732 P.2d 355 (1987)
112 Idaho 386
Bill GILBERT and M. Maxine Gilbert, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants and Cross-Respondents,
v.
CITY OF CALDWELL, A Municipal Corporation of the State of Idaho, Defendant-Respondent, and
Tony Russell Construction, Inc., a foreign corporation authorized to do business within the State of Idaho, Defendant-Respondent and Cross-Appellant.
No. 15990.
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
January 29, 1987.
*357 Wayne E. Davis and Ronald P. Rainey (argued) (Alexanderson, Davis, Rainey, Whitney & Kerrick), Caldwell, for plaintiffs-appellants and cross-respondents, Gilbert.
Charles A. Smyser, Boise, for defendant-respondent, City of Caldwell.
Richard C. Boardman (argued) and Paul S. Penland (Penland & Munther, Chartered), Boise, for defendant-respondent and cross appellant, Tony Russell Construction, Inc.
WALTERS, Chief Judge.
Bill and Marie Gilbert of Caldwell granted an easement to the City of Caldwell to permit a new sewer main to cross their commercial property. They were not satisfied with the reconstruction of the site following installation. Nor were they satisfied with the damages awarded by the district court following trial. Their appeal raises the following issues: (1) whether the district court erred in finding the city was not bound by any promise to restore the Gilberts' property to "as good or better" condition; (2) whether the district court's finding that the Gilberts did not rely upon any such promise is contrary to the evidence; (3) whether the district court erred in characterizing a view of the site by the *358 court as "evidence;" (4) whether only the promisor of a contract is liable to a third-party beneficiary; (5) whether the cost of repairs which would satisfy the intent of the contract, but not comply with contract specifications, was available to the court as a measure of damages in this case; and (6) whether the court erred by denying certain consequential damages and costs. On cross appeal, the contractor  Tony Russell Construction, Inc.  presents an additional issue: whether, for purposes of Idaho's offer of judgment rule, I.R.C.P. 68, the offers of multiple defendants should be compared individually or collectively to the plaintiff's recovery. We affirm the district court's judgment with respect to liability, but remand for a redetermination of certain damages. We affirm the district court's award to the Gilberts of costs accrued after the offers of judgment.
In pursuing the East Cleveland Sewer Project, the City of Caldwell determined that easements across private property were needed. City officials sought the support of the Chamber of Commerce and others for this project. As a result, V.E. Graves, a private citizen, contacted Mr. Gilbert and other property owners to request the donation of certain easements. After making further inquiries of city officials and obtaining special consideration, the Gilberts granted the easement as requested.
The Gilberts' commercial property bordered a thoroughfare in Caldwell. The proposed easement ran along a portion of the front of their property. Although an open drainage ditch lay between the easement and the street on this part of the frontage, the Gilberts were concerned that the construction would interfere with access and parking for businesses then leasing the site from the Gilberts. They also were concerned that the construction might impair future development of the property.
To appease the Gilberts, the city added certain terms to its contract with Tony Russell Construction, Inc. (TRC), the construction contractor. These provisions included limiting construction on the Gilberts' property to non-business hours and to a nine-day period. The city notified the Gilberts that these terms would be included in the city's contract with TRC. After commencing construction TRC determined that construction during non-business hours was impractical. TRC then independently contracted with the Gilberts to permit construction during business hours. Pursuant to this contract, TRC posted a $5000 performance bond with the Gilberts and proceeded with the project. The sewer line was laid in a v-shaped trench approximately five-hundred feet long, twenty feet deep and twelve feet wide at the surface. Approximately one-half of the length of the line lay under a paved access and parking area. The remainder was under an area where one of the Gilberts' tenants, an automobile salvage operation, stored some of its vehicles.
Following installation of the sewer line, the Gilberts were not satisfied with TRC's reconstruction of the site and filed this action. They contended that the backfill in the sewer trench was not compacted as agreed, that the value of their property was reduced, and that they were entitled to additional compensation pursuant to their agreement to permit work during business hours. The Gilberts initially sought over $160,000 in damages on contract and tort theories. The tort claims were voluntarily dismissed, leaving their claims on contract theories of approximately $111,000.
Following a non-jury trial, the district judge found TRC liable for deficiencies in the fill condition. TRC and the city were found jointly and severally liable for interruption of business. The court awarded $4989 to the Gilberts for defective construction and $2000 for construction during four business days beyond the ten days covered by the performance bond. Litigation costs also were awarded to the Gilberts. Finding the damages award unsatisfactory, the Gilberts have appealed.
The Gilberts contend that the city and its contractor breached three separate contracts. The first was a contract between the city and the Gilberts, part oral and part written, which allegedly arose from statements *359 made by Graves and city officials, and from letters and memoranda delivered to the Gilberts by the city (City-Gilbert contract). The second was a written project contract between the city and TRC with benefits running to the Gilberts as third-party beneficiaries (TRC-City contract). The third contract was a written agreement between TRC and the Gilberts permitting construction during business hours (TRC-Gilbert contract).
The district court found that Graves was not an agent of the city, that in any case the Gilberts did not rely on any oral promises, and that any such statements were of a general nature and did not rise to the level of contractual promises. Therefore, the court denied recovery on the alleged oral part of the City-Gilbert contract. The trial court held the city was liable only on its written promises, specifically its promise to limit its contractor to a nine-day period of non-business hours on the site. The court found in favor of the Gilberts on their TRC-City and TRC-Gilbert contract theories. We address each of the Gilberts' contract theories in turn.

I

A. The City  Gilbert Contract
We must first determine the particulars of any contract existing between the city and the Gilberts. The Gilberts contend that Graves, Mayor McCluskey, and other agents of the city, guaranteed that the property would be restored to "as good or better" condition after laying the sewer line. They argue that the easement was granted in reliance upon or as consideration for performance of this promise. The Gilberts also contend that a written report prepared by the city engineer, which accompanied a letter from the mayor's administrative assistant, included promises to limit the construction period and hours, and to replace natural gas lines, fences and pavement.
Uncontradicted evidence indicates that the construction disturbed a layer of "hard-pan," a highly compacted bed of soil located below the surface. The parties' experts agreed that such a layer can be created only by geologic processes and cannot be recreated by man. The Gilberts assert that the replacement fill is not as suitable for present or contemplated uses of the site as were the natural soils.
The district court found that Graves was a volunteer, not an agent of the city, and thus the city would not be bound by any statement or guarantee made by Graves. The court rejected a promissory estoppel theory urged by the Gilberts, finding no reliance on Graves' statements by the Gilberts. In addition, the court found that any "as good as" statements by the mayor or by others were of a general nature and were not contractual commitments. The court therefore limited liability under the City-Gilbert contract to damages arising from those promises made by city officials and reduced to writing.

i. Authority of Graves
The Gilberts contend the court erred in concluding that Graves was a volunteer, rather than an agent of the city. We believe this issue is subsumed into the question next to be addressed. That is, whether the Gilberts' contract with the city included oral promises made either by Graves or by city officials, or whether that contract was expressed solely by written documents. If, as we do conclude, the writings  rather than oral promises  express the terms of the contract, then it is immaterial whether Graves was an agent of the city.

ii. Oral statements by Graves and by city officials
The mayor and other city officials were clearly agents of the city possessing actual authority to enter into contracts. But proving the authority of an agent does not by itself establish the existence of a contract. Formation of the contract must also be proved.
There must be a meeting of the minds of the parties for a contract to be formed. Pierson v. Sewell, 97 Idaho 38, *360 539 P.2d 590 (1975). Whether there was a meeting of the minds as to the essential terms of the contract is a determination for the trier of fact. Rasmussen v. Martin, 104 Idaho 401, 659 P.2d 155 (Ct.App. 1983). To be enforceable, a contract must embody a distinct understanding of the parties. Dursteler v. Dursteler, 108 Idaho 230, 697 P.2d 1244 (Ct.App. 1985). The city contended, and the district court found, that the city officials' oral statements, and implicitly those of Graves, were not of the kind to constitute contractual promises, but instead were intended merely as encouragement. The court found the written promises of the city to be the specific provisions intended to address the Gilberts' concerns.
Prior to granting the easement the Gilberts contacted various city officials to obtain additional details concerning the project. The city responded through an administrative assistant's letter and a city engineer's report. The administrative assistant's letter informed Mr. Gilbert:
[T]he City of Caldwell will agree to the following considerations:
1. The part of the construction involving excavation, pipelaying, backfilling and paving shall be done during off-business hours. Access will be provided to all businesses during business hours. The period of construction will be limited to 9 calendar days and the construction will also include the replacement of the pavement according to specifications with a one-year warranty. No sealcoat is anticipated.
2. The contractor shall cooperate with the Gas Company to remove and replace the gasline shown on Sheet 13 of the plans within the above-defined 9 calendar day period such that all below-ground surface work shall be done before paving.
3. The contractor will be required to remove and replace all fences in like kind.
4. The City will provide a forklift and operator to relocate inventory, if required.
5. A 6-inch stubout will be left in manholes No. 1642 and 1643. A 6-inch stubout will also be left in the line at a point 10 feet west of the existing building (Gilbert's Auto Body).
The engineer's report included additional details and described structure prohibitions imposed by the easement, access provisions, applicability of relocation assistance, surfacing specifications, pavement base materials and other paving standards. Terms specifically limiting construction to non-business hours and to a nine-day period on the Gilberts' property were added to the city's contract with TRC. The city also referred the Gilberts to the TRC-City contract specifications regarding pavement replacement and fence removal and replacement. Only then, three months after Graves first contacted them, did the Gilberts grant the easement.
In the district court's opinion, the earlier "as good as" oral statements were intended merely as indications of a hope or expectation and not as contractual commitments. The district court found that the promises which were reduced to writing constituted the only consideration bestowed by the city in any City-Gilbert contract. The court implicitly found that the Gilberts' failed to carry their burden of proving an oral agreement between the city and the Gilberts to specifically restore the site to "as good or better" condition. This finding is not contrary to the evidence in the record.

iii. Reliance on oral statements
In the alternative, the Gilberts argue that the city is estopped from denying such promises. The Gilberts' contend they relied to their detriment upon the "as good as" promises. They contend they relied upon the representation by city officials that their concerns would be taken care of, and so did not examine the details of the TRC-City contract. The district court found no reliance on "as good as" promises.
The doctrine of promissory estoppel requires reliance upon a specific promise. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF *361 CONTRACTS § 98 (1979) (hereinafter SECOND RESTATEMENT). A party seeking to avail itself of the doctrine of promissory estoppel must show that:
(1) the detriment suffered in reliance was substantial in an economic sense; (2) substantial loss to the promisee acting in reliance was or should have been foreseeable by the promisor; and (3) the promisee must have acted reasonably in justifiable reliance on the promise as made.
Mohr v. Shultz, 86 Idaho 531, 540, 388 P.2d 1002, 1008 (1964).
The district court evidently did not accept Bill Gilbert's testimony that the easement was granted in reliance on the alleged "as good as" promises. Instead, the court focused upon the more specific provisions of the written documents and the TRC-City contract as the more likely basis for the grant of the easement. The district court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and to judge their credibility. The court's determination that the easement was granted in exchange for specific written promises, rather than in reliance on general oral promises, is supported by the evidence. We affirm the district court's conclusion that any City-Gilbert contract was limited to the terms of the written memorandum of the city engineer and the administrative assistant's letter.

B. The TRC  City Contract
We turn next to the contract between the city and TRC. The evidence clearly established that certain terms were included in the TRC-City contract to protect the Gilberts. The Gilberts' right to claim this protection as a third-party beneficiary has not been contested. This contract provided that work on the Gilberts' property would only be conducted during non-business hours and would be completed in nine days. Of course, the contract also included terms applicable to the entire project. Of special interest in this case, it required compaction of the backfill material to 95% of a laboratory maximum in paved areas, such as the Gilberts' parking lot, and to 85% of maximum in other areas, such as the Gilberts' storage area. Apparently these compaction standards were not called to the Gilberts' attention prior to the easement being granted.
Experts for both sides testified that their respective tests of the site indicated that the fill was not compacted to the specified densities. These tests indicated that throughout the length of the trench the soil compaction fell from three to twelve percent below the density specifications in the contract. Only near the surface did the density approach the required standard. The parties disagree regarding the significance of these deviations.
The Gilberts' evidence indicated that the variance from the specifications resulted from the contractor's use of water-jet compaction techniques instead of a mechanical compaction process as called for in the contract. They presented expert testimony and documentary evidence indicating that some settling had occurred and that more  up to a maximum of eight inches  was inevitable. The defendants' expert also inspected the site. He testified that the limited settling of one or two inches, thus far, indicated that any future settling would be minimal.
The Gilberts ask that we find error in the trial judge's failure to accept the conclusions of their allegedly "better-qualified" expert. Whether soil compaction is defective and whether such defects have or will result in injury to the plaintiff are primarily questions of fact. Cf. City of Wahpeton v. Drake-Henne, Inc., 228 N.W.2d 324 (N.D. 1975) (evidence found to support damage award). The weight of expert testimony is uniquely a matter for determination by the fact-finder. Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 644 P.2d 1333 (1982). The opinion of an expert is not binding on the trier of fact and may be rejected, provided the trier of fact does not act arbitrarily. Id. The defendants' expert opined that any additional settling would be minimal. The trial court found the defendants' expert more credible. We decline to usurp the trial court's function in that regard.

*362 i. Measure of damages

Nonetheless, the district court did find that failure to meet the specified densities was a breach of the contract and that an injury to the Gilberts had resulted. The court found that some improvements near the surface were necessary to correct surface softness problems resulting from the defective performance. Concluding that recompaction of the entire volume of the trench was unnecessary to make the plaintiff whole, the court awarded $4989 as the cost of eliminating surface softness in the unpaved area. This remedy and its cost were derived from the defendants' evidence.
The Gilberts argue that, upon finding defective construction, the only remedy available to the court was to award the cost of correcting the defect by recompacting the entirety of the trench, or at least the upper five to nine feet if no buildings were to be constructed on the site. The Gilberts' counsel apparently assumed that the cost of the defendants' correction method, which would not result in compliance with the specifications, was a suitable measure of damages only if the defendants proved the Gilberts' correction method to be an "economic waste." Therefore, in rebuttal, the Gilberts offered evidence of the effect on the property's value. The defendants objected. They argued that this evidence related to a new issue and was improper on rebuttal. Defendants' counsel contended that they were not relying upon any "economic waste" in full restoration as a basis for resorting to an alternative measure of damages. The court accepted this proposition and sustained the objection. The Gilberts did not otherwise attempt to rebut the sufficiency of TRC's repair method. All parties agree that TRC's compaction method will not result in strict compliance with the compaction standards. The district court made no specific finding regarding economic waste.
The Gilberts do not claim error in the trial court's refusal to admit this evidence. Instead they rely upon 1 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 346 (1932) (hereinafter FIRST RESTATEMENT) and an alleged "waiver" to establish an error by the district court in resorting to this measure of damages.
Section 346 reads in part:
Damages for Breach of a Construction Contract.
"(1) For a breach by one who has contracted to construct a specified product, the other party can get judgment for compensatory damages for all unavoidable harm that the builder had reason to foresee when the contract was made, ... determined as follows:
(a) For defective or unfinished construction he can get judgment for either (i) the reasonable cost of construction and completion in accordance with the contract, if this is possible and does not involve unreasonable economic waste; or
(ii) the difference between the value that the product contracted for would have had and the value of the performance that has been received by the plaintiff, if construction and completion in accordance with the contract would involve unreasonable economic waste. [Emphasis added.]
FIRST RESTATEMENT § 346.
In similar cases, our Supreme Court has cited Section 346 of the FIRST RESTATEMENT with approval. E.g., Jensen v. Bledsoe, 100 Idaho 84, 593 P.2d 988 (1979); Hunt Bros. Constr., Inc. v. Wolcott, 99 Idaho 241, 580 P.2d 418 (1978); Hafer v. Horn, 95 Idaho 621, 515 P.2d 1013 (1973).
TRC and the city contend that the district court did select a cost of completion or repair as the measure of damages. Their expert testified that replacing and recompacting the top eighteen inches of the unpaved area would yield a base strong enough to bear most traffic loads. The defendants introduced evidence of the cost of this repair method. We agree that the trial court did not resort to a difference-invalue measure. However, neither did the court apply the cost of completion in accordance with the contract.
*363 Ordinarily, where a contract calls for achieving specific standards, strict compliance with those standards is required. A contractor is required to perform in accordance with plans and specifications. Cf. Puget Sound Nat. Bank v. C.B. Lauch Constr. Co., 73 Idaho 68, 245 P.2d 800 (1952) (compliance with plans held to release contractor from fitness warranty). Substantial performance is performance which despite deviation or omission provides the important and essential benefits of the contract to the promisee. ID.J.I. 609; see also Nelson v. Hazel, 89 Idaho 480, 406 P.2d 138 (1965). Substantial performance will permit a contractor to recover on a contract, but it does not bar recovery by the promisee or a set-off for failure to strictly comply with the contract. See Mackey v. Eva, 80 Idaho 260, 328 P.2d 66 (1958). "It must be remembered that substantial performance is not full performance and that the party who relies on this doctrine has breached his contract. Consequently, he is liable in damages to the aggrieved party." [Footnote omitted.] J. CALAMARI AND J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed.) § 11-22 (1977).
Here, the contract provided that compaction was to be tested in a certain manner. The measure of costs to correct defects would ordinarily be the cost of bringing the project or structure into compliance with those standards. The trial court awarded damages based upon the cost of the defendants' alternate method of repair, finding it would achieve the "ultimate goal intended to be achieved by the plans and specifications." However, the court did not indicate whether it found this goal to be providing a site suitable for only present uses, suitable for present and contemplated future uses of the site, or "as good as" before construction. The Gilberts argue that the court could not resort to this measure of damages without finding that a repair resulting in compliance with specification would be an economic waste.
TRC argues that § 348 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1979) (hereinafter SECOND RESTATEMENT) is the modern formulation of damages in defective or incomplete construction cases and that it would permit this alternative measure. Under § 347 of the SECOND RESTATEMENT the loss in value to the injured party is the ordinary measure of damages for breach. Neither party attempted to prove the lost value. Where lost value is not proven, damages may be measured by the "reasonable cost of completion or of remedying the defects if that cost is not clearly disproportionate to the probable loss in value to [the injured party]." SECOND RESTATEMENT § 348(2)(b).
Sometimes, however, such a large part of the cost to remedy the defects consists of the cost to undo what has been improperly done that the cost to remedy the defects will be clearly disproportionate to the probable loss in value to the injured party. Damages based on the cost to remedy the defects would then give the injured party a recovery greatly in excess of the loss in value to him and result in a substantial windfall. Such an award will not be made. It is sometimes said that the award would involve "economic waste," but this is a misleading expression since an injured party will not, even if awarded an excessive amount of damages, usually pay to have the defects remedied if to do so will cost him more than the resulting increase in value to him. If an award based on the cost to remedy the defects would clearly be excessive and the injured party does not prove the actual loss in value to him, damages will be based instead on the difference between the market price that the property would have had without the defects and the market price of the property with the defects. This diminution in market price is the least possible loss in value to the injured party, since he could always sell the property on the market even if it had no special value to him.
SECOND RESTATEMENT § 348 comment c (1979).
Thus, in simplified form, under the FIRST RESTATEMENT the appropriate measure of damages is the cost of repair, *364 unless such would be an economic waste, in which case resort may be had to the value of the product contracted for less the value of the product actually constructed. Under the SECOND RESTATEMENT the ordinary measure is the loss in value; but if this loss is not proven (as in this case), the court should resort to the cost of completion or repairs unless such would be disproportionate to the "probable" loss in value.
It could be argued that the cost of a satisfactory, less costly repair method would approximate any lost value. However, when the Gilberts attempted to rebut any claim of economic waste the city's counsel objected and stated that neither the city nor TRC was relying on economic waste to invoke a diminution-in-value measure of damages. As noted, the objection was sustained. Clearly, the court did not resort to a FIRST RESTATEMENT § 346, lost-value measure.
Thus, we are asked to decide whether, absent an explicit finding of economic waste or disproportionality, a trial court may select the cost of an alternative method of repair, which would produce a result not strictly complying with the contract. "In an action for breach of contract, only such damages will be allowed as fairly compensate the injured party for his loss." Nelson v. Hazel, 91 Idaho 850, 851, 433 P.2d 120, 121 (1967). For breach of contract the law of damages seeks to place the aggrieved party in the same economic position he would have had if the contract had been performed. CALAMARI AND PERILLO, supra, § 14-4. Clearly, the cost of an alternative method of repair resulting in a comparable result may be appropriate where strict conformance with the contract would invite unreasonable economic waste. D. Federico Co. v. New Bedford Redevelopment Authority, 723 F.2d 122 (1st Cir.1983).
Various measures of damages have been applied where a construction contract breach results in a defective product. See generally, Annotation, Damages  Breach of Construction Contract, 41 A.L.R.4th 131 (1985); D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 1221 (1973); Farnsworth, Legal Remedies For A Breach Of Contract, 70 Colum.L.Rev. 1145 (1970).
The aim in assessing damages for deficiencies in performance should be to put the injured party in substantially as good a position as performance in accordance with the contract. The law recognizes, however, that sometimes actual reconstruction in compliance with the plans and specifications of the contract may be possible only at a cost that would be imprudent and unreasonable. Restatement of Contracts § 46, comment b at 574 (1932); A Corbin, Contracts § 1089, at 486-87 (1964). In such cases, the court should consider alternative measures of recoupment which will substantially compensate the injured party for the deficiency in a less economically wasteful manner. [Emphasis added.]
Alaska State Housing Authority v. Walsh & Co., Inc., 625 P.2d 831, 837 (Alaska 1980). "The crux of the determination of which measure of damages to apply is therefore the proportionality of the cost to the corresponding benefits." Eastlake Const. Co., Inc. v. Hess, 102 Wash.2d 30, 686 P.2d 465, 473 (1984).
Ordinarily the correct measure in a contract claim would be the expectation interest, in this case being the cost of repair to comply with the specifications. "There is no general license to install whatever, in the builder's judgment, may be regarded as `just as good.'" Jacobs & Youngs v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (1921). "The courts never say that one who makes a contract fills the measure of his duty by less than full performance." Id. 129 N.E. at 890. Therefore, ordinarily the cost-of-repair measure of damages should reflect a method of repair that would result in strict or full compliance with the terms of the contract.
Although a less costly alternative may be appropriate in some cases, we are convinced it should not be the measure of damages unless it has been shown that *365 the ordinary measure would be disproportionate to the loss in value or to the benefits of full repair, i.e. economically wasteful or result in a windfall to the injured party. See FIRST RESTATEMENT § 346; SECOND RESTATEMENT § 348(2). A finding permitting an alternate measure of damages should be specifically stated. See I.R.C.P. 52(a). A lack of findings may be disregarded by the appellate court only if the record is clear and yields an obvious answer to the relevant factual question. See Donndelinger v. Donndelinger, 107 Idaho 431, 690 P.2d 366 (Ct.App. 1984). We do not find this record to clearly yield a finding of economic waste or disproportionately. Thus we remand to the trial court for reconsideration in light of this opinion. The trial court may take additional argument and evidence as deemed necessary to determine the appropriate measure of damages.
The Gilberts also contend that this repair method will not correct violations of federal natural gas line compaction standards. Although the presence of the gas line was noted at trial, whether these standards were applicable and violated was not an issue. To the extent that this matter is relevant to the cost-benefit proportion of Gilberts' repair method, the trial court in its discretion may permit additional evidence on this factor.
Finally, the Gilberts suggest that a lesser damages measure could not be applied because the breach was willful and intentional. A willful breach may bar recovery by a substantially-performing contractor. See generally 13 AM.JUR.2d Building and Construction Contracts § 42 (1964); Annotation, Damages  Breach of Construction Contracts, 41 A.L.R.4th 131, § 32 (1985). Here, however, the contractor is not seeking to recover. Thus this rule is not applicable.

ii. Additional damages
The Gilberts assert other inadequacies in the damages. In particular, they point to the trial court's award of only $166 for repairing eroded new pavement along the drainage ditch, and to no award for the failure of the contractor to seal the new and old pavement joint or for the cost of soil compaction testing.
Whether the eroded pavement was in an area not originally paved, and thus not required to be paved, was a matter of controversy. The district judge awarded damages on the basis of refilling, but not repaving, this area. Apparently the Gilberts did not satisfactorily prove a duty to repave this portion of the property. This finding is not clearly erroneous and will not be disturbed.
The court did not award any damages for the cost of testing the soil compaction. The compaction tests were conducted by the Gilberts in preparation for trial. An award of "discretionary costs" such as these are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. See I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D). In reviewing the record we find that the Gilberts claimed this expense in their complaint, but did not renew it in their memorandum of costs. Apparently these expenses were incurred in anticipation of litigation. The court did not address this claim, either in its findings of fact or its order regarding costs. We are unable to determine why these alleged consequential damages or costs were denied. On remand, the court is directed to enter findings and conclusions regarding this claim.
The Gilberts also assert that TRC failed to seal the joint between the new and old pavement, thus permitting moisture to enter. The district court did not address this claim. It should be considered on remand.

iii. Liability
The Gilberts contend that the city, as well as TRC, should have been held liable for defective performance. Whether the promisee may be held liable to a third-party beneficiary turns upon the beneficiary's status. A donee beneficiary, of course, has no rights against the promisee, except where the promisee has received consideration to discharge the promisor. J. CALAMARI AND J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 17-10 (2d. ed. 1977). *366 A creditor beneficiary on the other hand, may also sue the promisee upon the original obligation, unless it is extinguished by an express novation. Id. As discussed above, the district judge found the underlying antecedent duty of the city to restore Gilberts' property to be limited to those written promises contained in reports and letters delivered to the Gilberts. These writings did not address the backfill standards. Thus the trial court did not err in concluding that only TRC, as promisor, was contractually liable for the defective backfill.
The district court also found that the Gilberts failed to prove any inadequacy in the specifications. This finding is not contrary to the record. The parties' experts seemed to agree that the plans and specifications were adequate for most purposes. This alternative theory of liability was not a substantial subject of litigation. We find no error in the district court's conclusion that the Gilberts failed to carry their burden of proof on this point.

C. The TRC  Gilbert Contract
When TRC decided that construction during non-business hours was impractical, TRC contracted directly with the Gilberts to permit construction during business hours. All parties concede that the "non-business hours" provision of the TRC-City contract could be waived by the Gilberts. The TRC-Gilbert agreement provided for TRC to post a $5000 bond with Bill Gilbert, to be distributed to Gilbert's two tenants at the rate of $250 each per day of construction on the site. Any remaining funds were to be returned to TRC. Unfortunately, TRC required more than ten days to complete the construction on the Gilbert property. The trial judge found that construction on the site during business hours continued for fourteen days and thus an additional $2000 was due the Gilberts.
The Gilberts argue that the record does not support a finding of only fourteen days of business obstruction. They contend that, at minimum, the construction continued for sixteen business days. The record shows that trenching on the Gilberts' property began on Thursday, October 22. The TRC-Gilbert contract expressly began to run on Monday, October 26. Paving was completed on Thursday, November 12, eighteen calendar days later. Arguably, this contract waived any claim for damages before October 26. Bill Gilbert testified that the businesses on his property were open on Saturdays. This evidence was not contradicted. Although the contract did not define business days, apparently the trial judge counted only Monday through Friday. The Gilberts argue that Saturdays should have been included. On its face the agreement was to permit construction "during business hours" with compensation at the rate of $500 per day "until completion of said project." From our review of the record we are unable to ascertain a basis for the exclusion of Saturdays. We therefore find it necessary to remand the case for clarification or amendment of the trial court's findings and judgment regarding the number of days to be compensated under the TRC-Gilbert contract.
The Gilberts also seek compensation for breach of the nine-day limit in the TRC-City contract. The trial court did not specifically address this claim in its findings and conclusions. This clause, as well as the non-business hours provision, may have been superceded or waived by the TRC-Gilbert contract. In any case the later arrangement could be found to provide the appropriate measure of damages for business obstruction. As this action is being remanded for clarification of the "non-business hours" claim, we also direct the trial court to determine whether the Gilberts are entitled to any damages for breach of the nine-day limit.

II

View as "Evidence"
With the consent of the parties, the trial judge conducted a view of the site in question. Later, in deciding this case, the district judge at one point in his findings characterized this view as "evidence." At other points he refers to the evidence *367 and to his observation of the site. The Gilberts contend that the court erred in characterizing this view as "evidence." It is well settled that a trial court, sitting without a jury, has discretion to view a site in order to evaluate and apply the evidence submitted. Lobdell v. State, 89 Idaho 559, 407 P.2d 135 (1965). A view of the premises may not supply a want of evidence and is not of itself evidence upon which a verdict may be based. Tyson Creek R.R. v. Empire Mill Co., 31 Idaho 580, 174 Pac. 1004 (1918). Generally, a view is not characterized as evidence because, unlike real, testimonial and documentary evidence, it cannot be included in the record. We note that this distinction has been subject to attack. See E. CLEARY, McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 216 (3rd Ed. 1984). The defendants ask us to adopt the approach that a "view" may constitute evidence. However, we find it unnecessary to make that determination. Even if the trial court erroneously considered its view of the premises as "evidence," if we disregard that "evidence" there otherwise remains substantial and competent evidence to support the trial court's findings. We conclude that the court's misstatement concerning the view as evidence was harmless error, not affecting the substantial rights of the parties. I.R.C.P. 61.

III

Costs

A. Rule 68 Offers
The trial court awarded costs to the Gilberts as prevailing parties. On cross appeal, TRC contends that a portion of this award is barred by I.R.C.P. 68. This rule provides that "[i]f the judgment, including attorney fees and costs, finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs, as allowed under Rule 54(d)(1), incurred after the making of the offer." To be effective, an offer must be made more than ten days "before the trial begins." I.R.C.P. 68. On November 30, 1984, TRC and the City offered settlements of $7500 and $2500, respectively. Apparently both of these offers were delivered by the city's counsel to the Gilberts. The offers were not expressly a "joint offer." It appears the Gilberts were free to accept or reject each offer independently. They chose to reject both.
Trial was scheduled for December 10, but on December 7 the parties agreed to "continue" the trial to December 12. Also, on December 7, the trial court found the tendered offers to be untimely, concluding that the last minute delay of commencement of trial should not provide an extension of the period for Rule 68 offers. The court grounded its conclusion on "fundamental fairness." As noted, the Gilberts ultimately were awarded $6989, plus I.R.C.P. 54 costs of $874 through November 30. TRC was held liable, either individually or jointly, for the entire amount.
Initially, we examine the trial court's reason for denying application of Rule 68. With regard to cost recovery our rule is identical to the federal rule. This rule is designed to encourage settlement and to avoid the expense and time of unnecessary trials. Cf. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 12 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3001 (1973) (on federal rule). The question of when the trial "begins" for purposes of the federal rule was examined in Greenwood v. Stevenson, 88 F.R.D. 225 (D.R.I. 1980). In Greenwood, a jury was selected and impanelled on April 2, 1980, but, because of the exigencies of pending criminal cases, a "trial date" of June 1 was anticipated. The defendants' offers of settlement were made on May 21, 1980. The plaintiff then sought to avoid the application of F.R.Civ.P. 68, arguing the defendants' offers were not timely. The court disagreed. The court reasoned that the settlement-encouraging purpose of the rule would best be served by selecting the last possible point in time for cutting off Rule 68 offers. The court held that the trial "begins" when the trial judge calls the proceedings to order and actually commences to hear the case, and not when the jury was selected previous to that time. Here, the initial trial date was "continued" at the same time that the timeliness motion *368 was decided. But the trial did not begin until twelve days after the offer was made. Applying our rule literally, and, in accord with Greenwood, we hold that the November 30 offers were timely.
However, as the Gilberts point out, TRC was adjudged liable for an amount slightly greater than its individual offer. TRC counters that, had the Gilberts accepted both offers, the Gilberts would have been in a more favorable position than was ultimately obtained. Thus, we are confronted next with whether  in cases involving multiple defendants  Idaho's Rule 68 should be read to compare (a) independent offers with a particular party's ultimate liability, or (b) collective offers with the total recovery.
Charles Wright and Arthur Miller suggest that one purpose of the federal rule is to protect the party making the offer. See 12 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3001 (1973). Rule 68, as formulated, compares "the judgment" and "the offer." Ordinarily a defendant should not be permitted to point to the offers of others for protection from prospective cost recovery. Therefore, we believe Rule 68 should be read to test the offer and recovery from each party independently.[1] Only if its own offer exceeded its individual liability can the particular defendant be said to have made a fair offer. We believe this interpretation will forward the rule's policy of encouraging fair and reasonable settlement offers by each party. Here, TRC was ultimately held liable for more than the $7500 it offered. Therefore, with respect to TRC, the Gilberts' position after trial was more favorable than if TRC's offer had been accepted.

B. Prevailing Party
In the alternative, TRC contends that the Gilberts were not the `prevailing party' for purposes of Rule 54(d)(1). TRC notes that the Gilberts originally sought over $160,000 on various claims and only recovered slightly more than $7500. We are not persuaded.
The determination of who is the prevailing party is committed to the trial court's sound discretion. Decker v. Homeguard Systems, 105 Idaho 158, 666 P.2d 1169 (Ct.App. 1983). When more than one party prevails  even in part  the trial court may determine which of them has prevailed for purposes of awarding costs. McGill v. Lester, 108 Idaho 561, 700 P.2d 964 (Ct.App. 1985). Here certain claims sounding in tort were voluntarily dismissed by the Gilberts. They then prevailed at trial on a contract theory. The recovery was limited only because the trial court adopted an alternative measure of damage. TRC cites cases of limited or nominal recovery for the proposition that a recovering party is not always the prevailing party. E.g., Yellow Pine Water User's Ass'n v. Imel, 105 Idaho 349, 670 P.2d 54 (1983). These cases do not suggest to us that the trial court in this case abused its discretion in deeming the Gilberts the prevailing party with respect to TRC. On remand, the Gilberts' recovery may be increased, but will not be reduced. Therefore, the award of costs is affirmed.

IV

Conclusion
In summary, we affirm the district court's finding that there was no binding oral agreement by statements of Graves or city officials to return the property to "as good or better" condition. The Gilberts' contract with the city was properly limited to the writings. The court's denial of damages for eroded pavement is also affirmed. The district court's award to the Gilberts of costs subsequent to offers of settlement is affirmed. The court's characterization of the view as evidence is deemed harmless error. The court's conclusions regarding *369 the liability of each defendant under the respective contracts are affirmed.
Our remand of the case relates to the amount of damages only. With respect to the measure of damages for breach by TRC of its contract with the city, we hold that the court erred by applying the defendants' measure of damages without a finding of economic waste or disproportionate cost. We remand for additional findings and possible modification of the award consistent with this opinion. On remand the court is also directed to address the Gilberts' claims for cost-of-testing and for sealing the pavement joint. We remand for findings and possible modification of the judgment with respect to the amount of TRC's liability pursuant to the TRC-Gilbert contract to compensate the Gilberts for construction during business hours. The court is also directed to clarify its findings regarding the nine-day period limitation. The district court may take additional evidence as directed and as deemed necessary. Finally, to the extent that any award of damages on remand embodies amounts previously awarded, the court should allow interest on those amounts at the statutory rate applicable to judgments, from the date of the original judgment. Any additional damages awarded as a result of this remand should bear interest from the date of the new judgment. Because we find each party to prevail in part on appeal, we decline to award fees or costs on appeal.
BURNETT and SWANSTROM, JJ., concur.
NOTES
[1]  Our result would be different had TRC and the city expressly made a joint, unapportioned offer of settlement, which could only be accepted or rejected in total by the Gilberts. In such a case, the collective offers may properly be compared to the total recovery. E.g. Johnston v. Penrod Drilling Co., 803 F.2d 867 (5th Cir.1986) (applying federal rule).


259 Ga. 325 (1989)
381 S.E.2d 30
VAUGHN
v.
THE STATE.
46381.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Decided July 11, 1989.
Long, Aldridge & Norman, Albert G. Norman, Jr., Bruce P. Brown, Simmons, Ballard & Thompson, Steven H. Ballard, for appellant.
Robert E. Keller, District Attorney, Clifford A. Sticher, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, V. Robert Denham, Jennifer Falk Weiss, Paul Vancil, Charles C. Olson, Terrence B. Adamson, amici curiae.
PER CURIAM.
William Glenn Vaughn was found in contempt of an order of Clayton Superior Court and sentenced to ten days in jail, probated on the condition he perform one hundred hours of community service. Vaughn appeals.
According to the facts found by the trial court the June 29, 1988 edition of the Clayton News/Daily published an article by "Billy" Vaughn entitled, "Confessions Of A Dope Dealer." An editorial note indicated the story was that of a drug dealer whose identity was disguised through the use of the fictitious name "Carlos" but otherwise true. The note went on to state the article was published to inform the public of the seriousness of the problem of drug trafficking in the county.
Vaughn claimed he interviewed Carlos under a promise of confidentiality. Carlos told him that he sells more than one hundred pounds of marijuana per month and can make "almost $5,000 in 45 minutes" and that "it's a hell of a business." He told of his source of illegal substances and his marketing techniques.
Vaughn was subpoenaed before the Grand Jury of Clayton County to testify in a case identified by an indictment against "Carlos (Last Name Unknown)." When Vaughn testified about some matters but refused to identify Carlos he was taken before a judge of the Superior Court for a hearing. After the hearing the judge found no state *326 or federal constitutional or other protection for Vaughn under the circumstances and ordered him to go back before the grand jury and identify Carlos. When Vaughn refused he was held in contempt.
1. Vaughn contends he has a right under the constitutions of the United States and of the State of Georgia to refuse to disclose the identity of his informant. He asserts the guaranty of freedom of the press affords him a newsgatherer's right not to disclose a confidential news source. We observe that the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal Constitution to the contrary in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665 (92 SC 2646, 33 LE2d 626) (1972). We decline to interpret the Constitution of Georgia to afford any greater right and therefore find no protection under these circumstances.
2. Vaughn also contends the grand jury lacked power to compel him to testify because it did not have a sufficient indictment before it. It was insufficient according to Vaughn because no person was named as the accused, only "Carlos (Last Name Unknown)." OCGA §§ 15-12-71 & 74. We do not interpret In re Lester, 77 Ga. 143, 147 (1886), to preclude the action of the grand jury in this case. That opinion holds that a grand jury may not force a person to come before it for a fishing expedition into the general knowledge of criminal activity known by him but may only proceed in a particular case where a party is charged with a specific offense. Here there is a particular case against a certain individual whose correct name is unknown to the grand jury. We hold this constituted a sufficient matter before the grand jury and authorized a subpoena for Vaughn's testimony.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Hunt, J., who concurs specially, and Gregory, J., who dissents. Weltner, J., disqualified.
HUNT, Justice, concurring specially.
I agree with the majority that the judgment in this case should be affirmed. I do not agree, however, that, in some other case, the principles outlined by Justice Gregory in his dissent might not create, for some other defendant, an immunity from the compulsion to testify.
Additionally, I write to commend Justice Gregory for the careful and original thought he has devoted to this vexing area of the law. Were I convinced that the information that the grand jury was seeking from the defendant was, indeed, within the realm of ideas rather than of factual detail, I would be inclined to join in the dissent.
GREGORY, Justice, dissenting.
According to the Georgia Constitution "[n]o law shall be passed to curtail or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press." Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. V. We are asked to decide whether *327 this proscription is violated by laws[1] construed to allow a grand jury to subpoena a newspaper reporter and, when he refuses to divulge the identity of a person who was the source for a published article revealing information about the drug scene in the locale, allow a judge to hold the reporter in contempt and order his punishment.
The facts (as reported in the majority opinion) are very important to this opinion because it does not undertake the task of deciding whether a "reporter's privilege" exists.[2] It is not construing a mere statutory or common law privilege, but constitutional rights. It considers only the fifth paragraph of the bill of rights embodied in the Georgia Constitution, rights of all citizens, and decides if the laws in question as applied to the facts violate its bidding. If the result tends to carve out an area of privilege against compelled testimony beneficial to those citizens who report in the press, so be it.
1. Though a profusion of writing exists on the subject generally, I will set forth a brief sketch of my view of the mission of the guarantees of freedom of speech and the press under the Georgia Constitution relating to the present inquiry.
Under our system of government sovereignty is vested in the people and there it rests in all circumstances. The people created a government to act as their agent in administering laws and carrying out numerous tasks an orderly society must have done in order to flourish. But the government is limited entirely by the sovereignty of the people and by particular restrictions expressly placed on the government in its creation. Preeminent among these restrictions is the imperative that no law shall curtail or restrain freedom of speech or of the press. It is preeminent because it directly affects the ability of the sovereign to decide the basic direction our society will take.[3] Such decisions depend on a supply of information which can only be communicated to a sovereign people by mass methods such as the press.
From the free flow of numerous ideas the sovereign ultimately *328 chooses some, eliminates others, and directs the course of the state. Without the free flow of these ideas the state loses direction. The press plays a peculiar role in this process because it is through the press the ideas are reported to the sovereign. There is no other effective way to report to the sovereign than through the press. If the sovereign was an individual rather than the people collectively, it would be possible to employ special agents to gather ideas and facts from all sources and bring them to the sovereign. Obviously, this cannot be done effectively other than by means of mass communications when the sovereign is the mass of persons called the people. The sovereign has determined it is in the best interest of all that it receive these ideas. No law may interfere with the process.
One task the people have assigned the government is to ferret out crime. This is a very important task but it must be accomplished within the restrictions laid down in support of a concern which the wisdom of the people declares even more essential, the free flow of ideas to the sovereign.
2. Before us is a clash between the task of investigating criminal activity given the government by the people and the restriction the people place on the government concerning free flow of ideas. Obviously the former must yield to the extent of any conflict between the two. The greater prevails over the lesser.[4] The Constitution orders it so, and puts the issue beyond the power of the government, including the courts, to decide otherwise. Since we are bound to uphold the Constitution and it plainly tells us no law may curtail or restrain the freedom of the press, the only possible avenue to affirm the trial court is to decide the laws in question do not curtail or restrain the freedom of the press. That I simply cannot, in good faith, do.
Vaughn was emersed in the milieu of ideas. He was about the business of reporting on the extent of drug trafficking in the community. That is a matter of concern to the sovereign in sifting among many ideas in order to give direction to the state. The subject of his inquiry was in the realm of ideas. It was not a mere investigation into an isolated fact bound event which might stir public curiosity. Making the distinction between ideas and facts is important though the line between the two may be unclear at times. This case addresses only the vital area of ideas. It does not reach the lower level of mere fact reporting. Vaughn sought to disclose the extent of drug trafficking in the community and his report generated ideas worthwhile to the sovereign in directing the state concerning that subject. His may fall short of the loftiest ideas in the mix but they are at least useful to *329 the sovereign.
3. I would hold that laws which require Vaughn to disclose the identity of the source of information for his report to the sovereign in this case curtail or restrain freedom of the press. In order to develop the ideas about the drug scene, Vaughn needed to communicate with those involved. Confidentiality was an element bearing on his ability to enter into such communications. While there may be some instances in which those involved in criminal activity might discuss their activities with others for publication without confidentiality of their identity there are bound to be other instances where this is not so. To the extent the latter is the case there is a curtailment or restraint on the freedom of the press. We are not free to hold that a little restraint is all right. Laws which destroy that confidentiality curtail and restrain freedom of the press in direct proportion to the blockage of information resulting from the absence of confidentiality. Therefore, I would construe the laws in a constitutional manner and hold Vaughn cannot be compelled to identify his source under these circumstances.
NOTES
[1]  OCGA §§ 15-1-3; 24-10-25.
[2]  Nor do we have a claim of privilege based on a reporter's risk of loss of employment should he disclose his source as in Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72 (7) (70 SE 781) (1911). Neither does this opinion address the rights of a criminal defendant versus a "journalistic privilege" as in Ga. Communications Corp. v. Horne, 164 Ga. App. 227 (1) (294 SE2d 725) (1982). Further, this opinion does not address the issues under the Federal Constitution as in Hurst v. State, 160 Ga. App. 830 (1) (287 SE2d 677) (1982). Instead, I consider the right of a free press under the Georgia Constitution as it affects every citizen who chooses to engage in the activity of a free press.
[3]  These ideas about freedom of speech and the press are certainly not original but come from a survey of many ideas including those expressed in the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 711 (92 SC 2646, 33 LE2d 626) (1972) where credit for a considerable part is given other individuals including James Madison and Alexander Meiklejohn. In, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245, 254, Meiklejohn, in turn, cites Justices Holmes, Harlan, Frankfurter and others. The process which produces these ideas is essentially evolutionary.
[4]  Fortunately, in this case we do not have to resolve a conflict between the right of a free press in this context and rights of an accused. That awaits another day.