598 A.2d 386 (1991)
Lindbergh BYRD, a/k/a Linwood Byrd, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES, Appellee.
No. 89-804.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Argued April 10, 1991.
Decided October 15, 1991.
*387 Betty M. Hunter, Washington, D.C., appointed by this court, for appellant.
James Klein, with whom Rosemary Herbert, Washington, D.C., was on the brief for Public Defender Service as amicus curiae.
Ann K.H. Simon, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Jay B. Stephens, U.S. Atty., John R. Fisher and Elisabeth A. Bresee, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before ROGERS, Chief Judge, FERREN, TERRY, STEADMAN, SCHWELB and WAGNER, Associate Judges, and BELSON, Senior Judge.[*]
STEADMAN, Associate Judge:
Arrested while driving a vehicle stolen the month before, appellant in this case was convicted both of unauthorized use of a vehicle ("UUV"), a crime under D.C.Code § 22-3815 (1989), and of receiving stolen property ("RSP"), a crime under D.C.Code § 22-3832 (1989), and was given consecutive sentences. The issue before us on appeal is a recurring one: where a defendant commits a single act which meets the requirements for conviction under two distinct statutory criminal provisions, can the defendant, after being tried and convicted in a single trial of both charges, be punished separately under each provision or under only one?
Although the answer has double jeopardy overtones, it ultimately turns on the legislative will. In the great bulk of cases, evidence of legislative intent with respect to any two specific statutes will be lacking. The issue is then resolved by application of what is known as the Blockburger test,[1] codified in this jurisdiction in D.C.Code § 23-112 (1989). However, the case before us is unusual in that in enacting the statute encompassing the two crimes of which appellant was convicted, the Council of the District of Columbia did include a provision addressing the general issue, D.C.Code § 22-3803 (1989). We conclude that a proper interpretation of that section permits appellant to be convicted of both RSP and UUV but to be sentenced for those crimes only concurrently, and not consecutively.

I
Appellant was arrested after police discovered that the car he was driving, a 1975 Datsun, had been reported as stolen a month previously. Although there was a key in the ignition of the car, it neither belonged to nor started the Datsun. The keyslot of the car's ignition had been "punched," probably with a screwdriver, in order to make the hole large enough for any key to fit the ignition. Testimony at trial established that the altered condition of the ignition would permit at least partial operation of the car with a key not belonging to the Datsun. During a search of the car, police found four coat hangers, a screwdriver, a wrench, and approximately eleven different keys, none of which belonged to the car.
Appellant testified that he had borrowed the Datsun from a friend identified only as "Smitty." He contradicted himself by first stating he had gone to Smitty's to pick up the car, but later indicating that Smitty had brought the car to him. Smitty told appellant that he had lost the key to the car, but *388 that it would run without a key. Appellant noticed that the ignition did not lock, and Smitty told him he could turn the car off by pushing in the "prong on the end" of the ignition and turning it.
In a bench trial, the court specifically found that appellant had "guilty knowledge that the [property] was stolen." The court found appellant guilty on both of the charged counts and sentenced him to imprisonment for a period of two to six years, execution of sentence being suspended, and to probation for a period of five years for the RSP offense, and to imprisonment for a period of twenty months to five years for the UUV count. The sentences were to be served consecutively.[2]
On appeal, appellant challenged only the sufficiency of the evidence to convict. The government in its brief commendably brought up a second issue presented by appellant's multiple convictions for UUV and RSP. It referred to (but argued as wrongly decided) our holding in Worthy v. United States, 509 A.2d 1157 (D.C.1986), that where the receipt and use of a motor vehicle are part of a unitary transaction, the defendant cannot be convicted of both offenses.
A panel of this court, hearing the appeal, concluded that applying the well-settled standard for review of sufficiency of evidence, see, e.g., Rose v. United States, 535 A.2d 849, 850 (D.C.1987), there was "ample support" for the convictions. Memorandum Order and Judgment, June 28, 1990. We think this ruling was plainly correct, and appellant does not argue it further before the en banc court. On the multiple punishment issue raised by the government, the panel deemed itself bound by Worthy and several related cases applying a "factual analysis" to multiple punishment issues. E.g., Arnold v. United States, 467 A.2d 136, 138-39 (D.C.1983) (per curiam). Noting that in this case "the facts necessary to prove RSP necessarily established UUV,[[3]]" the panel remanded the case to allow the trial judge to vacate one of the convictions and to resentence appellant. Id.
The government, asserting that the "factual analysis" test of Worthy and Arnold was "plainly inconsistent" with Supreme Court precedent, sought rehearing en banc, which we granted by order of February 27, 1991. Subsequently, the Public Defender Service was granted leave to file a brief as amicus curiae, which took the position that whatever the correct resolution in other situations, the issue of multiple punishments with respect to these two particular offenses is governed by D.C.Code § 22-3803, and that that section forbids more than one conviction. We agree that that Code section is controlling, although we differ with the precise interpretation proffered by the Public Defender Service.

II
The Double Jeopardy Clause, insofar as it applies to the problem of multiple punishments imposed following a single trial,[4] limits only the authority of courts and prosecutors. "The role of the constitutional guarantee [against double jeopardy] is limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense." Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 334, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1140, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981), quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2225, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977). Thus, "[t]he question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the question *389 of what punishments the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed." Id., 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. at 1145.
The problem normally presented is an absence of any evidence of actual legislative intent with respect to multiple punishments when two legislative provisions apply to and provide punishment for the same criminal act in a given case. Hence, almost sixty years ago, the Supreme Court laid down the rule to be followed in such situations in Blockburger v. United States, supra, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182:
[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed[5] the position that in applying this test, the court looks at the statutorily-specified elements of each offense and not the specific facts of a given case as alleged in the indictment or adduced at trial. "The Blockburger test has nothing to do with the evidence presented at trial. It is concerned solely with the statutory elements of the offenses charged." Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 2093 n. 12, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990) (emphasis in original). In Corbin, the Court contrasted the use of the Blockburger test to determine the permissibility of multiple punishments following a single trial with the appropriate test in the context of successive prosecutions. While establishing a "conduct" test in the latter "successive prosecution" context as a limitation regardless of legislative intent, it recognized the validity of the "elements" test in the multiple punishment arena as the guide to legislative intent and thereby to what punishments are constitutionally permissible.
In our jurisdiction, the Blockburger rule, albeit in "less than felicitous" language, has been codified as an express declaration of legislative intent in D.C.Code § 23-112 (1989).[6]See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 691-92, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 1437-38, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980) ("the only correct way to read § 23-112 ... is to read it as embodying the Blockburger rule for construing the penal provisions of the District of Columbia Code"). As set forth in the legislative history of that section, "[t]o obviate the need for the courts to search for legislative intent, section 23-112 clearly states the rule for sentencing on offenses arising from the same transaction." H.R.REP. No. 91-907, at 114, quoted in Whalen, supra, 445 U.S. at 693, 100 S.Ct. at 1438. Accordingly, the Blockburger rule is to be applied in the analysis of multiple punishment issues "in the absence of a clear indication of contrary legislative intent." Id., 445 U.S. at 692, 100 S.Ct. at 1438.
Our cases in general have applied the normal statute-oriented Blockburger test in dealing with such questions. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 528 A.2d 876, 880 (D.C.1987) (comparison of "essential elements" of offenses of assault with intent to kill and malicious disfigurement shows that "each statutory provision" requires proof of an "element" which the other does not); *390 Robinson v. United States, 501 A.2d 1273, 1275-76 (D.C.1985) (comparison of "essential elements" of the offenses of assault with intent to commit rape and assault with intent to commit sodomy makes clear each is a distinct offense authorizing multiple punishments for a single transaction). However, in several cases beginning with Arnold v. United States, 467 A.2d 136 (D.C.1983) (per curiam), we applied a fact-based analysis in determining whether multiple punishments were permissible where a single transaction was involved. In Arnold, the issue was whether the defendant could be punished both for grand larceny (D.C.Code § 22-2201 (repealed Dec. 1, 1982, D.C.Law 4-164)) and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle (D.C.Code § 22-2204 (also repealed Dec. 1, 1982)). Observing that with respect to the specific factual situation in that case, the conviction for unauthorized use included proof of no fact not also adduced on the larceny charge, we held that the two charges were in that instance the "same offense" for multiple punishment purposes.[7] Subsequently, in Worthy v. United States, 509 A.2d 1157 (D.C.1986), we applied the same analysis to convictions for unauthorized use of a vehicle and receiving stolen property, deeming Arnold "dispositive."[8]
We do not think the pure fact-based analysis of these holdings can survive the recent reaffirmation by the Supreme Court of the proper application of the Blockburger test in Grady v. Corbin, supra.[9] Otherwise put, these cases erred in concluding that since the facts as actually presented by the government to prove one charge were necessarily used by the government to prove the second charge, the two charges constituted the "same offense."[10] Rather, the focus should have been on the statutory elements of the two distinct charges; viz., whether each statutory provision required proof of an element that the other did not. We recognize that legitimate questions may arise at times with respect to the manner in which the Blockburger test is to be applied in a given case. However, we need not explore that issue further here,[11] because unlike the usual *391 situation, the legislature has in fact providing guidance apart from § 23-112 with respect to its intent regarding the specific offenses before us. We turn to that discussion.

III
In 1982, the Council of the District of Columbia enacted the "District of Columbia Theft and White Collar Crimes Act," which revised and modernized the statutes relating to the general area of thefts and other like crimes. In doing so, the Council included an express provision, D.C.Code § 22-3803 (1989), addressing the general area of multiple punishments:
No person shall be consecutively sentenced for both:
(1) Theft and fraud;
(2) Theft and unauthorized use of a vehicle; or
(3) Theft and commercial piracy; for the same act or course of conduct.
The narrow issue before us is whether the prohibition in clause (2) of consecutive sentences for "theft" and "unauthorized use of a vehicle" was intended by the Council to apply to convictions for "receiving stolen property" and "unauthorized use of a vehicle" where, as here, the two crimes involve the same "act or course of conduct."
It could hardly be questioned that the prohibition against consecutive sentences for convictions for "theft" and the other enumerated offenses encompasses any lesser-included offense of theft. However, it is argued, RSP is not a lesser-included offense of theft and therefore the statute has no application; accordingly, the Blockburger test of § 23-112 is the applicable expression of legislative intent and consecutive sentences are permitted.
This is too facile a reading of § 22-3803. To the contrary, we think that the relationship existing between the offenses of theft and RSP is so intimate and intertwined when "the same act or course of conduct" is involved that RSP, if not a lesser included of theft in such a situation, is the functional equivalent thereof and should be similarly treated in interpreting the section.
We start with the concept of "theft" itself as expressed in the 1982 law. In the expanded definition of the offense contained in that law, D.C.Code § 22-3811(b), theft is defined thus:
A person commits the offense of theft if that person wrongfully obtains or uses the property of another with intent: (1) to deprive the other of a right to the property or a benefit of the property; or (2) to appropriate the property to his or her own use or to the use of a third person.
The phrase "wrongfully obtains or uses" is given further definition in § 22-3811(a), including: "(1) Taking or exercising control over property; (2) making an unauthorized use, disposition, or transfer of an interest in or possession of property." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the definition transcends the traditional and everyday concept of theft as "the felonious taking and removing of personal property with intent to deprive the rightful owner of it." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2369 (1981). At the least, it indicates that the Council had an expansive concept of the term.[12]
Turning to the definition of RSP, many of the same concepts appear. "A person commits the offense of receiving stolen property if that person buys, receives, possesses, or obtains control of stolen property, knowing or having reason to believe that the property was stolen, with intent to deprive another of the right to the property or a benefit of the property." D.C.Code § 22-3832(a) (emphasis added). The intent required for RSP is expressed in virtually identical language to that used in the first *392 of the two types of intents required for theft, and both theft and RSP apply to the mere act of possession or use with such an intent. This recitation of the language is sufficient to show the substantial interrelation between the two reflected in the statutory definitions.[13]
The Supreme Court has recognized the same linkage in comparable types of statutes. In Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 417, 79 S.Ct. 451, 452, 3 L.Ed.2d 407 (1959), the Court was faced with the question whether the appellant could be convicted both of "feloniously receiving and feloniously taking the same property" under the Federal Bank Robbery Act. In holding that he could not as a matter of congressional intent, the Court recognized that nonetheless "in logic" Congress could have pyramided the offenses. Subsequently, in United States v. Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544, 96 S.Ct. 1023, 47 L.Ed.2d 222 (1976), the Court expressly recognized the relationship between the two types of offenses and their nature as not lesser-included but alternate offenses:
Situations will no doubt often exist where there is evidence before a grand jury or prosecutor that a certain person participated in a bank robbery and also evidence that that person, though not himself the robber, at least knowingly received the proceeds of the robbery. In such a case there can be no impropriety for a grand jury to return an indictment or for a prosecutor to file an information containing counts charging violations of [both robbery and RSP]. If, upon the trial of the case the District Judge is satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to go to the jury upon both counts, he must, under Heflin and Milanovich, instruct the members of the jury that they may not convict the defendant both for robbing a bank and for receiving the proceeds of the robbery. He should instruct them that they must first consider the charges under [robbery], and should consider the charge under [RSP] only if they find insufficient proof that the defendant himself was a participant in the robbery.
We subsequently recognized the proper application of this same "rule of priority" to cases involving our larceny and RSP statutes. Franklin v. United States, 392 A.2d 516 (D.C.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 948, 99 S.Ct. 1428, 59 L.Ed.2d 637 (1979). We specifically noted the kinship of such a rule to that governing lesser-included offenses: "Application of a rule of priority of jury consideration in fashioning a rule of priority for appellate remedial purposes is not unique to the situation involved in the instant cases.... The rationale for this remedy [of vacation of the lesser-included offense] is that, as here, the jury should have been charged to consider the lesser included offense only if it had already determined that the appellant was not guilty of the main offense." 392 A.2d at 519 n. 3. More recently, in our en banc decision in Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26, 53 n. 46 (D.C.1990), we recognized a somewhat similar relationship between the mutually inconsistent offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter by suggesting that the trial court "direct the jury to consider voluntary manslaughter first in its deliberations" because voluntary manslaughter is typically deemed a more serious offense than involuntary manslaughter.
Further recognition of the link between the two types of offenses may be *393 found in the area of presumptions. A defendant's unexplained (or unsatisfactorily explained) possession of recently stolen property may support a conviction of larceny, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 54, 60, 433 F.2d 1160, 1166 (1970), or receiving stolen property, e.g., Blackledge v. United States, 447 A.2d 46, 50 (D.C.1982).
Finally, it is significant to note the anomaly of treating § 22-3803 as inapplicable to RSP. The defendant who was the original thief could, under § 22-3803, be given only concurrent sentences not to exceed ten years,[14] while the one to whom he loaned the car for a joyride could be consecutively sentenced for a potential maximum term of twelve years, as was in fact almost the case here.[15] This is a patently illogical result. While it is not the proper function of any court to gratuitously fill in gaps left by the legislature, West Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1138, 1148, 113 L.Ed.2d 68 (1991), quoting Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 250-51, 46 S.Ct. 248, 250, 70 L.Ed. 566 (1926) ("`[w]hat the Government asks is not a construction of a statute, but, in effect, an enlargement of it by the court'"), where language is fairly capable of two interpretations, we think it most unlikely that the legislature intended that interpretation which would be "an unreasonable one `plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole.'" Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 400, 86 S.Ct. 852, 857, 15 L.Ed.2d 827 (1966), quoting United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 1064, 84 L.Ed. 1345 (1940).
In sum, we conclude that given the intimate relationship between theft and RSP as discussed above, most notably demonstrated by the "rule of priority," the provisions of § 22-3803 should be interpreted as a manifestation of legislative will to prohibit consecutive sentences for convictions of RSP and UUV arising out of the "same act or course of conduct."

IV
Section 22-3803, however, does not prohibit convictions for both RSP and UUV, but only the imposition of consecutive sentences. It is contended that notwithstanding the plain language of the statute, the Council merely expressed the then-understood limitations of the multiple punishment concept. Since that concept has been somewhat expanded subsequently, the application of the section should be correspondingly expanded. We find no warrant for such a deviation from the clear legislative language.
Up until a decade or so ago, it was generally thought that the prohibition against multiple punishments applied only to consecutive sentencing. However, in a case decided prior to the enactment of the 1982 law, Doepel v. United States, 434 A.2d 449, 459 (D.C.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1037, 102 S.Ct. 580, 70 L.Ed.2d 483 (1981),[16] we recognized that "even a concurrent sentence is an element of punishment because of potential collateral consequences" and accordingly forbade such concurrent sentences for both felony murder and the underlying felony.[17] This interpretation of the result that follows from a Blockburger analysis of multiple punishments was, four years later, confirmed by the Supreme Court in Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985). There, *394 the Court first concluded that Congress did not intend that the petitioner's conduct be punishable both under a statute prohibiting the receipt of a firearm and a separate statute prohibiting its possession. It then held that since a separate conviction, even with a concurrent sentence, could have collateral consequences, the imposition of even concurrent sentences "cannot be squared with Congress' intention." 470 U.S. at 864, 105 S.Ct. at 1673.
Here, however, the Council's expressed intent is clear. What is prohibited by § 22-3803 is not dual convictions or concurrent sentences, but, specifically, that a defendant not be "consecutively sentenced."[18] If there were any doubt on the issue, the Committee Report accompanying the bill states that "[n]othing in this section is intended to prohibit the court from imposing concurrent sentences" for the offenses enumerated therein. COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Bill No. 4-133, § 103, at 10 (June 1, 1982).
The "Extension of Comments" to this same report, see note [12] supra, indicated an awareness of the import of the provision by citing Evans v. United States, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 122, 123, 232 F.2d 379, 380 (1956), and United States v. Johnson, supra, 140 U.S.App.D.C. at 57, 433 F.2d at 1163, two older cases decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. In these cases, the court held that concurrent sentences could properly be imposed on a defendant for grand larceny and UUV despite the fact that the two offenses grew out of one act.[19]
The gradation of punishment for an offense is clearly a matter of legislative choice, whether it be as severe as authorizing dual punishment for lesser-included offenses, see Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983) (legislature specifically authorized dual sentences and convictions for armed criminal action and first-degree robbery), or as mild as prohibiting the imposition of multiple convictions even where two offenses clearly involve different elements. See Watson v. United States, 524 A.2d 736, 743 (D.C.1987). Thus, there is nothing aberrational in imputing to the Council the precise intent its plain language provides,[20] which is squarely in accord with a once-existent practice even under a Blockburger analysis.
The judgment convicting appellant on the counts of RSP and UUV is affirmed, and the case is remanded for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.
So ordered.
BELSON, Senior Judge, with whom WAGNER, Associate Judge, joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority that the fact-based analysis of Arnold v. United States, 467 A.2d 136 (D.C.1983) and Worthy v. United States, 509 A.2d 1157 (D.C.1986), cannot survive in light of the Supreme Court's reaffirmation that the Blockburger test is "concerned solely with the statutory elements of the offenses charged" and "has nothing to do with the evidence presented at trial."[1]Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 2093 n. 12, 109 *395 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990) (emphasis in original); see also Taylor v. United States, 508 A.2d 99 (D.C.1986). But, because the Blockburger test is a mandatory rule of statutory construction in this jurisdiction, Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 691-92, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 1437-38, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980); D.C.Code § 23-112 (1989), I cannot agree that the D.C. Council by enacting D.C.Code § 22-3803 (1989) evinced a contrary legislative intent so clearly as to overcome the statutory presumption that two offenses arising from the same transaction may be punished by the imposition of consecutive sentences where each offense requires proof of a fact that the other does not. The majority errs, I think, in going through the very sort of effort to divine legislative intent that Congress intended to obviate by adopting § 23-112.
In 1970, dissatisfied with the trend of decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia which "prohibit[ed] consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of the same transaction absent some plain indication of congressional intent," Congress enacted § 210(a) of Title II of Public Law 91-358, codified at D.C.Code § 23-112. H.R.REP. No. 91-907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 114 (1970). By enacting this provision, Congress created a statutory presumption that it, the legislature, intended to authorize consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of the same transaction when each offense requires proof of a fact which the other does not, thus "obviat[ing] the need for the courts to search for legislative intent." Id.; see also Ball v. United States, 429 A.2d 1353, 1357 (D.C.1981) ("§ 23-112 ... establishes a presumption of consecutive sentences for conviction of separate offenses").
To overcome this general statutory presumption, the Council or Congress must clearly indicate its intention to prohibit the imposition of consecutive sentences in particular instances. See Whalen, supra, 445 U.S. at 692, 100 S.Ct. at 1432. With respect to multiple punishment for the offenses of theft and unauthorized use of a vehicle (UUV) arising from the same act, the Council has clearly indicated its intent: "[n]o person shall be consecutively sentenced for both ... [t]heft and unauthorized use of a vehicle ... for the same act or course of conduct." D.C.Code § 22-3803.[2] Further, it is reasonable to posit, as the majority does, that this provision also *396 manifests the Council's intent with respect to lesser included offenses of theft and UUV because a lesser included offense is the same offense as the greater offense for double jeopardy purposes. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2226-27, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977) ("greater offense is ... by definition the `same' for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it"). The majority, however, goes much further and concludesevidentlythat the Council also clearly intended the offense of receiving stolen property (RSP) to come within the meaning of theft for the purpose of prohibiting the imposition of consecutive sentences for RSP and UUV arising from the same act or conduct. This interpretation is supported neither by the plain language of the statute nor by its legislative history.
In interpreting a statute, we must give effect to its plain meaning when the words used in it are clear. J. Parreco & Son v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Comm'n, 567 A.2d 43, 45 (D.C.1989) (citations omitted). "Absent a `clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.'" Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 336, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1141, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981) (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980)).
The plain language of § 22-3803 expressly prohibits the imposition of consecutive sentences for only the following sets of offenses arising from the same act or course of conduct: for theft and fraud, for theft and UUV, and for theft and commercial piracy. It does not expressly prohibit, however, the imposition of consecutive sentences for RSP and UUV arising from the same act. Had the legislature so intended, it could easily have done so. The court has no authority to rewrite an unambiguous statute, even for the purpose of making it more equitable or fairer. J. Parreco & Son v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Comm'n, supra, 567 A.2d at 44. Essentially, that is what the majority seeks to do. The statutory language involved here, which prohibits the imposition of consecutive sentences for certain specified crimes, is clear and unambiguous. The role of the court is to apply it according to its plain terms. See West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1138, 1147, 113 L.Ed.2d 68 (1991).
We are not unmindful that the court may look beyond a statute's plain meaning if there are persuasive reasons for doing so, e.g., to avoid absurd results, obvious injustice or defeat of the statutory purpose. People's Drug Stores, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 754 (D.C.1983) (en banc). Nevertheless, even such results (which are not involved here) must be accommodated where a statute leaves no basis to avoid them. See Wright v. United States, 315 A.2d 839, 841 (D.C.1974). Here, there is no way to avoid the clear mandate of the statute, as neither its language (in particular terms or in overall context) nor its legislative history discloses an intent to include the interpretation adopted by the majority.
I think it unnecessary to resort to legislative history to decide this case, but if one does so, one sees that the legislative history is consistent with the plain meaning of the statute. In explaining what this section does, Chairperson Clarke stated that "[t]his provision prohibits the imposition of consecutive sentences in cases in which the same act or course of conduct violates both... the Theft (section 111) and Unauthorized Use of Vehicles (section 115) provisions." EXTENSION OF COMMENTS, supra note 2, at 6 (emphasis added). This reference only to § 111, the definition of the theft offense codified at D.C.Code § 22-3811, demonstrates that the Council did not intend RSP, § 131, to be considered within the meaning of theft for purposes of this provision. Although the Council consolidated many of the theft-related offenses into the theft offense, it expressly preserved the separate offense of RSP. Furthermore, Chairperson Clarke stated that the Council did not intend to abrogate D.C.Code § 23-112 except "for the offenses listed." Id. at 7 (emphasis added). Because the Council was aware that § 23-112 obviates the need for the court to *397 search for legislative intent to confirm the trial court's power to impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising from the same act when Blockburger is satisfied, the Council's failure to include RSP and UUV must be taken to indicate that it intentionally omitted that combination of offenses from § 22-3803.
In each of the three categories for which the prohibition against consecutive sentences is addressed in § 22-3803, theft is linked to another offense, one of which is UUV. D.C.Code § 22-3803(2). Theft, its elements and penalties, are covered in subchapter II of the title under the caption "Theft; Related Offenses." Significantly, the offense of receiving stolen property is not included in subchapter II, but in a separate subchapter IV, along with trafficking in stolen property. In the legislative history, trafficking in stolen property and receiving stolen property are listed under "Subtitle 4Dealing in Stolen Property." I regard these separate categorizations as a clear indication that the legislature intended to separate the theft offenses from RSP. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the omission of RSP from the provisions of § 22-3803 was equally intentional.
The majority, nevertheless, looks past the plain meaning of the statute. It concludes that it is "most unlikely" that the Council did not intend to include RSP within the meaning of theft because of the relationship between theft and RSP, and the anomaly otherwise created in authorizing the sentencing of a defendant convicted of both RSP and UUV to a maximum sentence of twelve years as contrasted with a maximum sentence of ten years for a defendant convicted of both theft and UUV.[3] What the majority does, however, "is not a construction of a statute but, in effect, an enlargement of it by the court, so that what was omitted, presumably by inadvertence, may be included within its scope. To supply omissions transcends the judicial function." West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, supra, 111 S.Ct. at 1148 (quoting Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 250-51, 46 S.Ct. 248, 250, 70 L.Ed. 566 (1926)).
Finding that the relationship between the offenses of theft and RSP is "so intimate and intertwined when `the same act or course of conduct' is involved," the majority holds that RSP is the "functional equivalent" of theft.[4] A more accurate characterization of the relationship between theft and RSP is that they are closely related to one another, but mutually inconsistent. See State v. Bleau, 139 Vt. 305, 308, 428 A.2d 1097, 1099 (1981) ("The crimes of receiving stolen goods and larceny are inconsistent."). "It is an elementary principle of law that the principal in a theft, or the person who actually steals the property, cannot be convicted of the crime of receiving, concealing, or aiding in the concealment of the property stolen." Annotation, May Participant in Larceny or Theft be Convicted of Offenses of Receiving or Concealing the Stolen Property, 136 A.L.R. 1087, 1088 (1942). "And this is so for the commonsensical, if not obvious, reason that a man who takes property does not at the same time give himself the property he has taken." Milanovich v. United States, 365 U.S. 551, 558, 81 S.Ct. 728, 732, 5 L.Ed.2d 773 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Thus, unlike a lesser included offense where the lesser offense is committed at the same time as the greater offense, a defendant cannot commit theft and RSP at the same time.
To support its position that theft and RSP are "functionally equivalent," the majority relies heavily on the expanded definition of theft in D.C.Code § 22-3811 which overlaps with the definition of RSP. The Council, however, expanded the definition of theft to consolidate various theft-related offenses by eliminating "highly technical" distinctions between theft-related offenses that "served only to confuse the charging *398 process." COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Bill No. 4-133, § 111, at 10 (June 1, 1982). Yet, as noted above, the Council intentionally chose to preserve the offense of RSP in a separate subchapter, rather than combine it with the consolidated theft offense. Furthermore, the Council included in the theft definition the language "exercising control over property," which the majority emphasizes, in order to address the "typical embezzlement situation" and included the language "making an unauthorized use, disposition, or transfer of an interest in or possession of property" to address "the situation in which someone converts, conceals, or misappropriates anothers property." Id. at 11; EXTENSION OF COMMENTS, supra note 2, at 16. In light of the legislative history, the Council's "expansive concept" of theft should not be interpreted to incorporate more than the Council stated.
Furthermore, the sentencing anomaly created by heeding the plain meaning of § 22-3803 is not so serious that it is unreasonable to apply § 22-3803 literally.[5] The Council indicated that it prohibited the imposition of consecutive sentences for theft and UUV arising from the same act to carry forward the current law as stated by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in United States v. Johnson, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 54, 433 F.2d 1160 (1970) and Evans v. United States, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 122, 232 F.2d 379 (1956).
Because § 22-3803 does not clearly prohibit the imposition of consecutive sentences for the offenses of RSP and UUV, we must apply the Blockburger test to determine whether the same act violating both RSP and UUV constitutes a single offense for which consecutive sentences are prohibited. The RSP statute requires proof that the property in question must have been stolen by someone, a fact which the UUV statute does not require. Conversely, the UUV statute requires proof that the defendant operated or drove the vehicle for his own purpose, an element absent from the RSP statute. Thus, each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. Because the Blockburger test is fully satisfied and there is no clear indication of contrary legislative intent, I would affirm the imposition of consecutive sentences for the offenses of RSP and UUV arising from the same conduct or transaction.
NOTES
[*]  Judge Belson was an Associate Judge of the court at the time of argument. His status changed to Senior Judge on July 24, 1991.
[1]  Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).
[2]  The period of probation for RSP was to begin after appellant completed his UUV incarceration.
[3]  The panel also noted that "even though the Datsun was stolen nearly a month before appellant was apprehended operating the car, there was no evidence of appellant's receipt of the stolen Datsun apart from the unauthorized operation of the car at the time of his arrest."
[4]  "That [double jeopardy] guarantee has been said to consist of three separate constitutional protections. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). It is the third protection that is at issue here.
[5]  Prior Supreme Court holdings had indicated that the elements test was the proper one. See, e.g., Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 778-79, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 2411, 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985); United States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105, 108, 105 S.Ct. 611, 612, 83 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 338, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1142, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981); Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 & n. 17, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 1293-94 & n. 17, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 389, 78 S.Ct. 1280, 1282, 2 L.Ed.2d 1405 (1958); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 788, 66 S.Ct. 1125, 1128, 90 L.Ed. 1575 (1946). Compare also Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 1450, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989), resolving a split among the circuits and applying an "elements" test to the determination whether a lesser-included offense instruction should be given under FED.R.CRIM.P. 31(c).
[6]  D.C.Code § 23-112 states:

A sentence imposed on a person for conviction of an offense shall, unless the court imposing such sentence expressly provides otherwise, run consecutively to any other sentence imposed on such person for conviction of an offense, whether or not the offense (1) arises out of another transaction, or (2) arises out of the same transaction and requires proof of a fact which the other does not.
[7]  The Arnold court relied at least in part upon an understandable, yet shown by subsequent cases to have been an improper, reading of Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977). The mistaken premise asserted in Arnold was that "there is no meaningful difference between [the District of Columbia statutes] and the Ohio statutes analyzed in Brown." 467 A.2d at 139. The fact that the Ohio Court of Appeals had authoritatively construed that state's joyriding statute to be a lesser included offense of auto theft should not have been imported into a determination as to the legislative intent in enacting the District statutes at issue. Further, as we have acknowledged: "prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Albernaz, supra, there was some confusion as to whether the focus of scrutiny should be on the facts of a particular case or on the formal elements of the offenses being considered. Albernaz made clear that one must look to the statutory elements...." Waller v. United States, 531 A.2d 994, 997 (D.C.1987) (footnote omitted).
[8]  See also Kingsbury v. United States, 537 A.2d 208 (D.C.1988) (armed robbery and UUV); Curtis v. United States, 568 A.2d 1074 (D.C.1990) (mayhem and assault with a dangerous weapon).
[9]  While § 23-112, to be sure, uses the phrase "proof of a fact," the reference is to what the statutory "offense" requires in the way of proof, not to the specific "transaction." The word "requires" can refer only to elements, not to whatever facts may be adduced at trial. This is in accord with the Supreme Court's holding in Whalen, supra, that the section embodies the Blockburger rule. See also Schmuck v. United States, supra note 5, 109 S.Ct. at 1450 ("[s]ince offenses are statutorily defined, that comparison [for determining lesser-included offenses] is appropriately conducted by reference to the statutory elements of the offenses in question").
[10]  Of course, the results in Arnold and Worthy, decided under the pre-1982 statutes, would in any event be different today under D.C.Code § 22-3803 (1983), as discussed in part III infra.
[11]  We do not understand either appellant or amicus to argue that RSP and UUV constitute a single offense under a Blockburger "elements" test. We have addressed the continuing validity of the Arnold line of cases, although not strictly required to do so to dispose of this particular appeal, because of the unacceptable continuing conflict between the two lines of panel decisions in our jurisprudence represented by the Arnold line on the one hand and that represented by the "elements" cases such as Wilson v. United States, supra, on the other. The panel opinion rested squarely upon the Arnold line of cases, and an original purpose in going en banc was to deal with this precise issue, which was fully briefed before us. The alternate mode of disposition was first suggested by the brief of amicus curiae filed with the en banc court.
[12]  In the "Extension of Comments" on the 1982 law, the Chairperson of the Committee on the Judiciary, in his discussion of the scope of the definition of "theft" in the 1982 law, noted that there were "more than 30 statutes contained in Title 22 of the District of Columbia Code which prohibits various forms of theft or fraud." He then made a partial listing of such statutes, which included "D.C.Code Section 22-2205, Receiving Stolen Goods." EXTENSION OF COMMENTS ON BILL No. 4-133: THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA THEFT AND WHITE COLLAR CRIMES ACT OF 1982 (July 20, 1982) (submitted by David A. Clarke).
[13]  So close is this link that we ourselves have stated: "Receiving stolen property is a lesser included offense of theft. [A defendant] thus cannot be convicted of both theft and receipt of stolen goods with respect to the same property." Roberts v. United States, 508 A.2d 110 (D.C.1986). However, this language should be viewed as no more than a recognition that, as subsequently to be discussed, the two offenses have generally been considered alternates, precluding conviction for both, just as is the case with lesser-included offenses. At common law, it appears that larceny and RSP were considered different offenses for what has been termed "commonsensical, if not obvious" reasons. Milanovich v. United States, 365 U.S. 551, 559, 81 S.Ct. 728, 732, 5 L.Ed.2d 773 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also 4 TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW, § 461, at 23-24 (14th ed. 1981). To avoid any future misunderstanding, we hereby expressly disapprove the quoted statement in Roberts that RSP is a "lesser included offense of theft."
[14]  The maximum term for "Theft in the 1st degree" is ten years. D.C.Code § 22-3812(a).
[15]  The maximum term for UUV is five years, D.C.Code § 22-3815(d)(1), and for RSP seven years, D.C.Code § 22-3832(c)(1). Appellant faces a maximum exposure of eleven years under the sentences imposed here, set forth above.
[16]  An even earlier case to the same effect was Waller v. United States, 389 A.2d 801, 808 n. 8 (D.C.1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 901, 100 S.Ct. 1824, 64 L.Ed.2d 253 (1980), where we said:

[i]t is immaterial to this analysis [of merger] that appellant Waller was sentenced concurrently for conviction of the underlying felony [in addition to felony murder]. If this conviction is founded in error, we are bound to reverse, in light of potential collateral consequences stemming from the conviction.
[17]  Whalen, supra, had applied the traditional Blockburger test, contained in D.C.Code § 23-112, in barring consecutive sentences in such situations. See discussion supra.
[18]  Appellant draws to our attention the fact that the heading of § 22-3803 in the official print of the 1982 law, D.C.Law 4-164, § 103, 29 D.C.R. 3976 (Dec. 1, 1982) reads "Duplicative Punishments," and not "Consecutive Sentences," as appears in the D.C.Code version of § 22-2803. We do not think this can affect the plain words of the operative provision. Furthermore, notwithstanding the recent recognition that dual convictions can have certain collateral consequences even with concurrent sentences, plainly the major impact of multiple punishment is where sentences are consecutive.
[19]  Obviously, for the reasons discussed above, these holdings allowing concurrent sentences are no longer good law insofar as they turn on the application of a Blockburger analysis. This is no reason, however, to disregard the plain language of the statute as an expression of the result that the Council intended, and had the unquestioned power, to bring about.
[20]  "[A] concurrent sentence is traditionally imposed as a less severe sanction than a consecutive sentence." Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201, 216 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 233, 243 n. 9, 70 L.Ed.2d 345 (1981) (emphasis in original).
[1]  Thus, I join in parts I and II of the majority opinion.
[2]  I agree with the majority that § 22-3803 does not prohibit the court from imposing concurrent sentences for the offenses of theft and UUV arising from the same act or conduct. [Majority at 393]. The court, nevertheless, must still determine whether the act or conduct violating the two offenses constitutes the "same" offense for which concurrent sentences, as well as consecutive sentences, are proscribed. Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 1673, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985) ("second conviction, even if it results in no greater sentence, is an impermissible punishment" because of potential adverse collateral consequences that attach to the conviction such as delay of eligibility for parole, increase in sentence under recidivist statute, and use as impeachment of the defendant's credibility); Doepel v. United States, 434 A.2d 449, 459 (D.C.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1037, 102 S.Ct. 580, 70 L.Ed.2d 483 (1981) ("even a concurrent sentence is an element of punishment because of potential collateral consequences" (footnote omitted)); Waller v. United States, 389 A.2d 801, 808 n. 8 (D.C.1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 901, 100 S.Ct. 1824, 64 L.Ed.2d 253 (1980) ("It is immaterial to [double jeopardy] analysis that appellant Waller was sentenced concurrently ... in light of potential collateral consequences stemming from the conviction."). In comments regarding § 22-3803, Chairperson Clarke, who sponsored the bill, anticipated that the court would continue to determine whether a single act violating two separate and distinct statutory provisions constitutes the same offense for which only a single punishment would be permissible. EXTENSION OF COMMENTS ON BILL No. 4-133: THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA THEFT AND WHITE COLLAR CRIMES ACT OF 1982, at 6 (July 20, 1982) (submitted by David A. Clarke) ("Nor is anything in this section intended to prohibit the court from deciding to vacate a conviction on the grounds that two offenses are identical." (Footnote omitted)).

Although the court has previously held that "we are free to determine legislative intent without restriction to any single rule of statutory construction" where concurrent (rather than consecutive) sentences are being considered, Ball, supra, 429 A.2d at 1358, the court should adopt the Supreme Court's approach and use the Blockburger test. See Ball, supra, 470 U.S. at 856, 105 S.Ct. at 1668. Taking such an approach would provide consistency in determining whether a single act violating two separate and distinct offenses results in the "same" offense for which multiple punishment (regardless of whether it is the imposition of consecutive sentences or concurrent sentences) is prohibited.
[3]  If RSP is included within the meaning of theft for purposes of § 22-3803, the maximum sentence for a defendant convicted of both RSP and UUV would be seven years.
[4]  I agree with the majority's express disapproval of the language in Roberts v. United States, 508 A.2d 110, 113 (D.C.1986) that "[RSP] is a lesser included offense of theft."
[5]  The level of possible punishment does not always increase in accordance with common perceptions of offense severity under our current statutes. (Cf. D.C.Code § 22-2801 (rape) maximum, life, with D.C.Code § 22-3502 (sodomy with a person over 16 years old10 year maximum)). The sentencing differential between RSP and UUV and Theft and UUV is not "absurd," nor is it so unfair as to warrant judicial legislation in this case.


625 F.Supp. 26 (1985)
Penny CREATON, Patricia Walker and Dolores Anspach, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v.
Margaret HECKLER, in her official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services; Linda McMahon, in her official capacity as Director of the California Department of Social Services, Defendants.
No. CV 85-3306-R.
United States District Court, C.D. California.
June 20, 1985.
*27 Robert C. Bonner, U.S. Atty., Frederick M. Brosio, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., Chief, Civ. Div., Fumiko Hachiya Wasserman, George H. Wu, Asst. U.S. Attys., Los Angeles, Cal., for federal defendant.
Byron J. Gross, Bruce Iwasaki, M. Judith Nishimoto, Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, Los Angeles, Cal., James Carroll, San Fernando Valley Neighborhood Legal Services, Inc., Pacoima, Cal., Richard A. Rothschild, Western Center on Law and Poverty, Inc., Los Angeles, Cal., Thomas Weathered, Evelyn R. Frank, Legal Aid Soc. of Alameda County, Hayward, Cal., Thomas Mason, Redwood Legal Assistance, Ukiah, Cal., for plaintiffs.
John K. Van De Kamp, Atty. Gen., Anne S. Pressman, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., Barbara M. Motz, Michael V. Hammang, Deputy Attys. Gen., Los Angeles, Cal., for state defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
REAL, Chief Judge.
This matter came on for hearing before the Court on May 24, 1985 and on June 5, 1985. The Court having considered the pleadings, motions, memoranda of law, declarations, affidavit, exhibits, other papers and oral argument of counsel, being duly advised in the premises, makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On May 17, 1985, plaintiffs Penny Creaton ("CREATON"), Patricia Walker ("WALKER") and Dolores Anspach ("ANSPACH"), on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, brought a Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1331, 1343(a)(3) and 1361, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the defendants. Plaintiffs challenge implementation in California of federal and state regulations promulgated pursuant to Section 2640(a) of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1145 (1984) ("DRA"), which amended 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) by adding a subpart 38, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(38). Pursuant to the DRA, the SECRETARY amended 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(vii) to conform with the new law. See 49 C.F.R. 35586 (Sept. 10, 1984).
2. The named plaintiffs bringing suit to challenge the regulations set forth claims typical of the class as defined below:
All families in the state of California in which one or more members receives benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program and in *28 which one or more children living in the household receives benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act resulting from the disability, retirement or death of a parent, and which will lose some or all of their AFDC benefits through implementation of defendants' regulations purporting to implement Section 2640(a) of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984.
Further, the members of plaintiffs' class are so numerous that joinder is impracticable; there are questions of law or fact common to and typical of the class; and the plaintiffs as representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
3. The Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") program authorized under Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq., is a cooperative federal-state effort established by Congress in 1935 to enable each state, as far as practicable under the conditions of such state, to furnish financial assistance to certain needy children and the parent or relatives with whom they live. 42 U.S.C. § 602. States are not required to participate in the AFDC program, but those states wishing to participate must submit plans to the Department of Health and Human Services for approval. 42 U.S.C. § 602(b). If the plan meets the requirements of Title IV-A and the implementing regulations and is thereby approved, the state becomes eligible for approximately half of the program's funding from the federal government. 42 U.S.C. § 603. The AFDC program is administered locally by the states, in accordance with state and federal regulations. Implementing federal regulations are promulgated by the Secretary pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1302. The state of California participates in the program.
4. In order to qualify for AFDC benefits, applicants must meet certain standards of financial need, defined by their income and resources. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a).
5. Pursuant to the DRA, several changes were made to the AFDC program, including a change in the composition of the filing unit for AFDC assistance. Section 402(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a), was amended by the addition of paragraph 38, which provides:
PARENTS AND SIBLINGS OF DEPENDENT CHILD INCLUDED IN AFDC FAMILY; CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS
*   *   *   *   *   *
in making the determinations under paragraph (7) with respect to a dependent child and applying paragraph (8), the State agency shall (except as otherwise provided in this part) include
"(A) any parent of such child, and (B) any brother or sister of such child, if such brother or sister meets the conditions described in clauses (1) and (2) of section 406(a) [42 U.S.C. § 606(a)], if such parent, brother or sister is living in the same home as the dependent child, and any income of or available for such parent, brother, or sister shall be included in making such determination and applying such paragraph with respect to the family (notwithstanding section 205(j) [42 U.S.C. § 405(j)] in the case of benefits provided under title II)....
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(38).
6. The SECRETARY has interpreted "any income of or available for such parent, brother, or sister ... (notwithstanding section 205(j) [42 U.S.C. § 405(j)] in the case of benefits under title II) ...." to include Title II children's benefits to a Title II child beneficiary residing with an AFDC family assistance unit. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(38).
7. The language "for the use and benefit" of a Title II child beneficiary whose benefits are paid to an adult representative payee, which appears in both 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(j) and 408(e), has been interpreted by the SECRETARY.
8. The SECRETARY's interpretation of "for the use and benefit" of the Title II child beneficiary is set forth in the Affidavit of Jack Gallagher, Director of the Litigation Staff, Office of Regulations in the *29 Office of Policy, Social Security Administration, Department of Health and Human Services ("GALLAGHER AFFIDAVIT"). According to this affidavit, the SECRETARY considered prior to and after the DRA, that the use of Title II children's benefits to provide support and maintenance for both the beneficiary and the AFDC family assistance unit of which the beneficiary is a member, to be "for the use and benefit" of the beneficiary as set forth in section 208(e) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 408(e).
9. On September 10, 1984, the Secretary published interim final regulations, 42 Fed. Reg. 35586 (1984), implementing the DRA changes, effective October 1, 1984. The regulations require that all income and resources of the individuals required to be included in the assistance unit must be considered in determining eligibility and payment for the assistance unit. See, 49 Fed.Reg. 35588. The SECRETARY states that:
[T]he statute specifically provides for the inclusion of title II benefits, notwithstanding section 205(j). When title II benefits are paid to a representative payee on behalf of a member of the assistance unit and the payee lives in the same household as the assistance unit, the title II benefits must be counted as income. When the representative payee does not live in the household, the title II benefits are included only to the extent that the payee makes them available for the support of the beneficiary. Conforming changes in the title II regulations will be published shortly.
49 Fed.Reg. 35588-89.
10. The regulations defining the family filing unit provide:
For AFDC only, in order for the family to be eligible, an application with respect to a dependent child must also include, if living in the same household and otherwise eligible for assistance:
(A) Any natural or adoptive parent, or stepparent (in the case of States with laws of general applicability); and
(B) Any blood-related or adoptive brother or sister.
49 Fed.Reg. 35599 (Sept. 10, 1984), codified at 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(1)(vii).
11. Any conclusion of law deemed to be a finding of fact is hereby incorporated into these Findings of Fact.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. This Court has jurisdiction herein.
2. Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification is granted and, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the matter is certified as a class action.
3. Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction is denied because the Court rejects the legal arguments set forth by plaintiffs. See, Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Com'm v. Nat. Football League, 634 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.1980); Sports Form, Inc. v. United Press Intern., Inc., 686 F.2d 750, 753 (9th Cir.1982); Miss Universe, Inc. v. Flesher, 605 F.2d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir.1979); Benda v. Grand Lodge of Intern. Ass'n., 584 F.2d 308, 315 (9th Cir.1978).
4. Under the Secretary's interpretation of "for the use and benefit of" in 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(j) and 408(e), the Title II children's benefits paid to a representative payee are available to provide support and maintenance for both the Title II beneficiary and the AFDC Assistance Unit when the Title II children reside with parents or siblings who receive AFDC. See 42 U.S.C. § 408(e); GALLAGHER AFFIDAVIT; and Exhibit 1, attached hereto.
5. The construction of a statute by the agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to substantial deference, and the agency's interpretation will be deferred to if it is reasonable and consistent with the underlying congressional purpose. See Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 588, 102 S.Ct. 2597, 2609, 73 L.Ed.2d 227 (1982); Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 141-42, 102 S.Ct. 2355, 2361, 72 L.Ed.2d 728 (1982). There is nothing in the legislative history to indicate that the Secretary could not interpret "for the use and benefit" of the Title II child beneficiary to include Title II *30 payments made to provide for the support and maintenance of both the beneficiary and the AFDC family unit with which the child resides. Because the Secretary's interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(38), in light of her interpretation of "for the use and benefit" in 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(j) and 408(e), is reasonable and consistent with the DRA, the Title II children's benefit program, and the AFDC program, substantial deference must be given. Her regulations are consistent with her interpretation of the statutes.
6. Plaintiffs' oral motion for an injunction pending appeal is denied without prejudice because the Court is informed that the parties will make efforts to have the matter expedited on appeal.
7. Any finding of fact deemed to be a conclusion of law is hereby incorporated in these Conclusions of Law.


                                    UNPUBLISHED

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                      No. 18-4593

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                    Plaintiff - Appellee,

             v.

MELVIN KEITH BRYANT,

                    Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge. (2:17-cr-00432-DCN-1)

Submitted: January 17, 2019                                       Decided: January 22, 2019

Before WILKINSON and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit
Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Charles W. Cochran, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL
PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. Emily Evans
Limehouse, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South
Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

       Melvin Keith Bryant appeals the 120-month sentence imposed after he pled guilty

pursuant to a plea agreement to aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (2012) and 18

U.S.C. § 2 (2012). Counsel has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386

U.S. 738 (1967), indicating that he has found no meritorious issues for appeal. Counsel

nonetheless discusses whether the district court erred when it refused to depart below the

statutory mandatory minimum sentence applicable to Bryant’s conviction. Bryant has not

filed a pro se supplemental brief, and the Government declined to file a response brief.

Finding no error, we affirm.

       We review Bryant’s sentence for reasonableness, applying an abuse of discretion

standard, see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007), and review unpreserved, non-

structural sentencing errors for plain error, see United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575-

76 (4th Cir. 2010).    This review requires consideration of both the procedural and

substantive reasonableness of the sentence. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Thus, we must first

assess whether the district court properly calculated the advisory Sentencing Guidelines

range, considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012), analyzed any

arguments presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. See

Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-51; Lynn, 592 F.3d at 575-76. If no procedural error is found, we

may then review the sentence for substantive reasonableness, “examin[ing] the totality of

the circumstances[.]” United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir.

2010). “Any sentence that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is

                                            2
presumptively reasonable[,]” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.

2014), and “[t]hat presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is

unreasonable when measured against the . . . § 3553(a) factors[,]” United States v.

Vinson, 852 F.3d 333, 357-58 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). We

conclude that the district court’s imposition of the statutory mandatory minimum

sentence is presumptively reasonable and discern no basis to question the substantive

reasonableness of Bryant’s sentence.

      In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in this case and have

found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.

This court requires that counsel inform Bryant, in writing, of the right to petition the

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Bryant requests that a petition

be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may

move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must

state that a copy thereof was served on Bryant. We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court

and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                              AFFIRMED

                                            3


728 S.W.2d 497 (1987)
292 Ark. 116
Haskell Wayne SNELGROVE, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.
No. CR 86-224.
Supreme Court of Arkansas.
May 4, 1987.
*498 Pruitt & Hodnett by Roger T. Jeremiah, Fort Smith, for appellant.
Steve Clark, Atty. Gen. by Clint Miller, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.
DUDLEY, Justice.
Appellant, Haskell Wayne Snelgrove, was originally charged with capital murder. The information alleged that he caused the deaths of his mother and his wife in the course of the same criminal episode. As a result of plea bargaining, the capital charge was reduced to two counts of first degree murder. He entered pleas of nolo contendere and was sentenced to life imprisonment in each case. In a post-conviction proceeding, he now collaterally attacks both convictions pursuant to A.R.Cr.P. Rule 37. We affirm the trial court's denial of relief.
Appellant contends the trial court erred in accepting his pleas of nolo contendere because there was no recitation of the allegations which formed the basis for the pleas and because the court did not require him to state personally that there was a factual basis for the pleas.
A.R.Cr.P. Rule 24.6 provides:
RULE 24.6. Determining Accuracy of Plea.

The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without making such inquiry as will establish that there is a factual basis for the plea.
(Emphasis added.)
Compliance with Rule 24 is mandatory, but substantial compliance will suffice. McDaniel v. State, 288 Ark. 629, 708 S.W.2d 613 (1986). Further, if the factual basis is not sufficiently determined during the plea proceedings, it may be established at the Rule 37 post-conviction hearing. Davis v. State, 267 Ark. 507, 592 S.W.2d 118 (1980). Appellant is correct in stating that the following colloquy, which took place at the time of the pleas, did not establish a factual basis for his plea:
THE COURT: Is there a factual basis for the pleas, Mr. Marquette?
MR. MARQUETTE [APPELLANT'S ATTORNEY]: Yes, Sir.
THE COURT: Mr. Fields?
MR. FIELDS [PROSECUTING ATTORNEY]: Yes, Sir.
However, the deficiencies in establishing a factual basis were supplied in other responses and at the post-conviction hearing.
*499 At the post-conviction hearing, appellant admitted that before he entered his pleas of nolo contendere, he attended an evidence suppression hearing and there heard the trial court rule on the admissibility of the following evidence:
(1) The testimony of a minister to whom appellant had confessed that he was a beast-man who ate raw flesh and drank blood, and that demons and devils had told him to kill his mother and his wife;
(2) A letter written by his mother which expressed fear of appellant;
(3) Evidence which showed the victims were stabbed to death;
(4) A pocket knife, which was found in appellant's possession, had human blood on it, and the size of the blade was consistent with the width and depth of the stab wounds in the victims;
(5) A medical report which established that semen, which could have been appellant's, was found in his mother; and
(6) Evidence about prior convictions for rape which involved two women, one of whom was made to lie in a bathtub filled with gasoline, while appellant forced the other to have sexual intercourse by threatening to throw a lighted match into the gasoline.
The trial judge reserved ruling on the mother's letter and the prior rape convictions, but refused to suppress the other evidence. Obviously, in allowing the appellant to enter the pleas, the trial court was aware of these facts, as was appellant. The attorneys who represented appellant testified at the Rule 37 hearing that they explained the nature of the crimes to appellant, discussed all of the evidence with him, gave him a scenario of how they thought the trial would proceed, and discussed the possible sentences.
At the plea hearing the trial court determined that:
(1) Appellant knew the nature of the charges;
(2) Appellant knew the possible sentences;
(3) Appellant understood his nolo contendere pleas;
(4) Appellant's attorneys had explained the plea statement to him four times;
(5) Appellant understood he was giving up his right to appeal, to be tried by a jury, to cross-examine witnesses and to testify;
(6) Appellant understood he was to receive two life sentences, and;
(7) Appellant was not coerced into making the pleas.
Standard 14-1.6 of the American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice defines the requirement of a factual basis as follows: "The requirement of a factual basis refers to the presence of sufficient evidence, adduced at the taking of a guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere, upon which a judge may fairly conclude that a defendant could be convicted if the defendant elected to stand trial."
The record from the plea hearing and the post-conviction hearing establish that there was a factual basis for the pleas and there was sufficient evidence from which the trial court could conclude that appellant would be found guilty if he elected to proceed to trial.
Next, appellant argues that he did not personally answer the court's inquiry about whether there was a factual basis for the pleas, but instead his attorney answered and, therefore, this case should be reversed. He cites McDaniel v. State, 288 Ark. 629, 708 S.W.2d 613 (1986), as authority for his argument. McDaniel holds that, in a plea of guilty, the trial court shall ask the accused personally if he committed the act with which he is charged and whether he is pleading guilty because he is guilty. We do not consider the issue in this case because it was not raised in the petition for post-conviction relief. Rule 37.2(b) and (e) provide that, in order to be considered, an issue must be raised in the original or amended petition, and an issue is waived if it is not raised in the petition. We have long upheld this provision. Wiser v. State, 256 Ark. 921, 511 S.W.2d 178 (1974). Even though we do not consider the issue as it applies to this appellant, it is a subject of first impression, and one on which we have never given the trial courts any direction. *500 We take this opportunity to notify the trial bench that, from this time forward, the McDaniel rationale will be applicable to pleas of nolo contendere. Contrary to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, our Rules of Criminal Procedure require a factual basis for the nolo contendere plea as well as the plea of guilty. Since the sentencing power of the court is not reduced upon the entry of the nolo plea, it is equally important to make certain that the accused actually be guilty of the offense to which the nolo plea is offered. While the insistence upon a factual basis may make the nolo plea less attractive because a disclosure of the accused's misdeeds will be made public, this is a reasonable price to pay for the assurance that the accused is not innocent of the charge for some reason. Further, it will eliminate difficulty at post-conviction proceedings in determining the accuracy of the plea, and it will be useful to the trial court in determining the sentence. The form of the personal question can be concise. After the prosecutor makes a proffer of the facts which he would prove, the judge can ask the accused: "Are these the facts which you do not contest?"
Appellant next argues that he did not understand the sentence he was to receive and, therefore, his plea was not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered. The argument is without merit.
A.R.Cr.P. Rule 24.5 provides:
The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first determining that the plea is voluntary. The court shall determine whether the tendered plea is the result of a plea agreement. If it is, the court shall require that the agreement be stated. The court shall also address the defendant personally and determine whether any force or threats, or any promises apart from a plea agreement, were used to induce the plea.
The following colloquy took place at the plea proceedings:
THE COURT: Is this plea of nolo contendere based upon a plea agreement, do you know what you are to receive here, today?
MARQUETTE [APPELLANT'S ATTORNEY]: The judge wants to know if there has been some type of agreement between the prosecuting attorney's office and us?
APPELLANT: Yes, Sir.
THE COURT: What is that agreement, what are you supposed to receive?
APPELLANT: A sentence of a life sentence.
THE COURT: Two of them?
APPELLANT: One that I know of.
FIELDS [PROSECUTING ATTORNEY]: Two together, right? There will be two as one.
MARQUETTE [APPELLANT'S ATTORNEY]: There will be two sentences, they will run concurrently or at the same time; they will not be consecutive, one after the other, they will run at the same time.
THE COURT: Now, do you understand what you're supposed to receive?
APPELLANT: Yes, Sir.
THE COURT: And what is it?
APPELLANT: Life sentence.
THE COURT: How many?
APPELLANT: It could go two.
THE COURT: Two?
APPELLANT: Two?
THE COURT: I need it to be a little more definite.
APPELLANT: Two life sentences.
THE COURT: Do you understand that the Court doesn't have to go along with that agreement if it doesn't want to?
APPELLANT: Yes, Sir, I understand.
THE COURT: Was any force, threats, promises, coercion of any kind used against you to get you to enter these pleas?
APPELLANT: No, Sir, there wasn't.
As is readily seen, the appellant apparently did not initially understand the intricacies of how the agreement would result in him serving the equivalent of one life sentence by allowing him to serve two sentences concurrently. It is clear, however, that the trial court took pains to make *501 certain that, before the plea proceedings went further, appellant not only understood the terms of the agreement, but that he also understood that the court was not bound by the agreement. Further, the court did order that the two life sentences run concurrently. Appellant admits that he has not suffered any hardship by serving two life sentences concurrently, as opposed to one. He argues, however, that his initial misunderstanding of the terms was so obvious that the plea became involuntary and should have been rejected. He cites no cases in support of his argument, and we have found none. The requirements of A.R.Cr.P. Rule 24.5 were met.
Appellant's final contention is that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because he was given inaccurate parole information. Appellant testified at the Rule 37 hearing that his two attorneys left him with the impression that he would be paroled in two and one-half to three years. The attorneys, however, testified that they never told appellant that he would be paroled after a certain number of years. One of the attorneys explained: "We never specifically told him when he will be able to get out on parole. I think we told him that if his sentence were reduced to a number of years, there's a possibility that he would be eligible for parole in approximately eight to nine years."
The trial court is in the best position to resolve any conflicts in testimony. As we stated in Huff v. State, 289 Ark. 404, 711 S.W.2d 801 (1986):
Here, the trial court was basically presented with a swearing match: appellant claimed his attorney erroneously advised him that he would be paroled within 4 or 5 years and, based on that, he entered his guilty plea. The attorney claimed [otherwise]. The trial court evidently believed the attorney. Conflicts in testimony are for the trial judge to resolve, and he is not required to believe any witness's testimony, especially the testimony of the accused since he has the most interest in the outcome of the proceedings.... We cannot say his findings are against a preponderance of the evidence.
Affirmed.
HICKMAN, J., concurs.


542 So.2d 592 (1989)
STATE of Louisiana
v.
Michael PETERS.
No. 88 KA 1094.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
April 11, 1989.
Ralph Tureau, Gonzales, for plaintiff/appellee State of La.
Richard Chaffin, Baton Rouge, for defendant/appellant Michael Peters.
Before CARTER, LANIER and LeBLANC, JJ.
*593 CARTER, Judge.
The defendant, Michael Peters, was charged in two separate bills of information with simple burglary, in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:62. Initially, he pled not guilty and filed a motion to suppress oral statements and physical evidence. The motion to suppress was filed on behalf of the defendant and his brother, Jerry Peters, who had also been charged with these same burglaries. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress statements and physical evidence as to both Michael and Jerry Peters. Subsequently, Michael Peters entered guilty pleas to both simple burglaries pursuant to State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La.1976), thereby reserving his right to appeal the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. In exchange for these two guilty pleas, the State agreed that it would not institute criminal proceedings against the defendant for his involvement in a simple burglary in Ascension Parish. It was further agreed that the defendant would receive two concurrent sentences of four years at hard labor for these convictions and that these sentences would also run concurrently with any sentences imposed as a result of convictions in East Baton Rouge Parish. Thereafter, Michael Peters was sentenced in accordance with the plea bargain. Michael Peters has appealed,[1] alleging two assignments of error, as follows:
1. The trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress oral statements.
2. The trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence.
Shortly after midnight on October 22, 1986, Jerry and Michael Peters were arrested at a police roadblock near the intersection of Airline Highway and Sherwood Forest Boulevard in Baton Rouge. They had just burglarized a company in Ascension Parish and were proceeding to Baton Rouge in Michael's truck. Their actions were being monitored by an electronic tracking device which the authorities had installed in Michael's truck approximately seven days earlier. Although the suspects were apparently unarmed, the authorities fired at the truck numerous times before the suspects were arrested. Michael Peters was wounded in the back of the head and in the hand and was taken to a local hospital. Jerry Peters was not wounded.
Later that morning, Jerry Peters confessed to his and Michael's involvement in numerous burglaries in East Baton Rouge and Ascension Parishes. Approximately two days later, Michael was released from the hospital and was questioned by the authorities in East Baton Rouge Parish. After conferring with Jerry about alleged "deals" which had been made in exchange for their cooperation, Michael also made inculpatory statements. Several days later, Michael and Jerry Peters were transported to Ascension Parish and were questioned by the Gonzales Police and the Ascension Parish Sheriff's Department about various burglaries in Ascension Parish. Jerry Peters again advised Michael that he had made a deal with the authorities and that Michael should cooperate. Both Jerry and Michael Peters confessed to some of the Ascension Parish burglaries and aided the authorities in recovering an expensive rifle taken in one of the burglaries.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBERS ONE AND TWO:
In these assignments of error, the defendant, Michael Peters, contends that the trial court erred in denying the instant motion to suppress confessions and physical evidence. Jerry and Michael Peters filed a joint motion to suppress confessions and physical evidence in Ascension Parish. The hearing on this motion was held on August 18, 1987. The trial court denied the motion with respect to both Jerry and Michael Peters.
While Michael was in the hospital, Jerry Peters confessed to numerous East Baton Rouge and Ascension Parish burglaries. Subsequently, a joint motion to suppress *594 statements and physical evidence was filed by Jerry and Michael Peters in East Baton Rouge Parish. After several hearings, the trial court denied the motion. Because inculpatory statements were allegedly made by both Jerry and Michael Peters in East Baton Rouge and Ascension Parishes, the transcripts of the East Baton Rouge Parish motion to suppress hearings were introduced into evidence at the instant (Ascension Parish) motion to suppress hearing.
In order for a confession to be admissible into evidence, it must be affirmatively shown that it was free and voluntary and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements, or promises. LSA-R.S. 15:451. Confessions obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, or by the exertion of any improper influence are involuntary and inadmissible as a matter of constitutional law. The State has the burden of affirmatively proving the confession was free and voluntary. Therefore, if the defendant alleges police misconduct in eliciting a confession, it is incumbent upon the State to rebut these allegations specifically. State v. Welch, 448 So. 2d 705 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984), writ denied, 450 So.2d 952 (La.1984).
The admissibility of a confession is in the first instance a question for the trial court. Its conclusions on the credibility and weight of testimony relating to the voluntariness of the confession for the purpose of admissibility will not be overturned on appeal unless they are not supported by the evidence. State v. Horton, 479 So.2d 528 (La.App. 1st Cir.1985), writ denied, 493 So.2d 1215 (La.1986).
At the instant motion to suppress hearing, Michael Peters denied making any incriminating statements, either in East Baton Rouge Parish or Ascension Parish. Instead, he explained: "Whatever Jerry told me I went along with that...." He also explained that he had amnesia as a result of the gunshot wound to his head and did not remember anything about the Ascension Parish burglaries. It was agreed by all of the law enforcement officers who testified, as well as Jerry Peters, that Jerry did most of the talking and Michael followed Jerry's lead. However, both East Baton Rouge Parish and Ascension Parish law enforcement officers testified that the defendant did make incriminating statements about the burglaries. Furthermore, Jerry and Michael Peters also accompanied Ascension Parish law enforcement officers to a wooded area where a rifle which had been taken in the burglary of Philippe's Automotive, Incorporated, was recovered.
At both the East Baton Rouge Parish and Ascension Parish motion to suppress hearings, Jerry Peters testified that he "struck a deal" about "federal time" with Captain Bud Connors of the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Department. On the night of his arrest, after learning from the hospital that Michael was not severely wounded, Jerry Peters began to express concern for his safety if incarcerated in Angola. He was also concerned for Michael's safety and wanted to include him in any deal involving "federal time." Jerry Peters had been an informant for the F.B.I., the Louisiana State Police, and the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Department. He was convinced that he would have to be offered federal protection or be placed in a federal penitentiary in order to survive. He testified that, in exchange for his cooperation in confessing to the East Baton Rouge Parish and Ascension Parish burglaries and aiding in the recovery of property taken during those burglaries, Captain Connors promised him federal protection or at least placement in a federal penitentiary rather than Angola. Jerry Peters testified that this deal with Captain Connors included Michael. Jerry Peters also testified that he explained to the Ascension Parish authorities the deal which he had made with Captain Connors and that he subsequently made a deal with the Ascension Parish authorities that any sentences imposed as a result of Ascension Parish convictions would be imposed concurrently to any sentences imposed for East Baton Rouge Parish convictions.
Captain Connors testified at both the East Baton Rouge Parish and Ascension Parish motion to suppress hearings. Captain *595 Connors agreed with Jerry Peters' observation that, because he had been an informant, he probably would not live very long if incarcerated in Angola. Yet, Captain Connors testified that, although Jerry Peters insisted on a deal after his arrest, he did not enter into such a deal with him. Captain Connors testified that he informed Jerry Peters that he could not make such a promise and that a person of Jerry's experience should know that he could not do so. Captain Connors specifically testified that, on several occasions before Jerry confessed, he stated that he could not make any promises and that only the federal authorities could make a deal involving federal protection and/or incarceration in a federal penitentiary. However, Captain Connors did testify that, in exchange for Jerry's cooperation in confessing to the burglaries and assisting in the recovery of stolen property, he told Jerry that he would speak to the F.B.I. and the assistant U.S. Attorney on behalf of Jerry and Michael and explain to them Jerry's past cooperation as an informer.
There is no doubt that Jerry and Michael Peters cooperated with the authorities in both East Baton Rouge Parish and Ascension Parish by confessing to numerous burglaries and disclosing the whereabouts of stolen property. The only question is whether or not Jerry was induced to cooperate by guarantees of federal protection or "federal time" from Captain Connors in East Baton Rouge Parish and/or promised concurrent sentences from the Ascension Parish authorities. In his brief to this Court, the defendant complains that his incriminating statements made during questioning should be suppressed because of the above inducements and/or promises made to Jerry, which Jerry subsequently communicated to him.
Both motions to suppress filed in East Baton Rouge Parish and Ascension Parish were denied with respect to Jerry Peters. In any event, even if Jerry Peters' confessions had been rendered inadmissible because of such promises or inducements, the defendant has no standing to assert such a position in this case. A person adversely affected by a confession unlawfully obtained from another has no standing to raise its illegality in court. See State v. Burdgess, 434 So.2d 1062 (La. 1983).
The defendant also contends in brief that the alleged promises made to Jerry Peters (in both East Baton Rouge Parish and Ascension Parish) were subsequently verified by law enforcement officers in the defendant's presence. As noted above, however, Captain Connors denied making any deals with Jerry Peters or Michael Peters in his testimony at both the East Baton Rouge Parish and Ascension Parish motion to suppress hearings. Furthermore, Sgt. Bill Landry of the Gonzales Police Department and Chief Deputy Murphy Painter of the Ascension Parish Sheriff's Department both testified at the Ascension Parish motion to suppress hearing that they made no promises to Jerry or Michael Peters in exchange for their cooperation. Chief Deputy Painter stated that, after Jerry and Michael Peters had confessed to the burglaries in Ascension Parish, Jerry related that he had made a deal with the authorities in East Baton Rouge Parish. He asked about the possibility of concurrent sentences in Ascension Parish, and Chief Deputy Painter replied that he could not make such a promise but would speak to the District Attorney's Office and inform them that the Peters had cooperated by confessing to the burglaries and helping to recover stolen property. This testimony indicates that the possibility of concurrent sentences and discussions on this basis with the District Attorney's Office would not have been an inducement for Jerry and/or Michael Peters to confess in Ascension Parish because the subject did not arise until after they had confessed to the burglaries. Moreover, even if there was a statement made by the law enforcement officers prior to the confessions that they would relate to the District Attorney's Office the fact that the Peters had cooperated, such a statement is not a sufficient inducement to render a subsequent confession inadmissible. State v. Jackson, 414 So.2d 310 (La.1982); State v. Dison, 396 So.2d 1254 (La.1981).
At both the East Baton Rouge Parish and Ascension Parish motion to suppress *596 hearings, all of the allegations made by Jerry and Michael Peters about promises of federal protection, federal time, and concurrent sentences were specifically rebutted by the law enforcement officers who testified. In the instant case, the trial court observed the appearance and demeanor of the witnesses, and his ruling reflects that he accepted as credible the testimony of the law enforcement officers and rejected as unworthy of belief the testimony of Jerry and Michael Peters. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the instant motion to suppress inculpatory statements and physical evidence.[2]
For the above reasons, these assignments of error are meritless.
Accordingly, defendant's convictions and sentences are affirmed.
CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.
NOTES
[1]  The instant record does not indicate whether or not Jerry Peters was convicted of these offenses.
[2]  On March 10, 1988, eight months after its ruling denying the East Baton Rouge Parish motion to suppress and seven months after the instant ruling denying the Ascension Parish motion to suppress, the East Baton Rouge Parish trial court reversed its ruling on the motion to suppress with respect to Michael Peters only. The trial court indicated that it had erred in denying the motion to suppress as to Michael Peters because the State had failed to prove that Michael Peters had made any statements freely and voluntarily. In fact, there was no evidence at the hearing about statements made in East Baton Rouge Parish by Michael Peters. Almost all of the testimony at the East Baton Rouge Parish motion to suppress hearings related to Jerry Peters. The prosecutor explained that, at the time, he was not informed that Michael Peters had made incriminating statements in East Baton Rouge Parish and, for this reason, he did not present evidence about such statements at the motion to suppress hearings. Nevertheless, in the Ascension Parish motion to suppress hearing, as noted above, there was specific testimony from the law enforcement officers that Michael Peters had made incriminating statements and that he had not been promised anything or induced in any manner. Therefore, this new ruling granting the East Baton Rouge Parish motion to suppress with respect to Michael Peters has no effect on the instant case.


366 S.W.3d 199 (2012)
Ex parte William Elmer HASTINGS, Applicant.
Nos. AP-76749, AP-76750.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
May 16, 2012.
*200 Pro se, for Appellant.
Christine Womble, Asst. D.A., Dallas, Lisa C. McMinn, State's Attorney, Austin, for State.

OPINION
PER CURIAM.
These cases deal with whether an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed under Article 11.07 is timely when the applicant files it on the same day that a court of appeals issues its mandate in the applicant's direct appeal. We hold that, absent contrary evidence, a mandate is presumed to issue at 9:00 a.m. on the day the court of appeals issues it, thereby making any writ application filed later in the day timely.
On February 19, 2010, applicant entered a plea of nolo contendere to two indictments alleging aggravated sexual assault of a child under fourteen years of age. The trial judge sentenced him to fifteen years in prison on each conviction. The Fifth Court of Appeals upheld his convictions in an unpublished opinion on April 7, 2011.[1] This Court denied applicant's petitions for discretionary review on October 12, 2011. The Court of Appeals issued its mandate on January 10, 2012. Applicant filed his writ applications with the convicting court on that same day at 12:38 p.m. The State filed its response to the applications, addressing the merits of applicant's claims, on January 25, 2012. But, on February 8, 2012, the habeas judge signed an order stating that it did not have jurisdiction to address the merits of applicant's claims, asserting that applicant "did not file his application[s] after the mandate from the court of appeals issued." Finding that applicant filed his applications too soon, the trial judge sent the applications and all associated documents to this Court without addressing the merits of applicant's claim.
The convicting court does not have jurisdiction to consider a post-conviction application for a writ of habeas corpus under Article 11.07[2] until after the court of appeals issues the mandate in the underlying direct appeal. Ex parte Johnson, 12 S.W.3d 472, 473 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) ("Prior to the mandate, a judgment is not final."). In this case, the mandate issued on the same day the applications were filed, but the record fails to show which event occurred first.[3]
This is a common situation that requires a uniform rule to provide guidance to the bench, bar, and prospective habeas applicants and to reduce unnecessary and duplicative filings, which waste scarce judicial time and resources without apparent benefit.[4]
*201 We therefore hold that, absent evidence to the contrary, a direct-appeal mandate is presumed to have issued at 9:00 a.m. on the date it issues. This presumption may be rebutted with evidence that the mandate actually issued later in the day and after the writ application was filed in the convicting court. A district court will therefore have jurisdiction over a writ application filed after 9:00 a.m. on the day the mandate issues in the underlying direct appeal unless evidence to the contrary appears in the habeas record.
Applying this presumption in these cases, we conclude that the convicting court did have jurisdiction to address the merits of applicant's claims. We remand these cases so that the judge of the convicting court may address the merits of applicant's claims.
KELLER, P.J., not participating.
NOTES
[1]  Hastings v. State, No. 05-10-00264-CR & No. 05-10-00265-CR, 2011 WL 1317042 (Tex.App.-Dallas April 7, 2011 pet. denied) (not designated for publication).
[2]  TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07, § 3(a) ("After final conviction in any felony case, the writ must be made returnable to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas at Austin, Texas").
[3]  The applications were time-stamped at 12:38 p.m., but there is no copy of the mandate in the habeas corpus record. Thus we do not know the precise time that it was issued.
[4]  An application that is filed before the mandate issues requires the State to respond, the convicting court to make a determination of timeliness, and transmittal of all papers to this Court to make a final determination of jurisdiction. If this Court dismisses the original application for want of jurisdiction, the applicant simply begins all over again, refiling another application and starting the process anew.