                            In the
 United States Court of Appeals
              For the Seventh Circuit
                         ____________

No. 06-2204
STEVEN D. HALFHILL,
                                            Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                v.

NORTHEAST SCHOOL CORPORATION,
                                            Defendant-Appellee.
                         ____________
           Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division.
          No. 2:04-cv-0296—John Daniel Tinder, Judge.
                         ____________
ARGUED NOVEMBER 9, 2006—DECIDED DECEMBER 28, 2006
                   ____________

  Before BAUER, POSNER, and FLAUM, Circuit Judges.
  FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Steven D. Halfhill worked as a
third-grade teacher for the Northeast School Corporation
(Northeast) in Sullivan County, Indiana during the 2001-
2002 and 2002-2003 school years. Northeast elected not
to renew his teaching contract for the 2003-2004 school
year because of four incidents in which Halfhill made
physical contact with students when disciplining them.
Halfhill sued, alleging that Northeast violated his pro-
cedural due process rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
and breached his employment contract, in violation of
state law. The district court granted Northeast’s motion
for summary judgment and denied Halfhill’s cross-motion
2                                              No. 06-2204

for summary judgment. Halfhill appeals both rulings. For
the following reasons, we affirm.

                     I. Background
  Halfhill worked as a third-grade teacher at Northeast
for two years, but Northeast declined to renew his teach-
ing contract for a third year. In support of its decision,
Northeast claimed that Halfhill demonstrated a lack of
professionalism on four occasions. In September 2001,
while Halfhill was supervising an indoor recess, he
grabbed a misbehaving student (by the back of the neck
or arm, the parties disagree) and led him to an area
where the two could talk in private. The boy’s parents com-
plained to the principal, Mark Baker, who spoke with
Halfhill and advised him of the limited circumstances
in which a teacher is permitted to touch a student.
  On September 28, 2002, Halfhill disciplined another
misbehaving student by placing his thumb and index
finger under the child’s chin and pressing it upward.
Halfhill touched the student in this manner to force the
child to make eye contact with him. That student’s parents
also complained, and Baker met with Halfhill a second
time, advising him that a teacher is “going to lose” anytime
he touches a student.
  In October 2002, parents complained about allegations
that Halfhill had choked and kicked a student and looked
into the girls’ bathroom. Baker, Halfhill, and school
superintendent Richard Walters met with the parents to
discuss the allegations. At the meeting, Halfhill acted in
a negative and hostile manner, and Baker reminded
Halfhill that the parents had a right to express their
concerns. Though a subsequent investigation found no
merit to the parents’ allegations, Halfhill’s attitude dur-
ing the meeting concerned Baker and Walters.
No. 06-2204                                              3

  The last incident, which influenced Northeast’s decision
more than the others, occurred in April 2003. A scuffle
between two students prompted Halfhill to escort one of
the students to the office by placing his hand high on the
student’s back or neck. The student complained that
Halfhill hurt him, and the student’s mother contacted
the school. Baker and Walters met soon afterwards and
decided to recommend that the Northeast School Board
(Board) not renew Halfhill’s contract for the next school
year. The fact that Halfhill would receive certain tenure
privileges along with his next teaching contract in-
fluenced their decision.
  On April 22, 2003, Walters and Baker informed Halfhill
that they were recommending that the Board not renew
his contract and explained the reasons for their decision.
Halfhill responded by voicing his disagreement. On April
28, the Board held a special meeting to discuss the
renewal of Halfhill’s contract. After an executive session
in which Baker and Walters answered the Board’s ques-
tions about Halfhill and made their recommendation
against rehiring him, the Board voted, in an open session,
not to renew Halfhill’s contract. The Board notified
Halfhill about its decision the next day, which was two
days before the statutory deadline for informing a non-
permanent teacher of a decision not to renew his contract.
Had the Board passed the statutory deadline without
making a decision, Halfhill’s employment contract would
have been renewed automatically. See Ind. Code § 20-6.1-4-
14 (now repealed)
  Halfhill’s contract incorporated the terms of a “Master
Contract” applicable to all teachers in the school district
and contained a number of provisions relevant to this
dispute. Article V provided, “An employee shall not be
disciplined, reprimanded, suspended, reduced in com-
pensation, discharged, or deprived of any professional
advantage without just cause.” Article XIII required that
4                                             No. 06-2204

school administrators evaluate each teacher’s performance
on a yearly basis using a particular evaluation form. The
form provided space for an administrator to make com-
ments about the teacher’s performance and to mark
whether “the teacher’s contract should be renewed,” “the
teacher should be transferred to a different assignment
where he/she could serve in a more effective and satis-
factory way,” “the teacher should be given permanent
status,” or “the teacher’s contract should be non-renewed.”
Article XIII also allowed the teacher to rebut, in writing,
any negative comment on the evaluation form. Halfhill
received three evaluations during the time he worked for
Northeast. The last one, which he received on November
19, 2002, recommended that his contract be renewed.
  Two other provisions of Halfhill’s contract are also
relevant. Article XIV discussed dismissal procedures and
required the Board to provide a hearing to any teacher
whose administrative staff recommended the teacher’s
dismissal. Article XV outlined a teacher’s right to griev-
ance procedures. If a teacher believed that the school had
violated one of the terms of his teaching contract, then
under Article XV, that teacher could submit a grievance
to his or her principal. The principal had five days to
respond to the grievance, and if the teacher was not
satisfied with the response, then the teacher could appeal
successively to the superintendent, an arbitrator, and,
finally, the Board. The Board made a final decision about
the grievance, and its decision was binding on all parties.
  On May 1, 2003, Halfhill, pursuant to his rights under
Ind. Code § 20-6.1-4-14, requested that the Board provide
him with a written explanation of the reasons for its
decision not to rehire him. On May 6, the Board provided
its explanation, which recounted the four incidents
discussed above. Halfhill then filed an Article XV griev-
ance with Baker and requested a meeting with the Board
so that he could explain why its decision was improper. On
No. 06-2204                                                 5

May 9, Baker responded in writing to Halfhill’s grievance
and declined to reconsider his recommendation to the
Board. On May 14, 2003, Halfhill appealed Baker’s
response to Superintendent Walter.
  On May 22, Halfhill met with the Board to discuss its
decision. He brought with him a lengthy written statement
“as a kind of rebuttal to Dr. Baker’s reasoning . . . for non-
renewal,” but the Board refused to read the letter. Halfhill
Dep. at 31. Nevertheless, the Board gave Halfhill and his
attorney an opportunity to tell Halfhill’s side of the story.
Id. The Board did not tell Halfhill what Baker or Walters
had said about him, and Halfhill had no right to call or
cross-examine witnesses. Halfhill also claims that the
presiding member of the Board told him that the May 22
meeting was not a hearing. On May 28, the Board voted
to affirm its decision not to renew Halfhill’s contract.
  Halfhill then appealed his grievance to non-binding
arbitration. Halfhill’s representative in the arbitration,
Dan Hartz, testified that he contacted Walters prior to
the January 30, 2004 arbitration hearing and that
Walters told him arbitration was a waste of time because
“regardless of what the arbitrator decides it is only
advisory and it comes back to the same group of people,
the Board of Education, who have already made the
decision.” Appellant’s Br. at 40. As it happened, Walters’
prediction was accurate. The arbitrator recommended
that the Board reinstate Halfhill to his old position,
concluding that Northeast discharged him without just
cause in violation of Article V. On August 16, 2004,
however, the Board voted to reject the arbitrator’s recom-
mendation.
  On November 12, 2004, Halfhill filed this lawsuit,
alleging that Northeast had breached his employment
contract and violated his procedural due process rights. On
April, 6, 2006, the district court granted Northeast’s and
6                                               No. 06-2204

denied Halfhill’s motion for summary judgment. It ruled
that Halfhill possessed no property interest in the renewal
of his teaching contract; that even assuming Halfhill
possessed such an interest, Northeast provided him with
adequate process; and that Northeast did not breach his
employment contract.

                       II. Analysis
  The Court reviews the district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment de novo. In the course of our review, we
consider the facts in the light most favorable to Halfhill,
the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences
in his favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 255 (1986).

    A. Property Interest
   Halfhill contends that Northeast deprived him of a
property interest without providing adequate due pro-
cess protections. To prove a violation of procedural due
process rights, a plaintiff must show that the State
deprived him of a protected liberty or property interest
and that the deprivation occurred without adequate due
process. Brown v. City of Michigan City, Indiana, 462 F.3d
720, 728 (7th Cir. 2006). “A protected property interest
in employment can arise from a state statute, regulation,
municipal ordinance, or an express or implied contract—
those ‘rules or understandings that secure certain bene-
fits and that support claims of entitlement to those bene-
fits.’ ” Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, Indiana, 91 F.3d 922,
943 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Border v. City of Crystal Lake,
75 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1996)).
  Halfhill appropriately concedes that he had no right to
continued employment under Indiana law. When the Board
No. 06-2204                                                7

decided not to renew Halfhill’s contract, the teaching
contract of a teacher with more than two years of experi-
ence (permanent and semi-permanent teachers) continued
indefinitely until the teacher signed a new contract, and
a school board could not cancel the contract without good
cause. Ind. Code § 20-6.1-4-10, 10.5 & 11 (now repealed).
Teachers with two or fewer years of experience (non-
permanent teachers), however, had no right to continued
employment, though they had to be informed of a non-
renewal decision by May 1. Id. § 20-6.1-4-14(a)(1) (now
repealed).
   Halfhill maintains, instead, that he possessed property
rights that arose out of his employment contract. See
Batagiannis v. W. Lafayette Cmty. Sch. Corp., 454 F.3d
738, 740 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that a contractual
right can create a protectable property interest). Halfhill
first argues that he had a property right that stemmed
from Article V’s “Just Cause” provision, which stated that
an employee could not be “disciplined, reprimanded,
suspended, reduced in compensation, discharged, or de-
prived of any professional advantage without just cause.”
Northeast responds that it did not discipline or discharge
Halfhill but merely declined to renew his teaching con-
tract, a decision on which Article V has no bearing.
  At the time of the Board’s decision, Indiana law provided
that a school board could decline to renew a non-perma-
nent teacher’s contract for any reason. Ind. Code § 20-6.1-
4-14(i)(1) (now repealed). In addition, the law presumed
that these statutory provisions were a part of every
teacher’s contract. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Hamilton
Heights Sch. Corp. v. Landry, 560 N.E.2d 102, 108 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1990). In light of this presumption, the Board’s
decision not to renew Halfhill’s contract was not discipline,
discharge, or the deprivation of any professional advan-
tage. Halfhill had no expectation of continued employ-
ment beyond the end of the 2002-2003 school year, and he
8                                              No. 06-2204

received everything to which he was entitled under his
contract. Indeed, to hold otherwise would require us to
conclude that Northeast elected to give tenure rights to
teachers on their first day on the job—an unlikely proposi-
tion.
  We find persuasive a decision by the Montana Supreme
Court, which considered a nearly identical question and
arrived at the same result. See Irving v. Sch. Dist. No. 1-
1A, Valley County, 248 Mont. 460, 468, 813 P.2d 417, 422
(1991). In Irving, the plaintiff was a non-tenured teacher
whose contract was not renewed. She claimed that she
had a contract right to continued employment based on a
contract provision which stated, “No teacher shall be
disciplined, dismissed, reduced in rank or compensa-
tion[ ], or deprived of any professional advantage with-
out due process.” Id. The court concluded that “[a]s a
nontenure teacher who had no legitimate expectation of
contract renewal, [the plaintiff] was not dismissed or
deprived of any professional advantage. She received all
benefits, privileges[,] and rights she was entitled to.” Id.
As in Irving, Halfhill received all the benefits that his
contract provided him. Consequently, he was not disci-
plined, discharged, or deprived of any professional advan-
tage.
  Halfhill next argues that he had a property right that
arose out of Article XIII. That provision, however, simply
required the school to evaluate his performance before
January 1 of each school year, and the parties agree that
Baker conducted those evaluations. As a result, if Article
XIII created a property right, Halfhill was not deprived
of it.
  Halfhill also contends that his November 19, 2002
evaluation gave him a right to be notified by January 1,
2003 whether Baker would recommend that the Board
renew his contract. In other words, Halfhill maintains,
No. 06-2204                                               9

once Baker advised Halfhill on November 19 that he
would recommend that Halfhill’s contract be renewed,
Baker could not change his mind, even if—as Northeast
alleged here—Halfhill engaged in subsequent misconduct.
The Court rejects this argument. Nothing in Halfhill’s
evaluation form said that Baker’s perceptions about
Halfhill’s performance were set in stone. Halfhill attempts
to manipulate this check-the-box, mid-year evaluation
form into an unalterable right to receive a positive year-
end recommendation, but neither Article XIII nor the
evaluation form provided such a right.
  Halfhill also claims that he possessed a right, under
Article XIV, to receive certain due process procedures
before being dismissed. Putting aside whether Halfhill
can assert a property right in these procedures, see Kyle v.
Morton High Sch., 144 F.3d 449, 451 (7th Cir. 1998);
Shvartsman v. Apfel, 138 F.3d 1196, 1199 (7th Cir. 1998),
Northeast did not dismiss Halfhill from his position; it
declined to renew his contract. Accordingly, he had no
right to invoke Article XIV.
   Finally, Halfhill maintains that his Article XIII evalua-
tion, together with his Article XIV rights, created a
“mutually explicit understanding” that Northeast would
notify him by January 1, 2003 if his contract was not
going to be renewed. See Crull v. Sunderman, 384 F.3d
453, 464 (7th Cir. 2004). However, as we have already
commented, Halfhill’s evaluation form did not assert that
Baker was permanently bound by his November 19, 2002
decision to recommend contract renewal. Rather, the
November 19 evaluation provided Halfhill an assessment
of Baker’s current impressions about Halfhill’s perfor-
mance. The form said nothing about what would happen
if those impressions changed. Under these circumstances,
no jury reasonably could find that Halfhill and North-
east had a mutual understanding that Northeast would
renew Halfhill’s contract.
10                                              No. 06-2204

     B. Due Process
  Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that North-
east deprived Halfhill of a property right, Northeast
provided Halfhill more than adequate process. To deter-
mine what process is due when the State deprives an
individual of property, courts look at three factors: (1) the
private interest affected by the official action; (2) the risk
of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used and the probable value, if any, of addi-
tional procedural protections; and (3) the government’s
interest in maintaining the current procedures. See
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The
Supreme Court has held that where adequate post-
deprivation procedures are available, an individual with a
property interest in his continued employment is entitled
only to minimal predeprivation process: “oral or written
notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the
employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his
side of the story.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985).
  Though Halfhill contends that he did not receive ade-
quate predeprivation process, the record indicates other-
wise. In the termination context, predeprivation process
may occur any time before a governmental entity stops
providing an employee benefits, even if that process
occurs after the termination decision. See Krentz v.
Robinson, 228 F.3d 897, 903 n.4 (8th Cir. 2000). Halfhill
has not offered evidence that he was deprived of a benefit
before August 15, 2003, the date that the 2003-2004 school
year began. Prior to August 15, Walters and Baker met
with Halfhill, told him that they were going to recom-
mend that the Board not renew his contract, and allowed
him to express why he disagreed with their decision. In
addition, the Board provided Halfhill its reasons for not
renewing his contract, met with him for more than an
hour, and allowed him to present his side of the story. This
No. 06-2204                                              11

predeprivation process was more than constitutionally
adequate.
   With regard to postdeprivation process, Halfhill concedes
that the Article XIV grievance procedure was nominally
adequate but nevertheless maintains that the procedure
he took part in was a sham. See Ryan v. Ill. Dept. of
Children & Family Servs., 185 F.3d 751, 762 (7th Cir.
1999). In Ryan, the plaintiffs, in response to a motion for
summary judgment, offered evidence that their employer,
the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS), manufactured reasons for their termination, that
an outside attorney hired to review the plaintiffs’ termina-
tions believed that DCFS had made up its mind to dis-
charge the plaintiffs before they received a hearing, and
that one of the individuals hired to investigate the plain-
tiffs believed that DCFS intended to terminate the plain-
tiffs regardless of the evidence. As a result, we held that
the plaintiffs had offered evidence that the proceedings
were a sham. Id.
  Halfhill’s evidence on this point is far less compelling
than that offered in Ryan. He first offers Walters’ state-
ment that arbitration was a “waste of time” because the
Board had previously rejected Halfhill’s argument. How-
ever, Walters’ statement—unlike the more direct evi-
dence cited in Ryan—provides no insight into whether
the various board members had an open mind when
considering whether to accept the arbitrator’s decision.
Walters’ statement was nothing more than a prediction
about the result of a procedure in which Walters took no
part.
  Halfhill also offers the Board’s disagreement with the
arbitrator’s decision, but the Board’s ultimate conclusion
is not evidence of bias. It is simply the outcome of the
procedure to which Halfhill assented in his collective
bargaining agreement. See Batagiannis, 454 F.3d at 741
12                                             No. 06-2204

(holding that a school board, which had decided to fire the
plaintiff in 2002 and 2003, was not biased when it re-
viewed its decision in 2004, because the 2004 hearing
was exactly what the plaintiff had agreed to in her collec-
tive bargaining agreement); Honore v. Douglas, 833 F.2d
565, 568 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that a professor could
not demonstrate a procedural due process violation where
the Board of Regents had ultimate decision-making
authority and rejected a hearing committee’s recommenda-
tion to grant the professor tenure). Nor can Halfhill
demonstrate bias by pointing out that the Board’s final
decision came after it had already voted once not to renew
Halfhill’s contract. See Hudson v. City of Chicago, 374
F.3d 554, 563 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the plaintiffs
received adequate predeprivation process where a police
department made a preliminary decision to terminate
the plaintiffs, considered additional information sub-
mitted by the plaintiffs, and then decided to maintain its
original decision in favor of termination). Accordingly, the
district court correctly granted Northeast’s and denied
Halfhill’s motion for summary judgment on Halfhill’s
procedural due process claim.

     C. Breach of Contract
  For the reasons discussed above, Northeast did not
breach Halfhill’s employment contract by not renewing
it for a third year. The district court correctly granted
Northeast’s and denied Halfhill’s motion for summary
judgment on Halfhill’s breach of contract claim.

                    III. Conclusion
  For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district
court’s rulings.
No. 06-2204                                         13

A true Copy:
      Teste:

                    ________________________________
                    Clerk of the United States Court of
                      Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

               USCA-02-C-0072—12-28-06


412 F.Supp.2d 894 (2006)
Juanita LARA, Plaintiff,
v.
DIAMOND DETECTIVE AGENCY and William Brown, Defendants.
No. 04 C 4822.
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.
January 9, 2006.
*895 *896 Juanita K. Lara, Portage, IN, pro se.
Mitchell A. Kline, Law Office of Mitchell A. Kline, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.
William J. Borah, Linda Ochsenfeld, William J. Borah & Associates, Homewood, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
PLUNKETT, Senior District Judge.
Before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Count I (hostile work environment) and IV (intentional infliction of emotional distress) of Plaintiff Juanita Lara's amended complaint. For the reasons provided below, Defendants' motion is granted.

Background
The following facts are undisputed or have been deemed admitted pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, which this Court strictly enforces. Defendant Diamond Detective Agency ("Diamond") is a provider of security services for schools and businesses. (Defs.' LR 56.1(a)(3) ¶ 13.) Since March 1997, Diamond has employed Plaintiff, Juanita Lara ("Lara") as a security guard. (Id. ¶ 14.) Beginning in November 2001, Diamond assigned Lara to work at Thornwood High School in South Holland, Illinois. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 22.) Starting in 1997 and continuing through her assignment at Thornwood High School, Defendant William Brown ("Brown") supervised Lara. (Id. ¶ 23.) As a security supervisor, Brown is expected to ensure that each security post is filled on a particular day, and that the guards are on-time, in uniform and performing as expected. (Id. ¶ 21.)
During her deposition, Lara testified as to a number of incidents of alleged sexual harassment by Brown. First, Lara testified that in November 2001, Brown commented on her breasts, whispering to her that her "tits looked nice in that sweater."[1] (Id. ¶ 59.) Lara testified that she *897 was shocked by Brown's comment, asking him: "What did you say?" (Pl.'s LR 56.1(b)(3)(A) ¶ 101.) Brown denied commenting about Lara's wearing of a sweater or saying to her that "your nipples look nice in that sweater." (Defs.' LR 56.1(b)(3) ¶ 71.) Lara also testified that she told three other female security guards, Evelyn Chambers, Juanita Jones and Linda Robinson, about Brown's alleged comment. (Pl.'s LR 56.1(b)(3)(A) ¶ 101.) However, Lara did not inform a human resources employee at that time. (Lara Dep. 171:23-24.)
Thereafter, in February 2002, Lara alleges that after observing a woman on a monitor in the security office, Brown commented "look at the tits on her" while in Lara's presence. (Defs.' LR 56.1(b)(3) ¶ 57.) Moreover, Lara testified that sometime during the first two weeks of that month Brown also attempted to peer down her shirt to see her breasts. Specifically, she testified that as she leaned over a desk in the security office in order to use a phone, Brown, standing on the other side of the desk, tugged her uniform shirt and attempted to pull it to the side, as if to peer down her shirt. (Id. ¶ 61.) While Diamond's standard winter uniform required the shirt to be buttoned to the neck and accompanied by a necktie, at the time of the incident, the top two buttons of Lara's uniform shirt were unbuttoned and Lara was not wearing her uniform's tie. (Id. ¶ 64.) Lara responded to Brown's action by telling him "not to do that" after which she testified Brown began laughing and walked out of the office. (Defs.' LR 56.1(b)(3) ¶ 63; Pl.'s LR 56.1(b)(3)(A) ¶ 102.) Lara admitted that Brown touched neither her chest nor her breast. (Defs.' LR 56.1(b)(3) ¶ 65.) Again, Brown denied the event ever occurred. (Id. ¶ 68.)
Additionally, toward the end of May 2002, Lara testified that Brown asked her out on a date, to which Lara responded by turning away. (Id. ¶ 60.) However, Brown denied asking Lara to go out with him. (Id. ¶ 72.)
Lara also testified to two incidents for which she was unable to assign approximate dates.[2] Specifically, Lara testified that on nearly a daily basis, Brown would comment "Mm, Lara you smell so good" as he passed her in the hallway.[3] (Id. ¶ 58; Pl.'s LR 56.1(b)(3)(A) ¶ 100.) While Brown did not deny that he commented on Lara's perfume, he testified that he made only one remark about her perfume, sometime during the second year of her employment, in 1998 or 1999. (Defs.' LR 56.1(b)(3) ¶ 69.) She also added that on another occasion, Brown touched her hair as he passed her. (Pl.'s LR 56.1(b)(3)(A) ¶ 104.)
Despite these allegedly harassing comments and conduct, it does not appear that Lara lodged any specific complaints to superiors at Diamond about Brown's behavior until sometime in August 2002. During that time, Lara expressed her feeling to operations manager Ken Ferree that Brown was retaliating against her and that he was trying to have her terminated for not "going along with the program." (Id. ¶ 105.) As operations manager, Ferree performed client relations tasks, insured that Diamond's guards arrived at their work-site on time and in uniform as well as *898 controlling dispatch of guards. (Defs.' LR 56.1(b)(3) ¶ 34.)
Moreover, in September 2002, Lara complained to Ferree a second time. (Id. ¶ 17.) As a result of this second complaint to Ferree, Brown requested a meeting with Lara and Ferree, during which time Lara complained to Ferree about having been "written up" for failing to wear her uniform's necktie. (Id. ¶¶ 35-36.) During that meeting, Lara mentioned no incidents of allegedly sexually harassing behavior or comments by Brown toward Lara.[4] (Id. ¶ 39.) Ferree informed Lara that she needed to draft a letter to Geoffrey White ("White"), Diamond's Vice President of Human Resources, explaining her position as to why she felt that she should not have been "written up." (Id. ¶¶ 18, 37.) As Vice President of Human Resources, White was responsible for staffing, training, workers' compensation issues, as well as implementing and ensuring compliance with various policies and procedures. (Id. ¶ 19.) White also helped to enforce Diamond's sexual harassment policy, through investigating, interviewing and documenting an alleged incident. (Id. ¶ 32.)
As a result of Ferree's recommendation, Lara wrote a letter to White, complaining about "the continuing harassment and discrimination" she received. (Pl.'s LR 56.1(b)(3)(A) ¶ 106.) Yet again, Lara made no specific reference of sexual harassment in that letter to White and White testified that he was never made aware of sexual harassment complaints by Lara against Brown until he received notice of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") charge. (Defs.' LR 56.1(b)(3) ¶ 43.)
After filing a charge with the EEOC on December 13, 2002, Lara received her right to sue letter on April 29, 2005. Thereafter, on July 22, 2004, Lara filed a pro se complaint, which she amended on October 14, 2004 after obtaining the assistance of counsel. On February 10, 2005, this Court granted in part Defendants' motion to dismiss, thereby dismissing with prejudice the following counts or defendants: Count I (hostile work environment) as to defendants Brown and John Jordan ("Jordan"), Diamond's president, Count II (retaliation) and Count III (negligence) as to all defendants, and Count IV (intentional infliction of emotional distress) as to Jordan. On October 28, 2005, Diamond and Brown moved for motion for summary judgment on the remaining counts.

Legal Standard
To prevail on a summary judgment motion, "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, [must] show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). At this stage, the Court does not weigh evidence or determine the truth of the matters asserted, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Significantly, the Court views all evidence and draws all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir.2000). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the record as a whole establishes that no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. Id.
In addition, where "undisputed facts give rise to disputed inferences," summary judgment is not appropriate. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Inc. v. Powersports, Inc., 319 F.3d 973, 989 (7th Cir.2003) *899 ("[T]he choice between reasonable inferences from facts is a function of the factfinder."). See also Ramirez v. The Nutra-Sweet Co., No. 95 C 0130, 1997 WL 684984, at *7 (N.D.Ill. Oct.27, 1997) ("[I]f the evidence presented by the parties is subject to conflicting interpretations, or if reasonable minds could differ as to its significance, summary judgment must not be granted.") (citing O'Connor v. Chicago Transit Auth., 985 F.2d 1362, 1366 (7th Cir.1993)).

Analysis
Defendants move for summary judgment on three grounds, arguing: (1) that Lara's allegations do not constitute actionable sexual harassment; (2) that Diamond has established an affirmative defense in that Diamond exercised reasonable care to prevent sexually harassing behavior and that Lara failed to utilize internal opportunities offered by Diamond to address such behavior; and (3) that Lara cannot state an actionable claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Brown. See generally Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Each argument will be discussed in turn.
I. Lara's Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claim
Pursuant to Count I of her amended complaint, Lara alleges that Brown's actions created a hostile work environment. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1-19. Diamond first argues that even if the conduct alleged by Lara actually occurred, the totality of Brown's alleged conduct does not give rise to an objectively hostile work environment. See Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 8-9. In response, Lara contends that Brown's conduct, when viewed as a whole, "presents a genuine issue of material fact that an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment was created" such as to preclude summary judgment. (Pl.'s Resp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. at 24.)
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), it is "an unlawful unemployment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of an individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin." Moser v. Ind. Dept. of Corr., 406 F.3d 895, 902 (7th Cir.2005). Lara "may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment." Id. In order to establish a prima facie case for hostile work environment sexual harassment, Lara must show that:
(1) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (2) the harassment was based on her sex; (3) the harassment unreasonably interfered with her work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment that seriously interfered with her psychological well-being; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability.
Id.
As the Seventh Circuit has noted, in order for a plaintiff to show a hostile work environment, "the alleged harassment must be both subjectively and objectively so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive working environment." Whittaker v. N. Ill. Univ., 424 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir.2005) (internal quotation omitted). Moreover, "[i]n determining whether the environment was objectively hostile, a court must consider all of the circumstances, including the frequency and severity of conduct, whether it is threatening and/or humiliating or merely offensive, and whether the harassment unreasonably interferes with the employee's work." Id. "Indeed, the threshold for plaintiffs is high, as the workplace that is actionable is one that is hellish." Id. (emphasis added). *900 Whether such an environment exists is a question for this Court to decide. Hardin v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 167 F.3d 340, 345 (7th Cir.1999).
In viewing the evidence and drawing all inferences in Lara's favor, the Court finds that no reasonable jury could find that Lara's work environment was objectively hostile such that it rose to the level of being hostile or offensive, let alone being "hellish." Brown's alleged conduct was infrequent, occurred over a several month period and never reached the level of offensive touching or outrageous comments. It is also significant that Lara admitted Brown "never made too many sexual comments to me," see Def.'s LR 56.1(b)(3) ¶ 61, and that Lara, even when complaining to her supervisors, never specifically mentioned sexual harassment.
First, the most egregious conduct alleged by Lara, i.e. Brown's attempt to peer down her shirt, though offensive, does not constitute actionable sexual harassment as the Seventh Circuit has made it "clear that some acts going beyond occasional banter also fail to constitute an objectively hostile environment." Wyninger v. New Venture Gear, Inc., 361 F.3d 965 (7th Cir.2004) (citing Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353, 361-62 (7th Cir. 1998); Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir.1993)). Again, though offensive, it is certainly no worse than the poke to the buttocks experienced by the plaintiff in Adusumilli, or the unwanted touches and attempted kisses experienced by the plaintiff in Weiss, cases in which the Seventh Circuit found such conduct not actionable. See Adusumilli, 164 F.3d at 361-62; Weiss, 990 F.2d at 337. Moreover, as Lara testified, though Brown pulled on her uniform shirt, he did not contact her breast or her chest. (Defs.' LR 56.1(b)(3) ¶ 65.) As such, the incident's lack of severity fails to support her claim. See Whittaker, 424 F.3d at 646 ("It is well settled that `relatively isolated instances of non-severe misconduct will not support a claim of a hostile environment.'") (quoting Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 533 (7th Cir.1993)). Cf. Loughman v. Malnati Org. Inc., 395 F.3d 404, 408 (7th Cir.2005) (rejecting defendant-employer's argument that three isolated incidents of physical contact failed to create a hostile work environment in light of the severity of the incidents).
Next, Brown's February 2002 comment, "look at the tits on her," regarding a woman he observed on a security monitor is of lesser importance in the Court's analysis of Lara's allegations because it was not directed at Lara, even though it was allegedly made in Lara's presence. While the comment is still relevant in considering whether a hostile work environment existed, the Seventh Circuit has recognized that this type of "second-hand harassment" does not have as great of an impact as harassment directed at a Title VII plaintiff would have. See Gleason v. Mesirow Fin., Inc., 118 F.3d 1134, 1144 (7th Cir.1997). While this "does not mean that a plaintiff can never demonstrate a hostile work environment through second-hand comments or in situations where a plaintiff is not the intended target of the statements," see Smith v. Northeastern Ill. Univ., 388 F.3d 559, 568 (7th Cir.2004), in this case, however, Lara alleged only one second-hand comment, and when combined with her other allegations does not rise to the level of a hostile work environment.
Finally, with respect to Brown's allegedly daily remark "Mm. Lara you smell good," the remark does not facially appear to have been motivated by gender. Rather, Brown's comment facially appears to be non-gender based. As this Court has previously held, where there is no obvious gender-based animus for allegedly harassing incidents, a plaintiff-employee *901 has the burden to offer evidence showing that gender bias motivated such incidents. See Poulos v. Vill. of Lindenhurst, No. 00 C 5603, 2002 WL 31001876, at *5 (N.D.Ill. Sept.3, 2002) (requiring a plaintiff-employee to "present some evidence from which we can infer that these ostensibly neutral actions were motivated by anti-female bias to satisfy the second element of her prima facie case"). Consequently, because Lara has not provided additional evidence suggesting that she was the only recipient of such a comment or that the comments were made because of her gender, Brown's allegedly recurring comment cannot be used as a basis to support her hostile work environment claim. See id.
However, even if the Court were to consider the perfume remark as a basis for her claim, the Court notes that although the remark was allegedly frequent, it was neither severe, vulgar, or physically threatening, and it does not appear the comment interfered with her work performance. Nor has Lara alleged that these comments were of a sexual nature. See Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1456 (7th Cir.1994) (noting that the court "might be inclined to agree" with defendant-employer's argument that five specific instances of harassment over two-and-one half years were relatively isolated, non-severe and non-pervasive if the plaintiff-employee did not allege "that she was subjected to almost daily comments, gestures, and innuendo of a sexual nature" whenever her supervisor was in the office). Furthermore, the impact of the comment is also assuaged because it occurred as Brown and Lara passed each other in the school's hallway rather than in an enclosed or confined space, where physical proximity might have served to amplify the effect of Brown's remark on Lara. (Defs.' LR 56.1(b)(3) ¶ 58; Pl.'s LR 56.1(b)(3)(A) ¶ 100.) See Wyninger, 361 F.3d at 976 (pointing to a sexually insinuating telephone request by the plaintiff-employee's supervisor, coupled with an audience listening to that request, and a physically intimidating situation where the plaintiff-employee was locked in a small room with three larger men to discuss oral sex as "possibly" severe enough to constitute a hostile work environment, noting, however, that the incidents were not pervasive).
Lara cites to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir.1995) in an attempt to "draw the line" as to what does and what does not constitute actionable sexual harassment. (Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. J. at 23-24.) However, as the Baskerville court noted, "[d]rawing the line is not always easy," explaining that:
On one side lie sexual assaults; other physical contact, whether amorous or hostile, for which there is no consent express or implied; uninvited sexual solicitations; intimidating words or acts; obscene language or gestures; pornographic pictures. On the other side lies the occasional vulgar banter, tinged with sexual innuendo, of coarse or boorish workers.
Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 430.
Lara's testimony does not reveal that she felt physically threatened by Brown's conduct, which was largely occasional. If anything, it reveals that Lara felt Brown's behavior was obnoxious. Though Brown asked Lara out on a date, he never solicited Lara for sex, gestured to her obscenely nor did he show her pornographic pictures. He did not sexually assault her. Because Title VII does not protect against boorish and adolescent behavior, instead acting to "protect working women from the kind of male attentions that can make the workplace hellish for women," Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 430, Lara's hostile work environment claim fails to rise to the level such that it constitutes an actionable hostile work environment claim. As a result, summary judgment is *902 granted as to Count I of Lara's amended complaint.
II. Diamond's Affirmative Defense To Lara's Sexual Harassment Claim
Diamond also asserts that it has established an affirmative defense to Lara's hostile environment claim. See Defs.' Mem. Mot. Summ. J. at 10. However, because the Court finds that summary judgment is appropriate as to Count I of Lara's amended complaint, an inquiry into whether Diamond is able to set forth an affirmative defense to Lara's hostile work environment sex harassment claim is unnecessary. Cf. Tutman v. WBBM-TV, Inc. ICBS, Inc., 209 F.3d 1044, 1048-1049 (7th Cir.2000) (declining to "decide whether a hostile work environment existed because the question whether [the employer] took prompt and effective remedial action [was] dispositive").
III. Lara's Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim
Finally, the Court addresses Lara's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Brown. In support of its motion for summary judgment on Lara's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, Diamond argues that Lara's allegations "fall short of the extreme and outrageous conduct that would constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress" contending that Lara's allegations are "at most, petty indignities." (Defs.' Mem. Mot. Summ. J. at 13-14.) In response, Lara asserts that Brown's conduct was "well beyond" the parameters of a usual workplace dispute, arguing that she provided "solid evidence" showing that Brown caused severe emotional distress, citing that she was "shocked" about Brown's comment regarding the way her breasts looked in a sweater and her "disgust" that Brown asked her out on a date after "he had been harassing her for at least six months." (Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Summ. J. at 25-26.)
"A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress . . . requires more than what is required for sexual harassment." Poulos, 2002 WL 31001876 at *17 (quoting Piech v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 841 F.Supp. 825, 831 (N.D.Ill.1994)). Under Illinois law, "[t]o state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show that: `(1) defendants' conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) defendants either intended to inflict severe emotional distress or knew that there was a high probability that their conduct would do so; and (3) the defendants' conduct actually caused severe emotional distress.'" Lifton v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 416 F.3d 571, 579 (7th Cir.2005) (quoting Thomas v. Fuerst, 345 Ill.App.3d 929, 281 Ill.Dec. 215, 803 N.E.2d 619, 625 (2004)). Additionally, "`severe emotional distress' is distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it," see id., and "[t]he nature of the defendant's conduct must be so extreme as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and be regarded as intolerable in a civilized community." Dunn v. City of Elgin, 347 F.3d 641, 651 (7th Cir.2003) (internal quotation omitted).
In reviewing the totality of the conduct alleged by Lara in support of her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Brown's conduct, one comment regarding Lara's breasts, one comment regarding another woman's breasts, an attempt to peer down Lara's uniform shirt, asking Lara out on a date, an instance of touching her hair, and commenting daily on the smell of her perfume, the Court notes that Lara's allegations do not rise to the level of severity and outrageousness required for her to maintain her claim.[5]*903 Thus, Lara's feelings of "shock" or "disgust" as to such conduct fail to help her meet the high burden expected of her in order to state her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. As this Court, has previously noted, "Illinois courts have limited recovery on this tort to victims of only the most intolerable conduct." See Poulos, 2002 WL 31001876 at *17 (comparing Pavilon v. Kaferly, 204 Ill. App.3d 235, 149 Ill.Dec. 549, 561 N.E.2d 1245, 1251-52 (1990), which upheld an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim "against [a] defendant who knew plaintiff was susceptible to emotional distress, repeatedly propositioned her and offered her money for sex, fired her when she refused her advances, threatened to kill and rape her, harassed her family and psychotherapist, threatened to challenge custody of her child, and harassed her new employer with letters, phone calls and spurious complaints to government officials," with Miller v. Equitable Lift Assur. Soc'y, 181 Ill.App.3d 954, 130 Ill.Dec. 558, 537 N.E.2d 887, 888-90 (1989), which denied an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim notwithstanding "plaintiff's allegations that her supervisors ridiculed her performance or ignored her entirely, denied her request for a transfer, refused to cooperate in recovering valuable property that was stolen from her, forbade her to call the police when another employee physically attacked her, encouraged other insurance agents' sexual harassment of her, suggested that she use sex to make her insurance sales and fired her when she reported other employees' fraudulent practices, and that her co-workers ignored her, called her a white racist and threatened her with physical harm"). In light of this high standard, and Lara's inability to meet it, the Court dismisses Count IV of Lara's amended complaint.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants Diamond's and Brown's motion for summary judgment. This case is hereby terminated. This order is final and appealable.
NOTES
[1]  The Court notes that Brown's alleged November 2001 comment took place more than 300 days prior to Lara's filing of her EEOC charge on December 13, 2002. Generally, "federal courts only consider evidence from this 300-day period when making Title VII determinations." Bridges v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago, No.2005 WL 241469, 2005 WL 241469, at *5 (N.D.Ill. Jan.20, 2005) (citing Dandy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 388 F.3d 263, 270 (7th Cir.2004)). However, in considering a hostile work environment claim, "it does not matter that some of the component acts of a hostile work environment claim fall outside the statutory time period, as long as one act took place within the limitations period." Id. (citing Nat. R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002)). Because Lara has alleged acts occurring within the statutory time period, this Court can properly consider the November 2001 comment in determining whether a hostile work environment existed.
[2]  Lara's inability to assign specific dates to her allegations is not fatal to her ability to bring her claim. See Curde v. Xytel Corp., 912 F.Supp. 335, 341 (N.D.Ill.1995) (citing Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1456-57 (7th Cir.1994)).
[3]  The Court notes Lara's deposition testimony differed from the allegations in her amended complaint, in which she alleged Brown commented about the way Lara smelled "[o]n several occasions between November 2001 and June 2002" rather than every time he walked past her. See Am. Compl. ¶ 11.
[4]  Indeed, Ferree later testified that he was unaware of Brown's alleged behavior until approximately one year prior to being deposed on June 21, 2005. (Defs.' LR 56.1(b)(3) ¶ 42.)
[5]  In responding to the motion for summary judgment, Lara appears to rely on much of the same conduct she uses to assert her hostile work environment claim and her amended complaint only specifically mentions Brown's attempt to look at her breasts as extreme and outrageous behavior. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32-36. In such a situation, Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir.1997), is instructive in that "the court ruled that Title VII preempts common law claims of [intentional infliction of emotional distress] . . . if such a claim is based upon the same operative factual allegations." Ryan v. Town of Schererville, No. 2:03-CV-530, 2005 WL 1172614, at *25 (N.D.Ind. May 4, 2005) (citing Jansen, 123 F.3d at 493). See also id. (granting summary judgment where plaintiff used identical facts to support her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim as she did to buttress her Title VII claim). However, because Lara's claim fails even considering Lara's use of identical facts, the Court does not apply Jansen and its impact on the present case.