21 Cal.3d 471 (1978)
579 P.2d 7
146 Cal. Rptr. 358
In re MICHAEL C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
KENNETH F. FARE, as Acting Chief Probation Officer, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL C., Defendant and Appellant.
Docket No. Crim. 19921.
Supreme Court of California.
May 30, 1978.
*473 COUNSEL
Wilbur F. Littlefield, Public Defender, John J. Gibbons, Kenneth I. Clayman, Patricia Rice and Albert J. Menaster, Deputy Public Defenders, for Defendant and Appellant.
Paul Halvonik, State Public Defender, Charles M. Sevilla, Chief Assistant State Public Defender, and Janice L. Feinstein, Deputy State Public Defender, Peter Bull and Robert L. Walker as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Jack R. Winkler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, S. Clark Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Shunji Asari and Mark Alan Hart, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
TOBRINER, J.
Defendant Michael C., a 16-year-old minor, appeals from juvenile court orders sustaining allegations that he comes within Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 for having killed Robert Yeager (Pen. Code, § 187), adjudicating him to be a ward of the court, and committing him to the Youth Authority. We concur in defendant's contention that his confession was obtained in violation of the rules announced in Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974] and subsequent cases, and that its admission into evidence constituted reversible error.
On February 4, 1976, police interrogated defendant at the Van Nuys police station. After advising defendant of his Miranda rights, the police interrogating officer continued the conversation as follows:
"Q.... Do you understand all of these rights as I have explained them to you?
"A. Yeah.
"Q. Okay, do you wish to give up your right to remain silent and talk to us about this murder?
"A. What murder? I don't know about no murder.
*474 "Q. I'll explain to you which one it is if you want to talk to us about it.
"A. Yeah, I might talk to you.
"Q. Do you want to give up your right to have an attorney present here while we talk about it?
"A. Can I have my probation officer here?
"Q. Well I can't get a hold of your probation officer right now. You have the right to an attorney.
"A. How I know you guys won't pull no police officer in and tell me he's an attorney?
"Q. Huh?
"A. [Repeat of last answer.]
"Q. Your probation officer is Mr. Christiansen.
"A. Yeah.
"Q. Well I'm not going to call Mr. Christiansen tonight. There's a good chance we can talk to him later, but I'm not going to call him right now. If you want to talk to us without an attorney present, you can. If you don't want to, you don't have to. But if you want to say something, you can, and if you don't want to say something you don't have to. That's your right. You understand that right?
"A. Yeah.
"Q. Okay, will you talk to us without an attorney present?
"A. Yeah I want to talk to you." (Italics added.)
Later during the interrogation, defendant confessed.
(1a) We shall point out that under the rules established in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, and further elaborated in this state in People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375 [99 Cal. Rptr. 1, 491 P.2d 793], the police unlawfully obtained defendant's confession. Defendant's request to see his probation officer at the commencement of interrogation negated any possible willingness on his part to discuss his case with the police; it thereby invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege.
Noting that an environment of incommunicado police-dominated interrogation "is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner," the United States Supreme Court *475 in Miranda, concluded that "without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely." (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 457, 467 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 713-714, 719].) The Supreme Court in Miranda set down four warnings which must be given to persons in "custodial surroundings," and then specified the protections that must be afforded after the rendition of such warnings: "If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. [Fn. omitted.] At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.... If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 473-474 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 723].)
Recognizing that the suspect may not expressly state that he wants an attorney, we have held in previous cases that any conduct which "reasonably appears inconsistent with a present willingness on the part of the suspect to discuss his case freely and completely with police at that time" amounts to an invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege. (People v. Randall (1970) 1 Cal.3d 948, 956 [83 Cal. Rptr. 658, 464 P.2d 114].) We have variously held that a suspect's refusal to sign a waiver of his constitutional rights, a suspect's statement, "Call my parents for my attorney," and a suspect's telephone call to his attorney, in and of themselves each invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege. (People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714 [68 Cal. Rptr. 817, 441 P.2d 625]; People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522 [75 Cal. Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580, 40 A.L.R.3d 1323]; People v. Randall, supra, 1 Cal.3d 948.)
In this case we must decide whether a minor's request for his probation officer's presence "reasonably appears inconsistent with a present willingness" concurrently to "discuss his case freely and completely with police...." (People v. Randall, supra, 1 Cal.3d 948, 956.) In People v. Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d 375, we held that a minor's request to consult his parents invoked the minor's Fifth Amendment privilege. As we stated there: "It would certainly severely restrict the `protective devices' required by Miranda in cases where the suspects are minors if the only call for help which is to be deemed an invocation of the privilege is the call for an attorney. It is fatuous to assume that a minor in custody will be *476 in a position to call an attorney for assistance and it is unrealistic to attribute no significance to his call for help from the only person to whom he normally looks  a parent or guardian. It is common knowledge that this is the normal reaction of a youthful suspect who finds himself in trouble with the law." (People v. Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d 375, 382.)
In view of the emphasis which the juvenile court system places upon the close relationship between a minor and his probation officer,[1] and in light of the probation officer's instructions in the present case that his ward contact him immediately in case of trouble,[2] the "normal reaction" of the minor here would be to request consultation with his probation officer. Fearing that the police would take advantage of his ignorance,[3] Michael wanted and needed the advice of someone whom he knew and trusted. He therefore asked for his probation officer  a personal advisor who would understand his problems and needs and on whose advice the minor could rely. By analogy to Burton, we hold that the minor's request for his probation officer  essentially a "call for help"  indicated that the minor intended to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege. By so holding, we recognize the role of the probation officer as a trusted guardian figure who exercises the authority of the state as parens patriae and whose duty it is to implement the protective and rehabilitative powers of the juvenile court.
The Attorney General contends, however, that the request here for a probation officer can be distinguished from the request in Burton, for, instead of affording the counsel and protection of a parent, the probation officer represents an "arm of the prosecutorial system." That the probation officer serves as a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 830.5) and has been charged with the duty to file a petition alleging that a minor committed the claimed offense (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 650), however, does not alter the fact that the probation officer is frequently the person to whom a minor might turn for help on such matters as to whether or not he should obtain an attorney. When Michael C. asked to see his probation officer, he was not seeking to confide in a prosecutor.
*477 The People assert that once we extend our holding in Burton to include a request to see a probation officer, we cannot reasonably distinguish a request for consultation with one's football coach, music teacher or clergyman. (2a) The request for the probation officer, however, is entirely distinguishable; the probation officer is an official appointed pursuant to legislative enactment "to represent the interests" of the juvenile (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 280). Since the inception of the juvenile court system the probation officer has borne the duty to advise and care for the juvenile defendant. Consultation with a probation officer thus acts as a "protective [device] ... to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings" (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 458 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 714]) precisely because the probation officer is particularly well-suited to provide the minor suspect with "help in how to conduct himself with police" (People v. Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d 375, 383).
(1b) The People further rely on People v. Lara (1967) 67 Cal.2d 365 [62 Cal. Rptr. 586, 432 P.2d 202], and In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 444 [75 Cal. Rptr. 1, 450 P.2d 296], cases in which we held that the "totality of the circumstances" governed whether a juvenile had the capacity to understand the meaning of the warnings given him, and knowingly and intelligently to waive his Miranda rights. In the present case, the People argue that Michael C. is an "older juvenile" who has had previous experience with the police. Contending that nothing in the record suggests that the police coerced Michael by their questioning, the People thus conclude that, based on the totality of circumstances, the trial court properly ruled that Michael's confession was voluntary.
In cases in which we must decide whether a confession is voluntary or coerced we have looked to the "totality of the circumstances" to find whether the confessant was capable of understanding the interrogation and voluntarily confessed or whether his will was actually overcome. Here, however, we face conduct which, regardless of considerations of capacity, coercion or voluntariness, per se invokes the privilege against self-incrimination. Thus our question turns not on whether the defendant had the ability, capacity or willingness to give a knowledgeable waiver, and hence whether he acted voluntarily, but whether, when he called for his probation officer, he exercised his Fifth Amendment privilege. We hold that in doing so he no less invoked the protection against self-incrimination than if he asked for the presence of an attorney.
Finally, in People v. Randall, supra, 1 Cal.3d 948, 957, we held that the People bear the burden of demonstrating "that a questioned confession *478 meets the constitutional tests of admissibility." Similarly in Burton we placed the burden on the People to show that a request by a minor to see his parents "is not an indication of that minor's unwillingness to continue talking with police or of a desire for help in how to conduct himself with police...." (People v. Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d 375, 383.) (2b) Accordingly, we hold here that the People must meet the burden of proving that a minor who requests to see his probation officer does not intend to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege. (1c) In the instant case, the People did not meet that burden.[4]
Because the police did not cease custodial interrogation immediately upon defendant's exercise of his Fifth Amendment privilege, the trial court should not have admitted the confession which was obtained by subsequent questioning. The admission of such confession was prejudicial per se and compels reversal of the orders. (People v. Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d 375, 384; People v. Randall, supra, 1 Cal.3d 948, 958.)
The judgment is reversed.
Mosk, J., Richardson, J., and Newman, J., concurred.
MOSK, J.
While under these facts I must concur in the majority opinion, I have serious reservations about the ultimate result.
The majority concede, as they must, that the probation officer serves as a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 830.5) and has the duty to file charges against a minor (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 650), including those arising from the instant circumstances. Thus, regardless of the healthy rapport which may have developed between this arrestee and his probation officer, duties of the latter compel him to render reasonable assistance to his fellow peace officers.
*479 If this minor had contacted his attorney, or his parents (People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375 [99 Cal. Rptr. 1, 491 P.2d 793]), either or both might have advised him to remain silent, that his legal prospects would be enhanced by aloofness rather than cooperation, that the burden of proving the case against him should not be eased by voluntary disclosures.
May a probation officer, a statutory peace officer, properly give that kind of advice, even if he believes it to be in the best interests of the minor? I doubt it. Consistent with his public responsibilities, the probation officer must counsel his charge to be cooperative and to help solve the crime, even if by so doing the minor implicates himself in a serious felony.
Thus I am concerned that ultimately the minor will not benefit by deeming his probation officer to be a surrogate attorney or parent, a role that the officer cannot objectively assume. Where a conflict between the minor and the law arises, the probation officer can be neither neutral nor in the minor's corner.
Still another potential problem looms on the horizon. When the probation officer, a statutory peace officer, advises the minor to cooperate with the police, perhaps even to confess, the minor is likely to complain later of what he will perceive as pervasive law enforcement pressure. He may argue, with some rationality, that he had been subjected to a variation of the Mutt-and-Jeff technique criticized in Miranda: initial interrogating by overbearing officers, then comforting by a presumably friendly and gentle peace officer in the guise of a probation officer. (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 452 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 710-711, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974].) The bottom line is that pursuant to the technique he will have submitted to interrogation. When that argument is made to us, as it inevitably will be one day, we will face a difficult problem.
With all my misgivings, however, I agree with the majority that the People have not met the burden imposed by People v. Randall (1970) 1 Cal.3d 948, 957 [83 Cal. Rptr. 658, 464 P.2d 114], of establishing that the "questioned confession meets the constitutional tests of admissibility."
Bird, C.J., concurred.
*480 CLARK, J., Dissenting.
The question presented is whether the People carried their burden of proving that defendant did not intend to assert his privilege against self-incrimination when he asked to see his probation officer. Reviewing this question in light of the totality of circumstances shown by the record, I, like the trial court and the unanimous Court of Appeal, conclude that the People did carry their burden. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment.
Because of confusion created by the majority, it is necessary to emphasize that this question is one of fact to be decided in light of the totality of circumstances shown by the record.
On the one hand, the majority appear to hold that defendant's request for his probation officer constituted, per se, an invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege, foreclosing consideration of the "totality of the circumstances" to determine whether his request was actually intended as such an invocation. "In cases in which we must decide whether a confession is voluntary or coerced we have looked to the `totality of the circumstances' to find whether the confessant was capable of understanding the interrogation and voluntarily confessed or whether his will was actually overcome. Here, however, we face conduct which, regardless of considerations of capacity, coercion or voluntariness, per se invokes the privilege against self-incrimination." (Ante, p. 477.)
On the other hand, in the succeeding paragraph the majority appear to recognize that our inquiry into whether defendant asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege is not concluded when we find, what is not disputed, that he asked for his probation officer, but that we must proceed to inquire whether his request was meant as an assertion of the privilege. "[W]e hold here that the People must meet the burden of proving that a minor who requests to see his probation officer does not intend to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege." (Ante, pp. 477-478.) This recognition of the People's right to assume that burden is compelled by People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375 [99 Cal. Rptr. 1, 491 P.2d 793]. "[W]e hold that when, as in the instant case, a minor is taken into custody and is subjected to interrogation, without the presence of an attorney, his request to see one of his parents, made at any time prior to or during questioning, must, in the absence of evidence demanding a contrary conclusion, be construed to indicate that the minor suspect desires to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege." (Id., at pp. 383-384, italics added.)
*481 What term of art applies to the evidence bearing on the question whether defendant intended to assert his privilege against self-incrimination when he asked for his probation officer? The term that comes to mind is the "totality of the circumstances" shown by the record. However, quibbles over terminology are of little moment so long as it is clearly understood that one must consider the circumstances  the "context," if you prefer  of defendant's request in order to determine its significance.
The question whether defendant's request for his probation officer manifested an unwillingness to proceed with the interrogation in his absence is readily resolved by simply reading the succeeding portion of the transcript. After being informed that his probation officer would not then be summoned, defendant was again advised of his right to remain silent and again asked if he understood that right. Replying that he did understand it, defendant reiterated his willingness to continue the interrogation. (Ante, pp. 473-474.)
Recognizing that it is a question of fact whether defendant intended to assert his privilege against self-incrimination by requesting his probation officer, the distinguished trial judge[1] concluded that the record clearly indicated that defendant was willing to proceed with the interrogation in the absence of his probation officer. Affirming the judgment, the Court of Appeal unanimously concluded that "the `totality of the circumstances' affords sufficient `affirmative proof' of an intent to waive the privilege." After independently reviewing the record I reach the same conclusion and lament the fact that the majority free a confessed murderer.[2]
Manuel, J., concurred.
NOTES
[1]  See Bryan v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 575, 587 [102 Cal. Rptr. 831, 498 P.2d 1079]; In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855, 860, footnote 7 [83 Cal. Rptr. 671, 464 P.2d 127].
[2]  The probation officer testified at trial that he had "instructed Michael that at any time he has a police contact, even if they stop him and talk to him on the street, he is to contact me immediately," reasoning that "many times the kids don't understand what is going on, and what they are supposed to do relative to police...."
[3]  Clearly defendant's fear that the police would bring in a police officer under the pretext of providing Michael with an attorney was real enough. As the interrogating officer said to Michael later in the interview, "Well we don't always play fair, do we?"
[4]  The dissent suggests that although it is clear in the present case that defendant requested to see his probation officer out of a desire for help in how to conduct himself with the police (cf. People v. Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 383), we should not find that such a request invoked defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. The dissent apparently argues that no invocation of Fifth Amendment rights occurred, because once defendant's request was denied, defendant was willing to continue the interrogation with the police. Under such an analysis, of course, the police could ignore a defendant's request for an attorney and still argue that any subsequent confession was properly obtained, since the defendant was "willing" to continue the interrogation in the absence of his attorney. The dissent's approach flies directly in the face of Miranda, which as we have noted, explicitly holds that "[i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." (384 U.S. at p. 474 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 723]. See also People v. Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 384.)
[1]  That Judge Bonnie Lee Martin is the author of one of the most widely used handbooks on search and seizure issues is but one indication of her scholarship and sensitivity to the constitutional issues present in situations involving the admissibility of evidence. (See Martin, Comprehensive Cal. Search and Seizure (1971).)
[2]  The Court of Appeal observed that without the confession the balance of the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction.


                             NUMBER 13-11-00663-CV

                             COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                      CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
____________________________________________________________

ROBERT J. MATTINE,                                                           Appellant,

                                            v.

BEAKLEY & ASSOCIATES,
P.C.AND JOHN W. BEAKLEY,                           Appellees.
____________________________________________________________

             On appeal from the 359th District Court
                 of Montgomery County, Texas.
____________________________________________________________

                                      ORDER

  Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Benavides and Longoria
                          Order Per Curiam

       This appeal was abated by this Court on April 27, 2012, due to the bankruptcy of

one of the parties to this appeal.   See 11 U.S.C. § 362; see generally TEX. R. APP. P. 8.

Since the abatement there has been no activity in this appeal.
      The Court hereby orders the parties to file, within fourteen days of the date of this

order, an advisory regarding the status of the appeal and, if applicable, a motion to

reinstate the appeal or a motion to dismiss the appeal.

      Failure to respond to this order will result in reinstatement and dismissal of the

appeal for want of prosecution. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(b),(c).

      It is so ORDERED.

                                                PER CURIAM

Delivered and filed the
18th day of December, 2013.

                                            2


9 F.3d 118
NOTICE:  Although citation of unpublished opinions remains unfavored, unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value on a material issue, and a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited in oral argument, copies are furnished to the Court and all parties.  See General Order of November 29, 1993, suspending 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or further order.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.LInda Lou BOYD, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 92-2207.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Nov. 2, 1993.

Before LOGAN, GARTH,2 and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT1

1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal.  See Fed.  R.App. P. 34(a);  10th Cir.  R. 34.1.9.  The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

2
Defendant Linda Lou Boyd appeals from the district court's denial of her motion to suppress incriminating statements she made.  The sole issue she raises is whether the district erred in finding that she had not invoked her right to counsel before making the statement.  We affirm.

3
The record reflects that Ms. Boyd was advised of her Miranda rights on three occasions.  After the first time, she made clear that she did not wish to make a statement, but she did not ask for an attorney or make any other reference to an attorney.  After the third Miranda advisement was given by a different agent, Ms. Boyd said she understood her rights and was willing to give a statement.  She signed a form to that effect.

4
The district court found that Ms. Boyd made no statement which could reasonably be construed as an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.  On appeal, Ms. Boyd asserts that invocation of the right to counsel may be implied from the totality of the circumstances under which the statement was made, and that the district court erred in failing to find she implicitly indicated her desire for an attorney when she initially declined to make a statement.

5
We do not disagree with Ms. Boyd's basic premise that invocation of the right to counsel may be inferred from the circumstances.  However, we are not persuaded the district court incorrectly interpreted the situation here.  As we made clear in United States v. Giles, 967 F.2d 382 (10th Cir.1992), "[t]o invoke this right requires, 'at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police,' " id. at 385 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 2209 (1991).  Ms. Boyd made no such statement.

6
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

2
 The Honorable Leonard I. Garth, Senior United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation

1
 This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir.  R. 36.3


675 F.2d 1100
Joe D. ROMERO and Virginia Romero, Plaintiffs-Appellants,v.Patricia HARRIS, Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare,Defendant-Appellee.
No. 79-1737.
United States Court of Appeals,Tenth Circuit.
March 11, 1982.

Timothy Meehan and Santiago Chavez, of Northern New Mexico Legal Services, Inc., Taos, N. M., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Alice Daniel, Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D. C.  (R. E. Thompson, U. S. Atty., Albuquerque, N. M., Randolph W. Gaines, Chief of Litigation, Baltimore, Md., Larry K. Banks, Dept. of Health and Human Services, Washington, D. C., were on the brief), for defendant-appellee.
Before SETH, Chief Judge, and HOLLOWAY and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges.
HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge.

1
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal.  See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); Tenth Cir. R. 10(e).  The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

2
This is an action by plaintiffs Joe D. and Virginia Romero for review of a decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, adverse to plaintiffs.  The final decision of the Secretary upheld a ruling against plaintiffs that they make repayment of alleged overpayments of supplemental security income (SSI) benefits.  After review of the record the district court held that the Secretary's decision was correct, and plaintiffs appeal.

3
* Plaintiffs were recipients of SSI benefits before this action was brought under Title 16 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq.).  During 1976 Mr. Romero served as governor of the Taos Indian Pueblo.  He received no wages for this position.  However, he did receive a portion of the royalties collected from tourists.  These royalties were placed in a savings account which gave the plaintiffs excess resources allowed for a couple under the Social Security Act.  The resource limitation for receipt of SSI benefits by an individual who had an eligible spouse, as here, was $2,250 for their nonexcludable resources.  See 20 CFR § 416.1205(b).

4
In January 1978 the Social Security Claims Representative conducted an interview with plaintiffs and discovered that they had a savings account containing excess resources.1  On further examination it was determined that the plaintiffs were overpaid social security benefits from July 1976 through August 1977, because of the funds held in this account.  The amount of the overpayments was determined to be $1,888.50 for each plaintiff.2

5
In October 1978 an administrative hearing was held.  Mrs. Concho, plaintiffs' daughter, interpreted for Mr. Romero who does not speak English.  At the time of the hearing Mr. Romero was 81 and Mrs. Romero was 77.  Mr. Romero testified that he and his wife had a savings account at the time of one of the interviews which was conducted in October 1977.  He testified that the balance in the account at this time was approximately $2,000.  We note this was below the resource limitation, mentioned earlier.  He further indicated that at this interview he was not asked whether or not he had a savings account, nor did he disclose such information.  However, he did state that he would have disclosed the existence of the savings account had he been asked.  Mr. Romero testified that between January 1976 and October 1977 he was not made aware by anyone from the social security administration that he had a duty to report the savings account.  Mrs. Romero testified to the same effect on these facts.

6
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) made the following findings of fact: (1) the two claimants were overpaid benefits in the sum of $1,888.50 each in supplemental security income from July 1, 1976 to September 1977; (2) the claimants were at fault in causing the overpayments; (3) a refund of the overpayments would not be against equity and good conscience; (4) a refund of the overpayments would not defeat the purpose of Title XVI of the Social Security Act; (5) recovery has been made of a portion of the overpayments, and (6) total recovery of the overpayments should not be waived.  The ALJ held as a matter of law that refund of the overpayments should not be waived pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 404(b).

7
The plaintiffs appealed the ALJ's decision to the Appeals Council which concluded that there was no basis for granting the plaintiffs' request for review.  In reaching this conclusion the Council discussed only on the fault issue.  Specifically, it cited Exhibit 2, plaintiffs' statement for determining continuing eligibility for SSI payments dated October 7, 1977, as indicating that plaintiffs reported no savings when they actually had $2,000.  The Council's decision also stated that it was known that plaintiffs answered questions about their income and resources "on November 9, 1976, and apparently failed to report savings of $4,705.64."  The Council said that this supported a finding that plaintiffs "were not without fault in causing the overpayment and therefore recovery may not be waived even if it was found that it would defeat the purpose of title XVI of the Social Security Act."  (II R. 3).  This became the final decision of the Secretary.

8
Plaintiffs then brought this review action in the District Court for the District of New Mexico.  The district judge's opinion stated that the ALJ had not made any specific findings as to why he thought the plaintiffs were at fault; that however the Council's letter notifying them of its decision "states that the plaintiffs reported no savings when they actually had some and they did not report savings at another time."  The court stated that while Mr. Romero does not understand English, his wife does, that both knew about the savings account and used the money as their own, and that they should at least have reported the savings on their statement for continuing eligibility in October 1977.  The court concluded that there is substantial evidence from which the Secretary could conclude that plaintiffs were at fault in causing the overpayments.  (I R. 26-27).

9
On appeal, plaintiffs make three general arguments for reversal.  They claim that the Secretary's decision is in error in that (1) the finding of a knowing failure in November 1976 to disclose material information concerning plaintiffs' SSI benefits is not supported by substantial evidence or any record evidence; (2) the finding of a knowing failure in October 1977 to disclose information was in error because it was immaterial to the creation of the alleged overpayments, being after the period of the overpayments; (3) the findings that recovery of the overpayments would not defeat the purpose of Title XVI and would not be against equity or good conscience are not supported by substantial evidence and are in error.

II

10
Section 1631(b) of the Social Security Act as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1383(b), provides that whenever the Secretary finds that an incorrect amount of benefits has been paid with respect to an individual, proper adjustment or recovery shall be made by appropriate adjustments in future payments, or by recovery from or payment to such individual or his eligible spouse.  However, 42 U.S.C.A. § 404(b) provides that

11
In any case in which more than the correct amount of payment has been made, there shall be no adjustment of payments to, or recovery by the United States from, any person who is without fault if such adjustment or recovery would defeat the purpose of this subchapter or would be against equity and good conscience.

12
The regulations follow the statutory pattern.  20 CFR § 416.550 (1976) provides for waiver of adjustment or recovery of an overpayment of supplemental security income benefits when:

13
(a) (t)he overpaid individual was without fault in connection with an overpayment, and

14
(b) (a)djustment or recovery of such overpayment would either:

15
(1) (d)efeat the purpose of title XVI, or

16
(2) (b)e against equity or good conscience, or

17
(3) (i)mpede efficient or effective administration of title XVI due to the small amount involved.

18
In order to come within these provisions for waiver of adjustment or recovery to recoup overpayments a recipient must make the showing that he comes within such waiver provisions.  Morgan v. Finch, 423 F.2d 551, 553 (6th Cir.).

19
20 CFR § 416.552 (1976) provides that in determining whether an SSI recipient is "without fault," it is necessary to consider

20
all the pertinent circumstances surrounding the overpayment in the particular case.  The Social Security Administration considers the individual's understanding of the reporting requirements, the agreement to report events affecting payments, knowledge of the occurrence of events that should have been reported, efforts to comply with the reporting requirements, opportunities to comply with the reporting requirements, understanding of the obligation to return checks which were not due, and ability to comply with the reporting requirements (e.g., age, comprehension, memory, physical and mental condition).  Although the finding depends on all of the circumstances in the particular case, an individual will be found to have been at fault in connection with an overpayment when an incorrect payment resulted from one of the following:

21
(a) (f)ailure to furnish information which the individual knew or should have known was material;

22
(b) (a)n incorrect statement made by the individual which he knew or should have known was incorrect ..., or

23
(c) (t)he individual did not return a payment which he knew or could have been expected to know was incorrect.

24
The plaintiffs' challenges to the findings made against them must now be considered.

III

25
Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in holding that the Secretary's decision was supported by substantial evidence in finding that the plaintiffs were not without fault in creating the overpayments.  Plaintiffs vigorously challenge the two portions of the evidence relied on by the Appeals Council and the district judge as supporting the general finding against them on this issue of fault.

26
First, the Appeals Council's decision and the findings of the ALJ, (II R. 3, 15), cite Exhibit 2 and the Appeals Council's decision states that the exhibit was dated October 7, 1977, and shows that the plaintiffs "reported no savings when (they) actually had $2,000."  (II R. 3).  The ALJ cited Exhibit 1 dated June 1978 and Exhibits 2, 3 and 4 dated respectively October 1977, February 1978, and May 1978, (II R. 15), as support for the finding against plaintiffs on the fault issue.  The plaintiffs point out, however, that such evidence is immaterial because it all relates to statements after the period in question.  The ALJ found that the overpayments were between July 1, 1976, and September 1977 and the Appeals Council accepted the ALJ's decision without modification on that finding, or otherwise.

27
We must agree that no representations by plaintiffs within these exhibits occurred at a time when they could have caused any of the overpayments in question to occur.  Indeed the Secretary's regulations quoted earlier specifically provide that an individual "will be found to have been at fault in connection with an overpayment where an incorrect payment resulted from" failure to furnish information or an incorrect statement, inter alia.  20 CFR § 416.552 (1976).  (Emphasis added).  In addition, there was testimony by Mr. and Mrs. Romero that they had no communication with the Social Security offices about the savings account prior to October 1977 and had no idea that disclosure was required.  (II R. 32-35, 40).  There was no testimony by Government witnesses showing any statements by plaintiffs before October 1977 from which the overpayments could have resulted.  We must agree that these exhibits as cited and the record testimony cannot serve as substantial evidence supporting the finding that plaintiffs were at fault in causing the overpayments.

28
Further, the plaintiffs challenge the statement in the decision of the Appeals Council that it was "further known that plaintiffs answered questions about (their) income and resources on November 9, 1976, and apparently failed to report savings of $4,705.64."  (II R. 3).  This statement is not supported by any citation to record evidence, and no finding to this effect concerning any November 1976 events was made by the ALJ.  No evidence cited by the ALJ supports this statement of the Appeals Council.  We find no support in the record for the statement and there was the direct testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Romero, cited earlier, that they had no communication with the Social Security offices before October 1977 about the savings account.  Despite the plaintiffs' direct challenge on the issue (Brief of Appellants at 13-14), there is no evidence cited by the Government in its responsive brief to defend the Council's statement about the alleged November 9, 1976, failure to report the savings account.

29
On this state of the record, and in view of the requirement of the regulations that a finding of fault is made when overpayment "resulted from" a failure to furnish information or an incorrect statement, we must hold that there is not substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support the findings of the Secretary on this issue.  Hedge v. Richardson, 458 F.2d 1065, 1067 (10th Cir.).  Thus the finding on this issue must be reversed and we hold that on the record the first condition for waiver of recovery of the overpayment is satisfied, namely that plaintiffs were not at fault in causing the overpayments.

IV

30
This brings us to the remaining part of the showing required of plaintiffs, namely that recovery of the overpayments would defeat the purpose of Title XVI, or that recovery would be against equity or good conscience, or that it would impede the efficient or effective administration of Title XVI due to the small amount involved.  20 CFR § 416.550 (1976).

31
Plaintiffs argue that they have satisfied this second part of their burden, namely that they had shown that recovery would defeat the purpose of Title XVI under the standards of the regulations and that recovery would be against equity and good conscience.  First they say that the record establishes that their only source of income was SSI payments and that withholding of benefits to recoup the overpayments forced them below the minimum levels of income permissible under the regulations for necessary living expenses.  (Appellants' Reply Brief at 11-12).  Thus they contend that the summary finding of the ALJ that refund would not defeat the purpose of Title XVI is not supported by the record and is in error.

32
The controlling regulation for waiver on the ground that recovery of overpayments would defeat the purpose of Title XVI is 20 CFR § 416.553, reproduced in the margin.3 The 1978 version of this regulation is the relevant one on this issue because the ALJ's finding that recovery would not defeat the purpose of Title XVI was made in October 1978.  (II R. 16).  Moreover it was in September 1978 when the Social Security Administration informed the plaintiffs of the amount of their reduction in benefits as a result of the overpayment.  The Administration stated that $35.51 would be withheld from each of the monthly SSI benefit checks sent to each recipient, beginning in October 1978.  It also stated that beginning in October 1978, each plaintiff was entitled to $121.05 on a continuing monthly basis.  (II R. 138-39).

33
Plaintiffs contend that the ALJ's finding of October 27, 1978, that refund would not defeat the purpose of Title XVI, (II R. 16), is not supported by substantial evidence; that the record facts clearly establish that recovery would defeat the purpose of Title XVI, under either of the standards set out in 20 CFR § 416.553 (1978).  It is only necessary for the claimant to make a showing under subsection (a) or (b) in the alternative, and here the pertinent one is subsection (a) of § 416.553.

34
Plaintiffs made the requisite showing under section (a) that their total monthly income would not exceed the applicable federal monthly standard payment rates, plus one third of the quarterly amount of excludable earned and unearned income plus any state supplementary payments.  The federal monthly standard payment rate in effect for the remainder of 1975 and any calendar year thereafter is $236.60.  20 CFR § 416.412 (1978).4  Within the meaning of § 416.553, see note 4, supra, plaintiffs have no excludable earned and unearned income, nor do they receive any state supplementary payments, (II R. 85, 94, 98), and these facts are not in controversy.  Thus, the $236.60 amount is the one to be compared with the plaintiffs' current total monthly income since plaintiffs have no other monthly income than the SSI payments.5  Considering this single source of income, it is clear that the plaintiffs' combined total monthly benefits of $171.08 (total benefit after monthly withholding to recover overpayment) are less than $236.60, the "Federal Monthly standard payment" under § 416.553, with required additions.6

35
In sum, the record is not in dispute on these controlling facts.  The effect of the adjustments reducing plaintiffs' SSI payments in 1978 brought their net benefits below levels specified by § 416.553(a) (1978), thus defeating the remedial purpose of Title XVI.  Woods v. Gardner, 286 F.Supp. 648, 651 (W.D.Pa.).  The finding that recovery by withholding from plaintiffs' SSI benefits would not defeat the purpose of Title XVI is clearly not supported by substantial evidence and must be reversed.7

36
Accordingly the judgment upholding the Secretary's decision and dismissing the complaint is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accord with this opinion.

1
 The record shows that there were balances as follows in the plaintiffs' saving account at the First State Bank of Taos (II R. 127, 128):
7-1-76    $ 1,935.42
7-27-76     3,536.42
8-12-76     4,652.07
10-29-76    4,705.64
11-29-76    3,405.64
12-31-76    3,434.02
01-03-77    4,434.02
03-07-77  $ 3,434.02
03-31-77    3,476.95
06-30-77    3,620.40
07-01-77    3,520.40
08-22-77    3,020.40
09-13-77    2,820.40
09-22-77    2,000.00

2
 From April 1978 until August 1978 plaintiffs' entire benefits were withheld so that at the time of the administrative hearing the amount of the overpayment was $1,204.35 each

3
 20 CFR § 416.553 provides that:
Waiver of adjustment or recovery is proper when the person on whose behalf waiver is being considered is without fault, as defined in § 416.552, and adjustment or recovery would defeat the purpose of title XVI.  For purposes of this subpart, adjustment or recovery of an overpayment will be considered to defeat the purpose of title XVI:
(a) If such person's current total monthly income does not exceed:
(1) The applicable Federal monthly standard payment rate (see Subpart D of this part), plus
(2) One-third of the quarterly amount of earned or unearned income excludable pursuant to § 416.1165 (i.e. $20), plus
(3) One third of the quarterly amount of earned income excludable pursuant to § 416.1167 but no more than $65, plus
(4) The applicable State supplementary payment, if any (see Subpart T of this part); or
(b) If recovery or adjustment would deprive such person of income or financial resources needed for ordinary and necessary living expenses under the criteria in § 404.508(a) of this chapter.  (40 FR 47764, Oct. 10, 1975)

4
 Cost of living adjustments are made from time to time, but for our purposes it is unnecessary to trace further increases after this $236.60 figure

5
 The appellate briefs of the parties are in agreement that the Romeros' sources of funds consisted solely of SSI and food stamps.  (Appellants Reply Brief at 11-12; Brief for Appellee at 8).  Mr. Romero's term as Governor of the Pueblo, during which he had received tourists' royalties, ceased in December 1976.  (II R. 31-32).  There was a dispute as to whether the value of food stamps coupons are includible as income, but the regulations of the Secretary clearly stipulate that they are not includible. 20 CFR § 416.1146(d) (1978)

6
 The Secretary's brief of May 1980 states that "plaintiffs, even with the $71.00 recoupment adjustment, received.$373.00 monthly in SSI and food stamp benefits."  (Brief for Appellee at 8).  For purposes of § 416.553, the $100 food stamp benefits to the couple are not considered.  See note 6, supra.  The remaining $273 figure as a monthly SSI payment to plaintiffs as a couple is not shown in our record.  However, if payments have risen to $273 monthly, then after the $71.02 recoupment withholding they still would be below the $236.60, which was the minimum amount of income for an eligible couple under § 416.553.  And, as stated earlier, just before the critical time of the October 1978 hearing, the Social Security Administration wrote both plaintiffs and said their monthly payments would be $121.05 each "before we begin to recover your overpayment," (II R. 138, 139), by withholding $35.51 from the check to each plaintiff.  As reduced by the withholding, the 1978 net payments of $171.08 to the couple were well below the $236.60 minimum so as to defeat the purpose of the Title under § 416.553

7
 In view of our disposition on this proposition that recovery would defeat the purpose of Title XVI it is unnecessary to address the alternative question whether recovery would be against equity and good conscience, although a substantial question is also raised as to the ALJ's finding on that issue


242 F.Supp.2d 977 (2003)
Ruslan RAZILOV, Sara Lapham, and Derek Lapham, Plaintiffs,
v.
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and Allied Group, Inc., Defendants.
No. CV 01-1466-BR.
United States District Court, D. Oregon.
January 21, 2003.
*978 Mark A. Friel, N. Robert Stoll, Steve D. Larson, Steven C. Berman, Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlachter P.C., Portland, OR, Charles A. Ringo, Beaverton, OR, for Plaintiffs.
Heidi L. Mandt, Jan K. Kitchel, Joshua P. Stump, Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, P.C., Richard J. Kuhn, Hoffman, Hart & Wagner LLP, Portland, OR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
BROWN, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (# 57).
Ruslan Razilov, Jason Boutros, Sara Lapham, and Derek Lapham brought this class action on behalf of individuals who purchased personal lines of insurance from Defendants Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (Nationwide) and Allied Group, Inc. (Allied) and from their subsidiaries and affiliates from October 1999 to the *979 present. Plaintiffs allege Defendants used information in consumer reports when underwriting or rating such insurance policies, took adverse action against Plaintiffs and others based on such information, and then failed to provide notice of their adverse action as required by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. Plaintiffs seek statutory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees.
Nationwide moved to dismiss the action. The Court heard oral argument on March 18, 2002, and denied the Motion. Nationwide then filed its first Motion For Summary Judgment on July 15, 2002. After Boutros and Razilov filed a First Amended Complaint on August 5, 2002, adding the Laphams as plaintiffs and Allied as a defendant, Nationwide withdrew its Motion for Summary Judgment. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff Boutros voluntarily dismissed his claim.
On September 6, 2002, Defendants filed their Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants seek dispositive rulings on three grounds. First, Allied asserts it does not use consumer credit reports when underwriting insurance because it is "simply a stock holding company and does not underwrite insurance." Allied argues, therefore, it could not have taken any adverse action against Plaintiffs as a matter of law. Second, Nationwide contends Razilov's alleged FCRA injury is not "fairly traceable" to Nationwide as a matter of law because Nationwide did not issue Razilov's policy. In any event, Nationwide maintains it did not take any adverse action against Razilov even if it gave consumer credit information to AMCO Insurance Company (AMCO), the entity that issued Razilov's policy. Finally, Nationwide argues this Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims of the Laphams, who are Texas residents, against Nationwide.
After a thorough review of the record, the Court concludes Defendants have failed to establish definitively that Allied is "simply a holding company and does not underwrite insurance," which is the premise of Defendants' Motion applicable to Allied. In addition, because Defendants did not refute or address many of the facts Plaintiffs asserted in their Response to Defendants' Concise Statement of Facts, the Court deems Plaintiffs' version of those facts admitted for purposes of this Motion. When viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court concludes fact issues exist concerning Allied's role, if any, in the alleged taking of adverse action against policyholders based on consumer reports in violation of FCRA. As a consequence, the Court cannot resolve on this record Allied's contention that it did not take any adverse action against any Plaintiff as a matter of law. The Court, therefore, DENIES this part of Defendants' Motion.
The Court concludes, nonetheless, Plaintiffs have not established Razilov suffered an injury fairly traceable to the actions of Nationwide based on the plain language of § 1681m. The Court finds, therefore, Nationwide is entitled to summary judgment on Razilov's claims as a matter of law because Razilov lacks standing to bring those claims against Nationwide. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS this part of Defendants' Motion.
Finally, the Court finds it has jurisdiction over the Laphams' claims against Nationwide and DENIES this part of Defendants' Motion.

STANDARDS

1. Summary Judgment
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) authorizes summary judgment if no genuine issue exists regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party must show the *980 absence of an issue of material fact. Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir.2001). In response to a properly-supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and show there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
An issue of fact is genuine " `if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Guidroz-Brault v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 254 F.3d 825, 829 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). All reasonable inferences from the facts in the record must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Hensley v. Northwest Permanente P.C. Ret. Plan & Trust, 258 F.3d 986, 999 (9th Cir.2001), cert, denied, 534 U.S. 1082, 122 S.Ct. 815, 151 L.Ed.2d 699 (2002). A mere disagreement about a material issue of fact, however, does not preclude summary judgment. Jackson v. Bank of Haw., 902 F.2d 1385, 1389 (9th Cir.1990). The substantive law governing a claim or a defense determines whether a fact is material. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).

2. Statutory Construction
When a district court interprets a federal statute, it must apply a two-part analysis. "The first and most important step in construing a statute is the statutory language itself." Royal Foods Co. v. RJR Holdings, Inc., 252 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir.2001) (citing Chevron USA v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)). The court must look to the text of the statute to " `determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.' " Id. (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997)).
"The meaningor ambiguityof certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context." Food and Drug Admin, v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000). Accordingly, it is a " `fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.'" Id. at 133, 120 S.Ct. 1291 (quoting Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809, 109 S.Ct. 1500, 103 L.Ed.2d 891 (1989)). A court, therefore, must "interpret the statute as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme, and fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious whole." Food and Drug Admin, v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 133, 120 S.Ct. 1291 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
If the congressional intent is clear from the plain meaning of the statute, the court need not look any further for guidance. Id. If the statute is ambiguous, however, the court must proceed to the second step and determine the meaning of the statutory language by giving deference to the governing agency's interpretation as long as that interpretation is permissible. Id. at 132, 120 S.Ct. 1291. If there is no agency interpretation and the text of the statute is ambiguous, the court may look to legislative history as an aid to discern congressional intent. In re Bankruptcy Estate ofMarkAir, Inc., 308 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir.2002). See also Merkel v. Comm'r, 192 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir.1999) ("[I]f the statute is ambiguous, we consult the legislative history, to the extent that it is of value, to aid in our interpretation.").

FCRA
When Congress enacted FCRA, it required consumer credit reporting agencies to adopt procedures for meeting the *981 needs of business in a manner both fair and equitable to the consumer. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b). The purpose of FCRA is to protect consumers from the transmission of inaccurate information about them. Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329,1333 (9th Cir.1995).
Under FCRA, a consumer reporting agency may furnish consumer reports:
(3) To a person which it has reason to believe
(A) intends to use the information in connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the information is to be furnished and involving the extension of credit to, or review or collection of an account of, the consumer; or
(B) intends to use the information for employment purposes; or
(C) intends to use the information in connection with the underwriting of insurance involving the consumer; or
(D) intends to use the information in connection with a determination of the consumer's eligibility for a license or other benefit granted by a governmental instrumentality required by law to consider an applicant's financial responsibility or status; or
(E) intends to use the information, as a potential investor or servicer, or current insurer, in connection with a valuation of, or an assessment of the credit or prepayment risks associated with, an existing credit obligation; or
(F) otherwise has a legitimate business need for the information
(i) in connection with a business transaction that is initiated by the consumer; or
(ii) to review an account to determine whether the consumer continues to meet the terms of the account. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(3).
In addition to governing the conduct of consumer reporting agencies, FCRA requires the user of information provided by consumer reporting agencies to satisfy certain responsibilities. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) provides:
If any person takes any adverse action with respect to any consumer that is based in whole or in part on any information contained in a consumer report, the person shall
(1) provide oral, written, or electronic notice of the adverse action to the consumer;
(2) provide to the consumer orally, in writing, or electronically
(A) the name, address, and telephone number of the consumer reporting agency ... that furnished the report to the person; and
(B) a statement that the consumer reporting agency did not make the decision to take the adverse action and is unable to provide the consumer the specific reasons why the adverse action was taken; and
(3) provide to the consumer an oral, written, or electronic notice of the consumer's right
(A) to obtain ... a free copy of a consumer report on the consumer from the consumer reporting agency... which notice shall include an indication of the 60-day period under that section for obtaining such a copy; and
(B) to dispute ... with a consumer reporting agency the accuracy or completeness of any information in a consumer report furnished by the agency.
Similarly, a person or entity that takes an adverse action against a consumer based on certain information provided by *982 an entity related by common ownership or affiliated by common corporate control also has certain obligations under FCRA.
15 U.S.C. § 1681m(b)(2) provides:
(A) Duties, generally. If a person takes an action described in subparagraph (B) with respect to a consumer, based in whole or in part on information described in subparagraph (C), the person shall [give notice to the consumer].
* * * * *
(B) Action described. An action referred to in subparagraph (A) is ... any adverse action described in clause (i) or (ii) of section 1681a(k)(1)(B) of this title.
(C) Information described. Information referred to in subparagraph (A)
(i) except as provided in clause (ii), is information that
(I) is furnished to the person taking the action by a person related by common ownership or affiliated by common corporate control to the person taking the action; and
(II) bears on the credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living of the consumer; and
(ii) does not include
(I) information solely as to transactions or experiences between the consumer and the person furnishing the information; or
(II) information in a consumer report.
In connection with insurance, FCRA defines an "adverse action" to include:
(i) a denial or cancellation of, an increase in any charge for, or a reduction or other adverse or unfavorable change in the terms of coverage or amount of, any insurance, existing or applied for, in connection with the underwriting of insurance....
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(k)(1)(B)(i).

FACTS
The factual record on Defendants' Motion is not a model of clarity. Defendants combined in one Motion diverse arguments involving Allied, Nationwide, a nonparty entity described as "Nationwide Lloyds Insurance Company," as well as other insuring entities. Defendants failed to provide a clear, concise, undisputed factual record that identifies these entities and definitively explains their role, if any, in taking adverse action against any named Plaintiffs. In addition, Defendants did not support all of the assertions they made in their Concise Statement of Facts with citations to the evidentiary record as required by Local Rule (LR) 56.1(c). Defendants also did not admit or deny many of the facts Plaintiffs asserted in their Response to Defendants' Concise Statement of Facts.
LR 56.1(b)(3) states: "In the same manner as set forth in LR 56.1(b)(1) [accepting or denying each fact], the moving arty shall reply to the responding party's additional facts." LR 56.1(f) provides: For purposes of a motion for summary judgment, material facts set forth in the concise statement of the moving party, or in the response to the moving party's concise statement, will be deemed admitted unless specifically denied, or otherwise controverted by a separate concise statement of the opposing party.
(Emphasis added.)
In addition, LR 56.1(e) provides:
Except as otherwise required by law, when resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court has no independent duty to search and consider any part of the court record not otherwise referenced *983 in the separate concise statements of the parties.
As a consequence, the lengthy, factual record in this case is remarkably unhelpful and fraught with potentially immaterial details introduced by Plaintiffs, which the Court, nonetheless, must consider as deemed admissions.
As best the Court can tell, therefore, the following facts either are undisputed or deemed admitted except when otherwise noted:
AMCO, who is not a party to this action, issued and sold the relevant insurance policies to Razilov. The parties do not specify, however, the respective roles of AMCO and the entity or entities that underwrote the policies. The parties also fail to make clear whether they agree AMCO, as issuer, took adverse action against Razilov when it adjusted premiums for his policies based on information in his consumer credit report.
In paragraph 34 of their Response to Defendants' Concise Statement of Facts, Plaintiffs assert "Razilov was charged more for insurance by defendants based in part on information contained in his credit report." (Emphasis added.) As noted, AMCO is not a named defendant. The only evidence Plaintiffs cite in support of the assertion that "Defendants" charged Razilov an increased premium is Defendants' response to a request for admission in which they state: As to an action taken by one of its subsidiary companies, Allied Group, Inc., admits that AMCO Insurance Company adjusted plaintiff Razilov's renewal premium for his automobile insurance policy based on information in a consumer report.
Friel Aff., Ex. 28 at 2. Defendants, however, neither admitted nor denied Plaintiffs' assertion. For purposes of this Motion, therefore, the Court accepts as undisputed that AMCO adjusted Razilov's renewal premium adversely based on information in a consumer report.[1] The Court notes, however, Plaintiffs do not offer any factual evidence to show "Defendants" charged Razilov more for insurance based in part on information contained in his consumer credit report.
AMCO is a subsidiary of Defendants Allied and Nationwide. Allied is a regional insurance holding company incorporated under the laws of the State of Iowa. Allied also is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Nationwide and refers to its group of subsidiaries collectively as "Allied Insurance, a Member of Nationwide Insurance." The name "Allied Insurance" refers to Allied, AMCO, Allied Property & Casualty Company, Depositors Insurance Company, and Nationwide. Allied, AMCO, Allied Property & Casualty Company, and Depositors Insurance Company are listed on Allied's letterhead.
Allied owns the domain name for and hosts the website "www.alliedinsurance.com" The website enables Allied policyholders in Oregon and elsewhere to sign up for a "myAlliedPolicy.com" personal account through which they can obtain up-todate information about their policies, track billing, determine the status of claims, and arrange for the automatic payment of premiums. Neither Allied nor its subsidiaries have any employees. The president of Allied has day-to-day responsibilities for overseeing the activities of Allied and its "downstream subsidiaries."
Defendants contend Allied is a stock holding company and support that assertion with (1) references from the 2000 Form B Holding Company System Registration Statement filed with the Insurance Department of the State of Ohio that, in *984 turn, reflects Allied is a stock corporation and a property and casualty insurance holding company and (2) a notarized letter from the Oregon Department of Consumer and Business Services in which the Department states Allied is "known as a stock holding company." Plaintiffs dispute, however, that Defendants provided sufficient evidence to establish Allied is merely a stock holding company.
The parties agree Allied does not hold a current certificate of authority to write insurance in Oregon. In addition, Defendants contend Allied has never applied for such authority. Plaintiffs, however, assert Defendants did not provide any evidence to support this contention. Defendants rely on a notarized letter from the Oregon Department of Consumer and Business Services in which the Department indicates Allied is not currently a licensed entity in the state of Oregon. In that letter, the Department also concludes that Allied would not be licensed as an insurance company transacting insurance business in Oregon because it is "known as" a stock holding company.
Nationwide is licensed to sell insurance in Oregon. Nationwide employs all of the individuals who make underwriting, rating, or FCRA compliance decisions on behalf of Nationwide, Allied, and their subsidiaries.
Nationwide also establishes the policies and procedures for itself and its subsidiaries (including Allied) regarding the use of consumer credit information for underwriting and rating personal lines of insurance. Nationwide markets through exclusive agents; independent agents; direct responses; the Internet; and bank, worksite, and affinity partnerships. Nationwide owns and hosts the website "www.nationwide.com," which allows policyholders, including those in Oregon, to sign up for a "MyNationwide" personal account. The personal account allows policyholders to view policy details, to make changes to policies, to view policy forms and endorsements, to check billing information, and to get information on claims. Nationwide also provides insurance quotes and sells insurance directly through its website.
Nationwide prepared and filed the 2000 Form B Insurance Company Registration Statement with the Ohio Insurance Department on behalf of numerous subsidiaries. The Statement identifies Nationwide as the "ultimate controlling company." Nationwide and certain entities owned by Nationwide and Allied, may advertise, solicit, underwrite, and perform actuarial services for one another. Nationwide and Allied have contracted with TransUnion, LLC, to obtain credit reports for their use and for their subsidiaries' use in connection with underwriting insurance.
In December 1999, Nationwide's Director of Product Compliance and its Product Compliance Specialist exchanged emails in which they discussed efforts to ensure that Nationwide's subsidiary, Colonial County Mutual Insurance Company,[2] was in compliance with Nationwide's FCRA guidelines. Colonial does business all over the United States. Nationwide's Director of Product Compliance also sent emails to all Nationwide State Product Directors and State Officers, including the Vice President of Allied's staff underwriting operation, providing guidelines for agents and service centers regarding compliance with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and FCRA.
In addition, The Vice President responsible for pricing Nationwide's personal lines of insurance has some oversight responsibility for the setting of rates for insurance issued through a number of Nationwide subsidiaries and affiliates. Some *985 insurance policies issued through Nationwide subsidiaries are partially managed by Nationwide's home office in Ohio. Nationwide filed with the Oregon Insurance Division a table that showed proposed rate changes for companies owned by Allied and that indicated Nationwide and AMCO use the same financial stability discounts for rating personal lines of insurance. In September 2000, Allied made an insurance rate and rule filing with the State of Oregon on behalf of Nationwide. The Director of Product Compliance for Nationwide also has shared information regarding Nationwide policies and procedures with the Vice President of Allied's staff underwriting operation.
Nationwide's 1998 merger with Allied provided Nationwide with the opportunity to grow through approximately 3,000 independent agencies. Allied assumed responsibility for Nationwide's independent agency system. Allied also uses Nationwide's registered "frame" mark.
The Plaintiffs Lapham are residents of Texas and have never been residents of Oregon. While the Laphams resided in Texas, Nationwide issued their automobile insurance policy, and "Nationwide Lloyds," an affiliate of Nationwide that is a Texas company doing business in Texas, issued the Lapham's homeowners policy. In addition, Defendants contend the Laphams' policies were issued under the laws of the State of Texas, and Nationwide Lloyds "only" does business in Texas. Although Plaintiffs assert Defendants did not submit evidence to support these assertions, this dispute is immaterial to the resolution of this Motion. The Court, therefore, does not need to consider it.

DISCUSSION
As noted, Defendants renewed their Motion for Summary Judgment on the following grounds: (1) Allied has no liability under FCRA because it is a stock holding company, and does not underwrite insurance and, therefore, could not "take" adverse action as a matter of law; (2) Razilov has no standing against Nationwide because he has never been a Nationwide policyholder and no FCRA injury is fairly traceable to Nationwide; and (3) the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over the claims of Texas residents Sara Lapham and Derek Lapham.
In response, Plaintiffs argue: (1) FCRA requires notice to be given to a consumer by any person or entity, including but not limited to an insurer, who takes an adverse action based on information contained in a consumer credit report; (2) Nationwide took or participated in taking adverse action against Plaintiffs when it set guidelines for the use of credit scores by Nationwide and its subsidiaries in the underwriting and rating of insurance; (3) the Laphams consented to this Court's jurisdiction by filing their claim in this Court; (4) general jurisdiction exists over Nationwide; and (5) Nationwide waived any objection to this Court's personal jurisdiction over Nationwide when it filed a Motion to Dismiss and failed to raise that defense.

1. On this record, the Court cannot determine whether Allied took adverse actions against any Plaintiff and, then, failed to give the required FCRA notice.
As noted, to determine whether Allied took adverse action against any Plaintiff, the Court first must attempt to determine the plain meaning of the language in certain FCRA provisions.
Section 1681m(a) of Title 15 provides:
If any person takes any adverse action with respect to any consumer that is based in whole or in part on any information *986 contained in a consumer report, the person shall[provide notice] .... (Emphasis added.)
Section 1681m(b) provides:

If a person takes an action described in subparagraph (B) [adverse action described in section 1681a(k)(1)(A) or in clause (i) or (ii) of section 1681a(k)(1)(B)] with respect to a consumer, based in whole or in part on information described in subparagraph (C), the person shall-[provide notice].... (Emphasis added.)
The plain language of the statute requires any person who takes an adverse action against a consumer to give notice to that consumer. "Person" includes "any individual, partnership, corporation, trust, cooperative, association, government or governmental subdivision or agency, or other entity." 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(b). Allied is a corporation and, therefore, a "person" for purposes of FCRA liability.
As previously noted, FCRA defines an "adverse action" to include: (i) a denial or cancellation of, an increase in any charge for, or a reduction or other adverse or unfavorable change in the terms of coverage or amount of, any insurance, existing or applied for, in connection with the underwriting of insurance.... 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(k)(1)(B)(i).
Defendants argue Allied does not issue or underwrite insurance policies and Allied is, in fact, a stock holding company that is not licensed to write insurance in Oregon. Defendants also contend mere participation in the taking of an adverse action is not actionable under FCRA as a matter of law. Accordingly, Defendants maintain Allied was incapable of taking an adverse action against any Plaintiff.
According to Plaintiffs, however, "Allied Group uses insurance scores to rate or underwrite auto insurance policies issued by AMCO and Nationwide, including in Oregon." Pls.' Resp. to Defs.' Concise Statement of Facts at ¶ 26. Plaintiffs support this assertion with the deposition testimony of Melinda H. Oosten, the Senior Actuarial Officer in charge of pricing for Allied. Friel Aff., Ex. 2 at 4-5. Plaintiffs also assert Allied contracted with TransUnion to obtain credit reports for use by Allied and its subsidiaries in connection with underwriting insurance. Plaintiffs support this assertion with the Service Agreement between Allied and TransUnion and the deposition testimony of Daniel D. Ellet. The Court must accept these assertions as true for purposes of this Motion because Defendants did not directly dispute either of them. Defendants only provided evidence that Allied currently lacks a license to write insurance in Oregon and failed to establish that Allied is merely a stock holding company. Accordingly, the Court assumes for purposes of this Motion that Allied underwrites automobile policies issued by AMCO in Oregon and uses insurance scores based on consumer credit reports when doing so.
For the permissible purpose of "underwriting," the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has provided:
An insurer may obtain a consumer report to decide whether or not to issue a policy to the consumer, the amount and terms of coverage, the duration of the policy, the rates or fees charged, or whether or not to renew or cancel a policy, because these are all "underwriting" decisions.
Comment 604(3)(C)-1, 16 C.F.R. Pt. 600, App. (2002).
To "underwrite" means "to set one's name to (an insurance policy) for the purpose of thereby becoming answerable for a designated loss or damage on consideration of receiving a premium percentage: insure on life or property; also: to assume *987 liability for (a sum or risk) as an insurer." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary at 1289 (10th ed.1998).
Although Defendants argue it is impossible for Allied to deny, to cancel, or to change any customer's insurance policy because Allied does not issue insurance policies, neither party has provided this Court with undisputed facts that identify the scope of Allied's assumed role as an underwriter of the policies at issue. That ambiguity is heightened because the Court also must draw all inferences favorable to Plaintiffs as the nonmoving parties.
For purposes of this Motion, therefore, the Court concludes Defendants have failed to establish the premise that underlies this part of Defendants' Motion; that is, that Allied is a stock holding company and does not underwrite insurance. The existence of issues of fact, therefore, preclude the Court from granting summary judgment in favor of Allied. Accordingly, the Court denies the part of Defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment relating to Allied.

2. Razilov does not have standing to bring this action against Nationwide.
"[T]he core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III." Medina v. Clinton, 86 F.3d 155, 157 (9th Cir.1996) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). The three elements of standing are: First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in factan invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) `actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.' Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained ofthe injury has to be fairly... tracet[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (ellipses and brackets in original; internal quotations and citations omitted). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing these elements. Id. In response to a summary judgment motion, the plaintiff cannot rest on mere allegations but must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts that will be taken to be true for purposes of the summary judgment motion. Id.
Nationwide contends it is entitled to summary judgment because Razilov does not have standing to bring this claim against Nationwide. Nationwide argues Razilov cannot show (1) he personally suffered actual or threatened injuries as the result of Nationwide's conduct, (2) his alleged injuries are fairly traceable to Nationwide's actions, and (3) he is likely to receive a favorable decision by this Court as to his claims. In addition, Nationwide insists it could not have taken adverse action against Razilov because Nationwide never insured Razilov.
According to Plaintiffs, however, "Razilov, through guidelines set up by Nationwide, and through actions of Nationwide employees, was charged more for insurance based in part on information contained in his credit report."[3] To support this contention, Plaintiffs offer evidence that Nationwide established policies and *988 procedures regarding the use of consumer credit information, contracted for credit reports from a third party, took steps to ensure subsidiary compliance, made rate filings with the Oregon Insurance Division, and shared information with subsidiaries. Plaintiffs also assert Nationwide "takes or participates in taking adverse actions when using information from consumer credit reports for the purpose of underwriting and/or rating personal lines of insurance."

a. According to the plain language and context of the statute, a person "takes" an adverse action in connection with insurance when the person denies, cancels, increases in price, or reduces or changes adversely the terms or amount of insurance.
As noted, the parties do not dispute the notice requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) and (b) explicitly apply to any person who "takes" any "adverse action" against a consumer based on a consumer credit report. For purposes of Defendants' Motion, the parties also agree adverse action was taken against Razilov based on his consumer credit information. The question whether Razilov suffered a FCRA injury fairly traceable to Nationwide depends, therefore, on whether Nationwide took adverse action against Razilov, which, in turn, depends on the meaning of "takes" within the scope of the statute. This, apparently, is a question of first impression.
Unless otherwise defined, a court must interpret the words of a statute by their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning. See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979)(citing Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580-81, 95 S.Ct. 1180, 43 L.Ed.2d 469 (1975)). "Take" is the operative verb in § 1681m(a) and § 1681m(b) that triggers the duty to provide a notice to the consumer. As used in § 1681m, the verb "take" is transitive and "adverse action" and "action" are the direct objects that complete the verb's meaning.[4] The dictionary definition of "take" as a transitive verb is extensive. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary at 1201 (10th ed.1998). The most reasonable definition of "take" in this particular statutory context, however, is "to undertake and make, do, or perform... ([take] legal action)." Id.
Applying this plain-meaning, dictionary definition, a person "takes" an adverse action when the person does or performs the action. Carrying that meaning to the statutory definition of "adverse action", then, a person "takes" an adverse action in connection with insurance when the person denies, cancels, increases in price, or reduces or changes adversely the terms or amount of insurance based on information in a consumer credit report. Applying this interpretation, the Court concludes the statute is not ambiguous.
The Court also concludes this interpretation is consistent with the statutory scheme as a whole. For example, in Obabueki v. Int'l Business Mack Corp., the court applied § 1681b(b)(3) and § 1681a(k)(1)(B)(ii) in the employment context and held that an employer's internal decision adverse to a job applicant was not in itself, the taking of adverse action. 145 F.Supp.2d 371 (S.D.N.Y.2001). In Obabueki, a prospective employer withdrew an offer of employment on the basis of the job applicant's consumer report. The applicant asserted the prospective employer violated the FCRA provision that provides:
*989 "[B]efore taking any adverse action based in whole or in part on the report, the person intending to take such adverse action shall provide the consumer [certain information]." See § 1681b(b)(3). The applicant argued the defendant already had "taken adverse action" through its internal decision-making process, which occurred before defendant sent him a letter that indicated its intent to withdraw the conditional offer of employment. Although the definition of "adverse action" in the employment context requires "a denial of employment or any other decision for employment purposes that adversely affects any current or prospective employee," the court concluded "[a]n internal decision to rescind an offer is not an adverse action," Id. at 392. See § 1681a(k)(1)(B)(ii). The court noted "IBM's internal discussions had no impact on plaintiff; only when its staff acted by [a second] letter did IBM take any action." Id. (emphasis added). The same reasoning applies under § 1681m(a). The consumer is entitled to a FCRA notice in the insurance context when the adverse act is performed; that is, when the insurance is denied or cancelled, or when premium rates are increased, or when the terms or amount of insurance are reduced or changed adversely.

b. Mere participation in the decision that leads to an adverse action is insufficient.
Plaintiffs contend anyone who participates in the decisions that lead to an adverse action thereby participates in the taking of the action and, therefore, also must provide notice under § 1681m(a).
As noted, the plain language of § 1681m(a), however, extends only to a person who "takes" the adverse action. If Congress intended to include participant liability, it could have done so explicitly as it did in the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(e)("The term `creditor' means any person who regularly extends, renews, or continues credit; any person who regularly arranges for the extension, renewal, or continuation of credit; or any assignee of an original creditor who participates in the decision to extend, renew, or continue credit.")(emphasis added).
The only authority Plaintiffs offer in support of this argument is an unpublished opinion in which the court certified a class of consumers against whom the defendant "took or participated in adverse action based in whole or in part upon information in a consumer report." See Mick v. Level Propane Gases, Inc., No. 98-CV-959, 1999 WL 33453772, at *19 (S.D.Ohio Sept. 29, 1999). In that case, defendant allegedly submitted the consumer information for credit verification, then denied service, required a security deposit, or charged a higher price for consumers who had poor credit scores under a credit-scoring program. Id The Court finds this decision unpersuasive.
As noted, the purpose of FCRA is to protect consumers from the transmission of inaccurate information about them. Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d at 1333. This purpose is accomplished by informing consumers that their credit history has been used and providing consumers with the information they need to determine whether the information contained in their accessed consumer reports is accurate or needs to be corrected. See § 1681m. A consumer does not need multiple notices from various "participants" about the same adverse action in order to receive the protection afforded by FCRA. To the contrary, multiple notices regarding the same transaction would be confusing and could suggest erroneously that more than one adverse action had been taken. In any event, the statute does not contain any language that indicates Congress intended *990 to require all persons or entities who participated in decisions that led to adverse action to give notice in order to achieve the purpose of the statute.
For these reasons, the Court declines to read "participant" liability into the plain language of § 1681m(a).

c. There is no contrary statutory interpretation by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
The Court has construed the plain meaning of the statute and concluded the statute is not ambiguous. To complete the analysis, in any event, the Court also considered existing interpretations of the FTC, the federal agency charged with enforcing FCRA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s. The FTC has interpreted FCRA in staff opinion letters and issued an official Commentary on FCRA in 1990. See 16 C.F.R. pt. 600, App., Commentary on Fair Credit Reporting Act (FTC Commentary)(2002). The FTC Commentary constitutes advisory guidelines, and staff opinion letters constitute nonbinding interpretations. 16 C.F.R. pt. 600, App. § 621 at 3. See also 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.3 (FTC information opinions and their nonbinding effect). In light of the 1996 legislative amendments to § 1681m and the addition of the definition of "adverse action," however, much of the existing FTC Commentary may be outdated. In fact, the FTC has recently announced its intention to ask for public comment on a proposed revision to the FCRA Commentary, 16 CFR 600. See FTC website
 (Jan. 7, 2003). The Court notes, however, the Commission states in the notice its intent to request public comments is not a determination on the need for or the substance of the rule, guides, and statements of policy. See FTC website
 (Jan. 21, 2003).
Having reviewed the FTC record, the Court does not find anything in the FTC's interpretations of FCRA to contradict this Court's construction of the statute.

d. There is no contrary legislative history.
Even when "the express language of a statute appears unambiguous, a court must look beyond that plain language where a literal interpretation of this language would thwart the purpose of the overall statutory scheme, would lead to an absurd result, or would otherwise produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of the drafters." Royal Foods Co. v. RJR Holdings, Inc., 252 F.3d at 1108 (internal quotations and citations omitted). A review of the pertinent House and Senate Reports pertinent to FCRA, however, does not reveal anything in the legislative history to contradict this Court's interpretation of§ 1681m.
The 1996 Amendments, P.L. 104-208, significantly revised § 1681m(a) and § 1681m(b) and, among other things, added the definition of "adverse action." The 1996 Amendments were the product of Congress's consideration of bills from 1990 until their enactment as the Consumer Credit Reporting Act of 1996, which was part of the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996 contained in the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Bill of 1996. See generally, Joseph L. Seidel, The Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act: Information Sharing and Preemption, 2 N.C. Banking Inst. 79 (1998).
The House and Senate Reports do not discuss, and the parties do not point to, any consideration in the House and Senate Reports of participant or joint affiliate liability for the taking of an adverse action. See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 102-692 (1992); S.Rep. No. 103-209 (1993); H.R.Rep. No. 103-486 (1994); S.Rep. No. 104-185 (1995).
*991 Various House Reports indicate, however, the definition of "adverse action" was meant to be interpreted broadly and to parallel generally the "permissible purpose" provisions in § 1681b(3). An early House Report indicated examples provided in the definition of "adverse action" were meant to be "illustrative" rather than definitive. H.R.Rep. No. 102-692, at 21 (1992). In addition, "whenever a consumer report is obtained for a permissible purpose[,] ... a denial of a benefit based on the report triggers the adverse action notice requirements." H.R.Rep. No. 102-692, at 21 (1992). See also S.Rep. No. 103-209, at 8 (1993); H.R.Rep. No. 103-486 (1994).
In addition, legislative history reflects Congress's general intent to liberalize the sharing of information among affiliates. S.Rep. No. 103-209, at 8 (1993). The 1995 Senate Report, which accompanied the bill preceding the final 1996 Amendments, indicated:
Title IV will clarify that affiliates within a holding company structure can share any application information (last year's bill was limited to credit applications) and consumer reports, consistent with the FCRA. Under current law, such information can be deemed a "consumer report" and the information sharing entity can be deemed a "consumer reporting agency," thereby implicating all the restrictions of the FCRA. The affiliate sharing provisions of this Title will allow affiliates to share such information without being deemed a consumer reporting agency.
S.Rep. No. 104-185, at 20 (1995).
The 1995 Senate Report explains the definition of "adverse action," which was identical to the definition enacted in 1996, and refers to adverse determinations without differentiating between the decision to act and the action itself. S.Rep. No. 104-185, at 32 (1995).
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes the legislative history does not suggest this Court's interpretation of the plain language in § 1681m would thwart the purpose of the overall statutory scheme, lead to an absurd result, or produce a result at odds with the intentions of Congress.
In summary, the Court concludes a person "takes" an adverse action in connection with insurance when the person denies, cancels, increases in price, or reduces or changes adversely the terms or amount of insurance. Even though an affiliate or commonly-owned entity may have a role in establishing a decision-making process and may provide information or set policies, guidelines, and standards that lead to the taking of an adverse action, the statute only requires the person who takes the adverse action to notify the consumer. Because Plaintiffs did not show Nationwide denied, cancelled, increased the price, reduced or changed adversely the terms of Razilov's insurance, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that Razilov has standing to bring his FCRA claim against Nationwide. The Court, therefore, grants summary judgment to Nationwide as to Plaintiff Razilov's claims.

3. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the claims of Sara Lapham and Derek Lapham.
Personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is proper only if the forum state's long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction and the exercise of jurisdiction comports with federal due process standards. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. National Bank of Coops., 103 F.3d 888, 893 (9th Cir.1996) (emphasis added). "Oregon's long-arm statute confers jurisdiction to the extent permitted by due process." Gray & Co. v. Firstenberg Mack Co., 913 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir.1990). See also Or. R. Civ. P. 4L. Due process requires *992 a nonresident defendant to have certain minimum contacts with the forum state to ensure the maintenance of the action does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).
Plaintiffs have the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction. Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir.1995). "It is well established [.however,] that where the district court relies solely on affidavits and discovery materials, the plaintiff need only establish a prima facie case of jurisdiction." Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 587 n. 3 (9th Cir.1993) (citations omitted).
General personal jurisdiction refers to the authority of a court to hear any action involving a defendant regardless whether the action arose from the defendant's activities within the forum state. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). A district court has general personal jurisdiction over a defendant if the plaintiff shows the defendant has "substantial" or "continuous and systematic" contacts with the forum state. Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415, 104 S.Ct. 1868). Pertinent factors for the court to consider are whether the defendant:
1. makes sales, solicits, or engages in business in the state,
2. serves the state's markets,
3. designates an agent for service of process,
4. holds a license, or
5. is incorporated in the state.
Id. (citing Hirsch v. Blue Cross, Blue Shield of Kansas City, 800 F.2d 1474, 1478 (9th Cir.1986)).
Defendants argue this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the claims of Plaintiffs Sara and Derek Lapham. The Court notes personal jurisdiction is an issue of jurisdiction over the parties and generally is raised as to a defendant. Defendants do not make it clear whether they assert the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Plaintiffs Sara Lapham and Derek Lapham, an unusual assertion for a defendant to make, or whether they contend the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant Nationwide.
Sara Lapham and Derek Lapham filed their Amended Complaint in this district. "Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first of all an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived." Insurance Corp. of Ireland Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982). "[A]n individual may submit to the jurisdiction of the court by appearance." Id. Sara Lapham and Derek Lapham have consented to this Court's personal jurisdiction by initiating their action in this Court.
Even if the Court construes Defendants' arguments as assertions that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Nationwide, Plaintiffs have provided sufficient evidence for this Court to find it has general personal jurisdiction over Nationwide. Nationwide has been licensed to sell insurance in Oregon since 1956 and has a registered agent, CT Corporation System, for service of process in Oregon. Nationwide also owns and hosts the website "www.nationwide.com," which allows policyholders, including those in Oregon, to sign up for a "MyNationwide" personal account. Finally, according to deposition testimony of Kim Austen, an employee of Allied, Nationwide issues insurance in Oregon under the "Allied Insurance umbrella." See *993 Friel Aff., Ex. 3 at 5. The Court, therefore, concludes it has general jurisdiction over Nationwide because Nationwide has continuous and systematic contacts with Oregon.[5]
Accordingly, the Court concludes it has personal jurisdiction over Plaintiffs Sara Lapham and Derek Lapham and Defendant Nationwide. The Court, therefore, denies that portion of Defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment based on a lack of personal jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (# 57).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
NOTES
[1]  Plaintiffs do not contend AMCO failed to give Razilov the required FCRA notice.
[2]  Colonial County Mutual Insurance Company is not a party to this action.
[3]  During oral argument on January 6, 2003, in a related case, Sams v. Geico, CV 01-1458-BR, Plaintiffs' counsel clarified that Plaintiffs in this matter assert only that Defendants are direct statutory "takers" of adverse action. Specifically, Plaintiffs do not argue Defendants in this case are liable under theories of agency or alter ego.
[4]  A transitive verb expresses "an action carried from the subject to the object; requiring a direct object to complete meaning. Use of a verb or verb construction." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1833 (4th ed.2000).
[5]  Plaintiffs also contended Nationwide waived the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction when it filed a Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on November 7, 2001, without raising a jurisdictional defense. Sara Lapham and Derek Lapham did not join as plaintiffs, however, until after Nationwide filed its Motion to Dismiss. Beacuse the defense, therefore, was not available when Nationwide prusuant to Feb.R.Civ.P. 12(g) and (h)(1).