77 Ariz. 235 (1954)
269 P.2d 729
GENERAL PETROLEUM CORP.
v.
BARKER et ux. GENERAL PETROLEUM CORP.
v.
REED et al.
No. 5726.
Supreme Court of Arizona.
April 19, 1954.
Rehearing Denied May 11, 1954.
*239 Moore & Romley, Phoenix, for appellant, General Petroleum Corp.
Joseph H. Morgan and Donald J. Morgan, Phoenix, for appellees Barker.
Carl W. Divelbiss, Phoenix, Attorney for appellees Reed and Employers' Fire Ins. Co.
UDALL, Justice.
This is an appeal by defendant General Petroleum Corporation from orders of the Superior Court of Yavapai County in two consolidated cases, vacating unanimous verdicts in defendant's favor, setting aside the resulting judgments, and granting new trials therein. The primary question involved, as set forth in its sole assignment of error, is whether the trial court abused its discretion in making such orders.
In an earlier appeal we decided certain phases of this litigation and remanded the case for a new trial. See Barker v. General Petroleum Corp., 72 Ariz. 187, 232 P.2d 390; supplemental opinion on rehearing, 72 Ariz. 238, 233 P.2d 449. The facts therein stated give the overall picture and the basis for the suits.
The two damage actions grew out of a fire occurring June 3, 1948, at Camp Verde, Arizona, which destroyed a service station and grocery store building owned by the Barkers, who had leased the grocery store portion thereof to the Reeds. Upon retrial the actions were consolidated by stipulation, and are here consolidated on appeal.
The Barker suit (No. 17399) sought damages in the sum of $17,000, plus loss of certain rents and profits. J.J. Reed, et ux., lessees of the grocery store, and their insurer, Employers' Fire Insurance Company, brought suit (No. 17771) for damages in the sum of $4,114.60, for destruction of a stock of merchandise and certain personal effects, and loss of profits.
In each case it was alleged that the fire causing the destruction was caused by the negligence of an agent or servant of defendant General Petroleum Corporation (one Robert Bland) while making a delivery of stove gas into a barrel located in a storage room of the service station. The answer in each case was in effect a general denial.
The Barker complaint named as defendants the General Petroleum Corporation and W.F. Simpson, the latter being the wholesaler in the area for the corporation's products, and who we declared in the previous appeal was legally an agent of the corporation. The Reed suit named these same defendants as well as the Barkers. During trial a motion for instructed verdict as to Simpson was granted and judgment entered thereon. In the Reed case the court granted a motion to dismiss as to Barkers. No appeal has been taken from these rulings, therefore, except for certain third-party proceedings by General Petroleum Corporation against Simpson, which by stipulation are reserved for later consideration, the battle wages between the respective plaintiffs and the defendant corporation. We shall hereafter refer to them as plaintiffs and defendant.
*240 The trial court did not specify the particular ground or grounds upon which the motions for new trial were granted, and we are therefore compelled to review all the grounds set forth in plaintiffs' motions to see if any one of them justified the action of the trial court. Insofar as the motions are predicated upon errors of law occurring at the trial, we apply this yardstick: are these errors so prejudicial that if the case were here on appeal from a judgment in favor of defendant, we would be required to reverse the case? See, Southern Arizona Freight Lines v. Jackson, 48 Ariz. 509, 63 P.2d 193; cf. City of Phoenix v. Harlan, 75 Ariz. 290, 255 P.2d 609.

1. Fire Insurance
The first ground in this category is that the court erred in admitting evidence that plaintiffs Barker carried fire insurance. This fact was first brought out by Barker who stated that a Mr. Bolt, a "fire insurance adjuster", had helped him prepare a certain exhibit. No objection was made by counsel, and no motion was made to strike it or to admonish the jury to disregard it. Later, on cross-examination it was referred to again. Plaintiffs claim that even though the matter of fire insurance was inadmissible, inasmuch as it had come to the jury's attention Barkers were entitled to go into the subject and show the amount collected. There is no merit to this contention, because at the request of Barkers the trial court in its instructions specifically told the jury "* * * that any payment made to plaintiffs on account of insurance on the property destroyed may not be used to minimize the amount of damages sustained by them. So if you find the issues in favor of plaintiffs, you will award them damages for their loss, without any deduction for any sum they may have received on account of insurance." Giving this beneficial instruction sufficiently protected their rights with regard to insurance coverage.

2. Limiting Scope of Recross-examination of Bland
Robert Bland was called as a defense witness, and after giving testimony on direct examination he was cross-examined at length by counsel for both plaintiffs. On redirect examination Bland was asked only about the color of the socks he wore on the day of the fire and whether he was smoking during the time he was filling the drum with stove gas. Counsel for plaintiffs Barker then undertook on recross-examination of Bland to delve into the contents of a written statement, identified by the witness as having been made by him after the fire and prior to trial. The statement was not offered in evidence and there is no showing the court was even informed of its contents. Counsel apparently wanted to show that statements appearing therein were contradictory to some testimony given on direct examination or cross-examination, and thus impeach the witness. The objection was made and sustained by the court that this was improper recross-examination. This *241 ruling was assigned as one of the grounds for granting motion for new trial.
The question presented is whether the court, in the circumstances above set forth, abused its discretion in thus limiting the scope of recross-examination to the matters brought out on redirect examination. We are convinced that it did not. Unquestionably, under Rule 43(b) Rules Civil Procedure, Section 21-922, A.C.A. 1939, the scope of cross-examination proper is limited only by materiality, for "Any witness may be cross-examined on any matter material to the case. * * *" (Emphasis supplied.) See Podol v. Jacobs, 65 Ariz. 50, 173 P.2d 758, for an excellent exposition of the rule. However, Rule 43(b) does not mean the trial court, in its discretion, may not limit the scope of the inquiry on recross-examination. The rule in this respect is well stated in 70 C.J. Witnesses, § 868, as follows:
"Ordinarily a party must exhaust his cross-examination of a witness when it is entered into, and recross-examination is properly refused where redirect examination has been confined to the scope of the cross-examination and has brought out no new matter, particularly where the matter sought to be inquired into is not disputed. Recross-examination, generally, is not allowable as of right, but the whole matter of permitting recross-examination, and further questioning and particular questions thereon, is in the sound discretion of the trial court, whose action will not be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion is shown."

3. Denying right to cross-examine Simpson by leading questions
W.F. Simpson was called and testified as a witness for the plaintiffs. At this time he was a party defendant in both suits, but the court later directed a verdict in his favor. There is still pending a third-party claim by General Petroleum against Simpson for contribution in the event the judgment goes for plaintiffs. Upon redirect examination of Simpson, counsel for plaintiffs Barker undertook to declare the witness to be hostile and demanded the right to cross-examine him by leading questions. The court refused to permit it, and this ruling was assigned as a basis for new trial. Careful examination of the record convinces us the trial court was correct in ruling that the witness manifested no hostility. Under the test laid down by us in the recent case of J. & B. Motors, Inc., v. Margolis, 75 Ariz. 392, 257 P.2d 588, as to when leading questions may be asked of one's own witness, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit the neutral witness Simpson to be asked leading questions.

4. Bias and Prejudice of Jury
This was one of the grounds urged for new trial, but upon appeal no mention is made of it, doubtless because this assignment finds no support in the record.

*242 5. The Instructions
The motion for new trial alleges error of law occurred in the failure to give certain portions of plaintiffs' requested instruction No. 5, failure to give plaintiffs' requested instruction No. 15, and the giving of defendant's instruction No. 5. Plaintiffs' No. 5 would have been a comment on the evidence, for it assumed a fact in issue, namely, that the fire was touched off by a static or electric spark as plaintiffs contended, and made no mention of defendant's contention that it was touched off by the pilot light in the hot water heater. We believe it would have been reversible error to give this instruction. Plaintiffs' instruction No. 15 was an instruction relative to the failure of defendant to furnish reasonably safe and adequate appliances for delivery to plaintiffs of stove gas, which is an explosive and inflammable product. There was no evidence offered by plaintiffs that the appliances furnished were not safe or adequate, and the record before us certainly would not permit an inference of defendant's negligence in this regard. Defendant's No. 5 was an instruction on contributory negligence, wherein the jury was told that if this defense were established to their satisfaction it would be a bar to plaintiffs' recovery. The instruction is legally correct as was the instruction submitted by plaintiffs Barker and given by the court, that contributory negligence was a defense to be established by defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, unless such negligence was shown by or could be inferred from, the evidence adduced by plaintiffs. We find contributory negligence was very much an issue in the case even though not raised by the pleadings. Rule 15(b), Rules Civil Procedure, Section 21-449, A.C.A. 1939, declares:
"When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. * * *"
Furthermore, in the record brought before this court there is no showing of compliance with Rule 51, Rules Civil Procedure, Section 21-1019, A.C.A. 1939:
"At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the requests. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon the requests prior to their arguments to the jury, but the court shall instruct the jury after the arguments are completed. No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury."
*243 If this case were before us on appeal from a judgment for defendant, it is settled law that plaintiffs could not successfully assign error to the instructions because the record shows no objection to the giving or failure to give the instructions now complained of. Kauffroath v. Wilbur, 66 Ariz. 152, 185 P.2d 522, 524; Sibley v. Jeffreys, 76 Ariz. 340, 264 P.2d 831. We think in reason no different rule obtains in the lower court, and that litigants may not urge as errors of law and grounds for new trial, Section 21-1301 (6), A.C.A. 1939, the giving or failure to give instructions to which no specific objections were made. A contrary rule would make for uncertainty and confusion, erode away the value of verdicts fairly won, and place a premium on ambush tactics at trial.
The trial court's orders granting motions for new trial if based upon any of the legal questions numbered 1 to 5 heretofore considered, cannot be sustained. Rothman v. Rumbeck, 54 Ariz. 443, 454, 96 P.2d 755.
Weighing the Evidence
The final ground urged for new trial was that "The verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence, and is contrary to the evidence." (Italics ours). This last term means "`against the weight of the evidence'". 66 C.J.S., New Trial, § 70 a.
Defendant contends that once a case has been submitted to a jury, and it has, upon conflicting evidence, resolved the issues of fact, the trial court may not thereafter reweigh the evidence, and grant a new trial on the basis that some other verdict would have been more reasonable or more just. Thus it is argued, the trial court could not weigh the evidence when considering the motion for new trial, but would be limited to reviewing the record to determine if there is sufficient legal evidence therein to support the verdict rendered. Our decisions are not in harmony on this question. Defendant relies upon three Arizona cases wherein this court has admittedly used language that supports its position: Consolidated National Bank of Tucson v. Cunningham, 28 Ariz. 518, 238 P. 332; Apache Ry. Co. v. Shumway, 62 Ariz. 359, 158 P.2d 142, 159 A.L.R. 857; and Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Hicks, 64 Ariz. 15, 165 P.2d 167. We note that these three cases differ from the case at bar in that the appeals were taken after a motion for new trial was denied.
On the other hand, plaintiffs rely upon cases wherein this court has declared that upon motion for new trial the trial court may properly weigh the evidence: Huntsman v. First Nat. Bank, 29 Ariz. 574, 243 P. 598; Franco v. Vakares, 35 Ariz. 309, 277 P. 812; Brownell v. Freedman, 39 Ariz. 385, 6 P.2d 1115; Southern Arizona Freight Lines Ltd. v. Jackson, 48 Ariz. 509, 63 P.2d 193; Sadler v. Arizona Flour Mills Co., 58 Ariz. 486, 121 P.2d 412; Filer v. Maricopa County, 68 Ariz. 11, 198 P.2d 131; Zevon v. Tennebaum, 73 Ariz. 281, 240 P.2d 548; and Roman Catholic Church, Diocese of Tucson v. Keenan, 74 Ariz. 20, 243 P.2d 455.
*244 Inasmuch as the motions for new trial were denied in the Shumway and Hicks cases, supra, we are inclined to the view that the statements therein to the effect that the trial judge is without power to reweigh the evidence and set aside the verdict, are dicta. In any event however, we believe all the force of these cases, so heavily relied upon by defendant, is dissipated by an examination of Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 64 S.Ct. 409, 88 L.Ed. 520, upon which this court relied for its pronouncement that upon motion for new trial, the trial court may not reweigh the evidence. In the Tennant case, when the court declared that conflicts in the evidence presented a case for the jury which could not be re-examined by the court, it was speaking of motions for directed verdicts and motions for judgment non obstante verdicto, and was not speaking of motions for new trial. It thus appears that in the Shumway and Hicks cases, supra, we took the statements of the Supreme Court of the United States out of context when we applied them to the motion for new trial. The error of such action is fully discussed by Judge Parker in the scholarly opinion in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 4 Cir., 122 F.2d 350. Therein he shows the rule to be that motions for directed verdict and motions for judgment n.o.v. are always granted or denied as matters of law, whereas motions for new trial may be addressed to the discretion of the court, and may be granted even though the conflicting evidence in the record compelled submission of the case to the jury, and would have made a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. improper.
We have examined the cases above cited, together with Sharpensteen v. Sanguinetti, 33 Ariz. 110, 262 P. 609, and the case upon which the court there relied, Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World v. Thiebaud, 65 Kan. 332, 69 P. 348; and Dennis v. Stukey, 37 Ariz. 299, 294 P. 276, rehearing denied 37 Ariz. 510, 295 P. 971; and have come to this conclusion: A motion for new trial upon the ground the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and in ruling thereon the trial court may weigh the evidence. Upon appeal, the order granting a new trial will be upset where it is affirmatively shown the order is unreasonable and a manifest abuse of discretion under the state of the record and the circumstances of the case. Insofar as Consolidated National Bank of Tucson v. Cunningham, Apache Ry. Co. v. Shumway, and Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Hicks, supra, conflict herewith, they are disapproved. Some point is made that because our constitution provides the issue of contributory negligence shall be one for the jury, Const. of Arizona, Art. 18, § 5, then where this issue has been passed upon by a jury, the verdict may not be upset and a new trial granted. However, Franco v. Vakares, supra, and Dennis v. Stukey, supra, are sound authority to the contrary, *245 that this constitutional provision is no limitation upon the power of the trial court to grant a new trial. The spirit and purpose of the provision are sufficiently met by according a jury upon the new trial.
Reeds' Appeal
In the light of the rule we have stated, the order as to plaintiffs Reed is easily upheld. They were lessees of that portion of the building devoted to general store purposes, and their only relationship to or connection with the circumstances and events which preceded the burning was that their plumbing for hot water was connected with the water heater in the storeroom where Bland was filling the stove gas barrel. One of the issues formulated upon trial of the cases was whether the pilot light on this water heater was the proximate cause, or a contributing cause, of the fire. However, it is difficult to see how the lessees can be charged with responsibility for this heater, and consequently we believe a verdict that Reeds recover nothing is one that was properly set aside and a new trial granted in the reasonable exercise of judicial discretion.
Barkers' Appeal
In the case at bar the jury in rendering its verdict for defendant necessarily found under these peculiar circumstances that there were two contributing acts of negligence, i.e., the spilling of the stove gas on defendant's part, and maintaining a pilot light in close proximity to the gas barrels on plaintiffs' part, and that these acts were the proximate cause of the damage. To find for the plaintiffs under the circumstances of this case it would be necessary for the jury to find no contributory negligence on the part of plaintiffs, and to conclude that Bland, the agent of defendant, not only negligently spilled the gas but thereafter it was set afire without an independent intervening cause, and without a contributing cause chargeable to plaintiffs' negligence. Only by this finding could the jury conclude that Bland alone was negligent, and that his negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the fire.
An examination of the evidence on this matter convinces us the court's action granting the motion for new trial cannot be sustained. Barker testified that the driver had spilled gas on the floor before in filling the drum, that he warned him previously to be careful or "he was going to burn him down"; that on that warm June day (temperature 100 degrees) the doors and windows of the garage storeroom were wide open; this room was 18 feet by 16 feet, with an 8-foot ceiling; the pilot light was fifteen inches off the floor and 18 feet distant from the gas drum in question; that through Bland's negligence in filling the barrel "the gas run out all over everything * * * all over the floor in the northwest corner * * * it covered an area of about five or six feet right around these barrels, so there undoubtedly must have been two or three gallon that run over"; that he told Bland *246 "to get some of them rags to mop that oil up, and I turned around and saw it flash up * * *"; that there were no wool or nylon rags on the floor of the storeroom; that in his judgment it would have been impossible for the pilot light to have ignited the fumes from the spilled gas; "It (stove gas) is very violent if it is not handled properly and you have got to keep it confined. On a concrete floor where it is spilled it will spread very rapidly and the fumes will get out."; That the danger was greater in warm weather than in cold for it was then more volatile; that a fire may start from (a) a static spark caused by the rubbing reaction or friction, (b) a flame, (c) a heel of a shoe or other metal object striking another hard object thereby causing a spark.
Defense witness Bland testified that when he discovered the gas in the funnel would overflow the barrel, he tilted the spout and poured the remaining gas back into the five-gallon can on the floor; that he wiped off the barrel  but not the floor  with a rag, and was intending to draw some of the fluid from the barrel, and that as he turned around to get the can the whole wall back of the barrels was on fire; that no stove gas had been spilled on the walls, and only a small amount on the floor; that he was wearing rubber-soled and rubber-heeled field boots on the day in question; that while he used cigarettes and had some on his person he was not smoking during these operations; that he did not drop any hard object on the concrete floor; that he had "no idea as to what caused the fire".
Plaintiffs' son, Bob Barker, recently discharged from the Marine Corps, qualified as a demolition expert and testified to the inflammability and explosiveness of stove gas. He gave the opinion that under all the facts adduced at trial, the pilot light could not have caused the fire as it was so far distant the fumes would be dissipated. His theory was "there was one hard object struck against another and produced a spark". He admitted he was not there at the time of the fire and did not know of any hard object striking another and causing a spark. In fact there was no testimony to support his theory.
With this evidence before it, the jury denied Barkers any relief, doubtless because the jury recognized the clear preponderance of the evidence shows Barkers were contributorily negligent in maintaining the water heater with a burning pilot light, and this negligence was a contributing cause of the fire. The purpose of allowing the trial court to weigh the evidence upon motion for new trial, is that it shall exercise a sound judicial discretion and promote justice by preventing unjust verdicts. Sharpensteen v. Sanguinetti, supra, 33 Ariz. 110, 262 P. 609; Dennis v. Stukey, supra, 37 Ariz. 299, 294 P. 276; Kent v. Lindsey, 30 Ala.App. 582, 10 So.2d 54; Nevada Rock & Sand Co. v. Grich, 59 Nev. 345, 93 P.2d 513. It is our considered opinion that in the instant case where no errors of law occurred *247 at trial, where the jury was not biased or prejudiced, but exercised an honest and impartial judgment, and the clear preponderance of the evidence shows the verdict is correct and justice has been meted out, it was an abuse of discretion to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial.
The order granting a new trial to Reeds is affirmed; as to the Barkers the order granting a new trial is vacated with direction to reinstate the judgment.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
PHELPS, C.J., and STANFORD, LA PRADE and WINDES, JJ., concur.


85 Cal.App.2d 44 (1948)
GILMAN G. RICE, Respondent,
v.
D. E. WATKINS, Appellant.
California Court of Appeals.
Apr. 15, 1948.
 George H. Pratt for Appellant.
 Hanna & Morton and James M. McRoberts for Respondent.
 WOOD, J.
 This is an action for dissolution of a partnership and for an accounting. Defendant denied that a partnership agreement had been made. The court, after orally announcing its decision that a partnership existed, continued the trial to a later date, ordered an accounting of the partnership affairs, and appointed an appraiser to make a written report of the value of the partnership assets. Thereafter an accounting was had, the cause was submitted, and the court rendered judgment that there should be a dissolution of the copartnership; that the partnership business and assets be sold; and that the net proceeds from such sale be paid to plaintiff and defendant in accordance with their equities, which it found to be in certain sums hereinafter referred to. Defendant appeals from the judgment.
 [1] Appellant's contention that the evidence was insufficient to establish a partnership agreement is not sustainable. The evidence shows that about October 1, 1941, defendant told plaintiff that he intended to go into the delicatessen business and he needed some money; that plaintiff delivered five checks in the amounts of $1,000, $200, $100, $100, and $25 to defendant, and the total amount of money represented by those checks, $1,425, was a part of the money used in establishing the business; that the written lease, for the space in the general food market where the delicatessen was located, was obtained in the name of defendant as lessee, and the fixtures were also obtained in defendant's name; that all credit which was extended for the benefit of the business was extended in defendant's name; that defendant and his wife operated the business; that defendant was in the merchant marine from November, 1942, to July, 1944, and during his absence his wife operated the business; that at the time the business was started, and thereafter until plaintiff entered the Navy, plaintiff was employed full time by a cheese company; that during the time he was not in the Navy he went to the delicatessen at least once a week and remained there a few minutes; and that plaintiff was in the Navy from November, 1942, to September, 1945. The plaintiff testified, in part, that defendant told him if he (plaintiff) would "put up $1,400" the defendant would give him a half interest in the business and it would be a "50-50 partnership deal"; *47 that plaintiff stated that since he was selling the products of a cheese company to delicatessens, he thought it would not look well for him to be a competitor of those to whom he sold such products; that the defendant then suggested that plaintiff become a "silent partner," and stated that he (defendant) would put everything in his name and "operate the business" with plaintiff's cooperation; that plaintiff did not have the "cash" to invest in the business, but he borrowed the money on his home; that plaintiff and defendant discussed the salaries which defendant and his wife should receive for operating the business, and defendant "agreed" that his salary should be $50 a week and his wife's salary $35 a week; that plaintiff's "understanding" was that the profits would be used first to repay plaintiff the amount of his investment, and then the profits would be used to repay defendant the amount of his investment, and thereafter the profits would be divided between plaintiff and defendant equally, and that both parties would bear any losses equally.
 The testimony of plaintiff's wife, who was called as a witness in his behalf, corroborated in substance the testimony of plaintiff. Another witness, who was a fellow-employee of plaintiff, testified that when he was with plaintiff at the place of business he heard defendant ask plaintiff "if he had any money to give him to operate tomorrow because he did not have any change in the cash register"; and that plaintiff gave defendant a check for $25.
 Defendant testified, in part, that a partnership was never agreed upon or discussed; that the plaintiff offered to lend him the money in return for "favors" defendant had done for plaintiff; that when he accepted plaintiff's check for $1,000 he told plaintiff he would give him 6 per cent straight interest on the total amount until the final payment; that when he accepted the additional $425 from plaintiff he offered plaintiff a note for it but plaintiff said he did not care for one at that time; that it was a personal loan and not a loan to the business; that there was no obligation on defendant's part to pay the money back at any certain time; that he was to pay it back in payments if he could afford it and at the most convenient times; that the $75 which plaintiff was paid, in addition to the $1,425 he had lent defendant, was sent to plaintiff by defendant's wife while defendant was in the merchant marine; that he supposed the said $75 should have been applied on the interest owed plaintiff; *48 and that defendant had invested between $1,900 and $2,000 in the business.
 Defendant's wife, called as a witness in his behalf, testified in substance the same as defendant had testified.
 As stated in the case of Fewel & Dawes Inc. v. Pratt, 17 Cal.2d 85, at page 89 [109 P.2d 650]: "A finding of the trial court upon conflicting evidence will not be disturbed on appeal if there is evidence of a substantial character which reasonably supports the judgment." The evidence was sufficient to support the finding that a partnership existed.
 Plaintiff and defendant each appointed an auditor to examine the partnership accounts. At the time the trial was resumed the reports of both auditors and the statement of the appraiser were received in evidence. After hearing the testimony of the auditors the court made findings that the plaintiff and defendant, pursuant to an agreement, formed a partnership on December 19, 1941, for the purpose of carrying on a business known as "Watkin's Delicatessen"; that said agreement provided that plaintiff would contribute the sum of $1,425 and that defendant would contribute cash and property aggregating and having a value of $1,950; that said contributions were made; that said agreement also provided that "each party would receive back his capital contribution out of the net profits," and that "the defendant would be entitled to withdraw Eighty-five Dollars ($85) per week out of the net profits," and that the net profits thereafter would be divided equally; that the amount contributed by plaintiff was not a loan, and that said amount has been repaid to him; that defendant has made capital contributions aggregating $4,118.46, and that said sum has been repaid to him; that defendant wrongfully and maliciously applied a portion of the partnership money to his own use, and by reason thereof became indebted to the partnership and the plaintiff; that the report of the auditor (who was appointed by the defendant) was a true and correct statement and audit of the partnership business and accounts to and including August 3, 1946, and that said report was attached to and, by reference thereto, made a part of the findings; that it was true that the "equities" of the partners were in the amounts as set forth in such report, to wit, $3,719.52 as to the plaintiff, and $9,201.66 as to the defendant; that the interests of the said partners cannot be apportioned and distributed until liquidation of the partnership assets has been made; that the appraisal, made by the *49 appraiser appointed by the court, is correct as to the value of the partnership assets as of August 12, 1946, and that said value is as follows: stock on hand $4,742.71, liquor license $4,500, fixtures $3,125, and lease $3,000.
 [2] Appellant contends that the court made inconsistent findings as to the amount of salary defendant was entitled to receive. As shown above, the court made an express finding that defendant was entitled to withdraw $85 per week out of the net profits of the partnership, and that the partnership was formed on December 19, 1941. The number of weeks from the date the partnership was formed to the end of the accounting period (August 3, 1946) is approximately 239 weeks. On the basis that appellant was entitled to $85 a week for 239 weeks, his total salary would be $20,315 It appears, however, from the auditor's report, which was made a part of the findings, that the amount of salary to which defendant was entitled was $16,885. The accounting period covered by the auditor's report was also from the time the business was commenced to August 3, 1946 Obviously those findings are conflicting. The express finding that defendant was entitled to $85 a week (or $20,315) was an allowance for the full time covered by the accounting and did not provide for a deduction of the time defendant was in the merchant marine. The finding, by reference to the auditor's report, that defendant was entitled to $16,885 was apparently an allowance for the time defendant actually operated the business. At the time the trial judge announced orally that a partnership existed, and prior to the accounting, he stated that the defendant and his wife were entitled to $50 and $35 per week "for such times as he and she were there [at the delicatessen] respectively." The express finding that defendant was entitled to $85 a week did not include the qualification, which the judge had announced orally, that defendant was entitled to salary only for the time he was at the delicatessen. It cannot be determined from those findings whether the court intended that defendant should receive $85 per week for the full time of the accounting period or whether it intended that he should receive that amount only for the weeks he operated the business. Plaintiff asserts, in effect, that the amount of $16,885 was the correct amount of defendant's salary, and that since defendant gave plaintiff's auditor a written statement which showed $16,885 to be the amount of his salary, he should not now be permitted to claim *50 more than that amount. Appellant asserts, in reply thereto, that in computing his salary to be $16,885 he was complying with the oral decision of the trial judge that he was entitled to salary only for the time he was at the delicatessen. The said findings are irreconcilable.
 [3] Appellant asserts that the findings are also inconsistent as to the repayment of defendant's contribution. The express finding was that defendant's contribution of $4,118.46 had been repaid. The auditor's report, which was adopted as a finding, does not show that appellant's contribution had been returned. At a place in the report regarding defendant's account, opposite a heading "Investment Returned," no amount is shown, thereby indicating a finding that no part of defendant's contribution was returned. (There appears, however, in that report, regarding plaintiff's account, opposite the same heading, the sum of $1,500.) It appears that the express finding and the finding by reference, as to repayment of defendant's contribution, are inconsistent. The auditor's report does show, however, that defendant withdrew $14,570.32, and that he was also charged with a withdrawal of an additional $1,026.01 (which the report shows was unaccounted for), making a total of $15,595.33 withdrawn by defendant. The amount withdrawn by defendant was less than the total amount of his salary. It might be that the court, in finding that defendant's contribution of $4,118.46 had been repaid, considered that that amount was a part of the total amount withdrawn by defendant; however, the express finding that defendant's contribution had been repaid and the finding by reference that it had not been repaid are conflicting.
 [4] It also appears that the findings are incomplete, in that, there are findings as to the division of the profits of the partnership, but there is no finding as to the division of losses if any should occur. As stated above, the plaintiff testified that the parties agreed to bear the losses equally.
 The court, by its judgment, appointed a commissioner and ordered that he sell the partnership business and assets to the highest bidder; and ordered that the proceeds remaining after payment of the partnership indebtedness be applied "in payment of the equity" of each partner and, in the event such proceeds were insufficient to pay the parties their "equities in full," that the proceeds should be prorated in proportion to the equities of the parties. It further ordered *51 that in the event the sums paid to plaintiff should be "less than his partnership equity of $3,719.52, that the unpaid balance shall be paid by the defendant to plaintiff."
 [5a] The effect of that order is to grant plaintiff a personal judgment against defendant. In the event the net assets of the partnership amount to less than $12,921.18, that is, less than the total amount of the interests of both partners--$9,201.66 for defendant, and $3,719.52 for plaintiff, the defendant will be required to pay plaintiff the difference between the amount plaintiff receives from the partnership assets and $3,719.52. In other words, according to the judgment, plaintiff is entitled to receive $3,719.52, regardless of the amount realized on a pro rata basis from the sale of the partnership assets. The judgment was erroneous in that respect. Furthermore, according to the judgment, there is no liability on plaintiff's part for losses of the partnership, if any. [6] In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, each partner should be repaid his contributions, and should share equally in the proceeds remaining after all liabilities, including those to partners, are satisfied, and he must contribute towards the losses according to his share in the profits. (Civ. Code,  2412.) [5b] In the present case there was no agreement that the parties should not share the profits, and bear the losses, equally--on the contrary, plaintiff testified that they agreed to share the profits and bear the losses equally. There was no agreement that defendant would indemnify plaintiff for any losses or that he guaranteed him any profits. Plaintiff's wife testified that the parties had stated, in effect, they were "in it for better or worse"--that they might have a nice profit or a financial loss "to split between them." Under the findings herein, plaintiff was not entitled to recover a profit in excess of his proportionate share in any net profit which might be realized from the sale of the partnership assets.
 [7] The reason for ordering an appraisal of the partnership assets is not clear. Ordinarily it is not necessary to ascertain the appraised value of partnership assets in order to make a proper distribution since the proceeds of a sale of the assets, irrespective of value, are divided in proportion to the respective interests of the partners. [8] It is to be noted that the lease, which was in defendant's name as lessee, was not assignable without the consent of the lessor, and that the liquor license, which was in his name, was not transferable *52 without the approval of the State Board of Equalization. Although the appraiser fixed the value of the lease at $3,000, and the value of the liquor license at $4,500, it would seem that those two assets would not be of value to anyone other than the defendant unless the lessor consented to an assignment of the lease and the Board of Equalization approved a transfer of the license. In other words, it would seem that the defendant is the only one who would be justified in purchasing the lease and the liquor license. It might be that the court considered the possibility that, under the circumstances here, the defendant might purchase the assets for such a small amount that there would be no net proceeds from which to pay the $3,719.52 to plaintiff, and therefore ordered an appraisal in order to fix a basis for adequately compensating plaintiff in the event defendant acquired the property at the sale. The findings herein are not sufficient to justify a personal judgment against the defendant.
 [9] It appears further that certain provisions of the judgment are conflicting. It is provided therein that in the event the net proceeds of the partnership are insufficient to pay the parties their "equities" in full, "then proportionate payments shall be made to each upon a pro rata basis as the said interests of each bears each to the other." It further provides that in the event the amount paid to plaintiff by the commissioner shall be less than his "partnership equity" of $3,719.52, then the unpaid balance shall be paid to plaintiff by defendant. The provision that the parties should be paid on a pro rata basis and the provision that plaintiff should be paid in full irrespective of the pro rata basis are conflicting.
 By reason of the said conflicting and incomplete findings, the said error in awarding a personal judgment against defendant, and the said contradictory provisions in the judgment, the judgment must be reversed as to that portion thereof which determines the accounting as to the partnership affairs The finding that a copartnership existed between plaintiff and defendant, and the judgment that there should be a dissolution of the copartnership, are adequately supported by the evidence.
 The judgment is reversed as to that portion thereof which determines the accounting as to the partnership affairs, and the cause is remanded for retrial for the sole purpose of determining the accounting as to the partnership affairs. The portion of the judgment that there should be a dissolution *53 of the copartnership between plaintiff and defendant is affirmed.
 Vallee, J. pro tem., concurred.
 SHINN, Acting P. J.
 I concur in the reversal of a part of the judgment and affirmance of the remainder. It seems to me that in the effort to analyze and explain a simple case to the trial court nothing was developed except confusion.
 I do not understand the theory of the judgment. I cannot reconcile it with the findings or any rule of law or mathematics. The facts established by the findings are the following: Plaintiff contributed $1,500 of capital and defendant contributed $4,118.46; each partner was to have his capital investment returned to him; defendant was to receive a salary, payable out of net profits, and thereafter the profits were to be equally divided. Plaintiff's contribution of $1,500 has been returned to him, and the court found that defendant's contribution of $4,118.46 has been returned to him. Upon these facts any excess would be profit. Defendant earned salary of $16,885, and he was therefore entitled to draw from the profits of the business this amount, plus the amount of his contributions, or a total of $21,003.46. He has withdrawn $15,596.33, leaving a balance due him of $5,407.13 Defendant says that the court erred in finding that his capital had been returned to him, but the finding appears to be fully supported by the evidence. Defendant is entitled to receive $5,407.75 from the proceeds of the sale of the assets before there is any division of profits, whether this sum represents unpaid salary or part salary and part contributions which have not been returned to him. If the amount for distribution is less than the balance of defendant's unpaid salary he will have to lose the difference, since his salary is payable only out of profits. The results of any accounting for the period subsequent to the date of the original judgment should be treated on the same basis.
 The judgment based on the accounting is erroneous. If a division "upon a pro rata basis as the said interests of each bears each to the other" means in the proportions which the share of each bears to the whole, and I suppose it does, it is inconsistent with the findings.
 Defendant's entire salary of $16,885 is included in the total amount which forms the basis of his proportionate interest *54 in the total assets which, roughly speaking, amounts to three-fourths thereof. This ignores his right to receive his total salary before there is any division of profits. The difference in the results reached by applying the true method and the method of the judgment would be of little consequence if the proceeds prove sufficient to pay the claims of both partners in full, but if, for example, the proceeds for distribution amounted to only $5,407.13, defendant, as we have shown, should receive all of it and there would be nothing to divide with plaintiff.


554 F.2d 1064
Robbinsv.Vaughn*
No. 76-3873
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
6/14/77

1
N.D.Miss.

2
AFFIRMED***

*
 Summary Calendar case; Rule 18, 5 Cir.; see Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York et al., 5 Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 409

***
 Opinion contains citation(s) or special notations


592 F.2d 1188
Hebertv.Ocean Drilling and Exploration Co.*
No. 78-2651
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
3/27/79

1
W.D.La.

2
AFFIRMED***

*
 Summary Calendar case; Rule 18, 5 Cir.; see Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York et al., 5 Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 409

***
 Opinion contains citation(s) or special notations


    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

PAUL THOMAS CREWS, as personal
representative of the ESTATE OF                          No. 70756-6-1
BRENDA HOUSTON, and as personal
representative of the ESTATE OF                          DIVISION ONE
ELIZABETH CREWS, and in his individual
capacity,                                                UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                      Respondent,

                                                                                en

                                                                                m

AVCO CORPORATION,
                                                                                I

                      Appellant,

 PRECISION AIRMOTIVE LLC;                                                           up
                                                                                rvs
 FORWARD TECHNOLOGIES                                                               V.C-
 INDUSTRIES, INC.; CREST AIRPARK,
 INC.; and AUBURN FLIGHT SERVICES,
 INC.,

                      Defendants.                        FILED: April 6, 2015

       Appelwick, J. — Avco appeals the trial court's order sanctioning it for discovery

violations.   The trial court struck all of Avco's affirmative defenses and deemed all

allegations in Crews's complaint admitted. As a result, the court found liability and

causation established and set separate trials on compensatory damages and punitive

damages.      Avco argues that the discovery sanctions order violated its right to due

process. It further asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions

that were more severe than necessary. We remand for amendment of judgment to reflect

offset of amounts Crews received from other defendants. We otherwise affirm.
No. 70756-6-1/2

                                         FACTS

       On July 27, 2008, a rented Cessna 172N plane crashed in the Cascades near

McMurray, Washington.     The accident killed the pilot, Brenda Houston, and her two

passengers: Houston's 10 year old daughter, Elizabeth Crews, and their family friend, Dr.

Virgil Becker.

       On September 10, 2008, Houston's husband, Paul Crews, sued for injuries and

wrongful death. Crews named multiple defendants involved in the manufacture and care

of the plane. The personal representative of Becker's estate also brought suit against the

same defendants and named Houston's estate as an additional defendant, claiming pilot

negligence. The plaintiffs alleged that engine failure, in particular a faulty carburetor,

caused the plane crash. The defendants included Avco Corporation, which manufactured

and sold the plane's engine in 1978,1 and Precision Airmotive Corporation, which installed

a new carburetor float in the engine in 1999.

        Precision developed the float pursuant to its parts manufacturer approval (PMA)

from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). With a PMA, vendors of airplane parts

can sell replacement parts directly to customers and service shops. Precision acquired

a PMA to supply carburetors for Avco. The PMA required Precision to manufacture the

carburetors according to Avco's preapproved engineering drawings and specifications.

In the 1990s, Precision designed a new float made of a polymer resin called Delrin.

Precision obtained permission from Avco to use the Delrin float, and the FAA approved

the float.

      1 The engine was manufactured by Avco's unincorporated division, Lycoming
Engines. Because Avco is the named party in the lawsuit, we refer to Avco and Lycoming
together as "Avco" to maintain clarity and consistency.
No. 70756-6-1/3

       Crews and Becker alleged that the Delrin floats were defective and that a faulty

Delrin float was responsible for the plane crash. They further alleged that Avco and its

codefendants were aware the floats were defective but withheld this information and failed

to warn about the defects. The plaintiffs asserted claims for strict liability, negligence,

and breach of warranty. They sought both general and punitive damages.

      Avco asserted several affirmative defenses, including a lack of involvement with

the carburetor or float, compliance with federal regulations, federal and state statutes of

repose, comparative fault, the unavailability of punitive damages, and a demand for offset

of amounts recovered from other liable parties.       Avco also counterclaimed against

Houston's estate, alleging that pilot error caused the crash.

       In October 2010, Crews and Becker jointly served their first requests for production

on Avco. The requests generally pertained to the carburetors and Delrin floats, their

design and manufacture, Avco's communication with the FAA and with other companies

about the carburetors and floats, and information about any known defects or

malfunctions. Avco did not produce any discovery at that time. It objected to 68 of the

73 requests. It stated that it would produce the remaining documents with its answers

and affirmative defenses.

       Crews's and Becker's cases were consolidated on January 31, 2011.
No. 70756-6-1/4

       On April 29, Becker served his first interrogatories and second requests for

production on Avco. Avco objected to 16 of the 17 interrogatories. It also objected to 27

of the 30 requests for production. As to the remaining three, Avco stated that responsive

documents had already been provided.

       On July 6, Becker moved to compel Avco to answer his first interrogatories and

respond to his second requests for production. On July 7, the plaintiffs jointly moved to

compel production of documents responsive to their requests.             Avco opposed both

motions. In his reply, Becker asserted that Avco withheld documents reflecting its role in

testing, reviewing, approving, and certifying the Delrin float. As support, Becker attached

a December 2005 series of e-mails between Avco and Precision employees reflecting

Avco's knowledge of defects in the Delrin floats. Becker had obtained the e-mails from

Precision's discovery production.      The subject line of the e-mails was "Plastic Float

Leaking - Concerns." An Avco employee wrote that, "[p]er the attached file and our

previous conversations, it is clear that the hollow plastic carb floats can leak, allowing fuel

to enter the interior of the floats.   [Avco] is concerned that this condition will lead to

functional issues on engine installations."       The attached file was not included.        A

Precision employee replied, "We have been monitoring the situation with leaking Delrin

floats since their incorporation into production. We have, on several instances discussed

the situation with personnel at [Avco]."

       On July 21, Judge Julie Spector granted Becker's motion and the joint motion to

compel. Judge Spector ordered Avco to respond to Becker's requests within 14 days and

the plaintiffs' joint requests within five days. She further ordered Avco to specifically
No. 70756-6-1/5

identify by Bates stamp number each document that was responsive to each interrogatory

Or request. She also provided that the plaintiffs could seek costs for bringing the motions.

       On August 4, Avco amended its responses to the plaintiffs' first requests for

production and Becker's first interrogatories and second requests for production. Avco's

responses generally indicated that "[r]esponsive documents have either been produced

9nd/or are being made available for inspection" or that "Avco has located no documents

responsive to this request." (Emphasis omitted.)

       On August 31, Becker moved to hold Avco in contempt for failing to comply with

tJie order to compel. He requested that the court impose sanctions, including striking

Avco's federal statute of repose defense, holding that Avco may not oppose the

Availability of punitive damages in this case, holding that Avco had a duty to warn owners

and operators about the defective float, and monetary sanctions. On September 2, the

plaintiffs also jointly moved to hold Avco in contempt and to impose sanctions.

       On September 27, Judge Spector granted both contempt motions, finding that

Avco's "willful violation of the Court's July 20, 2011 Order has prejudiced and continues

to prejudice the plaintiffs in their prosecution of the case." She ordered Avco to fully

comply within seven days. She further ordered Avco to submit an affidavit detailing all

efforts made to fully comply with the order, "including, as for each ordered request, a

statement as to whether full and complete production has been made, and a detailed

description of how documents were identified and located."           Judge Spector again

provided that the plaintiffs could seek costs and fees for bringing the motions. She

reserved ruling on three sanctions: striking Avco's federal statute of repose defense;
No. 70756-6-1/6

ordering that Avco may not oppose punitive damages; and ordering that Avco had a duty

to warn about the defective floats.

       Avco submitted a declaration from counsel detailing Avco's efforts to comply with

Judge Spector's orders.      Counsel stated that, pursuant to company policy, "certain

Categories   of   documents       (such   as   engineering   documents     and   regulatory

Correspondence) are kept into perpetuity whereas other categories of documents are not

Required to be retained on a permanent basis but are retained only for fixed periods of

time, depending upon the category of document." Counsel's affidavit further explained

that many of the documents supplied by Precision regarding carburetors were "beyond

the various retention periods in [Avco's] Records Management Policy." The records

management policy was not attached to the declaration.

       On October 10, Avco moved to amend or vacate the contempt orders. It argued

that it made good faith efforts to comply with the plaintiffs' broad discovery requests and

that it had timely submitted the declaration of compliance as required by the court's order.

Avco also proposed that the subject matter of the orders be transferred to retired Judge

Paris Kallas, who had been appointed special discovery master the prior month.

       On November 8, Judge Spector denied Avco's motion. She declined to impose

further sanctions at that time.

       Effective January 9, 2012, the case was transferred to Judge Monica Benton.

       On January 20, Becker served Avco with his second interrogatories and third

requests for production. Avco responded on February 24. Again, Avco objected to many

of the requests or stated that it had no responsive documents.
No. 70756-6-1/7

      On May 25, Becker brought a motion before Discovery Master Kallas to compel

Avco to fully answer the second interrogatories and third requests for production. On

June 12, Discovery Master Kallas granted Becker's motion in part and ordered Avco to

produce certain discovery. She rejected Becker's argument that Avco's responses were

evasive, instead finding that Avco explicitly represented that its responses were complete

and compliant. She further stated that Avco was held to its representations and its duty

to reasonably supplement its responses.

       On September 4 and 5, Becker and Crews amended their complaints to add

federal causes of action.

       On September 28, the plaintiffs jointly moved for a default judgment against Avco

for itsfailure to complywith Judge Spector's discovery and contempt orders. The plaintiffs

explained that they sought discovery about Avco's role in approving the Delrin float,

knowledge about the defective floats, and failure to notify the FAA or aircraft operators

and owners about the defect. The plaintiffs identified several examples of documents

that Avco failed to produce, including the 2005 e-mails with Precision about the Delrin

float leaking problems. The plaintiffs asserted that Avco's noncompliance put them at a

"serious disadvantage trying to prepare for trial without the benefit of critical facts going

to the heart of their case against [Avco] and other defendants." The plaintiffs requested

that the court deem all allegations of the plaintiffs' complaints admitted and order Avco in

default thereof, or, in the alternative, strike Avco's affirmative defenses, hold that the

punitive damages elements against Avco had been met, and hold that Avco breached its

duty to warn.

                                                 7
No. 70756-6-1/8

      Avco responded on October 4. It did not assert that it had provided the allegedly

withheld documents. However, it maintained that it had responded to all the plaintiffs'

discovery requests and had produced documents or made documents available for

ipspection. It also explained that, under its records management policy, many of the

documents that Precision produced were no longer in Avco's possession.

       In the plaintiffs' October 5 reply, they noted that Avco failed to submit any employee

affidavit stating that no responsive documents existed or that certain evidence was

destroyed under the records management policy. Instead, they observed, Avco "wholly

relies on [its attorney's] declaration, which Judge Spector rejected."

       On February 4, 2013, the first day of trial, Judge Benton held oral argument on the

plaintiffs' motion for default. At oral argument, Avco's counsel produced a copy of the

records management policy for Judge Benton.            Counsel acknowledged that Judge

Spector was not provided a copy of the policy and was only informed about the policy via

counsel's declaration.    Judge Benton found that it was unclear whether the policy

extended to the documents requested by the plaintiffs. She stated that she was "not

satisfied . . . that some of the documents requested by the plaintiff couldn't have been

produced." She orally granted the plaintiffs' motion to sanction Avco.

       On February 5, Judge Benton entered a written order granting the plaintiffs' motion.

The order stated that there was substantial evidence that Avco did not comply with the

plaintiffs' discovery requests, listing "[a]s one example" the 2005 e-mail chain with

Precision. The court found that the withheld discovery tied directly to the plaintiffs' burden

of proof regarding Avco's violation of federal regulations and punitive damages. The

order further stated that Avco's justification for nonproduction was insufficient: "The Court

                                                  8
No. 70756-6-1/9

Examined the [records management policy], which was provided without affidavit or

declaration and here finds the categories within it, combined with counsel's assignment

Of documents to the categories within it, to be overly vague." (Emphasis omitted.). The

court found that Avco's "continued disregard and violation of the discovery and contempt

Orders is without reasonable excuse and is willful.            [Avco] has and continues to

Substantially prejudice plaintiffs' preparation for trial and presentation at trial, on issues of

liability, causation, and punitive damages." (Emphasis omitted.) It concluded that the

only sanction that suffices is as follows: "All of each plaintiff's allegations in their

respective operative Complaints against [Avco] are deemed admitted, and all of [Avco's]

defenses, if any, are stricken." The court established liability and causation in favor ofthe

plaintiffs and left to the jury the amount of compensatory and punitive damages to be

^warded.

       The jury considered compensatory damages and punitive damages in two

separate phases oftrial. It returned a verdict for Crews2 of $17,283,000: $11,283,000 in
compensatory damages and $6,000,000 in punitive damages.

       Avco appeals.3

                                         DISCUSSION

       Avco challenges the trial court's discovery sanctions order on multiple grounds.

Avco first argues that the order violated due process, because Avco had no notice that it
Was in continuing violation of previous discovery orders. Avco further contends that the

        2After the compensatory damages phase ofthe trial, Avco settled with Becker. At
the punitive damages phase, the parties presented evidence regarding only Crews's
claims. After trial concluded, Crews's and Becker's cases were deconsolidated.
       3Avco moved to include summaries and timelines as appendices to its opening
brief. There was no objection to the motion. The motion is granted.
No. 70756-6-1/10

trial court abused its discretion in imposing the most severe sanctions possible when

lesser sanctions would have sufficed. Avco also challenges specific sanctions, asserting

that the trial court erred in striking Avco's federal defenses, imposing punitive damages,

and denying an offset of amounts Crews received from other defendants.

  I.   Due Process

       Avco characterizes the discovery sanctions order as a violation of its right to due

process. Due process is satisfied if, before entering a default judgment or dismissing a

Claim or defense, the trial court concludes that there was a willful or deliberate refusal to

obey a discovery order and that the refusal substantially prejudiced the opponent's ability

to prepare for trial. Maqana v. Hyundai Motor Am., 167 Wn.2d 570, 591, 220 P.3d 191

(2009).

       Here, Judge Spector concluded that Avco willfully violated her discovery orders

and that its willful violation prejudiced the plaintiffs in their prosecution of the case.

Accordingly, Judge Spector held Avco in contempt. She denied Avco's motion to amend

or vacate the contempt orders. At no point did any judge enter an order finding that the

contempt was purged.

       Avco   nonetheless    asserts   that   it was   unaware    there   would   be further

consequences for its failure to comply with Judge Spector's contempt orders. This is so,

Avco argues, because Judge Spector and Discovery Master Kallas entered subsequent

orders indicating that Avco's responses were adequate. Avco does not assert that these

orders had preclusive effect on subsequent discovery decisions or estopped Crews from

                                                 10
No. 70756-6-1/11

arguing that Avco was in continuing violation. Avco merely asserts that, in light of the two

Orders, the discovery sanctions were an ambush.4 We disagree.

       First, Avco maintains that Judge Spector indicated that Avcowas in compliance by

declining the plaintiffs' proposal to impose more severe sanctions.               But, this

misrepresents the record. The fact that Judge Spector reserved ruling on the three

harsher proposed sanctions put Avco on notice of the risk that the more severe sanctions

Could be imposed in the future for failure to comply. Judge Spector declined to impose

those sanctions when ruling on Avco's motion to amend or vacate the contempt orders.

But, she did not expressly revoke her reservation of them in her previous order. Merely

declining to impose further sanctions did not indicate that Avco had purged contempt,

evidenced by the fact that Judge Spector specifically denied Avco's motion to vacate the

Contempt orders.

      Avco further alleges that Discovery Master Kallas confirmed that Avco's responses

were adequate. Again, this mischaracterizes the record. The issue before Master Kallas

was not whether Avco had purged its contempt.         The issue was whether Avco was

evasive in responding to Becker's second interrogatories and third requests for

production.    Becker had complained that, where Avco produced no responsive

documents, it failed to affirmatively state that it had no documents to produce. Master

Kallas stated that Avco's counsel represented that its responses were complete and

Compliant. She did not determine that the responses were in fact complete, and she

      4 At oral argument, Avco also asserted that the trial court should have held an
evidentiary hearing before imposing sanctions. But, Avco did not request an evidentiary
hearing in its response to the motion for default or at any other time on this record.

                                                11
No. 70756-6-1/12

further noted Avco's duty to supplement. Nothing in these orders provides that Avco's

early contempt had been purged or that the reserved sanctions had been lifted.

       In the 2011 contempt orders, Judge Spector made the requisite findings to satisfy

due process. Her orders clearly put Avco on notice that she was reserving additional

sanctions and identified what those sanctions were. The plaintiffs' motion for default put

Avco on notice that its compliance with the contempt orders was still in question. Avco

then had more than four months before the sanctions hearing, during which it could have

Complied with the orders or prepared a defense.          Neither the discovery sanctions

procedure nor the order violated Avco's right to due process.

 II.   Discovery Sanctions

       Avco argues that the trial court erred in imposing a "death penalty order" that was

more severe than necessary to cure any prejudice. If a party fails to obey a discovery

order, the trial court may "make such orders in regard to the failure as are just." CR

37(b)(2). The trial court has broad discretion as to the choice of sanctions for violation of

a discovery order. Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance, 131 Wn.2d 484, 494, 933 P.2d 1036

(1997). We will not disturb its ruling on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of

discretion, jd.

       Discovery sanctions serve to deter, punish, compensate, educate, and ensure that

the wrongdoer does not profit from the wrong. Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. &Ass'n

y. Fisons Corp., 122 Wn.2d 299, 356, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993). The trial court should

impose the least severe sanction that is adequate to serve the sanction's particular

purpose but is not so minimal as to undermine the purpose of discovery. ]d. at 355-56.

                                                12
No. 70756-6-1/13

       CR 37(b) presents a nonexclusive list of possible sanctions, including designating

facts as established, striking claims or defenses, limiting or prohibiting evidence, default,

and contempt. If a trial court imposes one of the harsher remedies under CR 37(b), the

record must clearly show that (1) one party willfully or deliberately violated the discovery

ijules and orders, (2) the opposing party was substantially prejudiced in its ability to

prepare for trial, and (3) the trial court explicitly considered whether a lesser sanction

Would have sufficed. Magana, 167 Wn.2d at 584. We can disturb a trial court's sanction

Only if it is clearly unsupported by the record, jd. at 583.

       Here, the trial court made the three required findings on the record. Thus, our

focus is whether the record supports those findings.

       A.   Willful Violation

       A party's disregard of a court order without reasonable excuse is deemed willful.

(Rivers v. Wash. State Conference of Mason Contractors, 145 Wn.2d 674, 686-87, 41

F\3d 1175 (2002). Here, the trial court found that Avco's "discovery violations were willful

as found by Judge Spector and have continued to be willful since her ruling has not been

Complied with. . . . Further the court finds that [Avco] has not presented a reasonable

excuse or justification for its non-compliance."       (Emphasis omitted.) This finding is
i

supported by the record.

       The plaintiffs repeatedly requested information about Avco's involvement with the

Delrin floats and knowledge that they were problematic.          Avco did not provide the

requested discovery, despite being ordered to produce and subsequently being held in

contempt for failing to do so. Avco claimed that, under its records management policy, it

                                                  13
No. 70756-6-1/14

Was not required to keep all the documents that the plaintiffs sought. As a result, Avco

asserted, its failure to produce the records was not willful.

       Avco did not produce or prove the policy at the original contempt hearing before

Judge Spector.     Instead, it submitted an attorney declaration stating that the policy

governs the retention of "various categories of documents, including intra-company and

inter-company correspondence." Counsel further stated that

       [t]he discovery served by plaintiffs seeks information and documents dating
       back many decades, much of which is not [sic] longer maintained in
       company records by virtue of the Records Management Policy and by
       attrition given the passage of time and the retirement or deaths of persons
       employed by [Avco] over the years.

The declaration did not specify the discovery requests or types of documents to which the

policy applied.

       Avco did not provide the actual policy to the court for another 16 months, when it

presented a copy of the policy for Judge Benton to review at the sanctions hearing.

Counsel again stated that the policy "has retention periods for various categories of

documents." As an example, counsel pointed out that the 2005 e-mails would not have

been maintained past a certain number of years.5 Judge Benton examined the policy and

found that it was "vague in many ways .... I'm not satisfied, looking at the exhibits

provided today, that some of the documents requested by the plaintiff couldn't have been

produced."

       5The records management policy was protected by a pretrial stipulation. Counsel
did not state on the record the number of years that correspondence would be retained
and instead pointed the trial court to the relevant portion of the written policy.

                                                 14
No. 70756-6-1/15

        The records management policy is not part of the record on appeal,6 so we are

unable to independently review its language. On the record before us, however, it was

not an abuse of discretion to reject the policy as an excuse for nonproduction. The scope
i

and operation of the policy is unclear and unsupported. Avco's attorney declarations and

pleadings do not explain how the policy applies to the "various categories" of documents

requested. Avco did not submit any other evidence, such as employee affidavits, about

how the policy applied to the requested documents and their destruction. As the trial

court noted, it would require a "leap of faith" to conclude that the policy covered the

evidence in question here.

        Avco also committed violations of the contempt order unrelated to its records

Management policy. It failed to comply with Judge Spector's order that it produce and
|
    i

identify by Bates stamp every document that was responsive to every interrogatory or
request for production. Instead, Avco produced and referred to 694 pages of Bates
stamped documents and "other business records."7 The plaintiffs determined that nearly
all ofthe Bates stamped documents were unrelated to the information sought. Avco also
maintained that it made relevant documents available for inspection in Pennsylvania. But,

when Becker's counsel went to Pennsylvania, no responsive documents were identified,

let alone Bates numbered. Counsel was shown a room wherein he estimated that roughly

       6The record on appeal contains nearly 18,000 pages of clerk's papers, our review
of which did not reveal a copy of the records management policy. Neither party cites to
the policy. Avco cites to its trial counsel's declarations, wherein counsel stated that the
policy existed. But, the policy was not attached to those declarations. And, in Avco's
final motion to the trial court, Avco stated that the policy was "provided" to the plaintiffs
and "shown" to the court—not entered into the record.
        7 The "other business records" appear to be over 6,000 pages of Bates stamped
documents that were not specifically identified.

                                                   15
No. 70756-6-1/16

60 boxes were assembled to be searched. He was not permitted to search them at that

time. But, he observed that two of the files were labeled "Moffett," the name of an Avco

0mployee and witness in the case. When counsel was later permitted to review the

documents, he saw that some files—including the Moffett boxes—had been removed.

He determined that the remaining files were unrelated to the discovery inthis case. Judge

Benton found that this was nonresponsive to Judge Spector's order and observed that

there was a "pattern here."

       Failure to comply was even evident with records admittedly in Avco's possession.

The plaintiffs requested a copy of Avco's insurance policy covering their claims against

Avco. Avco had not produced the insurance policy as of the day of trial. When Judge

Benton asked counsel why it had not been produced, counsel identified no impediment

preventing her from doing so. Instead, she responded that she made the policy "available

for inspection" and that it was "sitting in my office."

       Avco did not comply with the original contempt order. On this record, it was not an

abuse for the court to conclude that Avco did not provide a reasonable excuse for its

nonproduction. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the

violation of the discovery order was willful.

       B.    Prejudice

       The trial court found that Avco's "discovery violations caused the Plaintiffs

substantial prejudice in conducting discovery of this case, in preparation for trial and for

trial of this case." As a result of Avco's nonproduction, the court found that: (1) the

plaintiffs were unable to properly depose Avco's liability lay and expert witnesses; (2) the

plaintiffs did not have the requisite documents to present at trial; and (3) the prejudice

                                                   16
No. 70756-6-1/17

was even more pronounced due to Avco's continued contempt over more than 16 months.

These findings are supported by the record.

       In Magana, the trial court likewise sanctioned a defendant for withholding

requested discovery and hindering the plaintiff's ability to present crucial evidence at trial.

See 167 Wn.2d at 581-82. Magana was seriously injured in a car accident and sued the

carmaker, Hyundai, jd. at 576-77. Magana's theory was that there was a design defect

in the car seat, and he sought discovery about other accidents involving that particular

seat design. Id. at 577. Hyundai responded that there were no lawsuits or claims in

connection with that design. Id. at 577-78. At trial, the jury found in favor of Magana and

awarded over $8 million in damages, jd. at 578. Hyundai appealed on an evidentiary

issue and was awarded a retrial solely on the issue of liability, id. at 578-79.

       Prior to the second trial, Magana requested updated discovery about accidents

involving the particular seat design. Id. at 579. When Hyundai resisted, the trial court

Ordered production of all discovery involving consumer complaints and lawsuits involving

allegations of seat back failure. Id. at 580. Hyundai then produced numerous documents

related to seat back failure, including nine reports involving the same model of car in

Magana's accident. Id. at 580. As a sanction, the trial court imposed a default judgment

against Hyundai. Jd. at 581-82. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 593-94.

Regarding the prejudice prong, the court noted that the sole remaining issue was

Hyundai's liability, and Hyundai suppressed evidence relevant to Magana's claims on that

issue. !g\at589.

       Avco maintains that Crews was not prejudiced, because he obtained the sensitive

e-mails from Precision. But, as Crews points out, he was not provided the attachment

                                                  17
No. 70756-6-1/18

referenced in the e-mails. Moreover, based on discovery obtained from Precision as well

as deposition testimony from Avco's own employees, Crews asserted that Avco withheld

multiple other pieces of relevant discovery: reports about Delrin float leaks, information

about a previous Avco accident investigation involving the same model float,

communication between Avco and the FAA regarding the floats, and information about

weekly phone meetings between Precision and Avco about the leaking Delrin floats.

       In Magana, Hyundai produced incident reports 45-75 days prior to retrial, jd. at

579-80. Here the documents were not produced at all. Avco disputes the existence of

the requested discovery. However, the e-mail chain with Precision clearly showed that

some of the discovery sought had existed and would have demonstrated that Avco was

aware of problems with the Delrin floats and had at least some degree of involvement

with them. And, Crews offered evidence—based in part on Avco employee testimony—

that more information was out there.

       Here, as in Magana, the withheld information goes straight to the plaintiff's theory

of liability. The prejudice is at least as great as in Magana.

       The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Avco's discovery violation

prejudiced Crews's preparation for trial and presentation of his case.

       C.   Lesser Sanctions

       The trial court explicitly considered several lesser sanctions. At that time, trial was

beginning, and it was too late to coerce compliance.

       The trial court found that, although monetary damages could compensate Crews,

they would not adequately punish, deter, or educate. This was reasonable. Judge

                                                 18
No. 70756-6-1/19

Spector had imposed monetary sanctions against Avco on three prior occasions8 and

Avco still did not comply with the discovery orders.

       The court also found that limiting Avco's presentation of evidence would not

alleviate the prejudice to Crews in his ability to meet his burden of proof.          Avco's

nonproduction hindered Crews's ability to properly depose witnesses and present

evidence at trial, preventing him from establishing a case against Avco.          Restricting

Avco's evidence would not remedy this harm.

       Instead, the court deemed all plaintiffs' claims admitted, struck all of Avco's

defenses, and awarded punitive damages in an amount to be determined by the jury. The

Stricken defenses included lack of involvement with the carburetor or float, compliance

with federal regulations, the federal statute of repose, comparative fault, the unavailability

of punitive damages, and offset of amounts recovered from other defendants. In addition,

Avco was prohibited from asserting pilot error. The court found that this served to

       advance the important due process goals of insuring fair trials for all
       parties[,] of punishing a party for violations of long standing court orders, of
       deterring other parties from acting as [Avco] has in this case, of educating
       the party litigants, bench, bar, and the public about the importance of
       complying with discovery obligations and court orders, and in compensating
       the parties who are prejudiced by this conduct.

       The trial court made the required consideration of lesser sanctions on the record.

We find that itdid not abuse its discretion in rejecting the claim that lesser sanctions would

be adequate for a fair trial. Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion by determining that

      8 Judge Spector awarded the plaintiffs costs and fees for bringing their motions to
compel and motions for contempt and for responding to Avco's motion to amend or vacate
the contempt orders. Master Kallas ordered Avco to pay $18,683.58 in costs and fees
associated with those motions and further provided that Avco bore the Discovery Master's
expenses for considering the motion for costs and fees.

                                                 19
No. 70756-6-1/20

the focus of the contempt had moved beyond compliance with the contempt order and on

to punishment and deterrence.

       D.   Challenges to Specific Sanction Provisions

       1. Striking Federal Defenses

       Avco asserts that the trial court erred in precluding Avco from asserting its federal

defenses.9 Avco maintains that it did not manufacture or install the carburetor float and

cannot be held liable for the float under federal law.           Essentially, Avco asks us to

determine that, as a matter of law, it was not liable under federal regulations. That

question is not properly before this court. The trial court struck Avco's federal defenses

as a sanction for its discovery violations. Therefore, we do not ask whether the trial court

arrived at the proper legal conclusion, but whether the court acted within its discretion in

imposing the sanction.

       Crews asserted that Avco was liable for a defective and unsafe product and failed

to warn the FAA or aircraft owners and operators, in violation of several federal

regulations. Avco withheld information that it knew aboutthefaulty float before the subject
accident and was involved in communication and investigation as to the defect. This was

relevant to its involvement with the float and its failure to warn and therefore relevant to

its failure to comply with federal regulations. Avco's discovery violations thus prejudiced
the plaintiffs' ability to litigate Avco's liability under the federal regulations. Striking Avco's

        9 Crews asserts that Avco failed to preserve its defenses by failing to respond to
his third amended complaint. But, in Avco's answer to Crews's earlier complaint, it
alleged defenses that were relevant to the claims in Crews's amended complaint. This
was sufficient to preserve the defenses. See Durvea v. Wilson, 135Wn. App. 233, 239,
144 P.3d 318 (2006) (finding defenses preserved where answer to original complaint was
sufficient to indicate grounds on which defendant intended to defend).

                                                    20
No. 70756-6-1/21

federal defenses served to deter such conduct, prevent Avco from benefitting from

withholding the information necessary to prove Crews's case, compensate Crews for the

consequences of withholding that information, and punish Avco.

       This sanction was tailored to Avco's violation and was not an abuse of discretion.10

       2. Striking Comparative Fault Defense

       Avco contends that the trial court abused its discretion in striking Avco's

comparative fault defense. The court found that merely establishing certain facts, such

as Avco's liability, would "still prejudice the plaintiffs in their ability to prove the elements

of their case." The court stated that it would not instruct the jury to determine whether

any other parties are at fault, because it would "prejudice plaintiffs' ability to prove that

[Avco] is solely liable for their injuries and damages." The court further stated that itwould

not instruct the jury on the pilot's fault, because "it would be prejudicial to plaintiff Crews

to ask the juryto compare the negligence or liability of the acts of [Avco] to those of plaintiff

Crews given the discovery violation." Instead, the court instructed the jury that Avco's

violation of federal regulations was a proximate cause of the crash and that Avco was

liable to each plaintiff.

       Avco asserts that this was an abuse of discretion, because the comparative fault

defense was unrelated to the withheld discovery.           Avco maintains that striking this

       10 Furthermore, it is unclear that Avco's federal statute of repose defense is
relevant. Under the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), Pub. L. No. 103-
298, 108 Stat. 1552 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note), manufacturers of general
aviation aircraft and parts are not liable for damages arising out of an accident occurring
18 years or more after the date of delivery of the aircraft to its first purchaser or lessee.
GARA § 2(a)(1). Avco notes that it built and sold the plane's engine in 1978, meaning
the engine is covered by the 18 year period of repose. But, the original engine is not in
question here—it is the replacement carburetor that allegedly failed. The carburetor was
built in 1999. The statute has not triggered as to the carburetor.

                                                   21
No. 70756-6-1/22

defense goes a step further than Magana, where the sole issue was the defendant's

liability. Here, Avco notes, the parties also disputed whether the negligence of other

defendants or the pilot was a proximate cause of the crash.

       Avco is correct that this case is more procedurally complicated than Magana.

Crews sued 11 defendants in total. By the time of trial, Crews had dismissed and/or

settled with many of the defendants. Avco counterclaimed against Crews, alleging pilot

error. Becker named Houston's estate as a defendant, also alleging potential pilot error.

Contrary to Avco's position, however, we find that this complicated posture lends support

for the propriety of striking the comparative fault defense.

       Avco's discovery violations prejudiced Crews's ability to establish Avco's true role

in the plane crash.    This affected the allocation of liability to Avco and among the

defendants. This violation could have allowed the jury to undervalue Avco's portion of

fault. And, establishing pilot negligence could have defeated joint and several liability,

thereby shifting liability away from Avco. See RCW 4.22.070(1 )(b); Kottler v. State, 136

Wn.2d 437, 446-47, 963 P.2d 834 (1998).           Striking the comparative fault defense

prevented Avco from benefitting from its discovery violations in this way.

       Avco challenges the trial court's conclusion that it would have been insufficient to

merely establish Avco's liability, so this sanction was necessary. Crews counters that it

would cause severe prejudice if the jury were to "apportion fault between Houston and

Avco based on a trial solely about Houston's alleged negligence and a one-page

instruction that Avco was liable." It is reasonable, not an abuse of discretion, to accept

that Crews would suffer prejudice ifthe jury heard evidence of pilot error throughout trial,

but evidence of Avco's fault only from a paragraph long jury instruction. Again, this could

                                                22
No. 70756-6-1/23

lead the jury to misallocate fault between Crews and Avco, allowing Avco to benefit from
its discovery violations.

       Avco further maintains that this was not the least severe sanction necessary to

cure any prejudice Crews suffered. But, Fisons instructs us that the trial court should

impose the least severe sanction that is adequate to "serve the purpose of the particular

sanction." 122 Wn.2d at 355-56 (emphasis added). Discovery sanctions serve not only

to compensate, but to educate, punish, and deter. Id. at 356. And, the trial court's choice

of sanction is a matter of discretion—there is no bright line rule dictating which rationale

applies to which violation. Judge Benton stated that she was "truly troubled" by Avco's

conduct, and her rationales for imposing sanctions included "punishing [Avco] for

violations of long standing court orders." On the eve of trial, it was too late for compliance.

Financial sanctions would not adequately compensate Crews.                  Punishment and

deterrence were particularly valid purposes to be served by sanctions.

       It was not an abuse of discretion to strike Avco's comparative fault defense.

       3.   Imposing Punitive Damages

       Avco asserts that the trial court erred in imposing punitive damages. Avco first

argues that it could not be held liable under either Washington or Pennsylvania law. This

question, like Avco's liability under federal law, is not properly before this court. See

supra, at 20-21. This is because the trial court determined Avco's liability by deeming the

pleadings admitted as a sanction for Avco's discovery violations.

       Avco further contends that the trial court failed to perform a choice of law analysis

and determine that Pennsylvania law applies. When the transactions at issue did not all

occur in Washington, the court must determine which state's law applies to the claims.

                                                 23
No. 70756-6-1/24

FutureSelect Portfolio Mgmt., Inc. v. Tremont Grp. Holdings, Inc.. 175 Wn. App. 840, 856,

309 P.3d 555 (2013), affd, 180 Wn.2d 954, 331 P.3d 29 (2014). Here, the trial court

applied Pennsylvania law with respect to punitive damages and did not conduct a formal

choice of law analysis on the record. But, that is not fatal here.

       Crews asserted that Avco committed outrageous and reckless conduct when it

knowingly concealed and withheld its knowledge that the floats were faulty, creating an

unreasonable risk of death or severe injury. Crews further asserted that Pennsylvania

had the most significant contacts with the underlying accident: "[Avco's] principal place of

business i[s] Pennsylvania. . . . [Avco] designs, manufactures, sells, and places into the

stream of commerce reciprocating aircraft engines, including carburetors, and provides

continuing information and services to aircraft owners and operators in support of [Avco]

engines, from its Williamsport, Pennsylvania facilities." Because these allegations were

deemed admitted as a sanction, it was uncontested that Pennsylvania law applied as to

punitive damages.

       This sanction was tailored to Avco's violation. In Pennsylvania, punitive damages

are available "when a person's actions are of such an outrageous nature as to

demonstrate intentional, willful, wanton or reckless conduct." SHV Coal, Inc. v. C'nt'l

Grain Co., 526 Pa. 489, 493, 587 A.2d 702 (1991). Therefore, Crews argued, evidence

of Avco's knowledge about the faulty floats was highly relevant to punitive damages. The

trial court found that Avco's noncompliance substantially prejudiced the plaintiffs'

presentation of evidence on punitive damages at trial. In deeming the pleadings admitted,

the sanction made punitive damages available to be proved. This deprived Avco of the

                                                24
No. 70756-6-1/25

benefit of withholding information about its conduct and compensated Crews for the lack

of that information.

        The trial court did not err in failing to conduct a choice of law analysis. It was not

an abuse of discretion to allow punitive damages under these pleadings as deemed

admitted.

        4.   Denying Offset

        Finally, Avco argues that the trial court erred in denying it an offset of settlement

amounts Crews received from other defendants. Avco asserted offset as an affirmative

defense. The discovery sanctions order struck all defenses. However, after the court

imposed sanctions and after trial, the parties stipulated to a reduction in judgment based

on Crews's settlements with two other defendants.         The trial court then entered final

judgment without providing for the reduction. The court denied Avco's subsequent motion

to amend the judgment to reflect the parties' stipulation.11

        In sanctioning Avco, the court prohibited it from arguing that other parties were at

fault, reasoning that it would prejudice the plaintiffs' ability to prove that Avco was solely

liable. The discovery sanctions order did not provide a separate reason for striking Avco's

offset defense. Having ensured that judgment would be entered against Avco for the full

amount of damages proven, the trial court eliminated benefit to Avco from any willful

withholding of discovery. Crews was entitled to a single recovery. See RCW 4.22.060(2).

Avco was statutorily entitled to have its liability reduced by the amount Crews had already

received. See RCW 4.22.060(2). Denying Avco's statutory right to offset for settlements

        11 As of oral argument, the parties had not filed a partial satisfaction of judgment
to fulfill their stipulation.

                                                 25
No. 70756-6-1/26

with other defendants was not necessary to punish the discovery violation or to protect

the plaintiffs' recovery. The parties recognized this in their posttrial stipulation. We are

persuaded that it was an abuse of discretion to disregard the statute and the parties'

stipulation.

       Because it was an abuse of discretion to deny offset of settlement amounts, we

remand for amendment of the final judgment to reflect any offsets authorized pursuant to

chapter 4.22 RCW. We otherwise affirm.

WE CONCUR:

  s-*_- A.      >Mn+                                   &X.J".

                                                26