214 F.Supp. 621 (1963)
UNITED STATES of America
v.
John F. McGONIGAL.
Cr. A. No. 1424.
United States District Court D. Delaware.
February 5, 1963.
*622 Stanley C. Lowicki, Asst. U. S. Atty., Wilmington, Del., for plaintiff.
Robert C. O'Hora and John P. Daley, Wilmington, Del., for defendant.
LAYTON, District Judge.
Defendant was tried on an information charging him with engaging in receiving (writing) wagers for or on behalf of an unknown person engaged in the business of accepting (banking) wagers and wilfully failing to pay the special wagering or occupational tax of $50 (failing to purchase the $50 gambling tax stamp), contrary to Title 26 U.S.C. §§ 4411 and 7203.[1] Defendant did not take the stand in his own defense. The jury returned a verdict of guilty as to Count 1. Defendant thereupon filed motions for judgment of acquittal and for new trial, to which this opinion is directed.
In order for the jury to return a verdict of guilty, it must find not only that the defendant was engaged in the business of a writer but that his failure to purchase a $50 gambling tax stamp was wilful. In order for a criminal act to be wilful, it must not only be committed deliberately and knowingly, but with a bad motive or evil intent. United States v. Palermo, 259 F.2d 872 (3rd Cir. 1958). Simply stated, in order for the Government to convict here, it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this defendant deliberately committed the specified violation with the intention of getting away with it.
The test applicable to a motion for judgment of acquittal is somewhat different from that applicable to a motion for new trial. In the former, the Court scrutinizes the evidence, including reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, from the point of view most favorable to the government and assumes the truth thereof. If there is substantial evidence justifying an inference of guilt, irrespective of the evidence adduced by the defendant, the Court must deny the motion. In the latter, where the ground is that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, the Court weighs the evidence of both sides, considers the credibility of the witnesses, and if the verdict is against the weight of the evidence a new trial must be granted. United States v. Robinson, 71 F.Supp. 9 (D.C. D.C.1947).
With these principles in mind, let us examine the record insofar as it concerns defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal.
The testimony produced by the Government was sufficient to demonstrate satisfactorily that defendant was a "bookie" or, in other words, a writer, but as to the element of wilfulness the evidence was minimal. There was no showing that the defendant knew of the necessity of purchasing a $50 gambling tax stamp, or that he had been in the business for so long and associated so frequently with known gamblers that he should have known of the requirement. There was no evidence of his operation of the gambling business behind a false store front as in so many other cases. Here, defendant seems to have been operating a bona fide fruit and vegetable business.
Indeed, the sole evidence of notice to defendant of the gambling tax stamp requirement, without which no conviction can stand, is the fact that defendant was proved to have been a lifelong resident of Wilmington, coupled with the fact that 29 articles had appeared in the local newspaper since 1956 advising of *623 the necessity of purchasing a $50 gambling tax stamp before engaging in the business of a "bookie" or writer.[2] The Government was unable to prove whether the articles were front page or that defendant was a regular reader of the local newspaper and, of course, was unable to prove that he had read one or more of the articles in question.
As elsewhere pointed out, in order to convict here, the Government must produce satisfactory proof that defendant wilfully failed to purchase the $50 gambling tax stamp. Thus, the Government had to prove that the defendant knew that as a condition precedent to engaging in the writing of numbers the stamp had to be purchased. Both the Fifth and Third Circuit Courts have had occasion to speak on the subject of the requirements of actual knowledge on the part of a defendant in cases of this sort. In Hargrove v. United States, 67 F.2d 820, 90 A.L.R. 1276 (5th Cir. 1933), the Court said:
"The court here fell into the error of not distinguishing between the elements of an offense, where the statute simply denounces the doing of an act as criminal, and where it denounces as criminal only its willful doing. In the first class of cases, especially in those offenses mala prohibita, the law imputes the intent. [Citations]. Had the prosecution here been under such a statute, the charge of the court would have been unexceptionable. In the second class of cases, a specific wrongful intent, that is, actual knowledge of the existence of obligation and a wrongful intent to evade it, is of the essence." (Emphasis added.)
And in United States v. Martell, 199 F.2d 670 (3rd Cir. 1952), Judge Goodrich said this:
"Willfulness is an essential element of the crime prescribed by § 145(b). It is best defined as a state of mind of the taxpayer wherein he is fully aware of the existence of a tax obligation to the government which he seeks to conceal." (Emphasis added.)
There is no direct evidence that this defendant knew of the requirements of the law.[3] And in view of the use of the word "wilful" in the statute, there is, of course, no presumption to that effect. The only circumstantial evidence bearing on his knowledge is, as has been pointed out, the fact that the local newspapers had carried articles on an average of six times yearly for the past five years stating that numbers writers must purchase the $50 gambling tax stamp before engaging in numbers writing. Under a legal system which extends the blanket of protection to a defendant unless found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, it goes too far here to say with any reasonable conviction that this defendant knew of the existence of Sec. 4411 based upon five or six annual newspaper articles which, because of their possible appearance on a back page, or the fact that he was out of town or did not happen to read the paper on that particular day, may have escaped his attention.
No doubt the average juror, and, for that matter, the average judge might very strongly suspect that the defendant here had the requisite guilty knowledge. Nevertheless, on the state of this record such suspicion must be regarded as speculation rather than proof. Without going *624 so far as to say that there could not be a sufficiently strong set of facts based upon newspaper notoriety alone as to sustain a conviction, I am of the opinion that the facts here present no such case.
After scrutinizing this record in a light most favorable to the Government, including all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom, I do not find here substantial evidence justifying an inference of guilt. A judgment of acquittal will be entered.
NOTES
[1]  There were actually three counts to the indictment. At the end of the trial, the Government withdrew Count 3 and the Court directed a verdict of acquittal as to Count 2.
[2]  Other evidence relied on by the Government has been scrutinized and rejected as having little or no probative force.
[3]  The facts of this case differ so widely from United States v. Minker, D.C., 197 F.Supp. 295, as to render that authority inapplicable here. True, that Court said "Defendant knew, or must be presumed to have known, of the existence of an excise tax on wagers * * *." However, the opinion points out that defendant had actually been informed of the tax obligation by a government officer. Moreover, the record established a persistent and long drawn-out activity in the numbers racket accompanied by consistent acts of deliberate concealment of records.


              U NITED S TATES AIR F ORCE
             C OURT OF C RIMINAL APPEALS
                          ________________________

                            No. ACM 38005 (rem)
                          ________________________

                  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                                   Appellee
                                      v.
                            Joshua A. KATSO
                    Airman Basic (E-1), USAF, Appellant
                          ________________________

          Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary
                             On Remand from
          the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
                           Decided 2 February 2017
                          ________________________

Military Judge: Matthew D. van Dalen.
Approved sentence: Dishonorable discharge, confinement for 10 years, and
total forfeiture of pay and allowances. Sentence adjudged 6 May 2011 by
GCM convened at Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota.
For Appellant: Major Isaac C. Kennen, USAF.
For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Jennifer A. Porter, USAF; Major Jeremy D.
Gehman, USAF; and Gerald R. Bruce, Esquire.
Before DREW, MAYBERRY, and SANTORO, Appellate Military Judges.
Judge SANTORO delivered the opinion of the court, in which Senior Judge
MAYBERRY joined. Chief Judge DREW delivered a separate dubitante opin-
ion.
                          ________________________

               PUBLISHED OPINION OF THE COURT
                          ________________________

SANTORO, Judge:
    A general court-martial composed of officer and enlisted members con-
victed Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of one specification of aggravated sex-
                 United States v. Katso, No. ACM 38005 (rem)

ual assault, one specification of burglary, and one specification of unlawful
entry in violation of Articles 120, 129, and 134, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 920, 929,
934. The adjudged and approved sentence was a dishonorable discharge, con-
finement for 10 years, and forfeiture of all pay and allowances.
    Upon initial review, Appellant raised two issues for our consideration: (1)
whether his right to confrontation was denied when the military judge over-
ruled a defense objection to the testimony of the Government’s DNA expert,
and (2) whether the conviction for unlawful entry should be dismissed be-
cause the specification failed to allege that his conduct was prejudicial to
good order and discipline or service discrediting. We found that the expert
improperly repeated testimonial hearsay. We set aside and dismissed the
findings of guilt with respect to the specifications alleging aggravated sexual
assault and burglary, and authorized a rehearing. We also set aside and dis-
missed the unlawful entry specification because it failed to state an offense.
United States v. Katso, 73 M.J. 630 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2014) (Katso I).
    The Judge Advocate General (TJAG) of the Air Force certified the expert
witness issue to our superior court, which reversed our decision and remand-
ed to us for further review. United States v. Katso, 74 M.J. 273 (C.A.A.F.
2015) (Katso II). TJAG did not certify, nor did our superior court address, our
setting aside and dismissing the unlawful entry specification.
    On remand, Appellant raises five assignments of error: (1) the military
judge erred by allowing an expert to testify about DNA tests the expert had
not personally conducted, (2) the unlawful entry specification failed to state
an offense and should be dismissed, (3) the burglary and unlawful entry spec-
ifications are facially duplicative, (4) he is entitled to relief for procedural er-
rors relating to his confinement pending appeal, and (5) the military judge’s
instruction on proof beyond a reasonable doubt was erroneous.

                                I. BACKGROUND
   While celebrating her 21st birthday with several friends, Senior Airman
(SrA) CA became intoxicated after consuming between 15 and 20 drinks over
the course of the evening. At an off-base bar and unable to return to the base
on her own, she was assisted back to her room and fell asleep on her bed. SrA
CA testified that she woke up when she felt “someone having sex with [her].”
She said she was attacked by a man wearing denim pants, glasses, a beanie
cap, and a coat. After SrA CA struggled against him, her assailant left, and
SrA CA ran into another room and told a friend she had been raped. SrA CA
subsequently identified Appellant as her attacker.

                                         2
                 United States v. Katso, No. ACM 38005 (rem)

                                II. DISCUSSION
A. Admissibility of Expert Testimony
   Appellant raises no new argument nor does he identify any way in which
our superior court’s decision did not fully address this assignment of error.
Our superior court’s decision in Katso II resolved this issue adversely to him
and he is entitled to no relief. Katso, 74 M.J. at 284.
B. Failure to State an Offense
   Our prior decision resolved this assignment of error in Appellant’s favor
and our superior court did not address or overturn our decision on this point.
We decline the Government’s invitation to revisit Katso I’s analysis, and we
adhere to the decision setting aside and dismissing this specification. 1
C. Sentence Reassessment
    Having set aside and dismissed the guilty finding on the unlawful entry
charge and specification, we must either reassess Appellant’s sentence or re-
mand for a rehearing on sentence. Applying the analysis set forth in United
States v. Winckelmann, 73 M.J. 11 (C.A.A.F. 2013); United States v. Buber, 62
M.J. 476 (C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. Moffeit, 63 M.J. 40 (C.A.A.F. 2006);
and United States v. Sales, 22 M.J. 305 (C.M.A. 1986), and carefully consider-
ing the entire record and the totality of the circumstances, we are confident
that we can reassess the sentence. There has not been a change in the penal-
ty landscape as the military judge merged this offense with the burglary of-
fense for sentencing. All of the evidence admitted in sentencing remained rel-
evant and admissible. Appellant also does not contest the appropriateness of
his sentence. We therefore reassess the sentence to that which was adjudged
at trial: a dishonorable discharge, confinement for 10 years, and total forfei-
ture of pay and allowances.
    In reassessing Appellant’s sentence, we necessarily have also concluded
that the reassessed sentence is appropriate. We assess sentence appropriate-
ness by considering Appellant, the nature and seriousness of the offense, Ap-
pellant’s record of service, and all matters contained in the record of trial.
United States v. Snelling, 14 M.J. 267, 268 (C.M.A. 1982); United States v.
Bare, 63 M.J. 707, 714 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2006), aff’d, 65 M.J. 35 (C.A.A.F.
2007). The sentence as reassessed is appropriate for this Airman who invaded
a fellow Airman’s dormitory room and violently sexually assaulted her on an
Air Force installation.

1 Our setting aside and dismissing this charge and specification moots Appellant’s
third assignment of error.

                                        3
                  United States v. Katso, No. ACM 38005 (rem)

D. Confinement Pending Appeal
   We rendered our initial decision setting aside the findings on 11 April
2014. On 9 June 2014, TJAG filed a certificate of review with our superior
court. On 3 June 2015, Appellant requested review of his continued confine-
ment. On 15 June 2015, while this case was still with our superior court, a
properly-appointed reviewing officer determined that Appellant should re-
main in confinement pending the resolution of his appeal. On 30 June 2015,
our superior court reversed our decision, effectively reinstating Appellant’s
convictions for aggravated sexual assault and burglary.
    In Moore v. Akins, 30 M.J. 249 (C.M.A. 1990), our superior court faced the
exact issue presented in this case: if a service court reverses the conviction of
a servicemember in confinement, and the case is certified pursuant to Article
67(b)(2), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867(b)(2), under what circumstances, if any, is
the servicemember entitled to be released from confinement? Noting Con-
gress’s desire that “a practical means be made available to release accused
servicemembers from confinement pending appeal in meritorious cases,” our
superior court granted Moore’s habeas corpus petition and ordered his release
pending completion of appellate review. Moore, 30 M.J. at 253. The court held
that a servicemember “must be released from confinement, unless and until
the Government shows reasons, such as risk of flight, or obstruction of jus-
tice, that warrant keeping him in confinement.” Id. at 249. 2
   Later, in United States v. Miller, 47 M.J. 352 (C.A.A.F. 1997), the Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) reaffirmed Moore:
         After considering the matter, if the Judge Advocate General
         decides to certify a case to this Court, an accused’s interest in
         the favorable decision of the court below (even if inchoate) re-
         quires either that the accused be released in accordance with
         that decision or a hearing on continued confinement be con-
         ducted under [Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.)] 305.

2   In response, Congress enacted Article 57a(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 857a(c), which
provides that when a sentence to confinement has been ordered executed by the con-
vening authority but the case is pending review under Article 67(a)(2), UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 867(a)(2), “the Secretary concerned may defer further service of sentence to
confinement while that review is pending.” The grant of this discretionary authority
to the Secretary did not abrogate or alter our superior court’s holding in Moore.

                                           4
                   United States v. Katso, No. ACM 38005 (rem)

Miller, 47 M.J. at 362. The Miller rule has never been overturned and it has
been cited with approval by the CAAF in United States v. Kreutzer, 70 M.J.
444 (C.A.A.F. 2012). 3
    In its attempt to distinguish the instant case from Miller, the Government
argues: (1) Miller does not apply because Appellant never became a pretrial
detainee; (2) Appellant suffered no prejudice because when a hearing was ul-
timately held, the reviewing officer ordered his continued confinement; (3)
the fact that his convictions were eventually reinstated excuses the failure to
comply with Miller; (4) we should infer from our superior court’s disposition
without opinion of a similar issue raised in another case that Appellant is en-
titled to no relief; (5) we should infer from our superior court’s failure to ad-
dress this claim (which was brought to them only a few days before they is-
sued Katso II) that Appellant is entitled to no relief; and (6) Appellant suf-
fered no prejudice because he will now be released sooner than if he had been
released during the pendency of the appeal.
      1. Miller’s Applicability
    The Government’s initial response is that Miller does not apply to Appel-
lant. Citing Kreutzer, they argue that Appellant remained a “lawfully con-
fined post-trial prisoner” with an approved sentence to confinement through-
out the duration of our superior court’s review and that, therefore, Miller is
inapposite. We disagree.
    Kreutzer was convicted of premeditated murder and sentenced to death.
The Army Court of Criminal Appeals set aside the sentence to death but af-
firmed guilty findings with respect to several charges and specifications, in-
cluding murder while engaged in an inherently dangerous act. Facing nearly
the same claim as Appellant makes in the instant case, our superior court in
Kreutzer held that Miller’s requirement did not apply because Kreutzer re-
mained an adjudged prisoner throughout the duration of his appeal. Id.
   Miller was convicted of pandering, obstruction of justice, showing pornog-
raphy to minors, battery, attempted indecent assault, and providing alcohol
to minors. The adjudged sentence included confinement for 10 years. On ap-

3
    When Miller was decided, The Judge Advocates General had a 30-day period to de-
cide whether to certify a case to our superior court. United States v. Miller, 47 M.J.
352, 361 (C.A.A.F. 1997). Although the 30-day certification decision period has since
been expanded to 60 days, we agree with our Navy-Marine Corps colleagues that the
Miller requirement, i.e., confinement review upon certification, remains in effect.
Clark v. United States, 74 M.J. 826, 829 fn.2 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2015) (unpub. op.).

                                          5
                 United States v. Katso, No. ACM 38005 (rem)

peal to this court, we set aside several findings of guilt and affirmed others,
but reassessed the sentence to reduce the confinement to four years. Based on
the reassessed sentence, officials at the United States Disciplinary Barracks
set Miller’s minimum release date for the following day—before TJAG decid-
ed whether to certify the case for review. Miller, 47 M.J. 352.
    Kreutzer and Miller are not inconsistent. In Kreutzer, several guilty find-
ings had been affirmed and the appellant was pending a rehearing on sen-
tence4 (as well as a rehearing on the set-aside findings). In Miller, the reas-
sessed sentence meant that Miller had served his entire sentence and was
entitled to immediate release from confinement. Therefore, Miller’s interest
in the favorable service-court decision was clear: if affirmed, he faced no fur-
ther liability for his offenses.
   In the instant case, where our initial decision nullified Appellant’s crimi-
nal liability, his case is more closely aligned with Miller (and Moore) in that
our decision, if affirmed, would require his immediate release from confine-
ment unless there was a proper determination to hold him for a rehearing.
We therefore hold that the Government was obligated to comply with Miller.
    2. Miller’s Requirements and Remedies
   Miller did not, however, specifically identify which of R.C.M. 305’s proce-
dures were to be followed. Nor did the CAAF identify the remedy, if any, for
non-compliance.
    R.C.M. 305 (entitled “Pretrial confinement”) establishes both procedural
requirements and remedies for non-compliance. Procedurally, the rule re-
quires that within 72 hours of a commander’s ordering a prisoner into “pre-
trial confinement,” the commander must determine whether confinement
should continue. R.C.M. 305(h)(2)(A). Within 48 hours of entry into confine-
ment, a neutral and detached officer must review the adequacy of the proba-
ble cause to continue pretrial confinement. R.C.M. 305(i)(1). Within 7 days of
the imposition of confinement, a neutral and detached officer must review
both the probable cause determination and the necessity for continued con-
finement. R.C.M. 305(i)(2). The remedy for failure to comply with these pro-
cedural rules “shall be an administrative credit against the sentence ad-
judged for any confinement served as the result of such noncompliance. Such
credit shall be computed at the rate of 1 day credit for each day of confine-
ment served as a result of such noncompliance.” R.C.M. 305(k).

4 Our superior court referred to Kreutzer’s status as having a “temporarily inchoate
sentence” which was ultimately adjudged to include confinement for life.

                                         6
                    United States v. Katso, No. ACM 38005 (rem)

    One could argue that the CAAF’s intent in Miller was simply to require
that a neutral and detached officer hold a hearing to determine whether con-
tinued confinement was appropriate and, because no Rule for Courts-Martial
set forth such a procedure, the reference to R.C.M. 305 was nothing more
than a suggestion about how such a hearing might be conducted. Conversely,
one could also argue that Miller requires the Government to comply with all
of R.C.M. 305’s procedural protections and that failure to do so will trigger
R.C.M. 305(k)’s one-for-one credit requirement.
    We must first therefore resolve the question of what process Miller re-
quires before we can determine whether Appellant received the process due
and, if not, the scope of any remedy. This appears to be a case of first impres-
sion.
    We easily conclude that Miller did not contemplate that R.C.M. 305 would
be followed in its entirety. First, Miller said that the detainee would be enti-
tled to “a hearing” conducted under R.C.M. 305 (emphasis added). Had our
superior court intended that Appellant receive a 72-hour review, a 48-hour
review, and a 7-day review, we doubt they would have referred to a singular
hearing, especially since R.C.M. 305 does not refer to a “hearing.” See R.C.M.
305.
    Second, two of the three findings a reviewing officer must make to justify
continued confinement under R.C.M. 305 are that an offense triable by court-
martial was committed and that the prisoner committed it. R.C.M. 305
(h)(2)(B). In Katso I, although we set aside the findings, we authorized a re-
hearing. We necessarily implicitly determined that notwithstanding our deci-
sion, probable cause existed to believe Appellant committed an offense triable
by court-martial. 5 We doubt that our superior court intended to give a review-
ing officer the authority to overturn that decision.
    We therefore conclude that the review Miller requires is one to determine
“continued confinement”—that is, whether confinement on appeal is neces-
sary because it is foreseeable that the prisoner will not appear at trial (or
pretrial hearings) or that the prisoner will engage in serious criminal mis-
conduct and, if either of those two conditions is met, that less severe forms of
restraint are inadequate. See R.C.M. 305(h)(2)(B). This is also consistent with
Moore’s holding that a detainee in such a situation must be released unless
the Government establishes “reasons . . . that warrant keeping him in con-
finement,” Moore, 30 M.J. at 249, without making reference to the need to

5   See Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 601(d)(1).

                                            7
                        United States v. Katso, No. ACM 38005 (rem)

establish probable cause that the detainee committed an offense triable by
court-martial.
     Next we must determine when the Miller review is to occur. The CAAF
established the initial trigger: the date on which TJAG certifies a service
court decision is the date on which an appellant obtains an interest in the fa-
vorable lower-court decision requiring either release or a hearing. Miller, 47
M.J. at 362. We also know that the President determined 7 days from imposi-
tion of confinement is the outer limit by which confinement review must oc-
cur. We are, therefore, left with two possible windows: within 48 hours of cer-
tification 6 or 7 days of certification. 7 We believe that in the context of a Miller
review, 7 days is the appropriate window during which the hearing must be
held.
   The Government does not dispute that Appellant’s Miller review was not
conducted until 15 June 2015, 372 days after TJAG certified this case to our
superior court. Appellant requests that we grant 365 days of credit for illegal
confinement or alternatively use our Article 66(c), UCMJ, authority to reduce
the period of confinement by the same period. 8
    As noted above, Miller does not explicitly set forth the remedy for non-
compliance. We reject any argument that there can be no remedy for a Miller
violation, for “[i]t is a settled and invariable principle, that every right, when
withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.” Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 153 (1803).
   Because Miller could not have intended for each aspect of R.C.M. 305 to
control the continued confinement review, we are also not convinced that
R.C.M. 305(k) must be the source of the remedy. We do believe, however, that
the President’s determination that confinement without following established
procedural protections merits day-for-day administrative credit applies

6 See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (holding that the Fourth Amendment re-
quires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended re-
straint of liberty following arrest); see also Cnty. of Riverside v McLaughlin, 500 U.S.
44 (1991) (vacating court of appeals’ judgment and concluding county was entitled to
combine probable cause determinations with arraignments if conducted within 48
hour of an individual’s arrest).
7   R.C.M. 305(i)(2).
8 Although not explicitly stated, Appellant’s request for 365 days of credit suggests
that he, too, does not believe that all of R.C.M. 305’s procedural requirements apply
to Miller reviews and that non-compliance began after 7 days without a Miller re-
view.

                                            8
                    United States v. Katso, No. ACM 38005 (rem)

equally to Miller violations as it does to pre-trial confinement review viola-
tions. 9
    Therefore, we hold that the remedy for the Government’s failure to pro-
vide a Miller review within seven days of certification is day-for-day adminis-
trative credit (beginning on the eighth day) against the sentence as finally
affirmed, and if the affirmed sentence does not include confinement sufficient
to offset all the credit to which the appellant is entitled, the credit shall be
applied against hard labor without confinement, restriction, fine, and forfei-
ture of pay, in that order, using the conversion formula under R.C.M.
1003(b)(6) and (7). The credit shall not be applied against any other form of
punishment. 10
    While we understand the Chief Judge’s dubitante opinion and belief that
R.C.M. 305 does not apply to this case, as an inferior court we are not at lib-
erty to craft a rule contrary to that clearly articulated by our superior court.
Were we writing on a blank slate we may well have reached a different re-
sult. But we are not. We are bound to follow and apply precedent as we un-
derstand it. We cannot ignore or fail to implement our superior court’s decla-
ration that R.C.M. 305 does apply to Appellant, at least in some respect. Our
decision today attempts to reconcile Miller, the interests the Miller rule ap-
pears designed to protect, and the Rules for Courts-Martial.
   The Government’s remaining arguments merit little discussion. There is
no requirement that a detainee complain about the propriety of confinement,
exhaust administrative remedies, or establish prejudice before R.C.M. 305(k)
credit is due and we do not believe a different rule was intended to apply to
Miller reviews. While not stated explicitly in the Rule, the reason Appellant
need not raise those issues is likely because the President, in promulgating
the Rules, recognized that incarceration without due process is inherently
prejudicial. 11

9 The Chief Judge’s dubitante opinion suggests that the remedy for a Miller review
violation should be based on equity rather than the day-for-day credit set forth in
R.C.M. 305(k). As neither he nor the CAAF have set forth the criteria we could or
should use in such a situation, we believe we are bound to follow the policy determi-
nation contained within the Rules for Courts-Martial for the remedy for the failure to
receive a confinement review hearing. R.C.M. 305(k).
10   See R.C.M. 305(k).
11We summarily reject the Government’s remaining three arguments. That Appel-
lant will ultimately be released sooner than had he been released pending appeal
does not change the fact that his right to Miller’s procedural protections does not de-
pend upon the outcome of the appeal. Our superior court’s denial (without opinion) of
(Footnote continues on next page)

                                          9
                  United States v. Katso, No. ACM 38005 (rem)

   We therefore grant Appellant the relief to which he is entitled: he shall be
credited with 365 days of administrative credit against the reassessed sen-
tence to confinement.
E. Findings Instruction
    Appellant asserts for the first time on remand that the military judge’s
instruction on the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was error. 12 The
military judge instructed the members that if, based on their consideration of
the evidence, they were firmly convinced of Appellant’s guilt, that they must
find him guilty. Appellant did not object to the instruction at trial but now
argues that it violates Supreme Court precedent prohibiting a trial judge
from “directing the jury to come forward with [a guilty verdict], regardless of
how overwhelmingly the evidence may point in that direction.” United States
v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572–73 (1977) (citation omitted).
However, the CAAF recently rejected this argument under these circum-
stances. See United States v. McClour, No. 16-0455 (C.A.A.F. 24 January
2017). Accordingly, the military judge did not commit plain error in his rea-
sonable doubt instruction.

                                 III. CONCLUSION
    The findings of guilt as to Charges I and II and their specifications are
AFFIRMED. The findings of guilt as to Charge III and its specification are
set aside and the charge and specification are DISMISSED WITH PREJU-
DICE. The sentence, as reassessed, is AFFIRMED. Appellant shall be cred-
ited with 365 days of administrative credit against his sentence to confine-
ment.

a writ of habeas corpus in an unrelated case is irrelevant to the outcome of this case.
See Fetrow v. Cotton, 75 M.J. 405 (C.A.A.F. 2016). Similarly, we do not accept the
Government’s invitation not to grant Appellant the relief to which he is entitled be-
cause our superior court remanded the case without addressing the confinement is-
sue.
12The Government does not challenge our consideration of this issue despite its not
being raised during the initial submission of errors.

                                          10
DREW, Chief Judge (dubitante):
    I fully concur and join with the majority’s resolution of the expert testi-
mony, failure to state an offense, sentence reassessment, and findings in-
struction issues. However, while I applaud the majority’s attempt to reconcile
the rule announced by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) in
United States v. Miller, 47 M.J. 352 (C.A.A.F. 1997) and derived from Moore
v. Akins, 30 M.J. 249 (C.M.A. 1990), with Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.)
305, which Miller seeks to implement, I am doubtful that R.C.M. 305 has any
application to the facts in this case.
    The Constitution vests Congress with the power to “make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 14. Congress delegated to the President, as Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces, the authority to prescribe the Rules for Courts-Martial in Ar-
ticle 36, UCMJ. The President has exercised his delegated authority in
R.C.M. 305, in which he authorized pretrial confinement, established the
proper procedures to follow to order and review such confinement, and de-
tailed the remedy for noncompliance with those procedures.
    R.C.M. 305, by its very terms, applies to pretrial confinement. That is not
to say that such confinement can never arise as a result of the post-trial re-
view process. A confined appellant, having received a favorable final appel-
late decision that set aside his sentence to confinement (alone or along with
setting aside one or more findings) and authorized a rehearing, could most
certainly fall within the ambit of R.C.M. 305. If the convening authority de-
sires to keep an appellant in confinement until a new trial, the appellant
would become a pretrial confinee and the requirements of R.C.M. 305 would
apply. However, before an appellate decision has become final, the confinee
remains an adjudged and sentenced prisoner and not a pretrial confinee. See
United States v. Kreutzer, 70 M.J. 444, 451 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (Erdmann, J., dis-
senting). R.C.M. 305 simply does not apply while an appellate decision set-
ting aside a sentence to confinement remains inchoate.
    As the majority notes above, Congress, in response to Moore, enacted Ar-
ticle 57a(c):
       In any case in which a court-martial sentences a person to con-
       finement and the sentence to confinement has been ordered ex-
       ecuted, but in which review of the case under section 867(a)(2)
       of this title (article 67(a)(2)) is pending, the Secretary con-
       cerned may defer further service of sentence to confinement
       while that review is pending.
Article 57a(c), UCMJ (emphasis added).
                    United States v. Katso, No. ACM 38005 (rem)

   Even though Congress gave the Executive Branch in Article 57a(c) the
authority to defer further military confinement pending appeal—something
the Government had argued in Moore that the UCMJ did not previously pro-
vide—Congress declined to establish a requirement that the Government
must defer further confinement or must conduct a review to justify further
confinement. In particular, Congress chose not to amend the UCMJ to adopt
a procedure similar to 18 U.S.C. § 3143, 1 which was cited favorably in Moore.
See Moore, 30 M.J. at 251. The President, for his part, has not, before, be-
tween, or since the Miller and Moore decisions, exercised his statutory au-
thority to promulgate an R.C.M. or other rule requiring a review of continued
confinement during appeal.
    In neither Moore nor Miller did the CAAF base its holdings on constitu-
tional grounds. Rather, in Moore, it premised its decision on Article 57(d)
(now Article 57a(a)), which applies only to unexecuted sentences. As Appel-
lant’s sentence in this case was ordered executed long before we issued our
earlier inchoate decision setting aside his findings, Article 57a(a) provides no
basis for his requested relief. In Miller, the CAAF premised its decision on
Article 66(e), 10 U.S.C. § 866(e), which does not require the Government to
implement a Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) decision which is pending fur-
ther review by the CAAF. On the contrary, the CAAF recognized that Article
66(e) specifically excludes it:
          The Judge Advocate General shall, unless there is to be further
          action by the President, the Secretary concerned, the Court of
          Appeals for the Armed Forces, or the Supreme Court, instruct
          the convening authority to take action in accordance with the
          decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Miller, 47 M.J. 361 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 866(e)) (emphasis added). In Miller,
the CAAF recognized Article 66(e) in holding:
          If the Judge Advocate General immediately decides not to pur-
          sue a case any further, there must be immediate notice to the
          convening authority of the opinion of the Court of Criminal Ap-
          peals and immediate direction to release an accused or conduct
          a hearing under RCM 305, Manual, supra, on pretrial confine-
          ment.
47 M.J. at 361.

1   The requirement to conduct the review is found in 18 U.S.C. § 3141.

                                           12
                  United States v. Katso, No. ACM 38005 (rem)

   Again acknowledging Article 66(e), the CAAF next held:
       If there is not such an immediate decision, there will be a 30-
       day period during which the Judge Advocate General is consid-
       ering whether to accept the lower court’s opinion or to pursue it
       further by way of a motion for reconsideration or certification
       to this Court. During such period, an accused remains in con-
       finement because the opinion below is inchoate.
47 M.J. at 361. However, without citing Article 66(e) or any other Article, the
CAAF finally articulated the rule in question in this case:
       After considering the matter, if the Judge Advocate General
       decides to certify a case to [the CAAF], an accused’s interest in
       the favorable decision of the court below (even if inchoate) re-
       quires that the accused be released in accordance with that de-
       cision or a hearing on continued confinement be conducted un-
       der RCM 305.
47 M.J. at 362.
     Miller does not explain how an appellant’s interest in a favorable inchoate
decision is any greater (or “sufficiently weighty” as stated in Kreutzer, 70 M.J.
at 446) once The Judge Advocate General (TJAG) has certified a CCA deci-
sion to the CAAF. An inchoate decision remains inchoate until it is final,
withdrawn, or set aside. A decision by TJAG to certify a CCA decision to the
CAAF does not make the CCA decision any less inchoate. Indeed, the exercise
of TJAG’s statutory authority extends the incomplete nature of the CCA deci-
sion rather than ripening it to any degree. It is beyond dispute that an appel-
lant has a profound interest in a favorable CCA decision, but that interest is
no more or less weighty once TJAG has certified it to the CAAF. Contrast this
to an affirmative decision of TJAG not to certify a CCA decision, or to the ex-
piration of the time to seek reconsideration from the CCA and certification to
the CAAF. In those circumstances, Article 66(e) would make the CCA deci-
sion final and no longer inchoate and require the Government to implement
it, to include complying with R.C.M. 305 if it desires to place an appellant in
pretrial confinement pending a rehearing.
    Application of the Miller rule in this case results in an inappropriate
windfall for Appellant. Unlike the confinees in Moore and Miller, Appellant
waited nearly a year from TJAG’s 9 June 2014 certification to raise the issue
of his continued confinement. He did so on 3 June 2015. Three days later, the
convening authority directed a hearing to consider the matter and that hear-
ing was held on 15 June, during which the hearing officer determined that
Appellant should remain in confinement. On 30 June, the CAAF reversed our
prior decision, reinstating Appellant’s convictions for sexual assault and bur-

                                       13
                United States v. Katso, No. ACM 38005 (rem)

glary. The record does not reflect why the Government did not, on its own ini-
tiative, hold a Miller hearing shortly after TJAG’s certification. However, un-
like the confinee in Kreutzer, who remained on death row after the CCA set
aside his death sentence until the CAAF issued a writ of mandamus, the con-
ditions of Appellant’s confinement since his trial have at all times been prop-
er for adjudged and sentenced prisoner with the type of sentence that our de-
cision today finds appropriate. We have found no prejudice Appellant has suf-
fered for the procedural timing failure to follow the Miller rule. Miller re-
quired a review of Appellant’s continued confinement. That review deter-
mined that continued confinement was appropriate. Because that review was
held shortly after Appellant requested it but a year after TJAG certified his
case, the majority opinion provides an R.C.M. 305(k)-like automatic day-for-
day administrative credit, granting Appellant 365 days administrative credit.
I doubt that R.C.M. 305 or Article 66(e) demands such a result.

                 FOR THE COURT

                 KURT J. BRUBAKER
                 Clerk of the Court

                                      14


217 Va. 276 (1976)
JAMES E. MILLS, ET AL.
v.
MOORE'S SUPER STORES, INC., ET AL.
Record No. 750967.
Supreme Court of Virginia.
September 2, 1976.
B. K. Cruey (Cruey & Mason, on brief), for appellants.
Bolling Lambeth; John Lee Hopkins, for appellees.
Present, All the Justices.
1.  Evidence shows work under prime contract "stopped" on September 18. Since memorandum of lien was not filed by subcontractor within 60 days of September 18 memorandum was not timely under statute conditioned on filing within 60 days after work is completed or "otherwise terminated".
2.  Statute provides no time limit within which subcontractor must give written notice to owners of amount and character of his claim.  Notice to owners served more than 60 days after work was terminated, and additional notices served after suit was commenced, but before there was any change of position by the owners, was sufficient compliance with notice requirement.
3.  Although commissioner found that material of substantial value included in memorandum of lien had not been furnished for the job, commissioner excluded all such items from lien, and it was not error for chancellor to approve commissioner's conclusion that evidence fell short of establishing that subcontractor acted knowingly in claiming items that were not allowable.
4.  Under facts of this case, subcontractors who contract in good faith with assignee of general contract are not to be denied protection of mechanic's lien statute merely because owners did not know of the assignment.
Appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Franklin County.  Hon. B. A. Davis, III, judge presiding.
COCHRAN
COCHRAN, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
In this appeal the only question is whether the appellees, subcontractors furnishing materials for the construction of a residence on certain real estate of the appellants, perfected their statutory liens against the property.
On April 15, 1974, the appellants, James E. Mills and Iris W. Mills, his wife (owners), entered into a contract with Charles W. Hollon under which Hollon agreed to construct a residence for the owners for the sum of $30,000.  The contract was executed in order that the owners might obtain a commitment for bank financing.  On April 26, 1974, the owners and Hollon executed a second contract for the construction of the same residence on the basis of construction cost plus 15% commission.  When the residence was approximately two-thirds completed difficulties arose between the owners and Hollon, and all work performed by Hollon, or his corporation, Hollon and Shelnut Corporation, ceased on September 18, 1974.  Thereafter, mechanics' lien memoranda were filed by Moore's Super Store (Moore's), Walter Vincient Toms (Toms), Carey S. Fowler and John L. Bell, T/A Moneta Building Supply Company (Moneta), and others, claiming, as subcontractors, liens for materials furnished for the Mills project.
On November 27, 1974, Moore's filed its bill of complaint in the court below against the owners, to enforce various mechanics' liens.  Subsequently, Hollon and Shelnut Corporation and Hollon were made parties defendant, and Toms and Moneta, with leave of court, filed intervening petitions for the enforcement of their liens.  The matter was referred to a commissioner in chancery, who heard the evidence and reported his findings to the trial court.
The commissioner reported that the contract between the owners and Hollon, dated April 26, 1974, was assigned by Hollon to Hollon and Shelnut Corporation, but that the owners did not consent to the assignment or have any knowledge of it.  The commissioner reported that Moore's filed memoranda of mechanics' liens against Hollon and Shulnut Corporation and the owners on September 25, 1974, and November 21, 1974, for the same account of $7,572.54; that Toms filed a memorandum against Hollon and Shelnut Corporation and the owners for $557.87 on October 8, 1974, and a memorandum against Charles W. Hollon and the owners on November 21, 1974, for the same account of $557.87; and that Moneta filed a memorandum against Hollon and Shelnut Corporation, Charles W. Hollon, and the owners, on November 21, 1974, for $1,652.85.  The commissioner reported that these *278 liens were timely filed, and allowed all of them as first liens against Charles W. Hollon, general contractor, and the owners, except that he reduced Moore's lien by $2,600.08, the cost of materials which the evidence showed had not been furnished for the owners' construction job, to the sum of $4,972.46.  The land affected by the liens was a tract of 1.43 acres.
The commissioner found, from the testimony of Willie Robert Shelnut, a witness for the owners, who had been associated with Hollon in the construction business, that the total cost of labor and materials furnished on the Mills job before work was discontinued was $21,926.08, on which 15% commissions aggregated $3,288.91, making a total amount payable of $25,214.99.  The general contractor had received $20,000 in two payments on account from the bank which had agreed to furnish construction money for the owners, so that only $5,214.99 was available to pay the liens of Moore's, Toms, and Moneta in the total amount of $7,138.18.  The commissioner reported, therefore, that each of these three lien creditors was entitled to the same pro rata share (72.6%) of its asserted claim, or $3,610 for Moore's, $405.02 for Toms, and $1,199.97 for Moneta.  By decree entered May 9, 1975, the chancellor verruled all exceptions to the commissioner's reports, ratified and confirmed the same, and decreed that the appellees were entitled to overruled all exceptions to the amounts stated in the reports.  The owners have appealed from this decree.
  The owners first argue that the appellees failed to perfect their liens in compliance with the provisions of Code | 43-7. [1]  This statute requires that a subcontractor follow the procedure provided for general contractors in Code | 43-4, [2] and in addition give written notice to the *279 owner in order to perfect his lien which, of course, is limited to the amount in which the owner is indebted to the general contractor, at or after the time of notice.
"Perfection of lien by subcontractor; extent of lien. -- Any subcontractor, in order to perfect the lien given him by | 43-3 shall comply with | 43-4, and in addition give notice in writing to the owner of the property or his agent of the amount and character of his claim.  But the amount for which a subcontractor may perfect a lien under this section shall not exceed the amount in which the owner is indebted to the general contractor at the time the notice is given, or shall thereafter become indebted to the general contractor upon his contract with the general contractor for such structure or building or railroad."
"Perfection of lien by general contractor; recordation and notice. -- A general contractor, in order to perfect the lien given by | 43-3, shall file at any time after the work is done and the material furnished by him and before the expiration of sixty days from the time such building, structure, or railroad is completed, or the work thereon otherwise terminated, in the clerk's office . . . a memorandum showing the names of the owner of the property sought to be charged, and of the claimant of the lien, the amount and consideration of his claim, and the time or times when the same is or will be due and payable, verified by the oath of the claimant, or his agent, including a statement declaring his intention to claim the benefit of the lien, and giving a brief description of the property on which he claims a lien.  . . ."
The evidence establishes that work on the Mills residence under the contract terminated on September 18, 1974.  James E. Mills, Hollon, and Shelnut all testified to this fact.  Although the appellees conceded in oral argument that work "stopped" on that date, they insisted, nevertheless, that there was no evidence that the work at that time was "otherwise terminated" within the meaning of Code | 43-4.  We do not agree.
It is uncontroverted that no employees of Hollon, of Hollon and Shelnut Corporation, or of any subcontractor, worked on the project after September 18. The commissioner found, from the testimony of Mills, that Hollon himself terminated the construction.  The owners' counsel stated in oral argument that Mills "fired" Hollon, a contention which, though denied by Mills in his testimony, was supported by the testimony of both Hollon and Shelnut. Regardless of who prompted the termination, however, the evidence shows that work under the contract ceased on September 18, when Hollon and Shelnut Corporation was experiencing severe financial problems and construction of the Mills residence was approximately two-thirds completed.  We hold, therefore, on the record before us, that the work was "otherwise terminated" on that date, within the meaning of Code | 43-4.  See Loan Association  Kendall Company, 205 Va. 136, 147-48, 135 S.E.2d 178, 186-87 (1964), where we affirmed the chancellor's decree, which confirmed the commissioner's finding that work had been "otherwise terminated" prior to completion of construction.
The memorandum of lien filed by Moneta on November 21, 1974, was not filed within sixty days after the work was "otherwise terminated", as required by Code | 43-4.  Therefore, the chancellor erred in allowing this lien.
  We reject the owners' contention, however, that the Moore's and Toms liens were not perfected in compliance with the statute.  While the written notices of these liens were not served on the owners within sixty days after September 18, 1974, the memoranda of liens were timely filed.
There is no requirement in Code | 43-7 that written notice to the *280 owner shall be given within any specified time.  The language of this statute has remained without substantive change since its codification as Section 2477, Code of 1887, and no time limit has ever been prescribed for giving notice.  The notice affords protection to the owner, who is not in privity of contract with the subcontractor, so that he may not be required to pay twice for the same work and materials.  Since the statute speaks only of amounts payable by the owner to the general contractor at and after the time the subcontractor's notice has been given, the risk of losing his lien is properly imposed upon the dilatory subcontractor.
Only when the owner receives the notice to which he is entitled does he incur a legal obligation to the subcontractor.  In the present case, the record shows that the sum of $5,214.99, which the commissioner found to be available to pay subcontractors' liens, remained undistributed by the owners after the written notices were served on them by Moore's and Toms.
Coleman  Pearman, 159 Va. 72, 165 S.E. 371 (1932), relied on by the owners, is not controlling.  In that case, the subcontractors never gave the written notices to the owners which we held were mandated by the statute.  Our opinion stated, in dictum, that all statutory steps must be taken within the specified time in order to perfect a subcontractor's lien.  This fundamental rule of statutory construction applies where a time is specified, e.g., filing the memorandum within sixty days, but we are unwilling to extend it to an act for which no time limit for performance is specifically prescribed in the statute. To the extent, therefore, that Coleman indicates that the subcontractor's notice to the owner must be given within sixty days after construction is completed or the work otherwise terminated, it is hereby expressly disapproved.
The first notices to the owners in the present case were served by Moore's and Toms more than sixtay days after the work was terminated, but before the chancery suit was instituted to enforce the liens.  Additional notices were served after the suit was commenced, but before there was any change of position by the owners.  We hold that there was sufficient compliance by these subcontractors with the notice requirements of Code | 43-7.  *281
  We find no merit in the owners' contention that the forfeiture provisions of Code | 43-23.1 [3] should be invoked to invalidate Moore's lien. Although the commissioner found that materials valued at $2,600.08 included in Moore's memorandum of lien had not been furnished for the Mills residence, there is insufficient evidence in the record for us to hold as a matter of law that Moore's knowingly included these items.  Jack Bradley, Moore's manager, testified that he had heard rumors that some of the materials billed to the Mills job were not used there, but he assumed that his employees delivered the materials to the site of the job specified on the sales ticket, and he had no reason to believe otherwise.  He acknowledged that frequently a contractor will move materials from one job to another and that Moore's does not question how the contractor utilizes the materials.  The commissioner reasonably could have concluded that this evidence fell short of establishing that Moore's acted knowingly in claiming items that were not allowable.  He excluded all such items but did not otherwise impose a forfeiture, and we find no error in the chancellor's approval of the commissioner's reports in this respect.
"| 43.23.1.  Forfeiture of lien. -- Any person who shall knowingly include in his memorandum of lien work for performed upon or materials not furnished for the property described in his memorandum shall thereby forfeit any right to a lien under this chapter."
  The last argument of the owners, with which we are concerned, is that these liens were not perfected because the general contractor with whom the owners dealt was Hollon individually, whereas the general contractor with which Moore's and Toms contracted was Hollon and Shelnut Corporation.  The commissioner could properly find, as he did find, from the testimony of Hollon and of Shelnut, that the Mills contract was assigned by Hollon individually to Hollon and Shelnut Corporation.  Hollon, serving as president of the corporation, formal corporate action, it is clear were the sole stockholders. Although there was no evidence that the assignment was made in writing or that it was accepted by formal corporatre action, it is clear from their testimony that both Hollon and Shelnut understood and agreed that when the corporation commenced to do business about June 1, 1974, it took over and assumed the Mills contract, as well as other construction contracts on which Hollon and Shelnut had been working.
The owners' reliance on Atlantic States Const.  McCann Steel, 210 Va. 473, 171 S.E.2d 689 (1970), is misplaced.  There, a general contractor agreed to construct a building, but the contract was cancelled, and the landowners entered into a new contract with a second general contractor.  The first contractor, as an inducement to the second contractor to sign the contract, agreed to deposit an indemnity of $30,000.  After the signing of the second contract the original contractor *282 failed to deliver the indemnity, but endeavored to furnish the necessary steel for the job by ordering it from a supplier, who subsequently undertook to enforce a mechanic's lien against the property.  We held that the evidence established that there was no assignment of the first general contract, so that Code | 43-19 [4] did not apply.  We expressly refrained from deciding whether if there had been an assignment of the contract to the second contractor, the supplier, who dealt only with the first contractor, would have been entitled to a mechanic's lien under Code | 43-19 for materials furnished under a contract made after the assignment.  Here, there was an assignment to the second contractor, and the suppliers dealt only with that assignee.  We hold that, under the facts of this case, the subcontractors, who, so far as the evidence shows, contracted with the assignee in good faith, are not to be denied the protection of the mechanics' liens statutes merely because the owners did not know of the assignment.
"| 43-19.  Validity and priority of lien not affected by assignments. -- Every assignment or transfer by a general contractor, in whole or in part, of his contract with the owner or of any money of consideration coming to him under such contract, or by a subcontractor of his contract with the general contractor, in whole or in part, or of any money or consideration coming to him under his contract with the general contractor, and every writ of fieri facias, attachment or other process against the general contractor or subcontractor to subject or encumber his interest arising under such contract, shall be subject to the liens given by this chapter to laborers, mechanics, and material-men.  No such assignment or transfer shall in any way affect the validity or the priority of satisfaction of liens given by this chapter."
The owners are not prejudiced if the liens are upheld.  The liens, within the statutory limitations, were allowed only for materials which were furnished for the Mills residence pursuant to the general contract which Hollon represented to the materialmen to be a contract of his corporation.  In Atlantic States Const., supra, the second contractor denied that it owed anything to the supplier.  In the present case, neither Hollon nor his assignee, the corporation, has ever denied that moneys payable to Hollon under the contract would be payable to materialmen who furnished materials for the job for the assignee.  Under these circumstances, we hold that Moore's and Toms, suppliers of the assignee, are entitled to mechanics' liens against the property, even though in their memoranda of liens they designated the assignee corporation, rather than Hollon, as general contractor.  The written notices subsequently given to the owners described Hollon as the general contractor, and the dates these notices were given were the critical dates in fixing liability upon the owners for any sums then *283 or thereafter payable to the general contractor. The commissioner and the chancellor did not err in allowing the Moore's and Toms liens.
For the reasons stated, we will enter a final decree affirming the decree of the trial court insofar as it allowed the liens of Moore's and Toms and reversing the decree insofar as it allowed the lien of Moneta.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and final decree.
NOTES
[1]  Code | 43-7 (Repl. Vol. 1970) provides:
[2]  Code | 43-4 (Repl. Vol. 1970) provides in pertinent part:
[3]  Code | 43-23.1 (Repl. Vol. 1970) provides:
[4]  Code | 43-19 (Repl. Vol. 1970) provides: