74 So.3d 864 (2011)
ARC INDUSTRIES, L.L.C.
v.
William H. NUNGESSER,
William Nungesser
v.
Michael B. Moreno, et al.
Nos. 11-331, 11-332.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
October 5, 2011.
*865 George Pivach II, Pivach, Pivach, Hufft, Thriffiley & Nolan, L.L.C., Chasse, LA, for Defendant/Appellant, William H. Nungesser.
Gary Jude Russo, Cade Aaron Evans, Rachel Chance, Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere, and Denegre, LLP, Lafayette, LA, for Defendants/Appellees, Dynamic Industries, Inc., Emile Dumesnil, ARC Industries, L.L.C., Michael B. Moreno.
Timothy Thriffiley, Pivach, Pivach, Hufft, Thriffiley & Nolan, L.L.C., Belle Chasse, LA, for Defendant/Appellant, William H. Nungesser.
Court composed of SYLVIA R. COOKS, OSWALD A. DECUIR, and JIMMIE C. PETERS, Judges.
DECUIR, Judge.
In these consolidated cases, William H. Nungesser (Nungesser), appeals a judgment of the trial court granting the peremptory exception of no cause of action filed by defendant, Emile Dumesnil (Dumesnil).

FACTS
This matter arises out of a disputed consulting agreement between Nungesser and a new company, later designated as Arc Industries, LLC (Arc), whereby Nungesser was to provide consulting services to assist with Arc's fledgling offshore living quarters business. Nungesser alleges that the contract was negotiated by Dumesnil. However, the letter of intent is signed by Mike Moreno (Moreno) as representative of the new company. Though *866 an actual draft consulting agreement exists, it is not signed by the parties.
On November 11, 2005, in response to a request for payment from Nungesser, a bookkeeping employee of Arc mistakenly issued a payment to Nungesser. Nungesser was notified and refused to return the payment insisting that he was owed additional compensation under the consulting agreement. Consequently, on June 16, 2006, Arc filed suit in the Fifteenth Judicial District Court seeking declaratory judgment stating that no contract existed between the parties and demanding a return of the payment. Nungesser answered and filed a reconventional demand against Arc.
On December 18, 2006, Nungesser filed suit in the Twenty-Fifth Judicial District Court, naming Moreno, Dynamic Industries, Inc. (Dynamic), and Dumesnil as defendants. Moreno, Dynamic, and Dumesnil intervened. Nungesser's suit was ultimately transferred to the Fifteenth Judicial District Court and consolidated with Arc's suit. During the process, Nungesser filed supplemental reconventional demands against the defendants, including Dumesnil.
On December 22, 2009, Arc filed a motion for summary judgment on the claims asserted by Nungesser. The trial court denied the motion.
On October 25, 2010, Dumesnil filed a peremptory exception of no cause of action with respect to the consolidated suits. The trial court granted Dumesnil's exception dismissing Nungesser's claims against Dumesnil with prejudice. Nungesser lodged this appeal alleging the trial court erred in granting the exception and in refusing to allow Nungesser to amend his pleadings to state a cause of action.

DISCUSSION
The issue on appeal is whether Nungesser's petition and reconventional demands state a cause of action against Dumesnil, in his individual capacity.
In Ramey v. DeCaire, 03-1299, pp. 7-8 (La.3/19/04), 869 So.2d 114, 118-19, the court discussed the peremptory exception of no cause of action:
A cause of action, when used in the context of the peremptory exception, is defined as the operative facts that give rise to the plaintiff's right to judicially assert the action against the defendant. Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru South, Inc., 616 So.2d 1234, 1238 (La.1993). The function of the peremptory exception of no cause of action is to test the legal sufficiency of the petition, which is done by determining whether the law affords a remedy on the facts alleged in the pleading. Id. at 1235. No evidence may be introduced to support or controvert an exception of no cause of action. La. C.C.P. art. 931. Consequently, the court reviews the petition and accepts well-pleaded allegations of fact as true. Jackson v. State ex rel. Dept. of Corrections, 00-2882, p. 3 (La.5/15/01), 785 So.2d 803, 806; Everything on Wheels Subaru, 616 So.2d at 1235. The issue at the trial of the exception is whether, on the face of the petition, the plaintiff is legally entitled to the relief sought. Montalvo v. Sondes, 93-2813, p. 6 (La.5/23/94), 637 So.2d 127, 131.
Louisiana has chosen a system of fact pleading. La. C.C.P. art. 854 cmt. (a); Montalvo at p. 6, 637 So.2d at 131. Therefore, it is not necessary for a plaintiff to plead the theory of his case in the petition. Kizer v. Lilly, 471 So.2d 716, 719 (La.1985). However, the mere conclusions of the plaintiff unsupported by *867 facts does not set forth a cause of action. Montalvo at p. 6, 637 So.2d at 131.
The burden of demonstrating that the petition states no cause of action is upon the mover. City of New Orleans v. Board of Com'rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 93-0690, p. 28 (La.7/5/94), 640 So.2d 237, 253. In reviewing the judgment of the district court relating to an exception of no cause of action, appellate courts should conduct a de novo review because the exception raises a question of law and the lower court's decision is based solely on the sufficiency of the petition. Fink v. Bryant, 01-0987, p. 4 (La.11/28/01), 801 So.2d 346, 349; City of New Orleans at p. 28, 640 So.2d at 253. The pertinent question is whether, in the light most favorable to plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in plaintiff's behalf, the petition states any valid cause of action for relief. City of New Orleans at p. 29, 640 So.2d at 253.
We have reviewed Nungesser's pleadings, and, accepting all of the allegations as true, we find that Nungesser has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action against Dumesnil in his individual capacity.
Nungesser argues that his petition states a cause of action for conspiracy based on his allegations that Moreno, Dumesnil, and Dynamic conspired to divert business away from Arc and to Dynamic to avoid paying Nungesser's commission.
Our colleagues in the fourth circuit recently discussed the cause of action for conspiracy in Crutcher-Tufts Resources, Inc. v. Tufts, 2009-1572, p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/28/10), 38 So.3d 987, 991:
Conspiracy by itself is not an actionable claim under Louisiana law. Ross v. Conoco, Inc., 2002-0299 (La.10/15/02), 828 So.2d 546. Instead, it is the "tort which the conspirators agreed to perpetrate and which they actually commit in whole or in part" that constitutes the actionable elements of a claim. Ross, 02-2009 at pp. 7-8, 828 So.2d at 552.
La. C.C. art. 2324 provides: "He who conspires with another person to commit an intentional or willful act is answerable, in solido, with that person, for the damage caused by such act." In order to recover under a conspiracy theory of liability, a plaintiff must prove that an agreement existed to commit an illegal or tortious act; the act was actually committed and resulted in plaintiff's injury; and there was an agreement as to the intended outcome or result. Butz v. Lynch, 97-2166 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/8/98), 710 So.2d 1171. Similarly, Thomas v. North 40 Land Development, Inc., 04-0610 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/26/05), 894 So.2d 1160, held: "To establish a conspiracy, a plaintiff is required to provide evidence of the requisite agreement between the parties . . . stated otherwise, the plaintiff is required to establish a meeting of the minds or collusion between the parties for the purpose of committing wrongdoing."
Nungesser's pleadings do not contain even the threshold allegation that Dumesnil entered into any agreement to commit an intentional tort. There were no allegations that an illegal or tortious act was committed that then resulted in the plaintiffs' alleged injury, or that there was any agreement as to the intended outcome or result. As such, we find that Nungesser failed to state a cause of action for conspiracy and we hold that the trial court did not err in granting the exception of no cause of action.
Nungesser also argues that his pleadings state a cause of action for breach of contract against Dumesnil. We disagree. Other than the allegation that Dumesnil negotiated the alleged consulting *868 agreement on behalf of Arc, there is no allegation that Dumesnil was involved with the contract at all. We find no allegations that would support a cause of action for breach of contract against Dumesnil in his individual capacity.
Nungesser next asserts that his pleadings state a cause of action against Dumesnil for unjust enrichment. Nungesser's pleadings merely allege in a conclusory fashion that the defendants collectively were unjustly enriched. This is insufficient to support a cause of action against Dumesnil in his individual capacity.
Finally, Nungesser argues the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to amend his pleadings to state a cause of action. Absent a showing that the trial court committed manifest error or abused its discretion, in refusing to allow an amendment, its decision will not be disturbed on appeal. Eagle Pipe and Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 09-0298 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/10/10), 47 So.3d 428, writs granted, 10-2267, 10-2272, 10-2275, 10-2279, 10-2289 (La.2/4/11), 56 So.3d 979, 981, 982. We find no such error in this case.

DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court in these consolidated cases is affirmed. All costs of these proceedings are taxed to appellant, William H. Nungesser.
AFFIRMED.


69 F.Supp.2d 168 (1999)
ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
Austin J. DECOSTER, et al., Defendants.
No. Civ.A. 98-186-P-H.
United States District Court, D. Maine.
May 26, 1999.
Harold J. Friedman, Friedman, Babcock & Gaythwaite, Portland, ME, for Plaintiffs.
Timothy J. O'Brien, Verrill & Dana, Portland, ME, for Defendant Decoster.
Thomas H. Somers, Hoff, Curtis, Pacht, Cassidy & Frame, Portland, ME, Kerin E. Stackpole, Hoff, Curtis, Pacht, Cassidy & Frame, Burlington, VT, for Defendant Maine AG & Quality Egg.

*169 ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
HORNBY, Chief Judge.
The issue here is what statute of limitations applies to a Count seeking relief under the Agricultural Worker Protection Act ("AWPA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-72, for an employer's provision of unsafe housing, violations of statutory disclosure and posting requirements, and provision of false and misleading information concerning the terms and conditions of employment. See Compl. at. ¶ 52. I conclude that Maine's six-year statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 752, applies. Therefore, the defendants' motion for summary judgment on Count II is DENIED.
The parties agree that the AWPA contains no express statute of limitations. When a federal statute creates a cause of action but does not expressly provide a statute of limitations, the limitations period depends on the date that the statute was enacted. For causes of action under statutes enacted after December 1, 1990, the limitations period is four years. See 28 U.S.C. § 1658. For other statutory causes of action, the limitations period is determined by borrowing from some analogous statute. The AWPA was enacted in 1983; accordingly, the parties agree that I should "borrow" a statute of limitations for the AWPA, but they disagree over which one I should borrow.
The plaintiffs argue that I should borrow Maine's six-year limitations period, 14 M.R.S.A. § 752. The defendants argue that the proper limitations period should be borrowed from federal law, specifically, the six-month limitation on the Secretary of Labor's issuance of a citation under the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA"), 29 U.S.C. § 658(c).[1] I conclude that the plaintiffs are correct.
In general, a federal court should borrow a limitations period from state law. See North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 34-35, 115 S.Ct. 1927, 132 L.Ed.2d 27 (1995). Resort to an analogous federal statute is proper only when two conditions are met: (1) the federal statute "clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes," and (2) "the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking." DelCostello v. International Broth. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983); accord North Star Steel Co., 515 U.S. at 35, 115 S.Ct. 1927; Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 324, 109 S.Ct. 621, 102 L.Ed.2d 665 (1989). Neither condition applies here.

1. Federal Law Does Not Clearly Provide a Closer Analogy to the AWPA Than State Law Does
The defendants acknowledge that Maine's Housing Standards for Agricultural Labor Act, 26 M.R.S.A. § 586, is closely analogous to the AWPA. See Defs.' Mot. for Summ.J. at 4. They further acknowledge that the Maine statute authorizes a private civil action for people aggrieved by violations of the state statute and regulations promulgated thereunder. See id. The state statute, by its terms, does not apply to employers subject to the AWPA, see 26 M.R.S.A. § 586, but it subjects such employers to regulations that must be identical to federal regulations promulgated under the AWPA. See id. In other words, the state statute clearly is intended to fill any gaps in the AWPA by subjecting employers not regulated under the AWPA to a state regulatory scheme with requirements identical to the AWPA requirements. Thus, the state statute here is not merely closely analogous to the federal statute, it is part of what the State seems *170 to regard as a single federal-state cooperative regulatory program. State law thus provides a closer analogy than any other federal statute.
Nonetheless, the defendants claim I should borrow from federal law on the ground that the state statute contains no limitations period. It is true that the section of the state statute that creates a private right of action makes no reference to a statute of limitations, see 26 M.R.S.A. § 588(2), but Maine's catchall statute of limitations applies to such actions. With exceptions not relevant to this case, "civil actions" in Maine carry a six year statute of limitations, see 14 M.R.S.A. § 752, and the Maine farm worker protection statute creates a right to maintain a "civil action," 26 M.R.S.A. § 588(2). Thus, the six-year statute of limitations applies.

2. Federal Law Is Not Significantly More Appropriate in Light of Relevant Policy and Pragmatic Concerns
The defendants claim that OSHA's six-month period is best suited to AWPA cases for two policy reasons. (They make no similar argument for the FLSA). First, the defendants claim that the short limitations period promotes a rapid resolution of problems with living and working conditions. There is some merit to this argument, but I note that the Supreme Court has stated, with reference to a different federal worker-protection statute (the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109, which requires notice to employees prior to a plant closing or major layoff) that a state six-year limitation period is not long enough to frustrate the interest in the rapid disposition of labor disputes, see North Star Steel Co., 515 U.S. at 36, 115 S.Ct. 1927. Second, the defendants claim that the short limitations period is suited to these cases because migrant workers are likely to be important fact witnesses; allowing a plaintiff more time to file may prejudice the defendant, who will be unable to locate the plaintiff's co-workers to obtain testimony. While there is some force to this argument, there are arguments against the short period that are at least equally compelling. First, plaintiffs in such cases are likely to face significant language and cultural barriers that will increase the time that it takes them to find representation. Second, the sums involved in individual suits are likely to be small in the ordinary case, and class actions may be the only practical vehicle for plaintiffs to obtain relief; but a meaningful class in many cases will need to consist of individuals who suffered harm more than six months apart from one another. In order to displace the state-law limitations period, the federal period must be "significantly more appropriate" than the period drawn from state law; whatever the relative merits of the two periods, the balance does not clearly favor the OSHA period.
Nor is the interest in a uniform federal rule sufficient to overcome the presumption in favor of turning to state law. The Supreme Court has refused to turn to federal law in preference to state law merely to avoid a multiplicity of limitations periods. See North Star Steel Co., 515 U.S. at 36, 115 S.Ct. 1927. Moreover, the Court has suggested that where claims are likely to focus on activities at a single workplace, the burden that state-by-state variation in statutes of limitations places on the employer is not sufficient to require a uniform federal rule. See id. at 36-37, 115 S.Ct. 1927. Even in cases where a uniform federal rule is required, the Court does not always draw the uniform rule from federal law. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (holding that all § 1983 actions should be subject to the relevant state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions). Under the rule reaffirmed in North Star Steel Co., borrowing from federal law would clearly be improper in this case.[2]
*171 For the foregoing reasons, the proper limitations period on the plaintiffs' AWPA claims is six years. Accordingly, the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on Count II is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
NOTES
[1]  In their reply brief, the defendants for the first time argued that the appropriate limitations period should be borrowed from the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 255(a), if not from the OSHA. The argument fails for the same reason that the OSHA argument fails: there is no reason to borrow from federal law in this case.
[2]  Indeed, the defendants have not pointed to any case in which a court has borrowed a federal limitations period for an AWPA claim. The most helpful case they have been able to provide did not decide that a federal period should apply; the court simply denied summary judgment on the grounds that, even if the federal period applied, the plaintiff's action would not be barred. See Martinez v. Berlekamp Farms, Inc., 635 F.Supp. 1191, 1195-96 (N.D.Ohio 1986).


72 F.Supp. 375 (1947)
GROSSMAN et al.
v.
YOUNG et al.
District Court, S. D. New York.
July 3, 1947.
Silver & Saperstein, of New York City (Isaac M. Barnett, of New York City, of counsel), for plaintiffs.
Sullivan & Cromwell, of NewYork City, and Cook, Smith, Jacobs & Beake, of Detroit, Mich. (Inzer B. Wyatt, of New York City, Bethel B. Kelley, of Detroit, Mich., and Bruce A. Hecker, of New York City, of counsel), for defendant.
Roger S. Foster, of Philadelphia, Pa., amicus curiae, for Securities and Exchange Commission.
*376 RIFKIND, District Judge.
By his motion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b) (6), 28 U.S. C.A. following section 723c, defendant Leonard A. Young seeks an order dismissing the complaint for its failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Thereby he raises two questions of statutory construction heretofore unanswered. The action is brought under Sec. 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(b). The complaint states two causes of action whereby plaintiffs, stockholders of the corporate defendant, seek to recover, for the benefit of the corporate defendant, profits alleged to have been made by defendant Young from short term trading in the stock of the corporate defendant. The text of Section 16 is quoted in full in the margin.[1]
The complaint, filed on April 10, 1946, alleges that Young, an officer, director and owner of more than 10% of the outstanding stock of the corporation, which had equity securities outstanding registered on a national securities exchange, by means of a wholly owned and controlled Canadian corporation known as J. M. Quinn Securities, Ltd., traded, and realized profits from trading, in the securities of the corporation, between March, 1937, and March, 1940, and that the profits arose out of purchases and sales and sales and purchases within a period of six months; that Young fraudulently concealed these profits and failed to file the statements required by Sec. 16(a); that on April 18, 1944, the Securities and Exchange Commission instituted an action to compel Young to file such statements; that Young did file statements on February 26, 1945; that by reason of the fraudulent concealment by Young, plaintiffs were prevented from discovering the facts until "sometime subsequent to April 18, 1944"; that on March 21, 1946 [less than sixty days before the commencement of this action], plaintiffs requested the corporation to institute suit under Sec. 16(b) to recover the profits realized by Young and that the corporation failed to do so; that Young exercises effective working control over the corporation and its management making further demands futile.
*377 The second cause of action declared in the complaint is of the same character and is based upon the alleged purchase and sale by Young of 11,854 shares of stock of the corporation, in January, 1945.
The grounds upon which dismissal of the complaint is sought by this motion is, as to the first cause of action, that it fails to state a claim because it is not brought within the two year period prescribed by Sec. 16(b), and as to both causes of action, that the complaint discloses that the plaintiffs commenced the action before the expiration of the sixty day period after notice and demand upon the corporation.
The first question is whether the allegations of fraud, concealment and delayed discovery are sufficient to justify bringing the action more than two years after the profits were realized. Arguments may be marshalled on both sides of this question. In support of its motion defendant Young contends:
1. Since the action is based upon a newly created statutory right, unknown to the common law and since the statute creating the right provides its own time limitation such limitation constitutes a condition precedent to the maintenance of the action upon the statutory right and is, therefore, not capable of being tolled by fraud or by any other circumstance. The Harrisburg, 1886, 119 U.S. 199, 7 S.Ct. 140, 30 L.Ed. 358; Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 2 Cir., 1940, 108 F.2d 762; Partee v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 8 Cir., 1913, 204 F. 970, 51 L.R.A.,N.S., 721; United States v. Dawes, 7 Cir., 1945, 151 F.2d 639, 642, certiorari denied, 327 U.S. 788, 66 S.Ct. 808, 90 L. Ed. 1015; Bowles v. Distilling Co., D.C. S.D.N.Y., 1945, 62 F.Supp. 20, 22.
2. The plain language of the statute requires the holding that the action is barred after the expiration of two years from the time when "such profit was realized". This plain meaning of the language is corroborated by comparison with other provisions of the same statute wherein Congress, when such was its intention, explicitly established the date of discovery of the facts as one of the controlling dates in determining the timeliness of the action. Thus in Sec. 9(e) of the same statute it is provided: "No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this section, unless brought within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation." Section 18(c) of the same statute provides: "No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this section unless brought within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the cause of action and within three years after such cause of action accrued".
Among the arguments against the construction advocated by the defendant are the following:
1. The Harrisburg case does not establish an inflexible rule that whenever a period of limitation is provided in the very statute creating the right the time limitation conditions the right. In Midstate Horticultural Co., Inc. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 1943, 320 U.S. 356, 360, 64 S.Ct. 128, 130, 88 L.Ed. 96, the court said, "Origin of the right is not per se conclusive whether the limitation of time `extinguishes' it or `merely bars the remedy' with the accepted alternative consequences respecting waiver. Source is merely evidentiary, with other factors, of legislative intent whether the right shall be enforceable in any event after the prescribed time, which is the ultimate question. * * * whether the policy of interstate commerce legislation contemplates the one result or the other. This is the controlling question." See, also, Davis v. Mills, 1904, 194 U.S. 451, 454, 24 S.Ct. 692, 48 L.Ed. 1067.
2. In Exploration Co. v. United States, 1918, 247 U.S. 435, 38 S.Ct. 571, 572, 62 L. Ed. 1200, the court construed the language of the Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1093, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1166 note, relating to land patents, which reads: "That suits by the United States to vacate and annul any patent heretofore issued shall only be brought within five years from the passage of this act, and suits to vacate and annul patents hereafter issued shall only be brought within six years after the date of the issuance of such patents." The court held that the defendant's fraud tolled the statute. At page 449 of 247 U.S., at page 574 of 38 S. Ct., the court said, "When Congress passed the act in question the rule of Bailey v. *378 Glover [21 Wall. 342, 22 L.Ed. 636] was the established doctrine of this court. It was presumably enacted with the ruling of that case in mind. * * * It is not our belief that Congress intended that the Government should be deprived of title to public lands by those who add to the fraud by which they were obtained artifices which enabled them to conceal the fraudulent manner in which they were secured until the action was supposed to be barred by the lapse of six years."
3. Very recently, in Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 1946, 327 U.S. 392, 397, 66 S.Ct. 582, 585, 90 L.Ed. 743, 162 A.L.R. 719, the Supreme Court announced the proposition that into every federal statute of limitation is read the old chancery rule "that where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and `remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though there be no special circumstances or efforts on the part of the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the other party.' * * * If the Federal Farm Loan Act had an explicit statute of limitation for bringing suit under § 16, the time would not have begun to run until after petitioners had discovered, or had failed in reasonable diligence to discover, the alleged deception by Bache which is the basis of this suit."
4. To contrue the statute as advocated by the defendant would defeat the principal purpose for which the statute was enacted. The provision of subdivision (a) which calls for the filing of monthly reports and the provisions of subdivision (b) which provide a remedy for the recovery of short-term profits are asserted to be complementary. The former provides the information which is essential for the application of the latter. It is incongruous to permit an insider to escape repayment of his profits by compounding his fault in failing to file the required reports.
These conflicting arguments focus upon the question whether, as defendant contends, the action is barred in compliance with the statutory command that no such suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit was realized, or whether, as plaintiffs and the Securities and Exchange Commission propose, there shall be read into this statute the "mitigating construction" which is "read into every federal statute of limitation", namely, that "the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered". Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397, 66 S.Ct. 582, 585, 90 L.Ed. 743, 162 A.L.R. 719. For light in resolving such a problem, we normally turn to the legislative history. In this instance such recourse is fruitless because the questioned language was first inserted in the statute by the conference report. No debate preceded it and none followed.
Appropriate hereto is the familiar comment which appears in the Federalist, No. 37: "When the Almighty himself condescends to address mankind in their own language, his meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful, by the cloudy medium through which it is communicated." The will of Congress is no less subject to inevitable distortion by reason of the inadequate medium through which it must be communicated.
Section 16 is part of a comprehensive statute designed by Congress to correct many abuses, which had long received public and congressional attention, in transactions relating to securities. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 2 Cir., 1943, 136 F.2d 231, 148 A.L.R. 300, certiorari denied, 320 U.S. 751, 64 S.Ct. 56, 88 L.Ed. 446. Section 16 was the method selected by congress to control and regulate activities by insiders. The first subdivision imposes the duty of prompt disclosure. The second subdivision provides a civil remedy designed to discourage the activities frowned upon. The short space of time within which the action must be brought under Section 16(b) is intelligible when read in the context of an absolute duty to make prompt and frequent reports of the activities which may give rise to such an action. To allow an offending director or stockholder to escape responsibility under subdivision (b) by violating the provisions of subdivision (a) and by fraudulently concealing his activities which would give rise to the cause of action, would manifestly frustrate the purpose of Congress. Such frustration, if commanded *379 by the will of Congress, is beyond the power of the courts to correct; but in this instance it is not the product of legislative will if the statute is read as the Supreme Court in the Armbrecht case suggested that such a statute should be read, namely, by importing within it the familiar equitable doctrine of Bailey v. Glover.
The defendant may be right in attaching the label "dictum" to the quoted declaration of the Supreme Court; but it is very explicit dictum; and when dictum of so high a source illumines a path which leads in the direction of more fully achieving the underlying purpose of the statute as I perceive it, I readily yield to the invitation though command is absentto follow it.[2]
Such construction inevitably involves an element of evaluation of social purposes and, therefore, conscious or unconscious expression of personal predilection; but the more mechanical rules of construction, far from being free of such infirmity, actually embrace an unstated bias of perhaps greater proportions.
"Some rules of statutory construction come down to us from sources that were hostile toward the legislative process itself and thought it generally wise to restrict the operation of an act to its narrowest permissible compass. However well these rules may serve at times to aid in deciphering legislative intent, they long have been subordinated to the doctrine that courts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating general purpose, will read text in the light of context and will interpret the text so far as the meaning of the words fairly permits so as to carry out in particular cases the generally expressed legislative policy." Securities and Exchange Commission v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 1943, 320 U.S. 344, 64 S.Ct. 120, 123, 88 L.Ed. 88.
It is no answer to the argument derived from the dominant policy of the statute that 16(a) is supported by its own criminal sanctions and needs no assistance from the introduction of an expansion joint into the time limitation of 16(b). Not every violation of 16(a) is denounced as a crime by § 32. But even if the criminal and civil sanctions were coextensive, it does not follow that the civil remedy should be so read as to make nonperformance of the obligations of both subdivisions of 16 financially less hazardous than the nonperformance of 16(b) alone.
I reject as a mere play on words the argument that Holmberg v. Armbrecht offers no light for our problem because by its language it is confined to the construction of "statute of limitation" (327 U.S. at page 397, 66 S.Ct. at page 585, 90 L.Ed. 743, 162 A.L.R. 719), whereas the language under examination in 16(b) is asserted not to be a statute of limitation. The opinion of the court expressly rejects such a reading.[3]
The task remains of distinguishing the authorities relied on by defendant. The Harrisburg, 1886, 119 U.S. 199, 7 S.Ct. 140, 30 L.Ed. 358, presents no difficulty. That case did not reach the problem of fraud, or for that matter, any circumstance that would excuse delay. The court said (119 U.S. p. 214, 7 S.Ct. 147), "No question arises in this case as to the power of a court of admiralty to allow an equitable excuse for delay in suing, because no excuse of any kind has been shown". The effect of fraud on time limitations applicable to specified rights of action was considered in Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., *380 2 Cir., 1940, 108 F.2d 762, 763 and United States v. Dawes, 7 Cir., 1945, 151 F.2d 639, certiorari denied, 327 U.S. 788, 66 S.Ct. 808, 90 L.Ed. 1015. The first arose under the patent laws and the second under the Informer's Statute, 31 U.S.C.A. § 235. Superficial distinctions between these cases and the one at bar may be identified. Thus the language construed in the Pollen case dealt with the quantum of damages. In the Dawes case [151 F.2d 640] the usual words of limitation were followed by the peremptory admonition, "and not afterward". (A similar phrase appears in A. J. Phillips Co. v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 1915, 236 U.S. 662, 666, 35 S.Ct. 444, 59 L.Ed. 774.) I do not rest on these differences. The sufficient distinction is that the courts did not find it necessary, in order to give effect to the dominant purpose of the statutes there construed, to read into their self contained time limitations the "mitigating construction" of Holmberg v. Armbrecht (page 397 of 327 U.S., 35 S.Ct. 444), whereas in the case at bar I find such a necessity.
The second cause of action is based upon profits realized in 1945. That cause as well as the first, the defendant moves to dismiss on the ground that it appears on the face of the complaint that the plaintiffs have not complied with the provision of the statute which reads "Suit to recover such profit may be instituted * * * by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter." Admittedly in this case plaintiffs did not wait sixty days after their request to the corporation to bring such suit. The complaint explains their failure to bide the lapse of sixty days in the following language: "In such demand plaintiffs, notified the corporation that in view of the possible contention that the statute of limitations will bar recovery with respect to part of the corporation's claim against the defendant, Leonard A. Young, unless suit is instituted prior to April 19, 1946, it would be inadvisable and prejudicial to the interests of the corporation and its stockholders to await expiration of the sixty day period stated in Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, before instituting action; and that in the event that such suit should not be instituted by the Corporation within ten days from March 21, 1946, the plaintiffs in behalf of stockholders similarly situated, would institute action against the defendant, Leonard A. Young, in the name and in behalf of the corporation, pursuant to said Section 16(b)." The question is whether the defendant Leonard A. Young has status to raise this objection. It seems to me that the sixty day period specified in Section 16(b) was intended for the benefit of the corporation and not for the benefit of the profiting insider. It was designed to provide the corporation with a reasonable opportunity to institute suit. The corporation, though served with process in this case, has not appeared. Significant is the fact that the statute does not provide that notice shall be given to the wrongdoer of the request addressed to the corporation.
The complaint alleges that "By reason of the effective control exercised by said defendant [Young] over the corporation and its management any further demand upon the corporation to institute suit would be futile." For purposes of this motion this allegation must be deemed to be true. Even if we assume, therefore, that the defendant is in a position to raise the objection of failure to comply with the sixty day provision, the futility of the ceremonial required, I believe, should excuse the plaintiffs. Deleware & Hudson Co. v. Albany & Susquehanna R. Co., 1909, 213 U.S. 435, 29 S.Ct. 540, 53 L.Ed. 862, held that under Equity Rule 94, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723, forerunner of our present Rule 23(b), a prior demand for action by the corporation was excused upon the facts shown, despite the absence from Equity Rule 94 of the words which appear in the present rule, "or the reasons for not making such effort". United States ex rel. Texas P. C. Co. v. McCord, 1914, 233 U.S. 157, 34 S.Ct. 550, 58 L.Ed. 893, relied on by defendant, is readily distinguishable. The case arose under the Materialman's Act of 1905, 33 Stat. 811, 40 U.S.C.A. § 270a note. The materialman, who sued upon the contractor's bond, was suing in his own behalf and not in behalf of the *381 United States. The purpose of the statute therein construed was to give the United States an opportunity to enforce its own prior claim in its own behalf.
Motion denied.
NOTES
[1]  Sec. 16(a) "Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security) which is registered on a national securities exchange, or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of such security or within ten days after he becomes such beneficial owner, director, or officer, a statement with the exchange (and a duplicate original thereof with the Commission) of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he is the beneficial owner, and within ten days after the close of each calendar month thereafter, if there has been any change in such ownership during such month, shall file with the exchange a statement (and a duplicate original with the Commission) indicating his ownership at the close of the calendar month and such changes in his ownership as have occurred during such calendar month.

"(b) For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit was realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection."
[2]  Alfred F. Conard in "New Ways to Write Laws", 56 Yale Law Journal, 458, 467, 468, (1947) writes: "In the battle of wits between apparently whimsical judges and ever more diligent draftsmen, victory went always to the judges. They had the last word. When exclusio unius would not work, noscitur a sociis could always be brought to play. Today, it is clear that judges are not prisoners of language and do not even pretend to be. * * * Today, judges do not even pretend to make a mechanical application of the words of statutes. They much prefer to discover and apply the purpose of statutes."
[3]  "If the Federal Farm Loan Act had an explicit statute of limitation for bringing suit under § 16 [12 U.S.C.A. § 812], the time would not have begun to run until after petitioners had discovered, or had failed in reasonable diligence to discover, the alleged deception by Bache which is the basis of this suit". Holmberg v. Armbrecht, page 397 of 327 U.S., page 585 of 66 S.Ct.


112 Ga. App. 422 (1965)
145 S.E.2d 624
ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
v.
DILLINGHAM.
41475.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Argued September 7, 1965.
Decided September 23, 1965.
Rehearing Denied October 6, 1965.
*424 Oliver & Maner, Joseph M. Oliver, T. S. Gray, for plaintiffs in error.
Dawson & Phillips, R. L. Dawson, Richard D. Phillips, contra.
DEEN, Judge.
No question of comparative or contributory negligence enters into this award. The sums found for future pain and suffering are to be determined by the enlightened conscience of impartial jurors, and are not to be reduced to present cash value. Bagley v. Akins, 110 Ga. App. 338 (138 SE2d 430). "As we understand the law as to excessive verdicts, a verdict will not be set aside as excessive by this court unless it manifestly appears from the record that it was a result of prejudice, bias, or gross mistake." Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Coker, 77 Ga. App. 227 (9) (48 SE2d 150). "Before the verdict will be set aside on the ground that it is excessive, where there is no direct proof of prejudice or bias, the amount thereof, when considered in connection with all the facts, must shock the moral sense, appear `exhorbitant,' `flagrantly outrageous,' and `extravagant' . . . It must carry its death warrant upon its face." Western & A. R. v. Burnett, 79 Ga. App. 530, 543 (54 SE2d 357), citing Realty Bond &c. Co. v. Harley, 19 Ga. App. 186, 187 (91 SE 254). While it was stated in Seaboard Air-Line R. v. Miller, 5 Ga. App. 402 (63 SE 299) that the inference of bias or gross mistake which under Code § 105-2015 must appear before any court is authorized to set aside a verdict for excessiveness may arise from its size alone, through comparison with like cases and other verdicts, the comparison is difficult because no two cases are precisely alike. The student of verdict size may find examples to his heart's content collected in 16 ALR2d, Anno., pp. 3-389. Nonpecuniary damages generally *425 falling under the category of pain and suffering range at least up to $134,000 in cases where earning capacity has not been destroyed. See Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal.2d 498 (364 P2d 337). An excessive or inadequate verdict constitutes a mistake of fact rather than of law. It addresses itself to the discretion of the trial judge who saw the witnesses and heard the testimony. This court is a court for the correction of errors of law only, and this court's jurisdiction is confined to the question of whether the trial court abused his discretion in overruling the motion for a new trial on this ground. See also Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Vaughn, 19 Ga. App. 397 (3) (91 SE 516) followed in Wilson v. Dunaway, 112 Ga. App. 241, (144 SE2d 514). In the present case, where the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff shows painful and permanent injuries with loss of physical function, it cannot be said that the verdict is excessive as a matter of law.
The trial court did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial.
Judgment affirmed. Felton, C. J., and Jordan, J., concur.


854 F.2d 528
272 U.S.App.D.C. 119
Unpublished DispositionNOTICE: D.C. Circuit Local Rule 11(c) states that unpublished orders, judgments, and explanatory memoranda may not be cited as precedents, but counsel may refer to unpublished dispositions when the binding or preclusive effect of the disposition, rather than its quality as precedent, is relevant.UNITED STATES of Americav.Rodney PATTERSON, Appellant.
No. 87-3052.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Aug. 11, 1988.

Before SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, SILBERMAN and D.H. GINSBURG, Circuit Judges.
JUDGMENT
PER CURIAM.

1
This case was considered on the record and on the briefs filed by the parties.  The court has determined that the issues presented occasion no need for a published opinion.  See D.C.Cir. Rule 14(c).  For the reasons set forth by the district court in its order filed June 22, 1987, denying appellant's 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255 motion, it is

2
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the order of the district court be affirmed.

3
The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after disposition of any timely petition for rehearing.  See D.C.Cir. Rule 15.


                            NUMBER 13-13-00013-CR

                             COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                     CORPUS CHRISTI C EDINBURG

NICHOLAS GARCIA,                                                             Appellant,

                                            v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                           Appellee.

                    On appeal from the 148th District Court
                          of Nueces County, Texas.

              ORDER TO FILE REPORTER’S RECORD
     Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Garza
                           Order Per Curiam

      This cause is before the Court on the reporter’s failure to file the record. The

reporter’s record in this matter was originally due on January 15, 2013. The reporter has

previously requested and received three prior extensions of time to file the record. The

reporter has now requested a fourth extension of time for thirty days, or until October 17,
2013, to file the reporter’s record.

       The Court, having fully examined and considered the extensions previously

granted in this cause, is of the opinion that, in the interest of justice, an order should be

entered. The Court looks with disfavor upon the delay caused by the reporter’s failure to

have heretofore filed the record in this matter. Accordingly, the reporter, Sandra

Chavez, is hereby ORDERED to file the reporter’s record in this Court no later than

5:00 p.m. on October 17, 2013. No further motions for extension of time will be

entertained by the Court. If the reporter fails to file the record within the foregoing

specified period of time, the Court will act appropriately to avoid further delay and to

preserve the parties’ rights. See TEX. R. APP. P. 37.3 (a)(2).

       The Clerk of this Court is ORDERED to serve a copy of this order on Sandra

Chavez by certified mail, return receipt requested.

                                                  PER CURIAM

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the
3rd day of October, 2013.

                                             2


591 F.2d 1341
Lawsonv.Califano***
No. 78-3106
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
3/9/79

1
S.D.Miss.

AFFIRMED

*
 Summary Calendar case; Rule 18, 5 Cir.; see Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York et al., 5 Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 409

**
 Local Rule 21 case; see NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, 5 Cir., 1970, 430 F.2d 966


65 B.R. 902 (1986)
In re SENECA OIL COMPANY, Debtor.
Bankruptcy No. BK-85-825-A.
United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Oklahoma.
October 9, 1986.
As Revised October 27, 1986.
*903 *904 Ann Faford McWatters of Crowe & Dunlevy, Oklahoma City, Okl. and Lee Calligaro, Daniel E. Johnson of Casson, Calligaro & Mutryn, Washington, D.C. and Roger A. Grove of Horning, Johnson, Grove & Moore, Oklahoma City, Okl. for debtor.
Frank Polk and Ray Moss of Ames, Daugherty, Ashabranner, Fowler, Taylor, Lawrence & Moss, Oklahoma City, Okl. for Creditors' Committee.
*905 David Cheek of McKinney, Stringer & Webster, Oklahoma City, Okl. and Eric M. Reuben, Emmet, Marvin & Martin, New York City, for the Bank of New York, Interfirst Bank Dallas, N.A., United Bank of Denver, Nat. Ass'n, Credit Suisse and Bank of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, N.A.
Frederic Dorwart, Neil Tomlins of Holliman, Langholz, Runnels & Dorwart, Tulsa, Okl. for Kaiser-Francis Oil Co.
Marcia K. Sowles, Floyd I. Robinson, Beth M. Mizuno of U.S. Dept. of Energy, Washington, D.C. and Steven Mullins, Asst. U.S. Atty., Oklahoma City, Okl., for the U.S. Government.
RICHARD L. BOHANON, Bankruptcy Judge.
These contested matters concern allowance of interim and final requests for payment of professional fees and expenses for entities employed by the debtors and the Creditors' Committee pursuant to 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 330, 503(b), 1103 (West 1979 & Supp.1986) and certain creditors pursuant to 11 U.S.C.A. § 503(b)(3)(D), (b)(4) (West 1979 & Supp.1986).
In an earlier decision, In re Wilson Foods Corp., 36 B.R. 317 (Bankr.W.D.Okla. 1984), ("Wilson Foods I"), this Court discussed the applicability of the factors set forth in Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546 (10th Cir.1983) to a bankruptcy case. This discussion also concerns the standards followed when reviewing applications for allowance of fees and expenses. We will review the requests considering specifically the sufficiency of supporting documentation, the alleged excessiveness of hours and rates and the adequacy of disclosure by the plan proponents and Kaiser-Francis of their intent to request fees and expenses.
Seneca Oil Company and Seneca Drilling Company filed their Chapter 11 petitions in March 1985. The cases were consolidated for administration and plans were proposed. The Bank of New York, Interfirst Bank Dallas, N.A., United Bank of Denver, National Association, Credit Suisse and Bank of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, N.A., proposed a plan for Kaiser-Francis Oil Company to acquire most of the assets of the debtors. This plan was confirmed in November 1985. Soon thereafter entities requested compensation and reimbursement of expenses exceeding $825,000. The professionals requesting the allowances are attorneys, accountants, petroleum engineers and management consultants.
The Department of Energy objects to all requests of attorneys except those providing services in the ordinary course of business to the debtor. The debtors object to the requests of attorneys for the plan proponent banks and Kaiser-Francis.
The debtors were public companies engaged in the acquisition, exploration, development and production of oil and gas and in contract drilling services.
Mineral interests were held in nine states but principally in Oklahoma. Financial statements indicate combined assets of about $34.2 million with oil and gas reserves valued at about $12.6 million. Secured claims total approximately $42 million and unsecured claims total approximately $35.5 million.
As of March 1985, stockholders equity was about a negative $42 million. There were 6,936,200 shares of common stock issued and outstanding held by 5,251 shareholders. The shares were traded over-the-counter on the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations System.
I. Disclosure of Reasonably Foreseeable Administrative Requests.
The banks who actually proposed the plan and Kaiser-Francis who was the reorganizing entity seek reimbursement of their expenses under § 503(b)(3)(D) as creditors making a substantial contribution in the case, and reimbursement of their professional fees under § 503(b)(4).
In considering these motions we balance two policy considerations. First, entities should be encouraged to participate in the reorganization of an insolvent company. Second, creditors' interests in the *906 estate as well as the estate itself should be preserved by scrutinizing administrative expenses. This consideration is particularly important when considering large, undisclosed, foreseeable costs of administration which will materially impact the unsecured creditors. In re Taylor Transport, Inc., 28 B.R. 832 (Bankr.Ohio 1983); In re McAuley Textile Corp., 11 B.R. 646 (Bankr.Me.1981).
Section 503(b)(3)(D) provides for reimbursement of actual, necessary expenses incurred by entities in making a substantial contribution in a case. Section 503(b)(4) provides for reasonable compensation of an attorney or accountant of an entity whose expenses are allowed under § 503(b)(3)(D). Thus, allowance of reimbursement under § 503(b)(3)(D) is prerequisite to compensation under § 503(b)(4).
Section 503(b)(4) sets forth certain factors to be considered when reviewing an application for compensation. These factors are the time, nature, extent, and value of the services rendered and the cost of comparable services in nonbankruptcy cases.
However, before considering the requests we must determine whether the plan proponents and Kaiser-Francis adequately disclosed their intent to seek allowances.
Section 1125 requires that the court approve the disclosure statement and determine that it provides adequate information.
"[A]dequate information" means information of a kind, and in sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably practicable in light of the nature and history of the debtor and the condition of the debtor's books and records, that would enable a hypothetical reasonable investor typical of holders of claims or interests of the relevant class to make an informed judgment about the plan . . .
11 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1) (West 1979 & Supp.1986).
In describing the requirements of disclosure one court has stated:
As to administrative fees, the amended disclosure statement shall set forth estimated amounts to be claimed for debtors' attorneys' fees; unsecured creditors' committee's expenses; printing and mailing expenses for the plan; attorneys' fees as to future litigation; accounting fees for the purpose of filing necessary tax returns plus any other anticipated future costs of administration.
In re William F. Gable Co., 10 B.R. 248, 249 (Bankr.N.D.W.Va.1981).
To be allowed, administrative expenses must be disclosed. It should not be left to the interested parties and the court to guess what expenses may be incurred. The burden is on the plan proponent to disclose all reasonably foreseeable fees and expenses that may be claimed as costs of administration.
Here the combined disclosure statement and plan did not reveal that the plan proponents or Kaiser-Francis would request compensation or reimbursement of expenses. Furthermore, at the confirmation hearing the proponents did not state any intent to seek fees and expenses from the estate.
The plan proponents say in the disclosure statement that "Chapter 11 costs" are to be paid by the reorganized company.[1] The disclosure is adequate in that regard. However, it was not disclosed that the plan proponents and Kaiser-Francis would seek reimbursement of their costs. These costs were foreseeable and could have been estimated.
Post-petition administrative expenses of the Chapter 11 proceeding are estimated in the disclosure statement to involve five claimants. Now eleven rather than five entities have requested compensation and reimbursement. This circumstance as well as proponents' failure to disclose their claims leads the court to conclude *907 that Kaiser-Francis' and the plan proponents' applications result from afterthought or they laid behind the proverbial log, only to disclose their requests after confirmation. The disclosure statement must specify the professionals who will be paid from estate assets. Nondisclosed entities will be denied compensation unless the disclosure is immaterial or the fees and expenses unforeseeable.
Administrative expenses are estimated in the disclosure statement to total $500,000. If the claimed sum of almost $828,000 were to be allowed the actual expenses would exceed the estimate by more than 65%. To permit the plan proponents and Kaiser-Francis to exceed their own estimates would unfairly allow them to reduce the price paid for the debtors' assets and securities at the expense of every impaired class. A plan proponent or purchaser of a debtor's assets who intends to apply for reimbursement of fees and expenses must specifically estimate its costs in the disclosure statement or they will be disallowed. In re Metrocraft Pub. Services, Inc., 39 B.R. 567 (Bankr.N.D.Ga. 1984); In re William F. Gable Co., 10 B.R. 248 (Bankr.N.D.W.Va.1981); see In re Weiss-Wolf, Inc., 59 B.R. 653 (Bankr.S.D. N.Y.1986). Significant variance from estimates will not be permitted without justification.
The disclosure statement need not meet the requirements of federal or state securities legislation. In re Stanley Hotel, Inc., 13 B.R. 926 (Bankr.D.Colo.1981). In determining the adequacy of information contained in a disclosure statement, however, the court may consider practices of the Securities and Exchange Commission. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1125(d), 1145 (West 1979 & Supp.1986).
The fundamental purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 is protection of investors through full disclosure of information necessary to an informed investment decision. S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 84 S.Ct. 275, 11 L.Ed.2d 237 (1963). The primary disclosure vehicle is the registration statement. Instructions concerning material information to be included in the statement are particularly set forth at 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.1-229.517 (1986). Section 229.511 provides for disclosure of other expenses of issuance and distribution, including professional fees. The instruction to Item 511 of Forms S-1, S-2 and S-3 provides:
Insofar as practicable . . . legal, accounting and engineering fees shall be itemized separately. The information may be given as subject to future contingencies. If the amounts of any items are not known, estimates, identified as such shall be given.
17 C.F.R. § 229.511 (1986).
These regulations indicate clearly that adequate information concerning professional fees is material to the investor.
The objective of disclosure in bankruptcy is similar to the purpose of the Securities Act. A reasonable and typical creditor or equity security holder must be provided adequate information to make an informed judgment regarding a proposed plan. In re Werth, 29 B.R. 220 (Bankr.D.Colo.1983), 11 U.S.C.A. § 1125 (West 1979 & Supp. 1986). The primary vehicle to provide this information is the disclosure statement. By accepting the plan creditors invest their claims toward its effective implementation. Thus, like securities regulations, disclosure requirements in bankruptcy mandate adequate disclosure of material and foreseeable administrative expenses, including legal fees. There was not adequate disclosure in this case.
A plan also must be feasible to be confirmed. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a)(11) (West 1979 & Supp.1986). Administrative claims draw off the most liquid assets and thereby directly impact feasibility of a plan. Since the proponents' and Kaiser-Francis' claims were not disclosed, they could not be considered when evaluating feasibility. Disclosure of the requests during the plan confirmation process might have affected the Court's consideration of this finding and may have influenced the votes of the affected creditors.
*908 The Kaiser-Francis and plan proponents requests for allowances are denied in full due to their failure to disclose the intent to apply for the allowances, and the impact disclosure might have had on the finding of feasibility.
II. Sufficiency of Documentation Supporting Requests for Compensation and Determination of the Rate of Compensation.
Having discussed the requests of the plan proponents and Kaiser-Francis we now consider the requests of the other movants which include attorneys for debtor and the Creditors' Committee.
"Compensation is the lubricant which makes the bankruptcy machinery work when applied in the proper places in the proper amount. . . . Compensation is a basic, essential, and independent part of the system. . . . Those who in good faith provide valuable services have a right to rely on the provisions for compensation." Matter of King Resources, 651 F.2d 1349, 1352 (10th Cir.1980).
Our duty is to review the requests on behalf of the estate to assure quantum meruit. Matter of Liberal Market, Inc., 24 B.R. 653 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1982). This requires that movants provide sufficient information to assure the court that work performed was necessary and charges reasonable. The requirements are neither more strict nor more lax than the practice of law generally requires. We are cognizant that the court, unlike a client, does not negotiate an employment contract with each attorney. Reliance on generally accepted professional practices replaces the affect of such negotiations and provides a reasonable and reliable basis for reviewing applications for allowances. The court will take judicial notice of the general billing practices in this area based on experience in private practice and observations from the bench.[2]Matter of R.C. Sanders Technology Systems, Inc., 21 B.R. 40 (Bankr.N. H.1982). This policy abandons any vestiges of the "economy principle" developed under the Bankruptcy Act, and provides adequate compensation to maintain the interest of the current members of the bankruptcy bar and incentive to attract new members.
Several principles should be observed when requesting allowances. The result of observing these principles is a self-explanatory application. Meticulous, contemporaneous and specific time records must be kept. Wilson Foods I; In re Morgan, 48 B.R. 148 (Bankr.D.Md.1985); In re Jensen-Farley Pictures, 47 B.R. 557 (Bankr.D.Utah 1985); In re Cohen & Thiros v. Keen Enterprises, Inc., 44 B.R. 570 (N.D.Ind.1984); In re Best Pack Seafood, 21 B.R. 852 (Bankr.D.Me.1982). These records should include all information needed to complete the application. Proper recordation of this information makes compilation of the application a mechanical process. In re WHET, Inc., 61 B.R. 709 (Bankr.D.Mass.1986).
The application should include, in a legible, chronological form,[3] the date a task is performed, a brief, concise explanation of the task indicating its relevance to the *909 case, the time expended recorded to the nearest tenth of an hour, and the identity of the person who performed the task. If more than one person is involved in a single task the duties of each should be segregated to indicate their responsibilities.
When the explanation of a task includes reference to office conferences, telephone conversations or correspondence, the applicant should succinctly state the nature and substance of each conference, telephone conversation or letter. In re Sapolin Paints, Inc., 38 B.R. 807 (Bankr.E.D. N.Y.1985); In re Jones, 13 B.R. 192 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1981). Each person involved in these communications should be identified in a manner which reveals their relationship to the case.
Abbreviations may be used but care should be taken to make them meaningful, mathematical calculations should be accurate and pages should be numbered.
When compensable and non-compensable items are lumped together in one entry it is impossible for the court to allocate time to each activity. In such case all the time may be disallowed. In re Watson Seafood & Poultry, 40 B.R. 436 (Bankr.N. C.1984); In re Nation/Ruskin, Inc., 22 B.R. 207 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1982).
Time used to educate or familiarize oneself with the general Code provisions or basic law are efforts to make one competent. Since competence is a minimal standard which is presumed and expected, this time is not compensable. In re Citizens Mortgage Investment Trust, 37 B.R. 813 (Bankr.D.Mass.1984); Matter of Liberal Market, Inc., 24 B.R. 653 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1982); In re St. Pierre, 4 B.R. 184, (Bankr. D.R.I.1980).
Duplication of services will result in reduction or partial denial of awards. When more than one attorney is involved in a task, or when more than one law firm is representing a single entity the likelihood of duplication of efforts increases. In re Sapolin Paints, Inc., 38 B.R. 807 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.1985); Matter of Liberal Market, Inc., 24 B.R. 653 (S.D.Ohio 1982). We recognize that a lawyer need not actively participate in a proceeding to provide valuable insights and observations. We are not willing, however, to require the estate to pay for training an apprentice attorney or for the presence of a non-participating attorney. Thus, when more than one attorney attends a meeting, hearing, deposition, etc., unless both actively participate or duplication is plainly justified, a reduced fee or perhaps no fee will be allowed the second attorney. At least one court determines a reasonable fee for one attorney and prorates it among all attending attorneys. In re Clayton Grain Elevator, Inc., 30 B.R. 760 (Bankr.La.1983).
Unproductive travel time should not be billed. Only that portion of travel time actually used to administer necessary services to a client will be compensated. In re Jensen-Farley Pictures, Inc., 47 B.R. 557 (Bankr.D.Utah 1985).
Completing time sheets and preparing and presenting motions for reimbursement of fees and expenses can be a tedious task. Such efforts are required to assure that the standards of the Code are followed and to provide an objective basis upon which a court may allow compensation. Some courts provide compensation from the estate for these efforts on the basis that accurate and detailed records assist administration of the estate. In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655 (9th Cir.1985); In re Jensen-Farley Pictures, 47 B.R. 557 (Bankr.D.Utah 1985); In re Four Star Terminals, Inc., 42 B.R. 419 (Bankr.D.Alaska 1984); In re Advance Press & Litho, Inc., 46 B.R. 700 (Bankr.D.C.Colo.1984). Other courts view this time as a necessary expense of doing business and, therefore, do not allow compensation. In re Hotel Associates, Inc., 28 B.R. 332 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1983); Matter of Liberal Market, Inc., 24 B.R. 653 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1982); In re Nova Real Estate Inv. Trust, 25 B.R. 252 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1982); In re Absco, Inc., 23 B.R. 250 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1982); In re Cipriano, 8 B.R. 697 (Bankr.D.R.I.1981).
*910 Several of these cases follow the reasoning of civil rights cases regarding attorney fees. The purpose of compensation for efforts to resolve fee issues under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West 1981) is to encourage attorneys to represent clients who would otherwise be unable to obtain counsel and to act as private attorneys general in vindicating federal civil rights policies. Hernandez v. George, 793 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1986). The purpose of the Bankruptcy Code provisions allowing compensation are not completely analogous. We are to encourage participation in bankruptcy matters and assure compensation reasonably equivalent to that received by professionals outside the bankruptcy area. It is important that fees be economical but not `parsimonious' so that competent counsel will be available. In re WHET, Inc., 58 B.R. 278 (Bankr.D.Mass.1986). Cases deciding issues related to statutory attorney fees in other areas of law are instructive but not necessarily applicable under the Code.
We have held previously that efforts to prepare and present fee applications are not compensable. Wilson Foods I. We now hold that a portion of this time is compensable.
The work involved in obtaining court approval of a request involves a somewhat different process and more time than is required to prepare a bill in a nonbankruptcy matter. Where an attorney is required to expend uncompensated time the effective hourly rate is decreased. That result conflicts with the intent that bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy attorneys be similarly compensated.
In finding that debtor's court-approved attorney should be compensated for time expended to prepare and present its fee application one court has stated:
[I]t is both inconsistent with the express policy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act and fundamentally inequitable to impose substantial requirements on bankruptcy counsel as prerequisites to their obtaining compensation while simultaneously denying compensation for the efforts necessary to comply with those requirements.
In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655, 659 (9th Cir.1985).
The Nucorp court also reasoned that since relatively detailed, complex and burdensome fee applications are required by statute, are important to all parties, and assist the court, the work involved in preparing and presenting fee applications is an "actual and necessary" service.
We agree with the reasoning of Nucorp and hold that attorneys are entitled to reasonable compensation for efforts expended to prepare and present fee applications to the extent that they represent an additional burden imposed on the professionals by the Code. Only the time expended to sustain that additional burden should be allowed. In re WHET, Inc., 61 B.R. 709, (Bankr.D.Mass.1986). Therefore, allowances for compensation and expenses are appropriate for time required to prepare the application and the notice and for time in court to present the request. The time required to prepare the application and order for employment pursuant to Fed. R.Bankr.P. 2014 is also allowable. However, since a detailed billing summary including the same information as required by Bankruptcy Rule 2016 is generally prepared by a professional for a client, those efforts do not represent an additional burden and compensation for them will continue to be disallowed.
Several courts distinguish "truly legal services" from "ministerial tasks" and either disallow or reduce rates accordingly. In re American International Airways, Inc., 47 B.R. 716 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1985); In re Harmen Supermarket, Inc., 44 B.R. 918 (Bankr.W.D.Va.1984); In re Air Vermont, 40 B.R. 323 (Bankr.D.Vermont 1984); In re Sapolin Paints, Inc., 38 B.R. 807 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1984); Matter of Rego Crescent Corp., 37 B.R. 1000 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.1984); Matter of Minton Group, Inc., 33 B.R. 38 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1983); In re United Rockwool, Inc., 32 B.R. 558 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1983); In re Horn & Hardart Baking Company, 30 B.R. 938 *911 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1983); Matter of May Drug Co., Inc., 28 B.R. 923 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Idak Corporation, 26 B.R. 793 (Bankr.D.Mass.1982); In re Lafayette Radio Electronics Corporation, 16 B.R. 360 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1982); In re Hotel Associates, Inc., 15 B.R. 487 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1981); Matter of Nu-Process Industries, 13 B.R. 136 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1981); In re Jones, 13 B.R. 192 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1981); In re Underground Utilities Construction Co., 13 B.R. 735 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1981). The Department of Energy urges us to adopt this distinction which results in different rates for telephone, settlement, office and client conferences, research, trial preparation and court appearances. Where a court chooses to delineate between ministerial and legal tasks it necessarily directs the manner in which attorneys manage their firms. Such delineation would encumber daily management decisions concerning the activities attorneys will pursue. It also requires attorneys to assign personnel to tasks based on some imposed job description rather than the efficacies and urgencies of the situation. This is beyond the court's duty to assure reasonable fees. We feel it is best to leave managerial decisions to the law firms. Therefore, decisions concerning which tasks an attorney performs and involving the allocation of personnel toward the efficient and effective completion of tasks will be left to the discretion of the professional unless the allocation is egregious. In re Jensen-Farley Pictures, 47 B.R. 557 (Bankr.D.Utah 1985). Attorneys should adhere to standards which will efficiently use their high level of training, effectively resolve a problem, and obtain the best result for their clients at a reasonable fee.
Two topics are generally discussed when determining reasonable hourly rates. First, determination of a reasonable hourly rate for attorneys within the geographic area of the court. In re Consolidated Bancshares, Inc., 49 B.R. 467 (Bankr.N.D. Tex.1985); In re General Oil Distributors, Inc., 51 B.R. 794 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1985); In re Four Star Terminals, Inc., 42 B.R. 419 (Bankr.D.Alaska 1984); Matter of Rego Crescent Corp., 37 B.R. 1000 (Bankr.E.D. N.Y.1984); In re Bishop, 32 B.R. 302 (Bankr.R.I.1983); Matter of Liberal Market, Inc., 24 B.R. 653 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1982). And, second, whether rates for attorneys from outside the geographic area should be based on rates of local attorneys. Wilson Foods I; In re Jensen-Farley Pictures, 47 B.R. 557 (Bankr.D.Utah 1985); In re Atlas Automation, 27 B.R. 820 (Bankr. S.D.Mich.1983).
The Jensen-Farley court, addressing the second topic, took a different approach than we have. That court assumed that whenever counsel is hired the national market influences the rate. We have concluded that only a national case will involve a national market. In re Wilson Foods Corps., 40 B.R. 118 (Bankr.D.Okla.1984) ("Wilson Foods II"). When a case is not national the market is limited to the geographic area involved. A case involving a debtor doing business principally in a certain region, concerning assets in that region, and primarily including parties from that region is of limited geographic area and thus of a limited market. So long as competent bankruptcy attorneys are available within that region the market rate within it prevails. If attorneys from outside the region wish to practice in a regional market their rates should be competitive with rates for comparable services found within the regional market.
When considering the first topic courts have applied two methods to determine a reasonable hourly rate. The first involves a determination of a reasonable rate for each classification of attorney. In re White Motor Credit Corp., 50 B.R. 885 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1985). Courts applying the other method determine an average reasonable hourly rate allowed all attorneys and an average reasonable hourly rate allowed law clerks and legal assistants. In re Southern Indus. Banking Corp., 41 B.R. 606 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1984); Matter of Liberal Market, Inc., 24 B.R. 653 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1982).
We believe that calculation of the average hourly rate is a useful element in determining *912 the compensation to be allowed a law firm. It is the Court's observation that the average hourly rate for law firms in this district is approximately $95 to $105. This rate includes the time of law clerks and legal assistants. When this norm is exceeded it must be justified by a careful review of the rate requested by each classification of attorney.
There have been several cases which address enhancement of fees. We addressed this topic in Wilson Foods II. It now appears that the factors[4] previously reviewed when considering enhancement of fees are to be included in the determination of the reasonable hourly rate. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 478 U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986); Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir.1986); Wilson Foods II; In re Four Star Terminals, Inc., 42 B.R. 419 (Bankr.D.Alaska 1984).
The number of hours allowed is the sum of the reasonable time expended on necessary tasks. This sum is multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate to reach the "lodestar" fee. At least four of the Johnson factors are used to determine the rate for this calculation.[5] Adjustments to the lodestar fee are "proper only in certain `rare' and `exceptional' cases, supported by both `specific evidence' on the record and detailed findings by the lower courts". Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 478 U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986), quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898-901, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1548-50, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984); Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986).
III. Sufficiency of Documentation Supporting Requests for Reimbursement and Determination of Allowable Expenses.
Just as hourly records form the basis for compensation awards, expense records are necessary to justify reimbursement of expenses. The records should set forth sufficient information for the court to ascertain the necessity and reasonableness of each item. As an example, it is insufficient to charge for "photocopies". An adequate description would be, "10 photocopies of the disclosure statement, 100 pages at $.10 per page". General descriptions of expense items will suffice but extraordinary expenses (e.g., copying and mailing of the plan) should be specifically set forth, with allowance for reasonable "miscellaneous" matters.
Some expenses are overhead and thus the responsibility of the professional as part of the cost of doing business. In re Citizens Mortgage Investment Trust, 37 B.R. 813 (Bankr.Mass.1984). The Jensen-Farley court defines `overhead' as:
[A]ll continuous administrative or general costs or expenses incident to the operation of the firm which cannot be attributed to a particular client or case. The term is not definable with exact precision, but may be exemplified by such items as rent, taxes, insurance, lighting, *913 heating, and other office expenses, including secretarial services.
In re Jensen-Farley Pictures, 47 B.R. 557, 584 (Bankr.D.Utah 1985).
We find this statement is adequate. In addition to the overhead items enumerated in Jensen-Farley we specifically find the following items are not reimbursable: local mileage, ordinary course of business postal charges, unnecessary "express" mail or local messenger services, word processing, local telephone charges, books, and basic subscriptions for computer research tools.
Other expenses should be allowed to the extent generally accepted professional practices deem them reasonable. A different decision could result in an increase in hourly rates, discourage use of helpful research tools, or reduce the incentive for professionals to practice before bankruptcy courts. The following actual expenses are allowable if shown to be reasonable and necessary: photocopying, extraordinary postage (e.g., serving numerous copies of a plan and disclosure statement), long distance telephone charges, computer research time, required out-of-town meals, lodging and transportation, and court costs. Photocopying at rates comparable to the rates charged by commercial copy shops in the area is obviously reasonable. Higher rates may be justified where the applicant shows good cause. The estate should be required to bear only the actual expenses incurred and professionals will normally not be allowed any amounts in addition to their out-of-pocket costs.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, the motions of the plan proponents and Kaiser-Francis are denied for the reasons stated previously.
Since the particulars will be of interest only to the parties involved separate orders will be entered on each of the remaining motions specifying which portions are allowed.
NOTES
[1]  The Combined Disclosure Statement defines Chapter 11 costs to include, "debtors' costs, expenses, liabilities, and obligations including without limitation all disbursements to creditors in connection with the plan and all costs of administration not already paid". Combined Disclosure Statement at 10 (emphasis added).
[2]  The Third Circuit has formed a Task Force Committee to devise and recommend an "optimum court-awarded fee system" and to periodically review and report on the progress of the system. This action was taken in response to perceived problems with the time/rate "lodestar" regime. Court Awarded Attorneys Fees, Report of the Third Circuit Task Force (October 8, 1985).
[3]  The chronological format is an adequate manner of presentation. However, the WHET court has instituted applications arranged by function or task. In re WHET, Inc., 58 B.R. 278 (Bankr. D.Mass.1986). An example given by that court is, "a recovery of a preference would be an appropriate sub-heading under which would be listed who did what and when and for how long, what was sought, what was recovered, with any explanatory remarks or, if nothing was recovered, why the estate nonetheless should bear the expense". In re WHET, Inc., 58 B.R. 278, 282 (Bankr.D.Mass.1986). This explanation aids in the determination of reasonableness. We do not require this format but do recognize its value. Attorney time spent to supplement applications with information in this format will be reimburseable.
[4]  The "Johnson" factors include: 1) the time and labor required; 2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; 3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; 4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the cases; 5) the customary fee; 6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; 7) time limitations imposed by the client or other circumstances; 8) the amount involved and the results obtained; 9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; 10) the "undesirability" of the case; 11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and 12) awards in similar cases. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-719 (5th Cir.1974).
[5]  These are the "`novelty [and] complexity of the issues', `the special skill and experience of counsel', the `quality of representation', and the `results obtained' from the litigation . . .". Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 478 U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986) quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898-900, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1548-49, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984).