940 F.2d 652Unpublished Disposition
NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit.Wayne R. GRIES, Michael J. Moran, Plaintiffs-Appellants,v.ZIMMER, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 90-2430.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued May 9, 1991.Decided July 29, 1991.As Amended Aug. 26, 1991.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.  Robert D. Potter, District Judge.  (CA-87-576-C-C-P, CA-87-577-C-C-P)
Louis Adams Bledsoe, III, Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A.C., Charlotte, N.C.  (Argued), for appellant Moran;  Richard A. Vinroot, Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., Charlotte, N.C. on brief.
Louis L. Lesesne, Jr., Lesesne & Connette, Charlotte, N.C., for appellant Gries.
Martin Nesbitt Erwin, Smith, Helms, Mulliss and Moore, Greensboro, N.C.  (Argued), for appellee:  Julianna C. Theall, Diane P. Bishop, Smith, Helms, Mulliss and Moore, Greensboro, N.C. on brief.
W.D.N.C., 742 F.Supp. 1309.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Before MURNAGHAN and SPROUSE, Circuit Judges, and JOSEPH H. YOUNG, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:

1
Two ex-employees, Wayne R. Gries and Michael J. Moran, sued their employer, Zimmer, Inc., for age discrimination after their jobs were terminated.  After the initial trial ended in a mistrial because the jury could not reach a verdict, a second trial was held.  The jury returned verdicts for the plaintiffs;  however, it awarded damages of half the amounts requested.  The district judge granted a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and conditionally granted a motion for a new trial should that grant be reversed on appeal.  The judge also denied the ex-employees' motion for amendment of the judgment to provide for reinstatement in employment, pre-judgment interest, and an increase in damages.  The ex-employees have appealed.  We reverse the judgment notwithstanding the verdict, deny the motion for a new trial, and reinstate the jury's verdict.  We affirm, however, the denial of the motion to amend to provide reinstatement and an increase in damages.  We grant the motion for prejudgment interest.

I.

2
Prior to April 6, 1987, Gries and Moran worked for Zimmer, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bristol-Myers Squibb, with headquarters in Warsaw, Indiana.  Zimmer manufactures orthopaedic devices and surgical supplies.  Gries and Moran worked in Charlotte, North Carolina at Zimmer's Patient Care Division ("Patient Care").  Gries was Vice-President of Finance;  Moran was Vice-President of Operations.  Gries was 40;  Moran was 44.  Gries had been with Zimmer since 1979 as Budget Director and with Patient Care since 1984;  Moran had been with Zimmer since 1975 as Manufacturing Controller and with Patient Care since 1980, first as Vice-President of Finance and then as Vice-President of Operations.  The President of Patient Care, Robert Teskey was 53.  All three men were members of Patient Care's seven-person management committee.

3
On April 6, 1987, the three men, Gries, Moran, and Teskey, were terminated by Ronald Davis, the President of Zimmer's United States operations.  The propriety of the reasons for their termination is the principal subject of the instant lawsuit.  Undisputed, however, is the fact that the three men's termination coincided with the consolidation of Patient Care and another Zimmer division.

4
Thoughts of consolidation dated to the spring of 1986, when Davis began to consider combining Patient Care, Aspen Laboratories in Colorado, Snyder Laboratories in Ohio ("Snyder"), and Hall Surgical in California into two divisions.  In May and June 1986 the Senior Vice President of Finance at Zimmer, Jack Shinneman, prepared a report on the proposed consolidation.  The report assumed that the consolidation would be effective October 1986 and that management structures would be combined.  Davis received the report in June or July 1986.

5
At the end of July 1986, Davis also learned of inventory problems at Patient Care.  Although, the precise cause and degree of severity is disputed, the problems basically arose from a computerized production order tracking system recently implemented in the division.

6
In October 1986, Davis received from M.L. Fisher, Vice President, Human Resources at Zimmer a "requested" memorandum entitled "PC/Snyder Thoughts."    The memorandum outlined possible courses of action with respect to the three employees--termination and/or consolidation.  Some time between August 1986 and January 1987, Davis added comments to Gries' and Moran's performance evaluations criticizing them for the inventory problems.  By early spring 1987, Davis and Fisher had established the initial new management structure for the proposed consolidation of Patient Care and Snyder.  It did not include the three men.

7
On April 6, 1987, the three men were told of their termination.  Davis told them they had been terminated because of the consolidation.  A claim of unsatisfactory performance was not asserted.

8
Snyder's managers were appointed to lead the consolidated Patient Care Division ("Division").  Snyder's former president, Charles Deeds (age 53) became the president of the Division.  The other officers of the Division were Marley Price, Vice President/Controller (age 35);  Thomas Egan, Vice President/Marketing (Snyder product line) (age 37);  James Robson, Vice President/Marketing (Patient Care product line) (age 38);  Phillip Sauer, Vice President/Product Development (age 48);  J. Michael Hoban, Vice President/Human Resources (age 35);  Regina Brown, Vice President/Quality Assurance (age 50);  and R.G. Betts, Director, Manufacturing (age 41).  Hoban and Robson had been members of Patient Care's management committee.  Two other members of Patient Care's committee also were given new positions within the new Division:  Glen Cueman, Director of Engineering (age 37);  Eli Carter, Director of Quality Assurance (age 35).  The Vice President of Operations position in the Division was offered to Thomas Hufziger (age 58) on a temporary basis from April 2, 1987 to July 27, 1987, at which time Larry Harvey (age 37) took over the position.

9
Gries and Moran claimed their termination was due to age discrimination.  In December 1987, Gries and Moran filed suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. Secs. 621 et seq.1   In March 1989, trial began in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina before the Honorable Robert D. Potter, Chief Judge.  The trial lasted five days, but ended in a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict.

10
In January 1990, the parties retried the case before Judge Potter and a jury in a seven-day trial.  Gries sought damages of $111,702.21;  Moran sought $81,080.88.  The jury found for Gries and Moran, awarding damages of $55,851.10 and $40,540.44.  Zimmer moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a conditional grant of a new trial.  Gries and Moran moved to amend the judgment to provide for reinstatement, pre-judgment interest, and an increase in damages to the full amount requested at trial.  In the alternative, Gries and Moran moved for a new trial on the issue of damages.

11
On July 23, 1990, Judge Potter granted the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and conditionally granted the motion for a new trial.  The judge denied Gries' and Moran's motions.  The appeal followed.

II.

12
As in many discrimination cases, the parties tell two different stories using the same incidents and documents.  Gries and Moran argue that in early 1986 Davis concluded that Zimmer would save money by eliminating three executive positions held by older employees with seniority who were highly paid and replacing them with younger persons who would be paid at a lower pay level.  When problems with the computerized system at Patient Care arose in the summer of 1986, Davis used the inventory problems as the justification for the eventual elimination of these jobs during the consolidation.  On the other hand, Zimmer contends that the decision to terminate the three men during the consolidation, rather than other personnel, occurred because Davis had lost confidence in the three men after the inventory problems arose.

13
Confronted with a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we apply the same standard as the trial court.  The court must review the evidence "in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, giving them the benefit of all inferences."  Duke v. Uniroyal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1417 (4th Cir.1991);  Herold v. Hajoca Corp., 864 F.2d 317, 319 (4th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1107 (1989).  "If, with that evidence, a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of plaintiffs, the court must defer to the judgment of the jury, even if the court's judgment on the evidence differs."  Duke, 928 F.2d at 1417.  We have "cautioned against granting motions for directed verdict and jnov in discrimination cases where motive and causation are at issue...."  Herold, 864 F.2d at 319.  As we have explained,

14
"Determination of motive is ordinarily a function within the purview of the fact finder because so much depends on an assessment of the credibility of the witnesses.  A finding of motive should not be set aside by the reviewing court unless the evidence clearly compels rejection."

15
Id. (quoting Taylor v. Home Insurance Co., 777 F.2d 849, 854 (4th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1142 (1986)).

16
Two paths are open to a plaintiff alleging age discrimination under the ADEA.  First, a plaintiff can meet the "burden 'under ordinary principles of proof by any direct or indirect evidence relevant to and sufficiently probative of the issue.' "  EEOC v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 713 F.2d 1011, 1014 (4th Cir.1983) (citation omitted);  see Goldberg v. B. Green and Co., Inc., 836 F.2d 845, 848 (4th Cir.1988);  English v. Pabst Brewing Co., 828 F.2d 1047, 1051 (4th Cir.1987).  However, because "it is difficult to prove discriminatory intent under ordinary principles of proof," Goldberg, 836 F.2d at 849, a plaintiff can use a judicially-created proof scheme established under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) for Title VII cases.  See Herold, 864 F.2d at 319.  By choosing that path, the plaintiff first must establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.  The burden then shifts to the defendant to "articulate a nondiscriminatory reason" for terminating the plaintiff.  Finally, the plaintiff "must bear the burden of proving that he was the victim of intentional discrimination" by "demonstrating that the defendant's proffered reason was a mere pretext and that, as between the plaintiff's age and the defendant's explanation, age was the more likely reason for the dismissal."  Herold, 864 F.2d at 319.

17
We face, in the present instance, a particular type of ADEA case, namely, a reduction-in-force situation.  In reduction-in-force cases, the requirements for the prima facie case have been further elucidated.  In Herold, the court stated that

18
In a reduction-in-force case ... the plaintiff must show four things to make out a prima facie case under ADEA:  (1) that he is in the protected age group, (2) that he was discharged, (3) that at the time of the discharge, he was performing his job at a level that met his employer's legitimate expectations, and (4) that persons outside the protected age class were retained in the same position or that there was some other evidence that the employer did not treat age neutrally in deciding to dismiss the plaintiff.

19
Herold, 864 F.2d at 319;  see Western Electric, 713 F.2d at 1015.

20
Recently, in Duke, the court reconsidered the Western Electric/Herold analysis for situations "where legitimate business reasons led to a reduction of employees in an identified group or territory and the stated criterion for selection was employee performance...."  928 F.2d at 1418.  In such cases,

21
we hold that, to prove a prima facie case, the plaintiffs must establish that:  (1) they were protected by the ADEA;  (2) they were selected from the group or territory for termination;  (3) they were performing at a level substantially equivalent to the lowest level of those retained in the group or territory;  and (4) the process of selection produced a residual work force of persons in the group or territory containing some unprotected persons who were performing at a lower level than that at which the plaintiffs were performing.

22
Id. at 1418.  If such a case is established, "the employer may articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory basis of selection, in which case the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the employer's basis was a mere pretext for discrimination and that age was a determining factor in the selection process."    Id.

23
When Gries and Moran were terminated, the sole reason given by Zimmer was the Patient Care/Snyder consolidation.  The notice sent to all Patient Care employees stated that Moran's and Gries' positions were "redundant in the new organizational structure."    Davis assured both men that the termination was not due to their unsatisfactory performance.  Even upon inquiry from the North Carolina Employment Security Commission and the EEOC, Zimmer maintained that economic consolidation had been the reason for their termination.  Only after litigation had begun did Zimmer assert that unsatisfactory performance was an actual reason for termination.

24
Duke, therefore, does not apply here.    Duke only applies where "the stated criterion for selection was employee performance."    928 F.2d at 1418.  But Zimmer never stated to Moran and Gries that the criterion for termination was performance.  Instead, at the time the men were terminated, redundancy because of the reorganization was the reason given.  Unsatisfactory performance as a proffered rationale for termination arose only during the subsequent litigation.  The reasons told to an employee at termination may be considered background to the prima facie case.  The purpose of the prima facie case is to eliminate "the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection."  Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).  Thus it may be permissible to heighten the prima facie requirements for a plaintiff, basing them on reasons that the plaintiff should examine prior to his or her conclusion that age discrimination has occurred and the subsequent decision to bring a lawsuit.  Yet, it would be inappropriate to raise the plaintiff's burden to establish the prima facie case when it is based on reasons advanced by the defendant in response to the complaint which are in contradiction of those given at the time of termination.  Such explanations "frame the factual issue," Burdine, 450 U.S. at 325, and explanation of the discrepancy should be part of the defendant's burden to produce a legitimate non-discriminatory reason.  As elucidated in Western Electric and Herold, the third prong of the traditional test requires the plaintiff to establish that the reasons advanced by the employer are pretextual.  That burden on the plaintiff suffices.  We, thus, examine whether Gries and Moran proved their case under the analysis set forth in Herold and Western Electric.2

A.

25
Gries and Moran first had to establish a prima facia case of age discrimination.  See Herold, 864 F.2d at 319.  Both men were over forty and thus in the protected age group.  29 U.S.C. Sec. 631(a);  see Herold, 864 F.2d at 319-20;  see also Connell v. Bank of Boston, 924 F.2d 1169, 1172 (1st Cir.1991), petition for cert. filed (April 26, 1991) (No. 90-1646).  Both men were discharged.  Herold, 864 F.2d at 319.

26
And, at the time of their discharge, both men were performing "at a level that met ... [their] employer's legitimate expectations...."  Herold, 864 F.2d at 319.  Despite the summer 1986 inventory problem, Zimmer assigned 1986 end-of-the-year evaluations to Gries and Moran which fell in the "effective" range.  "Effective" is defined by Zimmer as "meets the requirements, goals and objectives of the position."    A November 1986 Executive Succession Planning Chart completed by J. Michael Hoban, Personnel Director of Patient Care, gave Moran a "4" ("exceeds requirements") and Gries a "3" ("meets requirements") in the "Current Performance Rating" category.  Moran and Gries also presented evidence that the inventory problem was the result of insufficient time to establish a complex product tracking system and that other people who had examined the problem believed it to have been largely addressed by Patient Care.  Patient Care's Engineering Director, Glenn Cueman even testified that he believed he had borne identical responsibility for the inventory problem as Moran and yet Moran had been terminated while Cueman was rated "totally effective" and retained.  Considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, Moran and Gries established that they were performing at a level that met Zimmer's legitimate expectations.

27
The fourth element of the prima facie case, as the Duke court recognized, "often proves difficult to apply."    928 F.2d at 1418.  Nevertheless, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by showing that the "employer treated an older worker differently than younger employees in similar positions" or produced "some other evidence indicating that the employer did not treat age neutrally."  Herold, 864 F.2d at 320.

28
At trial and on appeal, the parties have debated which employees the court should examine to determine whether age was treated neutrally.  Gries and Moran contended at trial that the seven-person Patient Care management committee was the proper focus for the court because only Patient Care's management was terminated or reassigned;  only Teskey, Moran, and Gries, were terminated among the seven Patient Care committee members;  and Teskey, Moran, and Gries were the only over-forty members of the committee.  The district judge and Zimmer disagreed, arguing that the focus should be on all the management from Patient Care and Snyder, the divisions affected by the consolidation.

29
Cases cited with respect to the issue of which employees group the court should have examined are not dispositive and offer no guiding principles.3   The consolidation itself, however, does offer guidance.  Under the consolidation plan, Zimmer faced a choice of which personnel to eliminate.  The issue for the court is whether, in choosing among personnel, Zimmer used impermissible criteria.  The plaintiffs needed to prove that, when Zimmer confronted the need to dismiss people because of the consolidation, it dismissed older rather than younger people.

30
Prior to consolidation, the Snyder management committee consisted of eight people.  Five were over forty:  the President, Deeds, was 53;  the Vice President for Product Development, Sauer, was 48;  the Director for Quality Assurance, Hofacker, was 57;  the Director of "Bio Lab," Brown, was 50;  and the Director of Manufacturing, Betts, was 41.  Of the remaining three, two--Egan and Hoffman--were 37, and one, Price was 35.  The Patient Care management committee contained seven people.  Three--Teskey, Moran, and Gries--were over 40.  Robson was 38, Cueman was 37, and Carter and Hoban were 35.

31
The initial plan for the 1986 consolidation contained a series of organizational charts in which "redundant" positions were crossed out.4   The organizational charts used were from Patient Care.  Crossed out were Teskey, Moran, and Gries, as well as, Cueman, Robson, and Hoban.

32
However, Cueman, Robson and Hoban were not terminated while all 40 and over were.  Robson and Hoban were given positions on the Division's management committee.  Cueman and Carter were placed one level below the management committee.  Similarly, all the Snyder committee members were retained, those over 40 and those under 40, although after consolidation some members, Hoffman and Hofacker, were technically one level below the Division management committee.

33
Therefore, although after the consolidation, four of the new Division's nine person management committee were over 50, all the under forty employees who had been members of the Patient Care and Snyder Management Committees were retained and the only terminated members were over forty.5   In addition, prior to consolidation, Zimmer initially intended to eliminate three positions held by younger employees.  Zimmer eventually maintained the younger employees.  Furthermore, Gries and Moran presented evidence from other Zimmer employees that Gries' and Moran's duties, although not their titles, were given to two younger men.6   Gries and Moran also have contended that they should have been allowed to bump junior employees.  The evidence supporting their claim that Zimmer had such a practice as an official policy was somewhat questionable;  however, in any case, they were not offered such an opportunity.  Zimmer did not purge itself of all over-forty executives.  But the plaintiffs need not prove total exclusion to meet the prima facie case.  They need to prove only that age was not treated neutrally.  They met such a burden and made out a prima facie case of discrimination.7

B.

34
In response to the prima facie case established by Moran and Gries, Zimmer articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory basis for selection beyond the elimination of their positions due to the consolidation.  Zimmer claimed that Davis had "lost confidence" in Moran and Gries because of the inventory discrepancy in 1986.  According to Davis, the inventory difference was initially over $800,000 and many of the identified causes of the discrepancy fell within Gries' and Moran's responsibilities.  In addition, Zimmer argued that Davis had been concerned about internal bickering between Gries and Moran.

C.

35
Presented with the inadequate performance explanation, Gries and Moran had to offer "substantial proof from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the articulated reasons were a pretext for age discrimination."  Duke, 928 F.2d at 1418.  In Duke, the court explained our task:

36
we act clinically in marshalling the evidence presented in favor of plaintiffs and disregard the substance of evidence offered by ... [defendant].  We also must assume that the testimony in favor of plaintiffs was credible, unless totally incredible on its face, and ignore evidence offered to rebut it.

37
Id.  Under that standard, we believe that a reasonable jury properly could have found that Zimmer's stated reasons were pretextual.  The key determinations required to decide the pretext issue involved credibility.  "Determining witness credibility is the job of the jury."  Herold, 864 F.2d at 320-21.  The judge should not take that "task away from the jury" once the jury has decided which witnesses to believe.  Id. at 321.

38
Three documents were essential to the trial.  First, the parties disputed the authenticity of the 1986 evaluations of Gries and Moran.  Teskey initially filled out those forms.  He dated Moran's, July 30, 1986, and although no date by Teskey appears on Gries', Hoban dated his review of it as December 1, 1986.  At a disputed date after the end of July, Davis added a comment on both evaluations relating to the inventory problems.  Davis also refused to give the men a salary increase at the end of the year.  Gries and Moran have claimed that Teskey's testimony demonstrated that Davis added the comments long after he had decided to terminate them.  Teskey testified that at the "end of the year"--December 1986--he and Davis discussed the evaluations and Davis said that he wanted "to write a comment."    In addition, at deposition Davis stated that he had added the comments after August 1986.  Zimmer, however, has claimed that Davis added the comments around August 27, 1986.

39
Second, the parties offer different interpretations of an October 17, 1986 memorandum.  The memorandum was prepared by Fisher on the PC/Snyder consolidation.  The memo outlines three possible courses of action.  One, "Consolidate PC into Snyder," details severing only Teskey, Moran, and Gries.  The second, "Do Not Consolidate But Review the Three Employees in Six Months," provided "Performance appraisals (review and rework with Legal)."    The third, "Terminate," discussed the termination only of Teskey, Moran, and Gries.  Gries and Moran claimed that Davis, following part of the second step, had "reworked" the reviews by later adding in December or January the inventory comments to their evaluations.  Zimmer argued that no such nefarious connotation was intended by the term, "reworked," and the memorandum and reviews were separate.

40
Third, the parties drew conflicting conclusions about two "Executive Succession Planning" charts.  Teskey testified that, in October 1986, he and Hoban worked together and filled out an Executive Succession Planning chart.  According to their chart dated November 24, 1986, all the management employees, including Gries and Moran, received current performance ratings of "4," "Exceeds Requirements."    However, at trial another chart appeared, allegedly prepared in February 1987, which gives identical information for all personnel except Moran, Gries, and Teskey.  Their ratings were displayed as "1," "Does Not Meet All Requirements."    Gries and Moran argued that the February 1987 chart represented another alteration by Davis and Fisher to support the termination decision.  Zimmer argued that the later document was not based on the earlier chart but rather prepared at the company headquarters by the personnel department and that Davis had not even known of the later chart.

41
In addition to presenting conflicting documents, Gries and Moran presented evidence that, aside from Davis and Fisher, few others at Zimmer were aware of the "severe" nature of the performance problems with the three men.  They argued that the inventory problem was not as serious or substantial as Davis claimed.  They claimed that Patient Care was asked to create a computer inventory system in a far shorter period of time than Zimmer itself had installed one, they were aware of the problem when it occurred, and they acted to attempt to resolve it.  Reports introduced at trial, from December 1986 and March 1987, based on visits by Zimmer personnel to Patient Care suggested that matters with respect to the inventory had much improved.  In listing the evidence, we do not imply that an incorrect but good faith belief as to the plaintiffs' competence constitutes proof of age discrimination.  See Little v. Republic Refining Co., Ltd., 924 F.2d 93, 97 (5th Cir.1991).  However, the evidence supports Gries' and Moran's contention that Zimmer's evidence about their performance did not reflect a good faith belief actually held by Davis.  In addition, Gries and Moran presented evidence that the duties they had held had been largely reassigned to retitled positions that were given to men under forty.  They also presented evidence that they were not offered the opportunity to fix their alleged performance problems, and, indeed were never even informed of any alleged deficiencies.

42
Credibility, in short, must resolve such conflicts.  It is quintessentially a task for the jury.  When viewed in the light most favorable to Gries and Moran, and when all reasonable inferences are drawn in their favor, the jury properly could have found that Zimmer's proffered reasons for dismissing Gries and Moran were mere pretexts and that it was more likely that age was the real reason.  Herold, 864 F.2d at 320.  If the jury had disbelieved Davis' testimony that he had "lost confidence" in the three men and therefore had decided to terminate them, it could have chosen to conclude, based on the evidence, that he had created a paper record to suggest that their termination had not been based on age discrimination.  Although the district court's judgment of the evidence obviously differed, the jury's verdict based on the evidence was that of a reasonable jury, resting on substantial evidence.  Judgment notwithstanding the verdict was, therefore, improper.

III.

43
Having concluded that the grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict was improper, we must proceed to decide whether the conditional grant of a new trial was also improper.  We review the district judge's decision under an abuse of discretion standard.  See Herold, 864 F.2d at 321.  A "motion for a new trial differs from that of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in that the court must weigh the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses."  Spell v. McDaniel, 604 F.Supp. 641, 647 (E.D.N.C.1985), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 824 F.2d 1380 (4th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027 (1988);  see Herold, 864 F.2d at 321.

44
Two principles inform our decisions.  First, in Abasiekong v. City of Shelby, 744 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir.1984), the court reversed grants of judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new trial finding an abuse of discretion.  It was concerned with judicial economy.  The Abasiekong court explained that:

45
"where the judgment n.o.v. is reversed and the trial court has alternatively granted the motion for a new trial, the case will ordinarily be remanded for a new trial, '[b]ut the courts of appeals have authority to order otherwise. ' "    (Emphasis added).

46
Id. at 1059 (quoting Mays v. Pioneer Lumber, 502 F.2d 106 (4th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975)) (emphasis in original).  In Mays, the court reinstated the jury verdict because "judicial efficiency would ill be served by permitting a third trial."    Id.  The Abasiekong court followed suit:

47
Abasiekong has also endured a first trial resulting in a hung jury and a second trial resulting in a judgment n.o.v.;    and again, "two trials are enough, and indeed, all that the judicial system can presently afford."

48
Id. at 1059 (quoting Mays, 502 F.2d at 110).  The Abasiekong court concluded that, "the district court does appear to have abused its discretion....  The jury's verdict was not against the clear weight of the evidence, and any 'miscarriage of justice' is more seriously threatened by forcing Abasiekong through the rigors of yet a third trial than by allowing the jury verdict to stand."    Id.  In the present case, as in Abasiekong, the first trial ended with a hung jury and the second ended with a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  In trial time alone, the proceedings have consumed a total of twelve days of court time.

49
The second principle, advanced to justify the grant of a new trial, namely, the possibility of a compromise verdict, was adopted by the district judge as the basis for his decision.  In Mekdeci By and Through Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat'l Laboratories, 711 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir.1983), the court stated that "a compromise verdict results when jurors resolve their inability to make a determination with any certainty or unanimity on the issue of liability by finding inadequate damages."  Mekdeci, 711 F.2d at 1513.  The court noted, however, that "an insufficient damages verdict, standing alone, does not necessarily indicate compromise."    Id.  The court examined "other evidence demonstrating that the deficient monetary award resulted from an impermissible compromise."  Id. at 1514.  The court listed "sufficiently persuasive indicia of a compromise":

50
"that the issues of liability were strongly contested, that there was some confusion on the part of the jury with regard to the contributory negligence issue, that the jury took two days to reach a verdict, and that neither party urged acceptance in the trial court of the verdict finally rendered."

51
Id.  (quoting Hatfield v. Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co., 396 F.2d 721, 723 (5th Cir.1968)). The court then found that "unique circumstances provide abundant indicia that the jury compromised the issues of liability and damages...."  Id. at 1515.

52
The Fourth Circuit has adopted a similar, although slightly more stringent, analysis.  We have held that a new trial on all issues is necessary "if the verdict 'could only have been a sympathy or compromise verdict ... [b]ut where there is no substantial indication that the liability and damage issues are inextricably interwoven ... a second trial limited to damages is entirely proper.' "  Spell, 824 F.2d at 1400 (quoting Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 511 F.2d 839, 846 (4th Cir.1975)) (emphasis in original).  In Spell, the district court in an "eminently sound," 824 F.2d at 1400, ruling stated that the pertinent factors included,

53
(1) clarity of the jury instructions and verdict form;  (2) length of the jury deliberations;  (3) strength of the evidence as to liability;  (4) questions and notes from the jury during deliberations;  and (5) whether the case involved a sympathetic plaintiff and unsympathetic defendant.

54
604 F.Supp. at 651.  The district court emphasized that "if inadequate damages were the sole test for compromise, Rule 59(a) would serve no purpose."  Id. at 653.  With respect to the facts at issue in Spell, the district court decided that the "totality of the circumstances simply does not point unerringly to a compromise verdict."    Id.

55
In the present case, the district judge concluded that a compromise verdict had been rendered.  He cited, and Zimmer has pointed on appeal, to a number of indicia of the alleged compromise verdict:  the evidence of liability was insubstantial;  the plaintiffs' counsel improperly attempted to invoke the jury's sympathies;  the jury instructions on damages were clear;  the jury may have wanted to resolve the issue to be finished that same day which was Friday, their last day of duty;  the one communication from the jury about damages was immaterial;  the damages were undisputed;  the jury split the plaintiffs' damage claims exactly in half despite different post-employment histories;  and both parties were dissatisfied with the jury's judgment.

56
We emphasize that "a jury's verdict is to be afforded every inference that it is proper and honest...."  Spell, 604 F.Supp. at 651.  We recognize that the decision that a verdict represents a compromise is "quintessentially a decision committed to the informed discretion of the judge who has conducted the trial...."  Spell, 824 F.2d at 1400.  However, after careful consideration, we believe that no new trial is required.  Admittedly an award of precisely fifty percent of the requested amount raises suspicions;  however, we do not believe that this fact alone can justify sending the case back for a third trial.8   None of the other factors present in a compromise verdict situation appear here.

57
First, after a seven-day trial, the jury debated only three and one-half hours.  As in Spell, the verdict was reached "within a reasonable period of time."    604 F.Supp. at 653;  see Guaranty Service v. American Employers' Insurance, 893 F.2d 725, 729-30 (5th Cir.1990) (concluding that where evidence supports the verdict, a ten minute jury deliberation was of "no importance").  The district judge speculated that the jury had been influenced by its receipt of the case on "a Friday late in the afternoon on the last day for which they had been summoned to serve."    However, we must presume that the jury acted properly and honestly.  Spell, 604 F.Supp. at 651.  We do not believe that the mere fact that a verdict is handed down on Friday afternoon means that it is, per se, a compromise verdict.  Moreover, the district judge's instruction to the jury emphasized the importance of reasoned deliberation.  Four times, he gave any member of the jury the opportunity to inform him that deliberation for "any reason " would not be possible.  We must assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that a juror concerned about leaving by early evening, would have stepped forward.  Furthermore, the jury gave no indication of being deadlocked or confused as to liability.  In comparison, in Mekdeci, after four days, the jury attempted to render a decision with an explanation of its reasons.  After being denied that request, the jury stated that it was hopelessly deadlocked, and the judge gave an Allen charge.  A period of three and one-half hours of deliberation is as indicative of the jury's belief in Zimmer's liability as it is indicative of Zimmer's non-liability.

58
Second, as discussed in Part II, the evidence on liability, even now weighing the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, was sufficient to preserve the possibility that a compromise verdict was not rendered.9   Moreover, the jury's one note to the judge during its deliberation supports the argument that no confusion existed as to liability.  The jury was instructed to decide the first issue, liability, and only upon finding liability to go on to determine damages.  During deliberations, the jury sent a question to the judge.  The judge noted upon receiving the jury's question, "All right.  They have gotten past the first issue."    The jury asked whether in calculating damages it should consider the bonus health plan and savings plan.  This question implies that it rapidly decided liability but had difficulty deciding the proper amount of damages.  Had the verdict been a compromise verdict, there would have been little need for the jury to debate which elements of damages it should include.  In Mekdeci, the jury "sent several communications to the judge indicating its uncertainty on the central issue of causation."    711 F.2d at 1515.  In the present case, as in Spell, "the jury communicated only once with the court and that communication was reasonable."    604 F.Supp. at 651.  Certainly, no "odd chronology" of jury deliberations exists.  Phav v. Trueblood, Inc., 915 F.2d 764, 768 (1st Cir.1990).  Notably, the only confusion apparent on the part of the jury was over damages, the aspect that both parties argue the jury calculated incorrectly.

59
Third, Zimmer has argued that a verdict of precisely one-half the amount of requested damages in a case where liability is contested leads to the conclusion that the award represents a compromise verdict.  In National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Great Lakes Warehouse Corp., 261 F.2d 35, 37 (7th Cir.1958), the court found a compromise verdict where the jury "awarded only one-half of the amount of loss as established by the undisputed evidence on this subject and under the court's instructions."    However, here the damages evidence was not undisputed and the court's instructions left room for jury discretion.  According even to the district judge, Zimmer argued in its closing argument that the plaintiffs had failed to mitigate their damages.  The judge also gave an instruction regarding mitigation which stated that if the plaintiff "failed to make reasonable efforts to find a new job, you should subtract from his damages any amount that he could have earned in a new job after his discharge."    The jury might have believed that, had damages actually been undisputed, it would not have been asked to decide upon an amount.10   From the jury's perspective, such a conclusion would have appeared supported by the judge's instruction that the jury award should be "fair and just."

60
A "low award of damages can reasonably be explained by the jury's consideration of other improper factors," Spell, 604 F.Supp. at 651, or the low award can be the result of the consideration of proper factors, although not necessarily in the manner that counsel or the judge would have preferred.  The evidence does not indicate what the jury was thinking when it determined that the appropriate damages would be half of, what even plaintiffs' counsel termed, a "lot of money."    However, it was repeatedly told by plaintiffs' counsel and the judge not to base the award or decision on sympathy.  We note also that, although Zimmer was a large company, Moran and Gries were well-to-do executives whose salaries and benefits over a thirty-three month period amounted each to over two hundred thousand dollars.  As in Spell, "The record contains absolutely no indicia of a compromise other than the low amount of damages."  Spell, 604 F.Supp. at 653.  Cf. Sentry Indemnity Co. v. Peoples, 856 F.2d 1479, 1481 (11th Cir.1988) (mathematical relationship between unpaid policy limit and jury award did not show impermissible compromise).

61
In conclusion, the grant of a new trial was an abuse of discretion.  The "telltale signs of a compromise verdict" are not present.  The record in fact contains evidence--the jury's note--that the jury engaged in a calculation of damages based on proper factors.  Damages, in view of the comments about mitigation, were not clearly inadequate.  As in Abasiekong, the plaintiffs have already been through two trials.  A third trial will do little to achieve anything closer to a just verdict than the one rendered.  We reverse the new trial grant by the district court to uphold the jury's verdict on liability.

IV.

62
The plaintiffs also have argued that the court should reverse the denial of their motions to amend the judgment to provide for reinstatement and pre-judgment interest, and adjust the damage award upward to the figure they claim was undisputed at trial.  In the alternative, the plaintiffs moved for a new trial on damages.

63
As explained earlier, the damages were not undisputed at trial.11   The district judge found that the damages were "virtually undisputed."    (Emphasis added.)    He found that the evidence concerning back pay and mitigation of damages "essentially was undisputed."    (Emphasis added.)    As we have explained in Part III, the evidence and the jury instructions may have led the jury to believe that a lower award would be permissible.  The jury may have taken into consideration some perceived failure to mitigate on the part of the plaintiffs.

64
The damage awards are not "manifestly inadequate" in view of the disputed damages.  Spell, 824 F.2d at 1400.  They are not "too low to be sustained."    Young v. Int'l Paper Co., 322 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir.1963).  "Appellate review is not designed to rationalize jury verdicts, even if such a task were possible."  Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 760 F.2d 481, 489 (3d Cir.1985).  Having concluded that the damages were somewhat disputed and that therefore the decision that a compromise verdict was rendered was an abuse of discretion, we likewise find that the jury award was not inadequate and a new trial solely on damages is not required.

65
Reinstatement and prejudgment interest are issues committed to the discretion of the courts.  See Duke, 928 F.2d at 1423-25 (reinstatement);  MacDissi v. Valmont Industries, Inc., 856 F.2d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir.1988) (prejudgment interest);  Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 717 F.2d 114, 120 (4th Cir.1983) (reinstatement);  EEOC v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 690 F.2d 1072, 1075 (4th Cir.1982) (prejudgment interest).  The Duke court stated that, "notwithstanding the desirability of reinstatement, intervening historical circumstances can make it impossible or inappropriate."    928 F.2d at 1423.  We find such circumstances present here.  For example, although prolonged litigation may not always render reinstatement not feasible, in this case, the "animosity between the parties" that the litigation appears to have created makes reinstatement inadvisable.  Id.  We do not believe that equity would be served by reinstatement.

66
However, "[i]n an ADEA case, prejudgment interest is designed to compensate the plaintiff for loss of the use of money wrongfully withheld through an unlawful discharge."  Reichman v. Bonsignore, Brignati & Mazzotta P.C., 818 F.2d 278, 281 (2nd Cir.1987).  Equitable considerations lead us to grant prejudgment interest on the damage awards from April 6, 1987.

67
REVERSED AND REMANDED.

1
 The EEOC and the North Carolina Employment Security Commission apparently were notified although nothing appears in the record as to what conclusion, if any, the entities reached

2
 Because we conclude that Gries and Moran met their burden under the McDonnell Douglas proof theory, we do not consider in detail whether they also could have met their burden under ordinary principles of proof.  Although we find the alleged link among age, seniority, and wage somewhat problematic, we believe the jury could have been influenced by the considerations that, as the only members of Patient Care's management committee who were terminated, the only members who were over forty, the only employees whose wages and benefits were based in part upon age, and the only employees who were not told about nor offered an opportunity to correct their allegedly poor performance or to replace junior employees, Gries and Moran might prevail.  Cf. Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc. 689 F.2d 481 (4th Cir.1982) (finding age discrimination without reliance on the McDonnell Douglas theory)

3
 For example, in Holzman v. Jaymar-Ruby, Inc., 916 F.2d 1298 (7th Cir.1990), the court permitted a chart listing changes in the sales force over one year.  In Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1395 n. 2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1984), the appellate court explained that even if personnel changes in the Philadelphia office, as opposed to the Philadelphia district, were examined, a prima facie case would have been made.  In Berndt v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales, Inc., 789 F.2d 253 (3d Cir.1986), the court examined a six person sales force for a specific region.  In MacDissi v. Valmont Industries, Inc., 856 F.2d 1054 (8th Cir.1988), the court stated that there was nothing wrong with looking at statistics only from the department in which the employees were laid off and noted that "overly formal statistical descriptions" had obscured the "more obvious significance" of the termination of the two oldest employees in a department, leaving all but one other non-managerial employee 33 years old or younger.  Id. at 1058.  In Herold, the court wrote that the judge acted within his discretion in permitting statistics for the branch from which the employee was terminated and not the entire Mid-Atlantic region.  864 F.2d at 321.  In Toth v. Square D Co., 712 F.Supp. 1231 (D.S.C.1989), the judge compared the percentage of employees over forty in the company before and after layoffs.  Id. at 1239 n. 12.  And in a recent First Circuit case, the court implied that the relevant body would be the entire bank.  Connell, 924 F.2d at 1177

4
 The notes to the charts referred to the fact that "the positions marked with an "X" would be considered redundant with one in the other division, and therefore eliminated....  [T]he status of specific individuals is not relevant to this study (e.g., Gries versus Price)."

5
 Another member, Thomas Hufziger, was initially a member of the committee.  He was 58.  Zimmer claimed that although he was appointed in a temporary capacity, he was offered a permanent appointment but turned it down, thereby necessitating a search for a replacement shortly after the consolidation.  The replacement, Harvey, was under 40.  Gries and Moran, however, argued and advanced evidence that Zimmer knew all along that Hufziger would not want to relocate and would never accept the position.  In addition, Gries and Moran showed that Zimmer had been conducting an outside search for the position prior to offering it permanently to Hufziger and that Zimmer offered it only after they learned of the possibility of an age-discrimination suit.  Gries and Moran claimed that Zimmer initially offered the position to Jeff Aull, age 37.  Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we conclude that a finding by the jury was possible that Hufziger's position was also intended to be held by a younger man.  Although Hufziger initially accepted the job, evidence showed that the job was initially only temporary, that Hufziger had lived in Indiana for twenty-five years and was not looking to move, that prior to making the permanent offer to Hufziger, Zimmer had begun an outside search for a candidate, and that the date of the permanent offer to Hufziger appears to have followed a May 12, 1987 letter from Moran to Davis (although Davis claims he never received it) raising the age discrimination issue

6
 The plaintiffs argued that Gries' responsibilities were given to Kenneth Coonce (age 35) on a temporary basis and then to William Franko (age 37).  They claimed Moran's responsibilities were given to Hufziger and then to Harvey

7
 We note that, under Duke 's prima facie analysis, the plaintiffs have met their burden.  Given the plaintiff's allegations that the 1986 and 1987 performance evaluations were filled out after the plan to terminate them was conceived and the presentation of some evidence to support such a theory, for purposes of the prima facie case we should not rely on those documents' suggestion that the men were performing at a "lower level," Duke, 928 F.2d at 1418, than the retained employees.  At least one company document produced in November 1986, ranked Gries and Moran as performing comparable to, and Moran as performing far better than, some of the retained employees.  They each had histories of generally favorable evaluations.  And evidence at trial indicated that some employees believed the inventory incident to have been exaggerated in severity.  Even if Duke applied, we would be obliged to find the evidence sufficient to permit the plaintiffs to survive the fourth prong of Duke 's prima facie analysis

8
 We note that, while an amount of exactly fifty percent of that demanded raises suspicion, logically nearly every verdict will be some percentage of the amount claimed.  Fifty percent may but need not represent an impermissible halving to reach a verdict

9
 The judge found persuasive the prior jury's inability to reach a verdict.  He noted that five of the six original jurors had concluded no liability was present.  However, Moran and Gries have claimed that there is no evidence in the record that the prior jury actually had found five to one against liability.  We have found in the record no support for the speculation about the prior jury's degree of separation

10
 We note that both parties were given the opportunity to request a jury poll and both declined

11
 Jones v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 870 F.2d 982 (5th Cir.1989), permitting an upward increase in damages, is distinguishable because damages at issue in Jones were stipulated and "should never have gone to the jury."  Id. at 985


817 P.2d 251 (1991)
112 N.M. 517
STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Frutoso LOVATO, Steve McCrary, Macy Alderette, and Anthony Contreras, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 12391.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
July 2, 1991.
Certiorari Denied August 12, 1991.
*252 Tom Udall, Atty. Gen. and Patricia Gandert, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellant.
Jacquelyn Robins, Chief Public Defender and Gina Maestas, Asst. Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for defendants-appellees.

OPINION
DONNELLY, Judge.
The state appeals from an order of the trial court suppressing evidence seized as a result of a stop of an automobile by police following a report of a drive-by shooting. We discuss: (1) whether there was reasonable suspicion for the stop; (2) whether the trial court's order suppressing evidence is supported by substantial evidence; (3) whether the trial court should be affirmed on alternative grounds because, as a matter of law, the stop constituted an arrest requiring a showing of probable cause; and (4) whether opening the door of the car by police amounted to an illegal search and seizure. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent herewith.
FACTS
At approximately midnight, October 31, 1989, Albuquerque city police officers received a report of a drive-by shooting on Sprunk Street in the Martineztown area of Albuquerque. A radio dispatch was issued to officers in the vicinity requesting that they attempt to locate a white Chevrolet Impala described as having been seen leaving the area.
Officer Ross Lucero testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress. He stated that he was in a patrol car accompanying another officer when the radio dispatch was received. At that time Lucero's vehicle was at Broadway and Stadium. The police car, in which Lucero was a passenger, drove toward Martineztown, proceeding north on Edith. As the officers drove to the area, a 1976 white Impala vehicle pulled out of a side street in the Martineztown area and headed south on Edith. When Lucero saw the car, he told the other officer, "That has to be them." No other vehicles were in the area.
The police car continued north past Grand Avenue, made a U-turn, and followed the Impala for less than a minute before stopping it. The car had five male occupants. Upon stopping the vehicle, Lucero testified that the officers initiated "felony stop" procedures. He called for back-up units; he then required the occupants of the Impala to lace their fingers behind their necks; when the other units arrived, he required the occupants of the Impala to get out of the vehicle one by one from the driver's door and walk backwards toward the back of the car; the occupants of the Impala were then handcuffed. The officers had their guns drawn at this time.
After the five individuals exited the vehicle, Lucero testified that he was uncertain whether another person might be hiding in the vehicle or lying on the floor of the car. Two officers approached the car, one on either side, with their guns drawn. The car did not have tinted windows. Lucero stated he was on the right side of the car. As he opened the door to investigate whether there were other occupants, a shotgun fell out onto the ground. The *253 shotgun was seized as evidence and the occupants were arrested.
During questioning at the hearing on the motion to suppress, Lucero testified that the "attempt to locate" the vehicle described as having been seen leaving the area referred to an "older model" Impala. After hearing a tape of testimony he gave at an earlier probation revocation hearing, Lucero acknowledged that he said the attempt to locate was put out on a "late" or "later" model car. He also testified that he thought "late" model meant "older" model.
Prior to the stop, the police broadcast did not indicate the number of people involved in the shooting, the license number of the suspect vehicle, or the direction the vehicle was believed to be traveling. Defendants' testimony at the motion to suppress indicated that they were driving away from the Martineztown area at the time they were stopped, that there were three people in the front seat and two in the back, and that the vehicle was a two-door car.
Following the hearing, the court ordered that the evidence be suppressed. The court's written order stated:
After having weighed the testimony, the Court finds that the specific facts available to the officer making this stop combined with the other information available to the officer lacked the necessary degree of specificity and was insufficient to support inferences that the vehicle stopped was related to illegal conduct. Therefore, the Court finds that the officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to stop defendants' vehicle.

I. REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR THE STOP

The trial court determined that the officers who made the initial stop lacked sufficient specific information to give rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle being stopped had been or was involved in illegal conduct. Assuming the trial court did not reject the state's uncontradicted showing, we disagree.
As observed by this court in State v. Cobbs, 103 N.M. 623, 626, 711 P.2d 900, 903 (Ct.App. 1985), "in appropriate circumstances, a police officer may detain a person in order to investigate possible criminal activity, even if there is no probable cause to make an arrest." The court in Cobbs, quoting in part from State v. Galvan, 90 N.M. 129, 131, 560 P.2d 550, 552 (Ct.App. 1977), further observed that "`[a]ppropriate circumstances' arise from the officer's `reasonable suspicion' that the law is being or has been broken." Thus, an officer making an investigative stop must have a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific articulable facts and any rational inferences that can reasonably be drawn from such facts, that the law has been or is being violated. State v. Cobbs; State v. Galvan. The facts known to the officers in this case, if accepted, were sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle stopped had been involved in the reported drive-by shooting.
It is undisputed that there was an "attempt to locate" put out on a white Impala, suspected in a drive-by shooting in Martineztown, that the radio dispatch did not include information on the license number of the car or the number of occupants in the vehicle. It is similarly undisputed that the incident involving the reported shooting occurred around midnight, the car occupied by defendants met the general description radioed by the police dispatcher, and there was no other vehicular traffic in the area. The facts also indicate that defendants' white Impala turned onto Edith heading away from Martineztown shortly after the police broadcast. The officers observed five individuals in the Impala, a fact they considered suspicious in what was described as a high drug area.
These facts provide a proper basis for an investigative stop. State v. Cobbs; see also United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701 (9th Cir.1983). Defendants argue that the police stop of their vehicle was improper because the officers did not know if the vehicle involved in the shooting was an older or newer model. Officer Lucero testified that defendants' vehicle was an older model. Although he testified that the police *254 dispatch referred to a late model car, Lucero stated he thought late model meant "old." Thus, from the perspective of the officer, the facts known to him included the fact that the vehicle involved in the shooting was an older vehicle. Additionally, defendants contend the officers did not know where the Impala was in relation to the scene of the reported crime when the vehicle was stopped. Although the officers indicated that they did not know exactly where Sprunk Street was, Lucero testified that he knew the patrol car in which he was riding was headed toward Martineztown and, when defendants' vehicle turned onto Edith heading toward the officers, it appeared to be heading away from the Martineztown area minutes after the reported shooting and at a time when no other vehicles were driving in the area.
We believe this case is similar to State v. Watley, 109 N.M. 619, 788 P.2d 375 (Ct. App. 1989), in which this court upheld the validity of an investigatory stop. In Watley there was a recently reported crime late at night, the defendant was the only person in the vicinity, and he generally matched the description given. See also United States v. Henning, 906 F.2d 1392 (10th Cir.1990) (police held to have reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle seen driving away from area where gunshot was heard).
In sum, we conclude that the facts known to the officers, as related by Officer Lucero, and the inferences that could be drawn from the facts were sufficient to justify a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police that the vehicle in question had been involved in the drive-by shooting reported minutes earlier. This conclusion is premised on the trial court having accepted the officer's testimony at the hearing. Thus, if the testimony was accepted, then the officers were justified in making an investigatory stop to determine whether the car in question was in fact the vehicle involved in the earlier reported shooting. We next consider defendants' argument that the trial court did not accept the officer's testimony.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendants argue that it is possible the trial judge rejected all or most of the officer's testimony after finding him to be not credible. If this is true, defendants contend, then this court should affirm. Defendants correctly point out that the issue on appeal is whether the result is supported by substantial evidence, not whether the trial court could have reached a different conclusion. See State v. Anderson, 107 N.M. 165, 754 P.2d 542 (Ct.App. 1988).
Based on this standard of review, defendants argue that the trial court's order in this case should be affirmed. Factually, defendants argue that this court should assume that the trial court rejected virtually all of the officer's testimony because the trial court did not consider the officer to be a credible witness. Defendants argue that under our standard of review we should assume that the trial court did not believe any of the officer's testimony, including his testimony about the radio dispatch and the information received by that dispatch.
In support of their argument that the trial court could have disbelieved Officer Lucero's testimony, defendants point to the fact that he was confused as to the meaning of "late model" with reference to the dispatcher's description of the white Impala and also to an exchange between the court and that witness regarding the officer's not remembering exactly when he testified in an earlier probation revocation hearing. At one point the court commented, "If you come in here and you're telling me you don't even remember when you testified [previously], you know, your credibility is going to be shot with me." With regard to the officer's misunderstanding as to the meaning of "late model" with reference to the car, he said that he thought that meant an older car. The Impala was either a 1975 or a 1976 model. This misunderstanding has little significance. The term "late model" is susceptible to different interpretations. In the parlance of automobile dealers, it apparently means a newer model. With respect to the trial court's comments about the witness's credibility "is going to be shot with me," *255 read in context, this appears to be no more than a warning to the policeman to tell the truth.
Although these contentions fall short of discrediting the officer's testimony, nevertheless, because of the disposition we make, the trial court will have an opportunity to give its reasons for rejecting the testimony of the officer, if in fact that was a factor in the court's ruling. The record before us does not, however, affirmatively indicate that this was the basis for the court's decision.
Nothing in the record suggests that the trial court rejected the testimony of the officer. Moreover, nothing in the testimony below or the arguments of counsel suggests that the basic facts concerning the radio dispatch or its content were in dispute. Instead, defense counsel below focused on specific details concerning the year of the vehicle being sought, the direction of the car in relation to the place of the shooting, and related matters. Similarly, the order of the trial court suppressing evidence herein focused on whether the officer effecting the stop of defendants' car possessed "specific facts available * * * combined with other information" so as to constitute specific articulable facts justifying the investigative stop of the vehicle. The order did not specifically address the court's determination concerning the credibility of the state's witness at the hearing on the motion to suppress.
In order to facilitate review on appeal, where the fact-finder rejects uncontradicted testimony based solely on a determination of credibility, the better procedure in such cases would be for the trial court to indicate in the record the reasons for rejecting uncontradicted testimony. White Glove Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. Brennan, 518 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir.1975). Such action facilitates appellate review and obviates the issue of whether uncontradicted testimony was rejected based on credibility, as argued here.
A trial court is not required to accept uncontradicted testimony as true if (1) the witness is shown to be unworthy of belief, or (2) his testimony is equivocal or contains inherent improbabilities, or (3) concerns a transaction surrounded by suspicious circumstances, or (4) is contradicted, or subjected to reasonable doubt as to its truth or veracity, by legitimate inferences drawn from the facts and circumstances of the case. Hernandez v. Mead Foods, Inc., 104 N.M. 67, 716 P.2d 645 (Ct.App. 1986); see also Sosa v. Empire Roofing Co., 110 N.M. 614, 798 P.2d 215 (Ct.App. 1990) (when a finding is made against the party with the burden of proof, appellate court can affirm such a finding if it was rational for the fact-finder to disbelieve the evidence offered in support of that finding). In some cases it may be possible for the reviewing court to ascertain from the record a rational basis for the lower court to have rejected uncontradicted testimony; in other cases, like the case before us, it is not so easily determined. Therefore, we adopt this rule which will facilitate appellate review. See White Glove Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. Brennan.
We address defendants' alternative grounds for affirmance which may arise on remand if the trial court finds the state's uncontradicted proof credible.

III. ARREST vs. STOP
Defendants argue, as an alternative basis for affirmance, that the "stop" carried out by the police was in fact an arrest due to its intrusive nature, and because the police lacked probable cause to support the arrest. Defendants correctly point out that this court will affirm the trial court if it is right for any reason. State v. Beachum, 83 N.M. 526, 494 P.2d 188 (Ct.App. 1972). Thus, defendants contend that this issue is properly argued on appeal even though it was not raised in the trial court. However, because this issue was not presented to the trial court, we do not have the benefit of the trial court's findings of fact on the factual issues incident thereto. See State v. Cobbs (whether an arrest has occurred depends on the facts of each particular case). Thus, the issue is whether, as a matter of law, the intrusive nature of the stop renders the encounter an arrest rather than a stop. We hold that *256 the intrusive nature of the encounter did not, as a matter of law, turn the investigative stop in this case into an arrest.
Defendants emphasize that the stop constituted an arrest because they were made to wait in their car with hands locked behind their heads pending the arrival of other officers; defendants were made to exit their vehicle one by one and walk backwards toward the officers; defendants were handcuffed without any prior questioning or investigation; and the officers ordered them to get out of the vehicle at gunpoint.
Do the foregoing facts indicate an arrest? Prior decisions of this court have recognized that the level of intrusiveness accompanying a stop may vary depending on the facts justifying the stop. State v. Cobbs. The ultimate question of whether an arrest was made is whether the officers' actions in stopping the vehicle and ordering the occupants out of the car were reasonable under the circumstances. In analyzing whether an arrest occurred, we look to whether the officers' actions were reasonable under the circumstances as juxtaposed against defendants' right to be free of arbitrary interference by the officers. Id., 103 N.M. at 627, 711 P.2d at 904. In some situations, officers may be required to ask the suspect questions as part of the preliminary inquiry. See id.
Even in routine traffic stops, police may adopt precautionary measures addressed to reasonable fears. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977). In Mimms the Supreme Court recognized the inordinate risks police take when they approach cars with persons seated in them, and approved the practice of requiring the persons to get out of the car and be subject to a protective frisk even in the absence of individualized suspicion.
Here, the evidence reflects that the officers had just received a report of a drive-by shooting and that minutes later they encountered and stopped a vehicle believed by them to be the one described in the broadcast. Under these circumstances, we cannot say as a matter of law that the evidence indicates the procedures employed by the officers were improper. Initially, there were only two officers on the scene and five occupants in the Impala. The occupants of the Impala were believed to be armed. On these facts, the actions of the officers in calling for assistance, and employing precautionary steps to determine whether the occupants of the Impala were armed could be found reasonable. Thus, the level of intrusion under these circumstances was not inappropriate in view of the level of danger the officers reasonably could assume to exist. See State v. Cobbs.
Defendants' reliance on United States v. Strickler, 490 F.2d 378 (9th Cir.1974), we conclude is misplaced under the facts of this case. In Strickler the court found police conduct in stopping a vehicle and requiring the occupants to exit the car at gunpoint to constitute an arrest. Strickler, however, has been eroded by later decisions from the same court, which explain the case as based on the use of excessive force under circumstances wherein the court determined there had been no threat to the safety of the officers. In United States v. Patterson, 648 F.2d 625 (9th Cir.1981), the Ninth Circuit noted that Strickler should not be read as indicating that every forceful detention turns a stop into an arrest. Similarly, in United States v. Taylor, the court explained that the use of drawn guns does not automatically turn a vehicle stop into an arrest. Instead, a decision as to whether an arrest has occurred must be judged by the amount of force employed, and whether, measured by the facts and circumstances existing at the time, the actions of the officers were reasonable. Where there is reason for the officers to fear for their safety, they may unholster their guns and use reasonable force in effectuating the stop without such action automatically constituting an arrest. Id., 716 F.2d at 708-09.
As observed by the court in United States v. Henning, 906 F.2d at 1395:
All that is needed to support an investigative detention is reasonable suspicion. * * * "[a]n investigative detention is justified where specific and articulable facts *257 and rational inferences from those facts give rise to reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or is committing a crime." United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 890 (10th Cir.1986).
In United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 916, 103 S.Ct. 1898, 77 L.Ed.2d 286 (1983), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a case similar to the one before us. In Merritt the police were looking for a fugitive from another state who was known to be armed and dangerous. The officers had a reasonable suspicion, based on facts known to them, that the fugitive was one of three persons in a white truck. After radioing for backup, four officers approached the vehicle with their shotguns drawn and ordered the suspects out of the car. Ultimately, there were twelve to fifteen police officers at the scene, two or three of whom were carrying shotguns at the ready. Despite the intrusive nature of the stop, the Tenth Circuit Court reversed the trial court's order suppressing evidence found in the suspects' vehicle, holding that the use of force did not turn the stop into an arrest.
In Merritt the court determined that law enforcement officers may employ reasonable force justified under the circumstances commensurate with the officers' need for safety. The Merritt court rejected the argument that a use of force by the police in conducting a stop necessarily constitutes an arrest. The court held:
It seems to us that to focus the analysis in this manner diverts attention from the court's true concern in any Fourth Amendment case  whether the police conduct, in light of all the circumstances, was reasonable. We should not ask whether the force used was so great as to render it an arrest but, instead, whether the force used was reasonable. Whenever the police confront an individual reasonably believed to present a serious and imminent danger to the safety of the police and public, they are justified in taking reasonable steps to reduce the risk [of injury]. They should not be constrained in their effort to reduce the risk of injury or death simply because the facts known to them create a reasonable suspicion, but do not rise to the level of probable cause.
Id., 695 F.2d at 1274.
Accordingly, we hold that the level of force used by the officers in effecting the investigative detention in this case did not, as a matter of law, convert the initial stop into an arrest.

IV. OPENING THE CAR DOOR
Defendants contend that, even if the stop was proper, the officers exceeded the proper bounds of investigation by opening the car door and that this action effectively amounted to a search of the car. Lucero testified that he and another officer approached the car, with guns drawn, once the five occupants were out, because they were not sure whether another occupant was lying on the floor of the car. In light of the testimony that there were three people in the front seat of the car and five people got out of the car, the officers' concerns were not unreasonable. Considering the fact that it was late at night, the visibility of the officers was limited, that the officers had a reasonable basis to believe that a firearm had been discharged earlier, and believed that either the occupants were armed or that there was a possibility that there may have been weapons in the vehicle, it was not unreasonable for the officers to have opened the car door immediately upon approaching it.
Defendants argue that the officers should not have opened the car door, reasoning that the car windows were not tinted and the police could have merely looked in a window to determine whether another person might still be in the car. This argument, however, overlooks the expressed concern of the officers that an armed person might have been hiding in the vehicle. Under such circumstances, the police were not required to forego reasonably prudent steps necessary for their own safety. An officer looking into the vehicle window might have found himself looking down into the barrel of a gun. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the actions of the officers were unreasonable. *258 Under the facts before us, the officers were entitled to take reasonable precautions to insure their safety, including the opening of the car door, and the actions which led to discovery of the shotgun were lawful. Law enforcement officers carrying out an investigatory stop are permitted to make a limited search for weapons that might be used to harm them. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Cobbs.
The cases relied upon by defendants do not persuade us that the actions of the officer were unreasonable or that their acts amounted to an improper search and seizure. In State v. Landry, 393 So.2d 713 (La. 1981), the court determined that any threat of harm from the suspect was neutralized once he was patted down, the officers determined the suspect had no weapons, and the suspect's bag was behind the officer. The court there determined the search to be a search for evidence. In this case, however, the officers had not yet determined that all the occupants of the vehicle had exited the vehicle. Thus, Landry is factually distinguishable and involved a situation in which the officer knew precisely what he was facing. Similarly, in Hoag v. State, 728 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc), the court held there were no facts to support a search for weapons. In contrast, in this case, the police officers were still confronted with a potential danger.

V. CONCLUSION
The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. On remand the trial court is directed to adopt specific findings of fact relating to defendants' motion to suppress evidence, including a determination of the credibility of the state's witnesses, and for evaluation of the motion in light of the evidence and matters set forth in this opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
BIVINS and CHAVEZ, JJ., concur.


896 N.E.2d 309 (2008)
231 Ill.2d 122
In re RANDALL M., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Randall M., Appellee).
No. 105137.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
September 18, 2008.
*310 Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Michael J. Waller, State's Attorney, Waukegan (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, Michael M. Glick and Karl R. Triebel, Assistant attorneys General, Chicago, Norbert J. Goetten, Lawrence M. Bauer and Marshall M. Stevens, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, of counsel), for the People.
Thomas A. Lilien, Deputy Defender, Jaime L. Montgomery, Assistant Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for appellee.

OPINION
Justice THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:
The issue is whether the appellate court properly construed the detention provisions contained in section 5-410 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-410 (West 2006)). For the reasons that follow, we vacate the appellate court's decision and dismiss the appeal as moot.

BACKGROUND

The Trial Court
In April 2005, the State filed a delinquency petition against Randall M. alleging one count of domestic battery. Randall admitted to the offense and was placed on probation.
In September 2006, and while Randall was still on probation, the State filed a new delinquency petition alleging unlawful possession of a firearm and unlawful use of a weapon. At the same time, the State petitioned to revoke Randall's probation. On the day that the new delinquency petition was filed, a detention hearing was held before the juvenile division of the circuit court of Lake County. At the hearing, the trial court found (1) sufficient probable cause to believe that Randall was a delinquent minor, and (2) that it was a matter of immediate and urgent necessity for the protection of both Randall and the community that Randall be held in secure detention. Pursuant to local rule, a minor requiring secure detention is lodged in the Hulse Detention Center "unless otherwise ordered by a Juvenile Court Judge." 19th Jud. Cir. Ct. R. 9.13 (eff. January 2, 1997). At the hearing's conclusion, the trial court noted that Randall would soon be turning 17, and asked specifically for the date of Randall's birthday. When counsel responded that Randall would be turning 17 on the following Monday, the trial court responded, "Monday? Monday you will be transferred to Lake County [jail]."
A few days later, Randall's attorney filed an emergency motion to enjoin Randall's transfer from the Hulse Detention *311 Center to the Lake County jail. The petition alleged, "based on [counsel's] information and belief from past practices," that once Randall turned 17, he would be transferred automatically from the Hulse Detention Center to the Lake County jail and housed in the general adult population. A hearing was held, and the trial court denied the motion and ordered Randall "transferred to the Lake County jail pursuant to statute." In so doing, the court specifically invoked section 5-410(2)(c)(v) of the Juvenile Court Act, which states that, as long as certain factors are first considered, "[p]ersons 17 years of age and older who have a petition of delinquency filed against them may be confined in an adult detention facility." See 705 ILCS 405/5-410(2)(c)(v) (West 2006).[1]

The Appeal
Randall filed a petition for leave to appeal under Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(5) (155 Ill.2d R. 306(a)(5)), and the appellate court allowed the petition. As framed by the appellate court, the issues to be considered were (1) "whether section 5-410 authorizes the automatic transfer of a minor with pending delinquency matters from a juvenile detention facility to an adult detention facility upon the minor's seventeenth birthday"; and (2) "whether, under section 5-410, a minor 17 years of age or older with pending delinquency matters may be housed in the general population of a county jail." 374 Ill.App.3d 808, 809, 313 Ill.Dec. 356, 872 N.E.2d 116.

Mootness
Before addressing the merits, the appellate court noted that both issues had become moot because, since filing his petition for leave to appeal, Randall had pleaded guilty and been sentenced. Consequently, Randall was no longer subject to section 5-410, which governs a minor's detention pending adjudication. Nevertheless, the court invoked the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine on the grounds that (1) the issues relate to the detention of minors and therefore are of a public nature; (2) there are no published decisions construing section 5-410; and (3) the issues are likely to recur. 374 Ill.App.3d at 811-12, 313 Ill.Dec. 356, 872 N.E.2d 116.

Automatic Transfer
On the merits, the appellate court first addressed the automatic-transfer question. The court observed that, until recently, section 5-410(2)(c)(v) stated that persons 17 years of age and older who have a pending delinquency petition "shall be confined in an adult detention facility." (Emphasis added.) See 705 ILCS 405/5-410(2)(c)(v) (West 2002). Clearly, this language was mandatory and required the minor to be transferred to the county jail on his or her seventeenth birthday. 374 Ill.App.3d at 814, 313 Ill.Dec. 356, 872 N.E.2d 116. In 2004, however, section 5-410(2)(c)(v) was amended to state that persons 17 years of age and older "may be confined in an adult detention facility," provided certain factors are considered. (Emphasis added.) See 705 ILCS 405/5-410(2)(c)(v) (West 2006). Clearly, this new language is discretionary and leaves no room for an automatic transfer on the minor's seventeenth birthday. 374 Ill. App.3d at 814, 313 Ill.Dec. 356, 872 N.E.2d 116. Consequently, the court held that any policy providing for automatic transfer is invalid. 374 Ill.App.3d at 814, 313 Ill. Dec. 356, 872 N.E.2d 116.
*312 The court then added that it was uncomfortable with the lack of procedural safeguards in section 5-410, most especially that Randall had to initiate a proceeding to prevent his transfer to the county jail. 374 Ill.App.3d at 814, 313 Ill.Dec. 356, 872 N.E.2d 116. The court compared section 5-410 with section 3-10-7 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-10-7 (West 2006)), which governs the transfer of minors prosecuted as adults from the Department of Juvenile Justice to the Adult Division of the Department of Corrections. Specifically, the court noted that section 3-10-7 provides for a formal notice requirement, an evidentiary hearing, the right to counsel, and a statement from the trial court setting forth the bases for its transfer ruling. 374 Ill.App.3d at 814-15, 313 Ill.Dec. 356, 872 N.E.2d 116. Section 5-410, by contrast, contains no procedural guidelines whatsoever. Accordingly, the court held that, in the interests of due process, "a procedure similar to the one outlined in section 3-10-7 of the Code should be employed in applying the transfer provision set forth in section 5-410(2)(c)(v) of the Act, albeit in an expedited manner." 374 Ill.App.3d at 815, 313 Ill.Dec. 356, 872 N.E.2d 116.

General Population
The court then addressed whether, under section 5-410, a minor 17 years of age or older with pending delinquency matters may be housed in the general population of a county jail. In arguing that such minors may be housed in the general population, the State relied on section 5-410(2)(c)(v), which states:
"Minors under 17 years of age shall be kept separate from confined adults and may not at any time be kept in the same cell, room or yard with adults confined pursuant to criminal law. Persons 17 years of age and older who have a petition of delinquency filed against them may be confined in an adult detention facility. In making a determination whether to confine a person 17 years of age or older who has a petition of delinquency filed against the person, these factors, among other matters, shall be considered:
(A) The age of the person;
(B) Any previous delinquent or criminal history of the person;
(C) Any previous abuse or neglect history of the person; and
(D) Any mental health or educational history of the person, or both." 705 ILCS 405/5-410(2)(c)(v) (West 2004).
According to the State, this language is clear and unambiguous. If housed in the county jail, minors under 17 years of age must be kept separate from the confined adults. By contrast, minors 17 years of age and older "may be confined in an adult detention facility" without restriction.
In rejecting this argument, the appellate court focused not upon section 5-410(2)(c)(v), but instead upon section 5-410(2)(d)(i), which states:
"If a minor 12 years of age or older is confined in a county jail in a county with a population below 3,000,000 inhabitants, then the minor's confinement shall be implemented in such a manner that there will be no contact by sight, sound or otherwise between the minor and adult prisoners. Minors 12 years of age or older must be kept separate from confined adults and may not at any time be kept in the same cell, room, or yard with confined adults." 705 ILCS 405/5-410(2)(d)(i) (West 2004).
After noting that Lake County has a population below 3 million inhabitants, the appellate court explained that section 5-410(2)(d)(i) was clear and unambiguous. With only limited exceptions that are inapplicable here, if a minor 12 years of age or *313 older is confined in the county jail, that minor "must be kept separate from the adults" and "in such a manner that there will be no contact by sight, sound or otherwise between the minor and adult prisoners." Accordingly, the appellate court concluded that, "even if he was properly transferred to the Lake County jail, [Randall] should have been confined separately from any adult prisoners." 374 Ill. App.3d at 818, 313 Ill.Dec. 356, 872 N.E.2d 116.
We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill.2d R. 315.

DISCUSSION
Both sides concede that the issues in this case are moot. Nevertheless, they invite this court to consider them anyway, given the public interest in an authoritative construction of the detention guidelines set forth in section 5-410.
There is a fundamental problem with this request: section 5-410 does not apply to this case. Section 5-410 appears in part 4 of the Juvenile Court Act, which governs the "arrest and custody" of minors. This part of the Act does not govern or even speak to the trial court at the detention hearing. Instead, it governs what the police may do with a minor between the time of his arrest and the time he is first brought before the court. For example, section 5-401 addresses the arrest and taking into custody of minors, section 5-401.5 governs the custodial interrogation of arrested minors, section 5-405 outlines a police officer's duties following the arrest of a minor, and section 5-415 defines how long an arrested minor may be held in temporary custody before he or she must be either released or brought before the court for a detention or shelter care hearing. See 705 ILCS 405/5-401, 5-401.5, 5-505, 5-415 (West 2006).
Not surprisingly, then, a careful reading of section 5-410 reveals that it governs not the pretrial detention of minors generally, but rather only the detention of minors while they are in police custody. Section 5-410(2) begins by stating that, when warranted, arrested minors 10 years of age or older "may be kept or detained in an authorized detention facility." 705 ILCS 405/5-410(2)(a) (West 2006). If the arrested minor is under 12 years of age, he or she may be detained in a county jail or municipal lockup for no more than six hours. 705 ILCS 405/5-410(2)(a) (West 2006). If the arrested minor is 12 years of age or older, he or she may be detained in a county jail or municipal lockup for no more than 12 hours, unless the crime is one of violence, in which case the minor may be detained for up to 24 hours. 705 ILCS 405/5-410(2)(c) (West 2006). Once this initial time limit expires, an arrested minor 12 years of age or older may remain in the county jail only if that jail complies with the detention standards enumerated in section 5-410(2)(d) (705 ILCS 405/5-410(2)(d) (West 2006)).
Notably, the statute relied upon by both the trial court and the State in this case section 5-410(2)(c)(v)applies only during the initial 12- to 24-hour period immediately following the minor's arrest. Again, section 5-410(2)(c) provides that "no minor shall be detained in a county jail or municipal lockup for more than 12 hours, unless the offense is a crime of violence in which case the minor may be detained up to 24 hours." 705 ILCS 405/5-410(2)(c) (West 2006). This section is then followed by five subsections, each of which in some way regulates this initial holding period. Section 5-410(2)(c)(i) defines when that period begins. 705 ILCS 405/5-410(2)(c)(i) (West 2006). Section 5-410(2)(c)(ii) provides for periodic supervision and prohibits the minor from coming or remaining in contact with confined adults. 705 ILCS 405/5-410(2)(c)(ii) (West 2006). Section 5-410(2)(c)(iii) *314 requires the police to inform the minor of the purpose of the detention, the time it is expected to last, and the fact that it cannot exceed the time specified under the Act. 705 ILCS 405/5-410(2)(c)(iii) (West 2006). Section 5-410(2)(c)(iv) requires the police to keep a log showing the basis for the detention, the bases for the decision to detain, and the length of time the minor was in detention. 705 ILCS 405/5-410(2)(c)(iv) (West 2006). Finally, and most importantly, section 5-410(2)(c)(v) describes the conditions under which the arrested minor may be confined during this initial holding period. If the minor is under 17 years of age, he or she must be kept separate from confined adults and may not at any time be kept in the same cell, room or yard with confined adults. If the minor is 17 years of age or older, he or she may be confined in an adult detention facility, provided certain factors are first considered. 705 ILCS 405/5-410(2)(c)(v) (West 2006). Read in its proper context, then, section 5-410(2)(c)(v) is not, as the State insists, a general statute governing the pretrial detention of minors with pending delinquency petitions. Rather, it is a narrowly focused subsection from a statute regulating only the initial hours of an arrested minor's custodial detention.
Once the initial 12- or 24-hour holding period expires, a minor 12 years of age or older may remain in the county jail only if that jail complies with the standards set forth in section 5-410(d) (705 ILCS 405/5-410(d) (West 2006)).[2] Under these standards, a county jail may hold a minor for up to 40 hours if it (1) ensures that there is no contact by sight, sound or otherwise between the minor and adult prisoners; (2) ensures that the minor is kept separate from confined adults and is not at any time kept in the same cell, room, or yard with confined adults; and (3) complies with all monitoring standards promulgated by the Department of Corrections and training standards approved by the Illinois Law Enforcement Training Standards Board (the Standards Board). 705 ILCS 405/5-410(d)(i) (West 2006). To keep the minor for between 40 hours and one week, the county jail must comply with all temporary detention standards promulgated by the Department and with all training standards approved by the Standards Board. 705 ILCS 405/5-410(d)(ii) (West 2006). And to keep minors for longer than one week, a county jail must comply with all programmatic and training standards for juvenile detention homes promulgated by the Department. 705 ILCS 405/5-410(d)(iii) (West 2006).[3]
The next step of the process is set forth in section 5-415, which requires that, "[u]nless sooner released, a minor alleged to be a delinquent minor taken into temporary custody must be brought before a judicial officer within 40 hours for a detention or shelter care hearing to determine whether he or she shall be further held in custody." 705 ILCS 405/5-415(1) (West 2006). Once this occurs, as it did here, *315 section 5-410 is no longer applicable. Now, the process is governed by section 5-501. See 705 ILCS 405/5-501 (West 2006). Titled "Detention or shelter care hearing," section 5-501 enumerates the procedures and guidelines governing the trial court's pretrial-detention determination. And unlike section 5-410, which applies before the commencement of any court proceedings, section 5-501 contains all of the procedural safeguards one would expect to find in a statute governing a judicial detention hearing.[4] Indeed, section 5-501 specifically provides for an evidentiary hearing, the right to counsel, and a written order setting forth the factual basis for the trial court's detention ruling. 705 ILCS 405/5-501(1), (2) (West 2006). Moreover, like section 5-410(d), section 5-501(4) outlines the conditions under which minors with pending delinquency matters may be held pending adjudication. See 705 ILCS 405/5-501(4) (West 2006). This is the statute that governs trial courts during a detention or shelter care hearing, and this is that statute that the trial court here should have consulted.
So where does this leave us? The parties concede that any issues relating to Randall's pretrial detention are moot, as Randall has since pleaded guilty and been sentenced. Nevertheless, they invite this court to address these issues anyway, under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. Unfortunately, the foregoing discussion compels us to decline this invitation. Indeed, all of the issues addressed by the courts below and briefed by the parties here relate to section 5-410. But that statute is inapplicable to this case, as the detention rulings at issue all arose in the course of Randall's detention or shelter care hearing. As importantly, no issues are raised, either by the parties or by the courts below, under the statute that does apply to this case, namely section 5-501.[5] Consequently, we have no choice but to vacate the appellate court's decision below and dismiss this appeal as moot.

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the appellate court is vacated, and the appeal is dismissed.
Appellate court judgment vacated; appeal dismissed.
Chief Justice FITZGERALD and Justices FREEMAN, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, KARMEIER, and BURKE concurred in the judgment and opinion.
NOTES
[1]  Section 5-410(2)(c)(v) was amended effective January 1, 2004. See Pub. Act 93-255, eff. January 1, 2004 (amending 705 ILCS 405/5-410). In this case, it is unclear whether the trial court was applying the pre amendment or post amendment version of that section, as its analysis contains elements of both.
[2]  These same standards are set forth again in section 5-501(4).
[3]  A clarification is required here. At oral argument, the State argued that sight and sound restrictions are required only during the first 40 hours of a minor's detention and that, after that, "the court would be free to order the person transferred to an adult facility free of any sight and sound restrictions." In support, the State noted that section 5-410(d)(i) is the only portion of section 5-410(d) that contains a sight and sound restriction, and it is expressly limited to the first 40 hours of the minor's confinement. The State is incorrect. All three subsections of section 5-410(d) require the county jail to comply with certain regulations promulgated by the Department. All of these regulations contain an explicit sight and sound restriction. See 20 Ill. Adm.Code §§ 701.270, 701.280, 702.5 (2003).
[4]  The appellate court's decision to invoke the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine was based partially on the fact that there are "no cases interpreting the statutory provisions at issue." 374 Ill.App.3d at 811, 313 Ill.Dec. 356, 872 N.E.2d 116. However, the likely explanation for the absence of relevant case law is that section 5-410 applies prior to the initiation of court proceedings and therefore rarely, if ever, will form the basis for a judicial order. By contrast, section 5-501 has been construed numerous times. See, e.g., In re T.W., 381 Ill.App.3d 603, 320 Ill.Dec. 931, 888 N.E.2d 148 (2008); In re C.J., 328 Ill. App.3d 103, 262 Ill.Dec. 36, 764 N.E.2d 1153 (2002); In re A.N., 324 Ill.App.3d 510, 258 Ill.Dec. 74, 755 N.E.2d 155 (2001).
[5]  We note that Randall's trial counsel attempted to bring this problem to the trial court's attention, to no avail. In his emergency motion to enjoin Randall's transfer, counsel argued that a close reading of section 5-410(2)(c)(v) "indicates that this provision applies only to the forty-hour period preceding a detention hearing." And then again, after the trial court denied the emergency motion, counsel politely suggested that "the statute that your Honor is forming its opinion on doesn't apply at this juncture and * * * only applies to the 40 hour window during which time a detention hearing would have to take place." The trial court thanked counsel for his input and stood on its ruling.