119 Mich. App. 319 (1982)
326 N.W.2d 497
HENRY
v.
HENRY
Docket No. 59745.
Michigan Court of Appeals.
Decided September 7, 1982.
D. Craig Henry, P.C., for plaintiff.
Majory B. Cohen, for defendant.
Before: J.H. GILLIS, P.J., and V.J. BRENNAN and N.J. LAMBROS,[*] JJ.
N.J. LAMBROS, J.
On November 5, 1980, defendant was awarded a judgment of divorce and custody of her two minor children. That judgment provided that the domicile or residence of said minor children shall not be removed from the State of Michigan without prior approval of the court, as required by GCR 1963, 729.4(1). In addition, the defendant was precluded from changing the domicile or residence of the minor children from the Grand Blanc School District without prior court approval. Defendant filed a petition to obtain the court's approval to move to Minnesota with the children, but this petition was denied. Defendant appeals as of right.
The instant case presents this Court with an opportunity to clarify our position regarding removal of children from this state subsequent to the entry of a judgment of divorce and the award of custody.
MCL 552.17(a); MSA 25.97(1) provides that our circuit courts shall have the jurisdiction to award *321 custody of minor children in all divorce proceedings. In an attempt to provide guidelines for the resolution of child custody disputes, our Legislature enacted the Child Custody Act of 1970, MCL 722.21 et seq.; MSA 25.312(1) et seq. GCR 1963, 729.4 requires that an order or judgment awarding custody of a child or children shall provide that the domicile or residence of the child shall not be removed from the State of Michigan without the approval of the judge who awarded custody, or his successor. This is the body of codified law which governs our review of the instant inquiry.
Two of our panels have already had an opportunity to examine this issue. In Hutchins v Hutchins, 84 Mich App 236; 269 NW2d 539 (1978), the court determined that in attempting to answer removal petitions, the decisions of the lower courts should be based upon the "best interests of the child" standard set out in the Child Custody Act. The Court observed that "[t]his standard applies not only in the original divorce proceeding but also in all actions involving a dispute of custody of a minor child, see MCL 722.24; MSA 25.312(4)." Id., 238. This view of the law was adopted by a majority of the Court in Watters v Watters, 112 Mich App 1; 314 NW2d 778 (1981).
In both of these cases separate opinions were appended by the third judge. Concurring in Hutchins, Judge WILLIAM R. BEASLEY wrote that "in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, permitting a child to be removed from the State of Michigan to a new, satisfactory location, should be routinely granted". (Footnote omitted.) Hutchins, supra, 239-240. Dissenting in Watters, Judge KENNETH B. GLASER indicated his belief that the criteria for determining the best interest of the child for custody purposes under the Child Custody Act, *322 MCL 722.23; MSA 25.312(3), were not intended to, nor should they be, applicable to removal petitions. We agree.
A close analysis of the Child Custody Act reveals nothing to support its application to those cases involving the removal of children from the state after the award of custody. Indeed, the Legislature, itself, defined the application and limits of the act with the following language, to wit: "AN ACT to declare the inherent rights of minor children; to establish rights and duties to their custody, support and visitation in disputed actions; to provide for certain procedure and appeals; and to repeal certain acts and parts of acts."
MCL 722.24; MSA 25.312(4) provides, "In all actions now pending or hereafter filed in a circuit court involving dispute of custody of a minor child, the court shall declare the inherent rights of the child and establish the rights and duties as to custody, support and visitation of the child in accordance with this act." (Emphasis added.) Application of the preceding language to child custody cases requires trial courts to determine what action would be in the best interests of the child. As mandated by MCL 722.23; MSA 25.312(3), 11 specific factors must be considered by the trial court.
To expand the application of the Child Custody Act to include removal petitions does violence to the expressed intention of the Legislature and imposes upon the trial courts the burden to reconsider factors previously before the court in child custody disputes and may be likely to present wholly inappropriate areas of inquiry in removal petitions.
Moreover, in 1975, our Legislature adopted the uniform child custody jurisdiction act, MCL *323 600.651; MSA 27A.651, for the purpose of avoiding child custody disputes "which have in the past resulted in the shifting of children from state to state with harmful effects on their well-being", and in the interest of promoting "greater stability of home environment and of secure family relationships for the child". In the words of Judge BEASLEY in his concurrence in Hutchins, supra, 240, fn 1, adoption of the act "recognizes the transcience of our late 20th century society".
We believe the appropriate test to be applied in cases dealing with removal petitions is that articulated by the New Jersey Court in D'Onofrio v D'Onofrio, 144 NJ Super 200; 365 A2d 27 (1976), aff'd 144 NJ Super 352; 365 A2d 716 (1976), adopted by reference in Watters v Watters, supra, and which recognizes the mutual rights involved:
(1) "It should consider the prospective advantages of the move in terms of its likely capacity for improving the general quality of life for both the custodial parent and the children.
(2) "It must evaluate the integrity of the motives of the custodial parent in seeking the move in order to determine whether the removal is inspired primarily by the desire to defeat or frustrate visitation by the noncustodial parent, and whether the custodial parent is likely to comply with substitute visitation orders when she is no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State.
(3) "It must likewise take into account the integrity of the noncustodial parent's motives in resisting the removal and consider the extent to which, if at all, the opposition is intended to secure a financial advantage in respect of continuing support obligations.
(4) "Finally, the court must be satisfied that there will be a realistic opportunity for visitation in lieu of the weekly pattern which can provide an adequate basis for preserving and fostering the parental relationship *324 with the noncustodial parent if removal is allowed." D'Onofrio v D'Onofrio, supra.
The D'Onofrio test focuses on what is in the best interest of the new family unit, i.e., custodial parent and child, and not what is in the best interest of the child; the latter having been decided in the earlier custody hearings. Adoption of the D'Onofrio test comports with the legislative intent as it is currently expressed and recognizes the increasingly legitimate mobility of our society. Arbitrary imposition of the "best interests of the child" test in all matters concerning children is illogical at best and cruelly insensitive at worst.
For these reasons, the decision of the lower court rejecting defendant's petition to move to another state with the children is reversed and the cause remanded for proceedings consistent with our decision.
NOTES
[*]  Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.


648 F.2d 914
PENNSYLVANIA MANUFACTURERS' ASSOCIATION INSURANCE COMPANY,and George Wollman, Inc.v.LUMBERMENS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY; Greyhound Line, Inc.;Super Tire Engineering Co.; Hubler Rentals, Inc.; AllianceTire & Rubber Co., Ltd.; Lydia Hendricks, Administratrix ofthe Estate of Lewis C. Richardson, deceased; Betty DunbarTwohig, Administratrix of the Estate of Leo L. Twohig,deceased; Betty Dunbar Twohig, Administratrix of the Estateof Leo Dale Twohig, deceased; Lillie Mae Brown,Administratrix of the Estate of Inez Brown, deceased;Dorothy Campbell LittleLumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, Appellant in 80-2365Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association Insurance Company,and George Wollman, Inc., Appellants in 80-2476.
Nos. 80-2365, 80-2476.
United States Court of Appeals,Third Circuit.
Argued Feb. 23, 1981.Decided May 11, 1981.

Raymond J. Lamb (argued), Lamb, Hutchinson, Chappell, Ryan & Hartung, Jersey City, N.J., for Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.
William B. Scatchard, Jr.  (argued), Capehart & Scatchard, P.A., Moorestown, N.J., for Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association Insurance Company and George Wollman, Inc.
Before WEIS, and GARTH, Circuit Judges and MILLER,* Judge.
OPINION OF THE COURT
WEIS, Circuit Judge.

1
This appeal presents the question whether two insurance companies each owed a defense to the owner and lessee of a truck that was in a collision causing fatal injuries.  Because the truck lease required that the lessee indemnify not only the owner but also its insurance carrier, and since the lessee's policy covered contractual liability, we conclude that the lessee's insurer is solely responsible for defense costs.  Accordingly, we vacate the district court's judgment assessing joint liability.

2
The plaintiffs, Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association Insurance Company (PMA) and George Wollman, Inc., filed suit against the Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, alleging that it shared the responsibility for defending their mutual insureds against personal injury and death claims.  On stipulated facts, the district court concluded that both insurance companies afforded primary coverage and entered judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $20,807.99, a share of the total defense costs prorated on the respective policy limits.

3
The accident occurred in New Jersey when a truck tire blew out, causing the vehicle to careen across the highway into the opposite lane where it struck an automobile and a bus.  Nine people were killed and ten were injured.  A number of claims resulted in litigation, but eventually all were settled through a cooperative and commendable effort by the insurers of the truck and the tire manufacturer.  The only matter upon which the carriers could not agree was whether Lumbermens Mutual was obligated to provide a defense to the various parties alleged to be responsible for the operation of the truck, or whether PMA was solely responsible for the expense.  The tire manufacturer's insurer has no interest in that question and is not a party to this litigation.

4
Hubler Rentals, Inc., which had its main office in Allentown, Pennsylvania, leased the truck and others to George Wollman, Inc., which had its principal place of business in Westville, New Jersey.  The lease between the two companies required that Wollman provide liability insurance to "protect the interest of HUBLER and the LESSEE (Wollman), including their authorized drivers."  The agreement also contained the following: "II.  The LESSEE (Wollman) hereby covenants and agrees: (n) To indemnify HUBLER or its insurance carrier for all liability by reason of injuries or damages to any person or property resulting from VEHICLES or its operator " Also included was a provision requiring that the lease be construed in accordance with Pennsylvania law.

5
Wollman secured an automobile liability policy from PMA.  It is conceded that the policy was applicable to the accident and covered not only Wollman and its driver, but Hubler as well.  A special endorsement in the PMA policy stated that the "insurance applies as primary insurance" to the owner of vehicles leased to Wollman.  The policy also contained an additional declaration covering the contractual liability of Wollman to Hubler and its insurance carrier under the terms of the lease.  In this respect, the policy read,

6
"(PMA) will pay on behalf of the insured (Wollman) all sums which the insured, by reason of contractual liability assumed by him under a contract designated in the schedule for this insurance, shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of Coverage Y bodily injury; or Coverage Z property damage to which this insurance applies "

7
The Wollman-Hubler lease was listed in the appropriate schedule.

8
PMA did defend Hubler, as well as Wollman, in the various suits and expended $51,829.20 for legal and investigative services.  PMA does not contest that it was a primary insurer and as such owed a defense to both parties.  Although Lumbermens insured Hubler under a number of policies, it refused to participate in the defense, claiming its coverages were excess only.1

9
The district court discussed three of the Lumbermens policies.  The first, No. T3L-26-450, was a garage policy.  It did not cover automobiles rented to others by Hubler.  Because the truck had been leased to Wollman, the district court gave effect to this exclusion and held that the policy did not apply.  No. F3L-26-482 was a combination automobile-general liability policy that did provide coverage for trucks owned by Hubler "while leased to another under a written lease agreement."  According to its terms, however, that policy was "excess insurance over any other valid and collectible insurance for Bodily Injury Liability and Property Damage Liability."  The district court concluded that this policy was excess over the insurance issued to Wollman by PMA and, consequently did not impose a co-primary duty to defend.2

10
The third contract, No. 2MF-13-506, was a comprehensive automobile liability policy, including garage insurance, which, according to the district court, provided primary coverage for Hubler.  The policy defined the automobile hazard which it covered to include "the ownership, maintenance or use of any automobile owned by the named insured (Hubler) while furnished for the use of any person."  A printed restriction at § e(2)(ii) of the policy excludes coverage arising out of the ownership of any automobile "while rented to others by the named insured."  On its face, this language would deny coverage, but a typed endorsement specifically waived this exclusion "as regards any owned vehicle, rented to others, while in the care, custody or control of the Named Insured (Hubler)."  The policy did not contain an "other insurance clause."3

11
The district court held that the lease requirement that Hubler service and maintain the truck while rented to Wollman came within the definition of "care" under the terms of the insurance contract, and accordingly found that the policy provided primary coverage to Hubler.4  Lumbermens concedes that coverage would also extend to Wollman, if the policy is applicable.

12
In this diversity case, the district court looked to the conflict of laws rule adopted by the forum state, New Jersey, and determined Pennsylvania law would apply, since both the PMA and Lumbermens policies were issued there.  On appeal, Lumbermens contends that New Jersey law should govern because Wollman had its principal place of business in that state; all of the vehicles, which bore New Jersey plates, were garaged, maintained, and used in that state; and the accident occurred there.  Lumbermens presses this position because it feels that New Jersey law is more favorably inclined toward enforcement of indemnification agreements.

13
On the other hand, PMA maintains that Pennsylvania law controls because it is a Pennsylvania corporation, with its principal place of business in Philadelphia, and that its policy was issued to Wollman, at an address in that city.  PMA contends that under Pennsylvania law, the lease between Hubler and Wollman does not bind PMA because it was not a party to that agreement.

14
Since our disposition of this case would be the same under either Pennsylvania or New Jersey law, we need not resolve the conflicts question.  In any event, Lumbermens' primary defense rests upon a construction of the lease, which by its terms calls for application of Pennsylvania law.

15
The district court followed the theory that the lease between Hubler and Wollman did not determine the respective liabilities of PMA and Lumbermens because they were not parties to it and relied on Transport Indemnity Co. v. Home Indemnity Co., 535 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1976).  That case grew out of a controversy between the respective insurers of the owner and renter of a truck.  In the lease, the renter agreed to indemnify the owner of the truck for any liability.  Id. at 234.  This court refused to enforce the indemnification clause as applied to the insurers, saying "the insurance carriers were not parties to this contract (the truck lease) and their liabilities are governed by their contracts with the insureds, and they cannot be held to anything beyond those contracted duties."  Id. at 235 (citations omitted).  In the case at hand, the district court believed that statement to be controlling.

16
The holding in Transport Indemnity Co. v. Home Indemnity Co., supra, however, is not determinative of the issue presented in this case.  Before rejecting the lease as inapplicable, we must review the insurance contract itself to determine the extent of coverage afforded.  In turn, the language of the insurance contract may require recourse to other documents, not to change the agreement between insurer and insured, but to establish facts that call policy terms into play.  Thus, if an insurance contract grants or denies coverage because a vehicle is rented, a copy of the lease may be important to resolve the policy dispute.  Carolina Casualty Insurance Co. v. Underwriters Insurance Co., 569 F.2d 304, 313-14 (5th Cir. 1978).

17
There are two distinguishing features between Transport Indemnity and the case here.  First, the indemnification clause in the Transport Indemnity case designated only the lessor, as opposed to the language employed in this case, which includes Hubler's "insurer" as an additional indemnitee.  Second, the PMA policy, under its designated contracts provision, specifically extended coverage to Wollman for its obligations under the lease.  Under the terms of that endorsement, PMA assumed Wollman's lease obligation to "indemnify Hubler or its insurance carrier for all liability " Thus, PMA was not a stranger to the lease, but underwrote Wollman's contractually assumed obligations.  To that extent, PMA incurred liability in excess of that required by the usual form policy.  See 13A J. Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice, § 7527 (1976 & Supp. 1980).

18
Once PMA's obligation under the policy is found to be co-extensive with that of Wollman's relevant contractual obligation, the scope of coverage is determined by the pertinent terms of the lease.  The next step, therefore, is to turn to the lease and examine the indemnity clause.

19
Indemnification agreements are generally recognized in Pennsylvania, but the courts are chary about enforcing a contract that requires indemnification against one's own negligence unless that provision is clearly expressed.  See Brotherton Construction Co. v. Patterson-Emerson-Comstock, Inc., 406 Pa. 400, 178 A.2d 696 (1962); Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Patterson-Emerson-Comstock, Inc., 404 Pa. 53, 171 A.2d 185 (1961); Gimbel Brothers v. William H. Vanderherchen, 468 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1972).  General language that indemnifies against "all liability," as found in the indemnifying provision here, is not enough in Pennsylvania to include that arising from negligence of the indemnitee.  Id. at 599.  The claim in this case, however, does not rest upon indemnification for damages incurred as a result of Hubler's own negligence, but for defense expenses incurred in contesting an award of damages.  The Pennsylvania cases that restrict exculpation from negligence, therefore, are not on point.

20
Wollman agreed in the lease to indemnify Hubler and Lumbermens for "all liability" resulting from the truck or its driver.  That liability is not limited to satisfaction of damages resulting from negligence, but includes as well the obligation to pay expenses incurred in disproving responsibility for damages.  That this broad indemnification was intended by the terms of the lease is established by an examination of its language in the light of the circumstances, including benefits customarily provided by liability insurance policies.

21
The mere fact that it was named as a defendant in the personal injury suits establishes neither Hubler's negligence nor a duty on the part of its insurance carrier to pay damages to the plaintiffs in that litigation.  What the litigation did trigger was the necessity for Hubler to secure and pay for counsel to defend the suits.  Ordinarily Hubler's insurance company would come forward and provide a defense, since form policies generally assume that obligation, whether the suit had merit or was groundless.  The policies issued by Lumbermens to Hubler contain typical defense language.

22
The inclusion of such a clause has the effect of imposing separate and distinct obligations on a liability insurance carrier to pay damages against its insured and to provide a defense.  The two duties are not coterminous and a carrier may be obligated to defend its insured in circumstances where the damage award itself may be payable by another insurance company, other party, or the insured himself.  C. H. Heist Caribe Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 640 F.2d 479 (3d Cir., 1981); Mattocks v. Daylin, Inc., 452 F.Supp. 512, 514 (W.D.Pa.1978), aff'd mem., 614 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1979).  When the lease agreement speaks of indemnifying Hubler's insurance carrier for "all liability," it must be read as including both of the carrier's obligations damage awards and the cost of defense.  Nothing in the lease limits its scope to payment to an injured person and it must therefore include the defense liability as well.

23
PMA, however, resorts to its "other insurance" clause, which provides that if the insureds, Hubler and Wollman, had similar (primary) insurance, liability would be prorated.  Such clauses are generally given effect if possible, allowing an otherwise solely primary carrier to be given coinsurer status.  See e. g., Insurance Co. of North America v. Continental Casualty Co., 575 F.2d 1070 (3d Cir. 1978).  That printed form provision, however, is subject to the special contractual endorsement making PMA a guarantor of Wollman's liability under the lease, as well as the clause stating that as to the owner of a leased vehicle, PMA's insurance was primary.  It is arguable that the latter clause is not inconsistent with PMA's claim that both companies have primary coverage.  When it is read in conjunction with Wollman's lease obligation to indemnify Hubler's insurance carrier "for all liability," however, it is clear that PMA is obligated to cover Wollman's obligation to indemnify Lumbermens for any defense costs incurred.  Thus, adding the obligation of PMA to meet Wollman's duties under the lease results in a neutralization of PMA's "other insurance" clause so as to foreclose that basis for the demand for contribution from Lumbermens.

24
PMA's position essentially is that it shouldered not only its own burden, but Lumbermens as well, and is therefore entitled to contribution.  That premise is not valid because by assuming Wollman's obligation to indemnify Lumbermens, PMA took to itself the whole responsibility.  We conclude, therefore, that PMA is not entitled to recover the cost of defense from Lumbermens.5  Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is vacated, and the case is remanded with directions that judgment be entered in favor of the defendant.

*
 The Honorable Jack Richard Miller, United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Washington, D. C., sitting by designation

1
 Coincidentally, Wollman had purchased an excess insurance policy with Lumbermens.  The total amount of damages exceeded the limits of the primary PMA policy, so the Lumbermens policy was used in contributing to the settlements.  Since that Lumbermens policy was excess, it did not provide a defense in these circumstances, and is not in issue here

2
 We have carefully reviewed the district court's conclusions with respect to the coverage of these first two Lumbermens policies.  We are in agreement with those determinations and find no necessity to discuss them further

3
 The copy of this policy, designated as Exhibit P-7, contains many other coverages and endorsements not applicable to this case in such a disorganized fashion that we must rely upon the findings of the district court with respect to the applicable endorsements and exclusions.  We note in that connection that the other garage policy issued by Lumbermens did have an "other insurance clause."  Although a similar clause is not found in policy No. 2MF-13-506, several pages do appear to be missing from the exhibit.  In any event, no exception has been taken to the district court's findings by the parties, and we do not pursue the matter further

4
 In view of our disposition of this case, we do not decide whether this ruling of the district court was correct

5
 The issues raised by PMA in its cross-appeal need not be addressed, since our disposition of the case moots them


91 Wn.2d 48 (1978)
586 P.2d 870
WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, Respondent,
v.
GREAT WESTERN UNION FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, ET AL, Appellants.
No. 45350.
The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.
November 16, 1978.
Johnson, George, Hull & Porter, P.S., by Harold D. Johnson and Larry Setchell, for appellants.
Kain & Snow, by George A. Kain, for respondent.
James A. Furber on behalf of Washington Savings League, amicus curiae.
STAFFORD, J.
Appellants Great Western Union Federal Savings and Loan Association and Kathleen Kelley (hereinafter referred to collectively as Great Western) appeal a judgment which declares certain of their activities to be the unauthorized practice of law. Respondent Washington State Bar Association (Bar Association) cross-appeals the trial court's refusal to grant injunctive relief. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
*50 Great Western, a federally chartered savings and loan association, lends money to purchasers of real property in exchange for obtaining a security interest in the property purchased. Purchasers may obtain either a new loan or assume an existing loan owed to Great Western by the seller of the property.
Great Western also provides a "closing" service to the purchaser and seller. As a part of this service, Great Western selects and completes legal documents which it deems necessary and appropriate to close both the loan between it and the purchaser and the sale between the purchaser and seller. In this respect, Great Western selects and completes such forms as promissory notes, deeds of trust, statutory warranty deeds, 1 percent real estate excise tax affidavits, agreements modifying deeds of trust and promissory notes, seller's letter of closing instructions,[1] and advance disclosure statements required by the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. Great Western then presents the documents needing signatures to the parties, states the title of each document, requests and obtains signatures on documents. Additionally, Great Western furnishes its borrower (the purchaser) with a loan commitment letter indicating that the sale and loan will be *51 closed in its offices[2] and provides a booklet prescribed by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development.
As part of its "closing service", Great Western charges the parties a settlement or closing fee. The fee is designed to recover Great Western's actual cost in performing the "closing services" and is determined by a schedule without regard to services actually performed. This fee is not itemized according to the "closing service" provided and includes charges for Great Western's services in (1) obtaining hazard and casualty insurance on the property; (2) establishing a computer record for the loan obligation; (3) preparation of additional disclosure statements required by RESPA and the Truth-In-Lending Act (15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.); (4) obtaining signatures on the documents; (5) recording documents; and (6) disbursing loan proceeds.
In addition to the closing fee, Great Western also charges a loan service fee for new loans or an assumption fee for loan assumption agreements. For these fees Great Western performs the following services: (1) receives and prepares the loan or assumption application; (2) verifies the borrower's financial and credit history; (3) prepares and delivers to the borrower various disclosure forms required by RESPA; *52 (4) obtains and evaluates an appraisal of the property; (5) reviews the entire loan application package; and (6) prepares and issues to the borrower a loan commitment letter.
Between July 1, 1975, and December 31, 1975, Great Western conditioned its approval of new loans as well as assumption applications upon its closing, in Great Western's offices, all transactions involving Great Western and the purchaser and seller. This policy, although in force for only 6 months, was applied even in those cases where Great Western knew that the purchaser and seller had previously appointed attorneys, title companies, or escrow companies as their closing agent for the sale transaction.
In one transaction Great Western's closing agent Kelley prepared for a seller and buyer a promissory note and second deed of trust solely between the seller and buyer, which was subordinate to Great Western's existing deed of trust securing the loan being assumed by the purchaser.
At all times relevant to the action herein, neither appellant was enrolled as an active member of respondent Bar Association.
In December 1975, respondent Bar Association filed this action for a declaratory judgment that many of Great Western's activities constituted the unauthorized practice of law and to restrain Great Western from further acts constituting the unauthorized practice of law. Following trial, the court entered a judgment which declared the following acts of Great Western and its employee Kelley to be the unauthorized practice of law.[3]
2. The activities ... between July 1, 1975 and December 31, 1975 in conditioning approval of its loan applications and assumption applications on the substitution of its agents for attorneys or others previously appointed by the parties to real estate transactions for *53 the purpose of drafting the following legal documents utilized in said transactions: deeds substantially in the form prescribed by RCW 64.04.030, RCW 64.04.040, and RCW 64.04.050, to which the Defendant is not a party and whether or not a fee is charged of the parties thereto, and mortgages, deeds of trust, promissory notes or agreements modifying such documents to which the Defendant Great Western is a party and charges a fee of the other party for such preparation, or to which the Defendant Great Western is not a party, constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.
3. The selection and completion of deed forms, or the drafting of deeds substantially in the form prescribed by RCW 64.04.030, RCW 64.04.040, and RCW 64.04.050, conveying an interest in real property when done with or without the charging of a fee by one not licensed to practice law and not a party to said conveyance.
4. The charging of a fee to the other party for the selection and completion of or the drafting of Mortgages, Deeds of Trust, Promissory Notes and agreements modifying said documents by one not licensed to practice law where the preparer of such legal documents is a party to the documents by reason of lending its funds to the other party to such documents.
Although it entered a finding of fact that the foregoing activities would continue unless restrained, the trial court denied the Bar Association's request for injunctive relief.
Great Western appealed assigning error to the foregoing paragraphs of the judgment and to the conclusions of law entered in support of the judgment. The Bar Association cross-appealed the trial court's refusal to grant injunctive relief.
[1] No error has been assigned to the findings of fact so they become the established facts of this case. Lakeside Pump & Equip., Inc. v. Austin Constr. Co., 89 Wn.2d 839, 842, 576 P.2d 54 (1958); Jordin v. Vauthiers, 89 Wn.2d 725, 728, 575 P.2d 709 (1978). Consequently our review is limited to determining whether those facts support the trial court's conclusions of law and judgment. Lakeside Pump & Equip., Inc. v. Austin Constr. Co., supra at 842; Jordin v. Vauthiers, supra at 728.
*54 Central to this appeal is Great Western's argument that the trial court erroneously concluded that:
The selection and completion of form legal documents, or the drafting of legal documents, including Deeds, Mortgages, Deeds of Trust, Promissory Notes and agreements modifying such legal documents, whereby the parties thereto are subject to binding legal rights and obligations, constitutes the practice of law.
(Conclusion of law No. 4.) Since the unchallenged findings of fact establish that Great Western engaged in these activities we need only consider Great Western's legal argument that such activities must be performed for another to be the "practice of law."
[2] The basic fallacy in Great Western's argument is its failure to differentiate between activities which constitute the practice of law from the person engaging in those activities. It is the nature and character of the service performed which governs whether given activities constitute the practice of law. Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, 41 Wn.2d 697, 699, 251 P.2d 619 (1952). If the nature and character of the activities result in a determination that the activities are the practice of law, the subsequent inquiry becomes whether the one undertaking such practice is authorized to do so. Hence, in considering the trial court's conclusion of law, we are only concerned with whether the nature and character of the activities involved warrant the conclusion that anyone undertaking them is engaged in the practice of law.
[3] The "practice of law" does not lend itself easily to precise definition. However, it is generally acknowledged to include not only the doing or performing of services in the courts of justice, throughout the various stages thereof, but in a larger sense includes legal advice and counsel and the preparation of legal instruments by which legal rights and obligations are established. In re Droker & Mulholland, 59 Wn.2d 707, 719, 370 P.2d 242 (1962); State ex rel. Laughlin v. Washington State Bar Ass'n, 26 Wn.2d 914, 927-28, 176 P.2d 301 (1947); Yount v. Zarbell, 17 Wn.2d 278, 135 P.2d *55 309 (1943); Hecomovich v. Nielsen, 10 Wn. App. 563, 571, 518 P.2d 1081 (1974). See Burien Motors, Inc. v. Balch, 9 Wn. App. 573, 513 P.2d 582 (1973); Andersen v. Northwest Bonded Escrows, Inc., 4 Wn. App. 754, 484 P.2d 488 (1971). Further, selection and completion of preprinted form legal documents has been found to be the "practice of law." In re Droker & Mulholland, supra; Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, supra. See In re Estes, 186 Wash. 690, 57 P.2d 1262 (1936); In re McCallum, 186 Wash. 312, 57 P.2d 1259 (1936); Paul v. Stanley, 168 Wash. 371, 12 P.2d 401 (1932).
The services at issue here are ordinarily performed by licensed attorneys, involve legal rights and obligations, and by their very nature involve the practice of law. We thus must agree with the trial court's conclusion that the selection and completion of form legal documents, or the drafting of such documents, including deeds, mortgages, deeds of trust, promissory notes and agreements modifying these documents constitutes the practice of law.
We next must consider Great Western's challenge to the trial court's conclusions of law and judgment that it was not authorized to engage in such practice of law. In this respect, the unchallenged findings of fact establish that Great Western charged and received a "closing" fee from the purchaser (its borrower) and the seller of the property.[4] This "closing" fee included charges (1) for the preparation, selection, or drafting of the deed between the purchaser and seller to which Great Western was not a party and (2) for the preparation, selection or drafting of the promissory notes, deeds of trust, mortgages, and agreements modifying these documents to which Great Western was a party. On the basis of these facts, we must determine whether the status of Great Western in performing these services warrants the determination that such practice of law was authorized.
*56 [4] Ordinarily, only those persons who are licensed to practice law in this state may do so without liability for unauthorized practice. RCW 2.48.010 et seq.; APR 5, 7; DRA 6.7. Moreover, both the legislature and this court have recognized that a person may appear and act in any court as his own attorney without threat of sanction for unauthorized practice. Dlouhy v. Dlouhy, 55 Wn.2d 718, 349 P.2d 1073 (1960); Americus v. McGinnis, 128 Wash. 28, 221 P. 987 (1924); RCW 2.48.190. Cf. CR 11; RAP 10.1(d), 10.2(e), 10.3(d).
Additionally, we have recognized that a party to a legal document may select, prepare or draft that document without fear of liability for unauthorized practice. See, e.g., In re Droker & Mulholland, supra; Mattieligh v. Poe, 57 Wn.2d 203, 356 P.2d 328, 94 A.L.R.2d 464 (1960); Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, supra; Paul v. Stanley, supra. This exception to our general prohibition against the practice of law by laypersons *57 is analogous to the "pro se" exception for court proceedings. Both exceptions are founded upon the belief that a layperson may desire to act on his own behalf with respect to his legal rights and obligations without the benefit of counsel.
The "pro se" exceptions are quite limited and apply only if the layperson is acting solely on his own behalf. See Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Tussey, 476 S.W.2d 177 (Ky. Ct. App. 1972); New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J. Mort. Associates, 32 N.J. 430, 161 A.2d 257 (1960); State Bar of Ariz. v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1 (1961), modified on rehearing, 91 Ariz. 293, 371 P.2d 1020 (1962). Moreover, a layperson who receives compensation for such legal services may not rely upon the "pro se" exception. The receipt of compensation is conclusive evidence that the layperson is not merely acting for himself but has assumed the additional burden of acting for another. See Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Tussey, supra; New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J. Mort. Associates, supra; State Bar of Ariz. v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., supra. See also Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, supra at 699; Annot., Drafting, of filling in blanks in printed forms, of instruments relating to land by real-estate agents, brokers, or managers as constituting practice of law, 53 A.L.R.2d 788, at § 4 (1957). In such instances, a layperson will be liable for the unauthorized practice of law even though he is a party to, or asserts a substantial interest in, the document or court proceeding.
Great Western's reliance upon our "pro se" exception to authorize its practice of law is accordingly misplaced. Great Western charged the purchaser (its borrower) and the seller of the property a fee for the "closing services" it provided. This fee included a charge for the selection, preparation or drafting of both the necessary loan documents and the deed between the purchaser and seller. By charging a fee for such legal services, Great Western removed itself from *58 the protection afforded by our "pro se" exception to the general prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law.
We therefore agree with the trial court's conclusion that Great Western's preparation of the loan documents to which it was a party and for which it charged its borrower a fee is the practice of law for itself as well as for the borrower. We affirm paragraph 4 of the judgment which declares these activities the unauthorized practice of law.
We also agree with the trial court's conclusion that Great Western's selection and completion of deed forms, or its drafting of deeds substantially in the form prescribed by RCW 64.04.030-.050,[5]for which it also charged a fee, is the unauthorized practice of law. Thus, we also affirm that part of paragraph 3 of the judgment which declares these activities to be unauthorized.
Great Western also assigns error to the trial court's conclusion of law and judgment that its activities in selecting, completing, or drafting deeds passing between the purchaser (its borrower) and the seller would constitute the unauthorized practice of law even if a fee was not charged. In this respect, Great Western does not contend it would in fact be a party to the deed. Rather, it asserts it would have a "substantial interest" in the quality of the deed passing between these parties to authorize it to select, prepare and draft the deed. This interest is said to arise because the Federal Savings and Loan Associations Act (12 U.S.C. § 1464) requires Great Western to obtain a first lien security upon real property taken as security for its loans.[6] 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c).
*59 [5] We agree the trial court erred by entering that portion of its conclusion of law and judgment which purports to declare that Great Western's activity in selecting, completing or drafting deeds passing between the purchaser and seller would be unauthorized even if no fee were charged. This issue was not properly before the trial court. There is neither evidence nor any finding of fact to indicate that Great Western ever performs these legal services without charging a fee. In fact, Great Western not only charges a fee for these services but it asserts that it must do so under the regulations of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.[7]See 12 C.F.R. 545.6-10. Given these facts, we cannot sustain the conclusion of law and judgment on this issue. They were entered without any factual basis. For the same reason, we need not consider Great Western's contention that in the absence of a fee it could have selected, prepared or drafted a deed because it had a "substantial interest" in the quality of the deed passing between the purchaser and seller. The only evidence is that a fee was in fact charged.
With respect to the selection, preparation or drafting of such deeds, amicus curiae also asserts these legal services cannot be the unauthorized practice of law because, as a practical matter, a lender will never select the type of deed and will act only as a "scrivener" for the parties. For "scrivening," amicus curiae asserts a fee may properly be charged. But, we need not consider the arguments of *60 amicus curiae. The unchallenged findings of fact demonstrate that Great Western did in fact select the deed form and thus did not act merely as a "scrivener." Furthermore, we ordinarily do not consider arguments raised only by amicus curiae. State v. Smith, 88 Wn.2d 639, 645 n. 1, 564 P.2d 1154 (1977); Long v. Odell, 60 Wn.2d 151, 154, 372 P.2d 548 (1962); Walker v. Wiley, 177 Wash. 483, 491, 32 P.2d 1062 (1934).
Great Western has also assigned error to paragraph 2 of the judgment and to its allied conclusion of law. On this issue, Great Western's argument is quite limited. It merely asserts that its requirement that the parties substitute Great Western's closing agent for the agent selected by the parties is the unauthorized practice of law only if the document preparation involved therein is unauthorized. Great Western then concedes that its substitution condition would be an unauthorized practice if the document preparation is unauthorized. Since we have already determined the document preparation to be unauthorized, and in light of Great Western's concession that this renders its substitution condition unauthorized, we find this assignment of error to be without merit. Moreover, Great Western's failure to seriously brief or argue this matter leads us to conclude that the claimed error has been abandoned. See Lassila v. Wenatchee, 89 Wn.2d 804, 809, 576 P.2d 54 (1978); State v. Wood, 89 Wn.2d 97, 99, 569 P.2d 1148 (1977).
[6] We also reject Great Western's argument that declaratory relief is precluded because the Bar Association failed to establish that these unauthorized practices resulted in public harm. It is our duty to protect the public from the activity of those who, because of lack of professional skills, may cause injury whether they are members of the bar or persons never qualified for or admitted to the bar. Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, supra at 699. In the sphere that encompasses the regulation of the practice of law, it is not merely this court's function to redress past injury but to prevent future harm *61 where possible. In re Droker & Mulholland, supra at 721. While the record may not disclose that Great Western's unauthorized practices specifically injured the public, proof thereof is not indispensible to the granting of declaratory relief. We have recognized, as has the legislature, that the unauthorized practice of law by laypersons is not in the public's best interest. See RCW 2.48.010 et seq. We thus hold that declaratory relief was appropriate. See State Bar of Ariz. v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., supra.
Finally, we agree with the Bar Association that injunctive relief should have been granted to restrain Great Western from continuing its unauthorized practice. The trial court entered an unchallenged finding of fact that Great Western's practices would continue unless restrained. Having determined that these practices constitute the unauthorized practice of law and that their continuance is not in the best interest of the public, it is our responsibility to prevent any possible future harm which may arise from such practices. In re Droker & Mulholland, supra at 721. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court and direct it to enter an appropriate order enjoining Great Western from continuing those practices herein determined to be the unauthorized practice of law.
In conclusion we: (1) affirm the trial court insofar as it determined Great Western's practices with respect to the loan documents to be the unauthorized practice of law; (2) affirm the trial court insofar as it determined that Great Western's charging a fee to its borrower (the purchaser) for preparation, selection or drafting of the deed between the borrower and the seller constituted the unauthorized practice of law; (3) reverse the trial court insofar as it determined that Great Western would also engage in the unauthorized practice of law if a fee were not charged the borrower with respect to Great Western's preparation, selection or drafting of the deed between the borrower and seller, the issue not being properly before us; and (4) reverse the trial court insofar as it refused to issue an injunction and order that court to enter an appropriate *62 order enjoining Great Western from continuing those practices determined to be the unauthorized practice of law.
WRIGHT, C.J., and ROSELLINI, HAMILTON, UTTER, BRACHTENBACH, HOROWITZ, DOLLIVER, and HICKS, JJ., concur.
Reconsideration denied February 21, 1979.
NOTES
[1]  Great Western utilizes a form for the "seller's letter of closing instructions." When signed by the seller as prepared by Great Western, it purports to relieve Great Western of any liability surrounding the sale transaction. It provides:

We acknowledge hereby that you are acting solely upon the foregoing instructions and not as our attorney, that we are not relying upon Great Western Union Federal Savings and Loan Association to any extent to interpret or insure compliance with any earnest money contract or other agreement, or for legal or other advice in connection with this transaction, and that we are obligated to retain for our own interests such legal counsel as we shall deem necessary to protect our interests. You are not liable to us if the purchaser instructs you not to disburse loan proceeds or close this transaction.
We further acknowledge that Great Western Union Federal Savings and Loan Association is not to be charged with liability with respect to the title to the said real estate, with any taxes or other charges in connection therewith or in connection with this transaction, or with the adequacy or legal sufficiency of any document prepared or employed in connection with this transaction.
[2]  The form letter of commitment sent by Great Western to its borrower (the purchaser) requires a promissory note and deed of trust in the form used by Great Western and attempts to disclaim any liability of Great Western surrounding both the loan and sale transaction. This form provides:

6. The loan will be closed in our ____ office. We will prepare the loan documents on our usual forms; however, you must understand we shall prepare those documents on our own behalf; and only for the purpose of perfecting our security interest for this loan. If you wish legal or other advice in connection with the loan or your purchase transaction you must retain your own legal counsel and may not rely upon Great Western to any extent to interpret or insure compliance with any earnest money contract or agreement, or to otherwise protect your interests. Further, by your acceptance of the loan you shall agree that Great Western shall not be charged by you with liability with respect to the title to the real property or with the adequacy or legal sufficiency of any document prepared or employed in connection with this transaction. Copies of the documents we shall prepare for this loan are available from us at your request so that you and your own legal counsel can review them.
[3]  The trial court also declared that Kelley's preparation, for the buyer and seller of real estate, of a promissory note and second deed of trust, to which neither Great Western nor Kelley was a party, constituted the unauthorized practice of law. Insofar as Great Western concedes this activity is unauthorized and does not assign error to this portion of the judgment, we will not consider it further.
[4]  Great Western's assertion in its reply brief that regulations of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board require that such charges be made is not well founded. The applicable regulation governing initial loan charges is 12 C.F.R. 545.6-10. During the period in question C.F.R. 545.6-10 (1975) provided in pertinent part:

Borrowers may be required to pay the necessary initial charges in connection with the making of a loan, including the actual costs of title examination, appraisal, credit report, survey, drawing of papers, closing of the loan, and other necessary incidental services and costs in such reasonable amounts as may be fixed by the board of directors; such necessary initial charges may be collected by the association from the borrower and paid to any persons, including any such director, officer, employee, attorney or firm rendering such services: ... Upon the closing of the loan, the association shall furnish the borrower a loan settlement statement showing in detail the charges or fees the borrower has paid or obligated himself to pay to the association or to any other person in connection with such loan; and a copy of such loan settlement statement shall be retained in the records of the association. [23 F.R. 9901, Dec. 23, 1958]
(Italics ours.)
We fail to see how this regulation requires Great Western (1) to prepare any document regardless of whether it is a party thereto; (2) to charge its borrower for document preparation; or (3) to charge the seller a fee for any services. At best the regulation permits Great Western to charge its borrower a fee for actual expenses incurred and if charged, to itemize in detail each charge incurred.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded that this federal regulation is relevant to our inquiry concerning whether Great Western's activities constitute the unauthorized practice of law.
[5]  We are cognizant of Great Western's objection that the record contains no finding of fact that it selected, prepared or drafted any conveyance document other than a statutory warranty deed. Inasmuch as our opinion would not differ had the record contained a finding of fact indicating Great Western had selected, prepared or drafted a quitclaim deed or a bargain and sale deed, we need not limit our decision herein to such activity with respect to statutory warranty deeds.
[6]  12 U.S.C. § 1464(c) provides that such associations "shall lend their funds only on the security of their savings accounts or on the security of first liens upon real property ..." (Italics ours.) The "first lien" required is that the property can be subjected to satisfaction of the obligation secured with the same priority as a first mortgage, a first deed of trust, or a first trust deed in the jurisdiction where the property is located. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c). Thus, even if a loan is made under the "first lien" option, the statute dictates only that Great Western obtain first priority in the event of default on the underlying obligation. There is no statutory requirement that particular covenants of title be used.
[7]  As we have stated in footnote 4, the assertion that a charge is required by 12 C.F.R. 545.6-10 is without merit.


238 Wis.2d 608 (2000)
2000 WI App 209
618 N.W.2d 266
Michael F. DUBIS, Trustee in Bankruptcy, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, Defendant-Respondent.
No. 99-2638.
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.
Submitted on briefs August 4, 2000.
Decided August 9, 2000.
*610 On behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Michael F. Dubis of Waterford.
On behalf of the defendant-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Phillip S. Caruso of Brookfield.
Before Brown, P.J., Nettesheim and Snyder, JJ.
¶ 1. SNYDER, J.
Michael F. Dubis, as trustee in bankruptcy for Gregg Anderson, appeals from an order granting summary judgment in favor of General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC). The circuit court determined that GMAC held a perfected security interest in Anderson's vehicle against the trustee. Dubis argues on appeal that the security interest was rendered invalid because, pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 409.103(2)(b) (1997-98),[1] Anderson "registered" his vehicle with the state and four months had passed during which time GMAC failed to reperfect its security interest. We conclude that GMAC's security interest remained perfected because § 409.103(2)(b) registration requires a debtor to obtain a certificate of title for a vehicle, not simply a certificate of motor vehicle registration. We affirm the circuit court's order.

BACKGROUND
¶ 2. The facts are undisputed. Anderson purchased a 1995 Mitsubishi automobile in South Dakota on June 4, 1996, and financed the purchase through GMAC. At the time, Anderson was a resident of South Dakota and a South Dakota certificate of title was issued showing GMAC as lienholder. In December *611 1997, Anderson moved to Wisconsin and registered his vehicle with the Department of Transportation (DOT). The DOT, however, did not issue him a certificate of title, only a "certificate of vehicle registration" and license plates.
¶ 3. On June 19, 1998, Anderson filed for bankruptcy in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Under 11 U.S.C. § 544 of the Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy trustee has priority over claims, liens or interests which are not fully perfected at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed. Dubis claimed that GMAC's security interest in Anderson's vehicle was no longer perfected because Anderson had "registered" the vehicle in Wisconsin consistent with WIS. STAT. § 409.103(2)(b). As such, Dubis sought a court determination that the lien was invalid and that the trustee could preserve the lien for the benefit of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 551.
¶ 4. In the Bankruptcy Court's order, Judge Russell A. Eisenberg characterized the litigation as "one of an epidemic of identical adversary proceedings all involving the same legal issue: Under [WIS. STAT.] § 409.103(2)(b) does `registration' require the owner of a motor vehicle to obtain or to seek to obtain a title for the motor vehicle?" The court then directed the parties to resolve this issue in state court because of the issue's grounding in state law.
¶ 5. In November 1998, the parties sought a declaratory action before the circuit court. Dubis then filed a summary judgment motion. The court ruled in favor of GMAC and Dubis appeals.

*612 DISCUSSION
[1, 2]
¶ 6. We review the circuit court's grant of summary judgment using the same methodology as the circuit court. See City of Beaver Dam v. Cromheecke, 222 Wis. 2d 608, 613, 587 N.W.2d 923 (Ct. App. 1998). That methodology is well known and we need not repeat it here except to observe that summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id.; WIS. STAT. § 802.08(2). Because there are no material facts at issue in this case, we must determine which party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Gorton v. Hostak, Henzl & Bichler, S.C., 217 Wis. 2d 493, 501-02, 577 N.W.2d 617 (1998).
[3-6]
¶ 7. Here, the issue presents a question of statutory interpretation which we review de novo. See id. at 502. Statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute itself. See Armor All Prods. v. Amoco Oil Co., 194 Wis. 2d 35, 50, 533 N.W.2d 720 (1995). If the language is clear and unambiguous on its face, we merely apply that language to the facts at hand. See Peter B. v. State, 184 Wis. 2d 57, 71, 516 N.W.2d 746 (Ct. App. 1994). Although we will not look beyond the statute's plain meaning, we do consider its parts in relationship to the whole statute and to related sections. Cf. Elliott v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 176 Wis. 2d 410, 414, 500 N.W.2d 397 (Ct. App. 1993). Where the language of a statute is ambiguous, we may then consider legislative intent and collateral sources, including "the scope, history, context, subject matter and object of the statute." Armor All Prods., 194 Wis. 2d at 50 (citation omitted).
*613 ¶ 8. The perfection of a security interest in a motor vehicle is governed by WIS. STAT. § 342.19. See State v. Frankwick, 229 Wis. 2d 406, 413, 599 N.W.2d 893 (Ct. App. 1999). Relevant to our case are the following provisions:
(1) ... a security interest in a vehicle of a type for which a certificate of title is required is not valid against creditors of the owner or subsequent transferees or secured parties of the vehicle unless perfected as provided in this chapter.
. . . .
(6) If a vehicle is subject to a security interest when brought into this state, s. 409.103 (1), (2) and (3) state the rules which apply to determine the validity and perfection of the security interest in this state.
Section 342.19.
¶ 9. WISCONSIN STAT. § 409.103(2) addresses security interests in titled goods transferred to Wisconsin and provides in part:
(2) CERTIFICATE OF TITLE. (a) This subsection applies to goods covered by a certificate of title issued under a statute of this state or of another jurisdiction under the law of which indication of a security interest on the certificate is required as a condition of perfection.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, perfection and the effect of perfection or nonperfection of the security interest are governed by the law (including the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction issuing the certificate until 4 months after the goods are removed from that jurisdiction and thereafter until the goods are registered in another jurisdiction, but in any event not beyond surrender of the certificate. After the expiration of that period, the goods are not covered by the certificate *614 of title within the meaning of this section. (Emphasis added.)
Stated another way, a perfected security interest on an original certificate of title remains perfected for at least four months after property is moved to Wisconsin, unless the certificate is surrendered. After four months, the security interest remains perfected until registration occurs.
¶ 10. The sticking point here is the term "registered." Dubis contends that registration involves the administrative process of filing an application and submitting fees with the DOT in exchange for a certificate of registration and vehicle license plates. See WIS. STAT. ch. 341. In this sense, registration does not require obtaining a certificate of title from the state. For support, Dubis cites Patti v. Barnett Bank (In re Hartberg,) 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1429 (1979), which addresses WIS. STAT. § 409.103(2)(b).
¶ 11. GMAC, on the other hand, looks at registration from a commercial law perspective, noting that WIS. STAT. § 409.103(2)(b) is a word-for-word recasting of § 9-103(2)(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). GMAC contends that in the context of commercial law, registration requires issuance of a certificate of ownership and that any law relating to vehicle registration is inapposite. GMAC points out that this is the approach taken by a majority of the courts and is more commercially sound.
¶ 12. We begin our analysis by reviewing WIS. STAT. ch. 409. We first observe that para. (2)(a) of WIS. STAT. § 409.103 speaks in terms of certificates of title as to "goods," and para. (2)(b) refers to certificates of title, the removal of "goods" from other jurisdictions and the subsequent registration of those goods. The language in para. (2)(b) makes clear that registration relates to *615 "goods" generally and that this statute is not intended to exclusively cover motor vehicles. Second, we note that within ch. 409, the only reference to registration is the singular use of "registered" in WIS. STAT. § 409.103(2)(b). As such, where para. (2)(b) speaks of goods in the original jurisdiction having a certificate of title, being "registered in another jurisdiction" suggests that the goods will be retitled in the other jurisdiction.
¶ 13. In sum, because WIS. STAT. § 409.103(2)(a) and (2)(b) refer to certificates of title and to "goods," it seems unlikely that the drafters intended the statute's one reference to registration to be narrowly focused on motor vehicle registration. Thus, given the context in which the term "registered" is used in § 409.103(2)(b), we find support for GMAC's position that the term entails obtaining a certificate of title for goods rather than a certificate of vehicle registration.
¶ 14. Within Wisconsin's vehicle registration laws, registration takes on a different meaning. WISCONSIN STAT. § 341.08 sets forth the registration application process for vehicles. Pertinent to this case is § 341.08(3), which states:
The department may accept an application and complete registration of a vehicle when the evidence of ownership is held by a nonresident lienholder or for other reason is not immediately available and the department is satisfied as to ownership of the vehicle. The title fee shall be collected at the time of registration and retained even though certificate of title is not issued.
Section 341.08(3) describes what occurred in Anderson's case. He applied for the registration of his vehicle while nonresident lienholder GMAC held the title to *616 the vehicle. The DOT completed Anderson's registration, satisfied as to the vehicle's ownership.[2] Anderson paid the title fee at the time he registered his vehicle "even though certificate of title [was] not issued." Id. (emphasis added). Consistent with this provision, Anderson's "Certificate of Vehicle Registration" states, "NO WISCONSIN TITLE ISSUED," and informs that the registration certificate is "Not Valid for Transfer of Ownership."
¶ 15. WISCONSIN STAT. § 341.08(3) works in conjunction with WIS. STAT. ch. 342, which addresses vehicle titling. WISCONSIN STAT. § 342.05(1) instructs that a vehicle owner subject to registration in Wisconsin shall apply for a certificate of title for the vehicle. Section 342.05(3) notes, however, that the certificate of title requirements do not apply "where the law expressly authorizes registration without a certificate of title." Section 341.08(3) expressly permits Anderson's registration of his vehicle without a certificate of title.
¶ 16. That registration of goods under commercial law is conceptually distinct from registration of motor vehicles under state vehicle registration laws has been illustrated by numerous courts.[3] We review two of the cases relied upon by GMAC. In Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Religa (In re Males), 999 F.2d 607 (2nd *617 Cir. 1993), Chrysler Credit Corporation perfected liens on two vehicles purchased by the Maleses in New Hampshire. When the Maleses moved to New York, they registered the vehicles there, acquiring state license plates and registration papers; New York, however, did not issue new certificates of title. The Maleses then filed for bankruptcy and sought to void Chrysler's liens on both vehicles. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that registration under New York's statutory equivalent of U.C.C. § 9-103(2)(b) required obtaining certificates of title, not simply the administrative registration of the vehicles. See In re Males, 999 F.2d at 614. The court relied upon the rationale in Strick Corp. v. Eldo-Craft Boat Co., 479 F. Supp. 720, 725 (W.D. Ark. 1979), observing that:
We reach this result for the reason that it is a reasonable and permissible interpretation of the applicable commercial law and promotes looking "only to one placethe certificate of titleto discover prior security interests." We reach the same result as the district court in Strick Corp.:
It is the opinion of this Court that the section [U.C.C. 9-103(2)(b)] continues in force the perfection of a security interest noted on a foreign certificate of title until a certificate has been issued by another jurisdiction ... [w]hen this section speaks of "registration," the Court construes the language to contemplate the issuance of an Arkansas title, not the procurement of a "non-negotiable," "non-title" registration in connection with the issuance of a vehicle license.
In re Males, 999 F.2d at 613 (citations omitted).
*618 ¶ 17. In the second case, General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Rupp, 951 F.2d 283 (10th Cir. 1991), GMAC perfected its security interest in the debtors' Missouri vehicle and maintained possession of the certificate of title. When the debtors moved to Utah, they filed for bankruptcy and sought to sell the vehicle free of GMAC's lien. See id. at 284. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that under U.C.C. § 9-103(2)(b), the term "registered" required both vehicle registration and a certificate of title, noting that the "Utah registration certificate obtained by debtors is merely administrative, is not a certificate of ownership, and does not permit notation of liens on it." Rupp, 951 F.2d at 287.
¶ 18. We find the reasoning offered in Rupp and In re Males compelling. The term "registered" must be interpreted within its context under commercial law and the U.C.C. Critical to commercial law and secured transactions, in particular, are certificates of title because they provide notice of prior security interests. A certificate of vehicle registration, however, does not supply this function. Thus, to allow Anderson to void GMAC's security interest by obtaining a certificate of vehicle registration would send a message that "debtors (and trustees in bankruptcy) may, unilaterally and without notice to a secured first lien creditor in another state, eliminate that creditor's security interest by simply moving to [another jurisdiction] with the secured vehicle and obtaining license plates in [that jurisdiction] without obtaining a new certificate of title." In re Males, 999 F.2d at 615. Such a result, the In re Males court cautioned, would "create commercial law havoc in setting aside secured interests noted on title certificates ...." Id. at 614. We doubt our legislature *619 intended such an effect under WIS. STAT. § 409.103(2)(b).
¶ 19. Finally, we consider the case Dubis describes as the "only reported Wisconsin case that either side could find which addressed this issue." That case, In re Hartberg, is a bankruptcy appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. In re Hartberg presents facts identical to this case. The court, interpreting Wisconsin law, concluded that the bank's lien on the debtors' vehicle was invalid because the debtors were issued a certificate of registration from the DOT and because four months had passed in which the bank had failed to perfect its lien in Wisconsin. What is missing from this case, however, is any discussion of the term "registered" within WIS. STAT. § 409.103(2)(b). While the final result in In re Hartberg certainly supports Dubis's argument, the court offers no analysis to persuade us that § 409.103(2)(b) registration entails vehicle registration, not commercial law title registration. Because the case fails to address the crux of the issue here and is not binding on this court, we conclude that the decision is inapposite.

CONCLUSION
[7]
¶ 20. We agree with GMAC that it has retained its security interest in Anderson's vehicle despite the vehicle's removal to Wisconsin and the issuance of a Wisconsin vehicle registration certificate and license plates. Given that GMAC's security interest was perfected under a South Dakota certificate of title, no certificate of title was issued by Wisconsin, and the vehicle was never "registered" in Wisconsin pursuant *620 to WIS. STAT. § 409.103(2)(b), GMAC's security interest is therefore valid. The circuit court's order is affirmed.
By the Court.Order affirmed.
NOTES
[1]  All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-98 version.
[2]  Anderson stated on his registration application that GMAC was a secured party on the vehicle.
[3]  See, e.g., In re Aguiar, 116 B.R. 223, 224 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990); Frank v. Norbel Credit Union (In re Murray,) 109 B.R. 245, 248 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1989); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Partee, 514 So. 2d 640, 644-45 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Brewton Trading Corp. v. Midland Bank & Trust Co., 454 N.Y.S.2d 510, 511 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982); Strick Corp. v. Eldo-Craft Boat Co., 479 F. Supp. 720, 725 (W.D. Ark. 1979).


In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                           Decided: September 14, 2015

                    S15A0892. WYATT v. THE STATE.

      HUNSTEIN, Justice.

      Appellant Norris Wyatt appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of what he

styled an “Extraordinary Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.” We affirm.

      In November 2002, Norris Wyatt pled guilty to felony murder predicated

on aggravated assault and was sentenced to life imprisonment with the

possibility of parole. In January 2014, Wyatt filed an “Extraordinary Motion to

Withdraw Guilty Plea” alleging, inter alia, that he pled guilty to an indictment

that failed to allege venue. The trial court dismissed the motion as untimely. On

appeal, Wyatt argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain his motion

because “the sentence imposed in his criminal case is void for the fact that his

indictment is fatally defective.”

      This Court addressed a nearly identical issue in Hagan v. State, 290 Ga.

353 (720 SE2d 645) (2012). In that case, Hagan pled guilty in the March 2010
term of the Catoosa County Superior Court to, among other things, malice

murder. In the March 2011 term of court, Hagan filed an “Extraordinary Motion

to With draw Guilty Plea” in which he argued that the judgment of conviction

in his case was void because the indictment failed to allege venue. Id. The trial

court denied the motion as untimely and meritless, and this Court affirmed the

trial court, stating as follows:

      We need not decide the merits, because Appellant’s motion was
      untimely, whether considered as a motion to withdraw his guilty
      plea or as a motion in arrest of judgment. Both sorts of motions
      must be filed within the same term of court at which the guilty plea
      or judgment being challenged was entered. See Rubiani v. State,
      279 Ga. 299, 299 (612 SE2d 798) (2005) (“‘[W]hen the term of
      court has expired in which a defendant was sentenced pursuant to
      a guilty plea, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to allow the
      withdrawal of the plea.’” (citation omitted)); OCGA § 17–9–61 (b)
      (“A motion in arrest of judgment must be made during the term at
      which the judgment was obtained.”); Lay v. State, 289 Ga. 210, 211
      (710 SE2d 141) (2011) (same). Appellant’s motion was not filed
      within the same term at which his guilty plea and the resulting
      judgment were entered. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s
      denial of Appellant’s motion.

Id. at 353. The same principles apply here, and the judgment of the trial court

must thus be affirmed.

      Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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