utilities and public utility uses requiring Conditional Use approval in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 205 [Zoning] and Chapter 187 [Subdivision and Land Development] and shall be considered "nonresidential use properties". . . . [28]
The amendments discussed above, with the noticeable exception of the portion of the Regionalization Amendment that defined community wastewater systems as public utilities and subjected them to conditional use approval, had been proposed as early as the March, 9 Regional Planning Commission meeting.[29] At that meeting, Hans Medlarz, the Kent County Director of Public Works, proposed several amendments to the Ordinance, including allowing rapid infiltration beds, removing the restrictions on the use of community wastewater systems beyond the quarter-mile outside the Growth Zone, and adding a regionalization requirement.[30] Although the Regional Planning Commission did not take action on those proposed amendments, they were forwarded to the Levy Court for further consideration and were part of the record before the April 11 Levy Court meeting.[31]

III. Contentions

The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment seeks to have the Bulk Utilities Ordinance voided on two bases. The plaintiffs argue that Kent County violated 9 Del. C. § 4110(i)(2) by amending the Bulk Utilities Ordinance after it was put to public hearing. They claim the Ordinance was amended as to a matter of substance not embraced within the title of the Ordinance, and as such Kent County was required to subject that amended Ordinance to all the procedures applied to newly introduced ordinances, which they did not do. Specifically, plaintiffs assert that the Transition Zone and Regionalization Amendments were not embraced by the title of the Bulk Utilities Ordinance.
The plaintiffs also contend that Kent County violated 9 Del. C. § 4911(a) when it amended the Kent County Zoning Code without those changes to the Zoning Code having been proposed by or first submitted to the Regional Planning Commission. The change to the Zoning Code that the plaintiffs identify is the portion of the Regionalization Amendment defining community wastewater systems as public utilities subject to conditional use approval.
Kent County filed a cross-motion for summary judgment seeking to have the Bulk Utilities Ordinance upheld as validly enacted.

IV. Legal Standard

Under Court of Chancery Rule 56(h), when the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment and, as *955 here, have not argued that there is an issue of fact material to the disposition of either motion, "the Court shall deem the motions to be the equivalent of a stipulation for decision on the merits based on the record submitted with the motions."[32] Thus, the usual standard of drawing inferences in favor of the nonmoving party does not apply.[33]

V. Legal Analysis

A. Compliance With 9 Del. C. § 4110(i)(2)

Section 4110 is the general enabling statute for Kent County enacted by the General Assembly.[34] Subsection (h) of § 4110 requires that all actions having the force of law shall be done by ordinance, and subsection (i) of § 4110 places certain requirements on the procedures by which Kent. County enacts ordinances.[35] Section 4110(i)(1) states in relevant part that "[n]o ordinance, except . . . those relating to the adoption or revisions of the County Code, shall contain more than 1 subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title."[36] Section 4110(i)(2) provides for notice and public hearing for proposed ordinances and backs those requirements with the following requirement:
After the public hearing, the county government may adopt the, ordinance with or without amendment or reject it, but if it is amended as to any matter of substance which is not embraced within the title of the ordinance, the county government may not adopt it until the ordinance or its amended sections have been subjected to all of the procedures hereinbefore required in the case of a newly-introduced ordinance.[37]
Although the parties have been unable to find any judicial interpretation or application of § 4110(i), they agree that the limitations that Article II, § 16 of the Delaware Constitution places on the General Assembly are analogous to (and likely inspired) the limitations that § 4110(i) places on the Kent County Levy Court.[38] As such, the parties logically advocate that I adopt the body of law interpreting that section of the Constitution by analogy to form the applicable standard of review in this case, an approach that will have the utility of promoting consistency and reliability in the lawmaking process at various levels within our state. I therefore use the decisions interpreting Article II, § 16, of the Delaware Constitution to interpret the § 4110(i)'s titling requirement.
The "principal object" of the constitutional titling requirement "is that the title of the Act when published shall be sufficiently comprehensive to give to the people, as well as to the members of the Legislature, fair and reasonable notice of the subject matter of the legislation proposed, thus preventing deception by the inclusion of provisions of which the title gives no intimation whatsoever."[39] One of *956 the purposes of the titling requirement is to "fairly apprise the people through publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have [the] opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire."[40] "All that is required is that the language be of sufficient import to give reasonable intimation of the subject matter dealt with."[41]
"[I]t has consistently been the policy of this Court to construe the provisions of Article 2, Section 16 of the Constitution most liberally, and whenever possible, to sustain rather than to destroy the legislation."[42] Kent County's power to regulate land use, however, is delegated from the General Assembly and as such "compliance with the conditions imposed on the exercise of that power is essential."[43]
*957 Before addressing the plaintiffs' arguments based on § 4110(i)(2), I take up Kent County's argument that § 4110(i)(1)'s exclusion of ordinances amending the County Code from the single subject titling requirement also excludes such ordinances from § 4110(i)(2)'s requirement that ordinances that are amended as to any matter of substance not embraced by the title must go back through the notice and hearing process. I reject that argument. Similar to Article II, § 16 of the Delaware Constitution, § 4110(i)(1) contains two discrete requirements: i) no ordinance shall contain more than one subject and ii) the subject of the ordinance must be clearly expressed in the title.[44] Section 4110(i)(1), like the analogous statutory provisions for New Castle County and Sussex County and unlike Article II, § 16,[45] contains an exception from the single titling requirement for ordinances relating to the adoption or revisions of the County Code. Section 4110(i)(1)'s exclusion of amending ordinances from the single subject titling requirement does not exclude *958 those ordinances from that section's requirement that the subject be clearly expressed in the title. To conclude otherwise would lead to the absurd conclusion that ordinances adopting or revising the County Code do not need titles at all. The requirement that the ordinance's subject be expressed in its title is the requirement that § 4110(i)(2) backstops and it would be nonsensical to conclude that § 4110(i)(1) excludes amending ordinances from that requirement. To so conclude would be to eviscerate the purpose of § 4110 because under that interpretation Kent County could amend an ordinance that originally revised the County Code to address anything and avoid the public notice and hearing process on those post-notice and hearing amendments.
Having determined that § 4110(i)(2) does apply to the Bulk Utilities Ordinance, I now address the plaintiffs' argument that the title of the Bulk Utilities Ordinance did not embrace the conditional use approval requirement, the mandate to consider a transition zone, and the regionalization requirement. As I concluded above, citizens who saw the title of the Bulk Utilities Ordinance were on notice that Kent County was planning to amend § 187-53 in a manner that would affect sanitary sewage disposal. The scope of that notice is critical here. Because the legislative act disclosed in the title was to amend an existing section, the scope of that notice is defined by the scope of the existing section, § 187-53.[46] In other words, the "the body of the [proposed legislation] must be germane to the subject contained in the legislation to which the title of the amending [legislation] refers."[47] This is a corollary to the well-settled proposition that the title of legislation amending an existing act only need to refer generally to the act it amends.[48]
Here, pre-existing § 187-53 regulated the minimum requirements for sanitary sewage facilities, including community wastewater systems. That regulation of sanitary sewage facilities entailed a comprehensive regulation of wastewater treatment options for Kent County subdivisions. The conditional use approval requirement, the mandate to consider a transition zone, and the regionalization requirement contained in the Bulk Utilities Ordinance all are germane to preexisting § 187-53's comprehensive regulation of sanitary sewage facilities because those amendments also regulate the wastewater treatment options for Kent County subdivisions. Although that conclusion alone is enough to support my finding that Kent County complied with § 4110(i), I note that the regulation contained in the amendments are foreseeable outgrowths of regulation contained in preexisting § 187-53. The conditional use approval requirement and the mandate to consider a transition zone directly address Kent County's control over the type of wastewater treatment systems allowed in *959 certain geographic areas, which was something that pre-existing § 187-53 regulated. The regionalization requirement mandates that community wastewater systems serve a larger base than just an individual subdivision. That requirement to have one wastewater treatment system serve a larger group of properties can be analogized to pre-existing § 187-53's requirement that larger subdivisions have community wastewater systems rather than individual on-site septic unless those subdivisions complied with onerous low density requirements.
I have no doubt that individuals interested in sanitary sewage disposal were on notice that what was ultimately approved as the Bulk Utilities Ordinance was within the scope of items that the Ordinance might address. Notice requirements like those contained in § 4110 are designed to give citizens the initial information they need to decide whether to embark on a fuller exercise in informed citizenship. Here, the title told any citizen that the Bulk Utilities Ordinance was addressing definitions related to sanitary sewage disposal and amendments to § 187-53 Minimum Requirements, the part of the existing Code regulating the permitted types of and requirements for wastewater systems. Combined with the title, Kent County sent out a public notice that included the Ordinance's synopsis, which provided additional information about the proposed Ordinance.[49] With this information, any reasonable citizen interested in wastewater systems (and development, given the connection between the two) should have then: i) read the full bill; ii) compared it to preexisting § 187-53; determined how it affects her interests; and iv) attended the public hearing on the proposed legislation or otherwise submitted public comment if concerned about the changes in the regulation of wastewater treatment systems it proposed. Indeed, that process of citizenship is exactly what many Kent County citizens embarked upon after reading the notice about the Bulk Utilities Ordinance. The Levy Court public hearing was attended by numerous citizens, including several of the plaintiffs. Those citizens voiced their concerns and were successful in having the Bulk Utilities Ordinance amended. In fact, the conditional use approval requirement and the mandate to consider a transition zone were amendments that were more favorable to, the plaintiffs' interests than the portion of the original Ordinance they replaced, which placed an outright prohibition on community wastewater systems beyond a quarter-mile outside the Growth Zone.[50]

B. Compliance. With 9 Del. C. § 4911

As discussed above, Kent County's power to regulate land use is delegated from the General Assembly and therefore Kent County must comply with the conditions imposed on the exercise of that power.[51]*960 One of those conditions is 9 Del. C. § 4911. Section 4911 requires that changes to Kent County's Zoning Code receive additional consideration and public scrutiny beyond that given to all ordinances. Section 4911(a) requires that no changes to zoning regulation "shall be made or become effective until the same shall have been proposed by or be first submitted to the [Regional Planning] Commission."[52] The Regional Planning Commission must have a public hearing after providing proper notice of the proposed zoning change and then make a report to the Levy Court which must hold its own properly noticed hearing before the changes to the Zoning Code can be finally adopted.[53]
The plaintiffs contend that the portion of the Regionalization Amendment stating that community wastewater systems "shall be considered public utilities and public utility uses requiring Conditional Use approval in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 205 [Zoning] and Chapter 187 [Land User (respectively, the "Conditional Use Approval Requirement" and the "Public Utility Classification") was adopted in violation of § 4911. This, the plaintiffs argue, effected a change to the Zoning Code because the definition of public utilities in the Zoning Code did not previously include community wastewater systems.[54] Although other portions of the Bulk Utilities Ordinance were the subject of the Regional Planning Commission hearing on January 26, 2007, the Conditional Use Approval Requirement and Public Utility Classification had not yet been proposed and, therefore, were not considered at a Regional Planning Commission public hearing. Kent County does not deny that the Conditional Use Approval Requirement and Public Utility Classification were not considered by the Regional Planning. Commission. Instead, it makes two rather odd arguments.
As to the Conditional Use Approval Requirement, Kent County argues that the Requirement was not really an amendment of the Zoning Code but an incorporation by reference of other pre-existing sections of the Kent County Zoning Code. Kent County's argument that the Conditional Use Approval Requirement does not amend the Zoning Code contradicts the plain language of the Bulk Utilities Ordinance, which expressly makes community wastewater systems subject to conditional use approval under the Zoning Code. Based on the information in Kent County's reply brief, whether community wastewater systems were subject to conditional use approval before the Bulk Utilities Ordinance was approved is at least questionable.[55] My conclusion that it was at least debatable whether community wastewater *961 systems required conditional use approval before the approval of the Bulk Utilities Ordinance is supported by an uncontroverted affidavit from a respected Kent County attorney stating that he is "aware of no community wastewater systems in Kent County for which conditional use approval was required prior to the passage of the Bulk Utilities Ordinance."[56] Moreover, this conclusion is supported by the well-known principle that courts should be suspicious of statutory interpretations that suggest that the legislature enacted a meaningless provision.[57]
With respect to the public utility classification,[58] Kent County argues that the amendment was not really an amendment because a 2004 amendment to 26 Del. C. § 102, a portion of the Delaware Public Utilities Act of 1974, added "wastewater (which shall include sanitary sewer charge)" systems to the definition of a public utility,[59] and that state definition of a public utility preempts Kent County's definition of a public utility. The problem with Kent County's argument is that the state definition of a public utility for the purpose of its Public Utilities Act (legislation largely addressing the interests of consumers affected by providers of certain public services) is entirely unrelated to Kent County's definition of a public utility for the purpose of its Zoning Code (a county law addressing land use).[60] Therefore, there is no conflict between the two different uses resulting in a situation where the state definition would preempt the county definition.[61] Kent County's *962 preemption argument lacks any logical force and does not affect my conclusion that Kent County changed its Zoning Code without following the procedures required by 9 Del. C. § 4911.

C. Severability

Because I have found that only a portion of the Ordinance violates § 4911 and the Ordinance contains a severability provision,[62] I will consider whether the remaining portions of the Ordinance can lawfully be severed.[63] "When an ordinance or statute faces constitutional or statutory challenges, a Court may preserve its valid portions if the offending language can lawfully be severed."[64] The general inquiry is "whether the statute will function in a manner consistent with the intent of [the enacting legislative body]."[65] The standard for severability has been articulated in the following two part test: i) "Is the unobjectionable part, standing alone, capable of enforcement?" and ii) "Did the legislature intend the [un]objectionable part to stand alone in case the other part should fall?"[66]
In applying that two part test to this case, I first note that the severability provision of the Bulk Utilities Ordinance indicates that the Levy Court intended the unobjectionable portion of the Ordinance to stand alone. The question then becomes whether the unobjectionable portion of the Ordinance is capable of enforcement. The relevant portion of the Ordinance, with the Conditional Use Approval Requirement and the Public Utility Classification stricken, reads:
Community sanitary sewer treatment and disposal systems must serve all properties of a public utility as defined under Delaware Code Title 26, which received a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity from the Public Service Commission, located in a community *963 sewer basin as delineated in the Kent County Comprehensive Plan. These systems must be sited on separate tax parcels established for the sole purpose of occupancy by utility structures and disposal systems. Community sanitary sewer treatment and disposal systems shall be considered public utilities and public utility uses requiring Conditional Use approval in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 205 and Chapter 187 and shall be considered "nonresidential use properties" and as such shall also be subject to the opaque buffer and landscape screening requirements of § 187-79 (Buffers) applicable to nonresidential uses that adjoin residential use properties.[67]
The unobjectionable portion of the Bulk Utilities Ordinance appears to be capable of enforcement. Therefore, only the Conditional Use Approval Requirement and the Public Utility Classification are void and the remaining portion of the Bulk Utilities Ordinance is valid.

VI. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part. Kent County's motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part. The parties shall submit a conforming order within ten days.
NOTES
[1]  2KCF BU ("Record") at 1.
[2]  Id. at 393.
[3]  Id. at 1, 393.
[4]  The plaintiffs do not dispute the revision of the definition of Sanitary Sewage Disposal, Community and the addition of a definition for Sanitary Sewage Disposal with Spray Irrigation. Tr. Of Oral Arg. (Nov. 27, 2007) ("Tr.") at 24.
[5]  Id. at 25. At oral argument, the plaintiffs' counsel acknowledged: "I think what it's signaling youand I'm being fair about thisis that the ordinance includes amendments to Section 187-53 as minimum requirements." Id.
[6]  Record at 22, 147; see also id. at 6.
[7]  Kent County Op. Br. Ex. C at 187:42.
[8]  Id. at 187:45.
[9]  Id. at 187:46-47. The Growth Zone "encompasses an area that Kent County has determined new development should be encouraged. To that end, incentives such as area and bulk requirement reductions are provided to encourage development within the zone rather than in the more rural areas of the County." Kent Cty. C. § 205-397.2(A)(1). The Growth Zone "is an area identified by Kent County where infrastructure such as water, sewer, and transportation facilities exists or is planned to serve development." Kent Cty. C. § 205-397.2(A)(2).
[10]  Record at 3.
[11]  Id. at 3.
[12]  Id. at 4.
[13]  Id. at 4-5.
[14]  Id. at 22.
[15]  See id. at 42-59.
[16]  See id. at 65-68.
[17]  See id. at 81-99.
[18]  See id. at 269-297. Henry Carey and Mary Moore were among the plaintiffs in this action who were present at the meeting. Id. at 294-95. Although it is difficult to ascertain from the record because of overlapping relationships and the use of entity names, it would not be unreasonable to infer that several other plaintiffs' interests were represented at the April 11 hearing. For example, the President of the Kent County Farm Bureau could be thought to have represented the interests of plaintiff Delaware State Farm Bureau, Inc. and Bill Harman likely represented the interests of plaintiff Harman Brothers, LLC. See id. at 287, 289.
[19]  Id. at 272.
[20]  Id. at 220-21.
[21]  Id. at 350-58.
[22]  Id. at 385-90.
[23]  Id. at 390.
[24]  Id. at 305, 352.
[25]  Id. at 304, 353.
[26]  Id. at 389.
[27]  Id. at 389-90.
[28]  Id. at 394.
[29]  See id. at 129-134.
[30]  Id. at 82-83.
[31]  Id. at 136, 165.
[32]  Ct. Ch. Rule 56(h).
[33]  Am. Legacy Found. v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 886 A.2d 1, 18 (Del.Ch.2005).
[34]  See 9 Del. C. § 4110.
[35]  9 Del. C. § 4110(h)-(i).
[36]  9 Del. C. § 4110(i)(1).
[37]  9 Del. C. § 4110(i)(2) (emphasis added).
[38]  Pls. Op. Br. at 10-11; Kent County Rep. Br. at 2. Article II, § 16 of the Delaware Constitution states: "No bill or joint resolution, except bills appropriating money for public purposes, shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title." DEL. CONST. art. II, § 16.
[39]  Klein v. Nat'l Pressure Cooker Co., 64 A.2d 529, 532 (Del.1949); see also Opinion of the Justices, 194 A.2d 855, 856 (Del.1963) ("Fundamentally, [the titling requirement] is designed to prevent deception of the general public and the members of the General Assembly by titles to bills which give no adequate information of the subject matter of the bills.").
[40]  Klein, 64 A.2d at 532.
[41]  Id.
[42]  Id.
[43]  Fields v. Kent County, 2006 WL 345014, at *3 (Del.Ch.2006). I confess to being chary about entering into the semantical battle between the parties regarding whether Kent County must "substantial[ly]" or "full[y]" comply with the requirements with the procedural requirements imposed by the General Assembly before enacting legislation. Compare Wilmington Trust Co. v. Highfield, 153 A. 864, 867 (Del.1931) (stating that provisions such as Article II, § 16 "`should not be so construed as to defeat or embarrass legislation where there has been a substantial compliance with its requirements'") (quoting Monaghan v. Lewis, 59 A. 948, 949 (Del. 1905)) with Fields, 2006 WL 345014, at *3 (requiring "full compliance" with a subsection of § 4110 in a situation where Kent County was regulating land use) and Carl M. Freeman Assocs., Inc. v. Green, 447 A.2d 1179, 1182 (Del.1982) (requiring strict compliance rather than substantial compliance with 9 Del. C. § 7002, the Sussex County analog to § 4110, where the ordinance at issue was regulating land use). In a case where a plaintiff challenges the validity of legislation adopted by a legislative body elected by the members of a polity, the plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate the infirmity of that legislation. See 6 EUGENE McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 22:27 (3d ed. 2007) ("An ordinance is presumed to be valid and the burden of proving it invalid is on one who asserts its invalidity."). Unless the court is persuaded that the legislation is invalid for some reason, such as that the legislature in question did not follow the statutorily required procedures for adopting the legislation, the court should uphold the decision made by the elected officials. Out of respect for our republican form of democracy, judges should be restrained in setting aside decisions of elected bodies invested with legislative authority. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 847-48, 103 S.Ct. 2690, 77 L.Ed.2d 214 (1983) ("Particularly where there is no taint of arbitrariness or discrimination, substantial deference is to be accorded the political decisions of the people of a State acting through their elected representatives.") (internal quotation and citation omitted); 16A AM.JUR.2D Constitutional Law § 201 ("In order to show a decent respect for the wisdom, integrity, and patriotism of the legislative branch by which all laws are passed, courts will presume that legislation is valid until the contrary is shown beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, courts should not pronounce legislation to be contrary to the constitution in doubtful cases.").

In a situation, however, when one legislative body having superior authoritysuch as the General Assemblyhas required that another legislative bodysuch as the Kent County Levy Courtfollow certain procedures, the court must do its duty and enforce the requirements imposed on the latter's lawmaking authority. See New Castle County v. BC Dev. Assocs., 567 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Del. 1989) ("[I]t is axiomatic that delegated power may be exercised only in accordance with the terms of its delegation."). Likewise, when the Constitution requires that the General Assembly abide by certain procedures, the court must enforce those requirements. But in each case, the court should defer to the relevant legislature unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the legislature in question did not comply with the applicable requirements for enactment. In my view, that comes down to a binary decision about compliance or noncompliance, which is not aided by the use of adjectival qualifiers, especially ones like full, strict, and substantial, which seem to be rather close synonyms. See id. at 1275 (avoiding qualifiers and stating that "when the validity of a zoning regulation is judicially challenged the standard for review is whether the action is in compliance with applicable statutes"); see also Carl M. Freeman Assocs., 447 A.2d at 1181-82 (suggesting its discomfort with the distinction between the strict and substantial compliance standards by finding its decision would be no different under the substantial compliance standard after it struck down an ordinance under the strict compliance standard); cf. Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger Int'l, Inc., 858 A.2d 342, 376-79 (Del.Ch.2004) (discussing how prior jurisprudence under 8 Del. C. § 271 had converted the terms "substantially all" into the term "substantially half"). Indeed, the cases that apply the strict compliance standard often also emphasize that the legislation is presumed valid. See Upfront Enters., LLC v. The Kent County Levy Court, 2007 WL 1862709, at *1 (Del.Ch.2007) ("Although a land use ordinance, as with all of the County's ordinances, is presumed valid, it will be declared invalid if it fails to meet the standards prescribed legislatively."). Unless this is meant to refer to some higher showing required of the plaintiff, that presumption is meaningless as it would simply mean that the plaintiff challenging the validity of legislation had the same burden as any other civil plaintiff, to tilt the judge out of equipoise and into believing that a violation more likely than not occurred. Similarly, I do not read the case law using the phrase "substantial compliance" to mean anything other than that the judge should not set aside legislation when the plaintiff has not convinced her that the legislation had not complied with the procedural requirements. See Highfield, 153 A. at 867 (stating that the substantial compliance standard "is but a particular application to the constitutional provision in question of the general principle which courts everywhere apply, viz., that every presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of legislative enactments and that they should not be declared invalid unless their invalidity is beyond doubt"). If any step were to be taken in this area, it would be more useful to convert the long-standing and important reluctance on the part of judges to set aside the actions of elected officials into a higher burden of persuasion, such that the court would have to be clearly convinced by the plaintiff that the legislature had violated a procedural requirement. In fact, I do not hesitate to admit that I read much of the relevant precedent as embodying just such an approach, which is the plaintiff seeking to invalidate a legislative enactment on procedural grounds must clearly convince the court of a violation and if the plaintiff leaves the court with serious doubt whether a violation has occurred, the deference owed to the political branches requires that the court not disturb their judgment.
[44]  See Klein, 64 A.2d at 531 ("Two distinct subjects are included in [Article II, § 16]; first, that no bill shall embrace more than one subject; the second, . . . that the subject shall be expressed in the title."); duPont v. Dir. of Div. of Revenue of Dep't of Fin., 329 A.2d 158, 160 (Del.Super.1974), aff'd, 347 A.2d 653 (Del.1975) (same).
[45]  9 Del. C. § 1152(a) (New Castle County); 9 Del. C. § 7002(m)(1) (Sussex County).
[46]  See duPont v. Dir. of Div. of Revenue of Dep't of Fin., 347 A.2d 653, 655 (Del.1975) ("If the act in question is amendatory of existing law, the title is adequate if it refers to the subject matter and to the section of the law to be amended (provided that the body of the act is germane to that law)."); see also NORMAN J. SINGER, 1A SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 22:8 (6th ed. 2002) ("The constitutional requirement is complied with if the title of the amendatory act identifies the act or section to be amended and declares its purpose to amend, and the new matter added by the amendatory act, is germane to the subject of the original act or section.").
[47]  Highfield, 153 A. at 869.
[48]  See, e.g., id. ("It is doubtless true that it is permissible, under such constitutional provisions as the one before us, for the title of an amendatory act to express its subject by reference only to the subject-matter and section or chapter number of the act it proposes to amend.").
[49]  The synopsis published in the notice of public hearing indicated that the proposed Ordinance would regulate the permitted types of and requirements for wastewater systems. Moreover, that synopsis put the public on notice that the changes would affect "new residential development in Kent County"a phrase that would certainly pique the interests of those concerned about development in Kent County. Record at 147.
[50]  As the plaintiffs' counsel acknowledged upon questioning at oral argument, if "the title sufficiently addressed the subject matter of the regulation or approval process for these systems on a whole [then] a lesser included amendment that dealt with the same subject would not offend the statute." Tr. at 35.
[51]  See also Farmers for Fairness v. Kent County, 2007 WL 1413247, at *5 (Del.Ch. May 1, 2007) ("[T]he County's good intentions cannot outweigh its responsibility to govern in a manner consistent with the requirements imposed upon it by Chapter 49 of Title 9; it must act within the scope of its grant of power and it cannot disregard the procedural safeguards that the General Assembly has imposed.").
[52]  9 Del. C. § 4911(a).
[53]  9 Del. C. § 4911(b)-(c).
[54]  See Kent Cty. C. § 205-6 ("PUBLIC UTILITYAn organization supplying water, electricity, transportation, etc., to the public, operated by a private corporation under government regulation or by the government directly.").
[55]  I am forced to rely on Kent County's reply brief because it did not explain how conditional use approval for wastewater treatment systems was already required by the Zoning Code in its opening brief. See Kent County Op. Br. at 30. The essence of Kent County's argument is that for at least certain zoning districts, "septage processing and storage" requires conditional use approval under the Kent County Zoning Code. Kent County Rep. Br. at 19-20. Kent County admits that septage and sewage do not have exactly the same meaning and then suggests that I should assume the drafters meant sewage instead of septage. Id. at 21-22. The ultimate conclusion of Kent County's four-page analysis is that community wastewater systems were already subject to conditional use approval. Id. at 19-22. That may or may not be the case, but all that matters for the purposes of this opinion is that what was at least a questionable went to being rock solid after the Bulk Utilities Ordinance was approved. That is, the Bulk Utilities Ordinance made an "amendment[], supplement[], change[] or modification[]" to the Zoning Code. 9 Del. C. § 4911(a). Kent County admits as much in its reply brief when it states that after the adoption of the Bulk Utilities Ordinance, "the requirement that such wastewater treatment facilities comply in all respects with the County Code provisions for public utilities became even more clearif any doubt existed before." Kent County Rep. Br. at 24.
[56]  Pls. Rep. Br. Ex. A. Kent County argues that all this suggests is that it was not enforcing its Zoning Code. If that is true, then Kent County can, as threatened in its reply brief, enforce the Zoning Code according to its belief that the Zoning Code's pre-existing provisions required conditional use approval for community wastewater systems. Kent County Rep. Br. at 20.
[57]  See, e.g., Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 900 (Del. 1994) ("[W]ords in a statute should not be construed as surplusage. . . . ").
[58]  In essence, the public utility classification also encapsulates the conditional use approval requirement because public utilities required conditional use approval under the pre-existing Zoning Code.
[59]  26 Del. C. § 102(6).
[60]  For this reason, Kent County's argument that the definition of public utility must be the same based on the following quotation from Public Water Supply Co. v. DiPasquale fails: "We find it inconceivable that the General Assembly would define `water utility' with identical language in Titles 7 and 26, yet contemplate that the meaning would change dependent upon whether DNREC or the PSC was regulating the water use." 735 A.2d 378, 385 (Del.1999). That case dealt with the use of a term by the same legislative body in two different statutes rather than the use of a term by two different legislative bodies in two unrelated pieces of legislation, and as such, is inapplicable in this case.
[61]  See Cantinca v. Fontana, 884 A.2d 468, 473 (Del.2005) ("In Delaware, the State and its political subdivisions are permitted to enact similar provisions, and regulations, so long as the two regulations do not conflict."). If the Levy Court was certain that the state definition of public utility in the Public Utilities Act of 1974 preempted Kent County's definition of a public utility in its Zoning. Code, then why was a separate change to the County Code required? A logical answer to that question might be that the Levy Court wanted to bring the County Code into accordance with the preempting state statute. Several factors weigh heavily against the inference that that was the Levy Court's motivation. If that was the Levy Court's rationale, then why not disclose that the change was made because the County was bound by the state definition? Moreover, why make change through the alteration of an entirely different chapter of the County Code as opposed to directly making the change to the definition of a public utility in the Zoning Code, especially when the state change to its definition of a public utility was made directly in the definitions section of the Public Utilities Act of 1974?
[62]  Record at 395. The Severability provision states:

The provisions of this Ordinance are severable and if any of its provisions or any sentence, clause, or paragraph or the application thereof to any person or circumstance shall be held unconstitutional or violative of the Laws of the State of Delaware by any court of competent jurisdiction, the decision of such court shall not affect or impair any of the remaining provisions which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
Id.
[63]  The parties devoted significant portions of their briefs and the oral argument to making irrelevant adjectival assaults on the other party's views and motives regarding land use regulation in Kent County rather than the merits of this action. Although all of the arguments received short-shrift, the parties provided almost no argument on severabilitythe sole mention of severability, at least that I am aware of, was a block quote in Kent County's reply brief. Kent County Rep. Br. at 26.
[64]  Newark Landlord Ass'n v. City of Newark, 2003 WL 22724663, at *1 (Del.Ch. Nov. 17, 2003); see also Farmers for Fairness v. Kent County, 2007 WL 1651931, at *5 (Del.Ch. May 25, 2007) (quoting Newark Landlord Assn).
[65]  Newark Landlord Ass'n, 2003 WL 22724663, at *1 (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685, 107 S.Ct. 1476, 94 L.Ed.2d 661 (1987)).
[66]  Id. (citing Langley v. Elsmere Assocs., 1994 WL 149256, at *1 (Del.Super.Feb. 23, 1994)).
[67]  Record at 394.


174 F.2d 899 (1949)
DORSEY
v.
UNITED STATES.
No. 12294.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
June 3, 1949.
Rehearing Denied September 1, 1949.
*900 Joe Creel, Miami, Fla., Meinhard H. Myerson, Jacksonville, Fla., Dan Chappell, Bart A. Riley, A. C. Dressler, Miami, Fla., for appellant.
Herbert S. Phillips, U. S. Atty., Tampa, Fla., Fred Botts, Asst. U. S. Atty., Miami, Fla., for appellee.
Before SIBLEY, McCORD, and WALLER, Circuit Judges.
SIBLEY, Circuit Judge.
Tharp, Howard, Dorsey and Webb were indicted in Count 1 for a conspiracy to violate General Ration Order No. 8 and Third Revised Ration Order No. 3 made under the Second War Powers Act, 50 U. S.C.A.Appendix, § 631 et seq., with respect to rationed sugar; and in Counts 2 and 3 Tharp was charged with substantive offenses with reference to rationed sugar documents; and in Counts 4 and 5 Howard was charged with similar substantive offenses. Howard pleaded guilty to Counts 4 and 5 and was not tried on Count 1. The other defendants were convicted and sentenced on Count 1 only, and appealed. Webb was put on probation and has not prosecuted his appeal. Tharp has died and the prosecution has abated as to him. Dorsey's conviction under Count 1 is now involved. The points argued for him are: 1. That Count 1 should have been dismissed on motion; 2. That several conspiracies were proved instead of the one charged and acquittal should have been directed on motion; 3. That Dorsey was illegally arrested and searched and the evidence so obtained should have been suppressed; 4. The judge misquoted evidence to the jury; and 5. There was other judicial unfairness.
1. The first count, six pages long, is verbose and difficult to follow, but charges a conspiracy lasting from June 1, 1945, to Dec. 1, 1946, to violate the Ration Orders above referred to by securing sugar ration checks for payees not entitled to them or the sugar stated in them; by selling and transferring such checks to persons not entitled to the checks or the sugar; by selling and distributing counterfeit sugar stamps and securing sugar thereon in violation of the Second War Powers Act and the regulations made thereunder; by paying money as bribes to Dorsey and by his receiving the money, Dorsey being a person acting for and in behalf of the United States in an official capacity as a Special Agent in Region Four of the Office of Price Administration, with intent to influence his actions and decisions, and with intent on Dorsey's part to have his actions and decisions influenced thereby, and to pay him large sums to do or omit to do official acts such as securing official documents, making official investigations, and covering up offenses and irregularities performed by the other conspirators in the acquisition and use of sugar and sugar documents contrary to the duly promulgated regulations for the control of sugar, a rationed article. Twenty-two overt acts are set forth.
The count is not multifarious. It charges a general plan to subvert the Ration Orders and to aid and cover the unlawful operations by including in it a Special Agent of the Office of Price Administration. It does not allege that the violations of the Orders were to be "wilfully" done, or that Dorsey's official capacity was known, as would be necessary in charging substantive offenses. But in charging that the plan was to violate the Orders wilfulness is implicit, and a plan to pay Dorsey to violate his official duty implies that they all knew his official capacity. It is well settled that in a charge of conspiracy to commit offenses the conspiracy is the gist of the offense and that the offenses to be committed need not be alleged with the fullness that would be necessary in prosecuting for the commission of such offenses. Thornton v. United States, 271 U.S. 414, 423, 46 S.Ct. 585, 70 L.Ed. 1013; Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425, 449, 28 S.Ct. 163, 52 L.Ed. 278; Hill v. United States, 4 Cir., 42 F.2d 812. In ruling on *901 the motion to dismiss the court held that such wilfulness and knowledge would have to appear in proof, but that the conspiracy charge was sufficiently made. There was no error.
2. The evidence tended to prove that the defendants other than Dorsey had been operating for some time, but that Dorsey did not enter the picture till October, 1946. His joining the conspiracy at that time did not make a new and independent conspiracy. There was certainly no fatal variance between what was alleged and what was proved. There was no ground for acquittal in this situation.
3. Tharp had been and Dorsey still was connected with the Office of Price Administration, and knew each other well. Howard was a large user of sugar and bought the contraband documents. He was detected and implicated Tharp. Tharp was arrested in Howard's office by government investigators, who were not arresting officers, in the act of dealing with Howard and was searched and questioned, and he made a sworn written confession charging Dorsey with being a party to the conspiracy, and detailing Dorsey's dealings. He agreed with the investigators to try to trap Dorsey the next morning at Tharp's home by giving him two $3,000 checks as having been paid over by Howard for sugar checks furnished by Dorsey. Dorsey met the appointment at Tharp's home, the investigators being concealed, and there is some conflict as to what occurred, that most unfavorable to Dorsey being that Tharp and Dorsey had some conversation, and then Tharp asked Dorsey if he had picked up the two checks, and Dorsey asked which ones, and Tharp said it was the checks he gave Howard, O. P. A. checks, 50,000# checks. Dorsey said he had checked on it, but it had not come to the Columbia Bank and he did not know what was the matter, they had not received a shipment for a month. Tharp then told Dorsey he delivered the checks to Howard yesterday but Howard did not have the money but gave him these two checks ($3,000 each) to hold till he got the money. Tharp then handed Dorsey the checks and he looked at them and handed them back and said, "That is all right. I can get the money later." The investigators then arrested Dorsey, searched him and found a little black memorandum book containing addresses, including Tharp's, and a wallet containing some money and automobile papers. Tharp recanted to a large extent and pleaded not guilty. He and Dorsey moved to suppress the evidence obtained from each by their several arrests. We have no occasion to inquire into the arrest of Tharp, for Dorsey cannot assert Tharp's right of immunity from unreasonable search. As to Dorsey, we have concluded his arrest though without a warrant, and by persons who were not arresting officers, was lawful. There being no special federal statute on the subject, the arrest in Florida for a federal offense is governed by Florida law. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210. The law of Florida is the common law, except as modified by statute. Florida Statutes Annotated in Sect. 901.15 provide: "A peace officer may without warrant arrest a person: (1) When the person to be arrested has committed a felony or misdemeanor in his presence. * * * (2) When a felony has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it. (3) When he has reasonable ground to believe that a felony has been or is being committed and reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing it. * * *" These provisions are in line with the common law. 4 Am.Jur., Arrest, Secs. 24, 25, 26; 6 C.J.S., Arrest, § 6. The Florida Statutes make no provision about arrests by a private person. The common law authorizes a private person also to arrest for a felony committed in his presence; or if a felony has been committed, and he has probable cause to believe and does believe the person arrested to be guilty. He can justify his not getting a warrant, though he had opportunity, by proving the arrested person was actually guilty. 4 Am.Jur., Arrest, Secs. 35, 36, 37; 6 C.J.S., Arrest, § 8. See also United States v. Gowen, 2 Cir., 40 F.2d 593, and Brady v. United States, 6 Cir., 300 F. 540, 541. We find but one case in the Florida Reports on the lawfulness of an arrest for a felony by a private person, *902 Poole v. State, 129 Fla. 841, 177 So. 195. The right to arrest was there upheld without other discussion than a recital of the circumstances which showed reasonably that the persons arrested had committed or were committing the felony of cow stealing. See as to probable cause, Rogers v. State, 158 Fla. 582, 30 So.2d 625.
In the present case, that a crime of conspiracy was in progress the verdict establishes, as does the evidence. The investigators knew that Howard had been detected, as had Tharp, and both had confessed. Howard and Tharp had accused Dorsey, and what Dorsey did and said in the investigators' presence tended to confirm the accusation. They had reasonable ground to believe Dorsey was in the conspiracy. The Di Re case, supra, is relied on by Dorsey, but Dorsey is not in the position of Di Re, whom no one had accused and against whom there was no suspicion till he was searched. Dorsey is in the position of Buttita whom the informer had charged with crime and whose arrest was not contested. Dorsey's arrest being lawful, it was permissible to search him. What was found on him, without detailing it, was of so little importance that it is not likely it influenced the verdict. Dorsey took the stand as a witness, but did not even refer to the occasion of his arrest and what was taken from him by search. There was no error in admitting the evidence.
4. The jury, having retired, returned and asked to have read "the testimony of the witnesses, Mr. Tharp for one." It was further specified by a juror that they wished what Mr. Tharp said when Mr. Dorsey came into his home, and regarding the two checks. The reporter apparently was not at hand, and the judge said he had fairly complete notes on Mr. Tharp's testimony and if there was no objection he would review the testimony from the notes. Counsel for both sides agreed. The judge then undertook to state the testimony, asking that if he was mistaken counsel would correct him, and stating it was for the jury to say what the testimony was. He covered not only what Tharp said, but also what Jett, who made the arrest, testified. There was some discussion with counsel which resulted in agreement as to a point of difference between Tharp and Jett. There was no objection made to going into Jett's testimony also. There was no error in mentioning it too, and no misquotation was claimed.
5. We find no merit in other complaints about the trial.
The verdict was authorized by the evidence. The judgment is
Affirmed.


       TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

                        JUDGMENT RENDERED AUGUST 22, 2013

                                      NO. 03-13-00359-CV

                                Milton E Lindsey, Jr., Appellant

                                                 v.

                               Kathryn Renee Ramsey, Appellee

    APPEAL FROM JUSTICE COURT, PRECINCT THREE OF TRAVIS COUNTY
            BEFORE JUSTICES PURYEAR, ROSE AND GOODWIN
  DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION -- OPINION BY JUSTICE PURYEAR

THIS CAUSE having this day come on to be considered, and the Court being of the opinion that

it is without jurisdiction of the cause and that the appeal should therefore be dismissed for want

of jurisdiction: IT IS ACCORDINGLY considered, adjudged and ordered that the appeal is

dismissed for want of jurisdiction. It is FURTHER ordered that the appellant pay all costs

relating to this appeal, both in this Court and the court below; and that this decision be certified

below for observance.


Order filed May 2, 2019

                                       In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                   ___________

                              No. 11-19-00125-CR
                                 ___________

           JAMAI NICOLE DABNEY BARRON, Appellant
                                          V.
                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 132nd District Court
                            Scurry County, Texas
                         Trial Court Cause No. 10597

                                     ORDER
      Jamai Nicole Dabney Barron was represented by retained attorney Anne-
Marie Gillespie at trial. Barron filed a pro se notice of appeal and request for the
appointment of appellate counsel. Barron asserts that she is indigent. An eligible
indigent defendant is entitled to have the trial court appoint an attorney to represent
the defendant in an appeal to this court.           TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 1.051(d)(1) (West Supp. 2018). Barron also requests that a reporter’s record be
provided free of charge for this appeal. We abate the appeal.
      We remand the cause to the trial court so that it may determine the following:
      1. Whether Barron desires to prosecute her appeal;
      2. Whether Barron is indigent;
      3. If not indigent, whether Barron has retained counsel for this appeal; and
      4. If indigent, whether Barron desires to have counsel appointed to represent
         her in this appeal or whether, after being warned of the dangers and
         disadvantages of self-representation, Barron competently and intelligently
         chooses to exercise the right to represent herself.

If it is determined that Barron is indigent and desires to have counsel appointed, the
trial court is directed to appoint counsel for this appeal. We also request that the trial
court address the issue of Barron’s entitlement to have the reporter’s record
furnished free of charge for this appeal. If it is determined that Barron is indigent
and is exercising her right to represent herself, the trial court must develop evidence
as to whether Barron’s decision to proceed without counsel is knowingly and
intelligently made. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); Ex parte Davis,
818 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Hubbard v. State, 739 S.W.2d 341, 345
(Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780, 783–86 (Tex. Crim. App.
1976).
      We note that Barron need not appear in person at the hearing and that the trial
court may permit her to appear via telephone. The trial court is directed to enter
findings of fact and conclusions of law, if necessary, and to make any appropriate
recommendations to this court.
      The clerk of the trial court is directed to prepare and forward to this court a
clerk’s record containing any findings, recommendations, or orders of the trial court.
If a hearing is held, the court reporter is directed to prepare and forward to this court

                                            2
the reporter’s record from the hearing. The records are due to be filed in this court
on or before May 23, 2019.
        The appeal is abated.

                                                                   PER CURIAM

May 2, 2019
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Stretcher, J., and Wright, S.C.J.1

Willson, J., not participating.

        1
          Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired), Court of Appeals, 11th District of Texas at Eastland,
sitting by assignment.

                                                      3


26 Cal.App.2d 197 (1938)
THE PEOPLE, Respondent,
v.
LOUISE WRIGHT, Appellant.
Crim. No. 1601.
California Court of Appeals. Third Appellate District.
April 29, 1938.
 Lawrence Edwards and Charles H. Epperson for Appellant.
 U.S. Webb, Attorney-General, and Gordon S. Hughes, Deputy Attorney-General, for Respondent.
 Thompson, J.
 A rehearing was granted in this case for the purpose of modifying the statement of facts contained in the original opinion, of which the appellant complains. After again reviewing the record we are convinced the original opinion correctly declares the law applicable to the facts *201 of this case. With certain modifications the original opinion is therefore adopted as follows:
 The defendant was convicted under the first count of an information charging her with pandering, contrary to the provisions of the statutes. (Stats. 1911, p. 9; 1 Deering's Gen. Laws of 1931, p. 819, Act 1906.) The information alleges that the defendant did "wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously procure for a female person, to-wit: one Esther Stephens Blanas, a place as an inmate of a house of prostitution".
 The appellant contends that the verdict and judgment of commitment are not supported by the evidence, that the court erred in receiving and rejecting testimony, and in giving to the jury and refusing certain instructions. It is also inferred the first count of the information upon which the defendant was convicted fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a public offense.
 [1] The information states a good cause of action for the crime of pandering. (People v. Cimar, 127 Cal.App. 9 [15 PaCal.2d 166, 16 PaCal.2d 139].) It alleges that the defendant procured Esther Blanas to become an inmate of a house of prostitution. Under the statute above referred to, pandering may be accomplished in several different ways. It is said in the Cimar case, supra, that "if the conduct of the defendant assisted, induced, persuaded or encouraged the female to become an inmate of the house of ill-fame for the purpose of practicing prostitution, the crime of pandering is sufficiently established". The first count of the information is couched in the language of the statute and states a good cause of action.
 [2] The judgment and verdict are adequately supported by the evidence. We have carefully read the entire transcript of evidence, and find that every necessary element constituting the crime of pandering as alleged in the information is sufficiently supported by competent evidence. [3] A statement of the defendant, which was taken by the court reporter under the direction of the district attorney, was properly received in evidence. The court reporter testified that it was voluntarily given without promise of reward or threat of punishment. Proof of the voluntary nature of the statement was not a necessary prerequisite to its admission in evidence, since it does not constitute a confession of the defendant, but rather consists of a mere series of declarations *202 regarding the circumstances of the transaction. (8 Cal.Jur. 98, secs. 194, 195.) The defendant admitted that she operated a house of prostitution at number 130 West Lafayette Street in Stockton, to which Esther Blanas was taken as an inmate; that the defendant accompanied Gus Blanas to Sacramento in his automobile June 28th, to procure a girl for her house of prostitution; that she was then introduced to Esther, who was called "Sunny" and at the request of Gus she consented to that girl becoming an inmate of her house of ill-fame. Two weeks later Gus Blanas took Esther to Reno where she said they were married. The defendant's statement with relation to her participation in procuring Esther to become an inmate of her house, reads in part:
 "Q. What sort of business do you conduct at that address? A. Prostitution. Q. Are you, yourself, actually engaged in that business? A. Well, I have been; I haven't lately. ... Q. During the past month what part did you play in the management at that place of business? A. I was there by myself. Q. You were working yourself? A. Yes. Q. Did you employ any other girls to work for you in the last month? A. In June, you mean? Q. Yes. A. Well, yes, for about a week and a half, something like that, the latter part of June. ... Q. Why did you go to Sacramento with Gus Blanas? A. I went over there to see if I could find somebody to come over to the house to work. ... Q. Did you have any conversation with either the girl [Esther] or Gus Blanas with respect to the prospect of her working for you at a future date? A. I did with Gus. ... He asked me if it would be all right if he brought a girl to the house to work. I said I guess it would be if she was of age. ... Q. You received money earned by this girl 'Sunny' in acts of prostitution at that place of yours at 130 West Lafayette Street each night as such money was turned over to you by your step-mother, Mabel? A. Yes."
 Regarding the defendant's knowledge that Esther became an inmate of her house of ill-fame with her consent, it appears that Gus Blanas in company with Irene, another prospective inmate of the house, and Mabel Massmedsu, went with Esther to the house where the defendant roomed to obtain her approval of placing Esther in the house of prostitution. The defendant stated in that regard:
 "Q. For what purpose did they come there? A. To bring the girls there. I guess to tell me that they were going to *203 work. ... Q. They wanted you to see if she looked like a proper girl to be there? A. Yes. ... Q. Gus's arrangements were made between himself and you, not with Mabel, isn't that correct, isn't that the reason they all came to your house? A. In one way, yes, but in another way, no. He had talked to Mabel first about it and Mabel asked me about it."
 The defendant testified she had given Mabel Massmedsu, her stepmother, full authority to manage and operate her house of prostitution. When Esther was first brought from Sacramento to Stockton to become an inmate of the house, she was taken to Mabel for approval. Esther testified in that regard:
 "Q. You had no conversation with her? A. No, but later I,--later my husband told me that that introduction was to see if I would do."
 Then, Esther was taken with the group to the defendant for her personal approval, as the above-quoted evidence clearly indicates. Esther testified that they met the defendant, who was called "Teena"; that she did not personally talk with her, but that the defendant did say to her associate, Irene, that it would be all right for them to become inmates of the house. Esther testified in that regard: "She [the defendant] answered Irene--Irene's question if it would be all right for us to work, and she said it was all right."
 Regarding the instructions which were given to Esther the following question was propounded to the defendant: "Who taught this girl 'Sunny', Mrs. Gus Blanas, the ways of the craft?" To this inquiry, the defendant replied: "I guess she [Mabel] did. One night I happened to be up there and she had been told before."
 The record contains conflicting testimony, but the foregoing evidence, with the reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom, warranted the jury in finding the defendant guilty of procuring the girl, Esther, to become an inmate of her house of ill-fame for prostitution purposes.
 It is true that the defendant talked with Gus Blanas and with her stepmother, Mabel Massmedsu, who was actively managing the business, regarding the admission of the girl to her house. It may be true that the plan of persuading Esther to become an inmate of the house originated with Gus Blanas, and that it was approved by Mabel, but it was the defendant's business. She actively participated in procuring *204 the girl to become an inmate of her house of ill-fame. She took from her one-half of all the money she earned from practicing prostitution. There is no doubt the defendant procured Esther to become an inmate of her house of ill-fame for the purpose of profiting from her practice of prostitution therein. Certainly the defendant "encouraged" the girl to become an inmate of her house and to practice prostitution there.
 [4] There is no merit in the appellant's inference that the evidence merely shows that Esther was induced to become an inmate of the house "to work" therein as a domestic servant, only. It is true that the defendant went to Sacramento to meet the girl to determine whether she would be suitable "to work" in the house of prostitution. The evidence is undisputed that she practiced prostitution therein. There is no evidence that she ever performed any other kind of work in that house. Reading the statement of the defendant which was received in evidence, one is impressed with the fact that the only purpose on the part of the defendant in inducing the girl to enter the house was to profit from her practice of prostitution at that place. At least that is a reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence. It was the sole province of the jury to determine from all of the evidence adduced at the trial whether Esther was procured by the defendant to become an inmate of her house of ill-fame for the purpose of practicing prostitution or merely to work there as a domestic servant. Indeed, in spite of the fact that Mabel, the manager of the house, testified she did not know that Esther practiced prostitution in the house, and that the defendant very carefully insisted that she went with Gus to Sacramento to get a girl "to work for her", the appellant's counsel on petition for rehearing conceded that Esther was taken into the house to practice prostitution. They do, however, insist that the defendant did not assist in procuring her for that purpose. These were questions for the determination of the jury. With their conclusion in that regard we may not interfere since it is supported by substantial evidence.
 The court correctly instructed the jury that the gist of the crime prohibited by the statute in question was to prevent pandering, and that the term "inmate", as it is used in the statute, means that the female must become an inmate in the house for the purpose of engaging in prostitution. It *205 follows that the verdict of guilty, which was returned by the jury, necessarily implies that it determined that the defendant procured the girl to become an inmate of her house for the purpose of inducing her to practice prostitution therein, and not to work there as a mere domestic servant.
 [5] It is contended the statement of the defendant, which was received in evidence, should be discredited because it was taken by the district attorney without first informing her that it might be used against her at the trial, and before she had an opportunity to talk with her attorneys. It is true that at the trial she contradicted many incriminating admissions which were contained in the statement. The record shows that the statement was made in the presence of District Attorney Clowdsley and Detective Sergeant Parker. The court reporter, who took the statement in shorthand, and transcribed it into typewriting, testified that it was taken with "no promises or threats; it was a free and voluntary statement". There is no evidence to the contrary. When it was offered in evidence, the objection thereto was limited to its application to counts two and four of the information, both of which were subsequently dismissed. Mr. Edwards, attorney for the defendant, said in that regard: "Object to it as to Counts Two and Four. ... It is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, not a proper foundation laid against those counts." The objection was specifically limited to the application of the statement to counts two and four, which were dismissed. The statement was voluntary and competent. The objection was properly overruled.
 It was the sole province of the jury to determine whether the admissions of the defendant in her statement were true, or whether the contradictory evidence which she gave at the trial conformed to the facts with respect to controverted issues. Her statement supports the conclusion that she personally participated in procuring Esther to become an inmate of her house of ill-fame for prostitution purposes.
 [6] It was not prejudicial error to have permitted the prosecutrix to testify over the objection of the defendant that she was seventeen years of age. It is immaterial what the age of a female is in order to constitute the crime of procuring her to become an inmate of a house of prostitution. Under the statute it is unlawful to procure a female to become an inmate of such a house, regardless of her age. The evidence *206 shows that the defendant said it would be all right to take her into the house "if she was of age". It also shows that Mabel informed the defendant that Esther told her she was twenty-two years of age. The evidence of her age is harmless. The ruling in that regard is not reversible error.
 [7] It was not error for the court to strike certain evidence from the record and to instruct the jury to disregard an answer given by the prosecuting witness in reply to a leading and suggestive question propounded on cross-examination by the defense, as follows:
 "As a matter of fact ... you were doing just what Gus told you [do you] ...? A. Yes."
 This question and answer might properly have been left in the record as tending to show whether the defendant procured or encouraged her to become an inmate of the house. But the evidence was cumulative, and, under the statute, even if she did enter the house in accordance with her husband's desire, the evidence conclusively shows that the defendant at least encourage and abetted her action in that respect. Regardless of the influence of her husband, the defendant was still guilty as a principal in the transaction. The ruling was harmless. It was not reversible error.
 For the same reason it was not reversible error for the court to have subsequent sustained an objection to a similar question propounded to the same witness by the attorney for the defendant.
 [8] It was not error for the court to overrule an objection of the defendant to an impeaching question propounded to an adverse witness, Mabel Massmedsu, who was called by the prosecution. The witness was clearly adverse and unreliable. In overruling the objection the court said, "Apparently he [the district attorney] is surprised at her testimony." It is a principle too well established to require citations, that a party who is taken by surprise in the testimony of a witness produced by him may be permitted to impeach the witness by proof of inconsistent statements which were made by him at another time and place. (Sec. 2049, Code Civ. Proc.)
 [9] There is no merit in the appellant's contention that the foundation for her impeachment was not first laid. The very character of her testimony clearly shows that she was adverse to the prosecution. In spite of the fact that the defendant asserted that Mabel was the manager in control of her house, Mabel testified that she acted as a mere chambermaid, *207 and that she did not know Esther practiced prostitution there. The court had a right to assume the district attorney would not have called her as a witness if he had expected her to so testify. The trial judge clearly saw from her conduct on the stand and from her manner of testifying that she was an adverse witness and that the prosecution had been taken by surprise in her testimony. Moreover, the objection to that impeaching evidence failed to assign the lack of proof of a foundation therefor. All that was said by Mr. Edwards was: "I will object on the ground that obviously it is an attempt to impeach his own witness."
 The rule is well established that when a party is surprised by unfavorable testimony given by a witness whom he has produced, such witness may be interrogated regarding previous inconsistent statements which he has made. (Sec. 2049, Code Civ. Proc.; People v. Crawford, 24 Cal.App. 396, 404 [141 P. 824]; 74 A.L.R. 1042, note). [10] The general objection that impeaching evidence is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, or that it is a mere attempt to impeach his own witness, is insufficient upon which to raise, for the first time on appeal, the failure to properly lay the foundation for the introduction of that evidence. (People v. Watts, 198 Cal. 776, 791 [247 P. 884]; People v. Cotton, 117 Cal.App. 469 [4 PaCal.2d 247]; 8 Cal.Jur. 504, sec. 518; 2 Cal.Jur. 273, sec. 86; 3 Am. Jur., p. 94, secs. 346, 347.)
 The ruling admitting evidence of contradictory statements previously made by an adverse witness was neither erroneous nor can it be raised for the first time on appeal. That objection was waived by failure to specify the particular ground relied upon.
 [11] It was not error to instruct the jury that the offense of pandering may be accomplished even though the accused person may procure the female to become an inmate of a house of prostitution by means of negotiations therefor through a third person. (People v. Torres, 193 Cal. 730 [227 P. 177].) This instruction was properly given. One may persuade, encourage or procure another to perform a criminal act even though the negotiations therefor are conducted through an agent or representative. While the evidence shows that the defendant personally went to Sacramento to see Esther and consented to her becoming an inmate in her house of ill-fame it also shows that defendant talked about the subject with Gus Blanas and with her manager of the *208 business, Mabel Massmedsu. It may reasonably be said her negotiations to admit the girl to her house were partly conducted through those individuals, but that fact rendered the defendant nonetheless guilty as a principal in the crime.
 [12] The jury was instructed that "pandering consists of unlawfully procuring a female to engage in gratifying the lust of other individuals". The jury was then told it must acquit the defendant unless it appeared that she procured Esther Blanas to become an inmate of her house of ill-fame with the intention of encouraging and enticing her to practice prostitution therein. Assuming that the statute is violated only by procuring a female to become an inmate of a house of ill-fame to practice prostitution therein, which we believe is the spirit of the law, the challenged instruction was properly given to the jury. If that is not the correct construction of the statute, then the instruction was more favorable to the defendant than she was entitled to have given, and she may therefore not complain of that fact. The jury was plainly told that the defendant could not be convicted unless it appeared that she had procured the girl to become an inmate of her house of ill-fame with the intention of inducing or encouraging her to practice prostitution therein. There is no doubt that the girl did practice prostitution in that house; and that the defendant appropriated one-half of the money the girl earned in that manner. There is therefore evidence that she procured her for that purpose.
 [13] It did not constitute error for the court to refuse to give two instructions offered by the defense regarding the subject of aiding and abetting the commission of a crime. That subject was adequately covered by another instruction which was given to the jury.
 [14] Nor was it prejudicial error to refuse to give the other instructions offered by the defense, which refusal is complained of. They contain no essential element of the crime which is not covered by other instructions which were given in the court's charge. The court very fully and fairly instructed the jury on every necessary element of the crime with which the defendant was charged. Moreover, from a careful reading of the entire record it is apparent that the verdict and judgment which were rendered in this case do not constitute a miscarriage of justice. On the merits of the case, without doubt, the defendant was properly convicted. *209
 [15] The defendant was not prejudiced by the filing of a second amended information on the morning of the first day of trial, after the jury was impaneled, which merely changed the language of the second and fourth counts thereof, with respect to separate charges of conspiracy to commit the offense of pandering. By leave of court the second amended information was filed after the jury had been impaneled and before any evidence was adduced. It does not appear the defendant objected to filing that amended pleading. The amended information did not change the language of the first count, which is the only charge of which she was convicted. At the close of the prosecution's evidence, upon motion of the defendant, the second and fourth counts of the information, which were the only ones changed in any manner by the challenged amendment, were dismissed. In its charge to the jury, the court specifically directed it as follows:
 "You are instructed that the court has dismissed counts 2 and 4 of the information on file against the defendant charging conspiracy to commit the crime of pandering, and you are, therefore, to disregard and give no consideration to said counts 2 and 4 charging conspiracy to commit the crime of pandering."
 The jury acquitted the defendant of count 3 of the information. She was convicted of count 1, only. That count was not changed by the amendment in question. The defendant was therefore not prejudiced by the amendment.
 [16] At any stage of the proceedings in a criminal case the court may authorize an amendment of an information to be filed to supply any defect or insufficiency thereof, which does not result in charging an offense which is not disclosed by the evidence adduced at the preliminary examination, and when the substantial rights of the defendant are not thereby prejudiced. (Sec. 1008, Pen. Code; 14 Cal.Jur. 91, secs. 68, 69; People v. Milligan, 77 Cal.App. 745 [247 P. 580].) In the case last cited an amendment of the information was filed by leave of court, over the objection of the defendant, after the evidence was completely closed. We are unable to perceive how the defendant could possibly be prejudiced by the amendment which was filed, under the circumstances of this case.
 [17] It is contended that it constitutes prejudicial error for the court to have permitted the case to go to the jury *210 after the two counts of the indictment with respect to the charges of conspiracy had been dismissed, without striking from the record all the evidence regarding conspiracy. That procedure was not erroneous or prejudicial. There was no motion on the part of the defendant to strike out any such evidence. The court was directed to no such alleged prejudicial evidence. We are not now pointed to any evidence in the record which appears to be incompetent or prejudicial. All of the challenged evidence to which our attention is now directed appears to be competent as tending to show the intent and purpose of the defendant to have procured Esther Blanas to become an inmate of her house of ill-fame for the purpose of unlawfully practicing prostitution therein. If there are circumstances which do not tend to prove those essential facts they are trivial and harmless. Moreover, the court by clear inference instructed the jury, as we have previously, stated, that it should not consider such evidence of conspiracy, and, on the contrary that it should disregard entirely the charges of conspiracy.
 For the reasons heretofore assigned it was not error for the court to refuse to give to the jury the instruction regarding the alleged absence of evidence with respect to conspiracy.
 The judgment is affirmed.
 Plummer, J., and Pullen, P. J., concurred.