15 Ariz. App. 460 (1971)
489 P.2d 718
PMC POWDERED METALS CORPORATION, Petitioner Employer, State Compensation Fund, Petitioner Carrier,
v.
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona, Respondent, Jesse F. Thomas, Respondent Employee.
No. 1 CA-IC 613.
Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department B.
October 14, 1971.
Robert K. Park, Chief Counsel by Arthur B. Parsons, Phoenix, for petitioners State Compensation Fund and PMC Powdered Metals Corp.
Morgan & Jerome by D.A. Jerome, Phoenix, for respondent Thomas.
William C. Wahl, Jr., Chief Counsel, Phoenix, for respondent The Industrial Comm. of Ariz.
HAIRE, Judge.
The petitioning employer and the State Compensation Fund raise two questions in this review of an award of the Industrial Commission (1) Did the hearing officer abuse his discretion in denying the petitioners' request for a continuance? (2) Is the award supported by the evidence?
The claim arose from a fall the claimant suffered during the course of his employment on June 3, 1969. At the time of the accident claimant was refueling a truck at a makeshift bulk storage facility. The refueling facility had been constructed by cutting away the side of a steep hill and forming a landing above the cut. Fuel was stored on the landing and was piped down to service trucks that would drive up beneath the landing. Claimant fell from a ladder that extended from the base of the cut up to the landing. He fell approximately eight feet to the ground, falling between a truck and the rocky wall forming the base of the hill.
On March 27, 1970, the Commission received a "Workmen's and Physicians Report of Injury" (ICA Form 102) signed by claimant. Although the name of Dr. Morton S. Thomas, III, was typed thereon, this report did not contain any medical information, *461 nor was it signed by Dr. Thomas. Based upon a subsequent report from the employer that the "injury resulted from preexisting condition and not from employment", the State Compensation Fund issued a notice of claims status on June 18, 1970 which denied the claim, stating that the claim was "denied on basis claimant did not sustain an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment within the meaning of the workmen's compensation law of Arizona." The denial of the claim was timely protested and a hearing was eventually held in Wickenburg, Arizona, on October 14, 1970. The notice for this hearing stated that:
"The parties are expected to submit all issues in controversy for decision at this hearing; therefore all necessary witnesses, evidence, documents, medical reports, payrolls and other essential proof must be available and ready for submission at the hearing. The above-named applicant is hereby ordered to appear in person and to have present all witnesses necessary to fully present applicant's case. The above-named defendant employer and defendant insurance carrier are hereby notified that they may appear and present any testimony necessary to the full presentation of their case."
Notwithstanding the foregoing, none of the parties presented any medical evidence nor any evidence relating to the claimant's resulting disabilities, if in fact there were any. It is this failure which gives rise to the questions involved on this review.
Prior to the hearing, claimant's counsel wrote a letter to the Commission requesting the issuance of subpoenas for four lay witnesses and for Dr. Morton S. Thomas, III, who resided in Wickenburg. The letter further stated:
"It appears that claimant was treated at the Veterans' Administration hospitals in Tucson and Prescott, Arizona. If we need Dr. Bucksbaum, Veterans Administration Hospital, Tucson, Arizona, I would like to have the privilege of examining this doctor in Tucson subsequent to the hearing of September 18, 1970, at Wickenburg."
This letter was received by the Commission, but through unexplained circumstances the letter was thereafter transmitted to the State Compensation Fund and no subpoenas were issued. As a result, only two witnesses were present at the hearing  the claimant and his wife. The claimant testified on direct examination that his foot slipped because of an oil spillage and that he then fell, striking his head on the truck on the way down, but, on cross-examination he admitted that he didn't remember slipping nor did he remember falling. In any event, it is undisputed that he did fall, and based upon claimant's testimony it appears clear that he was unconscious for a short period of time. Claimant admitted that for some time prior to the fall, Dr. Thomas had been treating him for high blood pressure and severe headaches. Claimant's son, who was then 14 years old observed the fall but was not present at the hearing and did not testify.
There was no medical testimony and very little lay testimony concerning any injuries which the claimant might have received in the fall. Both the claimant and his wife testified that he received cuts on the neck, arms and face and on the side of his head, and that his shirt was bloody. There is no testimony that these injuries caused his subsequent hospitalization or surgery. As to events subsequent to the fall, the claimant's testimony indicates that two fellow workers took him to his home and that his wife then took him to Dr. Thomas in Wickenburg. Dr. Thomas apparently did not treat him at all, but rather told claimant's wife to take him directly to the Veterans Administration Hospital in Prescott. Claimant testified that he was later transferred to the Veterans Administration Hospital in Tucson and that he underwent surgery there. No evidence was offered as to the reason for the hospitalization or the nature of the surgery.
*462 After the foregoing evidence was presented, counsel for the State Compensation Fund requested a continuance so that he could present medical testimony concerning the cause of the fall and also relating to the hospitalization and the nature of the surgery performed upon the claimant. The motion complied in all respects with the specificity requirements of Rule 56, Rules of Procedure Before the Industrial Commission (1970). When the hearing officer inquired as to why these medical witnesses had not been subpoenaed to appear for the Wickenburg hearing, counsel for the Fund alluded to the fact that he had previously furnished to claimant's counsel copies of medical reports from the Tucson and Prescott Veterans Administration Hospitals and stated that both counsel had assumed that there would have to be expert medical testimony; that the two named doctors were from Prescott and Tucson and pursuant to prior practices of the Commission they would not be required to appear and testify at a hearing in Wickenburg, Arizona. The hearing officer took the motion for continuance under advisement and later requested written memoranda from counsel relating thereto. In his memorandum, counsel for the Fund further supported his motion for continuance by attaching medical reports tending to show that claimant's fall was caused by fainting due to a brain tumor and that the subsequent hospitalization and surgery was also occasioned by the brain tumor. The hearing officer denied the motion for continuance and entered "Findings and Award for Compensable Claim" finding:
"3. On June 3, 1969 the applicant was filling diesel fuel drums on a pickup truck for defendant employer; in performing this function, it was necessary for the applicant to stand approximately eight feet above the ground with one foot on a ladder and the other on the truck; either the truck or the applicant's foot thereon was made slippery by the diesel fuel; while in the process of performing this duty, applicant's foot slipped from the truck and as a result he fell to the ground striking his head and sustaining injuries; said injuries arose out of and within the course of his employment within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, entitling him to benefits as provided by law."
* * * * * *
"5. Information available at the hearing was not suffficient to permit a determination of the full extent of applicant's injuries resulting from the industrial accident or a determination of the duration of any disability resulting therefrom."
and awarding:
"1. Temporary total and/or temporary partial compensation benefits from and after June 3, 1969, as provided by law.
"2. Medical, surgical and hospital benefits from and after June 3, 1969, as provided by law."
The hearing officer's findings and award was sustained upon review by the Industrial Commission.
As previously stated herein, the State Compensation Fund questions the sufficiency of the evidence to support the award and also contends that the hearing officer abused his discretion in failing to grant a continuance. In arriving at our decision concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, we must first consider the scope of the findings and award here involved. Both the claimant and the respondent Industrial Commission have submitted briefs in this matter and both stress the fact that the only issue determined by the findings and award was whether the claimant suffered an injury in an industrially related fall, and not whether there were any compensable results from that injury. So interpreted, the findings and award is supported by some evidence. We agree with the Fund's counsel that the workmen's compensation laws do not contemplate the invocation of Commission jurisdiction to determine inconsequential matters having no possible compensation or medical benefit *463 consequences. However, the Arizona courts have previously held that the Commission is not required to determine all relevant matters in one hearing, but may in the exercise of its reasonable discretion, determine certain matters in controversy at one hearing, and schedule later hearings for the determination of other issues in controversy. Talley v. Industrial Commission, 105 Ariz. 162, 461 P.2d 83 (1969).
Here the evidence was sufficient to support the Commission's finding that the claimant suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, and therefore the award must be affirmed unless we find that the denial of a motion for continuance constituted error.
The continuance was sought by the Fund so that medical evidence could be introduced on two issues: First, to show that the claimant's fall was caused by an idiopathic condition (that is, fainting as a result of a brain tumor) and thus was not an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment; and, second, to show that the hospitalization and surgery and any disability involved were the results of the brain tumor, and not causally related to an industrial injury. In view of the restricted nature of the award entered after the Wickenburg hearing, we will not consider the question of whether the motion to continue should have been granted in order to allow the Fund to present medical evidence on the second issue. The award, as construed by this Court and by the Commission does not preclude the Fund from offering evidence at a subsequent hearing as to the extent of the claimant's industrially related injuries, and thus we do not find any resulting prejudice on this second issue.
In considering the first basis for the Fund's motion to continue, we recognize that the granting of a continuance is discretionary. Sanchez v. Industrial Commission, 13 Ariz. App. 82, 474 P.2d 441 (1970); Rules of Procedure Before the Industrial Commission 56(a) (1970). However, we have held that motions for continuances should be freely granted. Sanchez v. Industrial Commission, supra; see Polston v. Industrial Commission, 13 Ariz. App. 291, 475 P.2d 950 (1970). A continuance should not be granted for dilatory purposes. Sanchez v. Industrial Commission, supra; see Rule 56(b), Rules of Procedure Before the Industrial Commission (1970).
In reviewing the total fact situation presented here, it is our opinion that the hearing officer closely approached, if in fact he did not cross, that fine line which separates the exercise of reasoned discretion from arbitrary and capricious action.
Nevertheless, for reasons not advanced by the hearing officer, we find that it is not necessary to set aside the award. Even if we assume that the Fund had been allowed a continuance and had introduced evidence showing that the claimant's fall from the ladder resulted solely from the fainting spell caused by a brain tumor, in our opinion his injuries resulting from the fall would be compensable.
Workmen's compensation claims for disabilities resulting from idiopathic or self-originating injuries[1] have been previously considered and rejected by the Arizona Supreme Court where the employment has not contributed to the hazard out of which the injury grows. Valerio v. Industrial Commission, 85 Ariz. 189, 334 P.2d 768 (1959); Gomez v. Industrial Commission, 72 Ariz. 69, 230 P.2d 686 (1951), rehearing, 72 Ariz. 265, 233 P.2d 827 (1951); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Industrial Commission, 69 Ariz. 320, 213 P.2d 672 (1950). See also, Sacks v. Industrial Commission, *464 13 Ariz. App. 83, 474 P.2d 442 (1970). In the fact situation here involved it is admitted that the claimant fell from a ladder and truckbed while performing the duties of his employment. This, in our opinion, constitutes an employment-contributed hazard or risk greater than "the hazards to which all mankind is daily exposed". See Valerio, supra. Most courts which have considered idiopathic falls from heights have held, as we do here, that injuries resulting from such falls are compensable. See 1 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 12.13, p. 192.11 (1968).
Since such evidence would not have led to a different result, it is our opinion that the failure of the hearing officer to grant a continuance to allow the Fund to present evidence concerning the alleged idiopathic nature of claimant's fall did not constitute prejudicial error, and therefore the award must be affirmed. This affirmance is made pursuant to the position taken by both the respondent claimant and the respondent Commission in briefs filed in this Court that the complained of findings and award is not to be construed as awarding claimant medical or compensation benefits of either a temporary or permanent nature, but merely is an award establishing that claimant's fall from the ladder resulted in "an injury" arising out of and in the course of his employment. Only those injuries resulting from the fall as shown by evidence to be hereafter received by the Commission will be compensable. In any future hearings, petitioner shall not be precluded from showing circumstances surrounding and relating to the cause of claimant's fall insofar as such circumstances are relevant to his subsequent physical condition and the cause thereof.
The award is affirmed.
JACOBSON, P.J., and EUBANK, J., concur.
NOTES
[1]  Larson refers to this class of injuries as "injuries arising out of risks or conditions personal to the claimant". 1 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 12.00, p. 192.6 (1968).


691 N.W.2d 177 (2005)
13 Neb. App. 256
In re Interest of VERLE O., also known as Tony O., alleged to be a mentally ill dangerous person.
Verle O., also known as Tony O., appellant,
v.
Mental Health Board of the 12th Judicial District, appellee.
No. A-03-1371.
Court of Appeals of Nebraska.
January 11, 2005.
*179 Susan L. Kirchmann, for appellant.
David L. Wilson, Kimball County Attorney, for appellee.
SIEVERS, MOORE, and CASSEL, Judges.
PER CURIAM.

INTRODUCTION
Verle O., also known as Tony O., appeals the order of the Kimball County District *180 Court, which affirmed the order of the Mental Health Board of the 12th Judicial District (the Board) finding Verle to be a mentally ill dangerous person and committing him to involuntary inpatient sex offender treatment. We address the consequences of the fact that Verle's prior sex offense conviction occurred as a result of a plea of nolo contendere.

BACKGROUND
In 1993, Verle was charged with attempted first degree sexual assault on a child, a Class III felony. Verle entered a plea of no contest and was sentenced to incarceration for 6 to 18 years.
On September 12, 2002, the State filed a petition with the Board, alleging that Verle was "believed to be a mentally ill and dangerous person by reason of his behavior, including repeated incidents of sexual assault of children." Following a hearing, the Board found "clear and convincing proof that [Verle] is a mentally ill dangerous person" and that "neither voluntary hospitalization nor other alternatives less restrictive of [Verle's] liberty than a Mental Health Board ordered treatment disposition are available or would suffice to prevent the substantial risk of harm to others." The Board found, based on the testimony at the hearing, that Verle suffered from pedophilia and narcissistic personality disorder and that he should be committed to involuntary inpatient sex offender treatment.
Verle appealed the Board's order to the district court for Kimball County, alleging that the Board erred by receiving certain evidence and that insufficient evidence was adduced during the hearing to adjudicate him as a mentally ill dangerous person requiring involuntary inpatient treatment. The district court found that the allegations of error in the receipt of evidence were without merit and that the Board's decision was supported by the evidence. Therefore, the court affirmed the Board's decision. Verle now appeals to this court.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Verle asserts, reassigned and restated, that (1) the use of Verle's 1993 or 1994 no contest conviction "violated Nebraska statutory and case law" as well as public policy, (2) the State failed to meet its burden to prove that he was mentally ill and dangerous, and (3) the testimony regarding Verle's narcissistic personality disorder was "unduly prejudicial and, therefore, irrelevant."

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court reviews the determination of a mental health board de novo on the record. In re Interest of Kochner, 266 Neb. 114, 662 N.W.2d 195 (2003). In reviewing a district court's judgment under the Nebraska Mental Health Commitment Act, appellate courts will affirm the district court's judgment unless, as a matter of law, the judgment is unsupported by evidence which is clear and convincing. Id.

ANALYSIS

Evidence of Recent Violent Acts.
"Before a person may be committed for treatment by a mental health board, the board must determine that the person meets the definition of a mentally ill dangerous person as set out in [Neb.Rev.Stat.] § 83-1009 [(Reissue 1999)]." In re Interest of Kochner, 266 Neb. at 120, 662 N.W.2d at 201. (Neb.Rev.Stat. § 83-1009 (Reissue 1999) has subsequently been repealed, and its successor can now be found at Neb.Rev.Stat. § 71-908 (Cum. Supp. 2004), operative July 1, 2004. Specifically, 2004 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1083, § 28, amended the language of the former § 83-1009 *181 1009 to read, "Mentally ill and dangerous person means a person who is mentally ill or substance dependent and because of such mental illness or substance dependence presents ...," where § 83-1009 had previously read, "Mentally ill dangerous person shall mean any mentally ill person, alcoholic person, or drug-abusing person who presents....") The statutory definition of mentally ill dangerous person requires the State to show that the person (1) suffers from a mental illness and (2) presents a substantial risk of harm to others or to himself within the near future as manifested by evidence of recent violent acts. See, § 83-1009; In re Interest of Kochner, supra.
At the hearing, a psychiatrist opined without objection that he had a "clinical opinion" based on a reasonable degree of medical and psychiatric certainty that Verle suffered from the mental illnesses of pedophilia and narcissistic personality disorder. The psychiatrist also testified that his opinion, based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty, was that Verle "would be a danger to others in regards to his diagnosis of pedophilia, in particular children, probably age 15 and below in the future." However, § 83-1009 requires more than an expert's opinion that the subject of the proceedings is "dangerous."
Under § 83-1009, there must be a recent violent act, a threat of violence, or an act placing others in reasonable fear of such harm in order to find that a person is dangerous. In short, it must be shown that Verle has actually been dangerous in the recent past and that such danger was manifested by an overt act or attempt or threat to do substantial harm to himself or to another. See In re Interest of Blythman, 208 Neb. 51, 302 N.W.2d 666 (1981). "In order for a past act to have any evidentiary value it must form some foundation for a prediction of future dangerousness and be therefore probative of that issue." Id. at 58, 302 N.W.2d at 671.
"[A]ny act that is used as evidence of dangerousness must be sufficiently probative to predict future behavior and the subject's present state of dangerousness." Id. at 59, 302 N.W.2d at 672.
The Board found clear and convincing evidence that Verle "is a mentally ill dangerous person" and that Board-ordered inpatient treatment was necessary to "prevent further harm to [himself] or to others." The Board explained that Verle "has been diagnosed with Pedophilia and Narcissistic Personality Disorder," but failed to specify any specific recent violent act or threat of violence that would make Verle dangerous, as required by § 83-1009.
Similarly, the district court did not make a finding as to any specific recent violent act or threat of violence. The district court, relying on In re Interest of Blythman, supra, found that while Verle had not performed any act in the past 9 years indicating that he was dangerous, "an untreated pedophile remains currently dangerous even though no incidences have occurred during extended incarceration. Clearly, as [Verle] denies he is a pedophile, he remained untreated. Therefore, he is dangerous." The flaw with this reasoning is that while In re Interest of Blythman may arguably support the conclusion that an "act" 9 years earlier is "recent," which we need not decide, In re Interest of Blythman does not support Verle's commitment and loss of liberty because of his status as "an untreated pedophile." Commitment on such basis has due process problems; plus, it was condemned in In re Interest of Blythman.
The district court partially framed the question as "whether an expert opinion which relies upon a conviction based on a *182 no contest plea can be relied upon in a mental health hearing to determine if a person is mentally ill." It seems evident that the district court similarly assumed that Verle's conviction based upon his plea of no contest provided the required evidence of recent violent acts. Accordingly, we consider the role and effect of evidence of a conviction, based on a plea of no contest, in a subsequent civil commitment proceeding.

Plea of Nolo Contendere.
Verle asserts that the court erred in using his "1993 no contest conviction" against him in the Board's proceedings and in admitting the record of the conviction, consisting of exhibits 1 through 4. Mental health board proceedings are governed by the Nebraska Evidence Rules. See Neb.Rev.Stat. § 83-1059 (Cum. Supp. 2002) (repealed by 2004 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1083, § 75, operative July 1, 2004, and recodified at Neb.Rev.Stat. § 71-955 (Cum. Supp. 2004)). Neb. Evid. R. 410, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-410 (Reissue 1995), provides that evidence of a defendant's plea of or offer of a plea of nolo contendere, and evidence of statements made in connection with such a plea or offer, are not admissible in any civil or criminal action, case, or proceeding against that defendant. However, in State v. Methe, 228 Neb. 468, 472, 422 N.W.2d 803, 807 (1988), the Nebraska Supreme Court explained that rule 410 "does not prohibit the use of the conviction which results from a nolo contendere plea." (Emphasis supplied.)
At the hearing before the Board, the State offered exhibits 1 through 4: the amended information; the petition to enter a plea of no contest, which petition contains a recitation of a factual basis contended by the prosecutor; and the court's two journal entries regarding entry of the plea and sentencing, respectively. "If ... a judgment [of conviction] has been entered on the plea, the record is competent evidence of the fact of conviction." State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Assn. v. Mathew, 169 Neb. 194, 197, 98 N.W.2d 865, 867 (1959). Verle objected to these exhibits "on the basis of relevance," as well as asserting that their probative value was outweighed by their prejudicial effect. Citing Mathew, Verle also objected to the exhibits on the ground that "a plea of nolo contendere may not be used in evidence in a civil action against the party making the plea." We consider this statement sufficient to preserve an objection to the exhibits under rule 410.
A plea of no contest does not admit guilt, but does not contest the charge. The plea consents to the entry of a judgment of guilt. See 4 Clifford S. Fishman, Jones on Evidence Civil and Criminal § 23:7 (7th ed. 2000). See, also, State v. Obst, 12 Neb.App. 189, 198, 669 N.W.2d 688, 696 (2003) ("`[t]he difference between the plea of nolo contendere and a plea of guilty appears simply to be that, while the latter is a confession or admission of guilt binding [the] accused in other proceedings, the former has no effect beyond the particular case'"), quoting 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 399 (1989). By entering a plea of nolo contendere, Verle avoided making any admissions of fact; therefore, the facts contained in exhibits 1 through 4, including the factual basis for the plea, may not be considered as admissions. See 4 Fishman, supra.
In State v. Methe, supra, the Nebraska Supreme Court determined that evidence of a prior conviction for intimidation by telephone call was admissible in a later prosecution for another instance of intimidation by telephone call for two purposes: (1) to corroborate the victim's testimony on the issue of identity and (2) to establish a motive for calling the victim as well as the defendant's intent to intimidate the victim. *183 For the second purpose, the precise nature of the prior conviction would make no difference. However, the elements of the crime underlying the prior conviction and the identities of the perpetrator and the victim would be essential to consideration of the conviction for the first purpose. Thus, we view Methe as allowing use of a prior conviction, including the allegations of the indictment, information, or complaint leading thereto. See State v. Martinez, 4 Neb.App. 192, 541 N.W.2d 406 (1995) (equating criminal "pleading" to charging document), aff'd 250 Neb. 597, 550 N.W.2d 655 (1996). We determine that rule 410, as explained by Methe, authorized the receipt in evidence of the record of Verle's prior conviction, which record included the amended information (exhibit 1), the journal entry memorializing the acceptance of the no contest plea (exhibit 3), and the journal entry upon the judgment imposing sentence (exhibit 4).
However, rule 410 also prohibits admission into evidence of "statements made in connection with [a] plea [of no contest]." Exhibit 2 consisted of Verle's statements in connection with the no contest plea and contained the prosecutor's "statement" of a factual basis for that plea. Rule 410 prohibited the use of these statements as evidence in the civil commitment proceeding, and exhibit 2 should not have been received in evidence.
A critical issue before the Board, and before the district court upon its de novo review, was the existence of "evidence of recent violent acts or threats of violence," see § 83-1009(1). At oral argument, the State maintained that the evidence of such recent violent acts was supplied by exhibit 2, Verle's statements in connection with the plea of no contest, and specifically by Verle's statements acknowledging the prosecutor's "statement" of a factual basis for that plea. As we have explained, that evidence was improperly received, because rule 410 prohibits the later use of a defendant's statements made in connection with his earlier plea of no contest.
While the evidence of Verle's prior conviction was not precluded by rule 410, the properly received evidence (exhibits 1, 3, and 4) establishes merely that Verle was convicted in 1993 or 1994 and sentenced in 1994 for the charge of criminal attempt of first degree sexual assault on a child. The only details of the crime provided by the properly received exhibits were the allegations of the amended information, which stated that Verle
"on or about the 16th day of February A.D. 1993, in the County of Kimball and State of Nebraska, then and there being did then and there intentionally engage in conduct which, under the circumstances as he believed them to be, constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in his commission of the crime of First Degree Sexual Assault on A Child, [Neb.Rev.Stat. §] 28-319(1)(c) [(Reissue 1989)], a Class II Felony...."
That knowledge fails to provide clear and convincing evidence of recent violent acts as required by the commitment statute. Indeed, because of the inchoate nature of the offense of criminal attempt, the allegation and resultant conviction provide literally no information regarding the nature and character of the acts actually performed. Thus, the mere fact of conviction fails to establish, by the requisite standard of clear and convincing evidence, performance of recent violent acts.
Of course, absent a showing to the contrary, it is presumed that the trial court disregarded all incompetent and irrelevant evidence. See In re Interest of Ty M. & Devon M., 265 Neb. 150, 655 N.W.2d 672 (2003). However, the district court recognized that "the nearly sole fact *184 upon which the doctors diagnosed pedophilia is the conviction in 1994 based upon [Verle's] `Nolo Contender[e]' plea." The district court also equated exhibits 1 through 4 to evidence of the conviction. Thus, it is apparent that the district court relied upon exhibit 2, and the State clearly relied upon that evidence to meet its burden to establish recent violent acts.
We recognize that the Nebraska Supreme Court has never expressly discussed whether it is proper to remand for a new hearing where evidence, relied upon by the State to establish a critical requirement for commitment, was improperly admitted. In In re Interest of Tweedy, 241 Neb. 348, 488 N.W.2d 528 (1992), the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed a district court order upholding a commitment, determining that the admitted evidence failed to establish the subject's dangerousness. The Supreme Court remanded to the district court with directions to remand to the mental health board, which was directed to accord the subject a new hearing or to order him released from custody. In In re Interest of S.B., 263 Neb. 175, 639 N.W.2d 78 (2002), the district court had reversed and remanded for further proceedings where the mental health board improperly relied upon telephonic testimony of the mental health professional. The Nebraska Supreme Court agreed that the telephonic testimony was improperly admitted and that without such testimony, the evidence was insufficient to support the commitment. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the district court's order reversing and remanding for further proceedings. We recognize that in neither of these cases did the Supreme Court expressly discuss the propriety of remanding for a new hearing. Compare, e.g., In re Interest of Ely, 220 Neb. 731, 371 N.W.2d 724 (1985) (where evidence that subject had no place to stay and no source of income was improperly admitted, evidence was insufficient; where evidence was insufficient, it was not necessary to decide whether not having job or home could be basis for finding dangerousness; cause was remanded with directions to dismiss petition).
We do find some authority from other states authorizing a remand for a new civil commitment hearing where the evidence was insufficient but the record indicated that there may have been other evidence that the State could have presented. See, e.g., Love v. State, 90 S.W.3d 236 (Mo.App.2002) (State's evidence was insufficient to meet definition of mental abnormality, but record indicated that there may have been other evidence State could have presented to make submissible case, so new trial was required); Johnson v. State, 58 S.W.3d 496, 500 (Mo.2001) (Missouri Supreme Court found that testimony of one of State's experts was improperly admitted and that with that evidence excluded, State had failed to show that subject was sexually violent predator, so cause was remanded for new trial because "[t]here may be other evidence that the [S]tate can present to make a submissible case"); In re J.P., 339 N.J.Super. 443, 772 A.2d 54 (2001) (cause remanded for new hearing because trial judge's determination to commit subject was based upon inadmissible actuarial instruments and upon expert testimony consisting of little more than institutional record review). Compare Turner v. Superior Court, 105 Cal.App.4th 1046, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 300 (2003) (court found insufficient evidence to support probable cause finding and ordered that commitment petition be dismissed rather than remanding for new probable cause hearing, since no legal error had permeated proceedings below).
We think it is evident from the record that a possibility exists that evidence of *185 Verle's acts underlying the 1993 or 1994 conviction could have been produced and may have been sufficient to establish dangerousness. We will therefore direct, as did the Nebraska Supreme Court in In re Interest of Tweedy, 241 Neb. 348, 488 N.W.2d 528 (1992), that the cause be remanded to the district court with directions to remand to the mental health board to accord the appellant a new hearing or to order him released from custody.
Because we conclude that the documentary evidence of Verle's statements made in connection with the plea of no contest pertaining to Verle's 1993 or 1994 conviction was improperly admitted and considered, we need not address Verle's other assignments of error. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analysis which is not needed to adjudicate the case and controversy before it. See King v. Crowell Memorial Home, 261 Neb. 177, 622 N.W.2d 588 (2001).

CONCLUSION
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the district court and remand the cause to the district court with directions to remand to the Board, which shall accord Verle a new hearing or order him released from custody.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.


                                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                Fifth Circuit
                                                                                F I L E D
                                                                                April 2, 2004
                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
                                                                                Charles R. Fulbruge III
                                                                                Clerk

                                            No. 03-40885
                                          Summary Calendar

CHARLIE J. LONG,

                                                                                Petitioner-
                                                           Appellant,

                                                  versus

DOUG DRETKE, DIRECTOR,
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION,

                                                                                Respondent-
                                                           Appellee.

                        ------------------------------------------------------------
                            Appeal from the United States District Court
                                   for the Eastern District of Texas
                                       USDC No. 6:02-CV-354
                        ------------------------------------------------------------

Before SMITH, DeMOSS AND STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

       Charlie J. Long (“Long”), Texas prisoner # 902617, appeals the district court’s denial of his

petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Long’s petition stems from his

1999 conviction for aggravated assault, for which he is serving a 20-year sentence. The district court

       *
           Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
granted Long a certificate of appealability on the sole issue whether Long was deprived of his right

to compulsory process under the Sixth Amendment when a defense witness asserted his Fifth

Amendment right against self-incrimination upon the advice of an attorney appointed to represent the

witness. The state courts rejected this claim on the merits. Long also has filed a motion for leave to

file an out-of-time reply brief of excess length; that motion is GRANTED.

       Contrary to Long’s assertion, the record does not support a determination that the witness’s

invocation of his Fifth Amendment right was anything but voluntary. Further, once the witness

appeared in court and refused to testify, Long’s Sixth Amendment compulsory process rights were

exhausted, regardless of the reason for invoking the Fifth Amendment. See United States v. Griffin,

66 F.3d 68, 70 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Follin, 979 F.2d 369, 374 (5th Cir. 1992).

Accordingly, the state court’s rejection of Long’s Sixth Amendment claim was not based on an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, and

Long is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

       AFFIRMED.

                                                -2-


171 S.W.3d 639 (2005)
Harold Wayne BAILEY, Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 14-01-00466-CR.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).
August 16, 2005.
*640 R. Scott Shearer, Houston, TX, for appellant.
Alan Curry, Houston, TX, for appellee.
Panel consists of Chief Justice HEDGES and Justices FOWLER and FROST.

OPINION
KEM THOMPSON FROST, Justice.
Appellant, Harold Wayne Bailey, was charged with failure to stop and render assistance. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 550.023 (Vernon 1999). After appellant pleaded guilty, the trial court ordered restitution as a condition of community supervision. Because we conclude that the trial court erred in ordering restitution for losses that did not result from appellant's failure to stop and render assistance, we reform the judgment to delete the payment of restitution from the conditions of community supervision. We affirm the trial court's judgment as reformed.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 19, 2000, appellant was involved in a car accident and intentionally failed to stop his vehicle at the scene of the accident. Albert Rinker, Jr. was seriously injured in the accident and appellant was charged with failure to stop and render assistance. Appellant pleaded guilty under a plea agreement with the State. The trial court found appellant guilty of the offense and assessed punishment at five years in prison. The trial court suspended the sentence and placed appellant on community supervision for ten years. As a condition of the community supervision, the trial court indicated it would require restitution and set a hearing to determine the amount. Before the restitution hearing, the State stipulated in writing that Rinker's injuries and resulting medical expenses incurred by reason of the accident were not increased or compounded by appellant's failure to stop and render assistance to Rinker. During the restitution hearing, the State conceded that there was a factual dispute as to whether appellant ran a red light and caused the accident. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ordered appellant to pay Rinker $49,148.43 in restitution for medical expenses incurred as a result of injuries Rinker sustained in the accident.
In 2001, appellant appealed the trial court's restitution order. In a per curiam opinion, this court dismissed the appeal as untimely. Bailey v. State, No. 04-01-00466-CR, 2001 WL 950939, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 23, 2001) (not designated for publication), rev'd, 160 S.W.3d 11 (Tex.Crim.App.2004). In 2004, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded the case to this court for a decision on the merits of appellant's challenge to the restitution order. Bailey v. State, 160 S.W.3d 11, 16 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004).

II. ISSUE AND ANALYSIS
In his sole issue on appeal, appellant asserts that the trial court's restitution order violates his right to due process of law. He contends that the injuries Rinker *641 sustained arose from the accident, not from his failure to stop and render assistance. Appellant argues that because Rinker's injuries were not causally connected to the offense to which appellant pleaded guilty, (1) the restitution ordered in this case was not for the offense for which he was convicted, and (2) the amount of restitution ordered had no factual support in the record.
We review challenges to restitution orders under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Cartwright v. State, 605 S.W.2d 287, 288-89 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision lies outside of the zone of reasonable disagreement. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (op. on reh'g). Although a trial court has broad discretion in determining conditions of community supervision, this discretion is not without limits. See TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 (Vernon Supp.2004-2005). A plain reading of article 42.037(b)(2) and (c)(1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure indicates that restitution is limited to the results of the offense or offenses charged. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.037(b)(2), (c)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) (stating that "[i]f the offense results in bodily injury to victim," the court may order restitution for an amount equal to the cost of necessary medical expenses, and that the court shall consider "the amount of the loss sustained by any victim as a result of the offense" in determining the amount of restitution); Gonzalez v. State, 954 S.W.2d 98, 106 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (stating that a reading of article 42.037 "clearly shows that restitution is limited to the results of the offense or offenses charged").
Furthermore, a majority of the courts that have addressed this issue have concluded that the amount of a restitution order is limited to the losses the victim suffered as a result of the offense for which defendant was convicted. See Cabla v. State, 6 S.W.3d 543, 546 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) (dicta); Drilling v. State, 134 S.W.3d 468, 470-71 (Tex.App.-Waco 2004, no pet.); Uresti v. State, 98 S.W.3d 321, 337-38 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.); Montgomery v. State, 83 S.W.3d 909, 912 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2002, no pet.); Gonzalez, 954 S.W.2d at 106; Stewart v. State, Nos. 05-99-00073, 05-99-00074, 2000 WL 31862, at *3 (Tex.App.-Dallas Jan.18, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication); But see In re C.T., 43 S.W.3d 600, 602-03 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.); Lerma v. State, 758 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Tex.App.-Austin 1988, no pet.). In this case, we must determine whether there is evidence Rinker's medical expenses resulted from appellant's failure to stop and render assistance.
Appellant argues the restitution order is erroneous because it was the accidentnot his failure to stop and render assistancethat caused Rinker's injuries. The State contends, however, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering appellant to pay restitution as a condition of his community supervision. The State recognizes that the amount of a restitution order is limited to only the losses or expenses that Rinker suffered as a result of the offense for which appellant was convicted. However, the State contends that, because appellant's involvement in an accident that resulted in injury or death to a person is an essential element of failing to stop and render assistance, appellant should be required to pay restitution because he was involved in the accident. See In re C.T., 43 S.W.3d at 602-03; Lerma v. State, 758 S.W.2d at 384. Had there been no accident, the State argues, there would have been no crime in failing to stop and render assistance. See In re C.T., 43 S.W.3d at 602-03; Lerma, 758 S.W.2d at *642 384. The State argues, therefore, Rinker's injuries arose from the offense of which appellant was convicted.
Appellant pleaded guilty to the following offense under section 550.021 of the Texas Transportation Code:
The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of a person shall:
(1) immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close to the scene as possible;
(2) immediately return to the scene of the accident if the vehicle is not stopped at the scene of the accident; and
(3) remain at the scene of the accident until the operator complies with the requirements of Section 550.023.
. . . .
A person commits an offense if the person does not stop or does not comply with the requirements of this section.
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 550.021(a), (c) (Vernon 1999). The part of section 550.023 applicable in this case requires the operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in the injury or death of a person to provide any person injured in the accident reasonable assistance, including transporting or making arrangements for transporting the person to a physician or hospital for medical treatment because it was apparent that treatment is necessary. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 550.031 (Vernon 1999).
Although "involvement in an accident resulting in injury or death of a person" is a prerequisite to the commission of the offense in question, such involvement alone is not sufficient to constitute a criminal offense. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 550.021, 550.023. It was appellant's failure to stop and assist Rinker that was the criminal conduct. In this case, the State, prior to the restitution hearing, stipulated in writing that Rinker's injuries and resulting medical expenses were not increased or compounded by appellant's failure to stop and render assistance. Given the State's stipulation, we conclude the State has not proven that Rinker's medical expenses resulted from the offense for which appellant pleaded guilty. Thus, the trial court erred in awarding restitution for these expenses. See Drilling, 134 S.W.3d at 470-71; Lemos v. State, 27 S.W.3d 42, 47-49 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied); Gonzalez, 954 S.W.2d at 106-07.
To support its argument, the State relies on Lerma and In re C.T. The Lerma court reasoned that a defendant convicted of failing to stop and render assistance could be ordered to pay restitution for the victim's injuries because involvement in an accident resulting in injury or death is an element of the offense for which the defendant was convicted. 758 S.W.2d at 384. The Lerma court explained that the appellant's effort to separate the accident and resulting injuries to the victim from his subsequent failure to stop and render assistance was "an effort to separate the inseparable." Id. But see Lemos, 27 S.W.3d at 47-49; Drilling, 134 S.W.3d at 470-71. The In re C.T. court applied the reasoning of Lerma to order restitution for property damage from a defendant who failed to stop and leave information after being involved in a three-car accident. See In re C.T., 43 S.W.3d at 602-03. In the present case, however, the State has stipulated that Rinker's injuries are separable from appellant's failure to stop and render assistance. We respectfully disagree with Lerma and In re C.T. to the extent they stand for the proposition that a defendant convicted of failure to stop and render assistance may be ordered to pay restitution to all those injured in the accident, regardless of whether their injuries resulted from the *643 defendant's failure to stop and render assistance.[1]
Based on the record before us, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion by ordering appellant to pay restitution as a condition of his community supervision. Because we have decided that the restitution ordered in this case was for losses that did not result from the offense of which appellant was convicted, we need not determine if the amount of restitution is supported by a factual basis in the record. Accordingly, we sustain appellant's sole issue on appeal. The judgment of the trial court is reformed to delete the payment of restitution from the conditions of community supervision. See Gordon v. State, 707 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986); Gonzalez, 954 S.W.2d at 106-07. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as reformed.
NOTES
[1]  There is no evidence in the record on the issue of whether it was appellant or Rinker who ran the red light, causing the accident. The State conceded the existence of a factual dispute on this issue. Appellant was not charged with reckless driving or driving while intoxicated, offenses which might relate to one's fault in the accident. In contrast, the offense of failing to stop and render assistance is based on one's actions after the accident. In this case, it is possible that appellant was not at fault for the accident at all; Rinker may have run the red light and caused the accident.


543 U.S. 924
RECORDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC.v.VERIZON INTERNET SERVICES, INC.
No. 03-1579.
Supreme Court of United States.
October 12, 2004.

1
C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 351 F.3d 1229.