122 S.W.3d 888 (2003)
In the Interest of C.A.J., A Child.
No. 2-03-092-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.
November 20, 2003.
*890 David A. Pearson, IV, Fort Worth, for Appellant.
Tim Curry, Criminal District Attorney, Charles M. Mallin, Michael R. Casillas, Melissa Paschall, Asst. Criminal District Attorneys, Fort Worth, for State.
Panel F: LIVINGSTON, DAUPHINOT, and HOLMAN, JJ.

OPINION
TERRIE LIVINGSTON, Justice.
Appellant, C.J., appeals from the trial court's order terminating her parental rights with regard to her child C.A.J. In a single point, appellant complains that the evidence was factually insufficient to support the court's conclusion that termination of the parent-child relationship was in the child's best interest. We affirm.

FACTS
Appellant gave birth to C.A.J., her third child, on April 19, 2002. When C.A.J. was born, she tested positive for cocaine. In response, the hospital called Child Protective Services (C.P.S.) to report the abuse. At the hospital, appellant admitted to the C.P.S. worker that she took crack cocaine on a daily basis while she was pregnant with C.A.J.
Due to the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services' (D.P.R.S.) ruling that C.A.J. had been abused, shortly after her birth C.P.S. removed her from appellant's care and placed her in foster care. Initially, C.P.S. considered appellant's mother, JoAnn Wilson ("Wilson"), as a placement option for the child, but she withdrew her name from consideration. Consequently, C.P.S. placed the child with Karen Eckman ("Eckman"), appellant's sister in California. The Eckmans took possession of C.A.J. with an understanding that they would ultimately adopt C.A.J.
Wilson testified that when she withdrew her name from consideration as an option *891 for placement for C.A.J., she recommended Eckman as a potential placement option. However, Wilson also stated that when she recommended Eckman, she did not think that Eckman planned to adopt C.A.J. Additionally, Wilson claimed that she was unaware that she could be reconsidered for placement. Appellant testified that she was unable to care for the child on her own. Appellant also admitted that it was probably in the child's best interest to live with her sister.
Aisha Anderson, the C.P.S. caseworker assigned to C.A.J. in July 2002, testified that she tried to set up visitation appointments between C.A.J. and appellant, but had been unable to do so because she could not locate appellant. After appellant was incarcerated, Anderson arranged the only visit that occurred between C.A.J. and appellant by taking C.A.J. to visit at the jail. Anderson noted that no bonding had occurred between appellant and the child.
During the termination proceedings, appellant was pregnant with her fourth child. Her second child lives with appellant's mother, and her first child lives with another relative. Appellant admitted to using drugs during all of her pregnancies. In addition to drug addiction, appellant also suffers from bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. Appellant has twice been convicted of prostitution and at least twice for assault. At the time of trial, appellant was serving a fifteen-month sentence for a felony level theft conviction and could not provide a stable home for C.A.J. Based upon this evidence, the trial court concluded that it was in the child's best interest to terminate appellant's parental rights.

ANALYSIS
In appellant's sole point, she complains that the evidence was factually insufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that termination of the parent-child relationship was in the child's best interest. A parent's rights to "the companionship, care, custody and management" of his or her children are constitutional interests "far more precious than any property right." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1397, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). "While parental rights are of constitutional magnitude, they are not absolute. Just as it is imperative for courts to recognize the constitutional underpinnings of the parent-child relationship, it is also essential that emotional and physical interests of the child not be sacrificed merely to preserve that right." In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex.2002). In a termination case, the State seeks not just to limit parental rights but to end them permanentlyto divest the parent and child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and powers normally existing between them, except for the child's right to inherit. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.206(b) (Vernon 2002); Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex.1985). We strictly scrutinize termination proceedings and strictly construe involuntary termination statutes in favor of the parent. Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20-21; In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 630 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied) (op. on reh'g).
In proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship brought under section 161.001 of the family code, the petitioner must establish one or more of the acts or omissions enumerated under subdivision (1) of the statute and must also prove that termination is in the best interest of the child. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001; Richardson v. Green, 677 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex.1984); Swate v. Swate, 72 S.W.3d 763, 766 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, pet. denied). Both elements must be established; termination may not be based solely on the best interest of the child as determined by the trier of fact. Tex. Dep't *892 of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex.1987).
Termination of parental rights is a drastic remedy and is of such weight and gravity that due process requires the petitioner to justify termination by "clear and convincing evidence." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.206(a) (Vernon Supp.2004); In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980). This intermediate standard falls between the preponderance standard of ordinary civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings. G.M., 596 S.W.2d at 847; D.T., 34 S.W.3d at 630. It is defined as the "measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 101.007. The higher burden of proof in termination cases alters the appellate standard of factual sufficiency review. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25. "[A] finding that must be based on clear and convincing evidence cannot be viewed on appeal the same as one that may be sustained on a mere preponderance." Id. In considering whether the evidence of termination rises to the level of being clear and convincing, we must determine "whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction" that the grounds for termination were proven. Id. Our inquiry here is whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the parent violated one of the conduct provisions of section 161.001(1) and that the termination of the parent's parental rights would be in the best interest of the child. Id. at 28.
Specifically, the State alleged and the court found that appellant's conduct had violated sections 161.001(1)(D), (E), and (R) of the Texas Family Code. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §§ 161.001(1)(D), (E), (R). Subsection D states that the court may terminate the parent-child relationship if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has "knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child." Id. § 161.001(1)(D). Subsection E provides another basis for termination if a parent has "engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child." Id. § 161.001(1)(E). Subsection R provides for termination when the parent has "been the cause of the child being born addicted to alcohol or a controlled substance, other than a controlled substance legally obtained by prescription, as defined by Section 261.001." Id. § 161.001(1)(R). The State need only present sufficient evidence to support one of the section 161.001(1) factors and show that termination is in the best interest of the child under section 161.001(2). Id. § 161.001; see In re W.J.H., 111 S.W.3d 707, 714 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied); In re W.S., 899 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ). Because appellant's argument is limited to the issue of whether termination of the parent-child relationship was in the best interest of the child, that is the only prong we need to address.
The primary focus of appellant's argument is that there is no evidence to show that the child would be better off if placed with appellant's sister than she would be if placed with appellant's mother. When ascertaining what is in the best interest of the child, we look at the following nonexclusive list of factors first set out by the Texas Supreme Court in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex.1976):
(1) the desires of the child;
(2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future;

*893 (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future;
(4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;
(5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child;
(6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody;
(7) the stability of the home or proposed placement;
(8) the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and
(9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.
Id. at 371-72. These factors are not exhaustive. Some listed factors may be inapplicable to some cases; other factors not on the list may also be considered when appropriate. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Furthermore, undisputed evidence of just one factor may be sufficient in a particular case to support a finding that termination is in the best interest of the children. Id. On the other hand, the presence of scant evidence relevant to each Holley factor will not support such a finding. Id.
In addition to the above, a parent's inability to provide adequate care for the child, lack of parenting skills, poor judgment, and repeated instances of immoral conduct may also be considered when looking at best interest. See Garza v. Tex. Dept. of Human Servs., 794 S.W.2d 521, 525 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ) (holding that a parent's lack of judgment, parenting skills, failure to provide adequate nutrition to her children, instructing them to disobey their foster parents, and skip school, are all factors to consider in a parental termination); Sanchez v. Tex. Dept. of Human Res., 581 S.W.2d 260, 265-66 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ) (holding that the parent's poor prognosis regarding her ability to learn to care for her children is a factor to consider in terminating the parent-child relationship); Coleman v. Tex. Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 562 S.W.2d 554, 557 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (considering the fact that the parent was living with someone to whom she was not married in determining whether to terminate the parent-child relationship); D.F. v. State, 525 S.W.2d 933, 940 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (op. on reh'g) (considering the parent's unstable employment history in determining the best interest of the child); Magallon v. State, 523 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tex.Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ) (considering the parent's repeated instances of unwed motherhood in determining whether termination was in the child's best interest).
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that appellant used illegal drugs during her pregnancy with C.A.J., as well as during her first two pregnancies and current pregnancy. The fact that appellant repeatedly exposed her unborn children to cocaine or methamphetamine may be considered in determining whether appellant endangered the well-being of her children. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72; In re W.E.C., 110 S.W.3d 231, 239 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). Appellant has been a drug addict for thirteen years and has enrolled in at least four different drug treatment programs, but failed to complete any of them. Appellant's drug addiction clearly poses an emotional and physical danger to C.A.J. now and in the future.
Appellant freely admits that she is unable to care for the child herself. She has no stable source of income or permanent home and spent most of her time prior to being in jail, living in motels or at the *894 Salvation Army. Without stability, income, or a home, appellant is unable to provide for the child's emotional and physical needs. Moreover, appellant's unstable life threatens the physical well-being of the child and may put the child at risk of injury.
Appellant wisely concedes that it is not in the best interest of the child to retain custody of the child herself. However, appellant argues that it will not be in the child's best interest to live in California with appellant's sister because the child will be far away and will never be allowed to see appellant or her maternal grandmother. Essentially, appellant fears that if the child is adopted by appellant's sister, C.A.J. will never know appellant's "side to the story" and will grow up hating appellant. Yet, this has nothing to do with the child's best interest.
Testimony at trial reflected that C.A.J. was doing well since her placement with the Eckmans. Anderson testified that Eckman maintained more than the required contact with D.P.R.S., in contrast to appellant and her mother who have both failed to cooperate with the state agencies in the past. In particular, appellant failed to stay in contact with her caseworker, failed to complete drug rehabilitation programs, and failed to complete her assigned C.P.S. service plan.
Appellant argues that it is in the best interest of the child to be placed with appellant's mother, Wilson, because her second child lives with Wilson and is doing well. However, Wilson herself admitted to withdrawing from consideration as a placement for C.A.J. Moreover, she recommended Eckman as a suitable placement. Wilson implied that she would like to be reconsidered as a placement for C.A.J., but admitted to never contacting the C.P.S. investigator to make her desire for reconsideration known. Additionally, no evidence was presented to show that placement of C.A.J. with the Eckmans would not be in her best interest.
In light of the evidence of appellant's continuous and long-term drug use, her unstable lifestyle, and criminal record, we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that termination of the parent-child relationship was in the child's best interest. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's sole point. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's order terminating the parent-child relationship in its entirety.


MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                                 FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any                                         Aug 28 2020, 8:40 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
                                                                                CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral                                           Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case.                                                      and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Christopher Taylor-Price                                 Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Agency                     Attorney General of Indiana
Appellate Division
                                                         Courtney L. Staton
Indianapolis, Indiana                                    Deputy Attorney General
                                                         Indianapolis, Indiana

                                           IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Harvey James Hardin,                                     August 28, 2020
Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                         19A-CR-2479
        v.                                               Appeal from the Marion Superior
                                                         Court
State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Charnette D. Garner,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Judge
                                                         Trial Court Cause No.
                                                         49G09-1901-F6-1760

Bailey, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2479 | August 28, 2020             Page 1 of 6
                                          Case Summary
[1]   Following a jury trial, Harvey James Hardin (“Hardin”) was convicted of

      Escape, as a Level 6 felony,1 and adjudicated a habitual offender.2 Hardin now

      appeals, challenging the admission of GPS evidence of his location. We affirm.

                                Facts and Procedural History
[2]   After a court placed Hardin on home detention, Hardin reported to Marion

      County Community Corrections (“MCCC”) on December 19, 2018. When

      prompted to provide the address of his residence, Hardin gave an address on

      Market Street. Hardin was advised of the rules of home detention, including

      the requirement that he stay within his residence and update MCCC of any

      address change in advance. He also signed a document that contained these

      rules. Eventually, Hardin was fitted with an ankle monitor. The monitor had a

      GPS feature as well as a telephone feature that allowed MCCC to call Hardin.

[3]   On December 20, 2018, Hardin’s case manager called Hardin through the

      monitor. On the call, Hardin admitted that he was living at 2332 East

      Washington Street, not at the address he provided on Market Street. Hardin

      claimed that the Wheeler Mission on Market Street did not have space, so he

      was staying with a friend. The case manager instructed Hardin to report to

      1
          Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-4(b).
      2
          I.C. § 35-50-2-8.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2479 | August 28, 2020   Page 2 of 6
      MCCC on or before the next day. After Hardin failed to report and his monitor

      ran out of power, a warrant was issued for his arrest. On January 3, 2019,

      Hardin was arrested at an apartment building at 2332 East Washington Street.

[4]   The State charged Hardin with three counts of Escape, each as a Level 6 felony.

      In Count 2, the State alleged that, “[o]n or about December 21, 2018,” Hardin

      “knowingly or intentionally violate[d] a home detention order” by “being in a

      location not permitted by his home detention contract terms.” App. Vol. 2 at

      90. The State also alleged that Hardin had the status of a habitual offender.

[5]   A jury trial was eventually held on August 21, 2019. At trial, the State elicited

      testimony from (1) the MCCC employee who went over the home-detention

      rules with Hardin, to whom Hardin had provided the address on Market Street;

      (2) the MCCC employee who called Hardin through the monitor and learned

      from Hardin that he was now living on East Washington Street, not Market

      Street; and (3) the officer who eventually arrested Hardin on East Washington

      Street after Hardin failed to report to MCCC as instructed. The State also

      introduced GPS records from a software program. Those records purportedly

      show Hardin’s location over time through the GPS feature on his monitor.

      Hardin objected to the admission of the records, arguing that the State had not

      shown that the location data was reliable. The trial court admitted the records.

[6]   The jury found Hardin guilty of Count 2 and not guilty of the other counts.

      The trial court entered a judgment of conviction and the matter proceeded to an

      enhancement phase, after which the jury found that Hardin had the status of a

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2479 | August 28, 2020   Page 3 of 6
      habitual offender. The court held a sentencing hearing and sentenced Hardin to

      an aggregate term of five years in the Indiana Department of Correction.

[7]   Hardin now appeals.

                                 Discussion and Decision
[8]   We review evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion. Hardin v. State, 148

      N.E.3d 932, 939 (Ind. 2020). However, we will not reverse if the alleged error

      is harmless. Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A). Error is harmless “where its probable

      impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to

      affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Id. In other words, we will not

      reverse “[i]f we are satisfied [that] the conviction is supported by independent

      evidence of guilt such that there is little likelihood the challenged evidence

      contributed to the verdict[.]” Blount v. State, 22 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. 2014).

[9]   Hardin argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the

      GPS records. However, assuming arguendo that the court improperly admitted

      the records, there is little likelihood that the evidence contributed to the verdict.

      Indeed, to obtain a conviction, the State was obligated to prove beyond a

      reasonable doubt that Hardin knowingly or intentionally violated a home-

      detention order, see I.C. § 35-44.1-3-4(b), by “being in a location not permitted

      by his home detention contract terms,” App. Vol. 2 at 72. At trial, there was

      evidence that Hardin was bound by the following term: “You will be confined

      inside (within the walls of your residence; front door to back door) the residence

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2479 | August 28, 2020   Page 4 of 6
       at all times,” except when traveling to approved locations. Ex. Vol. at 58.

       Hardin was also bound by a term governing address changes: “You must advise

       your Case Manager prior to a change in residence, phone number, who is

       residing with you, employment, employment hours, and the dates and times for

       any activities that you wish to be approved.” Id. Hardin was advised that he

       could call the MCCC Operations Center twenty-four hours per day. Id. at 9.

[10]   Independent of the GPS records, there is evidence that Hardin failed to advise

       MCCC prior to a change in residence—unilaterally traveling to an apartment

       building on East Washington Street without first advising MCCC. Indeed,

       Hardin admitted that he was on East Washington Street and not at the reported

       address on Market Street. Although Hardin claimed that he was living on East

       Washington Street because the Wheeler Mission on Market Street did not have

       room to accommodate him, Hardin nevertheless failed to advise MCCC in

       advance of a change of residence and he traveled to an unapproved location.

       When MCCC called Hardin, Hardin was informed that he failed to advise

       MCCC of the location of his residence in advance. He was given instructions

       to report to MCCC. However, after that conversation, Hardin failed to report.

[11]   All in all, the challenged GPS evidence purportedly showed Hardin’s specific

       location over time—at addresses other than the one on Market Street and

       beyond the 2332 East Washington Street address where Hardin had unilaterally

       moved. Yet, there is independent evidence that Hardin admitted to traveling to

       an unapproved location without first advising MCCC. In light of Hardin’s

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2479 | August 28, 2020   Page 5 of 6
       admission, we are not persuaded that evidence of additional travel contributed

       to the jury’s determination that Hardin violated the terms of home detention.3

[12]   We conclude that the alleged error is, at most, harmless error. We therefore

       need not directly address the admissibility of the challenged evidence.

[13]   Affirmed.

       Vaidik, J., and Baker, Sr. J., concur.

       3
         At times, Hardin points out that the charging information alleged a violation “on or about December 21,
       2018.” App. Vol. 2 at 90. He asserts that the GPS records were the only evidence of his location on
       December 21, 2018. To the extent Hardin suggests that the jury was obligated to ignore the December 20
       phone call between Hardin and MCCC due to the date in the information, we disagree. It is well-established
       that “[w]here . . . time is not an element of the offense, the State is not required to prove the offense occurred
       on the precise date alleged, and its presentation of evidence is not limited to events on that date.” Blount, 22
       N.E.3d at 569. Here, there is ample independent evidence of a breach on or about December 21, 2018.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2479 | August 28, 2020                        Page 6 of 6


Filed 9/11/17
                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                       DIVISION SEVEN

In re DESTINY D., a Person          B279742
Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.                          (Los Angeles County
                                    Super. Ct. No. DK20132)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
       Plaintiff and Respondent,

       v.
SERGIO D.,

       Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Philip L. Soto, Judge. Affirmed.
      Terence M. Chucas, by appointment of the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Marcy C. Wickham, County Counsel, R. Keith Davis,
Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Deputy County
Counsel for Defendant and Respondent.
      The juvenile court sustained allegations that Sergio D., the
presumed father of 15-year-old Destiny D., had a history of
alcohol abuse and was a current abuser of alcohol and Claudia A.,
Destiny’s mother, had failed to protect the child from Sergio. The
court declared Destiny a dependent child of the court, released
her to Claudia’s custody, limited Sergio to monitored visitation
with Destiny and terminated its jurisdiction. Without
challenging the court’s findings at jurisdiction or disposition,
Sergio contends the court acted in excess of its authority when it
terminated dependency jurisdiction with a juvenile custody order
at the conclusion of the combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing
rather than setting a future review hearing. We affirm.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      1. The Superior Court’s Predependency Restraining Order
         and Custody and Visitation Orders
       Sergio and Claudia have a long history of engaging in
domestic violence in Destiny’s presence. During one incident in
August 2016 Sergio held a knife to Claudia’s throat. Destiny
intervened to protect her mother; Sergio shoved Destiny, injuring
her.
       On August 18, 2016 Claudia petitioned the superior court
for a restraining order to protect her from Sergio. On
September 9, 2016, after an evidentiary hearing, the superior
court issued a restraining order requiring Sergio to move out of
                                                            1
the family home and stay at least 100 yards from Claudia. In
addition, the superior court issued temporary child custody and
visitation orders granting Claudia and Sergio joint legal custody
of Destiny, Claudia sole physical custody, and visitation for

1
      The restraining order expires on September 9, 2019.

                                2
Sergio on alternate weekends and three afternoons and evenings
during the week after school until 8:00 p.m. The order specified
the transfer of physical custody for visitation purposes would
occur at a police station and stated Sergio “shall not consume any
alcoholic beverage 12 hours prior to, and during, visitation” with
Destiny.
      2. The Referral and Investigation
      On September 13, 2016 the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (Department)
received a telephone referral alleging Sergio had inflicted serious
physical and emotional abuse on Destiny. During an interview
Claudia told the social worker Sergio had been violent
throughout their 18-year relationship, but she had remained with
him to keep her family together. Following the August 2016
incident, however, she finally had had enough and obtained the
restraining and custody orders to protect herself and Destiny
from Sergio.
      Destiny confirmed her father’s history of violent behavior
toward her mother, stating he had “[p]ut his hands on my mom
more times than I can count.” Destiny reported Sergio typically
did not hit her, but he did shove and injure her during the
August 2016 incident when she tried to defend her mother.
Destiny also admitted to engaging in self-harming “cutting”
behaviors when she was 13 years old because she had been
unable to cope with her parents’ marital conflict.
      Both Claudia and Destiny stated Sergio abused alcohol
regularly and had a history of driving while intoxicated with
Destiny in the car. While both Claudia and Destiny were
concerned about Sergio’s visitation while intoxicated, neither
identified any incident since the superior court’s orders were

                                 3
obtained in which Sergio had consumed alcohol prior to or during
a visit with Destiny.
       Sergio denied engaging in any intimate partner violence.
He claimed Claudia was volatile and aggressive and deliberately
incited arguments. He denied abusing Destiny. He
acknowledged pushing Destiny away during an argument with
Claudia when Destiny intervened, but insisted “that was it.” He
did not injure her. Sergio also denied abusing alcohol.
       In a follow-up telephone interview on October 27, 2016
Claudia reported everything had been going well. Destiny had
not visited with Sergio and was thriving. Claudia had new
insight into the extent to which the domestic violence had
harmed Destiny and wished she had taken action earlier to
protect herself and Destiny.
     3. The Dependency Petition and Detention Hearing
     On November 1, 2016 the Department filed a petition
pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm) and (b) (failure to
        2
protect), alleging Sergio and Claudia had a long history of
domestic violence; Sergio had physically abused Destiny at least
once during a violent altercation with Claudia; Sergio was a
current abuser of alcohol and drove with Destiny while
intoxicated; and Claudia had failed to protect Destiny from
Sergio’s violent conduct and alcohol abuse.
      In the report prepared for the detention hearing the
Department acknowledged the September 2016 restraining order
had gone a long way toward protecting Destiny from domestic
violence and both Sergio and Claudia appeared to be abiding by

2
      Statutory references are to this code.

                                 4
it. Nevertheless, the Department observed, Claudia had a
history of disregarding Sergio’s violent past to keep the family
together, and the Department was concerned her insight into the
effect of the domestic violence and Sergio’s alcohol abuse on
Destiny’s well-being, although a positive development, was too
recent to ensure Destiny’s safety. The Department also believed
all members of the family would benefit from court-ordered
services. The court agreed, detained Destiny from Sergio and
released her to Claudia provided Sergio not live in or visit the
home. Sergio was granted monitored visitation. The court
directed the Department to provide low cost/no cost referrals to
Sergio for drug and alcohol rehabilitation counseling, domestic
violence counseling, individual counseling and parenting classes.
       The juvenile court set the jurisdiction hearing for
December 13, 2016 and ordered the Department to address at
that time closure of the case with a section 362.4 juvenile custody
order.
       4. The Combined Jurisdiction/Disposition Hearing
       At the combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing Sergio
vigorously argued for dismissal of the petition. He insisted the
superior court’s orders, including the restraining order,
adequately protected Destiny and there was no need for the
dependency court to intervene. He believed Claudia had made
the referral that prompted the Department’s involvement
because she had been unhappy with the superior court’s
temporary custody order, which permitted Sergio unmonitored
visitation as long as he did not consume alcohol. His counsel also
argued, if Sergio picked up Destiny for her visitation while he
was under the influence of alcohol, 15-year-old Destiny was old
enough to realize it and refuse to ride with him.

                                 5
       Claudia argued the petition should be dismissed as to her
because Destiny was no longer in danger from her failure to
protect Destiny from Sergio. Quite the contrary, Claudia had
done everything in her power to protect Destiny by obtaining the
restraining order and visitation and custody orders.
       Destiny’s counsel argued Destiny remained in danger from
Sergio notwithstanding the superior court’s restraining order and
custody and visitation orders. She argued the order requiring
Sergio to refrain from consuming alcohol before picking Destiny
up for a visit effectively, and improperly, imposed on Destiny the
obligation to determine if her father had been drinking. In
addition, Destiny’s counsel argued, “It’s not just the drinking that
concerns us, it’s also the anger. And there’s nothing to cover that
in the family law order.” Destiny’s counsel did not argue Destiny
remained in danger because of Claudia’s action or inaction.
       The Department acknowledged the superior court’s orders
adequately protected Destiny from the risk of harm from
domestic violence and recommended the court dismiss those
allegations. However, it argued, the superior court’s order
requiring Sergio to refrain from consuming alcohol prior to
visiting Destiny was insufficient to protect Destiny. More was
needed, the Department asserted, including monitored visitation
and programs for Sergio to address his long-standing alcohol
dependency. The Department also reiterated that Claudia had a
history of not appreciating the harm caused by Sergio’s alcohol
abuse and had not prevented him from driving while intoxicated
when Destiny was in the car. The Department recommended the
court sustain the allegations in the petition pertaining to both
Sergio and Claudia, release Destiny to Claudia’s custody and
terminate its jurisdiction with a juvenile custody order granting

                                 6
Claudia and Sergio joint legal custody, Claudia primary physical
custody and Sergio reasonable visitation. In a last minute
information report provided to the court the day of the hearing,
the Department requested Sergio’s visitation with Destiny be
monitored.
       The juvenile court adopted the Department’s
recommendations. It dismissed the subdivision (a) counts and
the subdivision (b) allegations relating to domestic violence,
concluding the restraining order had removed any threat to
Destiny, but rejected Sergio’s and Claudia’s requests the
remaining allegations pertaining to each of them be dismissed.
The court sustained allegations under Section 300,
subdivision (b), relating to Sergio’s alcohol abuse and Claudia’s
failure to protect, stating, “While it was all well argued by
father’s counsel, I cannot agree that this is just a family law case
that should be dismissed and sent back to family law. We need
the ability to protect the child from both parents. We have the
ability to do so. I make a finding regarding that. I don’t agree
with mother’s counsel that mother with the knowledge of the
father’s prolonged, protracted drinking habits and his anger
management problems that were facilitated by his current
drinking, she needed to have done something much, much sooner
than she did. And failing to do so, she’s liable for the risks to the
child as well.”
       The juvenile court declared Destiny a dependent child of
the court, removed her from Sergio’s custody pursuant to
section 361, subdivision (c), and released her to Claudia’s

                                  7
        3                            4
custody. Over Sergio’s objection, the court terminated its
jurisdiction with a juvenile custody order that granted Claudia
and Sergio joint legal custody of Destiny, Claudia sole physical
custody and modified the superior court’s prior visitation order by

3
       The court’s citation to section 361, subdivision (c), in
connection with its orders concerning Sergio was error. That
provision applies only when the issue is whether to remove a
dependent child from the physical custody of a parent with whom
the child was residing at the time the dependency petition was
initiated. (See In re Anthony Q. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 336, 347.)
Nonetheless, the error was harmless: In making its disposition
orders the juvenile court has broad discretion under sections 361,
subdivision (a)(1), and 362, subdivision (a), to resolve issues
regarding the custody and control of the child. (See Anthony Q.,
at pp. 346, 353-354.)
4
       In objecting to the court’s decision to terminate its
jurisdiction, Sergio’s counsel urged the court to continue
supervision and provide enhancement services to Sergio and
Destiny so they could begin to repair their relationship: “I think
this court should . . . make sure that the father has a reasonable
chance of having a relationship with this child. I think if the
court dismisses this case, terminates this case, I think the
chances of this father and this child getting back together are
practically nil given the estranged relationship between these
two people, and the angst that is going on in this family law
matter. So I am asking that the court keep the case open. . . .
And order the father into the programs. But most importantly,
order conjoint counseling with the minor so that the father can
get back with this child.”

                                 8
requiring Sergio’s visitation of at least eight hours per week be
             5
monitored.
                         DISCUSSION
      1. The Juvenile Court Possesses the Statutory Authority To
         Terminate Its Jurisdiction at Disposition in an
         Appropriate Case Upon Releasing the Dependent Child
         To a Custodial Parent
             a. Standard of review
       Without challenging any of the juvenile court’s findings,
Sergio contends the court acted in excess of its statutory
authority when it terminated its jurisdiction at the conclusion of
the combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing. The question
whether a court is authorized to perform a certain act under a
statutory scheme is a purely legal question subject to de novo
review. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000)
24 Cal.4th 415, 432; In re Anthony Q. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 336,
344; see In re Andrew A. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1518, 1525
[“‘[t]he question whether a court is authorized to perform a
certain act is a purely legal question which entails construction of
statutory language and application of legal principles . . . [to
which] we apply de novo review’”].)

5
       The court stayed the termination order for one day
“pending receipt of juvenile custody order on December 14, 2016.”
The court received a custody order from counsel for Claudia and
filed it on December 14, 2016. Sergio’s notice of appeal, filed
December 14, 2016, identifies only the December 13, 2016 order.

                                 9
            b. The court’s statutory authority at disposition to
               make any reasonable orders necessary to protect
               the dependent child includes the power to
               terminate jurisdiction in an appropriate case
      At the jurisdiction stage of a dependency proceeding, the
court determines whether the child is a person described by
section 300. (§§ 355, 356.) If the juvenile court finds a basis to
assume jurisdiction, the court is then required to hear evidence
on the question of the proper disposition for the child. (§ 358,
subd. (a); Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 248;
In re Anthony Q., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 345; see Cal. Rules of
                             6
Court, rules 5.684(g), 5.690.) Typically, once the child has been
adjudged to be a dependent child pursuant to section 360,
subdivision (d), the juvenile court determines what services the
child and family need to be reunited and free from court
supervision. (In re Carl H. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1019, 1037; In re
Anthony Q., at p. 346; Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007)
148 Cal.App.4th 285, 302-303.) The court then sets a review
hearing, which must be held within six months, to evaluate the
family’s circumstances and decide whether continued dependency
jurisdiction is necessary. (§§ 366.21, subd. (e) [review hearing if
child removed from physical custody of his or her parent]; 364
[review hearing if child remains in the custody of one or both
parents].)
       Under this statutory scheme, Sergio contends, once the
court asserted dependency jurisdiction and released Destiny to
Claudia’s custody at disposition, it was obligated to set a
section 364 review hearing before it could consider terminating
its jurisdiction. (See § 364, subd. (a) [“[e]very hearing in which

6
      Rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

                                 10
an order is made placing a child under the supervision of the
juvenile court pursuant to Section 300 and in which the child is
not removed from the physical custody of his or her parent or
guardian shall be continued to a specific future date not to exceed
six months after the date of the original disposition hearing”].)
Alternatively, he observes, the court could have set aside its
jurisdiction findings and dismissed the petition upon finding
“that the interests of justice and the welfare of the minor require
the dismissal, and the parent or guardian of the minor is not in
need of treatment or rehabilitation.” (§ 390; see In re Carl H.,
supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 1038.) However, the court did neither.
Instead, it sustained jurisdiction based on the conduct of both
parents, released Destiny to her custodial parent and closed the
case at the conclusion of the disposition hearing. Emphasizing
that the court’s action was not directly authorized by any specific
statutory language or rule 5.695, which governs findings and
                                   7
orders of the court at disposition, Sergio argues the court

7
       Rule 5.695(a) provides, “At the disposition hearing, the
court may: [¶] “(1) Dismiss the petition . . . ; [¶] (2) [p]lace the
child under a program of supervision for a time period consistent
with section 301 and order that services be provided; [¶]
(3) [a]ppoint a legal guardian for the child . . . ; [¶] (4) [d]eclare
dependency and appoint a legal guardian for the child . . . ; [¶]
(5) [d]eclare dependency, permit the child to remain at home, and
order that services be provided; [¶] (6) [d]eclare dependency,
permit the child to remain at home, limit the control to be
exercised by the parent or guardian, and order that services be
provided; or [¶] (7) [d]eclare dependency, remove physical custody
from the parent or guardian, and: [¶] (A) After stating on the
record or in writing the factual basis for the order, order custody
to a noncustodial parent, terminating jurisdiction, and direct that
Custody Order--Juvenile--Final Judgment (form JV-200) be

                                 11
exceeded its authority in terminating its jurisdiction. His
argument is flawed in multiple respects.
      First, contrary to Sergio’s contention, section 364,
subdivision (a), which requires the juvenile court to schedule a
review hearing within six months of the original disposition
hearing when the court allows the child to remain at home with
ongoing court supervision, is not an impediment to the court’s
decision to terminate jurisdiction at the conclusion of a
disposition hearing. That section requires a post-disposition
review hearing only when the court has released the child to
parental custody and found that continued supervision with
family maintenance services is necessary to protect the child from
                          8
the risk of serious harm. If services and ongoing supervision are
not needed, section 364, subdivision (a), is not implicated.
       Second, Sergio’s narrow characterization of the juvenile
court’s discretion at disposition is contrary to the statutes that
grant the juvenile court broad authority to enter orders to protect
a dependent child and to reunite the family and terminate
jurisdiction as quickly as possible. (See John v. Superior Court
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 91, 95-96 [court’s fundamental task in statutory

prepared and filed . . . ; [¶] (B) After stating on the record or in
writing the factual basis for the order, order custody to a
noncustodial parent with services to one or both parents; or [¶]
(C) Make a placement order and consider granting specific
visitation rights to the child’s grandparents.”
8
       If the court permits a parent or guardian to retain custody
of a dependent child subject to its supervision, “the parents or
guardians shall be required to participate in child welfare
services or services provided by an appropriate agency designated
by the court.” (§ 362, subd. (c).)

                                 12
construction is to construe statute in light of statutory language
and in context of statutory scheme as a whole, to effect legislative
intent and avoid absurd results]; In re Anthony Q., supra,
5 Cal.App.5th at p. 344 [same].) Apart from the statutory
limitation on its authority to remove a child from a custodial
parent with whom the child was residing at the time the
dependency petition was filed (see § 361, subd. (c)), the juvenile
court enjoys wide discretion to make any orders necessary to
protect the dependent child (§ 361, subd. (a)), including “all
reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct,
maintenance, and support of the child” (§ 362, subd. (a)) and
those orders directed to the parents of a dependent child that it
“deems necessary and proper for the best interests of or for the
rehabilitation of the minor” (§ 245.5). That authority necessarily
includes, in an appropriate circumstance, discretion to terminate
dependency jurisdiction when the child is in parental custody and
no protective issue remains. (See § 361, subd. (a)(1) [limitations
on parental rights “may not exceed those necessary to protect the
child”]; In re Ethan C. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 610, 625 [“[e]ven after a
dependency finding has been made, the statutory scheme is
designed . . . to return full custody and control to the parents or
guardians if, and as soon as, the circumstances warrant”]; cf.
§ 364, subd. (c) [absent evidence the conditions still exist that
would justify the initial assumption of jurisdiction under section
300 or that those conditions are likely to exist if supervision is
                                                               9
withdrawn, “[t]he court shall terminate its jurisdiction”].)

9
      Although rule 5.695 articulates some of the options
available to the court under sections 245.5, 358, 360, 361, 361.2
and 390, the rule does not (and could not) preclude other options
at disposition if authorized by statute. (See In re Abbigail A.

                                 13
       Third, Sergio’s contention that the juvenile court’s only
options at disposition if it permits a child to remain at home are
to set aside the jurisdiction findings and dismiss the dependency
petition (§ 390; rule 5.695(a)(1)) or to declare dependency and
continue court supervision with services (§§ 361, subd. (a), 364,
subd. (a); rule 5.695(a)(5)), disregards the court’s statutory
discretion to impose necessary limitations on an offending
parent’s contact with a dependent child before terminating its
jurisdiction. (See § 362.4 [before terminating jurisdiction over
“minor who has been adjudged a dependent of the juvenile court,”
court may issue protective orders under section 213.5 and orders
determining custody of, or visitation with, the dependent child].)
If no substantial risk of harm exists once those restrictions are in
place, and ongoing supervision is unnecessary, termination of
jurisdiction is appropriate. (Cf. In re Chantal S. (1996)
13 Cal.4th 196, 204 [“[t]he juvenile court’s determination that
continuation of dependency was at that time unnecessary for
Chantal’s protection, was in turn [properly] premised on the
existence of the court’s custody and visitation order”].) To hold
otherwise and conclude that court supervision must be continued,
even absent a continuing risk of harm, simply because the
protective and custody orders that eliminated the risk were made
at the conclusion of a disposition hearing, rather than a

(2016) 1 Cal.5th 83, 92 [Judicial Council may not adopt rules that
are inconsistent with the governing statutes]; People v. Hall
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 950, 960 [same]; see also Trans-Action
Commercial Investors, Ltd. v. Firmaterr, Inc. (1997)
60 Cal.App.4th 352, 364 [“[i]t is settled [law] that in order to
comply with the constitutional requirement of consistency with
the statutory law, a rule of court must not conflict with statutory
intent”].)

                                14
subsequent review hearing, would be wholly at odds with the
fundamental goal of the dependency system to return the child to
his or her custodial parent and terminate dependency jurisdiction
as soon as circumstances permit. (See In re Ethan C., supra,
                      10
54 Cal.4th at p. 625.)
       Our conclusion that the juvenile court retains the
discretion in an appropriate case to terminate its jurisdiction at
the close of a disposition hearing when it finds services and
continued court supervision are not necessary to protect the child
is further strengthened, if not compelled, by analogy to
section 361.2, which permits the juvenile court to terminate its
jurisdiction at disposition after placing the dependent child with
a noncustodial parent and ordering that parent to become the
legal and physical custodian of the child. (See § 361.2,
            11
subd. (b)(1); In re Janee W. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452
[jurisdiction properly terminated at disposition under section

10
       Exercise of the court’s discretion to terminate dependency
jurisdiction at the conclusion of a disposition hearing when
protective and custody orders are in place and court supervision
is unnecessary would seem particularly appropriate in failure-to-
protect cases under section 300, subdivision (b), which specifically
provides that “[t]he child shall continue to be a dependent child
pursuant to this subdivision only so long as is necessary to
protect the child from risk of suffering serious physical harm or
illness.”
11
      Section 361.2, subdivision (b), provides in part, “If the court
places the child with th[e] [previously noncustodial] parent it
may do any of the following: [¶] (1) Order that the parent
become legal and physical custodian of the child. The court may
also provide reasonable visitation by the noncustodial parent.
The court shall then terminate its jurisdiction over the child. . . .”

                                  15
361.2, subdivision (b)(1), absent evidence child was at continuing
risk of harm].) It simply makes no sense to conclude, as Sergio
urges, that the Legislature intended to authorize the juvenile
court to terminate its jurisdiction at disposition after placement
of a child with a noncustodial parent when there is no longer a
reason for court supervision and not afford the juvenile court the
same discretion when the child has been released to a custodial
parent and orders made at disposition have fully resolved any
issue of continuing risk of harm. (Cf. In re Jaden E. (2014)
229 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1286 [“‘a section 361.2 placement with a
noncustodial parent should be treated in the same manner as a
section 362 placement with a custodial parent’”]; In re Pedro Z.
(2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 12, 21 [same].)
       As with placement of a child with a noncustodial parent
and termination of jurisdiction under section 361.2,
subdivision (b)(1), whether the custodial parent to whom a child
is released is “offending” or “nonoffending” is, of course, relevant
to the appropriate disposition orders, but not necessarily outcome
determinative. (See In re D’Anthony D. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th
292, 300 [nothing in section 361.2 requires a previously
noncustodial parent to be nonoffending to be considered for
placement; “‘[t]he term “nonoffending” does not appear in the text
of section 361.2’”]; In re Nickolas T. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1492
[same]; but see In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597, 607
[implicitly reading a requirement that noncustodial parent be
nonoffending to obtain custody under section 361.2].) Thus, as
we discuss more fully in the next section, the failure-to-protect
finding as to Claudia is relevant for the court to consider in
making orders at disposition, including whether to terminate
jurisdiction; it does not categorically disqualify her from custody

                                 16
or otherwise limit the court’s ability to issue orders necessary to
further Destiny’s best interest.
       Arguing in favor of affirming the order terminating
jurisdiction, the Department urges us to adopt the reasoning of
In re A.J. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 525, in which our colleagues in
Division One of the Fourth Appellate District held the juvenile
court possessed “inherent authority” to terminate jurisdiction at
the disposition hearing when further supervision was
unnecessary to protect the child. In that case, during a contested
disposition hearing, the juvenile court declared A.J. a dependent
child of the court, removed her from her mother’s custody and
placed her with her out-of-state, nonoffending, noncustodial
biological father, Joshua. The court continued the disposition
hearing for lack of proper notice to Joshua and indicated it would,
at the continued hearing, consider terminating its jurisdiction
after it had more information about A.J.’s adjustment to living
with Joshua. After several continuances, at a combined
contested disposition and six-month review hearing, the court
heard evidence concerning A.J.’s progress with Joshua.
Thereafter, the court declared Joshua A.J.’s presumed father and
terminated its jurisdiction, stating, “‘I don’t think there’s a
protective issue at this point.’” (Id. at p. 535.)
       On appeal A.J.’s mother, Jamie, argued the juvenile court
lacked the statutory authority at disposition to place A.J. with
Joshua and terminate its jurisdiction. When the court placed
A.J. with Joshua, Jamie observed, Joshua had not been declared
a presumed father. Consequently, she argued, neither
section 361.2, which permits placement of a dependent child with
a noncustodial parent and authorizes termination of jurisdiction
(see In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 454 [“only a

                                17
presumed father is entitled to assume immediate custody” under
section 361.2]), nor section 364, which only applies if A.J. had not
been removed from Jamie’s custody, authorized the court’s
termination order.
       The Court of Appeal agreed that, “[a]t the time the
[juvenile] court ordered that A.J. be placed with [Joshua] in
Hawaii, and indicated its intention to terminate jurisdiction, it
had found that Joshua was a mere biological father, not the
presumed father. For this reason, as Jamie contends, section
361.2 did not govern the juvenile court’s custody analysis.” (In re
A.J., supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 536.) The appellate court also
agreed section 364, authorizing jurisdiction following a child’s
release to his or her custodial parent, was inapplicable because
A.J. had been removed from the custody of her mother. (In re
A.J., at p. 536.) Nevertheless, while Joshua’s request for custody
and termination of jurisdiction “did not fit neatly within the
parameters of either section 361.2 or section 364” (ibid.), the
appellate court held the juvenile court had the inherent authority
to terminate jurisdiction after finding by clear and convincing
evidence it was in A.J.’s best interests to be placed with Joshua
and no further protective issue justified its retention of
jurisdiction. (Id. at pp. 536-537.)
       In our view, the In re A.J. court need not have relied on the
juvenile court’s inherent authority to find termination of
jurisdiction proper. By the time the court terminated
jurisdiction, Joshua had been declared a presumed father; thus,
section 361.2 provided adequate statutory authority for the
court’s action. (As for placement with Joshua prior to declaring
him a presumed father, section 362, subdivision (a), authorized

                                 18
the court to make any and all orders for the care and supervision
of the dependent child.)
       Still, In re A.J. is not wholly inapposite. In addition to its
reliance on the juvenile court’s inherent authority, the In re A.J.
court explicitly recognized the juvenile court’s broad statutory
authority under section 245.5 to direct any and all orders to the
parent or parents of a child that the court deems necessary and
proper to further the best interest of the child. (In re A.J., supra,
214 Cal.App.4th at pp. 536-537 [“‘“[t]he juvenile court has broad
discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the
child’s interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accordance
with this discretion”’”].) As discussed, that breadth of statutory
authority necessarily includes the discretion to terminate
jurisdiction at the conclusion of the disposition hearing in an
appropriate case when child welfare services and continued court
supervision are no longer necessary to protect the child.
      2. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by
         Terminating Its Jurisdiction at the Disposition Hearing
       In holding the juvenile court has statutory authority to
terminate dependency jurisdiction at the conclusion of a
disposition hearing, we do not intend to suggest such action
should be the norm. To the contrary, it will be an unusual case
when protections imposed at disposition will be sufficient to
permit the conclusion that termination is appropriate. It will be
rarer still for a juvenile court to reach that conclusion when the
parent with whom the child remains has been found to be an
offending parent. Nevertheless, as in the analogous section 361.2
context, the court’s decision is to be guided by the relevant facts.
(Cf. In re D’Anthony D., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at pp. 300-303
[although section 361.2 does not disqualify an offending

                                 19
noncustodial parent, the offense is relevant and properly
considered as part of the detriment determination under that
provision]; In re Nickolas T., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1505-
1506 [same].) Jurisdiction should not be terminated unless the
court concludes services and ongoing supervision are not
necessary to protect the child. (In re Austin P. (2004)
118 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1134.)
       Sergio suggests there is an inherent conflict between the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding that Claudia’s failure to
protect Destiny posed a substantial risk of harm to the child (see
In re Carlos T. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 795, 803 [“dependency
jurisdiction is not warranted under subdivision (b) if, at the time
of the jurisdiction hearing, there no longer is a substantial risk
that the child will suffer harm”]; In re Savannah M. (2005)
131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1397 [same]), on the one hand, and its
order the same day terminating jurisdiction after releasing
Destiny to Claudia on the ground there remained no further need
for continuing court supervision, on the other. (See In re I.G.
(2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 380, 387 [“[i]t is a clear abuse of
discretion to make findings that a minor is at risk in her home,
yet return the minor home and terminate supervision and
dependency”].) However, viewed in the aggregate, the court’s
findings are fully reconcilable. Having dismissed the allegations
concerning domestic abuse on the ground the restraining order
obtained by Claudia eliminated any risk of harm, the juvenile
court focused on the risks Sergio’s alcohol abuse posed for
Destiny in connection with Sergio’s visitation rights and whether
Claudia’s insight into the effects of such alcohol abuse were too
recent to adequately protect Destiny from harm. By modifying
the superior court’s visitation order to require monitored

                                20
visitation for Sergio and prohibiting Claudia from serving as the
monitor, the court eliminated those risks, and thereafter
reasonably concluded further court supervision was unnecessary.
(See In re Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 204 [“[a]s the
present case illustrates . . . , there are situations in which a
juvenile court may reasonably determine that continued
supervision of the minor as a dependent child is not necessary for
the child’s protection, and at the same time conclude that
conditions on visitation are necessary to minimize, if not
eliminate, the danger that visits might subject the minor to the
same risk of physical abuse or emotional harm that previously
led to the dependency adjudication”].)
       Finally, Sergio contends termination of jurisdiction was
inherently prejudicial because it effectively denied him
reunification and/or enhancement services vital to repairing the
rupture in his relationship with Destiny. Because Destiny
remained with her custodial parent, Sergio was not entitled to
reunification services. (See § 16507, subd. (b) [“[f]amily
reunification services shall only be provided when a child has
been placed in out-of-home care, or is in the care of a previously
noncustodial parent under the supervision of the juvenile court”];
In re A.L. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 138, 145 [no reunification
services are called for when a child is not removed from her
custodial parent]; see generally Bridget A. v. Superior Court,
supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 303 [when child remains in home of
parent, proper form of child welfare services is family
maintenance services, not family reunification services].)
       Sergio was also not entitled to what are now often referred
to in dependency jargon as enhancement services, “child welfare
services offered to the parent not retaining custody, designed to

                                21
enhance the child’s relationship with that parent.” (Earl L. v.
Superior Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1497, fn. 1; see In re
A.C. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 636, 642, fn. 5 [“‘enhancement’
services are ‘not designed to reunify the child with that parent,
but instead to enhance the child’s relationship with that parent
by requiring that parent to address the issues that brought the
child before the court’”].) An order for enhancement services is
subject to the court’s discretion. (See § 362, subd. (a); In re A.L.,
supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 145.) The Department was ordered
to provide Sergio with referrals for services at the detention
hearing. Whether or not to continue jurisdiction in order to
permit Sergio to participate in additional services, given
Destiny’s safe placement with Claudia, was a decision for the
court. Sergio has not shown the court’s rejection of his request
for some form of enhancement services was arbitrary, capricious
or patently absurd. (See In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295,
318 [under abuse of discretion standard, order must be affirmed
unless juvenile court has “‘“exceeded the limits of legal discretion
by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
determination”’”].)
                          DISPOSITION
       The disposition order terminating dependency jurisdiction
is affirmed.

                                            PERLUSS, P. J.

      We concur:

            ZELON, J.                       SEGAL, J.

                                 22


210 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 2000)
Andrew L. Gore,Appellant,v.Trans World Airlines, a Delawarecorporation; Thomas J. Clossick;James Nass; Harold Smallwood;Kenneth Gabriel; Rollin O. Parker,Appellees.
No. 99-2363
United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Submitted: December 16, 1999Filed: April 26, 2000

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.[Copyrighted Material Omitted][Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Before BEAM, HEANEY, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.
HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

1
Andrew Gore appeals the district court's1 dismissal of his case due to preemption under the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C.  151-163, 181-188 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). We affirm.

I.

2
Andrew Gore is employed as a mechanic by Trans World Airlines (TWA) at its Maintenance and Engineering Center, also known as the Overhaul Base, in Kansas City, Missouri. He is a member of the International Association of Machinist and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO and the terms of his employment are subject to a collective bargaining agreement.

3
On the evening of December 15, 1996, Gore was working at the Overhaul Base. While he and coworker Howard Cowher were on a break, another coworker, Harold Smallwood, allegedly overheard Gore telling Cowher that he planned to kill himself as well as other TWA employees. Smallwood reported the comments to union steward Roy Gardner, who in turn reported the comments by telephone to Thomas Clossick, a supervisor in the Facilities Maintenance Department at the Overhaul Base. Clossick telephoned the report to James Nass, who is the Manager of the Facilities Maintenance Department and Clossick's immediate supervisor. Nass consulted with Paul Davis, who is TWA's Employee Relations Manager. Nass then instructed Clossick to get written statements from the coworkers as to Gore's statements and if necessary to call the police.

4
After reading the coworkers' statements,2 Clossick called the Kansas City International Airport Police. Gore asserted that Smallwood had not heard the entire conversation and had taken Gore's statements out of context. The police handcuffed Gore and patted him down searching for weapons. They requested permission to search his locker, tool chest, tool box, lunch box, and vehicle. Gore initially denied consent, but after consulting with union stewards, Gore consented to the search of his vehicle and locker. Supervisor Clossick required Gore to turn in his TWA identification badge and parking pass, and he suspended Gore pending a termination hearing.

5
The following morning, Rollin Parker, a supervisor in the Facilities Maintenance Department at that time, informed his crew members of the occurrence, warned them not to allow Gore onto the premises, and instructed them to call the guard house if Gore attempted to return to the Overhaul Base. Nass held a supervisors' meeting with Parker and Kenneth Gabriel and told them to warn their employees that Gore was a dangerous man. Gore's identification badge photograph was enlarged and posted in various places at the Overhaul Base to enable TWA employees to recognize Gore.

6
The collective bargaining agreement includes a management rights clause, pursuant to which TWA issued Rules of Conduct and Personnel Regulations, providing in pertinent part that violence, threatening other employees, and firearms are prohibited from the premises and that the company reserves the right to make inspections of employee lockers, desks, lunch boxes, vehicles, and other items of personal property located on the premises when there is reason to believe they may contain prohibited items. Also, the collective bargaining agreement imposes contractual obligations on TWA to protect the safety of its employees. The agreement requires TWA to maintain safe working conditions and to promptly handle complaints involving the safety of working conditions. (See J.A. at 179.) The defendants claim to have acted in accordance with the duties imposed by the collective bargaining agreement.

7
Gore disputed the truth of the statements made by supervisors advising employees that Gore was dangerous or posed a threat to TWA employees. While on suspension, Gore submitted to a psychological examination which demonstrated that he posed no threat to TWA personnel. Thereafter, the TWA hearing board decided that Gore did not pose a threat and reinstated him with back pay.

8
Gore filed a complaint in federal court against TWA, Clossick, Nass, Smallwood, and Parker, asserting a 42 U.S.C.  1983 violation along with several state-law claims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of TWA and Clossick on the  1983 claim, concluding that they were not state actors and did not act under color of state law. (J.A. at 254.) Having thus disposed of the only federal law claim, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. This court affirmed the dismissal for lack of a state actor. See Gore v. Trans World Airlines, 163 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 1998) (unpublished); (J.A. at 255).

9
Gore then filed an amended complaint in state court, asserting claims of false arrest, negligence, libel and slander, and invasion of privacy for publicly placing him in a false light and public disclosure of private facts. The defendants removed the case to federal district court. Gore filed a motion to remand, which the district court denied upon concluding that "the evaluation of whether the Plaintiff's claims have merit is inextricably intertwined with consideration of terms in the [collective bargaining agreement]." (J.A. at 284.) Noting that the resolution of Gore's claims will require an analysis of both his rights and the defendants' duties under the collective bargaining agreement, the district court determined that the claims are minor disputes preempted by the RLA.

10
The district court then granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, citing its previous determination that the claims are preempted by the RLA and refusing to reconsider the preemption issue. Gore now appeals the district court's denial of his motion for remand and the dismissal of his complaint on grounds of preemption.

II.

11
We review the district court's denial of a motion to remand and its dismissal of the complaint on grounds of preemption under a de novo standard. See Schuver v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 154 F.3d 795, 798 (8th Cir. 1998); Taggart v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 F.3d 269, 272 (8th Cir. 1994).

12
A defendant may remove a state court claim to federal court only if the claim originally could have been filed in federal court, and the well-pleaded complaint rule provides that a federal question must be presented on the face of the properly pleaded complaint to invoke federal court jurisdiction. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). A defendant is not permitted to inject a federal question into an otherwise state-law claim and thereby transform the action into one arising under federal law. See id. "Congress has long since decided that federal defenses do not provide a basis for removal." Id. at 399. "Thus, a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint, and even if both parties admit that the defense is the only question truly at issue in the case." Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). To permit removal on the basis of a federal defense would deprive the plaintiff of the right to be the master of his cause of action. See Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 399.

13
An independent corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule is known as the complete preemption doctrine. Id. at 393. The complete preemption doctrine converts an ordinary state-law claim into a federal claim where "the pre-emptive force of a statute is so 'extraordinary' that it 'converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.'" Id. (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987)). Whether federal law preempts a state-law cause of action is a question of congressional intent. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994).

14
"Congress' purpose in passing the RLA was to promote stability in labor-management relations by providing a comprehensive framework for resolving labor disputes." Id. Under the RLA, parties are obligated to arbitrate minor disputes, which are controversies arising out of the application or interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, and therefore, complete preemption applies to disputes involving duties and rights created or defined by the collective bargaining agreement. See id. at 256-59. Claims of preemption under the RLA are governed by a standard that is "virtually identical" to that employed under  301 of the Labor and Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C.  185; under this standard, "a state-law cause of action is not pre-empted by the RLA if it involves rights and obligations that exist independent of the [collective bargaining agreement]." Norris, 512 U.S. at 260.

15
"[W]here the resolution of a state law claim depends on an interpretation of the [collective bargaining agreement], the claim is pre-empted." Id. at 261 (discussing favorably the analysis set forth in Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc, 486 U.S. 399 (1988)). However, "'purely factual questions' about an employee's conduct or an employer's conduct and motives do not 'requir[e] a court to interpret any term of a collective-bargaining agreement.'" Id. (quoting Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407) (alteration in original). Also, a mere need to reference or consult a collective bargaining agreement during the course of state court litigation does not require preemption. See id. at 261 n.8. Our preemption analysis focuses on a determination of whether the state-law claim "confers nonnegotiable state-law rights on employers or employees independent of any right established by contract, or, instead, whether evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract." Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985) (cited favorably in Norris, 512 U.S. at 260-61); see Taggart, 40 F.3d at 272 (noting that "the critical question is one of characterization--does the state law claim involve interpretation or application of the collective bargaining agreement").

16
In this case, the district court concluded that Gore's state-law claims are preempted because they are inextricably intertwined with a consideration or interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Gore asserts that his state-law claims exist independent of the collective bargaining agreement and are not preempted. Our review of Missouri law, however, convinces us that the rights asserted in Gore's tort suit are not nonnegotiable, independent state-law rights. Instead, the facts of this tort suit make it "inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract." Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 213.

17
Gore's complaint alleges claims of false arrest, negligence, libel and slander, and invasion of privacy (both by placing Gore in a false light and by disclosing private facts). While state law has created these tort actions, the collective bargaining agreement is the defining source of the duties specifically owed by the defendants for each claim asserted. "The essence of the cause of action of false arrest, or false imprisonment, 'is the confinement, without legal justification, by the wrongdoer of the person wronged.'" Rustici v. Weidemeyer, 673 S.W.2d 762, 767 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (quoting Warrem v. Parrish, 436 S.W.2d 670, 672 (Mo. 1969)). To prevail on this claim, the plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate that the defendants' actions were done "without legal justification." Gore's complaint pleads this essential element generically, avoiding any mention of the relative rights and duties contained within the collective bargaining agreement. The defendants have indicated that their actions were required according to their interpretation of specific provisions in the collective bargaining agreement.

18
While we are mindful that removal cannot be invoked on the basis of facts not alleged in the complaint, see Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 397, we are also constrained by the artful pleading doctrine--the principle that "a plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions." Rivet, 522 U.S. at 475 (internal quotations omitted). When a plaintiff has artfully pleaded in a manner that avoids an element of the tort that rests on federal law, the court "may uphold removal even though no federal question appears on the face of the plaintiff's complaint." Id.; see also Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397 n.2 (1981) (quoting a treatise stating that courts will not permit artful pleading to close off a defendant's right to a federal forum and will seek to determine whether the real nature of the claim is federal, regardless of plaintiff's characterization).

19
While Gore's complaint avoids mention of the collective bargaining agreement, it indicates that the actions took place in the course and scope of the defendants' employment with TWA, a relationship in fact governed by a collective bargaining agreement that specifically requires TWA to provide a safe working environment and to promptly investigate and handle complaints relating to worker safety.  Employers and employees are free to negotiate what actions an employer may take to preserve the safety and security of the workplace and the safety of other employees. Given the fact that Gore's alleged statements caused a serious security concern in the workplace, Gore's burden to prove that he was falsely arrested without legal justification will necessarily require an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement to determine whether the defendants acted contrary to their duties under the agreement.  Thus, this claim is not based on an independent state-law right but is inextricably intertwined with the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, the claim is preempted.

20
Likewise, Gore's libel and slander claims will require the court to construe whether the defendants' actions conformed to the rights and duties created under the collective bargaining agreement. "The elements of defamation in Missouri are: 1) publication, 2) of a defamatory statement, 3) that identifies the plaintiff, 4) that is false, 5) that is published with the requisite degree of fault, and 6) damages the plaintiff's reputation." Overcast v. Billings Mut. Ins. Co., 11 S.W.3d 62, 70 (Mo. 2000) (en banc). The element requiring a showing that the statement was published with the requisite degree of fault will need to be evaluated within the framework of the contract terms governing the standard by which TWA must handle employee safety complaints. The defendants assert that their actions were required by specific provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Again, artful pleading has avoided the fact that the collective bargaining agreement is inextricably intertwined with the resolution of this dispute.

21
The same can be said about Gore's claim of negligence. In the circumstances presented in this case, where simple negligence is claimed in the manner in which TWA employees (acting within the course and scope of their employment) investigated a claim of a threat to other employees, the collective bargaining agreement is the source of the duty of care owed. The duty allegedly breached is defined by the agreement that governs the employment relationship. See Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 216 (noting that preemption applies if the extent of the duty ultimately depends upon the terms of the agreement between the parties). When the collective bargaining contract is the source of the duty allegedly breached, application of the tort remedy is preempted. See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 405 & n.4.

22
Finally, Gore claims violations of his right to privacy because TWA employees published private facts and placed him in a false light. These state-law torts require a showing that the other party unreasonably obtained private information or that the disclosure would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. See St. Anthony's Med. Ctr. v. H.S.H., 974 S.W.2d 606, 610 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (stating the elements of the tort of publishing private facts); Sullivan v. Pulitzer Broad. Co., 709 S.W.2d 475, 478 n.5 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (stating the elements of placing another in a false light). The duties owed and the reasonableness of the parties' actions in these circumstances cannot be evaluated independently from the bargained-for terms of the collective bargaining agreement.  The extent of the plaintiff's privacy rights in this matter were legally negotiated by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, and therefore, the resolution of these tort claims is inextricably intertwined with an interpretation of the rights and duties created by the collective bargaining agreement.

23
Gore contends that his claims are purely factual, that the collective bargaining agreement need only be referenced during the state court litigation (not interpreted), and that justification defenses grounded in rights and duties created by the collective bargaining agreement do not give rise to preemption, citing Norris and Meyer v. Schnucks Markets, Inc., 163 F.3d 1048 (8th Cir. 1998). We disagree. Gore's claims are not purely factual but are rooted in an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. We do not hold that removal and preemption may be based on a federal defense. Instead, we have concluded that Gore cannot be successful on the claims he has pleaded in this factual situation without interpreting certain terms of the collective bargaining agreement that govern the rights and duties of the parties.  Additionally, we find the facts of Norris and Meyer distinguishable from the facts at hand.

24
In Norris, the plaintiff alleged that he was discharged in violation of state public policy and the state whistle-blower protection law. The Court held that these claims are not preempted because they are grounded in independently created state-law rights involving purely factual questions. See 512 U.S. at 266. To the contrary, for Gore to prove the elements of the torts he alleged in this case, he will be required to argue the meaning of standards or duties created and defined by the governing collective bargaining agreement. Because the collective bargaining agreement provides the source of the duties allegedly breached or governs the determination of reasonableness under the state law, the resolution of Gore's tort claims will require more than a mere tangential reference to the collective bargaining agreement, even though Gore's complaint omits any reference to the collective bargaining agreement. The Court in Norris expressly recognized that "where the resolution of a state-law claim depends on an interpretation of the [collective bargaining agreement], the claim is preempted." 512 U.S. at 261.

25
In the same manner, the Meyer case from our court is distinguishable. In Meyer, we held that Meyer's state-law claims of slander, tortious interference with a business relationship, and retaliatory transfer were not preempted by the LMRA. The facts, however, are far different from Gore's case. In Meyer, the plaintiff alleged that in retaliation for his criticism of his employer's improper sanitation procedures in handling meat, the company allowed supervisors to harass him and criticize him publicly. 163 F.3d at 1049. We stated that complete preemption occurs when the plaintiff's claim "require[s] the interpretation of some specific provision of a [collective bargaining agreement]." Id. at 1051. We concluded, however, that the causes of action alleged in that particular context were neither based on nor substantially dependent upon an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. (also noting that although the facts of the complaint occurred while the plaintiff was on the job, "the claims themselves are not inherently tied to any provision of the relevant [collective bargaining agreement]").

26
To the contrary, Gore asserts facts that occurred while the defendants were seeking to respond, according to their duties under the collective bargaining agreement, to a perceived security threat to many employees. The defendants have set forth specific provisions of the collective bargaining agreement that they contend governed their actions and prescribed their duties in this factual scenario. Gore cannot establish liability on his tort claims without demonstrating that the defendants' actions were wrongful under a proper interpretation of the relevant rights and duties bargained for in the collective bargaining agreement.

III.

27
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

Notes:

1
 The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

2
 The statements of Smallwood and Cowher both reported that Gore stated he needed to vent his anger before ending his own life and that he planned to kill TWA employees during a shift change. (See J.A. at 279.)

28
HEANEY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

29
The majority opinion is inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246 (1994), and with the decisions of this circuit in Taggart v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 F.3d 269 (8th Cir. 1994), Luecke v. Schnucks Mkts., Inc., 85 F.3d 356 (8th Cir. 1996), and Meyer vSchnucks Mkts., Inc., 163 F.3d 1048 (8th Cir. 1998), and for that reason, I respectfully dissent.3

30
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court in Norris, reviewed the scope of federal preemption under the RLA in a case involving a state law claim brought by an aircraft mechanic alleging he was discharged for refusing to certify a plane that he considered unsafe and for reporting his safety concerns to the FAA. The Court held that Norris's state law claim was not preempted even though he also could seek redress through the RLA's arbitral mechanism. The Court stated that "no proposed interpretation [of the RLA] demonstrates a clear and manifest congressional purpose to create a regime that broadly pre-empts substantive protections extended by the States, independent of any negotiated labor agreement." Norris, 512 U.S. at 255-56.

31
Here, the majority recognizes, and I agree, that the state of Missouri has created tort actions for false arrest, negligence, libel and slander, and invasion of privacy, both by placing Gore in a false light and by disclosing private acts. I part company with the majority, however, in its conclusion that the collective bargaining agreement is the defining source of the duties specifically owed by TWA to Gore. Here, as in Norris, the collective bargaining agreement is not the "only source" of the rights that Gore asserts in his state law claims. See id. at 258. Wholly apart from the collective bargaining agreement, TWA had an obligation not to violate Gore's state law rights. The parties' obligation under the RLA to arbitrate disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement does not relieve the company of this duty, nor does it deprive an employee of his opportunity to bring a state law. action for damages. See id. Here, as in Norris, we have purely factual questions about an employee's conduct, the employer's response to that conduct, and its motives for so responding.

32
The majority's argument that resorting to the collective bargaining agreement is necessary to determine where state statutes have been violated is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decisions in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988), and in Norris, holding that the issue of whether an employer's action establishes the elements of a claim under state law is purely a factual question. Norris's impact on the jurisprudence relating to an employee's right to bring a state law action in RLA cases is illustrated by the pre- and post-Norris decisions in the Fifth Circuit case of Hirras v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 10 F.3d 1142, cert. granted and judgment vacated, 512 U.S. 1231 (1994). There Hirras asserted, inter alia, a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on verbal abuse by co-workers, abusive telephone calls from unknown sources, and offensive graffiti. The district court held that the claim was preempted by the RLA; the Fifth Circuit affirmed. On certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded to the Fifth Circuit for reconsideration in light of Norris. On remand, the Fifth Circuit rejected the employer's argument that a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress arises out of the collective bargaining agreement because the agreement determines the standard by which the employer's conduct is judged. See Hirras v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 44 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 1995). The similarity between Hirras and this case should dictate the same result, one which the majority eschews.

33
I thought that this court settled the questions raised here in the two Schnucks cases. In Luecke v. Schnucks Mkts., Inc., 85 F.3d 356 (8th Cir. 1996), an employee brought an action for defamation against his employer, Schnucks Markets, alleging that the employer told others that he refused to take a drug test. Schnucks argued that resolving the defamation claim depended on an analysis of the collective bargaining agreement's clauses regarding management rights and establishing a grievance procedure. We held that the claim was not preempted because the issue could be determined based on whether the employee took the drug test, whether the company's statement that he refused was false, and whether it was made with malice. Similarly, here the questions to be answered are whether Gore was confined without legal justification, and whether Gore was libeled or slandered. The first question can be answered without reference to the collective bargaining agreement. Either the employer was justified or it was not. Although TWA's justification defense may be based on the collective bargaining agreement, the agreement would at most be consulted, and not interpreted. Whether Gore was libeled or slandered can be answered by determining whether TWA made a defamatory false statement about Gore, published it with the requisite intent, and in so doing damaged Gore, all questions that can be answered without interpreting the collective bargaining agreement. This reasoning applies equally to the privacy and negligence claims.

34
In Meyer v. Schnucks Mkts., Inc., 163 F.3d 1048 (8th Cir. 1998), John Meyer, a meat cutter, brought a state law action for slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and other claims. Schnucks removed the case to federal court alleging preemption. The district court held some claims were preempted; others were not. It then granted summary judgment on the non-preempted claims. Our court reversed, holding that none of the plaintiff's claims were preempted. We stated:Although the events underlying Mr. Meyer's complaint occurred on the job, the claims themselves are not inherently tied to any provision of the relevant CBA. To prove slander, Mr. Meyer will have to produce evidence that Mr. Jansen made false statements that injured Mr. Meyer's reputation. The elements of tortious interference with a business relationship are the existence of a contract or of a valid business expectancy known to the defendant, intentional and unjustified interference causing a breach of the contract, and damages. Except for the existence of the valid business expectancy itself, which can be demonstrated by mere reference to the CBA without any analysis of it, neither of these causes of action is based on, or substantially dependent.15 upon an interpretation of, the CBA. Therefore, neither of them is automatically preempted by the LMRA. For similar reasons, we see nothing in the basic elements of the other claims that requires analysis of the CBA for their resolution.

35
Id. at 1051.

36
Similarly, any inquiry in this case into the collective bargaining agreement merely would require its consultation, and not interpretation of it. Accordingly, Gore's claims are not be preempted.

37
For the reasons outlined above, I have no alternative but to dissent.

Notes:

3
 I recognize that some of the cases I rely upon involve preemption questions under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). I agree with the majority that preemption analysis under the LMRA and the RLA is virtually identical. See Norris, 512 U.S. at 263 n.9.


                            UNPUBLISHED

                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                       FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                            No. 00-1059

In Re: MARY RUTH BULLINS,

                                                              Debtor.

MARY RUTH BULLINS,

                                              Plaintiff - Appellant,

          versus

SOUTHLAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; A & A, IN-
CORPORATED; MICHAEL ALLEN; D. G. ALLEN; JUNE
ALLEN; ROBERT GORDON; RUSSELL J. HOLLERS,
Trustee; VON L. ALLEN,

                                             Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, District
Judge. (CA-98-489-1, BK-94-10830-13D, AP-94-2022)

Submitted:   September 20, 2000           Decided:   October 17, 2000

Before NIEMEYER and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Tomi W. Bryan, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. R. Frank
Gray, Shawna Y. Staton, JORDAN, PRICE, WALL, GRAY, JONES & CARLTON,
P.L.L.C., Raleigh, North Carolina; John C. Wainio, SPEARS, BARNES,
BAKER, WAINIO & WHALEY, L.L.P., Durham, North Carolina, for
Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

     Mary Ruth Bullins appeals the district court’s order affirming

the bankruptcy court’s order denying relief on her claims that the

Defendants engaged in fraud against her, engaged in unfair and de-

ceptive trade practices, and that the two corporate Defendants were

the alter egos of individual Defendants such that the corporate

veil could be pierced.     We have reviewed the record and the lower

courts’ opinions and find no reversible error.      Accordingly, we

affirm on the reasoning of the district court.       See Bullins v.

Southland Dev. Corp., Nos. CA-98-489-1; BK-94-10830-13D; AP-94-2022

(M.D.N.C. Dec. 3, 1999).

                                                            AFFIRMED

                                   2