316 F.Supp.2d 1142 (2004)
LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff,
v.
WESTERN ROOFING COMPANY, INC., Defendant.
No. 03-2036-JWL.
United States District Court, D. Kansas.
May 7, 2004.
*1143 Amy M. Decker, Scott R. Schillings, Cozen & O'Connor, Wichita, KS, James D. Dendinger, Cozen & O'Connor, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff.
Steven R. Fabert, James P. Nordstrom, Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith, Topeka, KS, T. Bradley Manson, Shapiro, Manson & Karbank, Overland Park, KS, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
LUNGSTRUM, District Judge.
This is an insurance subrogation case arising from the collapse of a roof on an office/warehouse building. Plaintiff Lexington Insurance Company ("Lexington") seeks to recover from defendant Western Roofing Company ("Western Roofing") for amounts Lexington paid as a result of the roof collapse. The matter is presently before the court on Western Roofing's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 44). For the reasons explained below, the court will grant this motion with respect to Lexington's tort claim, but will deny the motion with respect to Lexington's contract and warranty claims.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
The office/warehouse building that is the subject of this lawsuit is owned by The Westroads Limited Partnership ("Westroads"). Westroads does not occupy or manage the building. At the time the roof collapsed, the building was occupied by a tenant, Schlage Lock.
The building is managed by The Mid-America Management Company ("Mid-America") pursuant to a management agreement with Westroads.[1] The management *1144 agreement required Mid-America to "obtain, renew, and replace all policies of insurance insuring the property and the fixtures." Mid-America also agreed to "negotiate and settle directly with any insurance carrier, any insurance claims for damage to the property or fixtures."
There is, in turn, an advisory services agreement between Westroads as "Owner" and CB Richard Ellis[2] as "Agent." This agreement generally provides that Westroads will pay CB Richard Ellis to oversee the management and tenant relations at the building. The Westroads signature block is signed by William Staebler as vice president for Mid-America.
Western Roofing installed the original roof on the building in 1980. Western Roofing was not, however, the subcontractor that installed the downspouts on the building originally. Further, Western Roofing did not design the roof. The architect who designed the roof did not require overflow scuppers to be installed. Overflow scuppers would have served as a precautionary measure that would have allowed water to exit the roof if the downspouts had become clogged. Plaintiff does not contend that Western Roofing should be held liable for the fact that the building was arguably defectively designed when it was built because of the absence of overflow scuppers.
From 1998 through 2000, CB Richard Ellis made a number of calls to Western Roofing to repair building leaks. Some of these incidents revealed a recurrent problem with dead pigeon carcasses clogging the downspouts, causing rainwater to back up. The pigeon carcasses were located in a bend of the downspouts at ground level. Mr. Lanning testified in his deposition that "[t]he incidents with pigeons involved pigeons on the bottom of the downspouts and waters [sic] flowing into tenant spaces were out of the downspouts. It did not back-up on the roof." At first, in an attempt to remedy this pigeon problem, inspection hatches were installed at ground level to allow the dead pigeons to be removed. This, however, did not cure the problem. When the problem recurred, further action was taken.
In June of 2000, Western Roofing removed all of the downspouts from the building, cleaned them and removed the dead pigeons, reinstalled the downspouts, and installed wire screens over the top ends of the downspouts to prevent pigeons from entering the downspouts. Marcus Manson, owner and president of Western Roofing, testified in his deposition that it was mutually agreed among him, Michael Lanning, who is the property manager for CB Richard Ellis, and Kathleen Armstrong, who is with Mid-America, that Western Roofing would install these wire screens. The screens performed their intended function of keeping the dead pigeons out of the downspouts.
Contrary to Mr. Manson's testimony, Mr. Lanning testified in his deposition that he hired Western Roofing to investigate and solve the leak problem associated with the dead pigeons and that he did not have any discussions with Western Roofing about how to solve the problem. According to Mr. Lanning, he regarded Mr. Manson as his "go-to" roofing expert and Mr. Manson had authority to do whatever roofing work needed to be done as long as the *1145 work was within certain cost restraints. Mr. Lanning testified that the first time he knew Western Roofing installed the screens over the scuppers was when he, Mr. Manson, and Ms. Armstrong were conducting a routine roof inspection several months after Western Roofing installed the screens.
Western Roofing knew the screens could trap debris, but when the screens were originally installed did not inform anyone from CB Richard Ellis that there could be a problem with debris being trapped at the scupper openings. Nevertheless, CB Richard Ellis's on-site maintenance man, Jim Woosley, was required to fill out a weekly checklist to confirm that he completed assigned tasks, one of which was to check the screens for debris. He was not required to do this on a weekly basis, but was expected to do it at least once a month.
In October of 2000, Western Roofing was called to the Schlage Lock building due to a roof leak. An inspection revealed that foreign material was blocking the screens, preventing rainwater drainage. According to Mr. Manson's deposition testimony, at that time Western Roofing told Mr. Woosley that debris on the screens was the cause of the problem.
On May 3, 2001, a thunderstorm deposited a significant period of rainfall on the roof in less than an hour. Mr. Woosley was called by a tenant in another nearby building also managed by CB Richard Ellis. When Mr. Woosley arrived at that nearby building, the roof on the Schlage Lock building had partially collapsed. Mr. Woosley went up on the roof and observed that the downspouts were completely clogged with debris, leaving water standing on the roof. After the collapse, he reported the cause of the downspout blockage as cottonwood seeds that had been blowing through the air during the storm. He reported that he had last inspected the downspouts approximately a week or two prior to the collapse.
The named insured in Lexington's insurance policy was Mid-America, and Lexington is seeking reimbursement from Western Roofing for amounts Lexington paid under the policy to Mid-America. The insurance policy contains the following subrogation clause:
The right of subrogation against the insured, affiliated, subsidiary, and associated companies or corporations, the insured's officers, directors, and employees or any other corporations or companies associated with the insured through ownership or management, and at the option of the insured against a tenant, vendor, supplier, or customer of the insured, is waived.
The subrogation receipt provides:
In consideration of and to the extent of said payment [Mid-America] hereby subrogates [Lexington] to all of the rights, claims and interest which the undersigned may have against any person or corporation liable for the loss mentioned above, and authorizes [Lexington] to sue, compromise or settle in [Mid-America]'s name or otherwise all such claims ....
Based on these facts, Lexington as subrogee for Mid-America asserts claims against Western Roofing for negligence, breach of contract, and breach of express and implied warranty. Western Roofing contends it is entitled to summary judgment on Lexington's negligence claim based on the absence of a legal duty to plaintiff, immunity under the Kansas Products Liability Act ("KPLA"), K.S.A. § 60-3305, and the economic loss doctrine. It contends it is entitled to summary judgment on Lexington's contract and warranty claims on the basis that there is no legal or factual basis for the claims, Lexington is not a third-party beneficiary of the contract *1146 between Western Roofing and CB Richard Ellis, Lexington's claims are barred by the subrogation clause in the insurance policy, and Lexington's claims are barred because Western Roofing is entitled to diminish the damages by the amount Lexington paid Mid-America in insurance proceeds.[3]

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and that it is "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In applying this standard, the court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Spaulding v. United Transp. Union, 279 F.3d 901, 904 (10th Cir.2002). A fact is "material" if, under the applicable substantive law, it is "essential to the proper disposition of the claim." Wright ex rel. Trust Co. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 259 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir.2001) (citing Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir.1998)). An issue of fact is "genuine" if "there is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way." Adler, 144 F.3d at 670 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Spaulding, 279 F.3d at 904 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). In attempting to meet that standard, a movant that does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial need not negate the other party's claim; rather, the movant need simply point out to the court a lack of evidence for the other party on an essential element of that party's claim. Adams v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 233 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir.2000) (citing Adler, 144 F.3d at 671).
Once the movant has met this initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Spaulding, 279 F.3d at 904 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The nonmoving party may not simply rest upon its pleadings to satisfy its burden. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Eck v. Parke, Davis & Co., 256 F.3d 1013, 1017 (10th Cir.2001). Rather, the nonmoving party must "set forth specific facts that would be admissible in evidence in the event of trial from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant." Mitchell v. City of Moore, 218 F.3d 1190, 1197-98 (10th Cir.2000) (quoting Adler, 144 F.3d at 671). To accomplish this, the facts "must be identified by reference to an affidavit, a deposition transcript, or a specific exhibit incorporated therein." Adams, 233 F.3d at 1246.
Finally, the court notes that summary judgment is not a "disfavored procedural shortcut"; rather, it is an important procedure "designed `to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" *1147 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1).

ANALYSIS
For the reasons explained below, the court concludes that Lexington's negligence claim is barred by the economic loss doctrine. Lexington has, however, raised genuine issues of material fact regarding the legal and factual basis for its breach of contract and express and implied warranty claims. Further, it appears that Mid-America was in privity of contract with respect to the Western Roofing/CB Richard Ellis contract, and therefore Lexington as subrogee to Mid-America does not need to rely on a third-party beneficiary theory to pursue its claims against Western Roofing. Western Roofing's argument that the subrogation clause in the insurance policy bars Lexington from pursuing claims against Western Roofing is without merit because no evidence in the record suggests that Mid-America waived its claims against Western Roofing. Lexington's breach of contract claims are not diminished by the insurance benefits Lexington paid to Mid-America because Lexington is pursuing the claims against Western Roofing based on a right of subrogation.

A. Negligence Claim[4]
The Kansas Court of Appeals has adopted the economic loss doctrine. Prendiville v. Contemporary Homes, Inc., 32 Kan.App.2d 435, 83 P.3d 1257, 1259-60 (2004); Northwest Ark. Masonry, Inc. v. Summit Specialty Prods., Inc., 29 Kan.App.2d 735, 741-42, 31 P.3d 982, 986-87 (2001); Jordan v. Case Corp., 26 Kan.App.2d 742, 744, 993 P.2d 650, 652 (1999); Koss Constr. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 25 Kan.App.2d 200, 205-07, 960 P.2d 255, 259-60 (1998).[5] Under this doctrine, a buyer of a defective product is prohibited from suing in tort where the injury consists only of damage to the goods themselves. Koss, 25 Kan.App.2d at 207, 960 P.2d at 260. The economic loss doctrine does not, however, bar recovery for physical damage to "other property." Prendiville, 83 P.3d at 1264; Northwest Ark. Masonry, 29 Kan.App.2d at 741, 31 P.3d at 987. In determining whether the property damage consists of damage to the goods themselves or to "other property," the Kansas Court of Appeals has adopted the integrated system approach set forth in Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 21 cmt. e (1997). Prendiville, 83 P.3d at 1264; Northwest Ark. Masonry, 29 Kan.App.2d at 743-44, 31 P.3d at 988. Under this approach, damage does not constitute damage to "other property" if a defective product is part of an integrated system composed of several component materials that are indistinguishable from the final product. Northwest Ark. Masonry, 29 *1148 Kan.App.2d at 744, 31 P.3d at 988. Thus, the court must define the scope of the "integrated system" of which the wire mesh screens were a part  that is, whether the integrated system consisted, for example, only of the wire mesh screens themselves or whether the integrated system encompassed the entire building.
The Kansas Court of Appeals has adopted a relatively broad view of what constitutes the relevant integrated system for purpose of the economic loss doctrine. In Northwest Arkansas Masonry, the court held that the integrated system of which defective cement powder was a part consisted of the entire masonry wall, and thus the costs to repair and replace the wall were barred by the economic loss doctrine. Id. 29 Kan.App.2d at 744-45, 31 P.3d at 988-89. The court explained that the plaintiff was best situated to assess the risk of economic loss and insure against it, and could have allocated its risk either by contracting with the cement powder supplier or the general contractor. Id. at 744-45, 31 P.3d at 988.
This court applied the Kansas Court of Appeals' holding in Northwest Arkansas Masonry in Full Faith Church of Love West, Inc. v. Hoover Treated Wood Products., Inc., 224 F.Supp.2d 1285, 1289 (D.Kan.2002). In Full Faith Church of Love, this court held that the economic loss doctrine barred a property owner's claim for roof repair damages where the roof truss lumber and plywood sheathing decayed because it was treated with defendant's fire retardant chemical products. Id. at 1290. Although the court declined to dismiss plaintiff's damage claims to repair and replace "other property," it emphasized that it was ruling on the defendant's motion to dismiss and therefore had to assume that the treated wood deterioration caused physical damage to "other property" damaged as a result of the treated wood failure. Id.; see also Prendiville, 83 P.3d at 1261 (emphasizing that it was unclear what the "other property" was in Full Faith because the court was ruling on a motion to dismiss).
Most recently, in Prendiville v. Contemporary Homes, Inc., the Kansas Court of Appeals evaluated the extent of the "other property" exception to the economic loss doctrine in a residential construction defect case. The allegedly defective product at issue in Prendiville was an artificial stucco product that was used for the exterior finish of the house. Id. at 1258. The basement flooded, apparently due to a defect in the stucco, and the homeowner sought damages for replacing windows and the exterior finish. Id. at 1259. The defendant argued the damages sought other than to replace the defective exterior finish were barred by the economic loss doctrine. Id. at 1264. The court applied the integrated system approach and found that the entire house was the integrated system for purposes of the economic loss doctrine. Id. Accordingly, plaintiff's recovery, even for damages other than to replace the allegedly defective exterior finish, was barred by the economic loss doctrine because the plaintiff was not claiming any damages other than to the structure of the house, which did not constitute "other property." Id.
Based on the Kansas case law to date on this issue, the court is persuaded that Kansas courts would similarly take a broad view of what constitutes the relevant product for purposes of the economic loss doctrine in this case. Thus, the court predicts the Kansas Supreme Court would find that the entire Schlage Lock building was the integrated system for which damages are barred by the economic loss doctrine. The wire mesh screens installed by Western Roofing served no purpose other than as a component of the roof drainage system. Indeed, it was precisely because *1149 the roof needed to drain properly that they were installed to prevent pigeons from clogging the downspouts. Thus, the screens became part of an integrated system, i.e., the roof drainage system, which was of course indistinguishable from the rest of the building. The court is mindful that the wire mesh screens were probably minute in size compared to the entire building, but in Northwest Arkansas Masonry, Prendiville, and Full Faith Church of Love, the allegedly defective products were similarly relatively small components that were "simply one ingredient in ... larger, integrated system[s]." Kice Indus. v. AWC Coatings, Inc., 255 F.Supp.2d 1255, 1259 (D.Kan.2003). The economic loss doctrine is designed to preclude plaintiffs from circumventing the law of contracts and seeking to recover in tort for what is in essence a claim for breach of contract. United Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings), Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 1226 (10th Cir.2000). Here, if CB Richard Ellis had wanted assurances regarding the quality of work performed by Western Roofing, these two commercial entities were quite capable of bargaining for express warranties. Whether they in fact did so is not clear from the record. Regardless of whether they did, however, the court will not now referee the terms of their agreement under tort recovery theories. Accordingly, Lexington's negligence claim, which seeks damages for building loss and business interruption, see Pretrial Order (Doc. 46), at 13, is barred by the economic loss doctrine.
The court notes that its conclusion on this issue is consistent with persuasive case law from other federal courts in roof defect cases. In particular, the court notes the thoughtful reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in Mt. Lebanon Personal Care Home, Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 276 F.3d 845 (6th Cir.2002). The defective products at issue in Mt. Lebanon were fire retardant chemicals that were used to treat the lumber in the trusses of a nursing home.[6]Id. at 847. The chemicals weakened the treated lumber, causing structural failures. Id. The Court gave considerable attention to defining the product because "the economic loss rule permits recovery for damages to property other than the product purchased but denies recovery for damages to the product itself." Id. at 849. The plaintiff in Mt. Lebanon argued the relevant product should be defined only to include the treated wood itself, but the Court rejected that contention, explaining that "if we were to hold that [the treated wood] is the product for economic loss rule purposes, nearly any component part would be a product and we would, as a result, effectively eviscerate the distinction between contract and tort law." Id. at 850. In predicting how the Kentucky Supreme Court would resolve the issue, the Court reasoned:
the economic loss rule was established to preserve the border between contract and tort law. Where tort law is well-suited to redressing injuries to persons or property, contract law is well-suited to distributing the risk of economic loss. When parties engage in complex commercial endeavors, we think the Kentucky Supreme Court would seek to preserve their ability to distribute risks via contract and to insure against loss. With this in mind, we predict that the Kentucky Supreme Court would hold that the product for economic loss rule purposes includes the entire unit for which a party to a complex commercial *1150 transaction has the ability to distribute risk by contract and insure against loss. This rule ensures that the parties to complex commercial agreements  and not the courts  will be free to set the terms of their agreements.
Id. at 851. Based on this rationale, the Court concluded that the relevant product for purposes of the economic loss doctrine was the entire nursing home because the plaintiff had the ability to insure against loss with respect to the entire nursing home and/or to negotiate with the defendant for an extended warranty to insure against its risk of loss. Id.; see also, e.g., Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer E., Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 70, 90-93 (D.Mass.1998) (applying the integrated system approach and finding the relevant product for purposes of the economic loss doctrine was the entire building, not the allegedly defective roof insulation).
Accordingly, Western Roofing's motion for summary judgment on Lexington's negligence claim is granted based on the economic loss doctrine.

B. Breach of Contract and Warranty Claims
For the reasons explained below, the court finds Lexington has raised genuine issues of material fact sufficient to withstand Western Roofing's motion for summary judgment on Lexington's breach of contract and warranty claims. Accordingly, Western Roofing's motion for summary judgment on those claims is denied.

1. Nature of the Claims
Western Roofing contends that the only express warranty it ever gave for the roof was when it installed the original roof in 1981, that the work associated with the pigeon problem was not accompanied by any express warranty, and that it did not breach the implied warranty of workmanship because it properly made the roof repairs that CB Richard Ellis hired it to make to resolve the pigeon problem. In response, Lexington argues Western Roofing breached its contractual agreement to properly fix a problem associated with leaks caused by pigeons nesting in the downspouts.
The court's analysis of the merits of Lexington's contract and warranty claims is rendered virtually impossible by the fact that the evidence is unclear regarding the precise nature of the contractual undertaking at issue in this case. On the one hand, Mr. Manson's testimony suggests that Western Roofing was hired specifically to clean out the downspouts and place wire screens over the scuppers, hence Western Roofing did not select the method of resolving the pigeon problem and should not be held responsible for the method selected. Taking all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor, however, as the court must in resolving Western Roofing's motion for summary judgment, Mr. Lanning's testimony suggests that Western Roofing was hired to fix the pigeon problem, in which case Western Roofing's responsibilities would have included selecting and carrying out a method to resolve that problem. The evidence in the record regarding the communications between CB Richard Ellis and Western Roofing is simply too murky for the court to ascertain whether plaintiff's claims are most properly characterized as breach of contract and/or breach of express or implied warranties.
Further, if Western Roofing was in fact contractually obligated to select an appropriate method for resolving the pigeon problem, the record contains issues of material fact regarding whether Western Roofing carried out that contractual undertaking in a proper or workmanlike manner. Certainly, it could be reasonably inferred that Western Roofing should not be held liable because the building was defectively designed in the first instance *1151 because it did not have overflow scuppers as a backup drainage system, that CB Richard Ellis was well aware of the need to keep the screens clear of debris, and that if the wire mesh screens had not been installed the problem with dead pigeon carcasses would have continued to cause other leak problems. On the other hand, though, a rational factfinder could conclude that Western Roofing breached this agreement because it selected a method of solving the pigeon problem that ultimately prevented the roof from draining at all, failed to adequately warn CB Richard Ellis of the importance and degree of vigor needed to keep the wire mesh screens free of debris, and did not adequately take into account as a roofing contractor the obvious fact that the roof did not have a secondary drainage system. Thus, the court is unwilling to rule as a matter of law that Lexington's contract and warranty claims have no legal or factual basis.

2. Plaintiff's Entitlement to Maintain this Action
Western Roofing contends Lexington is not entitled to maintain the contract and warranty claims because Westroads was not an intended third-party beneficiary of the contract between CB Richard Ellis and Western Roofing to fix the pigeon problem. The court disagrees. It appears from the record that CB Richard Ellis entered into the contract with Western Roofing in CB Richard Ellis's capacity as an authorized agent of Mid-America. Although the advisory services agreement states that it is between CB Richard Ellis and Westroads, the Westroads signature block reflects that the agreement was actually signed by Mid-America, which it can be reasonably inferred was acting in its capacity as managing agent for Westroads. Thus, Westroads hired Mid-America to manage the building, Mid-America in turn hired CB Richard Ellis to perform some of the management functions, and CB Richard Ellis was performing those functions when it contracted with Western Roofing to fix the pigeon problem. It is a basic principle of agency law that "[t]he authorized contract of the agent with a third person is the contract of the principal, and the principal may sue thereon, though not named therein, and even though he or she was an undisclosed principal at the time the agent executed the contract." 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § 326, at 693 (2002) (footnotes omitted). Thus, regardless of whether Western Roofing was aware of the existence of the agency relationship between CB Richard Ellis and Mid-America, Western Roofing did in fact contract with Mid-America and Mid-America is in fact entitled to sue Western Roofing on that contract in its capacity as a party to the contract. In other words, there is direct privity of contract between Mid-America and Western Roofing. Accordingly, Mid-America is entitled to maintain an action on that contract. See Stewart v. Mitchell Transp., Inc., 197 F.Supp.2d 1310, 1314 (D.Kan.2002) (plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim if there is privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant on the matter sued on (citing Prof'l Lens Plan, Inc. v. Polaris Leasing Corp., 234 Kan. 742, 745, 675 P.2d 887, 891 (1984))).
Further, Western Roofing misconstrues the nature of Lexington's subrogation rights. Given the terms of the Westroads/Mid-America management agreement, it appears Mid-America was acting as an authorized agent of Westroads by obtaining insurance for the building and settling the property damage claim with plaintiff. Further, the subrogation receipt was signed by the controller of Mid-America. Lexington brings this action as a subrogee of Mid-America, not Westroads. Thus, Lexington stands in the shoes of Mid-America. See Western Motor Co. v. Koehn, 242 Kan. 402, 405, 748 P.2d 851, *1152 853 (1988) ("An insurer claiming the right of subrogation stands in the shoes of its insured ...."). Because plaintiff is subrogated to Mid-America with respect to Mid-America's claims against Western Roofing, and because Mid-America had privity of contract with Western Roofing, Lexington now has privity of contract with Western Roofing. Accordingly, Lexington does not need to resort to relying on a third-party beneficiary theory to maintain this action.

3. Subrogation Clause
Western Roofing also contends the subrogation clause in the insurance policy forbids Lexington from being subrogated to Mid-America with respect to its claim against Midwest Roofing, which was a vendor of CB Richard Ellis. In support of this argument, Western Roofing points to the clause in the insurance policy that states the right of subrogation is waived "at the option of the insured against a ... vendor ... of the insured." Although Western Roofing may be a vendor of the insured (i.e., Mid-America or perhaps more accurately CB Richard Ellis acting in its capacity as an agent of Mid-America), there is no evidence in the record from which it can be reasonably inferred that CB Richard Ellis or Mid-America waived Lexington's right of subrogation against Western Roofing. To the contrary, the subrogation receipt expressly states that Mid-America subrogated Lexington to its rights against "any person or corporation liable for the loss," i.e., Western Roofing. Accordingly, Western Roofing's argument that Mid-America waived Lexington's right of subrogation against Western Roofing is without merit.

4. Effect of Insurance Benefits Paid to Mid-America on Plaintiff's Right of Subrogation
Lastly, the court rejects Western Roofing's final argument citing King Grain Co. v. Caldwell Manufacturing Co., 820 F.Supp. 569 (D.Kan.1993), for the proposition that no damages are recoverable on a fully-insured loss based on breach of contract because the collateral source rule does not apply to breach of contract claims under Kansas law. Western Roofing's logic is as follows: a defendant is entitled to reduce its potential liability in a breach of contract case by the amount the plaintiff received in insurance benefits; therefore the insurance proceeds Lexington paid to Mid-America would bar Mid-America from recovering from Western Roofing; and therefore this same principle operates to defeat recovery by Lexington because Lexington as subrogee stands in the shoes of Mid-America.
The common law collateral source rule provides that "benefits received by the plaintiff from a source wholly independent of and collateral to the wrongdoer will not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer." Rose v. Via Christi Health Sys., Inc., 276 Kan. 539, 544, 78 P.3d 798, 802 (2003) (quotations omitted). The collateral source rule, however, generally does not apply to contract claims. King Grain, 820 F.Supp. at 572; see also 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 394, at 357 (2003). Thus, now that Mid-America has received insurance benefits for its loss, the amount it could recover in a breach of contract claim against Western Roofing would be diminished by the amount it has already received in insurance benefits. This does not, however, mean that Lexington, which as a subrogee stands in the shoes of Mid-America, is likewise prohibited from recovering from Western Roofing.
The very nature of an insurer's subrogation right is that upon paying a loss the insurer is subrogated in a corresponding amount to the insured's right of action against a third person responsible for the loss. See Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, *1153 Couch on Insurance § 222:5, at 222-22 to 222-34; 44A Am.Jur.2d Insurance § 1768, at 239-40 (2003). Thus, because an insured's right of subrogation is triggered upon payment of the loss, the logical corollary to Western Roofing's argument would be that an insured could never be effectively subrogated with respect to an insured's contract claim against a third party. This does nothing to further the purpose of subrogation, which is simply to prevent a double recovery. Deffenbaugh Indus. v. Wilcox, 28 Kan.App.2d 19, 24, 11 P.3d 98, 103 (2000). Here, there is no suggestion that either Lexington or Mid-America will potentially enjoy a windfall double recovery from Western Roofing if Lexington is successful. Further, there is no suggestion that Western Roofing runs the risk of being subject to double liability. To the contrary, Western Roofing will, at most, pay for the loss only once  to Lexington  which will make Lexington whole up to the amount it already paid to Mid-America as a result of the roof collapse. Cf. 16 Russ & Segalla, supra, §§ 223:49, at 223-71 to 223-72 (observing that collateral source statutes do not limit the amount an insurer may recover in a subrogation action absent a showing that the insurer stands to obtain a multiple recovery). Thus, the court is unpersuaded by Western Roofing's argument.
This conclusion is consistent with the holding in the case cited by Western Roofing, King Grain. In King Grain, the plaintiff settled the matter with its insurer for $150,000, then pursued a negligence and breach of contract action against the defendants. 820 F.Supp. at 570-71. The court observed that if plaintiff ultimately proceeded on a breach of contract theory rather than a negligence theory, the defendant could offset plaintiff's recovery by the amount of the insurance payment. Id. at 573. Significantly, though, the plaintiff in King Grain was the insured; the plaintiff was not an insurer pursuing its subrogation rights. Id. (observing the plaintiff's insurer did not claim any subrogation rights with respect to the plaintiff's claim against the defendant). Accordingly, Western Roofing's reliance on King Grain is misplaced and Western Roofing's motion for summary judgment on Lexington's contract and warranty claims is denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Western Roofing's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 44) is granted with respect to Lexington's negligence claim but is denied with respect to Lexington's contract and warranty claims.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED BY THE COURT that Western Roofing's motion to exclude expert testimony (Doc. 45) is hereby set for a hearing by telephone at 9:30 a.m. on Tuesday, May 18, 2004.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED BY THE COURT that this case is set for a limine conference in Courtroom 427 at 1:30 p.m. on Friday, May 28, 2004, and will proceed to trial by a jury beginning at 9:30 a.m. on Tuesday, June 1, 2004.
NOTES
[1]  Western Roofing argues the court should disregard this management agreement because Lexington did not produce it in response to a discovery request from Western Roofing. The court will not consider this argument because it was raised for the first time in Western Roofing's reply brief. See Minshall v. McGraw Hill Broadcasting Co., 323 F.3d 1273, 1288 (10th Cir.2003) (argument raised for the first time in reply brief is waived); Coleman v. B-G Maint. Mgmt., 108 F.3d 1199, 1205 (10th Cir.1997) (issues not raised in the opening brief are deemed abandoned or waived). Moreover, this argument essentially seeks affirmative relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1) and, as such, Western Roofing should have filed a formal motion on this issue.
[2]  Actually, the party to the agreement is CB Commercial Management Services. According to Mr. Lanning's deposition testimony, CB Commercial Management Services was the predecessor in interest to CB Richard Ellis. To avoid any confusion regarding what appears to be a non-issue, the court will refer to CB Commercial Management Services as CB Richard Ellis.
[3]  Western Roofing also raised a variety of other arguments in support of its motion for summary judgment. It appears to the court, however, that all of Western Roofing's arguments other than those listed above are moot given the clarification in Lexington's response memorandum that Lexington is not contending Western Roofing breached an agreement associated with the original roof installation. Rather, Lexington's claims focus only on Western Roofing's work associated with fixing the leak problem caused by pigeons nesting in the downspouts.
[4]  Given the court's conclusion that Lexington's negligence claim is barred by the economic loss doctrine, Western Roofing's arguments that it owed no legal duty to Lexington and that it is immune from liability under the KPLA are moot.
[5]  The Kansas Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether Kansas courts should apply the economic loss doctrine. When presented with a question of Kansas law that the Kansas Supreme Court has not resolved, the court's task is to predict how that court would rule on the issue. Save Palisade FruitLands v. Todd, 279 F.3d 1204, 1207 n. 1 (10th Cir.2002). In carrying out this task, the court must "follow any intermediate state court decision unless other authority convinces [it] that the state supreme court would decide otherwise." Id. Western Roofing has not presented the court with any persuasive reason to believe that the Kansas Supreme Court would reach a decision contrary to that of the Kansas Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the court will follow as Kansas law the Kansas Court of Appeals' decisions regarding the economic loss doctrine, which are notably in line with the majority approach on this issue. Koss Constr., 25 Kan.App.2d at 205, 960 P.2d at 259.
[6]  This very well may have been the same defective product that was at issue in Full Faith Church of Love. Mt. Lebanon, however, is more instructive here because the court in Full Faith Church of Love was not confronted with the issue of defining the contours of the "other property" exception to the economic loss doctrine.


254 B.R. 368 (2000)
In re Crystal G. FRANK, Debtor.
Crystal G. Frank, Plaintiff,
v.
Gulf States Finance Company, Defendant.
Bankruptcy No. 99-35130-H2-13. Adversary No. 99-3710.
United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division.
September 8, 2000.
*369 Johnie J. Patterson, High Point, NC, for Debtor.
William T. Green III, Houston, TX, for Gulf States.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
WESLEY W. STEEN, Bankruptcy Judge.
In this adversary proceeding, Crystal Frank, (the "Debtor"), seeks a judgment for damages (including punitive damages) from Gulf States Finance Company ("Gulf States") for alleged wrongful repossession and sale of her automobile subsequent to dismissal of the bankruptcy case but prior to reinstatement of the case. After trial on the merits, the Court concludes that the repossession and the sale do not violate § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code because the dismissal of a bankruptcy case is effective immediately and terminates the automatic stay upon entry of the order by the clerk. However, Gulf States' action violates state law and constitutes a breach of contract. Therefore, an award of damages is appropriate. However, the court *370 declines to award punitive damages because the Debtor is chargeable with substantial misconduct and because the Court is not convinced that the Debtor has made a reasonable effort to mitigate damages.

JURISDICTION
This is an adversary proceeding, a civil proceeding, arising in a case under title 11 and arising under title 11 of the United States Code. The United States District Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). By Order dated August 9, 1984, under authority granted by 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas referred all such proceedings to the bankruptcy judges for the district. This is a core proceeding as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), (G), and (O). The bankruptcy judge may hear and may determine core proceedings, 28 U.S.C. 157(b)(1). Neither party contests jurisdiction over the subject matter and both consent to entry of a final order by the bankruptcy judge.[1]

FACTS[2]
On March, 17.1999,[3] the Debtor purchased a 1994 Mitsubishi Galant from Charlie Thomas Ford for $7,148.08 (cash price, not including finance charges). The Debtor made a $2,000 down payment and the balance of the purchase price was financed by Gulf States. The Debtor signed a Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Contract[4] which granted Gulf States a security interest in the vehicle, including the usual rights to repossess and to sell the vehicle according to Texas law if the Debtor failed to fulfill her obligations under the contract. The contract required Gulf States to give the Debtor notice of the time and place of a public sale.[5]
About two months later, on May 26, the Debtor filed her chapter 13 petition that initiated this case. When the case was filed, the Court entered a routine Initial Order[6] that required the Debtor, among other things, to file all delinquent tax returns not later than July 26,[7] with a copy of each delinquent return to be provided to IRS Special Procedures (at an address specified in the order) to facilitate quick determination of priority tax claims to be paid under the plan. The order also required the Debtor to provide the chapter 13 trustee with copies of all tax returns filed while the case was pending.
On September 17, 1999, the chapter 13 trustee filed a motion to dismiss the Debtor's bankruptcy case alleging, among other *371 things, that the Debtor had not filed her 1998 income tax return and therefore the trustee could not determine whether the plan met the statutory requirement to provide for payment of all priority tax claims. The Debtor's response, filed September 20, admitted the trustee's allegations.[8]
On October 26, the Court conducted a "chapter 13 panel" at which numerous chapter 13 cases were called for hearing on confirmation, dismissal, etc. According to the minute entry from that date, the chapter 13 trustee reported that the Debtor had still not filed her 1998 return. The case was dismissed by order signed on that date and entered on October 29.
Ten days later, November 8, Gulf States repossessed the vehicle.[9]
The next day, November 9, the Debtor filed an emergency motion to reconsider the dismissal and to reinstate the case. The Debtor asserted that the Court should reconsider the dismissal and should reinstate the case because the Debtor had finally filed her 1998 tax return, but had (by mistake) not complied with the Initial Order requirement to send a copy of the delinquent return to the chapter 13 trustee or to the IRS Special Procedures division. It is not clear when the Debtor filed the 1998 return. Presumably it was filed some time between September 20 and November 9.[10]
On November 10, Debtor's counsel personally notified Gulf States' counsel that a motion to reinstate had been filed.[11] On November 17 Gulf States' counsel was notified that the Court had set an emergency hearing on the motion. The hearing was set for November 23.[12] Neither in these telephone conversations nor by any other means did Gulf States inform Debtor's counsel of the intended imminent sale of the vehicle or of the time or place of the sale.[13]
Gulf States did deposit into the U.S. Mails a written notice of repossession and right of redemption but, as more fully set forth below, the Court concludes that the notice is insufficient to satisfy statutory and contractual requirements. Whether or not the language of the notice was sufficient. Debtor testified that she never received it. Debtor's testimony is corroborated by other evidence, as discussed more fully below, and the Court finds that the Debtor never received the notice because it was not properly addressed.
On November 18, Gulf States sold the vehicle at auction for $1,854.75.[14]
Gulf States did not file any response to the Debtor's motion to reinstate the case and Gulf States did not appear at the hearing to oppose reinstatement or to seek any limitation on the relief sought by the Debtor. In particular, but without limitation, the Court finds that Gulf States was aware of the emergency hearing on reinstatement and that Gulf States did not ask the Court to deny the relief or to limit the relief to avoid prejudice to Gulf States' actions during the period that the dismissal was in effect. It was clear from the tone of Gulf States' presentation at trial that Gulf States rests entirely on its legal analysis (i) that it had no duty to give actual notice of repossession and sale to the Debtor, and (ii) that vacating the order of dismissal would have no effect on transactions *372 occurring prior to vacating the order of dismissal.
At the hearing on November 23, there was no objection to the Debtor's motion to vacate the order of dismissal. The Court granted the motion and signed an order that provides: "ORDERED that the Order of Dismissal entered October 29, 1999, is vacated . . . "[15]

ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT COMBINED WITH CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ANALYSIS
Neither of the parties to this dispute comes across as especially deserving protection in a court of equity.
The Debtor filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy case only two months after purchasing the vehicle that is in dispute here. Although she purchased the vehicle for $7,148 (and financed $6,072 of that amount), Debtor asserted that the vehicle was only worth $4,300 and Debtor's plan only proposed to repay that amount.[16] On the other hand, as discussed more fully below, either through gross negligence or willful misconduct, Gulf States addressed the repossession notice to the Debtor at an incorrect address and never did give the Debtor any notice that Gulf States would sell the vehicle at a public auction. Finally, notwithstanding the fact that the vehicle had been purchased by the Debtor only eight months earlier for $7,148. Gulf States asserts that the auction sale for $1,854.75 was a commercially reasonable transaction.
Continuing to assess the equities of the case, the Court concludes that the Debtor is clearly at fault for dismissal of this case, which dismissal resulted in this dispute. Despite the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code establishing deadlines for filing tax returns, and despite a court order (served three different ways on the Debtor and her counsel), the Debtor failed to file her 1998 federal income tax return until October or shortly thereafter  at least six months late under the Internal Revenue Code and at least four months late based on the Court's Initial Order. In addition, when she finally did file her tax return, she did not comply with the requirements of the Initial Order to serve copies on IRS Special Procedures or on the chapter 13 trustee. The Debtor did not timely file a pleading indicating that the return had been filed and did not appear at the October 26 hearing to inform the Court that the return had been filed. In essence, the ultimate cause of this dispute was Debtor's failing to comply with the specific procedures established by the Court to avoid inefficient case administration.
On the other hand, Gulf States rushed to repossession and to sale without regard for the requirement to send notice to the correct address, without clearly indicating in the notice how and when the collateral would be sold, and without disclosing the imminent sale despite being engaged in direct conversations with Debtor's counsel. After consideration of all of the facts and circumstances, the Court is convinced that Gulf States intentionally violated the contract and the law so that it could sell the vehicle prior to the hearing on reinstatement of the case.
The Debtor is also at fault in causing the events at issue in this case because the Debtor did nothing to reinstate her case between October 26 (when the case was dismissed) and November 8 (when her car was repossessed). Only after the car was repossessed did she file an emergency motion to reinstate and inform the Court, for the first time, that she had finally filed her tax return.
Therefore, while the Court ultimately finds that Gulf States is responsible for damages caused by its breach of contract *373 and law, the Court will not award punitive damages and will not award the full amount of damages requested for loss of wages.

SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS, AND FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Whether notice of repossession and sale were adequate:
First, there is the matter of the address to which the notice of repossession was sent. In the stipulated facts, the parties agreed that a Notice of Repossession and right to Redeem ("Notice") was sent to
   Frank, Crystal
   3418 Summer Tree Drive
   Houston, TX 77241[17]It is clear that this notice was never received by Debtor or by her counsel. Debtor had moved to another address shortly before the repossession of the vehicle.
Gulf States argues that it fulfilled all of the contractual and statutory requirements by sending this notice, regardless of whether the address was correct. Gulf States argues that Debtor specified her address in the Retail Installment Contract and that the Debtor had a duty under the contract to inform Gulf States of any change in her address. This argument is ludicrous. First, the address that Gulf States used is not the address given in the contract. Although it is not clear where Gulf States obtained the address to which the notice was sent, it is clear that the contract was not the source. Therefore, Debtor's failure to update the address is not the source of the error. But even more important, the Debtor did give Gulf States a correct mailing address when she filed her bankruptcy case. In fact, Gulf States addressed mail to her at this address during the course of the case.[18] Yet, when Gulf States sent a notice of repossession, it did not use the correct address that the Debtor provided. Second, the vehicle was repossessed from the Debtor's new address. If Gulf States could find the Debtor to repossess the vehicle, it seems that they could find her address to send her a notice of repossession and sale.
In addition, regardless of what address was put on the notice, it is beyond cavil that the notice does not comply with the contract or with the law. The contract requires notice of the time and place of public sale. The notice contains no such information. The notice required by the contract and by state law is not difficult to give. Gulf States presented no evidence concerning why it did not give proper notice.
The combination of these factors is more than sufficient to convince the Court that Gulf States intentionally failed to give proper notice so that the sale would take place before the hearing on reinstatement of the case. The Court also reaches this conclusion because Gulf States' counsel failed to disclose the proposed sale when *374 personally notified by Debtor's counsel that he had filed a motion to reinstate the bankruptcy case. Gulf States thus avoided a motion by the Debtor for a more expedited hearing. Gulf States does not deny these charges when made by the Debtor. Gulf States rested on its interpretation of the law as not requiring more effective disclosure and not requiring any disclosure whatsoever to Debtor's counsel.
Whether there was a violation of the Bankruptcy Code § 362 stay:
The Debtor argues that the repossession of the vehicle technically violated the automatic stay. Debtor's counsel, in his Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, argues as follows. Bankruptcy Code § 541 included the vehicle as property of the estate. Bankruptcy Code § 362(c)(1) provides that the automatic stay continues, with respect to property of the estate, until the property ceases to be property of the estate. Under FRBP 9001(7), the order dismissing the case was a "judgment." FRBP 9014 and 7062 provide that Rule 62 of the FRCP applies to judgments entered in contested matters. FRCP 62 provides that no action may be taken in enforcement of a judgment for 10 days following its entry. The order dismissing the case was entered October 29, 1999. Repossession occurred November 8, 1999, exactly 10 calendar days later. Therefore, the order dismissing the case was not yet final and repossession was premature.
The authority is almost unanimously to the contrary. An order dismissing a case is not subject to the limitations of FRBP 7062. It is effective immediately upon entry and the stay terminates immediately. Fish Market Nominee Corp. v. Pelofsky, 72 F.3d 4 (1st Cir.1995); In re de Jesus Saez, 721 F.2d 848 (1st Cir.1983), In re Weston, 101 B.R. 202 (Bankr.E.D.Cal. 1989), aff'd, 123 B.R. 466, 1991 WL 7112 (9th Cir. BAP 1991), aff'd, 967 F.2d 596, 1992 WL 151867 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1051, 113 S.Ct. 973, 122 L.Ed.2d 128, (1993); In re Doherty, 229 B.R. 461 (Bankr.E.D.Wash.1999); See also In re Lashley, 825 F.2d 362 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. den. 484 U.S. 1075, 108 S.Ct. 1051, 98 L.Ed.2d 1013, reh'g denied 485 U.S. 1016, 108 S.Ct. 1493, 99 L.Ed.2d 720; In re Thomas, 194 B.R. 641 (Bankr.D.Ariz. 1995). Therefore, Debtor's first argument is rejected.[19]
Second, Debtor argues that even if the preceding reasons were not sufficient, the order of dismissal was vacated. Debtor argues that when the order of dismissal was vacated, all of its consequences (including termination of the automatic stay) were terminated. Therefore, Debtor argues the stay remained in effect because the vehicle remained as property of the estate.
The Court also rejects this argument. Once the stay has terminated, it is not reimposed by reinstating a case, at least not with respect to foreclosure sales that have occurred prior to the reinstatement. See the cases cited above as authority for the proposition that the stay terminates immediately upon dismissal. See also In re Nagel, 245 B.R. 657 (D.Ariz.1999).
There are cases, such as In re Nail, 195 B.R. 922 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.1996) which hold that an order reinstating a case also reinstates the automatic stay with respect to creditor conduct that occurs subsequent to the reinstatement. The Court specifically declines to consider that issue here, and holds merely that even if a case is reinstated, the automatic stay is not retroactively reinstated with respect to creditor conduct that occurred between the dismissal and the reinstatement.
To be complete, it should be apparent that even if the Court were to conclude that Gulf States violated the automatic stay, the Court would not consider these circumstances to be appropriate for the award of punitive damages because the *375 Debtor's own conduct so substantially contributed to the damages.[20]

TEXAS BUSINESS AND COMMERCE CODE
Texas Business and Commerce Code § 9.504(c) requires a secured party to send to the debtor "reasonable notification of the time and place of any public sale." Texas Business and Commerce Code § 9 .507(a) provides that a sale violative of § 9.504 entitles the debtor "to recover from the secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply with the provisions of this subchapter." As noted above, (i) the notice sent by Gulf States was sent to an "old" address, (ii) the Debtor never received the notice because the Debtor had moved to a new address prior to the date that Gulf States sent the notice, (iii) Gulf States did not use the address provided by the Debtor in the contract, (iv) the Debtor gave Gulf States a correct address when the case was filed and Gulf States used the correct address in prior correspondence with the Debtor in the case, but Gulf States ignored the correct address to give the notice of repossession, (v) Gulf States was able to find Debtor's correct address to repossess the car, but apparently was unable to find the correct address to give the notice, and (vi) in conversations with Debtor's counsel, Gulf States intentionally withheld notice that the sale would take place prior to a hearing in this court on reinstatement of the case. Finally, the notice that was actually sent was only a notice of repossession, not a notice of sale, and does not specify the time and place of the public sale.
Even if the Court were incorrect in concluding that Gulf States intentionally failed to give proper notice of the sale of the collateral, it seems exceptionally clear that Gulf States did not comply with the contractual or the statutory requirement to send to the Debtor reasonable notification of the time and place of the public sale.
Amount of Damages
The Debtor testified that she lost her job because she lost her car. She also testified that she has been unable to find a job since November, 1999. The Debtor did not testify concerning what kind of work she does, nor did she testify concerning what efforts she has made to find new work. The Debtor testified that she is unable to find work unless she has a car; but that testimony is simply self-serving, unsubstantiated, and not credible. While it might be true that the Debtor lost a few months work, it is not credible that she has been unable to find work for almost a year because she does not have a car.
Debtor testified that when she was employed she "took home" $1,200 to $1,300 per month. The Court will allow damages equal to 3 months lost income: $3,750. The Court sees insufficient evidence to conclude that the Debtor could not obtain new employment after 3 months. In addition, the Court will disallow any claim in this case asserted by Gulf States.[21] Finally, the Court will allow attorney's fees in the amount of $ 7,213.35.[22]
NOTES
[1]  Joint Pretrial Statement paragraph 2.
[2]  The findings of fact include judicial notice of the prior hearings and pleadings in this case.
[3]  All dates below, unless otherwise indicated, are in calendar year 1999. Therefore the year will not be repeated.
[4]  Gulf States Exhibit 1.
[5]  See Gulf States Exhibit 1 and the Admissions of Fact in the Joint Pretrial Statement. Hereafter, the Admissions of Fact in the Joint Pretrial Statement will be referred to as "Stipulated Fact ". The Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Contract states, in enumerating the repossession rights: "In the event of repossession of the described vehicle, Seller (Holder) will give Buyer reasonable notice of the time and place of any public sale thereof or of the date after which any private sale may be held or any other intended disposition thereof is to be made."
[6]  Docket # 4. The Initial Order states: "One of the most frequent problems (resulting in delays, additional expense and waste of judicial resources) in chapter 13 cases is the failure to file tax returns timely." The order then goes on (i) to require the filing of delinquent returns within 60 days (with a copy to be provided to IRS Special Procedures  at an address specified in the order  to facilitate determination of delinquent taxes), and (ii) to require that the Debtor file all post-bankruptcy returns timely at the usual address for filing such returns. A copy of the Initial Order was handed to the person filing the bankruptcy petition, a copy was mailed to Debtor's counsel, and a copy was mailed to the Debtor. See Docket # 4.
[7]  I.e. within 60 days after the bankruptcy case was filed.
[8]  Docket # 11. The Debtor had earlier (August 27, 1999) filed an affidavit  docket # 8  stating that she was not required to file tax returns for 1996 or 1997. The Debtor did not deny that she was required to file a return for 1998 and did not, at that time, file the return.
[9]  Stipulated Fact (G).
[10]  Debtor's answer to the Trustee's motion admits that the return had not been filed as of October 20. The November 9 emergency motion states that the return had been filed.
[11]  Stipulated Fact (J).
[12]  Stipulated Fact (L).
[13]  Stipulated Face (N).
[14]  Stipulated Fact (M).
[15]  Docket # 20.
[16]  A $2,000 decline in value over 60 days is questionable under the principles established in Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 117 S.Ct. 1879, 138 L.Ed.2d 148 (1997).
[17]  At trial, it became apparent that Debtor never had any connection with that address. Then Gulf States' counsel argued that he had made a mistake and that the notice was actually sent to
   Frank, Crystal
   8418 Summer Tree Drive
   Houston, TX 77241. [Emphasis Supplied.]

The Court has looked carefully at Exhibit 2. Although it is possible, as counsel argues, that it is simply a bad copy, the Court is not convinced. The second "8" in the address is clear. Based on the evidence introduced at trial, the Court believes that the notice was not addressed properly, or if it was, the address was so difficult to make out that it is probable that it was not delivered to the right address. The illegible address is attributable to Gulf States. At any rate, as indicated above, the Court definitively finds that Gulf States recklessly or willfully ignored Debtor's correct address and that neither the Debtor nor her counsel received the notice.
[18]  Debtor's testimony. See also docket # 6 in this case, Gulf States' counsel's notice of appearance and request for notices. Gulf States' counsel served that notice on Debtor at her proper post office address.
[19]  See also 10 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 7062.02 (rev. 15th ed. 1999).
[20]  Bankruptcy Code § 362(h) provides that an individual injured by a willful violation of the automatic stay may recover punitive damages "in appropriate circumstances." The Court does not consider this to be "appropriate circumstances."
[21]  Bankruptcy Code § 502(j).
[22]  Fees accrued pre-trial of $6,763.35 and $450 allowed for 2 hours at trial.


803 F.2d 715
*U.S.v.Westbrook
86-4237
United States Court of Appeals,Fifth Circuit.
10/15/86

1
N.D.Miss.

AFFIRMED

2
---------------

* Fed.R.App.P. 34(a);  5th Cir.R. 34.2.


361 F.3d 1263
Susan BOSWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.SKYWEST AIRLINES, INC., a Utah corporation, Defendant-Appellee.United States Department of Transportation, Amicus Curiae.
No. 02-4188.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
March 15, 2004.

Robert B. Denton, The Disability Law Center, Salt Lake City, Utah (John Pace and Sonia K. Sweeney with him on the brief), for the Plaintiff-Appellant.
Heidi E.C. Leithead, of Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless, Salt Lake City, Utah, for the Defendant-Appellee.
Rosalind A. Knapp, Deputy General Counsel, Paul M. Geier, Assistant General Counsel for Litigation, Samuel Podberesky, Assistant General Counsel for Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings of the United States Department of Transportation, and R. Alexander Acosta, Assistant Attorney General, and Mark L. Gross and Karl N. Gellert, Attorneys for the United States Department of Justice, filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the United States Department of Transportation for the Appellee.
Before SEYMOUR, HENRY, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
HENRY, Circuit Judge.

1
Susan Boswell filed this action against Skywest Airlines, Inc., seeking an injunction requiring Skywest to provide medical oxygen for her on flights from St George to Salt Lake City, Utah. Ms. Boswell asserted claims under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA), 49 U.S.C. § 41705. The district court granted summary judgment to Skywest, reasoning that: (1) the Rehabilitation Act did not apply to Skywest's flights from St. George to Salt Lake City because Skywest does not receive federal financial assistance for this flight, and (2) the ACAA and accompanying Department of Transportation regulations vest airlines with the discretion to provide medical oxygen but do not require airlines to do so. Boswell v. SkyWest Airlines, Inc., 217 F.Supp.2d 1212, 1214-24 (D.Utah 2002).

2
Ms. Boswell appeals only the district court's resolution of her ACAA claim. She argues that the statute and accompanying regulations require air carriers to provide medical oxygen unless they can demonstrate "an undue burden" or a "fundamental[] alter[ation] of their program." 14 C.F.R. § 382.7(c).

3
After reviewing the parties' supplemental briefs and an amicus curiae brief from the United States Department of Transportation, we conclude that ACAA establishes certain administrative remedies but not a private right of action. We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Skywest and against Ms. Boswell on her ACAA claim on this alternative ground and do not address the other arguments made by the parties and the Department of Transportation.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

4
Ms. Boswell has a lung disease that affects her breathing. In June 2000, her physician prescribed medical oxygen. For a few months, she was able to breath for an hour or two at a time without supplemental oxygen. However, in August 2000, her physician advised her to use oxygen continuously.

5
As a member of the Utah State Advisory Council for the Division of Services for the Blind and Visually Impaired, Ms. Boswell was required to fly the Skywest route between St. George, Utah and Salt Lake City. She requested Skywest to provide medical oxygen during the flights, but Skywest has refused. As a result, Ms. Boswell maintains, she surrendered her board position.

6
Ms. Boswell then filed this action in the district court, alleging a violation of the ACAA and the Rehabilitation Act. She requested the district court to order Skywest to provide medical oxygen to her unless it could show that the provision of oxygen would constitute an undue burden or would fundamentally alter its operations. See 14 C.F.R § 382.7(c).

7
Skywest moved for summary judgment on both claims. As to the Rehabilitation Act, Skywest argued that because the airline did not receive federal financial assistance either for the Salt Lake City — St. George route in particular or for its operations "as a whole," see 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(3)(A), the statute did not apply to the failure to provide medical oxygen. As to the ACAA, Skywest argued that the statute and accompanying regulations vest airlines with discretion to provide medical oxygen to passengers but do not require them to do so absent a showing of undue hardship.

8
In a well-crafted opinion, the district court agreed with both arguments, and granted summary judgment to Skywest. See Boswell, 217 F.Supp.2d at 1214-24. The court acknowledged that "it [was] not unsympathetic to Ms. Bowell's situation," id. at 1223, and accepted her statements that the denial of her request caused serious difficulties for her. Nevertheless, the court stated, the provision of oxygen raised legitimate concerns, and the balancing of those concerns with the requests of passengers like Ms. Boswell was "better addressed by regulatory agencies than by judicial interpretation of vague regulatory provisions." Id. at 1224.

II. DISCUSSION

9
In this appeal, Ms. Boswell challenges only the district court's grant of summary judgment on her ACAA claim. In addressing that claim, the parties — like the district court — presumed that Ms. Boswell could assert a private cause of action under the ACAA. That presumption was supported by two circuit court decisions. See Shinault v. Am. Airlines, 936 F.2d 796, 800 (5th Cir.1991) and Tallarico v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 881 F.2d 566, 570 (8th Cir.1989).1 However, after the district court granted summary judgment to Skywest, the Eleventh Circuit reached a contrary conclusion. See Love v. Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 1347, 1356 (11th Cir.2002). We then asked the parties and the United States Department of Transportation to file supplemental briefs regarding the existence of a private right of action under the ACAA.

10
In her supplemental brief, Ms. Boswell urges us to: (1) follow the reasoning of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits and hold that the ACAA creates a private right of action and then (2) interpret the ACAA and accompanying regulations to require Skywest to provide her with medical oxygen unless the airline can demonstrate that it would suffer an undue hardship or a fundamental alteration of its operations. Skywest responds that the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Love is correct and that we should follow it here by holding that the ACAA does not create a private right of action.

11
We may affirm the district court's decision "on any grounds for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon by the district court." Lambertsen v. Utah Dep't of Corr., 79 F.3d 1024, 1029 (10th Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Upon review of the ACAA, accompanying regulations, and applicable case law, we hold that the ACAA does not establish a private right of action. Accordingly, Ms. Boswell may not sue Skywest for the alleged violation of the statute. Instead, she must pursue the remedies established by Congress and the Secretary of Transportation.

12
In reaching this conclusion, we begin our analysis with the case law concerning private rights of action. We then proceed to the text of the ACAA and the arguments advanced by the parties.

A. Private Rights of Action

13
The test for determining whether a statute creates a private right of action has evolved substantially over the last thirty years. Supreme Court cases decided early in this period focused on Congressional purpose. See., e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433, 84 S.Ct. 1555, 12 L.Ed.2d 423 (1964) (stating that "under the circumstances here it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose" and concluding that sections 14(a) and 27 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77n(a), 77aa, authorized a federal cause for rescission or damages to a stockholder). Subsequently, the Court formulated a four-part inquiry, asking whether: (1) the plaintiff is part of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted; (2) there is any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create or to deny a private right of action; (3) it would be consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme to imply a private right of action for the plaintiff; and (4) the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); see also Southwest Air Ambulance, Inc. v. City of Las Cruces, 268 F.3d 1162, 1169 (10th Cir.2001) (discussing Cort).

14
Later Supreme Court decisions have shifted the inquiry again. Now, "Cort's four factors have been effectively condensed into one — whether Congress expressly or by implication, intended to create a private cause of action." Sonnenfeld v. City & County of Denver, 100 F.3d 744, 747 (10th Cir.1996) (citing Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16, 100 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979) and Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979)). Thus, in its recent decisions, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the private right of action inquiry focuses on the Congressional intent underlying the particular statute at issue:

15
Like substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress. The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy. Statutory intent on this latter point is determinative. Without it, a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute. Raising up causes of action where a statute has not created them may be a proper function for common-law courts, but not for federal tribunals.

16
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This circuit's decisions have emphasized that Congressional intent is determinative. See, e.g, Davis-Warren Auctioneers, J.V. v. FDIC, 215 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir.2000) ("To decide whether a private right of action is implicit in a statute, we must determine `whether Congress', expressly or by implication, intended to create a private cause of action.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Chemical Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 111 F.3d 1485, 1493 (10th Cir.1997) ("In determining whether an implied private right of action exists under a particular statute, the focus is solely on congressional intent.").

17
In determining Congressional intent under this newer standard, we examine the statute for "rights-creating language," Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288, 121 S.Ct. 1511, — that which "explicitly confer[s] a right directly on a class of persons that include[s] the plaintiff." Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690 n. 13, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), and language identifying "the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted," id. at 688 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. 1946 (internal quotation marks omitted). We also consider the relation between the specific provision at issue and the related statutory scheme. Love, 310 F.3d at 1353; see, e.g., Southwest Air, 268 F.3d at 1170 (examining the general regulatory structure of the Federal Aviation Act, 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101 et seq, in determining that the Anti-Head Tax Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40116, does not create a private cause of action); Chemical Weapons, 111 F.3d at 1494 (examining the "general regulatory scheme, comprised in this instance in by the myriad of environmental statutes that regulate the Army's operations [at the facility at issue]" in concluding that the 1986 Defense Authorization Act did not establish a private cause of action). We now apply these principles to the ACAA.

B. The ACAA

18
Congress passed the ACAA in 1986 as § 404(c) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. See Pub.L. 99-435, § 2(a), 100 Stat. 1080 (1986). The statute was amended and recodified in 1994. In 2000, Congress added two subsections concerning the manner in which the statute may be enforced. See Love, 310 F.3d at 1350 n. 1 (discussing the legislative history of the ACAA).

Currently, the ACAA provides:

19
In general. — In providing air transportation, an air carrier, including (subject to section 40105(b)) any foreign air carrier, may not discriminate against an otherwise qualified individual on the following grounds:

20
(1) the individual has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

21
(2) the individual has a record of such an impairment.

22
(3) the individual is regarded as having such an impairment.

23
49 U.S.C. § 41705(a). The remaining sections of the ACAA provide that each violation of the statute constitutes a separate offense and that the Secretary of Transportation "shall investigate each complaint of a violation [of the ACAA]." 49 U.S.C. § 41705(b)-(c).

24
Congress passed the ACAA in response to a Supreme Court decision, United States Department of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 477 U.S. 597, 106 S.Ct. 2705, 91 L.Ed.2d 494 (1986), which held that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act did not apply to commercial airlines because they were not the intended beneficiaries of federal airport construction grants. See generally Curtis D. Edmonds, When Pigs Fly: Litigation Under the Air Carrier Access Act, 78 N.D. L.Rev. 687, 689-92 (2002) (discussing legislative history of the ACAA). "[T]he practical effect of DOT v. PVA [was] to leave handicapped air travelers subject to the possibility of discriminatory, inconsistent, and unpredictable treatment on the part of air carriers." S.REP. No. 99-0400, at 2 (1986), reprinted in, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2328, 2329. The statute was intended to "prohibit specifically discrimination against otherwise qualified handicapped individuals." Id. at 2330.

25
The ACAA is part of a broad statutory and regulatory scheme concerning aviation programs. As we note below, there are a number of provisions that apply to the ACAA, including those relating to the investigation of complaints, the conduct of administration hearings, the imposition of fines and other administration sanctions, and the appeal of administrative decisions to the courts.

C. The Parties' Arguments

26
In arguing that the ACAA creates a private right of action, Ms. Boswell contends that the statute contains rights-creating language: an air carrier "may not discriminate." Aplt's Suppl. Br. at 4 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 41705(a)). She contends that "the focus of the statute is on the individual with the disability." Id. According to Ms. Boswell, the existence of such language is determinative. See id. at 4-5.

27
Ms. Boswell further contends that the administrative remedies available to enforce the ACAA do not undermine this reading of the statute. She points to certain limitations in those remedies, noting that the Secretary of Transportation retains discretion not to investigate complaints if they are not supported by reasonable grounds, and that the right to appeal is limited because of the deference that must be afforded to the Secretary's findings of fact.

28
Ms. Boswell's reading of the statute resembles the interpretation of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits in decisions issued before the Supreme Court's shift away from the four-factor Cort inquiry. See Shinault, 936 F.2d at 801-05; Tallarico, 881 F.2d at 568-570. Thus, in Shinault, the court invoked "the well-established canon of statutory construction that `[t]he existence of a statutory right implies the existence of all necessary and appropriate remedies.'" Shinault, 936 F.2d at 804 (quoting Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239, 90 S.Ct. 400, 24 L.Ed.2d 386 (1969)). In Tallarico, the court undertook the four-part Cort inquiry, 881 F.2d at 569-70, concluding that "to allow a private cause of action is consistent with the underlying purposes of the ACAA." Id. at 570. As the Eleventh Circuit noted in Love, that focus on the broad remedial purpose underlying a statute — to the exclusion of its text and its place in the legislative scheme at issue — is no longer warranted. See Love, 310 F.3d at 1359-60 (noting that Shinault and Tallarico were based on an analysis of the Cort factors and that following the shift away from Cort "we may not engage in a similarly wide-ranging interpretative inquiry"); see also Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287-91, 121 S.Ct. at 1520-22 (considering the "text and structure" of Title VI in concluding that no private right of action exists to enforce disparate impact regulations).

29
As Skywest notes, Ms. Boswell's reading of the ACAA is undermined by the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Love. There, applying the post-Cort standard that this circuit has also applied, see e.g, Southwest Air, 268 F.3d at 1169-72, the court held that the ACAA does not create a private right of action. In support of this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit first noted that the statute does not expressly provide for a private right of action. "Moreover, taken together, the text of the ACAA itself... and the surrounding statutory and regulatory structure create an elaborate and comprehensive enforcement scheme that belies any congressional intent to create.... a private right to sue in a federal district court." Love, 310 F.3d at 1354.

30
We agree with the Eleventh Circuit. "The express provision of one method of enforcing a substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude others." Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 290, 121 S.Ct. 1511. Here, Congress established an administrative enforcement scheme for violations of the ACAA, authorizing individuals (like Ms. Boswell) who allege ACAA violations to file complaints with the Secretary of Transportation and to appeal the Secretary of Transportation's orders to the courts of appeal.

31
In particular, under 49 U.S.C. § 46101(a)(1), "[a] person may file a complaint in writing with the Secretary of Transportation ... about a person violating" the ACAA. After notice and an opportunity for a hearing, the Department of Transportation may enter an order compelling compliance with the ACAA, see 49 U.S.C. § 46101(a)(4), may revoke a carrier's air carrier certificate, see 49 U.S.C. § 41110(a)(2)(B), and may impose up to a $10,000 fine for each violation, see 49 U.S.C. § 46301(a)(3)(E). The Department of Transportation may also initiate an action in a federal district court to enforce the ACAA, see 49 U.S.C. § 46106, or may ask the Department of Justice to bring a civil action, see 49 U.S.C. § 46107(b)(1).

32
Under this statutory scheme, "a person disclosing a substantial interest in an order issued by the Secretary of Transportation... may apply for review of the order by filing a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or in the court of appeals of the United States for the circuit in which the person resides or has its principal place of business." 49 U.S.C. 46110(a). The court of appeals "has exclusive jurisdiction to affirm, amend, modify, or set aside any part of the [Transportation Secretary's] order and may order the Secretary, Under Secretary, or Administrator to conduct further proceedings." 49 U.S.C. § 46110(c). The court of appeals may also "grant interim relief by staying the order or taking other appropriate action when good cause for its action exists." Id. In these appeals, "[f]indings of fact by the Secretary, Under Secretary, or Administrator, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive." 49 U.S.C. § 46109(c).2

33
As Ms. Boswell argues, the remedies provided by Congress are not without limitation (such as the discretion afforded the Secretary to investigate only those complaints supported by "a reasonable ground," 49 U.S.C. § 46101(a), and deferential standard of appellate review that affords preclusive effect to those factual findings of the Secretary of Transportation that are supported by substantial evidence, 49 U.S.C. § 46110(c)). Thus, as she further argues, a private right of action may well afford a given individual more comprehensive relief for an ACAA violation. However, the choice as to which remedies are appropriate is for Congress rather than the courts. We are simply not authorized to compare the remedies specifically provided by Congress with a private right of action and to then impose the latter remedy if we deem it a better means of enforcing the statute. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286-87, 121 S.Ct. 1511 ("Without [Congressional intent to create a private remedy], a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter or how compatible with the statute."). Here, Congress's creation of specific means of enforcing the statute indicates that it did not intend to allow an additional remedy — a private right of action — that it did not expressly mention at all.

34
That conclusion comports with our decision Southwest Air, 268 F.3d at 1169-72. There, we held that the Anti-Head Tax Act (AHTA), 49 U.S.C. § 49116, does not provide a private right of action. We relied upon a general provision of the Federal Aviation Act that allowed those parties alleging violations of the statute to file complaints with the Secretary of Transportation. See id. at 1170 ("We are persuaded that the fact that Congress provided a means by which violations of the AHTA are fully enforceable through a general regulatory scheme indicates that the weight of the evidence of Congressional intent is against the suggestion that Congress intended to create a private right of action in the AHTA.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Significantly, we noted that two other circuits had held that a private right of action did exist. However, we observed, those courts had undertaken the superseded Cort inquiry. See id. at 1170-72.

35
Like the district court, we are sympathetic to Ms. Boswell's difficulties. The claim she asserts here presents a difficult question of balancing her right to be free from discrimination with Skywest's safety concerns about providing medical oxygen to passengers. However, this difficult question must be resolved by the means provided by statute.

III. CONCLUSION

36
For the reasons set forth above, we therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Skywest on the alternative ground that the ACAA does not establish a private right of action.

Notes:

1
 The Ninth Circuit has overturned the grant of summary judgment to a defendant airline on a private cause of action brought under the ACAA without expressly addressing the question of whether Congress authorized such a cause of actionSee Newman v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 176 F.3d 1128, 1131-32 (9th Cir.1999). The D.C. and Sixth Circuits have expressly reserved the question. See Tunison v. Cont'l Airlines Corp., 162 F.3d 1187, 1188 n. 1 (D.C.Cir.1998) ("This court has not previously addressed whether there is an implied private right of action under the ACAA, and the issue is not before us in this case. The court below `presumed' there was a private right of action under the ACAA given holdings to that effect in the 5th and 8th Circuits and [the defendant airline's failure to argue to the contrary].") (citing Shinault 936 F.2d at 800, and Tallarico, 881 F.2d at 570); Bower v. Fed. Express Corp., 96 F.3d 200, 204 n. 9 (6th Cir.1996) ("We do not address the question of whether a private right of action exists under the ACAA."); see generally Love v. Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 1347, 1359 n. 14 (11th Cir.2002) (collecting cases).

2
 Department of Transportation regulations also require airlines to establish procedures to resolve disputes regarding alleged ACAA violationsSee 14 C.F.R. § 382.65; see also Love, 310 F.3d at 1355 (discussing Department of Transportation regulations). In particular, airlines must "establish and implement a complaint resolution mechanism, including designating one or more complaints resolution official(s) ... to be available at each airport which the carrier serves." 14 C.F.R. § 382.65(a). Airlines must also "establish a procedure for resolving written complaints." 14 C.F.R. § 382.65(b).