925 So.2d 12 (2005)
James BERRYHILL
v.
ENTERGY NEW ORLEANS INC., a/k/a Entergy Corp., a/k/a Entergy Co., a/k/a Entergy Inc., Allstate Ins., Irvin Lewis, Jean Lewis, Hazel Berryhill, and XYZ Manufacturer and ABC Insurance Co.
No. 2005-CA-0005.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
August 3, 2005.
Writ Denied February 10, 2006.
*13 Tamara Kluger Jacobson, and Robert G. Harvey, Sr., Jonathan M. Walsh, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
Carter B. Wright, Eugene G. Taggart, John J. Zvonek, Taggart, Morton, Ogden, Staub, Rougelot, & O'Brien, L.L.C., New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellee, Entergy New Orleans, Inc.
*14 Kris P. Kiefer, Kiefer & Kiefer, Metairie, LA, for Alvin Lewis, Jean Lewis and Hazel Berryhill.
Christopher E. Lozes, Lozes & Ponder, Mandeville, LA, for Allstate Insurance Company.
(Court composed of Chief Judge JOAN BERNARD ARMSTRONG, Judge CHARLES R. JONES, and Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS SR.).
CHARLES R. JONES, Judge.
The Appellant, James Berryhill, appeals an adverse district court judgment, which determined that he was a resident of his mother's house, thus barring his recovery under a homeowner's policy. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court's judgments dismissing the claims of James Berryhill against all defendants.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This suit arises out of physical injuries sustained as a result of a gas explosion. On December 2, 2000, the Appellant James Berryhill suffered injuries from an explosion after he attempted to light a space heater at the home of his mother, Hazel Berryhill, at 1033 Alvar Street in New Orleans. At the time, he lived with his girlfriend, Carol Wharton, at 2507 Piety Street. He went to his mother's house to bathe because the hot water heater was not working at their home on Piety Street.
Mr. Berryhill filed suit on November 9, 2001, against Entergy; Allstate Insurance Company (hereinafter, "Allstate"), as the issuer of the homeowner's insurance policy; and Irvin Lewis, Jean Lewis, and Hazel Berryhill, as co-owners of the residence on 1033 Alvar Street.
On October 10, 2002, Allstate filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, alleging that Mr. Berryhill could not make a claim against the policy because he was insured as a resident under the policy. A provision in Ms. Berryhill's homeowner's policy excludes bodily injury claims against Allstate from those who are "residents" of the home. Mr. Berryhill argued that he was not a resident of his mother's home at the time of the incident; therefore, he should be subject to coverage under the policy. The Motion was denied.
On June 15, 2004, Mr. Berryhill and Allstate agreed, with the consent of the trial court, to bifurcate the trial of this matter and presented testimony and evidence solely regarding whether Mr. Berryhill was a resident at 1033 Alvar Street at the time of the incident. The district court found on October 29, 2004, that, for the purposes of the homeowner's policy, Mr. Berryhill maintained dual residency on the date of the subject accident, one of which was 1033 Alvar Street. The court also ruled that the policy provision, which precludes coverage for insureds' bodily injuries, applied to this incident.
On June 16, 2004, Entergy filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, alleging that they were not negligent in providing gas service on the day of the incident. At the time of the incident, Entergy New Orleans, Inc. (hereinafter, "Entergy") provided natural gas to the residence at 1033 Alvar Street. Entergy's records show that the only report of an underground gas leak within that block of Alvar Street had been repaired approximately one year prior to December 2, 2000. Entergy was not aware of a gas leak near the residence at the time of the explosion and was not called to the scene of the explosion. Moreover, the Appellant's expert testified that he did not find any evidence of a gas leak. The district court granted Entergy's Motion for Summary Judgment on November 15, 2004.

*15 DISCUSSION
Mr. Berryhill argues two assignments of error in this appeal: 1) the district court erred in ruling that he was a resident of 1033 Alvar Street and as such, precluded him his recovery from the Allstate Homeowner's policy; and 2) the district court erred in granting the Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of Entergy New Orleans, dismissing his claims against it. For the following reasons, we affirm both judgments of the district court, which dismissed Mr. Berryhill's claims against all defendants.
Regarding the Appellant's first assignment of error, we must review the district court's finding for manifest error on the issue of whether Mr. Berryhill was a resident of his mother's house.
It is well settled that a court of appeal may not set aside a district court's or jury's finding of fact unless it is manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong; and, where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable. Rosell v. ESCO, et al., 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La.1989), citing Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330, 1333 (La.1978).
The phrase "resident of the same household," as used in insurance policies, has no precise meaning. Palermo v. Audubon Ins. Co., 96-887 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/97), 689 So.2d 589, 593. Whether someone is a resident "is to be determined from the facts and circumstances taken together in each particular case." Bearden v. Rucker, 437 So.2d 1116, 1120 (La. 1983), quoting Mathis v. Employers' Fire Insurance Company, 399 So.2d 273, 275 (Ala.1981). Residency is a matter of intention and choice, and not necessarily physical location. Bearden, 437 So.2d at 1122. The intention of a person to be a resident of a particular place is determined by his expressions at times not suspicious, and his testimony, when called on, considered in the light of his conduct and the circumstances of his life. Andrade v. Shiers, 564 So.2d 787 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/20/90). Thus, the issue of being a resident of a household is not solely dependent upon being under the same roof. Tucker v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 599 So.2d 447 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/13/92). Additionally, a person may have more than one residence. Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 248 La. 246, 178 So.2d 238 (1965).
Mr. Berryhill argues that the district court erred in finding that he was a resident of 1033 Alvar Street on December 2, 2000, thus precluding recovery from the Allstate homeowner's policy. We disagree.
It is uncontested that Mr. Berryhill was living with Ms. Wharton at 2507 Piety Street at the time of the incident and that he had been for six months prior to the incident. He slept there, ate there, and kept most of his belongings there. Mr. Berryhill testified that he visited his mother at 1033 Alvar Street often and was visiting on December 2, 2000, to take a hot bath because the hot water heater at his Piety Street address was broken. Allstate agrees that Mr. Berryhill was a resident of 2507 Piety Street, but argues that he maintained dual residency at that address and at his mother's residence. See Taylor, 248 La. 246, at 259, 178 So.2d 238, 243. We agree.
The district court was reasonable in concluding from the evidence that Mr. Berryhill resided at 2507 Piety Street with the intention of remaining a resident at 1033 Alvar Street. He used the Alvar Street address on all of his Medical Center of Louisiana records on the day of the accident; he provided the Alvar Street address *16 on job applications, unemployment compensation forms, and his State Identification Card; he maintained personal belongings at the Alvar Street address; and he received mail at the Alvar Street address. From both Mr. Berryhill's and his mother's testimony, the district court found that he chose to maintain residency at 1033 Alvar Street so that in the event his relationship with Ms. Wharton did not work out, he could move back home. This had been a pattern after his prior relationships ended. Finally, Mr. Berryhill testified that he could get a key to his mother's house at any time and his mother testified that he was welcome to move home at any time. Thus, the district court concluded that Mr. Berryhill had never truly moved out of his mother's home.
Mr. Berryhill relies on Scott v. Glenn in support of his argument that he was not a resident of his mother's house. In Scott, this Court held that major children with clearly established separate permanent residences are not residents of their parents' household. Scott v. Glenn, 408 So.2d 1167 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/30/81). We also found that a woman who had married and moved to Italy was not a resident of her parents' home. Even though she had lived with them prior to her marriage, she was only visiting them temporarily at the time of the incident. The case sub judice is distinguishable because Mr. Berryhill was not married to Ms. Wharton and had not clearly established a separate permanent residence. In fact, he had given his mother's address as his own to the hospital on the very day of the incident. This was a "time not suspicious" because he was probably concerned with his medical treatment, not whether he is a resident of the address for insurance purposes. See Andrade, 564 So.2d at 789.
Based on the record, we find no indication that the district court's judgment was manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Mr. Berryhill was a resident of 1033 Alvar Street on December 2, 2000, thus precluding his recovery from the Allstate homeowner's policy, and we therefore AFFIRM the district court judgment.
Regarding Mr. Berryhill's second assignment of error, we must review de novo the district court's decision to grant the Appellee's, Entergy of New Orleans's, Motion for Summary Judgment.
Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo under the same criteria that govern the district court's consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Independent Fire Insurance Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 99-2181, 99-2257 (La.2/29/00), 755 So.2d 226; Schroeder v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 591 So.2d 342, 345 (La.1991). Summary judgment is favored in Louisiana law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2). A summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, scrutinized equally, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art 966(B).
The burden of proof remains with the mover. Board of Assessors of the City of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, XXXX-XXXX, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/25/02), 829 So.2d 501, 506. If the moving party fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact. La. C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2). A fact is material if it is essential to the plaintiff's cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery and if, without the establishment of the fact by a preponderance of the evidence, plaintiff could not prevail. Generally, material facts are those that potentially insure or preclude recovery, affect the litigant's ultimate success, or *17 determine the outcome of a legal dispute. Prado v. Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts, A.G., 611 So.2d 691, 699 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/15/92).
In his second assignment of error, Mr. Berryhill argues that the district court erred in granting the Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of Entergy New Orleans, dismissing his claims against it.
Specifically, Mr. Berryhill finds error in an affidavit by Entergy's Director of Gas Operations, Perry Dufrene, which supported Entergy's Motion for Summary Judgment. Mr. Berryhill claims that the affidavit states, "where the accident occurred took place on December 3, 1999 at 1031 Alvar Street," and argues that it is factually wrong because the incident took place on December 2, 2000 at 1033 Alvar Street. This is neither a clerical error nor an issue of negligence on Entergy's part; it is a misreading of the affidavit by the Appellant. Read as a whole sentence, the affidavit states:
"ENOI's gas department records show that the only report of an underground leak on ENOI's gas utility facilities within the block of Alvar St. where the accident occurred took place on December 3, 1999 at 1031 Alvar St. The leak was fully repaired by December 7, 1999."
Ultimately, Mr. Dufrene testified that Entergy had no record of a gas leak at 1033 Alvar Street on December 3, 2000.
Mr. Berryhill also finds summary judgment for Entergy inappropriate because Jean Lewis, Mr. Berryhill's sister who lived in the house adjoining 1033 Alvar, testified that there was a "leak in the middle of the street right in front of her door and they [dug]." Ms. Lewis did not know when this repair took place. Also, Ms. Berryhill testified that "the block was smelling full of gas." However, Entergy has no record of repairing a leak near 1033 Alvar Street except for one that had been repaired on December 7, 1999, a year prior to the incident. More importantly, the Appellant's expert found no evidence of a gas leak or accumulation of gas underneath the house, thus negating Entergy's alleged negligence. The statements by Ms. Lewis and Ms. Berryhill are not conflicting as to the date of the repair. Therefore, they do not raise a material issue of fact that would preclude summary judgment.
Therefore, we find that Mr. Berryhill's second assignment of error lacks merit and we affirm the district court's granting of summary judgment.

DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm both judgments of the district court, which dismissed James Berryhill's claims against all defendants.
AFFIRMED.


                                Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 461

                 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                      DIVISION III
                                      No. CV-14-303

                                                 OPINION DELIVERED SEPTEMBER 17, 2014
MELISSA WILHITE
                               APPELLANT         APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN
                                                 COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FORT
                                                 SMITH DISTRICT
V.                                               [NO. JV-2012-367]

                                                 HONORABLE MARK HEWETT,
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF                           JUDGE
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR
CHILDREN                                         AFFIRMED; MOTION TO
                    APPELLEES                    WITHDRAW GRANTED

                         ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Chief Judge

       Appellant Melissa Wilhite appeals the January 7, 2014 order of the Sebastian County

Circuit Court terminating her parental rights to her two children, T.W. and M.W., ages four

and three, respectively. Pursuant to Linker-Flores v. Arkansas Department of Human Services,

359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2004), and Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-9(i) (2013),

Wilhite’s counsel has filed a no-merit brief and a motion to withdraw, alleging that there are

no meritorious grounds for appeal. Wilhite was given an opportunity to file pro se points

for reversal but declined to do so. We affirm the termination and grant the motion to

withdraw.

       The Department of Human Services (“DHS”) initiated the case on June 16, 2012,

after DHS was called by the Fort Smith Police Department to the scene of a traffic stop

where appellant was being arrested for an active warrant for failure to pay fines, possession
                                 Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 461

of drug paraphernalia, and other citations related to vehicle-registration and insurance

violations. Her two children were in the vehicle at the time of her arrest and were found

to be dirty, not properly clothed, and in heavily soiled diapers. T.W. also had noticeable

medical issues, which appellant explained as a medical condition for which she could not

afford medical care. Appellant further stated that she did not have any other clothing for the

children, that she was staying at the Salvation Army Shelter, that her husband had been

arrested the previous day by federal agents at the motel where they were staying, and that she

had no money to pay for the motel. As a result, the children were taken into DHS custody.

       The children were adjudicated dependent-neglected due to parental unfitness and

neglect. The court set a goal of reunification and ordered appellant to complete parenting

classes and demonstrate improved parenting; maintain stable, clean and safe housing; maintain

income sufficient to support the children; maintain a reliable means of transportation; resolve

pending criminal charges; submit to a drug-and-alcohol assessment and a psychological

evaluation; submit to random drug screening; and visit with her children on a regular basis.

       The case continued for seventeen months, with little improvement in appellant’s

circumstances. She was homeless, had very little income, and did not complete many aspects

of her case plan. DHS sought termination of appellant’s parental rights through a petition

filed on July 23, 2013, alleging in its petition that termination was in the children’s best

interest, and that appellant was unfit under two grounds: (1) Arkansas Code Annotated

section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a), which allows for termination if, essentially, the children have

remained out of the home in excess of twelve months and the conditions which brought the

children into care had not been corrected despite the offer of meaningful services by DHS,

                                               2
                                 Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 461

and (2) Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(4), which allows for

termination if the parent has previously had parental rights involuntarily terminated to a

sibling of the juveniles.

       The circuit court found that the statutory grounds alleged in the petition had been

proved and that it was in the children’s best interest to terminate parental rights, considering

the likelihood that they would be adopted1 and the potential harm caused by returning them

to Wilhite’s custody. The circuit court granted the petition on January 7, 2014.

       In compliance with Linker-Flores and Rule 6-9(i), Wilhite’s counsel has examined the

record for adverse rulings and has adequately discussed why there is no arguable merit to an

appeal of the decision to terminate Wilhite’s parental rights, noting that there were no other

adverse rulings or evidentiary objections. After carefully examining the record and the

no-merit brief, we hold that Wilhite’s counsel has complied with the requirements for a

no-merit parental-rights-termination appeal and that the appeal is wholly without merit. We

therefore affirm the termination of Wilhite’s parental rights to T.W. and M.W. by

memorandum opinion, In re Memorandum Opinions, 16 Ark. App. 301, 700 S.W.2d 63

(1985), and grant the motion to withdraw.

       Affirmed; motion to withdraw granted.

       WOOD and BROWN , JJ., agree.

       Leah Lanford, Arkansas Public Defender Commission, Dependency-Neglect Appellate
Division, for appellant.
       No response.

       1
         Caseworker Robbie McKay’s testimony that the children were in a prospective
adoptive placement in which the foster parents indicated a desire to adopt them was not
challenged. This court has held such evidence sufficient to support this element of the best-
interest analysis. Brabon v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 2, 388 S.W.3d 69.

                                               3


790 F.2d 85
Bellequev.Teamsters Local 162
84-4150
United States Court of Appeals,Ninth Circuit.
5/8/86

1
D.Or.

AFFIRMED


37 B.R. 380 (1984)
In the Matter of ST. PETERSBURG HOTEL ASSOCIATES, LTD., Debtor.
ST. PETERSBURG HOTEL ASSOCIATES, LTD., Plaintiff,
v.
ROYAL TRUST BANK OF ST. PETERSBURG, Defendant.
Bankruptcy No. 82-1065, Adv. No. 83-718.
United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division.
January 25, 1984.
Howard Batt, Clearwater, Fla., for Royal Trust Bank.
Domenic L. Massari, Tampa, Fla., David L. Schrader, St. Petersburg, Fla., for debtor.
ALEXANDER L. PASKAY, Chief Judge.

ORDER ON COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
THIS IS the next, and hopefully the last, round in the above-captioned adversary proceeding instituted by St. Petersburg Hotel Associates, Ltd. (Associates) by a Complaint which sought injunctive relief against Royal Trust Bank of St. Petersburg (Royal Trust), the Defendant named in the proceeding. Shortly after the commencement of the proceeding, Associates filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction and sought an order prohibiting Royal Trust to proceed in a pending state court action filed by Royal Trust against Darrell Wild and his wife, LouAnn Wild, both of whom are non-debtors, although Mr. Wild is a general partner of Associates.
On November 2, 1983, this Court entered an order and denied the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 36 B.R. 524. In the interim, Associates also filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and a Motion for Rehearing.
On January 3, 1984, this Court entered an order and denied the Motion for Rehearing. *381 However, the order did not act on the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order.
The present matter under consideration is a Motion filed by Associates on January 5, 1984 which sought a final evidentiary hearing on its request for a permanent injunction. On the same date, this Court entered an order and originally scheduled a final evidentiary hearing for January 31, 1984. However, inasmuch as the final evidentiary hearing in the state court proceeding is now scheduled to be held on January 23, 1984, an earlier hearing was requested. The request was granted and the matter was rescheduled for January 17, 1984.
The record as established at the final evidentiary hearing consists of the following matters: the testimony received at both the initial hearing and the second hearing; an order heretofore entered by this Court which authorized Associates to enter into two distinct leases relating to the partial use of the hotel facility owned by Associates; the fact that Associates filed its disclosure statement which is now scheduled to be heard on February 6, 1984; and lastly, testimony received at the valuation hearing. In addition, the Court also heard testimony of Mr. Wild.
It is the contention of Associates that the record as established warrants limited injunctive relief because in the event Mr. Wild is unable to obtain the protection sought, the efforts of Associates will be thwarted and frustrated and Associates will not be able to achieve the rehabilitation it seeks through this Chapter, a prospect which is not only real, but could be achieved in the near future. This contention is based on the proposition advanced by Associates that Associates needs at least $1.2 million or possibly as much as $1.8 million to achieve rehabilitation and unless Mr. Wild and his wife are protected against the entry of an impending judgment against them on their guarantees, Mr. Will will be effectively prevented from obtaining additional investment from the limited partners and he will not be able to refinance some of his holdings located in Wisconsin which will produce sufficient funds to permit him to invest a minimum of $400,000 toward the reorganization of Associates. In this connection, Associates points to the fact that the disclosure statement has already been filed; it is scheduled to be considered on February 6, 1984 and if approved, it would permit the general partner, Mr. Wild, to proceed to solicit new investments not only from the limited partners initially, but also possibly from new investors which he cannot so, of course, without running afoul of Securities Laws. This is so, contends Associates, because the protection accorded by § 1125(e), the "safe harbor provision" of the Code, only protects persons from possible violation of any applicable law governing the offers, issuances, sales or purchases of securities, if the solicitation was made in good faith and in full compliance with the provision of the Code which, of course, includes the approval of the disclosure statement, a prerequisite of § 1125(b) of the Code for solicitation.
In opposition of these contentions, Royal Trust contends that there is absolutely no justification for injunctive relief because the proposition urged by Mr. Wild is nothing more than a speculative, unsupported hope; there is no commitment from all of the limited partners of any additional funds to invest; and there is no commitment presented at this time to assure that Mr. Wild is able to obtain financing. Moreover, so contends Royal Trust, LouAnn Wild is not even a partner, general or limited, of Associates and her only connection with Associates is that she happens to be married to Mr. Wild. Accordingly, there is clearly no justification to grant injunctive relief to LouAnn Wild.
Chapter 11, unlike Chapter 13, contains no provision which permits injunctive relief to protect co-debtors not involved in any case pending under the Code, c.f. § 1301. Nevertheless, there are respectable authorities which held that under special circumstances non-debtors, co-debtors may be protected temporarily if such protection is essential to the efforts of a debtor to achieve rehabilitation. In re Otero Mills, Inc., 25 B.R. 1018 (D.C.N.M.1982) and In the *382 Matter of Old Orchard Inv. Co., 31 B.R. 599, 10 B.C.D. 1200 (D.C.W.D.Mich.1983). It is well settled as a general proposition that before the stay may be issued, the petitioner must demand "a clear case of hardship or inequity" if there is "a fair possibility that the stay would work damage on another party." Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 255, 57 S.Ct. 163, 166, 81 L.Ed. 153 (1936). Thus, it is recognized that while the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, § 362, does not protect non-debtors, the Bankruptcy Court possesses ample power pursuant to § 105 of the Code to issue such orders which appear to be necessary and appropriate to carry out the provisions of Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and in appropriate circumstances protect non-debtors. In re Landmark Air Fund II, 19 B.R. 556 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ohio 1982). For instance, technical legal distinction between corporations and alleged alter-egos of corporations must be respected and observed in determining the automatic stay impact uses against or with respect to property of someone who is not technically a debtor. In re Loughnane, 28 B.R. 940 (Bkrtcy.D.Colo. 1983). See also the series of cases involving asbestosis litigation; Wedgeworth v. Fibreboard Corp., 706 F.2d 541 (5th Cir.1983); Lynch v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 710 F.2d 1194 (6th Cir.1983); Williford v. Armstrong World Industries, et al., 715 F.2d 124 (4th Cir.1983).
Considering the foregoing, this Court is satisfied that this record fails to establish the requisite degree of proof that LouAnn Wild is entitled to any injunctive protection since there is nothing in this record which shows that the judgment against her would have any impact on Associates. However, this is not the case in the case of Mr. Wild, the general partner of Associates and while a stronger showing could have been made based on changed circumstances, this Court is satisfied that it is appropriate to grant a short respite and protection by way of an injunction against any further proceedings at this time by Royal Trust against Mr. Wild. As noted earlier, since the last hearing this Court authorized Associates to enter into two substantial leases, and it is likely that the competing plan of reorganization filed in this case by St. Petersburg Bayfront Concourse Hotel Corporation, the holder of the first mortgage on the hotel, is no longer a viable plan of reorganization. Moreover, Mr. Wild should be given a limited time, in the event a disclosure statement is approved, to solicit funds necessary for funding the reorganization and to proceed to attempt to obtain a confirmation of a plan of reorganization.
This leaves for consideration the matter of Royal Trust's right to call up a certain letter of credit issued in favor of Royal Trust on behalf of Associates in the amount of $90,000, a letter of credit which was pledged as security for a personal guarantee given to Royal Trust by Mr. and Mrs. Wild. Whether or not this letter of credit is entitled to protection or conversely, Royal Trust is entitled to call upon the issuer of the letter of credit to honor the same would depend on whether or not a letter of credit is deemed to be property of the estate within the meaning of § 541 of the Code. This Court had the occasion to consider this question, albeit, in a totally different context and held in the case of In re Twist Cap, Inc., 1 B.R. 284 (Bkrtcy.Fla.1979) that under the particular state of circumstances involving that case it was proper to issue a temporary restraining order prohibiting the holder of a letter of credit to demand the issuer to honor the same. This decision, which created a great furor among banks and other institutionalized lenders, has been severely criticized and several decisions since expressly rejected the holding without considering the facts involved in that case and the circumstances which this Court considered to be controlling. See, In re Page, 18 B.R. 713 (D.C.Colo.D.D.C.1982); In re North Shore & Central Illinois Freight Co., 30 B.R. 377 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ill.1982); In re Planes, Inc., 29 B.R. 370 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ga. 1983); In re M.J. Sales & Distributing Company, Inc., 25 B.R. 608 (Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y. 1982); Baird, Standly Letter of Credit in Bankruptcy, 49 Univ. of Chicago L.Rev. 130 (1982); and Chaitman & Sovern, Enjoining *383 Payment on a Letter of Credit in Bankruptcy: A Tempest in a Twist Cap, 38 Bus. Lawyer 21 (Nov. 1982). For instance, in the case of In re Page, 18 B.R. 713 (D.C.Colo.D. D.C.1982), Judge Gesell held on appeal that the automatic stay, § 362(a)(3) and (4) does not prevent honoring the letter since the letter and its proceeds are not the debtor's property; and the lien on the debtors' indemnifying collateral, which is a security interest to secure a future advance, was created and perfected pre-petition when the transaction was entered into, not after bankruptcy when the Bank is asked to honor the letter. He also held, however, that the automatic stay prevents the Bank from enforcing its security interest in the indemnifying collateral without the bankruptcy court's permission. In this particular instance, this Court is satisfied that there is nothing in this record which would warrant either a finding that this particular letter of credit is property of the estate, therefore, protected by the automatic stay or that Royal Trust should not be permitted to proceed and obtain the proceeds on the ground that they would materially impact Associates.
Based on the foregoing, it is the considered opinion of this Court that while a limited injunctive relief is appropriate protecting Mr. Wild against the entry of a judgment, Royal Trust should be permitted to proceed against LouAnn Wild and permitted to demand the proceeds of the letter of credit.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Royal Trust, its agents, servants and attorneys or anyone acting on its behalf be, and the same hereby is, restrained and prohibited to proceed and undertake any steps, direct or indirect, toward obtaining a final judgment against Darrell Wild provided Associates obtains an approval of its disclosure statement on February 6, 1984 and further provided that Associates obtains a confirmation not later than 45 days after the entry of the order approving the disclosure statement and further provided that Darrell Wild furnishes to this Court satisfactory proof 30 days subsequent to the entry of the order approving disclosure statement of the committment of funds sufficient to fund the plan of reorganization. It is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that in the event Associates is unable to meet these conditions and Darrell Wild is unable to furnish this satisfactory proof of committment as noted above, the injunction shall be deemed to be dissolved forthwith and Royal Trust will be authorized to proceed in the state court to seek a final judgment against Darrell Wild. It is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the injunction shall not be construed to prohibit Royal Trust to proceed and demand the proceeds of the letter of credit. It is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the complaint for injunctive relief against LouAnn Wild be, and the same hereby is, dismissed.