784 N.W.2d 886 (2010)
280 Neb. 163
Robert A. STRAUB, appellee,
v.
CITY OF SCOTTSBLUFF, a political subdivision, and League Association of Risk Management, appellants.
No. S-09-1121.
Supreme Court of Nebraska.
July 2, 2010.
*887 John W. Iliff and Jessica S. Wolff, of Gross & Welch, P.C., L.L.O., Omaha, for appellants.
Kristine R. Cecava, Sidney, and Michael J. Javoronok, Scottsbluff, of Javoronok & Neilan, for appellee.
*888 HEAVICAN, C.J., WRIGHT, CONNOLLY, GERRARD, STEPHAN, McCORMACK, and MILLER-LERMAN, JJ.
HEAVICAN, C.J.

INTRODUCTION
The City of Scottsbluff and the League Association of Risk Management (collectively appellants) appeal the decision of the three-judge panel of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court, affirming the trial court's award. The trial court awarded Robert A. Straub the maximum weekly wage of $600 for 1 3/7 weeks of total temporary disability and $229.21 for 298 4/7 weeks for a 35-percent loss of earning power.

BACKGROUND
Straub is a sergeant with the Scottsbluff Police Department and was employed in that capacity when he suffered injuries as a result of two accidents within a 6-week period of time. The first accident occurred on June 25, 2006, when Straub was struck by a passing vehicle during a routine traffic stop. Straub recorded the traffic stop, and the recorded video was made part of the record as a DVD. From the DVD, it appears as though Straub was struck in his left hip by the side mirror of the passing vehicle. He also suffered a puncture wound to his lower leg. Straub stated that he did not know how his lower leg was punctured, but that it happened during the accident.
After the accident, Straub went to a hospital emergency room and stated that he was hurting "from [his] hips to [his] toes." The doctor who treated him recommended that Straub use ice and follow up as soon as possible with an orthopedist. The accident resulted in a fractured left iliac wing and lower back complaints with associated soft tissue injuries. Straub's chosen orthopedist recommended that Straub take some time off of work. Straub testified that he had begun taking days off at the time of the incident and had returned to work on Wednesday, June 28, 2006. Straub testified that he continued to have pain in his hip, lower back, and midback, and pain and numbness in his legs.
Straub further testified that he continued to have pain and that his orthopedist ordered an MRI. On August 7, 2006, while on his way to a hospital for the MRI, Straub's vehicle was hit by another vehicle. Straub had taken the day off from work and had taken his children to a babysitter's house. The accident occurred between the babysitter's house and the hospital. Straub testified that the impact occurred on the driver's side and that he was thrown forward in the vehicle. Straub testified that his chest, back, and neck ached immediately after the accident and that he later developed shoulder pain. Straub stated that he had braced himself against the vehicle's dashboard on impact and that he believed that was how his shoulder had been injured.
The Workers' Compensation Court found that both accidents were work related and compensable. Specifically, the trial court, citing Larson's Workers' Compensation Law,[1] determined that the car accident was compensable because Straub was on his way to a doctor's appointment due to injuries received during the first work-related incident. The trial court did not find sufficient evidence that Straub's shoulder injuries stemmed from a work-related accident, but did find sufficient evidence that his left hip, lower back, and left lower leg were injured. The trial court found that Straub had a 35-percent loss of earning power as a result of the accidents. The trial court then awarded $600 to Straub for 1 3/7 weeks for total temporary *889 disability and $229.21 per week for 298 4/7 weeks for a 35-percent loss of earning power. Appellants were also ordered to pay medical expenses for or on behalf of Straub, or to reimburse Straub or his health care provider.
Appellants appealed the decision of the trial court, and the three-judge panel of the Workers' Compensation Court issued an order of affirmance on review. Appellants appeal from that order, and we affirm the award.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Appellants assign, restated and consolidated, that the trial court erred in determining that (1) the accident on August 7, 2006, occurred within the scope and course of Straub's employment, (2) Straub had a 35-percent loss of earning capacity, and (3) the DVD of the first accident shows that Straub's left hip was injured.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appellate review, the factual findings made by the trial judge of the Workers' Compensation Court have the effect of a jury verdict and will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong.[2]
In workers' compensation cases, an appellate court is obligated to make its own determinations regarding questions of law.[3]

ANALYSIS

STRAUB'S INJURIES on AUGUST 7, 2006, WERE COMPENSABLE
Appellants first argue that Straub's injuries on August 7, 2006, were not compensable injuries because they did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. The record indicates that after Straub's first accident, his orthopedist ordered an MRI to be administered at a Scottsbluff hospital. Straub was not working on the day of the appointment, and he drove from his house to the babysitter's house to drop off his children before driving to the hospital. The second accident occurred on the way to the hospital from the babysitter's house.
The trial court cited Kraus v. Jones Automotive, Inc.,[4] for the proposition that a trip serving a dual purpose was still compensable under certain circumstances. The dual purpose rule provides:
[I]f an employee is injured in an accident while on a trip which serves both a business and a personal purpose, the injuries are compensable as arising out of the course and scope of employment provided the trip involves some service to be performed on the employer's behalf which would have occasioned the trip, even if it had not coincided with the personal journey.[5]
In Kraus, the Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff who had been on a business trip from Omaha, Nebraska, to Lincoln, Nebraska, was acting within the course and scope of his employment even though he had embarked on a private errand. The record demonstrated that the plaintiff had driven from Lincoln toward Grand Island, Nebraska, on a personal errand, but had turned around and was returning to Omaha when he was killed in a one-vehicle accident.[6]
*890 The trial court also cited Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 10.07, "Accident During Trip to Doctor's Office,"[7] which states that an accident occurring on a trip to a doctor's office or a place of testing ordered by the doctor is generally compensable if the original injury was also compensable. The trial court also pointed out that the Workers' Compensation Court routinely orders payment for mileage to and from doctor's visits and testing.
We have specifically declined to address this issue in the past.[8] And while some courts have rejected the rule found in Professor Larson's treatise,[9] other courts have allowed workers to recover for injuries sustained on the way to a medical appointment for a compensable injury.[10] We find Taylor v. Centex Construction Co.[11] particularly persuasive in this case.
In Taylor, the employee sustained an eye injury in the course of his employment. He was granted leave to go to the doctor. After the doctor's appointment, the employee stopped for lunch and to have the company truck serviced, and he then proceeded to drive back to work. While driving back to his jobsite, the employee was involved in a car accident and was injured. The employer argued that the second injury was not compensable, because it did not arise out of or in the scope of his employment and because he deviated from the most direct route back to work.[12]
The Kansas court found that because the workers' compensation statute required employees to undergo medical treatment for work-related injuries, an injury sustained on the way to such medical treatment occurred in the course and scope of his employment.[13] The court also found that there was nothing in the workers' compensation statute that required the employee to take the most direct route between the doctor's office and his place of employment, but only that the route selected be reasonable and practical, and one that would not materially delay the employee's return to work.[14]
The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, like the statutory scheme in Taylor, provides that if an employee fails to avail himself or herself of medical or surgical treatment, he or she can lose those benefits.[15] We have also allowed compensation for travel to and from necessary medical services in the past.[16] We find that an employee's injury which occurs en route to a required medical appointment that is related to a compensable *891 injury is also compensable, as long as the chosen route is reasonable and practical.
Having determined that an injury sustained on the way to a doctor's appointment is compensable, we apply the rule in Kraus[17] and Jacobs v. Consolidated Tel. Co.[18] Under our dual purpose rule, an injury arising out of a trip with both a business and a personal purpose is compensable if the trip was occasioned by a business purpose. We find that an employee who is injured while en route to a medical appointment for a covered injury is acting within the course and scope of his or her employment, as long as the route taken is reasonable and practical.[19] Much like in Kraus, Straub had completed his personal errand of dropping off his children at the babysitter's house and was continuing on the business errand of attending his medical appointment.
We therefore find appellants' first assignment of error to be without merit.

TRIAL COURT WAS NOT CLEARLY WRONG IN DETERMINING THAT STRAUB HAD 35-PERCENT LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY
Appellants next argue that Straub did not present sufficient evidence that he sustained a 35-percent loss of earning capacity. We note first that upon appellate review, the findings of fact made by the trial judge of the compensation court have the effect of a jury verdict and will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong.[20] In testing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of fact by the Workers' Compensation Court, the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the successful party, every controverted fact must be resolved in favor of the successful party, and the successful party will have the benefit of every inference that is reasonably deducible from the evidence.[21]
The basis for the trial court's decision that Straub had a 35-percent loss of earning power was the report of the court-appointed vocational case manager. Under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-162.01(3) (Cum. Supp.2008), a court-appointed vocational case manager's opinion is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of correctness. The trial court also considered a rebuttal report.
The court-appointed vocational case manager's report stated that Straub was limited to "`Light'" physical activity, which represented a loss of earning capacity. That report estimated Straub's loss of earning power at 46 percent, including his shoulder injuries. The rebuttal report listed Straub's loss of earning capacity as somewhere between 0 and 15 percent, and placed him in the "Medium" range of physical capabilities.
The trial court determined that the court-appointed vocational case manager's report was rebutted in part, specifically as to the shoulder injuries and overhead reaching. The trial court concluded that considering the orthopedist's reports and the reports of the vocational counselors, Straub suffered a 35-percent loss of earning capacity. Appellants essentially argue that the court-appointed vocational case manager's report was not competent, and they argue that the trial court should not have given that report the weight that it did.
We note, however, that both the rebuttal report and the court-appointed vocational case manager's report state that Straub *892 has some restrictions due to his injuries. The trial court in its order recognized both reports and the differences between them and stated that it had considered both reports when making its decision. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court's decision was clearly wrong.
In conjunction with its assertion that the court-appointed vocational case manager's report was not credible, appellants also argue that Straub has not sufficiently demonstrated a loss of earning capacity, because Straub continues to work for the Scottsbluff Police Department and because his wages have increased. Appellants also argue that because Straub is a statutory civil service employee, he cannot suffer a loss of earning capacity.
In Davis v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,[22] however, we stated:
Earning power, as used in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-121(2), is not synonymous with wages, but includes eligibility to procure employment generally, ability to hold a job obtained, and capacity to perform the tasks of the work, as well as the ability of the worker to earn wages in the employment in which he or she is engaged or for which he or she is fitted.
We continued:
Thus, the mere fact that after an injury, the employee receives, or is offered, his or her former wages, or a larger sum, does not necessarily preclude recovery of compensation under the workers' compensation statutes.... The fact that an employee is still employed and still paid the same or better does not, of itself, mean he or she has not experienced some loss of earning capacity.[23]
We find appellants' second assignment of error to be without merit.

DVD SHOWED EVIDENCE OF INJURY TO STRAUB
Finally, appellants claim the DVD, found at exhibit 2, does not show that Straub's hip had been injured. As noted, we review the decision of the trial court for clear error and its findings will not be otherwise overturned.[24]
The DVD shows a vehicle sideswipe Straub as he was conducting a routine traffic stop. The vehicle knocked Straub into the stopped vehicle, and then Straub limped away. The DVD later shows Straub stopping the vehicle that hit him, while Straub continued to limp. Appellants argue that Straub is not a credible witness because he told his orthopedist that he had been knocked down but the DVD did not support that claim.
First, we note that our review of the record contains no such statement by Straub. Straub testified that he was struck by a passing vehicle, and the notes from his chiropractor indicate that Straub reported being struck by a vehicle. In its order, the trial court stated that it found Straub's testimony credible and noted that Straub had been injured in the course of his employment in the past but had never made any workers' compensation claims. The trial court also viewed the DVD. Based on the record before us, we find that the trial court did not clearly err in determining that Straub had injured his hip during the first accident. Appellants' third assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION
We find Straub's second accident, which occurred while en route to a required medical appointment for compensable injuries, was also compensable. We also find the *893 trial court did not commit clear error when determining that Straub sustained a 35-percent loss of earning capacity or when finding that the DVD, found at exhibit 2, showed that Straub's left hip was injured.
AFFIRMED.
NOTES
[1]  Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 10.07 (2009).
[2]  Money v. Tyrrell Flowers, 275 Neb. 602, 748 N.W.2d 49 (2008).
[3]  Id.
[4]  Kraus v. Jones Automotive, Inc., 3 Neb.App. 577, 529 N.W.2d 108 (1995), citing Jacobs v. Consolidated Tel. Co., 237 Neb. 772, 467 N.W.2d 864 (1991).
[5]  Jacobs v. Consolidated Tel. Co., supra note 4, 237 Neb. at 775, 467 N.W.2d at 866.
[6]  Kraus, supra note 4.
[7]  1 Larson & Larson, supra note 1.
[8]  Phipps v. Milton G. Waldbaum & Co., 239 Neb. 700, 477 N.W.2d 919 (1991).
[9]  Bear v. Anson Implement, Inc., 976 S.W.2d 553 (Mo.App.1998); Lee v. Industrial Com'n, 262 Ill.App.3d 1108, 635 N.E.2d 766, 200 Ill.Dec. 427 (1994); Gayler v. North American Van Lines, 566 N.E.2d 84 (Ind.App.1991).
[10]  Manuel v. Davidson Transit Org., No. M2007-01580-CV-R3-WC, 2008 WL 4367492 (Tenn. Spec. Workers' Comp. Panel 2008); Kehr Mid-West Iron v. Bordner, 829 N.E.2d 213 (Ind.App.2005); American Manufacturers Mut. Ins. v. Hernandez, 252 Wis.2d 155, 642 N.W.2d 584 (2002); Taylor v. Centex Construction Co., 191 Kan. 130, 379 P.2d 217 (1963).
[11]  Taylor, supra note 10.
[12]  Id.
[13]  Id.
[14]  Id.
[15]  Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-120(2)(c) (Cum.Supp. 2006). See, also, Yarns v. Leon Plastics, Inc., 237 Neb. 132, 464 N.W.2d 801 (1991).
[16]  Behrens v. American Stores Packing Co., 228 Neb. 18, 421 N.W.2d 12 (1988); Pavel v. Hughes Brothers, Inc., 167 Neb. 727, 94 N.W.2d 492 (1959).
[17]  Kraus, supra note 4.
[18]  Jacobs, supra note 5.
[19]  See, Behrens, supra note 16; Pavel, supra note 16.
[20]  Bishop v. Speciality Fabricating Co., 277 Neb. 171, 760 N.W.2d 352 (2009).
[21]  Id.
[22]  Davis v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 269 Neb. 683, 688, 696 N.W.2d 142, 147 (2005).
[23]  Id. at 688-89, 696 N.W.2d at 147.
[24]  Bishop, supra note 20.


                                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                  Fifth Circuit
                                                               F I L E D
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS             February 9, 2004

                        FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT              Charles R. Fulbruge III
                                                                   Clerk

                             No. 03-41132
                           Summary Calendar

     MICHELLE REED,

                                         Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                  v.

     LOWE’S HOME CENTERS INC.; ET AL.,

                                         Defendants,

     LOWE’S HOME CENTERS INC.,

                                         Defendant-Appellee.

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
                  Eastern District of Texas, Beaumont
                              1:02-CV-475

Before JONES, BENAVIDES and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

     Plaintiff-appellant    Michelle   Reed   (Reed)   appeals    from    a

summary judgment dismissing her claims against Defendant-appellee,

Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., alleging employment discrimination and

     *
      Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
also claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress under

Texas state law.      Our de novo review of the record leads to the

inescapable conclusion that Reed failed to establish a prima facie

case of discrimination and that her proof and allegations with

respect   to   her   state   law    tort      claim   cannot   survive    summary

judgment.      The   judgment      of   the    district   court   is     affirmed

essentially for the reasons stated in the district court’s order

dated July 16, 2003.

                                                                         AFFIRMED

                                        2


                      127 T.C. No. 6

                UNITED STATES TAX COURT

               ANONYMOUS, Petitioner v.
     COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 7199-06.               Filed September 6, 2006.

     P is a foreign national. A member of P’s family was
kidnapped several years ago and held for ransom. P filed a
motion to seal the record because P fears that P or other
family members might be targeted for another kidnapping if
information about P’s identity or financial circumstances
were publicly disclosed.

     Held: The significant risk of physical harm to P and
P’s family outweighs the public interest in access to court
proceedings under these circumstances. P’s motion to seal
the record shall be granted, and P is permitted to proceed
anonymously.

Sealed, for petitioner.
Sealed, for respondent.
                                 -2-

                               OPINION

     KROUPA, Judge:    This matter is before the Court on

petitioner’s motion to seal court records.    Petitioner requests

us to seal the record in this case and permit petitioner to

proceed anonymously.    Petitioner has demonstrated a significant

risk of physical harm to petitioner and petitioner’s family

members if the record were to remain open.    We conclude that it

is appropriate to seal the record and permit petitioner to

proceed anonymously.

     Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to

the Internal Revenue Code, and all Rule references are to the Tax

Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

                             Background

     Petitioner is a foreign national.    At the time petitioner

filed the petition, petitioner resided outside the United States.

A member of petitioner’s family was kidnapped and held for ransom

several years ago.    Kidnappings are a rampant problem in the

country where petitioner and most of petitioner’s family reside.

Petitioner fears that petitioner or other members of petitioner’s

family might also be kidnapped and their lives placed in jeopardy

if petitioner’s identity or petitioner’s financial circumstances

were made public in this case.    Petitioner filed the motion to

seal court records at the same time petitioner filed the

petition.
                                -3-

                            Discussion

     We shall begin by describing the general presumption of

openness that attaches to judicial proceedings.   Generally,

official records of all courts shall be open and available to the

public for inspection and copying.    Nixon v. Warner Commcns.,

Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978); In re Coordinated Pretrial

Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 101 F.R.D. 34,

38 (C.D. Cal. 1984).   Hearings and the evidentiary record of

proceedings before this Court shall be open to the public.     Secs.

7458, 7461(a).   Common law, statutory law, and the U.S.

Constitution all support this important principle.    Nixon v.

Warner Commcns., Inc., supra; Willie Nelson Music Co. v.

Commissioner, 85 T.C. 914, 918 (1985); In re Coordinated Pretrial

Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., supra.     The

right to inspect and copy judicial records, however, is not

absolute.   Nixon v. Warner Commcns., Inc., supra at 598.    Courts

have supervisory power over their own records and files, and

access to records has been denied where the court files might

become a vehicle for improper purposes.    Id.

Sealing the Record
     This Court has broad discretionary power to control and

seal, if necessary, records and files in our possession.     Willie

Nelson Music Co. v. Commissioner, supra.    We may, in our

discretion, seal the record or portions of the record if justice

so requires and the party seeking such relief demonstrates good

cause.   Sec. 7461(b)(1); Rule 103(a); AT&T Co. v. Grady, 594 F.2d
                                 -4-

594, 596 (7th Cir. 1978); Willie Nelson Music Co. v.

Commissioner, supra at 920; Tavano v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

1991-237, affd. 986 F.2d 1389 (11th Cir. 1993).    To determine

whether sealing the record is appropriate, we must weigh the

presumption, however gauged, in favor of public access to

judicial records against the interests advanced by the parties.

Nixon v. Warner Commcns., Inc., supra at 602; AT&T Co. v. Grady,

supra at 598; Willie Nelson Music Co. v. Commissioner, supra at

919.

       Taxpayers seeking to seal court records must come forward

with appropriate testimony and factual data to show good cause.

Estate of Yaeger v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 180, 189 (1989); Willie

Nelson Music Co. v. Commissioner, supra at 920 (citing Wyatt v.

Kaplan, 686 F.2d 276, 283 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v.

United Fruit Co., 410 F.2d 553, 557 n.11 (5th Cir. 1969)); Tavano

v. Commissioner, supra.    Taxpayers may not rely on conclusory or

unsupported statements to establish claims of harm that would

result from disclosure.    Willie Nelson Music Co. v. Commissioner,

supra at 920; In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum
Prods. Antitrust Litig., supra at 44.

       Good cause has been demonstrated and records sealed where

patents, trade secrets, or confidential information are involved

or where an individual’s business reputation will be hurt.    See

In re Smith, 656 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1981) (striking an

individual’s name from factual resumes on due process grounds as

resumes were prepared in criminal proceeding where the individual
                                -5-

was not indicted); Crystal Grower’s Corp. v. Dobbins, 616 F.2d

458 (10th Cir. 1980) (sealing portions of record involving

documents alleged to be subject to attorney-client privilege or

work product doctrine); In re Sarkar, 575 F.2d 870 (C.C.P.A.

1978) (sealing record involving patent application proceeding so

that the information would remain a trade secret in the event of

an adverse decision); Sendi v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 100 F.R.D.

21 (D.D.C. 1983) (sealing parties’ tax returns to protect

confidentiality and privacy interests).    Merely asserting

annoyance, embarrassment, or harm to a person’s personal

reputation, however, is generally insufficient to demonstrate

good cause and overcome the strong common law presumption in

favor of access to court records.     Willie Nelson Music Co. v.

Commissioner, supra at 921, 925 (record not sealed where

nationally known entertainer sought to avoid public scrutiny or

news coverage of case); Tavano v. Commissioner, supra (record not

sealed where taxpayer had civil suit pending against employer and

did not want employer to learn facts of case).

     Petitioner submitted affidavits together with supporting

documentation that demonstrate the severe degree of harm

petitioner and petitioner’s family members would risk if we did

not seal the record.   These affidavits and documentation show

that a member of petitioner’s family was kidnapped several years

ago and that kidnapping is rampant in the country where

petitioner and most of petitioner’s family reside.    Petitioner

fears that publicizing petitioner’s identity and financial
                                -6-

circumstances will increase the risk that either petitioner or a

member of petitioner’s family will be the target of another

kidnapping and that petitioner’s life or the lives of

petitioner’s family will be placed in jeopardy.   We find these

facts compelling.   Petitioner has demonstrated through these

affidavits that physical harm has actually been inflicted against

a member of petitioner’s family, and there is a risk that the

same type of physical harm may be inflicted upon petitioner or

another member of petitioner’s family.

     We must evaluate this risk of physical harm against the

public interest in access to judicial records.    See Nixon v.

Warner Commcns., Inc., supra at 602; Does I Thru XXIII v.

Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1069 (9th Cir. 2000); AT&T

Co. v. Grady, supra at 596; Willie Nelson Music Co. v.

Commissioner, supra at 919.   After careful consideration of the

facts of this case, we find that the balance favors petitioner.

The risk of extreme physical harm to petitioner and petitioner’s

family outweighs the countervailing public interest favoring open

judicial proceedings.

Permission To Proceed Anonymously
     Petitioner also requests permission to proceed anonymously.

There is no provision in our Rules that permits a taxpayer to

proceed anonymously.1   The Rules generally require taxpayers’

     1
      Written determinations of the Commissioner such as rulings,
determination letters, technical advice memoranda or Chief
Counsel Advice and background file documents are generally made
public with certain deletions of names, addresses, and other
                                                   (continued...)
                                 -7-

names to be included on pleadings and other papers filed with the

Court.    See Rules 32(a) (requiring a party’s name to be set forth

on pleadings), 23(a) (requiring all papers filed to contain the

full name and surname of each petitioner), 60(a) (requiring a

case be brought by and in the name of a person against whom the

Commissioner determined the deficiency in the case of a

deficiency notice).

     When there is no applicable Rule, we may prescribe the

procedure, giving particular weight to the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure to the extent adaptable to the matter at hand.   Rule

1(a).    Where our Rules are silent, we have looked to the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure and cases in other Federal courts

interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance.

See Willie Nelson Music Co. v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. at 917

(looking to decisions interpreting rule 26(c) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance in interpreting Rule

103(a)); Allen v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 577, 579 (1979).

     Several U.S. Courts of Appeals have permitted litigation to

proceed anonymously.    See, e.g., Does I Thru XXIII v. Advanced
Textile Corp., supra at 1067; James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238

(4th Cir. 1993); Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185-186 (5th Cir.

1981).    The Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit have occasionally permitted

     1
      (...continued)
identifying information. Sec. 6110(a), (c). A person may act to
restrain disclosure of these materials, however, under the
procedures set forth in sec. 6110(f).
                                -8-

anonymous litigation to proceed.      Qualls v. Rumsfeld, 228 F.R.D.

8, 10 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and

Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).

     The decision whether to allow parties to proceed anonymously

is in the discretion of the trial court.     James v. Jacobson,

supra at 238.   A party may generally proceed anonymously when the

trial court reasonably determines that the need for anonymity

outweighs the prejudice to the opposing party and the general

presumption that the parties’ identities are public information.

See Does I Thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., supra at 1068.

Some factors to be considered in deciding whether a party may

proceed anonymously include whether the party challenges

governmental activity, whether the party is required to disclose

information of the utmost intimacy, and whether the party is

compelled to admit his or her intention to engage in illegal

conduct.   Doe v. Stegall, supra at 185.

     Petitioner has a unique need for anonymity in this case.

Petitioner fears that physical harm may come to petitioner or

petitioner’s family and their lives placed in jeopardy if

petitioner’s identity or financial circumstances were made public

in this case.   We weigh this risk of physical harm against the

risk of prejudice to respondent and the public interest in

knowing the parties’ identities.   See Does I Thru XXIII v.
Advanced Textile Corp., supra at 1068.     We hold that petitioner

may preserve anonymity in the special circumstances of this

proceeding because petitioner’s need for anonymity outweighs
                                 -9-

prejudice to the opposing party and the public interest in

knowing the identities of parties to judicial proceedings.    There

is little risk of prejudice to respondent here.    Petitioner wants

only to keep the information from public view.    Petitioner is

willing to provide sealed copies of documents to respondent.

Further, the risk of severe physical harm to petitioner and

petitioner’s family outweighs the general public interest in

knowing the parties’ identities.   Accordingly, we conclude that

the balance is in petitioner’s favor, and petitioner may

therefore proceed anonymously.

Prior Public Disclosure of Information

     Respondent objects to sealing the record here because some

of the information has already been disclosed in a different

judicial forum, and the records of that forum have not yet been

sealed.   Respondent argues that we therefore cannot maintain or

protect petitioner’s privacy due to the previous disclosure.      We

disagree.   The public availability of some facts in another forum

should not bar protection against the risk of future harm caused

by disclosure in this Court.   See Does I Thru XXIII v. Advanced
Textile Corp., supra at 1069 n.11 (“Past acts of bravery in the

face of danger is poor rationale for denying the courageous

individual protection against future harm.”); Estate of Yaeger v.

Commissioner, 92 T.C. at 183, 190.     The prior disclosure of some

information does not preclude our decision to seal the record in

this Court and permit petitioner to proceed anonymously.
                                 -10-

Conclusion

     After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of

this case, we find that the demonstrated risk of severe physical

harm to petitioner and petitioner’s family outweighs the public

interest in access to judicial records and to the identity of the

parties.   There is little prejudice to respondent in permitting

petitioner to proceed anonymously.      Accordingly, we shall grant

petitioner’s motion to seal the entire record and permit

petitioner to proceed anonymously.      We do not address whether or

to what extent any later opinions in this case will be sealed.

     To reflect the foregoing,

                                                   An appropriate

                                             order will be issued.


        SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
           Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1202
KA 12-00846
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, WHALEN, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,

                    V                               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DEAN MANOR, ALSO KNOWN AS DEAN MCLEAN, ALSO KNOWN
AS DEAN MCLANE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (CARA A. WALDMAN OF
COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (STEPHEN X. O’BRIEN OF
COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.

     Appeal from a resentence of the Supreme Court, Monroe County
(Joseph D. Valentino, J.), rendered February 14, 2012. Defendant was
resentenced by imposing terms of postrelease supervision.

     It is hereby ORDERED that the resentence so appealed from is
unanimously affirmed.

     Memorandum: On defendant’s prior appeal from a judgment
convicting him following a jury trial of, inter alia, murder in the
second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]) and criminal possession of a
weapon in the second degree (former § 265.03 [2]), we modified the
judgment by directing that the sentence on the criminal possession of
a weapon in the second degree count run concurrently with the sentence
on the murder count (People v Manor, 38 AD3d 1257, lv denied 9 NY3d
847). Defendant now appeals from a resentence imposing terms of
postrelease supervision with respect to that conviction.

     Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that
the gap of approximately 10 years between his original sentence and
his resentence “violated his statutory right to have his sentence
pronounced ‘without unreasonable delay’ ” (People v Smikle, 112 AD3d
1357, 1358, lv denied 22 NY3d 1141, quoting CPL 380.30 [1]; see People
v Woods, 122 AD3d 1400, 1401, lv denied 25 NY3d 1210). We decline to
exercise our power to review that contention as a matter of discretion
in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [3] [c]). He also failed
to preserve for our review his contention that Supreme Court was
deprived of jurisdiction by its failure to comply with the time limits
in Correction Law § 601-d. In any event, that contention is without
merit. “The Court of Appeals has held that the failure to comply with
the time requirements set forth in Correction Law § 601-d (4) does not
constitute a jurisdictional defect depriving the court of the
                                 -2-                          1202
                                                         KA 12-00846

authority to correct an illegal sentence and to resentence a   defendant
to a term that includes a period of postrelease supervision”   (People v
Langenbach, 106 AD3d 1338, 1338, lv denied 21 NY3d 1043; see   generally
People v Lingle, 16 NY3d 621, 630-633; People v Williams, 14   NY3d 198,
217, cert denied 562 US 947).

     Contrary to defendant’s additional contention, the court at
resentencing did not further modify the sentence beyond the imposition
of terms of postrelease supervision, and indeed it specifically
directed that the sentence remained as modified by this Court on
defendant’s prior appeal.

Entered:   December 23, 2015                    Frances E. Cafarell
                                                Clerk of the Court


215 U.S. 437 (1910)
MECHANICAL APPLIANCE COMPANY
v.
CASTLEMAN.
No. 48.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued December 3, 1909.
Decided January 3, 1910.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.
*438 Mr. Lee W. Grant, with whom Mr. P.B. Kennedy was on the brief, for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Benjamin T. Castleman, defendant in error, pro se.
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the court.
This case comes here under § 5 of the Court of Appeals Act, as amended January 20, 1897, 29 Stat. 492, c. 68, upon a certificate from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri, presenting a question of the jurisdiction of that court to entertain a suit brought by Benjamin T. Castleman, defendant in error, against the Mechanical Appliance Company, plaintiff in error, to recover for the breach of a certain alleged contract concerning the making and delivery of massage motors.
The action was originally brought in the Circuit Court of the city of St. Louis, in the State of Missouri, and the Mechanical *439 Appliance Company, a foreign corporation, then defendant, removed the case to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri upon the ground of diverse citizenship. After the case reached the United States Circuit Court the bill of exceptions shows that a motion to quash the summons and certain affidavits were withdrawn, and a plea to the jurisdiction was filed.
The original service of summons in the state court had been made by the sheriff, who returned the summons as follows:
"Served this writ at the city of St. Louis, Missouri, on the within named defendant the Mechanical Appliance Company (a corporation) this 29th day of December, 1906, by delivering a copy of the writ and petition furnished by the clerk to Dudley Shaw, agent of the said defendant corporation, he being in said defendant's usual business office and in charge thereof. The president or other chief officer of said defendant could not be found in the city of St. Louis at the time of service."
In the plea to the jurisdiction, in the Circuit Court of the United States, the plaintiff in error set up:
"1. That it is a corporation, organized under the laws of the State of Wisconsin, that it has never taken out a license to do business in the State of Missouri, and that at the time of the alleged service of the writ of summons herein as set out in the return of the sheriff, to wit, 29th day of December, 1906, the defendant did not have any agent, office or place of business in the city of St. Louis or in the State of Missouri.
"2. That the person upon whom service was attempted to be had by the sheriff, and to whom a copy of the summons and petition was delivered, to wit, Dudley Shaw, was not and had not been for some time prior thereto an officer, agent or employe of this defendant. That said Dudley Shaw was not, at the time of the delivery of the summons herein to him by the sheriff, in charge of defendant's usual business office, or in defendant's usual business office in the city of St. Louis, for the reason that this defendant had, at said time, no business *440 office nor any other office in the city of St. Louis, State of Missouri."
Certain affidavits are set out in the bill of exceptions, and it is therein stated that they were filed. Two affidavits appear to have been filed in support of the plea to the jurisdiction, and one, by the plaintiff, in opposition thereto. In the certificate the learned Circuit Judge states:
"I hereby certify that in this cause the following question of jurisdiction arose: the defendant filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that it was a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Wisconsin, that it has no office, place of business, or agent in, and was not doing business in the State of Missouri at the time of the service of summons herein and that the person served with the process herein was not the agent of the defendant at the time of said service. Defendant filed affidavit in support of the plea. I overruled the plea on the ground that the facts stated in the return of the sheriff to the summons were conclusive on the defendant and could not be controverted by it. When the cause was called for trial the same objection was made by the defendant and overruled for the same reason. The question only of jurisdiction of the court is, therefore, hereby certified to the Supreme Court of the United States for its decision thereon."
It is settled that a question of this character involves the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court as a Federal court and may be brought here by writ of error under § 5 of the Court of Appeals Act of 1891 as amended in 1897. Remington v. Central Pacific Railroad Company, 198 U.S. 95.
It is contended by the defendant in error that the plea to the jurisdiction did not definitely state that the corporation defendant was not doing business in the State of Missouri at the time of the attempted service; and, furthermore, that the affidavits were not shown to have been offered in evidence, although the bill of exceptions states that the same were filed. The certificate of the judge, which is required by statute in *441 order to bring the case to this court, states that the defendant raised, by plea to the jurisdiction, the grounds of objection that it was a foreign corporation, having no office, place of business or agent in and was not doing business in the State of Missouri at the time of the service of summons, and that the person served with the process was not the agent of the defendant at the time of said service.
The certificate shows that the court did not consider the affidavits, and overruled the plea on the sole ground that the facts stated in the return of the sheriff to the summons were conclusive, and could not be controverted by the defendant. It is also stated in the certificate that when the case was called for trial the same objection was made and overruled for the same reason. In the light of this certificate and the statements of the bill of exceptions we think it must be regarded that the question was fairly before the court, notwithstanding the somewhat meagre allegations of the plea in this respect, and presented the question, which it is certified was decided, upon plea and objections attacking the jurisdiction of the court, because the corporation was not doing business in the State of Missouri, and the person attempted to be served was not its agent at that time.
In a memorandum opinion it is indicated that the learned judge, in the court below, followed a previous ruling in the same court; and it is stated that it is the law of Missouri, as held by its highest court, that in a case of this kind a return of this character is conclusive upon the parties. But it is well settled that, after removal from the state to the Federal court, the moving party has a right to the opinion of the Federal court, not only upon the question of the merits of the case, but as to the validity of the service of process. Wabash Western Ry. Co. v. Brow, 164 U.S. 271, 278.
It is equally well settled in the Federal jurisdiction that a foreign corporation can be served with process within the State only when it is doing business therein, and that such service must be upon an agent who represents the corporation *442 in its business. This subject underwent extensive consideration in the case of Goldey v. The Morning News, 156 U.S. 518, and the rule is there stated by Mr. Justice Gray, speaking for the court, as follows (p. 522):
" . . . service of mesne process from a court of a State, not made upon the defendant or his authorized agent within the State, although there made in some other manner recognized as valid by its legislative acts and judicial decisions, can be allowed no validity in the Circuit Court of the United States after the removal of the case into that court, pursuant to the acts of Congress, unless the defendant can be held, by virtue of a general appearance or otherwise, to have waived the defect in the service, and to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court."
In view of the principles thus determined, we think the return of the sheriff in the state court was not conclusive upon the question of service. For when the question was raised in the Circuit Court of the United States the jurisdiction of the court would fail if it appeared that the corporation attempted to be served was not doing business in the State of Missouri, and the attempted service was not upon one of its agents. Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 406; St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350; Peterson v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 364; Green v. C., B. & Q. Railway Co., 205 U.S. 530.
Defendant in error cites the case of Smoot v. Judd, 184 Missouri, 508, in which it was held that where a sheriff's return recited a personal service of process which was false, the remedy of the unserved defendant against whom judgment by default had been taken, in the absence of fraud on the part of the plaintiff in the suit, was in an action on the sheriff's bond for damages for the false return, and not by a suit to set aside the sheriff's sale and deed made in pursuance of the default judgment. It is to be noted, in this connection, that the attack upon the service in that case was made after judgment, and not, as in the present case, by a motion to set aside the *443 service of summons, or a plea to the jurisdiction over the person. Moreover, in cases which concern the jurisdiction of the Federal courts, notwithstanding the so-called conformity act, Revised Stats., § 914, neither the statutes of the State nor the decisions of its courts are conclusive upon the Federal courts. The ultimate determination of such questions of jurisdiction is for this court alone. Western Loan & Savings Co. v. Butte & Boston Consolidated Mining Co., 210 U.S. 368, 369; Mexican Central Railway Co. v. Pinkney, 149 U.S. 194.
Defendant in error also relies upon the cases of Walker v. Robbins, 14 How. 584, and Knox County v. Harshman, 133 U.S. 152. Neither of these cases control the one under consideration. In Walker v. Robbins, supra, a bill in equity was filed to enjoin enforcement of a judgment at law, entered upon a false return of a marshal in the Circuit Court of the Mississippi District. This court held that a bill in equity would not lie for such purpose, and further, that the return was not false, and if it were, the defendant Walker waived the want of service by pleading to the merits of the action. It was there said by Mr. Justice Catron, delivering the opinion of the court (p. 585): "In cases of false returns affecting the defendant, where the plaintiff at law is not in fault, redress can only be had in the court of law where the record was made, and if relief cannot be had there, the party injured must seek his remedy against the marshal."
The case was decided upon the grounds which we have stated, and the language quoted, and relied upon by the defendant in error is very far from indicating that a party might not appear specially and object to service of summons, and move to set aside the same, and to dismiss the action upon the grounds which are involved in the case at bar.
In Knox County v. Harshman a bill in equity was filed for an injunction against the prosecution of a writ of mandamus to enforce the levy of a certain tax against the county. The bill alleged that neither the county court nor any of the judges thereof had any notice of the suit until after the end of the *444 term at which judgment was rendered, and that no service of summons was made upon Frank P. Hall, the county clerk, as was stated in the marshal's return. This court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Gray, held that a court of equity would not interfere with the judgment, under the circumstances shown, and as to the officer's return of service of copy of the summons on the clerk, if false, no fraud having been charged or proved against the petitioner, redress must be sought in an action at law, and not by a bill in equity; and that if the questions of fact could be considered as open in the case, the proof at the hearing showed that service had, in fact, been made.
Neither of these cases involved the right of the defendant to appear upon attempted service in an action at law, and by motion, or plea for that purpose, raise the question of jurisdiction over his person. The case of Wabash Western Railway Co. v. Brow, 164 U.S. 271, is much closer in its analogy to the case at bar. In that case suit was commenced in the state court, in Michigan, against the Wabash Western Railway Company to recover in an action for damages. The service of summons and copy of the declaration was made upon one Hill as agent of the company. The case was removed to the Federal court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The railroad company thereupon appeared and moved to set aside the declaration and rule to plead, upon the ground of want of jurisdiction, and filed an affidavit showing that Hill, upon whom the service had been attempted, was the freight agent of the Wabash Railroad Company, a corporation which owned and operated a railroad from Detroit to the Michigan state line, and was not an agent of the Wabash Western Railway Company, the defendant in the suit; and, at the time of the attempted service, the defendant did not own, operate and control any railroad in the State of Michigan, had no place of business therein, and was not doing business within the State. The action was overruled by the Circuit Court, the objection to the jurisdiction was renewed when the defendant filed its *445 plea and before trial in the case, which resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of Brow.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the filing of the petition for removal, in general terms, had effected the appearance of the Wabash Western Railway Company to the action. This court, in an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, held that the record disclosed that the corporation at the time of the attempted service was neither incorporated nor doing business, nor had any agent nor property within the State of Michigan, and that the individual upon whom service had been attempted was not the agent or an officer of the corporation, and, therefore, no jurisdiction was acquired over the person of the defendant by the attempted service; and, further, that the petition for removal did not effect an appearance in the case, consequently reversing the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals and remanding the case to the Circuit Court, with directions to grant a new trial, and to sustain the motion to set aside the service and dismiss the action.
The Circuit Court should have considered the question upon the issues of fact raised, as to the presence of the corporation in Missouri and the authority of the agent upon whom service had been attempted. It is true, as suggested by the defendant in error, that the affidavits appearing in the bill of exceptions are stated to have been filed, and there is no definite statement that they were offered to be read in evidence, but we think it is apparent that they were filed for that purpose. No objection appears in the record to the filing of the affidavits; on the other hand, it appears that the plaintiff below also filed an affidavit. These affidavits are made part of the record by a bill of exceptions and we think they should have been considered upon the question of jurisdiction.
As we have already indicated, the learned Circuit Court was in error in holding that the return of the sheriff in the state court concluded the parties, and had it considered the affidavits exhibited in the bill of exceptions, as in our view it should have done, the conclusion would have been reached that the *446 weight of the testimony disclosed that the defendant corporation was not doing business in the State of Missouri at the time of the attempted service of process, and that the person named in the return of the sheriff was not at that time the duly authorized agent of the defendant corporation.
Holding these views, the judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the cause remanded to that court with directions to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.
Reversed.


4 Ill. App.3d 197 (1972)
280 N.E.2d 560
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JAMES FRANK MARRO, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 55496.
Illinois Appellate Court  First District.
February 24, 1972.
*198 *199 Edward V. Hanrahan, State's Attorney, of Chicago, (Robert A. Novelle and James S. Veldman, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE McGLOON delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal by the State pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 110A, par. 604), from an order entered in the Circuit Court of Cook County quashing a search warrant and suppressing the evidence seized thereunder.
We reverse and remand.
The warrant in question in this case was issued upon the affidavit of an investigator assigned to the State's Attorney's office of Cook County. As a basis for issuing the warrant, the affiant, in the complaint for the warrant, stated that on December 11, 1969, he interviewed a confidential informant who told the affiant that he had been placing bets over a certain phone number. The informant further said that "* * * he picks up his winnings, and pays off his losing wagers at Rick's Restaurant, at Ruby and Grand, in Franklin Park, Illinois." The informant knew the man who conducted these money transactions and took the bets only *200 as "Jimmy." The affiant stated that on December 12, 1969, he again met with the informant, dialed the phone number given by the informant and listened to the conversation of the informant who allegedly placed a bet on a horse race with the above mentioned "Jimmy." The affiant stated he had known the informant for six months during which time the informant provided other information on gambling, "* * * all of which has proved to be reliable, and resulted in two gambling raids. These raids resulted in arrests and convictions in one case, with one case still pending, and seizure of gambling paraphernalia in all raids."
Through the telephone company, the affiant found out the address at which the telephone specified by the informer was located. The affiant state that a check of other utility records, i.e., electric, gas, etc., revealed the user on each such record to be one Raymond M. Marro.
As a result of the affiant's complaint a search warrant was issued for the premises in question, located at 2934 Scott, in Franklin Park, Illinois. Pursuant to the warrant the named premises was searched and various pieces of evidence seized as a result of which the defendant was arrested and subsequently indicted for the offense of gambling.
At the hearing on the motion to quash, evidence was introduced by the defendant to establish that there was no Rick's Restaurant located at "Ruby and Grand" in Franklin Park, Illinois, but there was such a restaurant located at Pearl and Grand, some five blocks east of the former location. The evidence consisted of a letter from the Superintendent of Streets in Franklin Park, Illinois, stating that Rick's Restaurant was located at Pearl and Grand. Also there was an affidavit, submitted by the defendant, stating that he had resided in Franklin Park for 20 years and the only Rick's Restaurant he knew of was located at Pearl and Grand in Franklin Park. The trial judge granted the motion to quash on the grounds that the statement in the affidavit, as to the location of Rick's Restaurant, was false on its face and this falsity could be inquired into and considered by the trial judge in a hearing on the motion to quash. The trial judge further thought there should have been independent corroboration by the State's Attorney's investigator of the alleged activity of collecting winnings and paying losses at Rick's Restaurant.
On appeal the State argues that the ruling of the trial judge was error because in establishing that Rick's Restaurant was not located at Ruby and Grand, as stated in the affidavit, the court went beyond the four corners of the affidavit and warrant, and this going behind the affidavit to establish the truth or falsity of the statements therein is not permitted under Illinois law. Further, the State argues that the *201 affidavit for the search warrant sufficiently established probable cause for the issuance of such warrant.
The defendant has not filed in this court a brief in support of his position or any other records relating to the proceedings at the hearing in the trial court.
 1 At the outset of our opinion we must make note of the defendant's failure to file a brief in this court and the effect thereof on this appeal. As a general rule such failure has left the decision of whether to reverse pro forma or to consider the appeal on its merits to the sound discretion of the reviewing court. (People v. Sanders (1966), 75 Ill. App.2d 422, 220 N.E.2d 487; People v. Keeney (1968), 96 Ill. App.2d 323, 238 N.E.2d 614.) At times this court has opted for the alternative of a pro forma reversal. (People v. Nardone (1963), 43 Ill. App.2d 409, 193 N.E.2d 617; People v. Kuzas (1968), 100 Ill. App.2d 332, 241 N.E.2d 115.) However, we think that under the circumstances of this case, this court should consider the merits of the appeal.
In reviewing the proceedings at the hearing in the trial court, we think the trial judge erred in granting the defendant's motion to quash. The main basis for that holding was that the affidavit for search warrant contained a statement that was "false on its face" in that the location of Rick's Restaurant was stated as "Ruby and Grand."
 2-4 That the statement is not "false on its face" in the sense that the error was obvious simply by looking at the affidavit, without any other inquiry, is made evident by the record. It was only after the introduction of documentary evidence that the misstatement as to the restaurant's location was established. We think this type of inquiry was expressly prohibited by the holdings of the Illinois Supreme Court in the companion cases of (People v. Bak (1970), 45 Ill.2d 140, 258 N.E.2d 341 and People v. Mitchell (1970), 45 Ill.2d 148, 258 N.E.2d 345.) In those cases the Court held that a defendant has no constitutional right to challenge or controvert the matters declared in the affidavit under oath which accompanied the finding of probable cause and the issuance of a search warrant. The Court in Bak, supra, said that the determination of probable cause was to be tested only on the evidence originally presented to the judicial officer issuing the warrant and could not be relitigated by a later disputing of the evidence. We think that in establishing the falsity of the statement as to the location of Rick's Restaurant the trial judge inquired beyond the face of the affidavit and warrant, and that inquiry was prohibited by the Bak-Mitchell holdings.
 5 The second reason assigned by the trial judge in support of his granting the motion to quash was that the State's Attorney's investigator upon whose affidavit the warrant issued should have corroborated *202 independently the statement of the informant that he picked up his winnings or paid his lost bets at Rick's Restaurant by going to this restaurant and observing such activities. We do not think such action was an indispensable prerequisite to the establishment of probable cause sufficient to support issuance of the instant search warrant.
 6-8 An affidavit for a search warrant will not be deemed insufficient because it is based on the hearsay averments of an undisclosed informant as long as there is a substantial basis for crediting such hearsay. (United States v. Ventresca (1965), 380 U.S. 102; People v. Parker (1969), 42 Ill.2d 42, 245 N.E.2d 487.) The Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas (1964), 378 U.S. 108 established what will be considered a substantial basis as follows: First, the affidavit must list the underlying circumstances upon which the informant's conclusions are based, and, second the affidavit must explain why the undisclosed informant is reliable. If the information supplied by the informant is deemed inadequate under the Aguilar standards, the other averments which corroborate the information contained in the hearsay report may then be considered to determine whether, with this added support, probable cause exists for the warrant to issue. Spinelli v. United States (1969), 393 U.S. 410.
 9 In the instant case we must note that the facts involved are almost identical with those that were before the Illinois Supreme Court in the Mitchell case, supra, and our Appellate Court in the case of People v. Perlman (1970), 126 Ill. App.2d 481, 262 N.E.2d 253. In each of these cases there was an issue of whether probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant existed. In each of these cases the affiant police officer received information from an undisclosed informant who had previously supplied true and accurate information resulting in enumerated arrests and convictions. In each of these cases the undisclosed informant stated he placed bets over a certain phone number, and a check with the telephone company resulted in ascertaining the address associated with that phone number, which address was set out in the warrant. In each of these cases the affiant stated he dialed the given phone number, handed the telephone to the informer and then listened to the one-sided conversation of the informant, the substance of which was the placing of a bet. In Mitchell, supra, the bet involved a horse race. In Perlman, supra, the bet involved a baseball game. In each of these cases the court held that overhearing one side of a conversation which appeared to result in the placing of a bet corroborated, to a limited extent, the informant's information. The court in each of these cases held these averments established probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.
 10, 11 In the instant case the informant indicated he used a specified *203 phone number to place bets. His reliability was established by an enumerated record of arrests, a conviction and the seizure of record evidence of gambling as a result of precise information he had furnished to the police. A corroborative telephone call, virtually identical to the one placed in both the Mitchell and Perlman cases, was initiated by the affiant and a description thereof listed among the averments of the affiant. At the hearing on the motion to quash, the defendant sought to distinguish the phone call in the instant case from that in Mitchell on the grounds that in Mitchell there was an acknowledgement of the bet in that the unknown recipient of the call inquired of the informant, after he placed the bet, "Is that all you've got?" We do not find this distinction to be persuasive. In the instant case the unknown recipient acknowledged during the phone call that he was the "Jimmy" with whom the informant had stated he had previously placed his bets, and when the informant identified himself, "This is Al," the alleged "Jimmy" replied, "Whadda ya have, Al?", whereupon the informant placed his bet. We think this was sufficient to infuse the call with the same limited corroborative value the court recognized in the call involved in Mitchell.
We conclude, on the basis of the above discussion, that probable cause was established to support the issuance of the search warrant in this case. It was not necessary that the affiant's corroboration include observance of the payoffs in Rick's Restaurant. The order of the trial court quashing the search warrant and suppressing evidence is reversed and the cause remanded for such further proceedings as are consistent with the views herein expressed.
Reversed and remanded.
DEMPSEY and McNAMARA, JJ., concur.


                                  COURT OF APPEALS
                               EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                    EL PASO, TEXAS

  THE STATE OF TEXAS,                           §
                                                                No. 08-16-00322-CR
                 Appellant,                     §
                                                                  Appeal from the
  v.                                            §
                                                                120th District Court
  GEORGE FRANK DIAMOS, III,                     §
                                                              of El Paso County, Texas
                 Appellee.                      §
                                                                (TC# 20130D05419)
                                                §

                                      JUDGMENT

       The Court has considered this cause on the record and concludes there was no error in the

judgment. We therefore affirm the judgment of the court below. This decision shall be certified

below for observance.

       IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 9TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2018.

                                            YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.