142 Wis.2d 772 (1987)
419 N.W.2d 348
MONTGOMERY WARD & CO., INC., Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Wisconsin DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Respondent.[]
No. 87-0544.
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.
Submitted on briefs December 7, 1987.
Decided December 30, 1987.
*774 For the petitioner-appellant the cause was submitted on the briefs of Timothy C. Frautschi and Foley & Lardner, of Milwaukee.
For the respondent the cause was submitted on the brief of Donald J. Hanaway, attorney general, and Alan Lee, assistant attorney general.
Before Gartzke, P.J., Eich and Sundby, JJ.
EICH, J.
Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. (MWC), appeals from a judgment affirming a decision and an order of the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission. The commission affirmed the Department of Revenue's deficiency assessment against MWC for sales and use taxes for the taxable period February 1, 1976, through January 31, 1981. The assessment charged interest on the deficiencies at the rate of twelve percent per annum. The issues are: (1) whether the twelve percent interest rate, which was first established on July 31, 1981, may be applied to deficiencies accruing prior to that date; and (2) if so, whether the retroactive application violates MWC's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. We resolve both issues against MWC and affirm the judgment.
*775 The facts are not in dispute. Prior to July 31, 1981, the statutory interest penalty on sales and use tax deficiencies was nine percent per year. Sec. 77.60(1), Stats. (1979-80). In the 1981 budget act, the legislature increased the rate to twelve percent. Sec. 1125hm, ch. 20, Laws of 1981. The act also provided for the "[i]nitial applicability" of the change, stating that it would "first appl[y] to all determinations, assessments or other actions made by the department ... on August 1, 1981, regardless of the taxable period to which they pertain." Id. at sec. 2203(45)(g). Finally, the act provided that "[a]ll sections of this act take effect on ... the day following publication...." Id. at sec. 2204. The act was published on July 30, 1981, and thus its effective date was July 31, 1981.
On June 17, 1982, the department assessed the 1976-1981 deficiencies against MWC, charging interest at the rate of twelve percent for the entire period. MWC appealed to the tax appeals commission, which upheld the assessment and interest charge. MWC sought judicial review and the circuit court affirmed, concluding: (1) that the language of the budget bill evinced an intent on the part of the legislature that the interest rate increase was to have a retroactive effect; and (2) that the retroactive application was not unconstitutional.

I. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
[1, 2]
Questions of statutory construction generally are reviewed independently by appellate courts. American Motors Corp. v. ILHR Dept., 101 Wis. 2d 337, 353, 305 N.W.2d 62, 70 (1981). However, we frequently will defer to the interpretation and application of a statute *776 by the agency charged with its administration. West Bend Education Ass'n v. WERC, 121 Wis. 2d 1, 11-12, 357 N.W.2d 534, 539 (1984).
The statutes, as well as the cases, caution that under certain circumstances a court should defer to the agency's conclusions of law. Sec. 227.20(10), Stats. 1979-80, provides that upon review of an agency's determination, "due weight shall be accorded the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency involve...." Our cases similarly recognize that if the administrative agency's experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge aid the agency in its interpretation and application of the statute, the agency's conclusions are entitled to deference by the court. Where a legal question is intertwined with factual determinations or with value or policy determinations or where the agency's interpretation and application of the law is of long standing, a court should defer to the agency which has primary responsibility for determination of fact and policy. [Footnote omitted.]
West Bend, 121 Wis. 2d at 12, 357 N.W.2d at 539-40. In these situations, we will sustain the agency's conclusions of law if they are reasonable, even though an alternative view may be equally reasonable. Revenue Dept. v. Lake Wisconsin Country Club, 123 Wis. 2d 239, 242-43, 365 N.W.2d 916, 918 (Ct. App. 1985).
[3,4]
There is no question that the legislature can, if it wishes, enact a law with retroactive application, as long as the act, "clearly, by express language or necessary implication," indicates that such was its intent. Hunter v. Sch. Dist.Gale-Ettrick-Trempealeau, 97 Wis. 2d 435, 444-45, 293 N.W.2d 515, 520 (1980), *777 quoting 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3rd ed.), p. 115, sec. 2201. Stated another way, legislation is presumed to apply prospectively unless the statutory language indicates, expressly or by necessary implication, a contrary intent. Chappy v. LIRC, 128 Wis. 2d 318, 323, 381 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Ct. App. 1985), aff'd, 136 Wis. 2d 172, 401 N.W.2d 568 (1987).
[5]
The plain language of sec. 2203(45)(g), ch. 20, Laws of 1981, establishes that the change in the interest rate from nine percent to twelve percent "first applies to all determinations ... made by the department ... on August 1, 1981." There is no dispute that the deficiency determinations in this case were made after August 1, 1981. The question is whether the language immediately following the above-quoted phrase"regardless of the taxable period to which [the determinations] pertain"clearly indicates an express or implied intent on the part of the legislature to permit the department to assess interest at the increased rate on deficiency determinations made on or after August 1, 1981, but which are applicable to taxable periods prior to that date.
We see no other way to read the provisions of the act. The new interest rate plainly applies to all deficiency determinations made on or after August 1, 1981, regardless of the taxable periods to which those determinations may pertain. The department could reasonably apply the rate to its determination of MWC's sales and use tax remittances for the taxable period February 1, 1976, through January 31, 1981.
MWC contends, however, that such an intent is belied by the fact that, under sec. 2204, ch. 20, Laws of 1981, the act did not "take effect" until July 31, 1981. It argues, without elaboration, that this provision can *778 have no meaning other than that the interest rate change cannot be effective prior to July 31, 1981. We disagree.
Section 2204 of the act provided that all of its provisions, save several specifically listed, would become effective the day after publication, July 31, 1981. One of the provisions taking effect on that date was, of course, sec. 2203(45)(g), which, as we have said, authorized imposition of a twelve percent interest rate on all deficiency determinations made by the department on or after August 1, 1981, regardless of whether those determinations pertained to taxable periods prior or subsequent to that date.
Because we see no ambiguity, much less any conflict, in the "initial applicability" provisions of sec. 2203(45)(g) and the "effective date" provisions of sec. 2204, there is no need to consider the legislative materials cited by MWC. In re Paternity of J.S.C., 135 Wis. 2d 280, 287, 400 N.W.2d 48, 52 (Ct. App. 1986). The commission and the court correctly interpreted the provisions of the act as authorizing imposition of the twelve percent interest rate on the deficiency determinations in question.

II. EQUAL PROTECTION
[6]
MWC argues that application of the twelve percent interest rate to tax deficiencies for periods prior to July 31, 1981, creates an irrational and unreasonable classificationthat of delinquent taxpayers assessed before August 1, 1981, and those assessed thereafterand thus violates the equal protection clause. The constitutional test is, as MWC points out, "whether there exists any rational and reasonable *779 justification for the classification." Kallas Millwork Corp. v.Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 388, 225 N.W.2d 454, 458 (1975).
MWC asserts that some taxpayers with pre-1981 deficiencies were charged only nine percent interest (because their assessments were made prior to August 1, 1981), while others with deficiencies for the same period, but who were assessed on or after August 1, 1981, must pay twelve percent. It contends that there can be no rational basis for such a classification and that, as a result, the retroactive application of the statute is unconstitutional. We disagree.
[7]
In taxation, more than in other fields, the legislature "possess[es] the greatest freedom in classification." Treiber v. Knoll, 135 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 398 N.W.2d 756, 759 (1987), quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).
"No scheme of taxation, whether the tax is imposed on property, income, or purchases of goods and services, has yet been devised which is free of all discriminatory impact. In such a complex arena in which no perfect alternatives exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigorous a standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes become subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection Clause." Treiber at 66-67, 398 N.W.2d at 759, quoting San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973).
The provisions in question create two general classes: taxpayers whose delinquencies were assessed prior to August 1, 1981, and those whose delinquencies were assessed on or after that date. Each class is treated equally; the members of the former group pay nine percent on their delinquencies and members of *780 the latter pay twelve percent. MWC claims, however, that there may be some taxpayers with delinquencies or deficiencies for years prior to 1981 who would be paying only nine percent interest and some paying twelve percent, depending on whether the determination was made before or after August 1, 1981, and that this is an arbitrary distinction lacking any rational basis.
The supreme court considered a similar situationand a similar challengein Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm., 198 Wis. 368, 224 N.W. 121 (1929). Prior to 1923, no interest was chargeable on assessments of delinquent income taxes. In that year, a ten percent charge was imposed, running from the date the returns were, or should have been, filed. After 1927, the rate was reduced to six percent. Because of the manner in which the commission's field audits were conductedthe auditors applied the law as it existed when the audits were performed "various rates of interest [were] being applied to ... delinquent taxpayers for the same years." Id. at 370, 224 N.W. at 122. Plankinton argued to the court that, as a result, the interest provisions were unconstitutional because they resulted in an arbitrary and unreasonable classification. The court rejected the argument, stating:
The law is well settled that states may impose burdensome and even harsh penalties on the delinquent taxpayer, prospective or retrospective. There may be minor inequalities in the laws without offending against the rules of uniformity and equality. "Perfect equality in taxation is impossible and unattainable." "Perfect uniformity and perfect equality of taxation in all the aspects in which the human mind can view it is a baseless *781 dream." Practical considerations outweigh those of a theoretical or metaphysical nature. Practical uniformity and equality is constitutional uniformity and equality. The delinquent taxpayer gains no vested rights by his delinquencies. The legislature may change the remedies, or penalties, from time to time, and make them either prospective or retrospective, in its discretion. The delinquent offends against those who pay promptly; he offends against the government, which may continue only as the property owners respond to its necessities. [Citations omitted.] Plankinton, 198 Wis. at 373, 224 N.W. at 123.
[8]
The fact that some taxpayers may be assessed interest at different rates depending upon when the delinquency or deficiency is determined and when the assessment is made does not, in our opinion, establish the unconstitutionality of the law.
It is a commonplace that the equal protection clause does not require a state to maintain rigid rules of equal taxation, to resort to close distinctions, or to maintain a precise scientific uniformity. Possible differences in tax burdens, not shown to be substantial, or which are based on discrimination not shown to be arbitrary or capricious, do not fall within the constitutional prohibition. Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 145 (1938).
One challenging the constitutionality of a law bears a heavy burden. All legislative acts are presumed to be constitutional, and a challenger, to be successful, must prove unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Quinn v. Town of Dodgeville, 122 Wis. 2d 570, 577, 364 N.W.2d 149, 154 (1985). It is not enough to establish doubt as to the constitutionality of *782 the act, or to show that it is probably unconstitutional. We will "indulge[] every presumption and will sustain the law if at all possible." Id. MWC has not satisfied us that the acts in question are unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, and we therefore reject its challenge.
By the Court.Judgment affirmed.
NOTES
[]  Petition to review denied.


923 F.2d 869
Unpublished DispositionNOTICE: Federal Circuit Local Rule 47.8(b) states that opinions and orders which are designated as not citable as precedent shall not be employed or cited as precedent.  This does not preclude assertion of issues of claim preclusion, issue preclusion, judicial estoppel, law of the case or the like based on a decision of the Court rendered in a nonprecedential opinion or order.Hian K. CUA, Petitioner,v.OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, Respondent.
No. 90-3160.
United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.
Nov. 6, 1990.

PER CURIAM
Before (ARCHER, CLEVENGER and RADER, Circuit Judges):
Judgment
PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.  Fed.Cir.R. 36


                                                                            FILED
                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            AUG 03 2016

                                                                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

                             FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE DANIEL GOMEZ,                               No. 14-74039

               Petitioner,                       Agency No. A070-943-998

 v.
                                                 MEMORANDUM*
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

               Respondent.

                      On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                          Board of Immigration Appeals

                             Submitted July 26, 2016**

Before:        SCHROEDER, CANBY, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

      Jose Daniel Gomez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions pro se for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an

immigration judge’s decision denying his applications for relief from removal.

          *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
          **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny in part and dismiss in

part the petition for review.

      In his opening brief, Gomez does not raise, and therefore has waived, any

challenge to the agency’s determinations that he is removable, and that he failed to

demonstrate eligibility for relief from removal. See Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d

1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (a petitioner waives an issue by failing to raise it in the

opening brief).

      To the extent Gomez contends he is eligible for prosecutorial discretion, we

lack jurisdiction to consider his contention. See Vilchiz-Soto v. Holder, 688 F.3d

642, 644 (9th Cir. 2012).

      We lack jurisdiction to consider Gomez’s unexhausted contention regarding

his counsel in criminal proceedings. See Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d 1071, 1080

(9th Cir. 2010).

      We grant the government’s motion to strike new evidence (Docket Entry

No. 33). See Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 371 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining

standard for review of out-of-record evidence).

      PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

                                           2                                    14-74039


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190 S.E.2d 469 (1972)
281 N.C. 625
STATE of North Carolina
v.
Thomas Garland HART.
Supreme Court of North Carolina.
July 31, 1972.
Robert Morgan, Atty. Gen., Eugene Hafer, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
James G. Taylor, Asst. Public Defender, for defendant.
Petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals, 14 N.C.App. 120, 187 S.E.2d 351.
Denied for lack of merit.


                                11TH COURT OF APPEALS
                                   EASTLAND, TEXAS
                                      JUDGMENT

In the interest of E.W.T. and              * From the 118th District Court
I.G.T., children,                            of Howard County,
                                            Trial Court No. 49,041.

No. 11-16-00116-CV                         * October 13, 2016

                                           * Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion
                                            (Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,
                                            Willson, J., and Bailey, J.)

      This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that the
appeal should be dismissed. Therefore, in accordance with this court’s opinion,
the appeal is dismissed.


857 F.2d 1476
U.S.v.Gill (Archie)
NO. 87-2749
United States Court of Appeals,Seventh Circuit.
AUG 15, 1988

1
Appeal From:  E.D.Wis.

2
AFFIRMED.


636 F.2d 1211
U. S.v.Castelli
80-1986
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Third Circuit
11/6/80

1
W.D.Pa.

AFFIRMED


160 Ill. App.3d 953 (1987)
513 N.E.2d 984
MICHAEL BURKE, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 86-1075.
Illinois Appellate Court  First District (5th Division).
Opinion filed September 4, 1987.
*954 Lawrence P. Seiwert, of Chicago, for appellant.
Hugh G. McBreen, of McBreen & McBreen, of Chicago, for appellee City of Chicago.
Michael W. Tootooian, of Matyas & Norris, of Chicago, for appellee McKay Contractors, Inc.
Barbara L. Pence, of Law Offices of John M. Barnes, of Chicago, for appellee George J. Beemsterboer, Inc.
Judgment affirmed.
JUSTICE MURRAY delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal by plaintiff, Michael Burke, from a trial court's summary judgment in favor of all defendants in a fall-on-ice-and-snow negligence action.
On December 21, 1981, Burke, an employee of Northwest Airlines, slipped on ice and was injured as he exited a truck-stair vehicle he was using to deplane passengers from his employer's aircraft, Northwest Airlines, Inc. (Northwest), parked at gate C-3 at Midway Airport in Chicago, Illinois. In December 1982, Burke filed a negligence action against the city of Chicago to recover damages. He later filed an amended complaint adding McKay Contractors, Inc., and George J. Beemsterboer, Inc., as party-defendants. The city had hired McKay and Beemsterboer to remove snow by plowing at the airport. In a second amended complaint he charged the city, McKay, and Beemsterboer with:
(1) Failing to provide snow removal services, permitting dangerous ice accumulations to exist thereon.
(2) Failure to warn of a dangerous ice condition.
(3) Failure to properly remove snow, allowing dangerous ice accumulation to form.
In addition to the above, Burke charged the city with failure to spread or provide salt or urea in icy areas as required by an agreement with the airlines.
The various defendants filed motions for summary judgment. On January 15 and January 30, 1986, the trial court granted the summary judgments of McKay and Beemsterboer, respectively. On February 19, 1986, plaintiff filed his motion for summary judgment and his reply to the city's and the other defendant's motions. On March 25, *955 1986, judgment was entered in favor of the city and the other defendants. This terminated the litigation in the trial court. Plaintiff has appealed.
On appeal plaintiff raises three points:
(1) He contends all defendants had a duty to remove the snow accumulation from the site of plaintiff's injury.
(2) Questions of facts existed precluding the granting of summary judgments as to all defendants.
(3) The failure of the city to spread sand or urea at the site of plaintiff's injury constituted negligence as a matter of law, impelling the trial court to grant his motion for summary judgment and deny the city's motion.
The facts appearing in the record disclose the following: The defendant city owned and maintained Midway Airport in the city of Chicago, Illinois. It leased certain portions of the airport to Northwest Airlines, plaintiff's employer. Under the terms of the agreement, the city agreed to:
"operate, maintain and keep in good repair the areas and facilities described in [the lease] * * * to keep the Airport free from obstruction, including the removal of snow, vegetation, stones and other foreign matter, as reasonably as may be done, from landing, take off, public ramp, and public parking areas."
The city contracted with McKay and Beemsterboer for the snow removal at the airport.
On December 21, 1981, in excess of two inches of snow fell at the airport. Temperatures ranged from 22° to 33° Fahrenheit. At about 4 p.m. the gate C-3 ramp was plowed. McKay had contracted with the city to plow the ramp at gate C-3. The only witness to the event was plaintiff, Burke. Burke testified in his discovery deposition that snow removal equipment plowed the gate C-3 ramp area between 4 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. No snow fell between that time and the time plaintiff slipped, fell and was injured at 7 p.m. that evening. The snow had turned to ice at the location of Burke's accident. Norton, the city airport manager, testified that the city had in the past spread sand and urea with its own equipment and personnel after snowplowing. However, there was no contractual obligation to do so.
 1 Plaintiff first argues that all the defendants had a duty to remove the snow and ice accumulation from the situs of his injury. The question of the existence of a legal duty is one of law to be decided by the court, while the question of whether a duty was properly performed is a question of fact to be determined by the fact finder. Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc. (1975), 60 Ill.2d 552, 328 N.E.2d 538.
*956  2 All parties concede that in Illinois, including the sometimes icy and snowy, windy city of Chicago, a landlord has no duty to remove natural accumulations of ice and snow from areas within his control. (Gilberg v. Toys "R" Us, Inc. (1984), 126 Ill. App.3d 554, 467 N.E.2d 947.) Plaintiff relies on an exception to this Illinois rule of nonliability in slip-and-fall cases on snow and ice which imposes a duty to use due care where the landlord had assumed the duty to remove snow and ice. (Erasmus v. Chicago Housing Authority (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 142, 407 N.E.2d 1031.) In Erasmus a division of this court in affirming a trial court's granting the housing authority's motion for summary judgment held that a landlord's duty in removing snow was not to remedy a natural accumulation of snow or ice, but to prevent an unnatural accumulation of the snow or ice, whether the unnatural accumulation was caused by a negligent clearing operation or design deficiency.
 3 In a case of first impression involving a condominium resident, rather than a Chicago public housing resident, a division of this court seems to have extended the duty of an owner, who assumed the duty of snow removal by virtue of a declaration of condominium and condominium bylaws, to remove snow and ice after a reasonable time for removal had elapsed; the duty arose under contract law rather than common law. (Schoondyke v. Heil, Heil, Smart & Golee, Inc. (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 640, 411 N.E.2d 1168.) The court, however, did state in Schoondyke:
"Where the precipitation is recent or continuous, the duty to remove such obstruction as it forms cannot be imposed, and the dangers arising therefrom are viewed as the normal hazards of life, for which no owner or person in possession of property is held responsible." Schoondyke v. Heil, Heil, Smart & Golee, Inc. (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 640, 643, 411 N.E.2d 1168, 1171, citing Durkin v. Lewitz (1954), 3 Ill. App.2d 481, 491, 123 N.E.2d 151, 156.
 4 In Tressler v. Winfield Village Cooperative, Inc. (1985), 134 Ill. App.3d 578, 481 N.E.2d 75, the court followed the Schoondyke decision based on a contractual duty, but stated:
"The mere presence of snow and ice does not demonstrate negligence on the landlord's part. On the other hand, if the defendant knew or should have known of the dangerous condition and failed to take proper steps to guard against it, he can be held liable." 134 Ill. App.3d 578, 581, 481 N.E.2d 75, 77.
Even if this court followed the decision of the above two cases rather than cases such as McCann v. Bethesda Hospital (1979), 80 Ill. App.3d 544, *957 400 N.E.2d 16, and Erasmus v. Chicago Housing Authority (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 142, 407 N.E.2d 1031, both of which involved snow removal and which held that owners or possessors of property are not liable in snow or ice slip-and-fall cases absent a showing of unnatural accumulation or design failure, this court would have to affirm the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of all defendants in this case.
Plaintiff's own deposition testimony shows that the area he slipped in was plowed earlier and no snow fell after the plowing. The area he fell in consisted of wet snow that had turned to ice. There is no evidence indicating that the snow that turned to ice was a result of piling, bad design of the ramp, or other acts of negligence by the plowers.
In Schoondyke v. Heil, Heil, Smart & Golee, Inc. (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 640, 411 N.E.2d 1168, the evidence showed that the snow had fallen in the morning and no plowing had occurred by evening, when plaintiff fell. In Tressler v. Winfield Village Cooperative, Inc. (1985), 134 Ill. App.3d 578, 481 N.E.2d 75, there was no plowing and plaintiff in her deposition stated that she had requested the landlord to clear the walks prior to her fall. Both cases involved no plowing at all, not a defective plowing. In order to deduce defective plowing in this case, the court would have to conclude that the city or its contractors had a duty to remove all the snow during the plowing operation. That is not the duty assumed by its lease with Northwest Airlines, Burke's employer. The duty that was assumed by the lease was removal of snow, etc. "as reasonably may be done."
The record in this case does not disclose how or why the wet snow turned into the ice upon which Burke slipped and injured himself, whether by a defective snow removal operation or by a natural accumulation after the plowing. Absent evidence of an unnatural accumulation or negligent plowing operation, there is no showing of breach of an existing duty by any of the defendants. Burke also relies on the fact that the city had failed to throw salt or urea in the area as a breach of the city's duty. Burke relies on the fact that the city had in the past voluntarily thrown salt or urea on the airport and had been requested to do so the day of the occurrence.
 5 Courts have held landowners liable where the execution of a gratuitous undertaking created a physical hazard causing injury. (Sims v. Block (1968), 94 Ill. App.2d 215, 236 N.E.2d 572.) On the other hand, courts have also held that the gratuitous performance of clearing snow and/or spreading of salt does not create a continuing duty to perform the function. (Chisolm v. Stephens (1977), 47 Ill. App.3d 999, *958 365 N.E.2d 80.) In other words, Illinois law is fairly clear that the negligent performance of a gratuitous undertaking would impose liability for injuries proximately resulting therefrom, but the mere reliance by a party upon defendants' gratuitous performance in the past, without more, is insufficient to impose any duty thereafter. (Chisolm v. Stephens (1977), 47 Ill. App.3d 999, 1007, 365 N.E.2d 80; Cronin v. Brownlee (1952), 348 Ill. App. 448, 109 N.E.2d 352; see Spack v. Longwood Apartments, Inc. (1959), 338 Mass. 518, 155 N.E.2d 873.) To the same effect is the recent decision of this court in Lohan v. Walgreens Co. (1986), 140 Ill. App.3d 171, 488 N.E.2d 679.
 6 The record in this case fails to show the existence of a duty of any of the defendants in connection with the snow or ice upon which plaintiff fell and was injured, or a breach of such duty. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgments for all defendants and properly denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
Affirmed.
SULLIVAN, P.J., and LORENZ, J., concur.


DATE 12/8/2015
                                                                                FILED IN
R

                                           NOTICE OF APPEALS                                          14th COURT OF APPEALS
                                    ASSIGNMENT OF COURT THE COURT OF APPEALS                             HOUSTON, TEXAS
                                                                                12/9/2015 11:07:13 AM
TO:         14TH COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
                                                                                Clerk

From:       Deputy Clerk: PHYLLIS WASHINGTON
            Chris Daniel, District Clerk
            Harris County, T E X A S

CAUSE: 2010-34306

VOLUME                       PAGE                       OR          IMAGE 67823051

DUE 3-09-16                                            ATTORNEY 24055283

NOTICE OF APPEAL HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO THE 14TH COURT OF APPEALS

DATE JUDGMENT SIGNED:                              12-3-15

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL DATE FILED NONE

REQUEST TRANSCRIPT DATE FILED                                        12/7/2015

NOTICE OF APPEAL DATE FILED                                         12/3/2015

NUMBER OF DAYS: ( CLERKS RECORD ) 60
FILE ORDERED:                  YES               NO             IMAGED FILED:                   YES       NO

CODES FOR NOTICE OF APPEAL: BC,C, O;

                                                                     CHRIS DANIEL
                                                                     Harris County, District Clerk

                                                                     By: /s/PHYLLIS WASHINGTON
                                                                            PHYLLIS WASHINGTON , Deputy

BC       NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED
BG       NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED – GOVERNMENT
C        JUDGMENT BEING APPEALED
D-       ACCELERATED APPEAL
OA       NO CLERK’S RECORD REQUEST FILED
O        CLERK’S RECORD REQUEST FILED (W/NOTICE OF APPEAL)
NA       AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

AP9 R04-30-92 S:\FormsLib\Civil Bureau\Civil Courts & Post Judgment\Post Trial\Appeal Status Card              Revised 01-18-2013
JURN7 (NSA#)     JUSTICE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM       DEC 08, 2015(C1)
INT6510                     CIVIL CASE INTAKE                OPT: _____ - INT
                          GENERAL PARTY INQUIRY              PAGE:    1 -    5

CASE NUM: 201034306__ PJN> __ TRANS NUM: _________ CURRENT COURT: 295 PUB? _
CASE TYPE: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT              CASE STATUS: DISPOSED (FINAL)
STYLE: GILLET, JOEL                        VS VICKERY, KEITH
=============================================================================
                        **** INACTIVE PARTIES ****
  PJN PER/CONN COC BAR          PERSON NAME                   PTY  ASSOC. ATTY
  NUM    NUMBER                                              STAT
_     00012-0001 IVP 04514200 HONORABLE MARY KATHERINE KATIE D COHORN, CHERY
_     00004-0005 IVD          ZUPT L L C                        D
_     00003-0005 IVD          KATHMANN, DIETMAR                 D
_     00002-0005 IVD          VICKERY, KEITH                    D
_     00001-0003 IVD          GILLET, JOEL                      D
_     00010-0001 XPL 00794802 LYONS, SCOTT                        WADE, ERIC D.
_     00009-0001 XPL 00794802 LAUHOFF, ANDREW                     WADE, ERIC D.
_     00008-0001 XPL 00794802 PENDER, RICHARD                     WADE, ERIC D.

==> (35) CONNECTION(S) FOUND
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6=CASE INQ.   7=BACKWARD     8=FORWARD     9=PTY. ADDR.   10=REFRESH    11=HELP
JURN7 (NSA#)     JUSTICE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM         DEC 08, 2015(C1)
INT6510                     CIVIL CASE INTAKE                  OPT: _____ - INT
                          GENERAL PARTY INQUIRY                PAGE:    2 -    5

CASE NUM: 201034306__ PJN> __ TRANS NUM: _________ CURRENT COURT: 295 PUB? _
CASE TYPE: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT              CASE STATUS: DISPOSED (FINAL)
STYLE: GILLET, JOEL                        VS VICKERY, KEITH
=============================================================================
                        **** INACTIVE PARTIES ****
  PJN PER/CONN COC BAR          PERSON NAME                   PTY    ASSOC. ATTY
  NUM    NUMBER                                              STAT
_     00007-0001 XPL 00794802 TINK, CHARLES                         WADE, ERIC D.
_     00006-0001 XPL 00794802 IPOZ SYSTEMS LLC                      WADE, ERIC D.
_     00004-0003 XDF          ZUPT L L C
_     00003-0003 XDF          KATHMANN, DIETMAR
_     00002-0003 XDF          VICKERY, KEITH
_     00010-0002 3PD          LYONS, SCOTT                      D
_     00009-0002 3PD          LAUHOFF, ANDREW                   D
_     00008-0002 3PD          PENDER, RICHARD                     D

==> (35) CONNECTION(S) FOUND
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6=CASE INQ.   7=BACKWARD     8=FORWARD      9=PTY. ADDR.   10=REFRESH    11=HELP
JURN7 (NSA#)     JUSTICE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM       DEC 08, 2015(C1)
INT6510                     CIVIL CASE INTAKE                OPT: _____ - INT
                          GENERAL PARTY INQUIRY              PAGE:    3 -    5

CASE NUM: 201034306__ PJN> __ TRANS NUM: _________ CURRENT COURT: 295 PUB? _
CASE TYPE: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT              CASE STATUS: DISPOSED (FINAL)
STYLE: GILLET, JOEL                       VS VICKERY, KEITH
=============================================================================
                        **** INACTIVE PARTIES ****
  PJN PER/CONN COC BAR          PERSON NAME                  PTY   ASSOC. ATTY
  NUM    NUMBER                                             STAT
_     00007-0002 3PD          TINK, CHARLES                    D
_     00006-0002 3PD          IPOZ SYSTEMS LLC                 D
_     00004-0004 3PP 21723300 ZUPT L L C                       D WILSON, STUAR
_     00003-0004 3PP 21723300 KATHMANN, DIETMAR                D WILSON, STUAR
_     00002-0004 3PP 21723300 VICKERY, KEITH                   D WILSON, STUAR
_     00004-0002 XPL 21723300 ZUPT L L C                          WILSON, STUAR
_     00003-0002 XPL 21723300 KATHMANN, DIETMAR                   WILSON, STUAR
_     00002-0002 XPL 21723300 VICKERY, KEITH                      WILSON, STUAR

==> (35) CONNECTION(S) FOUND
1=ACTIVE      2=ATY. INQ.    3=ACT.ENTRY   4=ISS. SERV.   5=DOC. INQ.
6=CASE INQ.   7=BACKWARD     8=FORWARD     9=PTY. ADDR.   10=REFRESH    11=HELP
JURN7 (NSA#)     JUSTICE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM       DEC 08, 2015(C1)
INT6510                     CIVIL CASE INTAKE                OPT: _____ - INT
                          GENERAL PARTY INQUIRY              PAGE:    4 -    5

CASE NUM: 201034306__ PJN> __ TRANS NUM: _________ CURRENT COURT: 295 PUB? _
CASE TYPE: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT              CASE STATUS: DISPOSED (FINAL)
STYLE: GILLET, JOEL                        VS VICKERY, KEITH
=============================================================================
                        **** INACTIVE PARTIES ****
  PJN PER/CONN COC BAR          PERSON NAME                   PTY  ASSOC. ATTY
  NUM    NUMBER                                              STAT
_     00001-0002 XDF 21754300 GILLET, JOEL                        WINCHESTER, L
_     00001-0002 PXD 01266005 ANNELIN, JAMES S.
_     00013-0001 RCV 00784048 FETTNER, DAVID ADAM
_     00011-0001 ARB 11294450 KENNEDY, MARY KATHERINE
_     00005-0001 AGT          ZUPT L L C (TEXAS LIMITED LIAB
_     00004-0001 DEF 21723300 ZUPT L L C                          WILSON, STUAR
_     00003-0001 DEF 21723300 KATHMANN, DIETMAR                   WILSON, STUAR
_     00002-0001 DEF 21723300 VICKERY, KEITH                      WILSON, STUAR

==> (35) CONNECTION(S) FOUND
1=ACTIVE      2=ATY. INQ.    3=ACT.ENTRY   4=ISS. SERV.   5=DOC. INQ.
6=CASE INQ.   7=BACKWARD     8=FORWARD     9=PTY. ADDR.   10=REFRESH    11=HELP
JURN7 (NSA#)     JUSTICE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM       DEC 08, 2015(C1)
INT6510                     CIVIL CASE INTAKE                OPT: _____ - INT
                          GENERAL PARTY INQUIRY              PAGE:    5 -    5

CASE NUM: 201034306__ PJN> __ TRANS NUM: _________ CURRENT COURT: 295 PUB? _
CASE TYPE: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT              CASE STATUS: DISPOSED (FINAL)
STYLE: GILLET, JOEL                        VS VICKERY, KEITH
=============================================================================
                        **** INACTIVE PARTIES ****
  PJN PER/CONN COC BAR          PERSON NAME                   PTY  ASSOC. ATTY
  NUM    NUMBER                                              STAT
_     00001-0001 PLT 21754300 GILLET, JOEL                        WINCHESTER, L
_     00001-0001 PAP 01266005 ANNELIN, JAMES S.
_     00001-0001 PAP 01266005 ANNELIN, JAMES S.

==> (35) CONNECTION(S) FOUND
1=ACTIVE      2=ATY. INQ.    3=ACT.ENTRY   4=ISS. SERV.   5=DOC. INQ.
6=CASE INQ.   7=BACKWARD     8=FORWARD     9=PTY. ADDR.   10=REFRESH    11=HELP