932 A.2d 350 (2007)
Patricia DINSMORE
v.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING, Appellant.
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.
Submitted on Briefs July 13, 2007.
Decided September 10, 2007.
*351 Terrance M. Edwards, Asst. Counsel and Timothy P. Wile, Asst. Counsel In-Charge, Harrisburg, for appellant.
No appearance entered on behalf of appellee.
BEFORE: McGINLEY, Judge, PELLEGRINI, Judge, and LEAVITT, Judge.
OPINION BY Judge LEAVITT.
The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Department), appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County (trial court), sustaining the appeal of Robert, Jr. and Patricia Dinsmore and rescinding the driver registration suspension imposed by the Department for the Dinsmores' failure to maintain financial responsibility for their vehicle as required by Section 1786 of the Vehicle Code.[1]
The Dinsmores own a 1993 Ford station wagon that was previously insured by Progressive Specialty Company (Progressive). On March 10, 2006, Progressive terminated the Dinsmores' motor vehicle liability insurance policy for nonpayment of premium. Progressive notified the Department of the Dinsmores' insurance termination as required by Section 1786 of the Vehicle Code[2] and Section 221.3 of Chapter 67 of the Pennsylvania Code.[3] On May 15, 2006, *352 the Department notified the Dinsmores that their vehicle registration was being suspended for three months, effective on June 19, 2006.[4] The Dinsmores then appealed to the trial court, which held a hearing de novo.
At the hearing, the Department offered into evidence the electronic transmission it received from Progressive stating that Progressive had terminated the Dinsmores' insurance policy for nonpayment along with a printout verifying that the Dinsmores' vehicle was of the type required to be registered. The Department also submitted a notice dated March 29, 2006, informing the Dinsmores that the Department had received notification from Progressive of the cancellation. Patricia Dinsmore, who appeared pro se, testified that she did not receive the March 29th notice from the Department and that she did not receive notification of her insurance termination from Progressive until April 14, 2006, more than thirty days after the purported March 10 termination. She testified that upon receiving Progressive's notice, she obtained new insurance on the next business day, April 17, 2006. At the hearing, Mrs. Dinsmore did not have with her a copy of the April notice of termination sent by Progressive, and the trial court left the record open for receipt of this document.
Relying on Eckenrode v. Department of Transportation, 853 A.2d 1141 (Pa. Cmwlth.2004) and Webb v. Department of Transportation, 870 A.2d 968 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2005), the trial court sustained the Dinsmores' appeal and rescinded their registration suspension. The court found that Progressive failed to provide the Dinsmores with timely notice of the insurance cancellation as required by the insurance regulatory statute[5] and that when the Dinsmores finally received notice, they immediately obtained new insurance. The trial court reasoned that under Eckenrode, it was allowed to determine the facial validity of insurance cancellations and, in this case, the court found the cancellation of the Dinsmores' policy to be defective. The trial court went on to say that because the *353 cancellation was facially defective, it was a "waste of time and effort" to require the Insurance Commissioner to review the motorist's insurance dispute, as required by Section 1786(d)(5) of the Vehicle Code. Trial court opinion at 8, Reproduced Record at 60a (R.R. ___). The Department now appeals.[6]
The Department raises one issue for this Court's review: whether the trial court exceeded its scope of review and committed error when it determined that the Dinsmores' insurance termination was facially defective.[7] The Department argues that it satisfied its prima facie burden of proving the Dinsmores' failure to maintain financial responsibility for their vehicle. It further argues that the trial court does not have the ability to consider an insurance company's failure to give timely notice, or whether the termination of the insurance policy was effective, as these inquiries are exclusively within the province of the Insurance Commissioner under Section 1786(d)(5) of the Vehicle Code.[8] The Department contends that the trial court committed an error of law in sustaining the Dinsmores' appeal and exceeded its jurisdiction.
In registration suspension cases, the Department has the initial burden of showing that the vehicle in question is of the type required to be registered and that the Department received notice that the registrant's automobile insurance policy had been terminated. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(d)(3). This burden may be satisfied by the certified receipt of an electronic transmission from an insurance company stating that a registrant's policy has been terminated. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1377(b). This type of evidence, when submitted by the Department, will constitute prima facie proof that the termination by the insurance company was legally effective and that the registrant's vehicle lacked the required financial responsibility *354 coverage. Id. This presumption may be rebutted by the production of "clear and convincing evidence" that the vehicle was insured at all relevant times. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(d)(3)(ii). When a registration suspension is appealed to a court of common pleas, that court's scope of review is limited to determining whether the vehicle is of the type required to be insured and whether the Department received a notice of termination from an insurance company. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(d)(3).
When the Department determines that a vehicle lacked the required financial responsibility coverage, it must suspend the registration of that vehicle for three months. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(d)(1). There are several exceptions to this rule where, for example, the registrant can prove to the Department's satisfaction that the lapse in insurance was for less than thirty-one days and that the vehicle was not operated during that time. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(d)(2)(i). If the registrant disputes the validity of an insurance policy cancellation, he must challenge it by requesting review from the Insurance Commissioner. This request, once made, acts as a supersedeas on the suspension until the Insurance Commissioners' review is complete. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(d)(5).
In the case sub judice, it was not disputed that the vehicle was of the type required to be insured. The trial court examined whether the Dinsmores had presented evidence to rebut the presumption that the vehicle was not insured at all relevant times. The trial court ultimately concluded that the vehicle had been insured, finding that the Dinsmores did not receive notice from Progressive of their impending cancellation the effect of which was to keep their insurance intact.
This Court addressed a similar situation in Webb v. Department of Transportation, 870 A.2d 968 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005). In Webb, the registrant appealed his suspension, pro se, arguing that he had not received any notice of his insurance policy termination until he received notice of his registration suspension from the Department. The trial court found that the registrant's insurance termination had not been effected because the insurance company did not give him the advance written notice required by Section 2006 of the Insurance Company Law, 40 P.S. § 991.2006. On appeal, we explained that a trial court does not exceed its scope of review "to the extent that a court reviewing a [Department] registration suspension appeal may certainly examine the record before it to determine whether an insured's evidence has overcome the applicable presumption established by [the Department.]" Id. at 974. This Court found that an inquiry into the validity of an insurance policy termination is within the province of the Insurance Commissioner when an examination beyond the record on its face is warranted. However, we also noted that the Department's own suspension notice does not state specifically that such appeals are to be brought to the Insurance Commissioner, which makes it understandable that the registrant would bring such an issue to the trial court hearing the suspension appeal. We concluded that in such circumstances it is appropriate to allow the registrant to seek nunc pro tunc review of his insurance policy cancellation from the Insurance Commissioner.
The Dinsmores present the same challenge as that brought by the registrant in Webb. The suspension notice provided by the Department states: "You have the right to appeal this suspension to the Court of Common Pleas of the county of your residence within thirty (30) days of the mail date of this letter." R.R. 32a. This notice makes no mention of the Insurance *355 Commissioner or that the correct procedure for appealing the validity of the insurer's cancellation is before the Insurance Commissioner, and not before the Court of Common Pleas.[9]
We are bound by Webb. The Dinsmores are entitled to review of their insurance policy cancellation by the Insurance Commissioner. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's order and remand this matter with instructions to hold the suspension appeal of Patricia Dinsmore in abeyance pending the Insurance Commissioner's review and disposition of Patricia Dinsmore's nunc pro tunc request for review of her insurance policy cancellation.[10]

ORDER
AND NOW, this 10th day of September, 2007, the order of October 30, 2006, is hereby VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED to the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County to hold the suspension appeal of Patricia Dinsmore in abeyance pending the Insurance Commissioner's review and disposition of Patricia Dinsmore's nunc pro tunc request for review of her insurance policy cancellation.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
NOTES
[1]  Section 1786 provides, in pertinent part, that "[e]very motor vehicle of the type required to be registered under this title which is operated or currently registered shall be covered by financial responsibility." 75 Pa. C.S. § 1786(a).
[2]  Section 1786(e)(3) states, in pertinent part,

An insurer who has issued a contract of motor vehicle liability insurance and knows or has reason to believe that the contract is only for the purpose of providing proof of financial responsibility shall notify the Department if the insurance has been canceled or terminated by the insured or by the insurer. The insurer shall notify the Department not later than ten days following the effective date of the cancellation or termination.
75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(e)(3).
[3]  Section 221.3(a) provides,

An insurer who has issued a contract of motor vehicle liability insurance and knows or has reason to believe that the contract is for the purpose of providing financial responsibility, shall immediately notify the Department if the insurance has been cancelled or terminated by the insured or by the insurer. The insurer shall notify the Department not later than 10 days following the effective date of the cancellation or termination. This requirement shall not apply to a policy which has been in effect for more than 6 months from the date the policy was initially issued.
67 Pa.Code § 221.3(a).
[4]  Section 1786(d)(1) requires that a vehicle registration be suspended for three months if the Department determines that

the required financial responsibility was not secured as required by this chapter and shall suspend the operating privilege of the owner or registrant for a period of three months if the Department determines that the owner or registrant has operated or permitted the operation of the vehicle without the required financial responsibility.
75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(d)(1).
[5]  This statute provides, in relevant part, as follows:

A cancellation or refusal to renew by an insurer of a policy of automobile insurance shall not be effective unless the insurer delivers or mails to the named insured at the address shown in the policy a written notice of the cancellation or refusal to renew. The notice shall:
(1)Be in a form acceptable to the Insurance Commissioner.
(2)State the date, not less than sixty (60) days after the date of the mailing or delivery, on which cancellation or refusal to renew shall become effective. When the policy is being cancelled or not renewed for the reasons set forth in section 2004(1) and (2), however, the effective date may be fifteen (15) days from the date of mailing or delivery.
Section 2006 of the Insurance Company Law of 1921, Act of May 17, 1921, P.L. 682, added by the Act of June 17, 1998, P.L. 464, 40 P.S. § 991.2006.
[6]  This Court's scope of review is limited to determining whether the trial court committed an error of law or manifestly abused its discretion in reaching its decision. Eckenrode, 853 A.2d at 1143 n. 5.
[7]  The Department raises a second issue pertaining to its March 29, 2006, letter to the Dinsmores. The March 29 letter informed the Dinsmores that the Department had received notice from Progressive of the cancellation and advised that "[f]ailure to respond to this letter within three weeks may result in a suspension of your vehicle registration." Trial court opinion at 2, R.R. 54a. The trial court noted in its opinion that the Department did not question Mrs. Dinsmore about this letter. The trial court also suggested, in dicta, that Mrs. Dinsmore could have reasonably believed she only needed to act by the Department's three-week deadline, or April 20, 2006. Presently, the Department contends that the trial court erred by holding that the March 29 letter created a three-week grace period. A closer examination of the record reveals, however, that counsel for the Department did question Mrs. Dinsmore about the March 29 letter, and Mrs. Dinsmore testified she never received it. Notes of Testimony, October 6, 2006, at 14-15; R.R. 22a-23a. This being the case, there is simply no issue as to whether the letter was misleading, and therefore the trial court did not hold that the language of the inquiry letter created a grace period.
[8]  This provision states:

An alleged lapse, cancellation or termination of a policy of insurance by an insurer may only be challenged by requesting review by the Insurance Commissioner pursuant to Article XX of the act of May 17, 1921 (P.L. 682, No. 284), known as The Insurance Company Law of 1921. Proof that a timely request has been made to the Insurance Commissioner for such a review shall act as a supersedeas, staying the suspension of registration or operating privilege under this section pending a determination pursuant to section 2009(a) of The Insurance Company Law of 1921 or, in the event that further review at a hearing is requested by either party, a final order pursuant to section 2009(i) of The Insurance Company Law of 1921.
75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(d)(5).
[9]  The first standard notice sent by the Department, which states that it has received a communication from an insurance company that a registrant's insurance has been cancelled, does mention that inquiries about the validity of insurance cancellation notices should be brought to the Pennsylvania Insurance Department. However, the Dinsmores maintain that they never received this notice, dated March 29, 2006. Additionally, we note that there is still no mention that this is the only remedy to appeal such an issue, or that such an issue may only be appealed to the Insurance Commissioner.
[10]  If the Dinsmores fail to seek nunc pro tunc review by the Insurance Commissioner then the Department will have grounds to reactivate the case before the trial court.


                     United States Court of Appeals
                            FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
                                   ___________

                                   No. 06-3330
                                   ___________

United States of America,               *
                                        *
             Appellee,                  * Appeal from the United States
                                        * District Court for the
      v.                                * Northern District of Iowa.
                                        *
Heather Servantez,                      * [UNPUBLISHED]
                                        *
             Appellant.                 *
                                   ___________

                             Submitted: August 10, 2007
                                Filed: August 23, 2007
                                 ___________

Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
                        ___________

PER CURIAM.

       Heather Servantez appeals the 126-month prison terms the district court1
imposed after she pleaded guilty to two drug offenses under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and
846. For reversal, she argues that her sentence is unreasonable and the district court
committed a clear error of judgment by sentencing her at the top of the advisory
Sentencing Guidelines range, because the court gave undue weight to her criminal
history without taking into account the petty nature of most of the offenses.

      1
       The Honorable Linda R. Reade, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
the Northern District of Iowa.
       When the applicable Guidelines range is undisputed, as it is here, we consider
whether the sentence is unreasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. See
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261-62 (2005). The presumption of
reasonableness accorded a sentence within the Guidelines range, see Rita v. United
States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462-68 (2007), may be rebutted by showing that the district
court failed to consider a factor that should have received significant weight, gave
significant weight to an irrelevant factor, or otherwise committed a clear error of
judgment, see United States v. Davidson, 437 F.3d 737, 741 (8th Cir. 2006). The
record supports that the district court properly considered only relevant factors,
including Servantez’s extensive criminal history and her role in the conspiracy, and
did not commit a clear error of judgment in choosing a sentence at the top of the
Guidelines range. Thus, we conclude that the sentence is not unreasonable.

      Accordingly, we affirm.
                     ______________________________

                                         -2-


                                                            FILED
                                                        DECEMBER 8, 2016
                                                     In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                   WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                            DIVISION THREE

MICA CRAIG,                                  )         No. 33985-8-III
                                             )
                    Appellant,               )
                                             )
             V.                              )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                                             )
WAL-MART STORES, INC.,                       )
                                             )
                    Respondent.              )

      LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. -A rattlesnake bit Mica Craig while he was shopping at

Walmart's outdoor garden center in Clarkston, Washington. Mr. Craig sued Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc., doing business as Walmart, on a theory of premises liability. Walmart

successfully moved for summary judgment. Mr. Craig appeals.

       Walmart argues it lacked actual or constructive notice of any rattlesnake incident

on its premises. Mr. Craig responds that rattlesnakes are well known to live in the

undeveloped lots adjacent to the outdoor garden center, and Walmart's decision to

operate an outdoor garden center in such an area created the risk that a rattlesnake might

enter the garden area and bite a customer. Mr. Craig argues that by creating such a risk,
No. 33985-8-111
Craig v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

Walmart owes him a duty of reasonable care to prevent his injury. We agree and,

therefore, reverse the trial court.

                                          FACTS

       A.      OVERVIEW OF INJURY

       In May 2012, Mr. Craig entered the garden center of Walmart to purchase a bag of

mulch. The garden center was an outdoor open air section of the store located in the

parking lot. Other customers were also shopping in the outdoor garden center at the time.

Mr. Craig saw bags of mulch stored on wooden pallets. He bent down near the bags to

brush aside what he thought was a stick obscuring a price tag. The "stick" turned out to

be a rattlesnake, and it bit his hand. Mr. Craig immediately went to a medical clinic, and

eventually went to a hospital where he received appropriate care and treatment.

       B.     PROCEDURE BELOW

       Mr. Craig brought suit against Walmart. He alleged premises liability, among

other causes of action. After brief discovery, Walmart moved for summary judgment

dismissal of Mr. Craig's premises liability claim.

       Walmart asserted it lacked actual or constructive notice of any rattlesnake danger.

Specifically, it asserted its Clarkston store had been in operation since September 2009,

that over four million customers had visited the store prior to May 2012, and that there

had never been a "reported incident involving a snake." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 34.

Walmart also described various efforts it used to decrease the risk of dangerous incidents,

                                             2
No. 33985-8-III
Craig v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

such as routinely sweeping and checking the garden center area and hiring a company to

provide monthly pest control.

       In response, Mr. Craig submitted declarations, including one from a middle-aged

man who had lived in Clarkston his entire life, and another from a snake expert. The

layperson asserted, "it is common knowledge that rattlesnakes are prevalent in areas

around the levies of [Clarkston], including in the immediate vicinity of the Clarkston,

WA Walmart." CP at 217. The expert asserted that there were undeveloped lots

immediately adjacent to Walmart's outside garden center, and that rattlesnakes could live

in those lots and the general area. He also posited various steps that Walmart could have

taken, but did not, which would have reduced the risk of a rattlesnake getting into the

outdoor garden center area.

       Mr. Craig argued that the Pimentel' self-service exception applied. He argued that

Walmart's outdoor garden center used a self-service method of operation, and that

Walmart's choice to use such a method of operation in rattlesnake country created the

unsafe condition.

       The trial court granted Walmart's summary judgment motion. In dismissing Mr.

Craig's premises liability claim, the trial court concluded:

       1
           Pimentel v. Roundup Co., 100 Wn.2d 39, 666 P.2d 888 (1983).

                                              3
No. 33985-8-III
Craig v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

       [T]o invoke the Pimentel exception, a plaintiff must present some evidence
       that the unsafe condition in the particular location of the accident was
       reasonably foreseeable. There is simply no evidence whatsoever of any
       snake activity of any kind anywhere on the premises of this particular
       Walmart store and a complete lack of evidence that Walmarts [sic] mode of
       business operations would somehow encourage or promote invitees to
       encounter and interact with [a rattlesnake].

CP at 279 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 2

       Mr. Craig appeals.

                                           ANALYSIS

       A. SUMMARYJUDGMENTSTANDARD

       "' Summary judgment is properly granted when the pleadings, affidavits,

depositions, and admissions on file demonstrate there is no genuine issue of material fact

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Berger v. Sonne land,

144 Wn.2d 91, 102, 26 P.3d 257 (2001) (quoting Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658,

663,958 P.2d 301 (1998)). "The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact." Id. "The appellate court engages in the same

inquiry as the trial court when reviewing an order for summary judgment." Id. "All facts

and reasonable inferences are considered in a light most favorable to the nonmoving

party." Id. at 102-03. "All questions of law are reviewed de novo." Id. at 103.

       2
         Although Mr. Craig asserted causes of action other than premises liability, the
parties treated the summary judgment order as a final order dispositive of all claims.

                                             4
No. 33985-8-III
Craig v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

       B. PREMISES LIABILITY AND THE PIMENTEL EXCEPTION TO NOTICE

       In premises liability actions, a person's status as an invitee, licensee, or trespasser

determines the scope of the duty of care owed by the possessor of that property. Tincani

v. Inland Empire Zoological Soc'y, 124 Wn.2d 121, 128, 875 P.2d 621 (1994). Walmart

does not dispute that Mr. Craig was a business invitee.

       A business invitee must usually show that the owner of the premises had actual or

constructive notice of the hazardous condition for liability to attach. Tavai v. Walmart

Stores, Inc., 176 Wn. App. 122, 128, 307 P.3d 811 (2013). But such notice need not be

shown if the nature of the proprietor's business and his methods of operation are such

that the existence of unsafe conditions on the premises is reasonably foreseeable. Id.

This is known as the Pimentel exception. Id.

       The Pimentel exception is a limited rule for self-service operations. A self-service

operation is one where goods are stocked and customers serve themselves by handling

the goods. O'Donnell v. Zupan Enter., Inc., 107 Wn. App. 854, 859, 28 P.3d 799 (2001).

The exception applies if (I) the area where the injury occurred was self-service, (2) the

hazardous condition that caused the injury was within the self-service area, and (3) the

mode of operation inherently created a reasonably foreseeable hazardous condition. Id.

      Walmart first argues that the Pimentel exception does not apply because the

outdoor garden center was not a self-service area. We disagree. The record is undisputed

that customers are permitted in the entire outdoor garden center, including the area where

Mr. Craig was bitten, to gather goods they wish to purchase.

                                              5
No. 33985-8-III
Craig v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

       Walmart also argues its mode of operation did nothing to cause a reasonably

foreseeable hazardous condition. Again we disagree. Rattlesnakes wander. As noted by

Mr. Craig's expert, rattlesnakes are especially prone to wander during the spring, such as

in May, when Mr. Craig was bitten. Walmart's choice to locate an outdoor garden center

in its parking lot and adjacent to undeveloped land where rattlesnakes are known to live

created a reasonably foreseeable hazard. The reasonably foreseeable hazard was that its

customers would interact with wandering rattlesnakes hiding among the dirt, plants, and

other items for sale in the outdoor garden center. It is further reasonably foreseeable that

a customer, retrieving such items, might be bitten by a rattlesnake. This risk is inherent

during the entire spring and summer when Walmart utilizes its outdoor garden center.

       Our holding today does not impose potential liability on all self-service businesses

operating in rattlesnake country. Most businesses have walls and doors that generally

prevent wild animals, including rattlesnakes, from entering. Potential liability is limited

to only those situations where the business owner fails to take reasonable care to prevent

rattlesnake bites. See Pimentel, 100 Wn.2d at 49. Although Walmart addressed the steps

it took to reduce various risks of animal-caused injury, Walmart neither argued below nor

on appeal that its steps were sufficient to eliminate liability as a matter of law. We,

therefore, express no opinion on that issue here.

                                              6
No. 33985-8-III
Craig v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

      Reverse.

      A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to

RCW 2.06.040.

                                         Lawrence-Berrey, J.

I CONCUR:

 3a .
Fearin~

                                            7
                                         33985-8-III

       KORSMO,     J. (dissenting)-The majority extends liability to all landowners in the

Clarkston area simply because rattlesnakes commonly live in the region. There is no

support for that extension of landowner liability in our case law, particularly since the

majority's rule is completely at odds with the Washington Supreme Court's own

interpretation of the Pimentel 1 exception. I dissent.

       The majority's theory is premised on two facts: (1) rattlesnakes live in the

riverbanks of the Clarkston area, and (2) Walmart runs its garden center outside in the

general vicinity of the river. That casts far too wide a net.

       The self-service exception at issue finds its origins in this court's opinion in

Ciminski v. Finn Corp., 13 Wn. App. 815,537 P.2d 850 (1975), a decision that was

largely adopted by the Washington Supreme Court in Pimentel, 100 Wn.2d at 49-50. The

Pimentel court stated the difference in its ruling from that in Ciminski:

       The Ciminski decision contains language which suggests that the
       requirement of showing notice is eliminated as a matter of law for all self-
       service establishments. 13 Wn. App. at 820-21. This is not the conclusion
       we reach under the analysis adopted here; the requirement of showing
       notice will be eliminated only if the particular self-service operation of the

       1
           Pimentel v. Roundup Co., 100 Wn.2d 39, 666 P.2d 888 (1983).
No. 33985-8-III
Craig v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

       defendant is shown to be such that the existence of unsafe conditions is
       reasonably foreseeable.

Id.

       Subsequent cases have refined this distinction even further. In a decision

reversing this court, the Washington Supreme Court determined that the Pimentel self-

service rule did not apply to a hazard unrelated to the self-service nature of the business:

       Because Pimentel is a limited rule for self-service operations, not a per se
       rule, the rule should be limited to specific unsafe conditions that are
       continuous or foreseeably inherent in the nature of the business or mode of
       operation. Risk of water dripping from a leaky roof is not inherent in a
       store's mode of operation.

Wiltse v. Albertson's Inc., 116 Wn.2d 452,461, 805 P.2d 793 (1991). In a subsequent

case citing Wiltse with approval, the court summarized the self-service exception:

       There must be a relationship between the hazardous condition and the self-
       service mode of operation of the business. See Wiltse.

Ingersoll v. DeBartolo, Inc., 123 Wn.2d 649, 654, 869 P.2d 1014 (1994).

       The trial court properly applied these cases when it dismissed this action at

summary judgment. The rattlesnake passing through the area was no more a result of the

self-service operation than was the leaky roof in the grocery store.

       Plaintiffs expert hypothesized that a snake travelling between its winter and

summer homes may have passed through the Walmart lot and decided to spend the night

under a pallet when it became too cold to travel further that day. There was no evidence

                                             2
No. 33985-8-111
Craig v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

that the store's garden shop was a particularly attractive location 2 for snakes to visit, let

alone take up residence. It simply happened to be the nearest available shelter.

Presumably, the same thing could be said about a vehicle in the parking lot or any other

nearby sheltered location such as the benches on a golf course or a backyard barbecue.

This pallet simply was a convenient location. It was not an attractive nuisance for snakes.

       Operating a self-service business is not a basis for premises liability in the absence

of notice of a dangerous condition. Only when the self-service operation creates a risk

that is reasonably foreseeable does liability arise. No evidence was presented that

operating a garden shop outside presented a foreseeably greater risk of rattlesnake

encounters than having the parking lot did. Pimentel requires more than the plaintiff

presented here.

       The judgment should be affirmed. Accordingly, I dissent.

                                                           Korsmo,t7'

       2
         While the majority states that the garden items created a "foreseeable hazard" of
rattlesnake encounters, there is no evidence in the record backing the statement. Majority
at 6. Indeed, the only evidence that plaintiff presented was that rattlesnakes liked
riverbank areas for their dens and that they would forage up to two miles away in the
summer. There is no indication that the mulch and fertilizer bags attracted snakes or even
attracted creatures that snakes feast on. The same expert indicates that snakes "might"
like the empty lands adjacent to Walmart, but no one indicated that snakes had ever been
found there.

                                               3


965 S.W.2d 418 (1998)
STATE of Missouri, Respondent,
v.
Shawn P. DERRICK, Appellant.
No. 21777.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division One.
March 20, 1998.
*419 Susan W. McGraugh, Asst. Public Defender, St. Louis, for Appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Cristi A. Ingalsbe, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for Respondent.
CROW, Judge.
A jury found Appellant guilty of statutory rape in the first degree, § 566.032, RSMo 1994, and assessed punishment at imprisonment for seven years. The trial court entered judgment per the verdict. This appeal followed.
As Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the proof to support the verdict, it is unnecessary to set forth a full account of the evidence. This opinion summarizes only the evidence necessary to resolve Appellant's sole claim of error.
The victim was born December 31, 1982. The offense occurred May 26, 1996.
Brian W. Adkison, a doctor of osteopathic medicine, examined the victim May 29, 1996. He quoted the victim as saying she had been sexually assaulted by two individuals, each of whom had sexual intercourse with her. Adkison's examination revealed "a recent laceration to [the victim's] hymen." Because "the bruising was still purplish," Adkison concluded the laceration "couldn't have been much beyond [five days old]."
During the prosecutor's questioning of Adkison, this dialogue occurred:
"Q. Did she tell you the names of the two perpetrators?
A. Yes, she did.
Q. And what names did she tell you?
A. Shawn Derrick and oneHume."
Appellant's point relied on:
"The trial court plainly erred, and [Appellant] was greatly prejudiced, when the court allowed Dr.... Adkison to testify that [the] victim ... told him that she had been raped by [Appellant]. This statement was hearsay and did not fall under any recognized exception to the hearsay rule. The admission of this statement violated [Appellant's] rights to due process and a fair trial as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution."
Appellant concedes that the testimony complained of in his point relied on was received at trial without objection, hence any issue regarding its admissibility was not preserved for review. See: State v. Graves, 588 S.W.2d 495, 499[4] (Mo. banc 1979). Appellant seeks plain error relief,[1] which is granted only when the court finds that manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice has occurred. *420 State v. Sutherland, 939 S.W.2d 373, 379-80[20] (Mo. banc 1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 186, 139 L.Ed.2d 125 (1997).
Citing State v. Bell, 936 S.W.2d 204 (Mo. App. W.D.1996), and State v. Miller, 924 S.W.2d 513 (Mo.App. W.D.1996), Appellant maintains that Adkison's testimony that the victim told him that Appellant was one of the rapists was inadmissible. Appellant insists that Adkison's testimony was prejudicial because it "improperly bolstered the strength of [the victim's] testimony in this swearing match."
Assumingwithout decidingthat Adkison's account of what the victim told him should have been excluded had a timely and proper objection been made, it does not inevitably follow that Appellant is entitled to a reversal. Reversal is warranted only if Adkison's testimony regarding the victim's revelation resulted in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice. Sutherland, 939 S.W.2d at 379-80[20].
The victim testified she and her 15-year-old sister ("B__") accompanied Appellant, Shannon Shaffer, Mike Hume and Jerry Wright to Wright's "trailer." According to the victim, everyone was drinking.
The victim told the jurors that Appellant and Hume had sexual intercourse with her in the living room of the trailer. The victim testified she submitted because she was afraid she would be hurt if she refused.
Appellant testified he was at the trailer with the other three males, the victim, and B__. However, swore Appellant, he was never alone with the victim and never had sexual intercourse with her.
B__ testified she was in another room of the trailer getting a tattoo and did not see any encounter between the victim and Appellant. However, B__ avowed that eventually the victim came to the room where B__ and others were "drinking and talking." Asked how the victim was acting, B__ answered, "She was crying and told me she wanted to leave."
The victim and B__ were driven to a site a few blocks from their residence and walked the rest of the way home.
In State v. Higgins, 852 S.W.2d 172, 176[11] (Mo.App. S.D.1993), this court held that where the victim of a sexual offense testified at trial and was fully cross-examined by the accused's lawyer, the testimony of an investigator that the victim revealed the accused had touched the victim "in a private area"received without objectiondid not warrant plain error relief.
Here, Adkison's examination of the victim confirmed recent sexual intercourse. Appellant conceded he and the victim were at the trailer during the time the alleged offense occurred. B__'s testimony that the victim was crying buttressed the victim's testimony that the sexual activity was against her will. The victim testified and was fully cross-examined by Appellant's lawyer.
Given those circumstances, this court holds Adkison's testimony that the victim named Appellant as one of the two males who had sexual intercourse with her does not warrant plain error relief. While that testimony may have supplied some corroboration for the victim's testimony on that issue, its value was too exiguous to constitute manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice. Cf. State v. Howton, 890 S.W.2d 740, 746 (Mo.App. W.D. 1995).
Appellant's point relied on is denied; the judgment is affirmed.
GARRISON, P.J., and PREWITT, J., concur.
NOTES
[1]  The argument following Appellant's point relied on asserts the trial court erred in failing, sua sponte, to declare a mistrial when Adkison testified that the victim "identified [Appellant] as her assailant." Appellate courts are wary of claims that a trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial sua sponte in a criminal case. That is because generally, the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States bars retrial if a judge grants a mistrial in a criminal case without the defendant's request or consent. State v. Tolliver, 839 S.W.2d 296, 299[9] (Mo. banc 1992). Consequently, a judge who declares a mistrial in a criminal case sua sponte may thereafter be confronted by the defendant's contention that he cannot be retried. Reversing convictions because trial courts fail to declare mistrials sua sponte allows defendants to remain mute when incidents unfavorable to them occur during trial, gamble on the verdict, then obtain a new trial if the verdict is adverse. This puts trial courts in an untenable position and is contrary to the principle that an appellate court will not, on review, convict a trial court of error on an issue which was not put before it to decide. Lincoln Credit Co. v. Peach, 636 S.W.2d 31, 36[12] (Mo. banc 1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1094, 103 S.Ct. 711, 74 L.Ed.2d 942 (1983).


272 B.R. 651 (2001)
In re MIDWAY INDUSTRIAL CONTRACTORS, INC., Debtor.
No. 99 B 9175.
United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.
October 11, 2001.
*652 *653 *654 *655 *656 *657 *658 Walter E. Trittipo, Hough & Cook, Chicago, IL, for debtor.
William A. Brandt, Chicago, IL, trustee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
SUSAN PIERSON SONDERBY, Chief Judge.
This matter comes becomes before the Court on: (i) the Amended Application of Walter E. Trittipo for Compensation as Attorney for Debtor in Possession (the "Fee Petition"); and (ii) the Motion of Walter E. Trittipo for Approval and Allowance of Attorneys Fees as a Secured Claim (the "Motion for Allowance of Secured Claim"). For the following reasons, the Court awards fees in the amount of $18,500.00, with respect to the Fee Petition, which is approximately 56 percent of the amount requested and reimbursement of costs in the amount of $864.80. The Court denies the Motion for Allowance of Secured Claim.
I. BACKGROUND
The First and Second Chapter 11 Cases
Prior to commencing this bankruptcy case, Midway Industrial Contractors, Inc. ("Midway") filed a voluntary petition for reorganization under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Code") numbered 92 B 13149 with this Court on June 11, 1992 (the "First Chapter 11 Case"). On June 25, 1992, the Court authorized Midway's employment of Walter E. Trittipo ("Trittipo") pursuant to Section 327 of the Code to act as Midway's counsel in the First Chapter 11 Case.
The Court entered an order on August 3, 1995, confirming the second amended plan of reorganization filed by Midway on January 4, 1995. The First Chapter 11 Case was closed on January 28, 1999.
On March 22, 1999 (the "Petition Date"), a little short of two months after the First Chapter 11 Case was closed, Midway filed a second voluntary petition for reorganization under chapter 11 of the Code, commencing the above-captioned case (the "Second Chapter 11 Case"). On August *659 31, 1999 (the "Conversion Date"), the Second Chapter 11 Case was converted to a case under chapter 7 of the Code. William A. Brandt, Jr. was appointed chapter 7 trustee and continues to serve in that capacity (the "Chapter 7 Trustee").
Employment of Trittipo in the Second Chapter 11 Case
Midway filed an Application in the Second Chapter 11 Case to Engage Attorney under General Retainer pursuant to Section 327 of the Code on May 4, 1999, in order to employ Trittipo as its legal counsel (the "Employment Motion"). In the Employment Motion, Midway stated, to the best of its knowledge and that of its counsel, that Trittipo had no interest adverse to Midway or its estate.
In conjunction with and in support of the Employment Motion, Trittipo submitted an affidavit (the "Initial Rule 2014 Affidavit") pursuant to Rule 2014 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (hereinafter, "Bankruptcy Rules"). In the Initial Rule 2014 Affidavit, Trittipo disclosed that, as of the Petition Date, he had a claim against Midway for the balance owing for services he and his law firm rendered in the First Chapter 11 Case. According to the Initial Rule 2014 Affidavit, Trittipo had assigned his claim for these fees to his former law partner Mr. Cook, apparently in exchange for the former partner's release of claims against Trittipo. As a result, according to Trittipo,
. . . the arrangement . . . for divesting himself and his firm of the legal right to the collection of his and Mr. Cooks prior attorney fees, coupled with the fact that no claim is made in the Chapter 11 petition, for attorney fees due for services rendered by Mr. Trittipo or his firm to Debtor after the date of the Plan of Reorganization in the prior Chapter 11 proceeding, any such claims for said services being hereby expressly and completely waived and their (sic) being no existing business relationship whatsoever between Mr. Trittipo, or his law firm, and Mr. Cook, or his law firm, it is believed by Mr. Trittipo that, as a consequence of the foregoing assignment to Mr. Cook there will remain no adverse interest, as prohibited by section 362(sic) of the Bankruptcy Code, which otherwise would prohibit representation by Walter E. Trittipo of Debtor in its present proceeding.
Trittipo reported that he had no other connections with Midway, its creditors, or any other parties in interest, their respective attorneys and accountants, the United States trustee, or any person employed in the office of the United States trustee.
The Court entered an order on June 24, 1999, authorizing the employment of Trittipo as counsel to Midway, with fees to be allowed upon notice and motion (the "Retention Order"). The Court also authorized Midway to transfer the sum of $26,500 to Trittipo as a general retainer. Trittipo alleges that he only received $18,500 of the retainer.
The Sverdup Lawsuit
Before its demise, Midway operated as an industrial painting subcontractor, specializing in large commercial and governmental projects. From sometime in 1997 to January 1998, Midway served as a subcontractor to Sverdup Facilities, Inc. ("Sverdup") and Lindblad Construction Co. of Joliet, Inc. ("Lindblad") with respect to a construction project on property owned by Allied Tube and Conduit ("Allied") located in Harvey, Illinois.
Disputes arose among the parties and Midway was not paid when it completed its performance on the project. Consequently, Midway retained the services of Trittipo pursuant to a Retention Agreement *660 dated May 15, 1998 (the "Contingency Fee Agreement") to prosecute its claims against Sverdup, Lindblad and Allied. The Contingency Fee Agreement provided, inter alia, for compensation to Trittipo on a contingency fee basis in varying percentages based upon the timing of the resolution of Midway's claims.
Starting in May 1998, Trittipo negotiated on behalf of Midway with Sverdup, Lindblad and Allied. Trittipo eventually filed a complaint in August 1998, on Midway's behalf in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois against Sverdup, Lindblad and Allied commencing the lawsuit captioned Midway Industrial Contractors, Inc. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Co., et al., case number 98 CH 11003 (the "Sverdup Lawsuit").
In connection with the Sverdup Lawsuit, Trittipo allegedly served notices of an attorney's lien claim on Sverdup, Lindblad, Allied and National Fire Insurance Co. of Hartford ("National Fire")[1] on January 20, 1999, January 21, 1999, January 26, 1999 and January 27, 1999, respectively, purportedly pursuant to the provisions of the Illinois Attorney's Lien Act, 770 ILCS 5/1 (the "Attorney's Lien Claim").
In March 1999, after the closing of the First Chapter 11 Case and prior to the Petition Date in the Second Chapter 11 Case, Trittipo negotiated a settlement with Lindblad, whereby Lindblad agreed to pay the full amount of Midway's invoice of $18,524.80. Trittipo continued to represent Midway in the Sverdup Lawsuit after the Petition Date during the pendency of the Second Chapter 11 Case up to the Conversion Date.
Sverdup eventually settled after the Conversion Date with the Chapter 7 Trustee. The settlement provided for the payment by Sverdup of the sum of $65,000.00 to the estate. The Chapter 7 Trustee filed a motion to approve the settlements of various mechanics' lien claims, including those against Lindblad and Sverdup. The settlements were approved on February 14, 2000. The Chapter 7 Trustee received the settlement payments from Lindblad and Sverdup in the aggregate amount of $83,524.80, which are currently being held by the Chapter 7 Trustee pending resolution of this matter (the "Sverdup and Lindblad Settlement Funds").
Trittipo's Failure to Disclose
The existence of the Contingency Fee Agreement, the Sverdup Lawsuit, and the Attorney's Lien Claim were not disclosed in the Employment Motion. Trittipo failed to disclose the Contingency Fee Agreement, the Sverdup Lawsuit and the Attorney's Lien Claim in the Initial Rule 2014 Affidavit. The first disclosure of these facts was made when Trittipo filed an Amended Rule 2014 Affidavit on November 15, 2000, approximately one year and five months after the entry of the Retention Order.
The Retention Order did not authorize Trittipo to render services in connection with the Sverdup Lawsuit on a contingent fee basis. Midway never brought a motion to retain Trittipo or any other attorney as special counsel to continue the prosecution of the Sverdup Lawsuit on behalf of Midway. Neither Midway nor the Chapter 7 Trustee sought to assume the Contingency Fee Agreement as an executory contract under Section 365 of the Code.
Trittipo's Application for Allowance and Payment of Fees and Motion for Allowance and Payment of Secured Claim
Under consideration by the Court are the following matters:
*661 (i) the Motion of Trittipo to Allow Attorneys Fees as a Secured Claim and for Order Directing Payment, wherein Trittipo requests that the Court allow a secured claim in his favor in an unspecified amount pursuant to the terms of the Contingency Fee Agreement as a result of the settlements with Sverdup and Lindblad. Trittipo requests that the Chapter 7 Trustee be directed to pay the secured claim from the Sverdup and Lindblad Settlement Funds; and
(ii) the amended application of Trittipo to allow the sum of $33,077 in fees and reimburse $864.80 in expenses which he incurred in connection with representing Midway in the Second Chapter 11 Case and to allow the application of the retainer to those fees and costs.
The United States trustee and creditors George Gee and Marquette National Bank (collectively, the "Creditors") filed objections to the Fee Petition and the Motion for Allowance of Secured Claim. The United States trustee requests the Court treat the Fee Petition and the Motion for Allowance of Secured Claim as one request for allowance of professional compensation. The United States trustee recommends that Trittipo's compensation in the Second Chapter 11 Case be limited to the amount of the retainer Trittipo has already received, as a consequence of Trittipo's failure to make a timely disclosure of the fact that Trittipo had a claim for fees arising from the Contingency Fee Agreement. Moreover, the United States trustee argues that limiting the compensation to the retainer is justifiable in light of the lack of success of the Second Chapter 11 Case.
In their combined objection, the Creditors echoed the objections of the United States trustee, arguing that the lack of disclosure merits a denial of Trittipo's request for allowance of fees. The Creditors, however, urge the Court to deny all of the requested fees. These creditors also contend that Trittipo waived any lien rights he may have had by virtue of the Attorney's Lien Claim because of the failure to procure court approval of his employment to continue the prosecution of the Sverdup Lawsuit and because of Trittipo's failure to disclose the Attorney's Lien Claim in the Initial Rule 2014 Affidavit. Finally, the Creditors argue that if the Attorney's Lien Claim is valid, it is inferior to the secured claims held by the Creditors.
The Chapter 7 Trustee objects to the Fee Petition on procedural grounds, arguing that the Fee Petition should be denied because Trittipo failed to give the requisite 20 day notice of the hearing under Bankruptcy Rule 2002(a)(6). The Chapter 7 Trustee did not file an objection to the Motion for Allowance of Secured Claim.
II. DISCUSSION
The Fee Petition
Section 327 of the Bankruptcy Code allows the debtor-in-possession, with the court's approval, to employ one or more attorneys that do not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate and that are not disinterested persons. 11 U.S.C. § 327. A professional with an adverse interest or who is not disinterested cannot be employed by the debtor-in-possession. In re Spanjer Bros., Inc., 191 B.R. 738, 753 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1996) (citing In re Tinley Plaza Associates, L.P., 142 B.R. 272, 276-77 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1992) and In re Envirodyne Industries, Inc., 150 B.R. 1008, 1016-17 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1993)).
A "disinterested person" is defined in relevant part as a person that: "(A) is not a creditor, an equity security holder, or an insider; . . . and (E) does not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate or of any class of creditors or equity security holders, by *662 reason of any direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor . . . or for any other reason." 11 U.S.C. § 101(14). Adverse interests are not defined in the Code, but are generally considered to be ". . . any economic interest that would tend to lessen the value of the bankruptcy estate or that would create either an actual or potential dispute in which the estate is a rival claimant, or; . . . a predisposition under circumstances that render such a bias against the estate." In re Crivello, 134 F.3d 831, 835 (7th Cir.1998) (citing In re Roberts, 46 B.R. 815, 827 (Bankr.D.Utah 1985)). The requirements that a professional be disinterested and have no adverse interest:
`serve the important policy of ensuring that all professionals appointed pursuant to section 327(a) tender undivided loyalty and provide untainted advice and assistance in furtherance of their fiduciary responsibilities.'
Id. at 836 (quoting Rome v. Braunstein, 19 F.3d 54, 58 (1st Cir.1994)).
Bankruptcy Rule 2014 governs the procedures with respect to the application for employment under Section 327 of the Code. The application for employment must state, among other things: the specific facts showing the necessity of the employment; the reasons for the selection of the proposed professional; the professional services to be rendered; and, to the best of the applicant's knowledge, all of the proposed professional's connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party in interest, their respective attorneys and accountants, the United States trustee or any persons employed in the office of the United States trustee. Fed.R.Bank.P. 2014. In addition, the person to be employed must file a verified statement (the "Rule 2014 Affidavit") setting forth the person's connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party in interest, their respective attorneys and accountants, the United States trustee, or any person employed in the office of the United States trustee. Id.
The disclosure in the Rule 2014 Affidavit must be explicit enough for the court and other parties to gauge whether the person to be employed is not disinterested or holds an adverse interest. See In re Granite Partners, L.P., 219 B.R. 22, 34 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1998). Persons to be employed "must disclose all facts that bear on . . . disinterestedness, and cannot usurp the court's function by choosing, ipse dixit, which connections impact disinterestedness and which do not. The existence of an arguable conflict must be disclosed if only to be explained away." Id. at 35 (internal citations omitted). Disqualification is justified for lack of adequate disclosure in the Rule 2014 Affidavit, even if it turns out that the professional is in fact disinterested. In re Filene's Basement, Inc., 239 B.R. 845, 848 (Bankr.D.Mass.1999).
The disclosures must be explicit and complete. "Coy or incomplete disclosures which leave the court to ferret out pertinent information from other sources are not sufficient". In re Saturley, 131 B.R. 509, 517 (Bankr.D.Me.1991).
Full disclosure serves a crucial role in the professional being paid. Crivello, 134 F.3d at 836 (". . . counsel who fail to disclose timely and completely their connections proceed at their own risk because failure to disclose is sufficient grounds to revoke an employment order and deny compensation"). Under Section 330 of the Code, the court may award reasonable compensation for actual and necessary services rendered by a professional person employed by the estate under Section 327 of the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 330. In order to be paid by the estate *663 the professional's employment must have been approved by the court. In re Milwaukee Engraving Co. Inc., 219 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir.2000), cert. denied Maier, McIlnay & Kerkman, Ltd. v. Bodenstein, 531 U.S. 1112, 121 S.Ct. 856, 148 L.Ed.2d 770 (2001). See also In re Monument Auto Detail, Inc., 226 B.R. 219, 224 (9th Cir. BAP 1998) (quoting In re Weibel, Inc., 176 B.R. 209, 211 (9th Cir. BAP 1994)("[c]ourt approval of employment. . . . is the sine quo non to counsel getting paid.")). The amount of compensation must be reasonable after a review of the factors set forth in Section 330 of the Code, which includes a consideration of the nature, extent and value of the services. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3).
If counsel has been employed and the court subsequently learns that during counsel's employment he was not disinterested or held an adverse interest, the court can revoke the order of employment and deny compensation. 11 U.S.C. § 328(c). Under these circumstances, the professional is said to have been "erroneously employed". Crivello, 134 F.3d at 837.
Denial of fees under Section 328(c) of the Code serves three purposes: (1) punishment of the transgressor; (2) deterrence of future violations; and (3) preservation of public confidence in the integrity of the bankruptcy process. Granite Partners, 219 B.R. at 41 (citations omitted).
The Seventh Circuit allows the court discretion in deciding whether and in what amount to deny fees under Section 328(c) of the Code. Crivello, 134 F.3d at 837-38. See also Milwaukee Engraving, 219 F.3d at 638-39.
Bankruptcy judges are given wide latitude in deciding whether a denial of the fees of an "erroneously employed" professional in whole or in part is appropriate. Crivello, 134 F.3d at 839. The bankruptcy judge, "[b]eing on the front line . . . is `in the best position to gauge the ongoing interplay of factors and to make the delicate judgment calls which such a decision entails'". Id. (quoting In re Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 182 (1st Cir.1987)).
The first factor the bankruptcy court should consider before it elects to disallow a portion of the requested fees is whether any evidence exists to support an inference of intentional non-disclosure. Id. If there is evidence in support of such an inference, the court "should not fall prey to the professional's story of confusion, miscommunication or negligence". Id. The punishment for intentional non-disclosure should be treated by the bankruptcy court as severely as a fraud upon the court. Id. Under these circumstances, this Court would not hesitate to order the denial of all compensation.
Absent any allegations of intentional concealment, the court should consider other factors. Judge Ginsberg provides guidance in this regard:
In exercising that discretion, the court needs to balance the draconian impact of the loss of fees for services actually rendered by a professional . . . and the denial of reimbursement of expenses actually incurred and paid by [the professional] in his representation of the debtor against the actual injury or prejudice to the estate from his failure to live up to the requirements of § 328(c). 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 328.04[2] at 328-16 (15th ed.1990). Also relevant is the question of whether the lawyer made full disclosure to the court of problems which might exist in meeting the requirements of § 328(c). Al Gelato, 99 B.R. 404.
Diamond Mortgage, 135 B.R. at 96.
On the Petition Date, Trittipo was a creditor of Midway with a claim *664 arising from rendering services on behalf of Midway with respect to the Sverdup Lawsuit. Furthermore, Trittipo asserts that this claim had secured status. Accordingly, at the time of the entry of the Retention Order, Trittipo was not disinterested because he: (i) was a creditor of the estate; and (ii) he held an interest adverse to the group of unsecured creditors and other secured creditors by virtue of the Attorney's Lien Claim. In addition, the Attorney's Lien Claim gave Trittipo an economic interest that lessens the value of the estate by diminishing the amount of the Sverdup and Lindblad Settlement Funds available to other creditors. The possession of the Attorney's Lien Claim raised the potential for a dispute with the estate, which has been actualized by these proceedings. As such, at the time of the Retention Order, Trittipo had an adverse interest.
The Court became aware of Trittipo's lack of disinterestedness and the fact that he held an adverse interest after the approval of his employment. As a result, the Court will now exercise its discretion under Section 328(c) of the Code to determine whether and in what amount to deny Trittipo's fees. No one has alleged that Trittipo intentionally concealed the Attorney's Lien Claim. Accordingly, the Court will not order the complete disallowance of all fees.
Trittipo makes numerous arguments to support his request for complete allowance of his fees. First, Trittipo alleges that he in fact made the required disclosure and therefore, a denial of his fees is unwarranted. Specifically, Trittipo points out that the Sverdup Lawsuit was disclosed in Midway's Statement of Financial Affairs and that he stated in the Initial Rule 2014 Affidavit that he was generally familiar with the legal matters of Midway. This argument is unpersuasive. Trittipo would put the onus on the Court to investigate the veracity of the Initial Rule 2014 Affidavit by combing the record for other documents, when the burden was on him to submit a comprehensive and accurate Rule 2014 Affidavit. As the Seventh Circuit points out with respect to Disclosures of Compensation required under Bankruptcy Rule 2016, "[b]ankruptcy courts have neither the resources nor the time to investigate the veracity of the information submitted in 2016(b) statements and affidavits and to root out the existence of undisclosed conflicts of interest". Crivello, 134 F.3d at 839. The Court should not have to "rummage through files" to determine if counsel has satisfied his obligations of disclosure. In re Rusty Jones, 134 B.R. 321, 345 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1991).
Trittipo argues that the lack of disclosure has not caused any prejudice to the estate in general. This argument ignores the objective of requiring disclosure. The objective of requiring disclosure is not so much to protect against prejudice to the estate, but to ensure undivided loyalty and untainted advice from professionals. Crivello, 134 F.3d at 836. That is why lack of disclosure in and of itself is sufficient to warrant disqualification, even if in the end there was no prejudice. Filene's Basement, 239 B.R. at 849. Trittipo's lack of prejudice argument is relevant, however, in assessing the amount of disallowance, which is discussed below. See Diamond Mortgage, 135 B.R. at 96.
Trittipo next contends that the employment arrangement would have been approved had the disclosure been made. Such an argument is speculative and irrelevant. Monument Auto, 226 B.R. at 226. The Court will indulge in some speculation, however, solely for the future reference of proposed professionals. Had the Court been made aware of the Attorney's Lien Claim at the time of the Employment Motion, *665 it would not have authorized Trittipo's employment, absent a waiver of the claim. See In re Automend, Inc., 85 B.R. 173, 176 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1988) (an attorney who is a prepetition creditor with a lien securing payment of fees is not disinterested and is therefore disqualified from employment by the debtor).
Finally, Trittipo blames his failure to disclose on lack of a full understanding of his disclosure obligations under the Code and Bankruptcy Rules. While the Court is sympathetic that members of the bar must navigate the various requirements and intricacies of the numerous provisions of the Code and Rules, lack of knowledge cannot serve as an excuse. Rather, a "law firm is chargeable with the knowledge of the law". In re Glenn Electric Sales Corp., 99 B.R. 596, 599 n. 2 (D.N.J.1988). This is particularly true here where Trittipo had practiced for seven years before the Court. Moreover, Trittipo admits that he waived his claims for fees owing from the First Chapter 11 Case to avoid being precluded from employment. This acknowledgment by Trittipo directly contradicts his claim of ignorance.
None of Trittipo's arguments persuade this Court to refrain from disallowing at least some portion of the requested fees. Trittipo states in the Fee Petition that he performed 169.60 hours of services for Midway at a rate of $195 per hour, which total $33,077.00 in fees. After a detailed review of the Fee Petition, the Court finds that Trittipo rendered $30,600.05 of reasonable services on behalf of Midway ($33,077.00 less $1,228.50 rendered in connection with retention matters, which as discussed herein, were mishandled by Trittipo and $1,248.00 rendered on the Sverdup Lawsuit). The fact that Trittipo rendered reasonable services and the argument that Trittipo's services were a factor in the generation of the Sverdup and Lindblad Settlement Funds weigh in favor of a partial allowance.
On the other hand, the lack of disclosure did result in some prejudice to the estate. The estate has now been burdened by the expense of responding to Trittipo's assertion of the Attorney's Lien Claim and objecting to the Fee Petition. In light of this prejudice, the exceedingly long time it took for a disclosure to finally be made, and in consideration of the need to ensure compliance by professionals with the Bankruptcy Code and Rules, the Court agrees with the United States trustee that it is appropriate to limit the fee allowance to an amount equal to the retainer which Trittipo claims he received, $18,500.00. This amount constitutes a 44% reduction of the fees requested. This percentage reduction comports with other decisions in this district wherein the court partially disallowed fees for non-disclosure. Diamond Mortgage, 135 B.R. at 101 (sixty percent reduction in fees for failure to disclose that attorney was pre-petition creditor); In re Al Gelato Continental Desserts, Inc., 99 B.R. 404, 408 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1989) (ten percent reduction in fees for failure to disclose adverse interest); Rusty Jones, 134 B.R. at 342 (sixty percent reduction in fees for failing to disclose significant personal and business relationship with the principals of the debtor); In re Begun, 162 B.R. 168 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1993) (fifty percent reduction for failure to timely and fully comply with Bankruptcy Rule 2014).
It is unfair to reduce the reimbursement of the costs incurred by Trittipo. Diamond Mortgage, 135 B.R. at 101. The costs totaling $864.80 consist of the $830.00 filing fee and a charge of $34.80 for purchasing bankruptcy forms. Both of these costs are reimbursable.
Accordingly, Trittipo is awarded $18,500.00 in fees and $864.80 in costs *666 (collectively, the "Allowed Fees and Costs"). As stated above, the Retention Order allowed the payment of a $26,500 retainer to Trittipo, but Trittipo claims he only received $18,500 of the retainer. There appears to be an open question as to whether the parties agree with Trittipo's statement that he did not receive the full retainer. Accordingly, Trittipo is given leave to apply $18,500.00 of the retainer to the Allowed fees and Costs. Any amount of the Allowed Fees and Costs not satisfied after application of $18,500.00 of the retainer shall have administrative expense status under Section 503(b)(2) of the Code. The Court orders the disgorgement of any amount of the retainer remaining in Trittipo's possession after application of $18,500.00 to the Allowed Fees and Costs, and Trittipo is directed to deliver said remaining amount to the Chapter 7 Trustee.
Finally, as the United States trustee points out, it is appropriate to reduce fees on the basis of an unsuccessful chapter 11 case. See In re Wire Cloth Products, Inc., 130 B.R. 798, 807 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1991). Given the 44% disallowance of fees already, the Court does not believe that the failure of the chapter 11 case warrants a further reduction in fees.
Motion for Allowance of Secured Claim
Actions to determine the extent, validity and priority of liens are considered adversary proceedings. Fed.R.Bank.P. 7001(2). The Motion for Allowance of Secured Claim requests a determination of the validity of the Attorney's Lien Claim, a request which is typically brought as an adversary proceeding. The fact that the request was brought as a motion instead of as an adversary proceeding does not present a jurisdictional defect:
Although Bankruptcy Rule 7001 requires an adversary proceeding to be commenced in order to determine the validity, priority, or extent of a lien, there is authority which holds that failure to commence an adversary is not a jurisdictional defect and may be waived. In re Robinson, 217 B.R. 527, 530 (Bankr.E.D.Tex.1998) (citing In re Lawler, 106 B.R. 943, 957 (N.D.Tex.1989)). These authorities have reasoned `where the rights of the parties have been adequately presented no prejudice results from consideration of the issues on the merits.' Id.

In re Enfolinc, Inc., 233 B.R. 351, 354 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1999). See also In re Zolner, 249 B.R. 287, 288 (N.D.Ill.2000), aff'd In re Zolner, 249 B.R. 287 (N.D.Ill.2000).
No one but the Court has raised the issue that this matter should have been brought as an adversary complaint. Trittipo has been given ample opportunity to present his case and he has not made an argument to the contrary. Additionally, the Creditors and the United States trustee did not object to the procedural posture of the Motion for Allowance of Secured Claim. Accordingly, the Court will analyze the merits of the request.
State law determines the nature of an interest in property. Raleigh v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20, 120 S.Ct. 1951, 1955, 147 L.Ed.2d 13 (2000). "Bankruptcy courts are not authorized in the name of equity to make wholesale substitution of underlying law controlling the validity of creditors' entitlements, but are limited to what the Bankruptcy Code itself provides." Id. (citations omitted).
Trittipo is seeking to enforce a lien claim he possessed at the Petition Date. The Creditors and the United States trustee have raised the issue of whether the professional employment and disclosure requirements of the Bankruptcy Code trump *667 the prepetition state law lien rights held by Trittipo. In other words, does the fact that Trittipo violated a Code and Bankruptcy Rule disclosure requirement result in an extinguishment or work as a waiver of his purported prepetition lien? The parties do not cite to a Code or Bankruptcy Rule provision or other authority answering this query in the affirmative.
The Code certainly gives the bankruptcy court discretion in determining the reasonableness of counsel's fees. Under Section 329, the court is empowered to review the reasonableness of compensation agreements made within one year before the petition date, but Section 329 says nothing about avoiding an attorney's lien. The Code provides mechanisms for avoidance of liens, e.g., Section 522(f) (avoidance of liens impairing exemptions), Section 544 (avoidance of liens through the exercise of a trustee's strong-arm powers), Section 545 (avoidance of statutory liens), and Section 547 (avoidance of preferential liens), but these statutory grounds are either inapplicable in this case or were not asserted here.
A review of case law is illuminating, but not dispositive. In In re Albert, 206 B.R. 636 (Bankr.D.Mass.1997), an attorney retained by the chapter 7 debtor in a state court lawsuit, which was commenced prepetition, but was settled postpetition, brought a motion to enforce his attorney's lien against the settlement proceeds. Prior to the petition date, the attorney and the debtor entered into a retention agreement providing for a contingent fee. The attorney did not become aware of the filing of the bankruptcy case until some weeks after the chapter 7 case was filed. The chapter 7 trustee decided not to continue to employ the attorney on behalf of the estate and did not assume the retention agreement. The chapter 7 trustee did not contest the existence of the attorney's lien as of the petition date at the hearing on the motion to enforce the lien.
The court found that under Massachusetts law, the attorney had a valid attorney's lien, which related back to the commencement of the attorney's services. As such, the lien was shielded from avoidance under Section 546(b) of the Code. Id. at 639-40.
The court examined the extent of the attorney's lien and held that the lien could only secure fees for prepetition services. Id. at 640. Further, the bankruptcy court has the authority to review the reasonableness of the fees secured by the lien. Id. If the fees arise from a contingency fee agreement and the agreement was not assumed postpetition, the contingency fee agreement "cannot serve as a measure of compensation" and the reasonableness standard applies. Id. (citing In re Leiden Corp., 59 B.R. 239 (Bankr.D.R.I.1986)). Compensation for postpetition services is available only to professionals who are employed with the court's authorization. Id. at 642. In the end, the court ruled that the attorney held a valid attorney's lien in the settlement proceeds that secured the amount of reasonable services rendered prior to the petition date. The court authorized the retroactive employment of the attorney to cover the period of time he did not know of the bankruptcy case. The court denied any fees for services rendered after the attorney became aware of the bankruptcy case.
The conclusion of Albert is that the lien survives but its extent is determined by bankruptcy reasonableness standards, unless the underlying agreement is assumed. In addition, the lien does not extend to unauthorized postpetition services. The conclusion in Albert concerning the survival of the lien was reached because the trustee did not contest its validity. The Albert decision does not indicate whether *668 the court considered its authority vel non to avoid the lien for the attorney's failure to comply with Code employment provisions.
In the Monument Auto case, 226 B.R. 219, a law firm whose employment on behalf of the chapter 11 debtor-in-possession was not authorized, sought to have fees it incurred in the postpetition period allowed after the conversion of the case to chapter 7. The court held that the lack of employment authorization was fatal to the ability of the firm to recover any postpetition fees. The Court also held that "the [f]irm's possession of an attorney's lien did not obviate its obligation to satisfy the employment and compensation requirements of the Code and Rules". Id. at 225. The court did not rule on the validity of the attorney's lien since it was unnecessary to do so given the fact that all fees were disallowed. Even if the lien were valid, it secured nothing.
Trittipo is not seeking a determination that the fees purportedly secured by the Attorney's Lien Claim were reasonable. The sole issue before the Court is the validity of the Attorney's Lien Claim.
Neither the Albert or Monument Auto decisions directly addresses the issue presented here  can Trittipo's lien be extinguished or avoided by virtue of his non-compliance with the Code and Rule disclosure requirements? As in Monument Auto, however the Court need not address this issue, because as discussed below, Trittipo does not have a valid statutory or equitable attorney's lien under Illinois law. Given the clear directive from the Supreme Court that a bankruptcy court is not to interfere with creditor entitlements without express statutory authority, the Court is disinclined to rule on this issue unless it is dispositive of the case. It is not.
Trittipo Waived the Attorney's Lien Claim
There is an argument, which no one raised, that Trittipo voluntarily waived the Attorney's Lien Claim. Rights arising from statutes may be waived as long as the waiver is knowing, voluntary and intentional. Department of Public Aid ex rel. Allen v. Dixson, 323 Ill.App.3d 600, 752 N.E.2d 1147, 256 Ill.Dec. 905 (3rd Dist.2001). In the Initial Rule 2014 Affidavit, Trittipo stated that no claim was made for ". . . attorney fees due for services rendered by Mr. Trittipo or his firm to Debtor after the date of the Plan of Reorganization in the prior Chapter 11 proceeding, any such claims for said services being hereby expressly and completely waived . . .". Trittipo knew of his rights to assert an attorney's lien, as evidenced by his assertion of one. The services he rendered under the Contingency Fee Agreement took place after the date of the Plan of Reorganization in the First Chapter 11 Case, so they fall within the time period of the waiver in the Initial Rule 2014 Affidavit. Finally, Trittipo made and submitted the Initial Rule 2014 Affidavit voluntarily and intentionally. Accordingly, Trittipo waived the Attorney's Lien Claim.
The Validity of the Attorney's Lien Claim
Assuming arguendo that Trittipo did not waive the Attorney's Lien Claim, he still has not proven its validity. In Illinois, the creation and perfection of an attorney's lien is governed by the Illinois Attorney's Lien Act. 770 ILCS 5/1. The statute provides in pertinent part:
Attorneys at law shall have a lien upon all claims, demands and causes of action, including all claims for unliquidated damages, which may be placed in their hands by their clients for suit or collection, *669 or upon which suit or action has been instituted, for the amount of any fee which may have been agreed upon by and between such attorneys and their clients, or, in the absence of such agreement, for a reasonable fee, for the services of such suits, claims, demands or causes of action, plus costs and expenses. To enforce such lien, such attorneys shall serve notice in writing, which service may be made by registered or certified mail, upon the party against whom their clients may have such suits, claims or causes of action, claiming such lien and stating therein the interest they have in such suits, claims, demands or causes of action.
770 ILCS 5/1 (2001).
There must be strict compliance with the statute in order to create an effective attorney's lien. In re Del Grosso, 111 B.R. 178, 182 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1990) (citations omitted). The following steps must be taken under the statute: "(1) the attorney must have been hired by a client to assert a claim; (2) the attorney must perfect the lien by serving notice in writing; and (3) the notice must be served on the party against whom the client has a claim". Id. The notice must be served during the existence of the attorney-client relationship. Id.
The notice of the lien required under the statute must be writing. The written notice must contain language claiming the lien and stating the interest the attorney has in the claim. 770 ILCS 5/1. The written notice must be served on the parties against whom the client has a claim. Id. "Service on a party's attorney is insufficient to perfect the statutory lien." Del Grosso, 111 B.R. at 182.
Trittipo appended copies of the Contingency Fee Agreement to the Motion to Allow Secured Claim evidencing that Trittipo was hired to represent Midway to prosecute the Sverdup Lawsuit. Although Trittipo appended copies of return receipts appearing to indicate service by certified mail on Sverdup, Allied and National Fire, he did not include the written notice of the Attorney's Lien Claim. There is no way for the Court to determine whether the appropriate notice was indeed sent, or, if it was sent, whether the content of the notice satisfied the statutory requirements. Therefore, the burden of establishing a valid lien under the Attorney's Lien Act is not met. See In re Crisp, 92 B.R. 885, 891 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1988) (attorney's lien arising under contingency fee agreement not allowed due to lack of proof showing transmittal of notice required under Missouri law).
The Equitable Lien in the Sverdup and Lindblad Settlement Funds
Trittipo alternatively argues that he is entitled to an equitable lien in the Sverdup and Lindblad Settlement Funds. According to the Seventh Circuit,
[i]n Illinois, an equitable lien arises in two situations, the first of which occurs where the parties express in writing their intention to make a particular property, real or personal, or some fund the security for a debt, or where there has been a promise to convey or assign the property as security. The essential elements of an equitable lien are (1) a debt, duty or obligation owing by one person to another, and (2) a res to which the obligation fastens.
In re Brass Kettle Restaurant, Inc., 790 F.2d 574, 575 (7th Cir.1986) (internal citations omitted).
Whether an equitable lien arises from a contingency fee agreement depends upon the precise language of the agreement. Id. at 576. The language must be more than a promise by the client *670 to pay the attorney's fees in an amount equal to a specified portion of the recovered fund. Id. Rather, the language must indicate that the fees are to be paid out of a specific fund, thereby giving rise to an actual assignment of a portion of the fund. Id.
In Brass Kettle, the Seventh Circuit found an equitable lien from the language "Forty Percent (45%) of any recovery made". Id. Another agreement providing for "an amount equal to 25% of the increase obtained from the condemning body over the amount of $132,200.00" did not give rise to an equitable lien, because the language did not indicate that the attorney would have rights in the recovered funds. Achs v. Maddox, 175 Ill.App.3d 989, 993, 530 N.E.2d 612, 614, 125 Ill.Dec. 454 (2nd Dist.1988), appeal denied Achs v. Maddox, 125 Ill.2d 563, 537 N.E.2d 807, 130 Ill.Dec. 478 (1989).
The Contingency Fee Agreement at issue here, provides in relevant part:
This agreement includes the following fee schedule that will apply for your representation of MIDWAY in the matter before the Circuit Court of Cook County Illinois. Since MIDWAY continues to experience difficult cash flow problems and currently does not have the funds to pay you for handling our continual Chapter-11 proceedings, I agree on MIDWAY's behalf to a contingent fee which will depend solely on the level of work which your firm will perform in order to settle this action. The fee schedule in which MIDWAY agrees to is as follows:

                   Action                                  Fee Structure
1. Settlement prior to law suit being filed                 25%  Recovered Amount
2. Settlement after filing suit, but before                33-1/3%  Recovered Amount
   commencement of discovery.
3. Settlement after commencement of                        40%  Recovered Amount
   discovery, but before pre-trial
   preparation
4. Settlement after pre-trial preparation,                 45%  Recovered Amount
   but before trial.
5. Settlement after trial commencement or                  50%  Recovered
   Amount upon judgment

The above language indicates that Trittipo did not have rights in the "Recovered Amount". The percentage amounts are referred to as a "fee schedule" and are under the heading "Fee Structure", leading the Court to find that Midway merely promised to pay the percentage amount but did not assign the fund. Therefore, Trittipo has not satisfied the requirements to obtain an equitable lien on the Sverdup and Lindbad Settlement Funds.
Contrary to Trittipo's assertion, the language in the Contingency Fee Agreement is not "virtually identical" to the language in the agreement in the case of Lewsader v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 296 Ill.App.3d 169, 694 N.E.2d 191, 230 Ill.Dec. 560 (4th Dist.1998). In Lewsader, the agreed upon compensation was "33-1/3% of any amount recovered by settlement". Id. at 198. Based on this language, the court found an equitable lien.
Granted, the language in the Lewsader agreement is close to the Contingency Fee Agreement, but the addition of the word "of" in the Lewsader agreement works to attach the settlement fund with the lien. The words "of" or "from" are missing from the Contingency Fee Agreement. Careful consideration of the exact words is needed when the standard is precision.
*671 Finally, because Trittipo does not have a valid lien, the Court need not address the issue raised by the Creditors as to the relative priorities of their security interests. The Court also finds that the seven-day notice period of the hearing on the Fee Petition is sufficient in light of the fact that this matter was continued from time to time giving adequate opportunity for the parties to raise their arguments. Accordingly, any further notice is waived.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court awards Walter E. Trittipo fees in the amount of $18,500.00 and allows reimbursement of costs in the amount of $864.80 (the "Allowed Fees and Costs"). Trittipo is given leave to apply $18,500.00 of the retainer to the Allowed Fees and Costs. Any amount of the Allowed Fees and Costs not satisfied after application of $18,500.00 of the retainer shall have administrative expense status under Section 503(b)(2) of the Code. The Court orders the disgorgement of any amount of the retainer remaining in Trittipo's possession after application of $18,500.00 to the Allowed Fees and Costs, and Trittipo is directed to deliver said remaining amount to the Chapter 7 Trustee. The Court denies the Motion of Trittipo for Allowance of Secured Claim.
NOTES
[1]  The Court cannot discern from the pleadings how National Fire relates to the Sverdup Lawsuit. The relationship of National Fire, however, is irrelevant for purposes of this decision.