974 F.2d 1015
36 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1096
SOUTH CENTRAL PETROLEUM, INC.;  Jerry R. Sawyer, Appellees,v.LONG BROTHERS OIL COMPANY;  Charles L. Long;  David B. Long;Kenneth F. Long;  Pat W. Long;  Imogene Long, Appellants.A. V. Beebe;  Harold Wisenhunt.
No. 91-3690.
United States Court of Appeals,Eighth Circuit.
Submitted:  June 8, 1992.Decided Sept. 10, 1992.

Robert C. Compton, El Dorado, Ark., argued (William I. Prewett, on the brief), for appellants.
B. Michael Bennett, Dallas, Tex., argued, for appellees.
Before JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge, HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and BEAM, Circuit Judge.
HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

1
In this diversity action, Long Brothers Oil Company appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment and order that South Central Petroleum and Jerry Sawyer pay Long Brothers Oil Company $62,627 in exchange for one-half ownership of an oil well.   We affirm.

FACTS

2
In 1985, Long Brothers Oil Company (Long Brothers), along with several other investors, purchased Fouke (oil) Field in Miller County, Arkansas, from Phillips Petroleum Company (Phillips).   As part of the transaction with Phillips, Long Brothers bought all but an 11.22 percent interest in a gas well known as the Silberberg B-1.   Long Brothers did, however, acquire from Phillips a preferential right to purchase the unsold interest, which was owned by Texaco Producing, Inc.  (Texaco);  Long Brother's preferential purchase right enabled it to successfully match any offer made to Texaco for the 11.22 percent interest.

3
Long Brothers began "producing" Fouke Field in 1986.   On September 27, 1988, Long Brothers signed an agreement with South Central Petroleum and Jerry Sawyer "to work together in an effort to buy Texaco's one-eighth ( 1/8) working interest in the Silberberg # B-1 unit."   To pursue this goal, Long Brothers agreed to contact Texaco and attempt to acquire Texaco's Silberberg B-1 interest "for a price not to exceed $400,000."   If Long Brothers succeeded and if the property was not quickly resold, the parties agreed to purchase and own the interest according to a 50 percent (Long Brother's purchase and ownership share), 37.5 percent (South Central Petroleum), and 12.5 percent (Sawyer) arrangement.   The parties further agreed that their agreement would become effective September 15, 1988 and "continue in effect for a period of six (6) months, and thereafter until terminated by any of the parties to this agreement with thirty (30) days prior written notice."

4
On December 5, 1988, Texaco agreed to sell its Silberberg B-1 interest to a third party.   On February 14, 1989, Long Brothers notified Sawyer that it was terminating their agreement pursuant to the thirty-day termination provision.   Less than thirty days later, on March 15, 1989, Long Brothers exercised its preferential purchase right and purchased Texaco's interest in the Silberberg B-1 for $137,500.   Long Brothers then divided its new acquisition among the partners who had originally organized to purchase Fouke Field.   Long Brothers did not notify Sawyer or South Central Petroleum of the Texaco acquisition.

5
When Sawyer and South Central Petroleum learned of Long Brothers' acquisition of Texaco's interest on January 15, 1991, they demanded that Long Brothers convey one-half of the acquisition pursuant to the September 27, 1988 agreement.   Long Brothers refused, and this action ensued.

6
Arguing that their contract with Long Brothers should be enforced, Sawyer and South Central Petroleum moved the district court for summary judgment.   The district court granted their motion.   After conducting a trial to determine a remedy, the district court ordered Long Brothers to transfer one-half of the acquired Texaco interest to Sawyer and South Central Petroleum, who in return were ordered to pay Long Brothers one-half of the purchase price and transaction costs ($90,928) minus an offset ($28,301), representing one-half of the income minus expenses earned by Long Brothers from the Texaco interest from the time Long Brothers acquired it until the district court's order.   This offset resulted in a net payment of $62,627 by Sawyer and South Central Petroleum to Long Brothers in exchange for the transfer of one-half of the acquired Texaco interest.

DISCUSSION
I.

7
Long Brothers first appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment.   According to Long Brothers, Sawyer and South Central Petroleum sat on their rights to own the Texaco property until such ownership appeared profitable, and thus, Sawyer and South Central Petroleum waived their right to enforce their agreement with Long Brothers.1  See Sanders v. Flenniken, 180 Ark. 303, 21 S.W.2d 847, 848 (1929) (citing with approval Patterson v. Hewitt, 195 U.S. 309, 321, 25 S.Ct. 35, 38, 49 L.Ed. 214 (1904) ("There is no class of property more subject to sudden and violent fluctuations of value than mining lands[,] ... and there is no class of cases in which the doctrine of laches has been more relentlessly enforced.")).

8
Long Brothers, however, does not dispute that Sawyer and South Central did not discover Long Brothers' acquisition of the Texaco property until nearly two years after its purchase.   In fact, with respect to this issue, Long Brothers limited its evidence to the affidavit of Charles Long, who claimed that if Long Brothers knew that Sawyer and South Central Petroleum would attempt to exercise their right, Long Brothers would have settled an independent foreclosure litigation differently, and in the process, would have resolved the current dispute.   The district court characterized Long's opinion as "pure speculation."   We agree with this characterization.   See generally Resource Developers, Inc. v. Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Found., 926 F.2d 134, 141 (2d Cir.1991) ("We have not hesitated to affirm a summary judgment when the only proof proffered in opposition amounts to nothing more than speculation and conjecture.")  (citation omitted).   In any event, Long's affidavit does not indicate that Sawyer and South Central Petroleum were aware of their right to acquire their share of the Texaco property during the foreclosure litigation mentioned by Long.

9
Under Arkansas law, four elements must be satisfied to apply the doctrine of estoppel:

10
(1) the party to be estopped must know the facts;  (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted on or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it is so intended;  (3) the latter must be ignorant of the true facts;  and (4) he must rely on the former's conduct to his injury.

11
Burdine v. Dow Chem.  Co., 923 F.2d 633, 635 (8th Cir.1991) (citations omitted).   Despite raising waiver as an affirmative defense, Long Brothers has not established the first element of knowledge.   For that matter, the second element of intention has not been satisfied either.   As the district court noted, even if Sawyer and South Central Petroleum were aware of their right, "there is simply no showing whatsoever that the failure to be involved in the foreclosure litigation is inconsistent with an intention to enforce the contract with Long Brothers assuming that Long Brothers received title to the property."   Thus, Long Brothers' waiver argument fails, and we interpret the contract as we would any other.

12
The contract provided for termination upon thirty days notice.   Long Brothers elected termination on February 14, 1989.   This termination took effect thirty days later on March 16, 1989.   Long Brothers acquired the Texaco interest on March 15, 1989, at which time the agreement remained effective.   Accordingly, the district court correctly granted summary judgment for Sawyer and South Central Petroleum and ordered Long Brothers to transfer one-half of the acquired Texaco interest to Sawyer and South Central Petroleum.

II.

13
Following its summary judgment order for specific performance, the district court held a trial to assist it in fashioning an appropriate remedy.   After this trial, rounding all figures to the nearest dollar, the district court ordered that Sawyer and South Central Petroleum pay Long Brothers $88,928 in acquisition costs and $2,000 in attorneys fees.   Neither party disputes the $90,928 amount.   Long Brothers objects, however, to the district court's award of an offset credit in favor of Sawyer and South Central Petroleum, which reduced the amount they owed to Long Brothers by $28,301.

14
Under the law of Arkansas, a cotenant possesses a right of accounting for revenues (minus expenses) stemming from the exploitation of oil wells.   See Ark.Code Ann. § 18-60-101 (Michie 1987) (generally establishing a right to accounting);  Fife v. Thompson, 288 Ark. 620, 708 S.W.2d 611, 612 (1986) (applying general right of accounting to oil extraction).   The district court calculated the offset amount ($28,301) by subtracting Long Brothers' operating costs ($12,344) from the revenues produced by the acquired interest ($63,692), and then adding six percent in prejudgment interest ($2,628), see Ark.  Const. Art. 19, § 13, to one-half of this difference.   Long Brothers argues that the trial court inappropriately relied on hearsay evidence in making this calculation.

15
To determine the offset, the district court admitted the expert opinions of witnesses for both parties.   The district court admitted this evidence under the evidentiary rule permitting an expert to rely upon hearsay in forming an opinion as long as the hearsay evidence itself remains inadmissible.   See Fed.R.Evid. 703.   Indeed, the district court recognized that Sawyer's and South Central Petroleum's expert's testimony involved triple hearsay, because the expert based his opinion on information obtained from a commercial production service, which received its information from the state, which in turn obtained its information from the operator of the well, and none of these sources testified at the trial. Sawyer's and South Central Petroleum's expert presented his revenue conclusion in an exhibit, which also listed the production figures on which he based his opinion.   As the expert explained, the spreadsheet-like exhibit listed the underlying data and reflected the calculations that formed his opinion.   Thus, when the district court accepted the expert's revenue charts, it also allowed the underlying data to be at the court's disposal.

16
Long Brothers objects to this, and contends that it demonstrates that the district court improperly relied on hearsay evidence.   When the district court admitted the exhibit, however, it limited the admission to the expert's opinion, and not to the underlying figures, as required by Federal Rule of Evidence 703.   As the district court explained:

17
I'm going to admit the exhibit.   I think that it does qualify under the rule that experts may testify as to conclusions based on evidence that's not itself independently admissible.

18
This statement convinces us that the district court did not blur the evidentiary distinction which Long Brothers argues was violated.   See Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 346, 102 S.Ct. 460, 464, 70 L.Ed.2d 530 (1981) ("In bench trials, judges routinely hear inadmissible evidence that they are presumed to ignore when making decisions.");   see also Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 749, 767, 49 S.Ct. 471, 477, 73 L.Ed. 938 (1929).

19
"The admission of opinion testimony is committed to the broad discretion of the trial court."  Hurst v. United States, 882 F.2d 306, 311 (8th Cir.1989) (citation omitted).   The Federal Rules of Evidence permit experts to rely on inadmissible information in forming their opinion as long as the underlying information be "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field...."  Fed.R.Evid. 703.   Indeed, "[a] trial court should exclude an expert opinion only if it is so fundamentally unsupported that it cannot help the factfinder....  Any weaknesses in the factual underpinnings of (the expert's) opinion go to the weight and credibility of his testimony, not to its admissibility."  Hurst, 882 F.2d at 311 (citations omitted).   Here, the district court expressly limited the admission to the expert's opinion and did not admit the information on which the expert based his opinion.   Moreover, Long Brothers does not dispute that their opponent's expert based his opinion on information reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.   In fact, Long Brothers' expert relied on the same type of production figures on which Sawyer's and South Central Petroleum's expert based his opinion.   We therefore do not believe that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the contested expert testimony.

III.

20
Long Brothers finally argues2 that Sawyer and South Central Petroleum should not receive an offset for the Silberberg B-1's profits during the twenty-three months that Sawyer and South Central did not exercise their ownership rights, because Sawyer and South Central did not offer any evidence that Long Brothers actually received income from the Silberberg B-1 well.   During most of the 23-month period in question, Long Brothers was in receivership, and thus, Long Brothers did not directly receive the income from the well.   The receiver probably used the income from the Silberberg B-1 to benefit Long Brothers, but no evidence documented this probability.   Even so, Sawyer and South Central Petroleum still had a right under their agreement with Long Brothers to receive one-half of the profits from the Silberberg B-1.   Because Long Brothers failed to notify Sawyer and South Central Petroleum that it had purchased the Texaco interest, even though the parties contracted to work together to acquire this interest and share its purchase and ownership, equity demands that Long Brothers compensate Sawyer and South Central Petroleum for lost profits.   For this reason, we do not find Long Brother's argument persuasive.

21
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order.

1
 Long Brothers also characterizes its agreement with Sawyer and South Central as ambiguous and therefore argues that the terms can be interpreted in several rational ways.   Because we find the contract to be clear, we find no merit in this argument.   Long Brothers further urges that the frustration of purpose doctrine prevents the enforcement of the agreement because the agreement contemplated the quick resale of the Texaco acquisition.   This argument ignores the terms of the agreement which expressly provides that "[s]hould the Texaco interest be acquired for the parties to hold or sell in some undefined time in the future, the purchase price will be shared and the Texaco interest will be owned as follows:  ...."

2
 Long Brothers further argues that the district court's ruling allows Sawyer and South Central Petroleum to benefit from Long Brothers' exercise of its preferential purchase right without Sawyer and South Central paying for this benefit.   At the time of its agreement with Sawyer and South Central, Long Brothers knew it possessed the preferential purchase right.   Hence, when Long Brothers negotiated the agreement, the burden was on it to gain consideration in exchange for permitting Sawyer and South Central Petroleum to possibly share the benefit of the preferential purchase right


682 F.Supp.2d 387 (2010)
J.G. and J.G., on behalf of J.G. Plaintiffs,
v.
BRIARCLIFF MANOR UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.
No. 07 Civ. 7245-WGY.
United States District Court, S.D. New York.
January 29, 2010.
*389 Gary S. Mayerson, Mayerson and Associates, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.
Leah Lennon Murphy, Kuntz, Spagnuolo, & Murphy, P.C., Bedford Village, NY, for Defendant.

Memorandum and Order
WILLIAM G. YOUNG, District Judge.[1]
The plaintiffs, J.G. and J.G. (the "Parents"), seek reimbursement on behalf of their daughter, J.G., for tuition and transportation expenses from the Briarcliff Manor union Free School District (the "District") pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. The Parents allege that the District's proposed Individualized Education Program for the 2005-2006 school year was procedurally and substantively inadequate. The parties have agreed to treat the matter as a "case stated" under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.[2]See, e.g., E.G. *390 v. City Sch. Dist. of New Rochelle, 606 F.Supp.2d 384, 386 n. 2 (S.D.N.Y.2009).

I. FINDINGS OF FACT
J.G. is an elementary school child with dyslexia. When she was in kindergarten, J.G. was noted to have trouble identifying names and sounds. Impartial Hr'g Tr. ("Tr.") 250-52. Because the Parents declined to have J.G. participate in a reading support program, J.G. instead received building level speech services for thirty minutes a week during the 2003-2004 school year. Impartial Hr'g, District Ex. ("District Ex.") 42.[3]
At the beginning of the 2004-2005 year, J.G.'s first-grade teacher evaluated J.G.'s reading skills to be below average and recommended her for the first-grade reading support program. Tr. 696, 705-09. The Parents declined because they did not want J.G. to be out of the classroom for long periods of time, Tr. 709, and instead hired a private reading tutor in September 2004. The tutor maintained contact with J.G.'s classroom teacher throughout the school year and taught J.G. using the Orton-Gillingham method. District Ex. 14 at 1; Tr. 284-85. After a parent-teacher conference in November 2004, however, the Parents agreed to have J.G. participate in the first-grade reading support program. Tr. 296. By January 2005, the teacher indicated that J.G.'s writing and spelling had improved, but that J.G. still had difficulty with decoding and reading comprehension. Tr. 339, 718, 734.
In February 2005, the Parents hired a private psychologist who administered an array of tests to assess J.G.'s general intelligence and cognitive functioning, academic achievement skills, structural analysis, and emotional functioning. Impartial Hr'g, Parents Ex. ("Parents Ex.") Q. J.G.'s cognitive functioning test results were all in the average, bright normal, and superior range. Id. at 3. The psychologist found, however, that J.G. had difficulty expressing herself sometimes and had difficulty repeating sentences and word sequences. Id. The psychologist also indicated that J.G. had a weak short-term auditory memory, had not acquired the basic decoding skills usually mastered in first grade, and had trouble with consonant-vowel-consonant words. Id. at 5-6. The psychologist recommended a rule-based, structured, multi-syllabic approach such as Orton-Gillingham remediation. Id. at 6.
After the February 2005 evaluation, the Parents referred J.G. to the District's Committee on Special Education ("CSE") for an evaluation on March 17, 2005. In May 2005, J.G. was observed to have difficulty copying words from a chart, requiring *391 the teacher's assistance to complete her work. District Ex. 18. Soon after, the District's speech pathologist assessed J.G. and found that while J.G.'s general receptive and expressive language skills were average, she had a relative weakness in short-term auditory memory. Parents Ex. 0 at 8. The speech pathologist noted that this might affect J.G.'s ability to decode and recommended presenting information in smaller units using multimodal methods of reading instruction. Id. at 8-9.
After receiving these evaluations, Dr. Lydia Lavin ("Lavin"), Director of Pupil Personnel Services, scheduled a CSE meeting for June 13, 2005 to discuss J.G.'s issues with reading and develop an Individualized Education Program ("IEP") if needed. Among those in attendance were the Parents, Lavin, the school speech pathologist, J.G.'s classroom teacher, and J.G.'s reading support teacher. Parents Ex. C at 5. The reading support teacher stated that J.G. had made "tremendous progress" since January, while her classroom teacher noted that although J.G. could write independently, she could not always read back what she had written. The classroom teacher also indicated that J.G. was sometimes fidgety while writing and seemed to have trouble with decoding, Id. Although the CSE found this to be a difficult case to decide, after a discussion with the Parents, the CSE ultimately classified J.G. with a learning disability and recommended special education intervention. The CSE discussed an IEP for J.G. Parents Ex. M.
On July 22, 2005, the Parents received a draft of J.G.'s IEP for the 2005-2006 school year (the "June IEP"), the product of the June 13 meeting. Parents Ex. C. The June IEP recommended a special education English/Language Arts class; presenting information in small units; pairing verbal directions with visual cues; and a multi-modal method of teaching. Id. It also provided specific goals and objectives for reading, writing, and speech/language. Id.
On August 2, 2005, Lavin received a letter from the Parents rejecting the June IEP and stating that they were withdrawing J.G. from the District to place her in private school for the 2005-2006 school year. Parents Ex. L. The letter stated the Parents' concerns that: the IEP did not state that J.G. would receive Orton-Gillingham or Lindamood-Bell instruction; the special English class would not be sufficiently intensive; and that the IEP did not address J.G.'s learning deficits in basic mathematical functions. Id.
In response, Lavin's assistant, Barbara Watters ("Watters") immediately called the Parents on August 3, 2005 and left a message to schedule a meeting to address the Parents' concerns. Tr. 175; Parents Ex. V. Watters spoke to the Parents on August 4, 2005, and the Parents agreed to August 8 or 9 as possible meeting dates. Tr. 176-77. Relying on this information, Lavin commenced the usual procedure of securing the attendance of the CSE members. Tr. 181; Parents Ex. V. Lavin then sent two letters dated August 4 and August 5, 2005, respectively, to the Parents confirming the date and time of the meeting. On August 8, 2005, Mr. G called Lavin asking for an adjournment because the Parents wanted J.G.'s private tutor to be present, but the tutor would not return from vacation until late August. Parents Ex. V. In addition, Mr. G also advised that his family was going on vacation on August 15, 2005. Tr. 181-82; Parents Ex. V. When Mr. G suggested postponing the meeting until after Labor Day, Lavin responded that by law, an IEP must be in place before the start of the school year. Tr. 181-82. Lavin suggested the tutor participate by phone on August 9, and also *392 suggested that the CSE hold an additional meeting in September if the Parents wanted the tutor's physical presence at the meeting, Tr. 181-82; Parents Ex. V.
On August 9, 2005, the CSE met to address the Parents' concerns regarding the June IEP. When the Parents did not show up, Lavin called them to invite them to participate, but Mr. G declined. Parents Ex. B at 4; Parents Ex. V. The August 9 meeting then proceeded in the absence of the Parents. Among those present were Lavin, two regular education second-grade teachers, a second-grade special education teacher who would have taught J.G. had J.G. remained in the District, the school psychologist, and a parent member of the CSE. Parents Ex. B at 4. During the meeting, the CSE discussed monitoring J.G. for self-esteem issues, her potential placement in a special math class, and that the second-grade special education teacher who would teach J.G. was trained in both Lindamood-Bell and Orton-Gillingham methods. Id. The revised IEP that arose out of the August 9 meeting (the "August IEP") recommended two hours of special education English/Language Arts class and one hour of special education math class per day, recommended immediate positive reinforcement, and added specific goals and objectives for math. Parents Ex. B.
In December 2005, the Parents requested an impartial due process hearing, seeking among other things, to obtain tuition reimbursement for J.G.'s 2005-2006 school year at Windward, a private special education school in Westchester County. Parents Ex. A. After a hearing, the impartial hearing officer ("IHO") ruled that the District's IEP was procedurally and substantively adequate, and that the Parents did not prove that windward was an appropriate placement for J.G. IHO Decision at 18. Therefore, the IHO denied the Parents' claim. Id. at 20. The Parents then appealed to a State Review Officer ("SRO") who affirmed the IHO's decision in a detailed, fourteen-page opinion. The Parents now seek review of the SRO's decision and allege that the SRO erred in concluding that: 1) the Parents were not denied a meaningful opportunity to participate in the development of J.G.'s IEP and 2) that the District's 2005-2006 IEP was reasonably calculated to serve J.G.'s needs. The Parents also argue that equity favors their claim for reimbursement of J.G.'s 2005-2006 Windward tuition and transportation expenses.

II. RULINGS OF LAW

A. Standard of Review
Federal courts reviewing administrative determinations under the IDEA must base their decisions on the preponderance of the evidence, taking into account the record from the administrative proceeding as well as any further evidence presented by the parties. Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 377, 380 (2d Cir.2003). See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B). "[T]he responsibility for determining whether a challenged IEP will provide a child with an appropriate public education," however, "rests in the first instance with administrative hearing and review officers." P., ex rel. Mr. and Mrs. P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, "[w]hile federal courts do not simply rubber stamp administrative decisions, they are expected to give `due weight' to these proceedings, mindful that the judiciary generally `lack[s] the specialized knowledge and experience necessary to resolve persistent and difficult questions of educational policy.'" Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d at 119, 129 (2d Cir.1998) (internal citations omitted). "Deference is particularly appropriate *393 when ... the state hearing officers' review has been thorough and careful." Id.

B. IDEA Overview
The IDEA mandates that states receiving certain federal funds provide a free appropriate public education[4] ("FAPE") to children with disabilities. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8). To meet the statutory standard, a FAPE must be administered in accordance with an IEP. Id. The statute also mandates that children with disabilities be educated in the least restrictive environment. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5). If a state fails to provide a FAPE, a child's parents may send her to a private program and seek retroactive tuition reimbursement from the state. Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 (2d Cir.2005). Parents who unilaterally withdraw their child from public school and subsequently seek tuition reimbursement for a private school, however, do so at their financial risk. See School Comm. of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 374-75, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985). Parents challenging an IEP are entitled to reimbursement only if the court determines that; 1) the proposed IEP was procedurally or substantively inadequate; 2) the private schooling obtained by the parents is appropriate for the child's needs; and 3) the equities support the parents' claim. Cerra, 427 F.3d at 192. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374, 105 S.Ct. 1996. The burden of proof in such actions falls upon the party seeking relief. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62, 126 S.Ct. 528, 163 L.Ed.2d 387 (2005).

C. Procedural Compliance
Under the IDEA, a school district must provide the parents of a disabled child with an adequate opportunity to participate in the development of an IEP.[5]Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 524, 127 S.Ct. 1994, 167 L.Ed.2d 904 (2007) (stating that the IDEA requires school districts to give parents an opportunity to play a "significant role" in developing an IEP); Cerra, 427 F.3d at 192. The Supreme Court noted in Rowley that compliance with the significant procedural provisions of the IDEA "would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP." Grim, 346 F.3d at 381 (quoting Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982)). Not every procedural error in the development of an IEP, however, renders it inadequate under the IDEA. Id. If a procedural violation is alleged, a hearing officer may find that a child did not receive a FAPE only if the procedural inadequacy: 1) impeded the child's right to a FAPE; 2) significantly *394 impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decision making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the child; or 3) caused a deprivation of educational benefits. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii); Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 524-25, 127 S.Ct. 1994.
In this case, the Parents allege that the District violated their procedural rights by: 1) failing to develop and draft the goals and objectives in the IEP during the June 13 meeting; 2) failing to give adequate written notice of the August 9 meeting; and 3) holding the August 9 meeting in the Parents' absence. The Parents argue that the aforementioned procedural deficiencies violate their rights under Winkelman, which states that parents must be given the chance to serve as members of the team that develops the IEP and that the team must take into consideration the "concerns parents have for enhancing [their child's] education," 550 U.S. at 524, 127 S.Ct. 1994 (internal quotation marks omitted). As discussed below, however, the evidence supports the conclusion that the Parents were given an adequate opportunity to participate in the development of the IEP, that the CSE took into account all of the Parents' concerns, and that J.G. was not deprived of a FAPE.

1. Development and Drafting of Goals during the IEP Meetings
First, the Parents claim that they were denied meaningful participation at the June 13 meeting because the "proposed goals and objectives for J.G.'s IEP were developed without the input of ... J.G.'s parents," and the objectives were drafted only after the June 13 IEP meeting. Pls.' Mem. on Modified De Novo Review ("Pls.' Mem.") 12-13. As the IHO pointed out, however, the Parents' letter to the District dated June 21, 2005 directly contradicts these claims. IHO Decision at 18; Parents Ex. M.
In their letter summarizing the June 13 meeting, the Parents write that: at first the CSE voted against classifying J.G. as learning disabled because she was a difficult case, but "her parents disagreed with this determination and a discussion followed. Everyone at the meeting had an opportunity to further the discussion." Parents Ex. M at 1 (emphasis added). A second vote was then taken, and the CSE decided that J.G. did qualify for such services. Id. at 2, The Parents' letter also states that "some of the goals and objectives discussed for an IEP were: some type of special class that has (2) 45-minute sessions a day and learning to decode [consonant-vowel-consonant] words [including] reading sight words, blending, [and] correct writing skills." Id. Thus, the evidence supports the conclusion that the Parents had an opportunity to and did fully engage in the discussion both regarding whether J.G. required special services and what the IEP goals and objectives should be.
Further, while the IEP requires a statement of measurable annual goals, 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d), there is no legal authority requiring parental presence during the actual drafting of the written IEP document. E.G. v. City Sch. Dist. of New Rochelle, 606 F.Supp.2d 384, 388-89 (S.D.N.Y.2009). Moreover, in this case, the Parents had an opportunity to and did respond to the goals in the IEP after it was drafted. Parents Ex, L. See id.

2. Inadequate Written Notice
The Parents next argue that their procedural rights were violated under the IDEA because the District failed to provide written notice five days prior to the August 9 meeting as required by statute, 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2008.1. This Court concurs with the SRO's holding that this was a de *395 minimis error that did not deprive J.G. of a FAPE, SRO Decision at 10.
The record shows that on August 3, immediately after receiving the Parents' letter expressing their discontent with the June IEP, the District called the Parents to schedule a meeting. On August 4, five days prior to the proposed meeting, the Parents agreed over the phone that they would be available to meet on August 9. Tr. 175-77; Parents Ex. V. Moreover, Lavin sent letters to the Parents dated August 4 and August 5, 2005 so that the Parents received written notice of the August 9 meeting at least three days[6] prior to the meeting. District Exs. 7, 8. There is no evidence that in light of the Parents' actual notice of the meeting five days prior and written notice at least three days prior to the August 9 meeting, the late written notice deprived J.G. of a FAPE. Nor is there any evidence that the short written notice caused the Parents to be absent from the August 9 meeting.

3. The Parents' Absence from the August 9 Meeting
The Parents argue that their right to meaningful participation was violated when the CSE held the August 9 meeting in their absence. Given the totality of the circumstances, this Court concurs with the SRO that the Parents were not denied meaningful participation because the Parents were afforded an opportunity to participate, the Parents declined this opportunity, and despite the Parents' absence from the meeting, the District addressed and incorporated their concerns into the August IEP.
A school district has an affirmative obligation to take steps to ensure that one or both parents of the child are present at each IEP meeting or are afforded the opportunity to participate. Cerra, 427 F.3d at 192-93; see 34 C.F.R. § 300.322. This obligation includes scheduling a meeting at a mutually agreed upon time and place, 34 C.F.R. § 300.322(a)(2), and using other methods to ensure parent participation, such as telephone or video conference calls, id. § 300.322(c). If unable to convince the parents that they should attend, the school district may hold the meeting in their absence, but must make a record of its attempts to arrange for the parents' presence. Id. § 300.322(d). In this case, the District fulfilled its obligations under the law.
Immediately upon receiving the Parents' letter dated August 2, 2005, the District properly called the Parents on August 3 to schedule another meeting. On August 4, 2005, the parties mutually agreed to an IEP meeting on August 8 or 9. Tr. 175-77; Parents Ex. V. Relying on this agreement, Lavin commenced the usual procedure of securing the attendance of the CSE members, which was more difficult than usual considering it was summer vacation from school. On August 8, 2005, Mr. G asked Lavin for an adjournment because J.G.'s private tutor who the Parents wanted at the meeting would not return from vacation until late August, at which time Mr. G's family would already be gone for vacation. Tr. 181-82. When Mr. G suggested postponing the meeting until after Labor Day, Lavin appropriately explained that the law requires an IEP to be in place before the start of the school year. Tr. 182; 34 C.F.R. § 300.323(a). Lavin then offered for the tutor and the Parents to participate by phone on August 9, and offered to hold another CSE meeting in September if the Parents wanted the tutor *396 to be physically present. Tr. 195-96; Parents Ex. V. In light of the simultaneous unavailability of the Parents and private tutor until after Labor Day, the Parents' availability on August 9, the difficulty in assembling CSE members during the summer vacation, and the need for an IEP before the start of the school year, Lavin acted reasonably in maintaining the scheduled meeting date.
The record also shows that when the Parents did not show up to the August 9 meeting, Lavin called Mr. G to invite him to participate by phone. Mr. G, however, declined the opportunity to participate. District Ex. 6 at 4; Parents Ex. B at 4; Parents Ex. V. In line with statutory requirements, the District kept records of this and other communications offering the Parents an opportunity to participate in the August 9 meeting, both in the form of written notes by Dr. Lavin and the August IEP itself. Parents Ex. V; Parents Ex. B. Therefore, the District fulfilled its statutory obligations in offering the Parents an adequate opportunity to participate in the August 9 meeting.[7]
The Parents argue, however, that it was the District's impermissible delay in sending them a copy of the June IEP that led to the conflict in schedules in August, which then prevented the presence of all persons the Parents wanted at the August 9 meeting. Because they did not receive a copy of the June IEP until the end of July, more than a month after the June 13 meeting, the Parents argue that it was the District's actions that created the compressed time period in which the CSE had to meet again and create a revised IEP. As in Cerra, the Parents here fail to direct the Court to "any statutory provision or regulation requiring that an IEP be produced at the time parents demand ... [s]chool districts must only ensure that a child's IEP is in effect by the beginning of the school year and that the parents are provided a copy." Cerra, 427 F.3d at 193-94 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 300.342(a)). The record also shows that Lavin did not in bad faith withhold the June IEP as the Parents seem to suggest. Instead, Lavin explained that she had limited staff in the summer months and that she herself must review the IEPs to ensure their appropriateness before sending them out. Tr. 188.
In addition, despite their absence from the August 9 meeting, the CSE addressed the Parents' concerns regarding the June IEP. First, the August 9 meeting was called specifically to address the Parents concerns regarding the June IEP as detailed in the Parents' letter dated August 2, 2005. Parents Ex. B. at 4 (August IEP stating that purpose of meeting was "to address communication received by parent"); see Parents Ex. M. Second, the August IEP addresses all deficiencies as alleged by the Parents, including: 1) that the June 13 discussion did not specifically address J.G.'s fidgety behavior and frustration, see Parents Ex. M; 2) that 1.5 hours of special education English instruction was not sufficient, Parents Ex. L; 3) that the IEP did not specifically state the District would use Lindamood-Bell or Orton-Gillingham *397 methodology to instruct J.G., id.; and 4) that the June IEP did not address J.G.'s weakness in basic math, id. In turn, the District discussed and incorporated each of these concerns into the revised IEP. In particular, the August IEP: 1) included a discussion that J.G. requires positive praise, extra support, and constant reevaluation; 2) adds an extra half hour of special English instruction; 3) adds a special math class and specific short-term goals in math; and 4) included a discussion that revealed that the special education teacher who would teach J.G. was trained in both Lindamood-Bell and Orton-Gillingham. Parents Ex. B. Therefore, the Parents' concerns were actively addressed in the August 9 meeting despite their refusal to attend.
Further, it is significant that the Parents had already unilaterally decided to place J.G. at Windward for the 2005-2006 school year by August 2, 2005. Mr. G testified that a tuition decision for Windward had to be made by August 1, 2005, Tr. 611, and the Parents' August 2, 2005 letter stated that "[J.G.] will be attending private school next year.... This is formal notice of us withdrawing [J.G.] from the Briarcliff Manor Union Free School District." District Ex. 9 (emphasis added). Thus, even assuming that the alleged procedural violations were legally significant, they could not have prejudiced J.G.'s education because as discussed infra, see Part II.D., J.G.'s IEP was appropriate and available to J.G. had her parents "chosen to avail themselves" of the program. See Grim, 346 F.3d at 381-82 (holding that alleged procedural violation could not have prejudiced child's education because program was substantively adequate and there was no evidence that procedural violation affected parents' decision to enroll child in private school).
The Parents' early decision by August 2, 2005 to enroll J.G. in private school also directly undercuts their argument that Lavin deprived them of meaningful participation by failing to call together a September meeting as she had previously suggested. As the SRO points out, during their August 8, 2005 conversation, Mr. G told Dr. Lavin that he "didn't see any sense in being there" at the IEP meeting(s) because "his daughter is not coming." Parents Ex. V; Tr. 414-16. Given that by August 11, 2005, the Parents' intention of enrolling J.G. at Windward became even more clear, Parents Ex. I, it was reasonable for Lavin not to hold another IEP meeting.

D. Substantive Compliance
The evidence shows that the IEP offered by the District for J.G.'s 2005-2006 school year was substantively adequate under the IDEA. The IDEA requires an IEP to be "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefit[s]." Cerra, 427 F.3d at 194 (internal quotation marks omitted). A school district is not required to furnish "`every special service necessary to maximize each handicapped child's potential."' Id. at 195 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207, 102 S.Ct. 3034). Moreover, "[b]ecause administrative agencies have special expertise in making judgments concerning student progress, deference is particularly important when assessing an IEP's substantive adequacy." Id. at 195. An IEP is substantively adequate if it is likely to produce progress, not regression. Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130.
The Parents argue that the August IEP is substantively inadequate because; 1) the District failed to assess J.G.'s then-present levels of performance; 2) the IEP failed to address J.G.'s social/emotional needs; and 3) the IEP did not adequately address all *398 of J.G.'s learning deficits nor did it specifically state that Orton-Gillingham or Lindamood-Bell instruction would be provided. Pls.' Mem. 13-14. The Court concurs with the SRO's holding that the IEP was reasonably calculated to enable J.G. to receive educational benefit, SRO Decision at 14. The August IEP adequately addresses all of the alleged substantive deficits claimed by the Parents.

1. Assessment of J.G.'s Level of Performance
The Parents claim that the District failed properly to assess J.G.'s then-present levels of performance before developing an IEP, "to the extent that [the assessments] were generic and not individualized." Pls.' Mem. 14. To the contrary, the evidence shows that J.G. underwent evaluations and observation by different specialists, the results of which were carefully considered at both CSE meetings and incorporated into the IEPs.
In February 2005, J.G. was evaluated by a private psychologist who administered eighteen different tests, addressing areas including the child's intelligence, academic achievement skills, structural analysis, math skills, and vocabulary. Parents Ex. Q. The results of these tests were considered and incorporated into the June IEP. Parents Ex. C at 2-5. In March 2005, the District's speech-language pathologist conducted a speech and language assessment of the child, the results of which were also incorporated into the June IEP. Id. at 4-5. Moreover, during the June 13 meeting, both J.G.'s reading support teacher and classroom teacher gave detailed assessments of her then-current level of functioning in reading, decoding, writing, and her behavior in class. Id. at 4, The child's classroom teacher even reported that by the end of the 2004-2005 school year, her reading level was at a first-grade level, which was appropriate. Tr. 737, 947-48. After the June IEP meeting, J.G.'s private special educator wrote a letter to the District stating that J.G. had "made strides" but recommended that the child be taught using the Orton-Gillingham method. The tutor's recommendation is reflected in the August IEP, in which the CSE discussed the fact that the second-grade teacher who would have taught J.G. was trained in both Lindamood-Bell and Orton-Gillingham. Parents Ex. B at 4. Thus, there is ample evidence that J.G. received an individualized evaluation of her then-present level of performance, which was then incorporated into both IEPs.

2. J.G.'s Social and Emotional Needs
Next, the Parents claim that the August IEP did not address J.G.'s social and emotional needs. The SRO's ruling that the Parents failed to show that J.G. required any such special education services at the time the August IEP was formulated, however, is amply supported by the record. SRO Decision at 14. The objective evidence shows that although J.G. sometimes lacked confidence, she did not have particular social or emotional disorders that may have warranted formal services.
The private psychologist hired by the Parents stated in her evaluation that J.G. was a "friendly cooperative youngster who sustained excellent eye contact ... was comfortable conversing about a variety of topics ... [and although] sometimes hesitant to guess ... when she was encouraged to do so, she was invariably correct." Parents Ex. Q at 2. The District's school psychologist noted that J.G. was eager to please but lacked confidence, requiring positive praise and needed to be "pushed." Parents Ex. B at 4. The August IEP addresses these observations by implementing a plan for "immediate positive reinforcement," "positive praise," constant reevaluation, and monitoring for *399 self-esteem issues. Parents Ex. B at 1, 4. Further, the Parents did not state in any of their communications to the District before the August 9 meeting that they believed J.G. required special services to address any serious social or emotional problems. Thus, there is no evidence that the August IEP was inadequate in this manner.

3. J.G.'s Learning Deficits
The Parents do not specify which of "J.G.'s learning deficits" the August IEP allegedly fails to address, see Pls. Mem. at 14, however the evidence here shows that the August IEP addressed all of J.G.'s observed learning deficits at the time the IEP was drafted. SRO Decision at 11-14. The Parents' private psychologist in her February 2005 evaluation indicated that while J.G.'s overall cognitive functioning in all areas was in the average to superior range, J.G. had some learning deficits in reading and in basic math.
With respect to J.G.'s reading abilities, the private psychologist noted that the child had a weak short-term auditory memory, lacked mastery of the consonant vowel consonant words, and had not acquired the basic decoding skills usually mastered in first grade. Parents Ex. Q at 5-6. The psychologist thus recommended the Lindamood-Bell or Orton-Gillingham method. Id. at 6. The District's speech pathologist also noted that J.G. had a relative weakness in short-term auditory memory and recommended presenting information in smaller units, repeating information as necessary and utilizing multi-modal methods of teaching and reading instruction. Parents Ex. 0 at 8. J.G.'s classroom teacher indicated that by the end of the 2004-2005 school year, the child's reading ability was at the appropriate first-grade level, Tr. 737, 947-48, but that J.G. still needed some assistance with formation of letters and some spelling, Tr. 727.
The record shows that the August IEP is tailored to J.G.'s deficits in reading. The August IEP provided for: two hours per day of a small special education English/Language Arts class; a multi-modal approach to teaching; new information to be "chunked" into smaller components; and verbal directions to be paired with verbal cues whenever possible. Moreover, the August IEP provides for specific annual goals and objectives in areas of word recognition, decoding, and comprehension skills. Moreover, the August IEP states that the teacher who would have taught J.G.'s second-grade English class is trained in both Lindamood-Bell and Orton-Gillingham. Parents Ex. B at 4; Tr. 801, 819-20. The teacher specifically testified at the impartial hearing that she teaches reading using the Orton-Gillingham method and that her approach provided for structure and immediate feedback and gratification. Tr. 800-01.
With respect to J.G.'s math skills, the Parents' private psychologist noted that the child had a "good understanding of basic concepts and applications but ... has a hard time with simple basic addition." Parents Ex. Q at 5. J.G.'s first-grade math teacher testified at the hearing that sometimes the child required a number line to help her with basic math problems. Tr. 945. In turn, the August IEP reflects that J.G. "has difficulty with remembering addition and subtraction concepts, as well as utilizing vocabulary in math word problems." Parents Ex. B at 2. To address these issues, the August IEP provides for a 15:1 special education math class for one hour per day, id. at 1, and lists specific goals and objectives in mathematics that reflect J.G.'s deficits, id. at 5-6. The August IEP also indicates that the special education math class utilizes a multi-sensory approach and that the teaching can be *400 geared to J.G.'s weaknesses and learning style. Id. at 4.
Therefore, there is no evidence that the August IEP fails adequately to address any of J.G.'s learning deficits.

III. CONCLUSION
Because the Parents have not shown that J.G. was denied a free appropriate public education, their reimbursement claim fails. Accordingly, the Court will not address the remaining prongs of the reimbursement test regarding the appropriateness of J.G.'s placement at Windward or considerations of equity. See Frank G. v. Board of Educ. of Hyde Park, 459 F.3d 356, 365 (2d Cir.2006). Therefore, judgment will enter for the District.
SO ORDERED.
NOTES
[1]  Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
[2]  Derived from the procedures of the courts of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, see, e.g., Parker v. Morrell, 59 Mass.App.Dec. 34 (Mass.Dist.Ct.1976), the "case stated" procedure is firmly established in the jurisprudence of the First Circuit. See, e.g., Boston Five Cents Sav. Bank v. Secretary of Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 768 F.2d 5, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1985); Continental Grain Co. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth., 972 F.2d 426, 429 n. 7 (1st Cir.1992); Bunch v. W.R. Grace & Co., 532 F.Supp.2d 283, 286-87 (D.Mass.2008). It is a most helpful procedural device. In this session of the Court, it works like this: whenever cross motions for summary judgment reveal that the relevant facts appear without significant dispute, the courtroom deputy clerk offers the parties to treat the case as a case stated. Should they accept, as was the case here, the Court treats the undisputed facts as the established record and draws the reasonable inferences therefrom without the necessity of drawing adverse inferences against each moving party, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The facts of the case being established, the Court affords each party thirty minutes for final argument (not the usual ten minutes per party when hearing argument on a motion). In due course, the Court enters findings and rulings as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a).
[3]  Many of the exhibits offered at the impartial hearing are also attached to the Parents' counsel's affidavit accompanying the Parents' present motion. These documents, however, will be referred to by the exhibit numbers and letters designated by the parties for the impartial hearing.
[4]  A "free appropriate public education" means special education and related services that

(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge;
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency;
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved; and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(d) of this title.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).
[5]  The IDEA requires "[a]n opportunity for the parents of a child with a disability to examine all records relating to such child and to participate in meetings with respect to the identification, evaluation, and educational placement of the child, and the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child, and to obtain an independent evaluation of the child." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1).
[6]  Although the IHO found that the parents had four days written notice, IHO Decision at 16, the Parents claim they only had three days notice because they received both letters on August 6, 2005.
[7]  As the SRO noted, if the circumstances were different, e.g., the meeting could have been adjourned without compromising the completion of an IEP before the first day of school, then perhaps the District would have violated procedural requirements of the IDEA by denying a reasonable adjournment. SRO Decision at 11, n. 4. See Mr. & Mrs. M v. Ridgefield Bd. of Educ., No. 3:05-CV-584 (RNC), 2007 WL 987483, at *6 (D.Conn. March 30, 2007) (holding that district violated the procedural requirements of IDEA when the district made no effort to reschedule a meeting despite the parents' express and timely request for an adjournment and lack of reasons not to consider adjournment). This, however, is not the case here.


461 F.3d 1097
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Azim CHOUDHRY, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 05-10810.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted July 28, 2006.
Filed August 25, 2006.

Mark Rosenbush, San Francisco, CA, for the defendant-appellant.
Derek D. Owens, Special Assistant United States Attorney, and Barbara J. Valliere, Assistant United States Attorney, United States Attorney's Office, San Francisco, CA, for the plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California; Phyllis J. Hamilton, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CR-05-00179-PJH.
Before GILBERT S. MERRITT,* ANDREW J. KLEINFELD, and RICHARD A. PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
PAEZ, Circuit Judge.

1
Azim Choudhry ("Choudhry") appeals the district court's denial of his pre-trial motion to suppress evidence. Upon observing a vehicle parked illegally, two San Francisco police officers performed an investigatory traffic stop of the vehicle, in which Choudhry was a passenger. During a subsequent search of the vehicle, the officers discovered a gun under the front passenger seat. Choudhry was indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Alleging that the search and seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, Choudhry filed a motion to suppress the gun.

2
In challenging the lawfulness of the stop, Choudhry argued that a civil parking offense that is enforced through an administrative process could not, standing alone, justify an investigatory stop. Choudhry also argued that the other circumstances surrounding the stop were insufficient to support a finding of reasonable suspicion and that the stop therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. Other than noting the parking violation as one fact in its analysis of the events leading up to the stop, the district court did not address the merits of Choudhry's argument regarding the parking violation. Although we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress, we do so on a narrower ground than the one advanced by the district court. Because parking infractions constitute traffic violations under California's Vehicle Code and local laws enacted pursuant to the Vehicle Code, and because the officers had the authority to enforce the particular violation at issue, we hold that a civil parking violation under California's Vehicle Code falls within the scope of the Supreme Court's decision in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). Accordingly, we conclude that the parking violation provided the officers with reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of the vehicle. In light of our disposition, we need not address the other factors that the district court relied upon to deny the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

3
Just after midnight on February 7, 2005, San Francisco Police Officers Silver and Chan were patrolling Bernal Heights Boulevard. The officers observed a vehicle parked illegally near the entrance of Bernal Heights Park, an area designated as a no-stopping/tow-away zone between the hours of 10 PM and 6 AM every day.1 Because the officers were unable to determine whether the car was occupied, Officer Silver used the police car's spotlight to illuminate the vehicle from behind. In response to the sudden spotlight, the vehicle's occupants, Sonja Alvarado ("Alvarado") and Choudhry, made "hurried movements." According to Officer Silver, these movements led the officers to believe that either a sexual encounter or "some other possibly illegal act" was taking place. In a declaration filed in opposition to the motion, Officer Silver explained that the officers decided to investigate further and turned on their emergency lights "in order to conduct an investigatory stop." Alvarado, the driver of the vehicle, turned on the vehicle's engine and began to pull away. After both police officers exited their patrol car and commanded her to stop, she did.

4
While Officer Chan questioned Alvarado, Officer Silver spoke with Choudhry through the passenger side window. Having determined that Alvarado's license had been suspended and that there were two active warrants outstanding for her arrest, Officer Chan placed Alvarado under arrest. Because Officer Silver recognized the "faint odor of burnt marijuana," he suspected that Choudhry possessed marijuana and ordered Choudhry out of the car. As Officer Silver performed a pat-down search, Choudhry admitted that he had marijuana in the pocket of his pants. Officer Silver found marijuana in Choudhry's front pants pocket and placed Choudhry in the police car. Choudhry then informed Officer Silver that he had found a gun, which he had placed inside Alvarado's car. Officer Silver discovered the gun under the passenger seat where Choudhry had been sitting.

5
The Grand Jury subsequently indicted Choudhry for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), possession of a firearm by a felon. Claiming that the detention and search violated the Fourth Amendment, Choudhry filed a motion to suppress the evidence that the officers seized as a result of the stop. As he does in this appeal, Choudhry advanced two central arguments in support of his motion: first, Choudhry argued that because California has decriminalized parking offenses, the police could not perform an investigatory stop on the basis of the parking violation alone; and second, Choudhry asserted that the other circumstances surrounding the stop were insufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion.

6
The district court denied Choudhry's motion. In its oral decision, the court declined to determine whether the parking violation was enough, standing alone, to justify the stop. Instead, the court concluded that the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop were sufficient for the officers to have formed an articulable, reasonable suspicion that Alvarado and Choudhry were engaged in criminal activity. The district court relied on the following circumstances: (1) the parking violation, (2) Alvarado's brief attempted "flight," (3) the couple's hurried movements after the officers turned on the spotlight, and (4) Officer Silver's belief that Bernal Heights was a high-crime area.

7
After the district court denied his suppression motion, Choudhry entered a conditional plea of guilty to the indictment, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion. The district court sentenced Choudhry to 57 months and he timely appealed. On appeal, Choudhry re-asserts that the parking violation was insufficient alone to justify an investigatory stop and the totality of the circumstances did not constitute reasonable suspicion.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

8
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo whether the police had reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop, a mixed question of law and fact. See United States v. Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d 928, 934 (9th Cir. 2006). We may affirm the denial of the motion to suppress on any basis supported by the record. See United States v. Henderson, 241 F.3d 638, 649 n. 1 (9th Cir.2000). We review the district court's findings of fact for clear error. See United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir.2000).

III. DISCUSSION
A.

9
The officers' investigatory stop of Alvarado's vehicle implicates the Fourth Amendment "because stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a seizure . . . even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). Investigatory traffic stops are akin to the on-the-street encounters addressed in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); accordingly, the same objective standard applies: a police officer may conduct an investigatory traffic stop if the officer has "reasonable suspicion" that a particular person "has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime." Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d at 1104.

10
Officers have reasonable suspicion when "specific, articulable facts . . . together with objective and reasonable inferences, form the basis for suspecting that the particular person detained is engaged in criminal activity." Id. at 1105 (internal quotation marks omitted). The reasonable suspicion analysis takes into account the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc). "This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002).

11
A traffic violation alone is sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769; United States v. Willis, 431 F.3d 709, 714-17 (9th Cir.2005). In Whren, the Court held that, in general, "the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." 517 U.S. at 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769; Willis, 431 F.3d at 715 ("Whren stands for the proposition that if the officers have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred, the officers may conduct a traffic stop.").2 The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the standard should be different where "civil traffic regulations" are concerned. See 517 U.S. at 810-11, 116 S.Ct. 1769.

B.

12
Whether Whren applies to parking violations under California's civil-administrative enforcement scheme is a matter of first impression in this court. We conclude that it does and that, here, the parking violation justified the investigatory stop of Alvarado's vehicle. In so holding, we note that our conclusion is consistent with the decisions of our sister circuits that have considered Whren's application to parking violations. See Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 402-03 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Copeland, 321 F.3d 582, 594 (6th Cir.2003); United States v. Thornton, 197 F.3d 241, 248 (7th Cir.1999).

13
In 1992, the California Legislature significantly amended the California Vehicle Code ("Vehicle Code") to establish a separate civil administrative scheme for enforcing parking violations. Section 40200(a) mandates that "any" non-misdemeanor parking violation "is subject to a civil penalty" to be enforced through "the civil administrative procedures set forth in this article." Cal. Veh.Code § 40200(a). The new enforcement scheme provides for civil penalties for parking violations and delinquent payments, but no criminal sanctions. See, e.g., id. § 40220 ("Collection of unpaid parking penalty . . .").3 Legislative intent, California court decisions, and the interpretation of the California Attorney General all confirm that parking violations are "[n]o longer . . . treated as infractions within the criminal justice system; instead, they are treated as civil offenses subject to civil penalties and administrative enforcement." Tyler v. County of Alameda, 34 Cal.App.4th 777, 40 Cal. Rptr.2d 643, 645 (1995); see also Cal. Stats.1992, c. 1244 § 1(b), 1992 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1244 (Deering) ("Criminal penalties are not appropriate sanctions for standing and parking violations; and criminal procedures are not necessary for the fair enforcement of those violations."); 82 Op. Att'y Gen. Cal. 47 (1999) (adopting the interpretation in Tyler). The Vehicle Code authorizes municipalities to establish parking enforcement agencies and to contract with public and private agencies to process parking citations. See, e.g., Cal. Veh.Code §§ 40200.5, 40200.6. As discussed in detail below, however, California law also allows police officers to enforce parking violations. See id. § 40202(a) (outlining how the "peace officer or person authorized to enforce parking laws" must proceed when an unoccupied vehicle is parked illegally); People v. Hart, 74 Cal.App.4th 479, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 762, 766 (1999) (noting that a police officer was authorized to enforce a parking violation where the illegally parked vehicle was occupied).

14
In Whren, the Court held that when police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable. 517 U.S. at 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769. The defendants in Whren argued that, in the context of "civil traffic regulations," the Fourth Amendment standard should be different—namely, that the standard should consider whether a reasonable officer would have made a stop based on the particular violation, not whether the officer observed any violation. Id. The Court rejected this argument. Instead, it held that a traffic violation was sufficient to justify an investigatory stop, regardless of whether (i) the violation was merely pretextual, id. at 811-12, 116 S.Ct. 1769, (ii) the stop departed from the regular practice of a particular precinct, id. at 814-15, 116 S.Ct. 1769, or (iii) the violation was common and insignificant, id. at 818-19, 116 S.Ct. 1769. Thus, under Whren, so long as Officers Silver and Chan had reasonable suspicion to believe that Alvarado "violated the traffic code," the stop was "reasonable under the Fourth Amendment [and] the evidence thereby discovered admissible." Id. at 819, 116 S.Ct. 1769.

15
Choudhry seeks to distinguish Whren on two related grounds. First, he argues that Whren does not apply because the reasonable suspicion inquiry centers on criminal activity—that is, he asserts that Whren is limited to conduct for which the individual may be arrested. Second, he argues that in California, parking laws are distinct from other traffic laws because of California's separate civil-administrative scheme for enforcing parking penalties. We find neither argument persuasive.

1.

16
In separating civil parking violations and criminal activity, Choudhry reads Whren more narrowly than that decision and our circuit law permit. Although the reasonable suspicion inquiry does center on suspected criminal activity, Whren carves out an exception in the context of traffic stops, i.e., a stop is "reasonable" where an officer suspects an individual has committed a traffic violation. 517 U.S. at 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769. Whren is not limited to "criminal" traffic code violations. In fact, the case specifically contemplated the opposite: at the outset of its opinion, the Court noted that it was addressing the petitioners' appeal in the scope of "civil traffic violation[s]." Id. at 808, 116 S.Ct. 1769.4 The Court explicitly declined to distinguish among different types of traffic code violations, be they standing or moving violations. See id. at 818-19, 116 S.Ct. 1769. Indeed, we have interpreted Whren as applying generally to traffic code violations. See Willis, 431 F.3d at 715 (describing Whren as sanctioning all stops where the officers have cause to "believe that the petitioner violated the traffic code");5 cf. Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 864 & n. 4 (9th Cir.2005) (noting that although a "non-criminal" traffic violation did not justify impoundment, it was "sufficient justification for police officers to seize a vehicle for a traffic stop"). Thus, Whren does not distinguish between traffic violations enforced through a civil-administrative process and traffic violations subject to criminal enforcement.

2.

17
Choudhry's argument must turn not on the distinction between civil and criminal traffic violations, but on whether a parking violation, which is enforced through a civiladministrative scheme, should be considered a traffic violation within the scope of Whren. In light of the administrative process used to enforce parking penalties in California, there is some force to Choudhry's argument that parking violations are distinct from criminal traffic infractions. On balance, however, his argument fails. The structure of the California Vehicle Code, the authority of law enforcement officers to enforce the Vehicle Code, and the specific authority granted to San Francisco City and County police officers to enforce the violation at issue lead us to conclude that Whren controls Choudhry's case.6

18
Although California has enacted a civil administrative process to enforce parking penalties, it has not removed parking regulation from the division of the Vehicle Code that covers moving traffic violations. See Cal. Veh.Code §§ 22500-26. This organizational structure demonstrates that while the legislature intended to decriminalize parking penalties, it still considered parking regulation as part of the general "traffic laws." A structural analysis of the Code is informative. The general rules governing parking regulation, as well as the provisions granting local authorities the power to establish parking restrictions pursuant to the Vehicle Code, are contained in Division 11, Rules of the Road. See Cal. Veh.Code §§ 22500-26. Among other rules, Division 11 covers moving violations, which include laws governing such matters as turns, stop signs, and vehicle speed. Notably, the Vehicle Code has separate divisions entitled Equipment of Vehicles (Div.12, §§ 24000-28150), Safety Regulations (Div.14.8, §§ 34500-20.5), and Drivers' Licenses (Div.6, §§ 12500-15325). Had the legislature intended to treat parking regulation as entirely distinct from other traffic offenses, it could have separated them in a similar way. Instead, the legislature determined that a separate civil-administrative scheme was the preferred method for processing and enforcing civil penalties for parking violations. To distinguish parking violations from other traffic violations, as Choudhry urges we do, would necessarily require us to rely on logic the Supreme Court considered, but rejected, in Whren: that different "types" of traffic violations could be distinguished in justifying a traffic stop. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 818-19, 116 S.Ct. 1769.

19
Nor does California case law suggest a distinction in the authority to enforce parking and traffic violations under the Vehicle Code; rather, decisions by the California Court of Appeal recognize the general authority of police officers to "detain and cite a person for violating the Vehicle Code." Hart, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d at 766 (emphasis added); see also People v. Brown, 62 Cal.App.4th 493, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 793, 794 (Ct.App.1998) ("A police officer may legally stop a motorist he suspects of violating the Vehicle Code for the purpose of issuing a citation." (emphasis added)). In Hart, the court considered the validity of a detention that occurred during the citation of a driver for a parking violation when the driver was present in the car. The court noted that although the Vehicle Code outlines the procedures for citing an unattended illegally parked vehicle, see Cal. Veh.Code § 40202, it does not contain a provision governing the procedures for "giving notice" when an illegally parked vehicle is occupied, Hart, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d at 766. Citing the general authority of police officers to "detain and cite" individuals for Vehicle Code violations, the court held that a detention in such a situation was appropriate. Id.7

20
Here, the officers had the express authority to enforce this specific parking violation. Alvarado had parked the vehicle in an area designated by signs as a no parking/tow-away zone between the hours of 10:00 PM and 6:00 AM. California Vehicle Code section 22651 allows "[a]ny peace officer . . . engaged in directing traffic or enforcing parking laws and regulations" to remove a vehicle "[w]henever any vehicle is parked or left standing where local authorities, by resolution or ordinance, have prohibited parking and have authorized removal of vehicles." Cal. Veh.Code § 22651(n). Section 130 of the San Francisco Traffic Code is such an ordinance: it grants police officers the authority to remove or cause to have removed "any vehicle that is parked or left standing unattended in violation of California Vehicle Code or the San Francisco Traffic Code and where signs are posted giving notice of removal for such a violation." S.F. Traffic Code § 130. Vehicle Code section 22651(n), in combination with the local code provision, confirms that the officers were within their authority to enforce Alvarado's parking violation. Thus, while California utilizes distinct civil procedures to enforce penalties for parking violations, parking regulation nonetheless falls within the scope of Whren's holding.

IV. CONCLUSION

21
Because the parking violation alone provided the officers with a sufficient basis to conduct an investigatory stop of Alvarado's vehicle, we need not address the totality of the circumstances analysis on which the district court relied to deny Choudhry's motion. For the above reasons, we agree with the district court that the stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment. We therefore affirm the denial of Choudhry's motion to suppress and his conviction.

22
AFFIRMED.

Notes:

*
 The Honorable Gilbert S. Merritt, Senior Judge, United States Court Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation

1
 The car was parked in violation of The City and County of San Francisco Municipal Code, Traffic Code ("San Francisco Traffic Code" or "S.F. Traffic Code") § 32. That section requires the Board of Supervisors to pass resolutions designating restricted parking or stopping areas and to erect signs giving notice of those areas. It further states: "Any person violating any of the class of resolutions now or hereinafter in effect, which are referred to in the following subsections of this Section, shall be guilty of an infraction." Subsection (b) refers to "[r]esolution[s] prohibiting parking on any street or alley." S.F. Traffic Code § 32(b)

2
 InLopez-Soto, we considered and rejected the argument that Whren altered the standard for traffic stops from "reasonable suspicion" to "probable cause." See 205 F.3d at 1104.

3
 Following the 1992 amendments, parking violations are subject to fines. In instances of delinquent or non-payment, municipalities may assess late payment penalty fines,see id. § 40203.5, or, when unpaid penalties exceed $400, may enforce collection through entering a civil judgment, see id. §§ 40220, 40221. At no point, however, may a municipality impose penal sanctions. In fact, the 1992 amendment to section 40220 deleted subsection (c), which allowed the processing agency to "[f]ile a criminal complaint with the court" if fees remained unpaid. See id. § 40220, Notes 1992 Amend. (West 2005).

4
 Choudhry argues that the Court's use of the term "civil" is dicta because the Court did not address whether the specific provisions at issue were criminal or civil. We are not persuaded. At the very least, the inclusion of "civil" at multiple points inWhren indicates that the Court viewed the traffic violations as civil offenses and that the Court's reasoning therefore applies to traffic regulations enforced through civil-administrative procedures. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 808, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769. Moreover, "[w]e do not treat considered dicta of the Supreme Court lightly." Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1132 n. 17.

5
 The dissent inWillis did not dispute the majority's interpretation of Whren, but disagreed with the court's conclusion that the standard had been met in that case. See 431 F.3d at 723 (Fletcher, W., J., dissenting) (noting that in light of Whren, "police may make an ordinary `traffic stop' whenever they have sufficient reason to believe that a traffic law has been violated").

6
 Our analysis here mirrors the analytical framework employed by the Sixth Circuit inCopeland. In Copeland, the Sixth Circuit held that Whren applied to a traffic stop based on a parking violation because the regulation was "set forth under the general traffic laws of the Michigan Vehicle Code" and "officers may enforce any of the regulations subsumed in [the relevant] section by virtue of a stop." 321 F.3d at 594.

7
 In Choudhry's attempt to distinguishHart, he misreads the Vehicle Code. First, Choudhry argues that, in Hart, the defendant violated a provision found in the "criminal infractions" section of the Vehicle Code (Cal. Veh.Code § 22500(f)), while Alvarado's parking violation fell under section 40200. Alvarado did not violate section 40200 or a similar provision, as Choudhry's analysis would suggest. She violated section 32 of the San Francisco Traffic Code. San Francisco derives its authority to restrict "stopping, standing, or parking" on its roads in part from a different provision in the same Vehicle Code chapter at issue in Hart. See Cal. Veh.Code § 22507(a). The parking enforcement scheme covers "any" non-misdemeanor parking violation. See id. § 40200. Section 22500(f) is not a misdemeanor. Accordingly, both the violations at issue here and in Hart are enforced under section 40200.7
Second, during oral argument, Choudhry argued that Hart is distinguishable because Alvarado violated the San Francisco Traffic Code, not the California Vehicle Code. The distinction Choudhry draws, however, is not supported by the structure of the Vehicle Code. As noted above, the San Francisco Traffic Code provision at issue was adopted pursuant to the Vehicle Code. Section 40000.1 of the Vehicle Code treats violations of the code and violations of laws adopted pursuant to the code similarly: "it . . . constitutes an infraction for any person to violate, or fail to comply with, any provision of this code, or any local ordinance adopted pursuant to this code." Section 40200 places parking violations under the civil enforcement scheme, but otherwise does not alter section 40000.1.