Filed 8/29/13 In re Angelica M. CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
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           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re ANGELICA M. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

MERCED COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES                                                               F067060
AGENCY,
                                                                             (Super. Ct. Nos. JP000226A,
         Plaintiff and Respondent,                                                   JP000226B)

                   v.
                                                                                OPINION
N.M.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
         APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Merced County. John D. Kirihara,
Judge.
         Seth F. Gorman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         James N. Fincher, County Counsel, and Sheri L. Damon, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*        Before Cornell, Acting P.J., Gomes, J. and Detjen, J.
       N.M. (mother) appealed from a 2013 order terminating parental rights (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 366.26)1 to her four-year-old daughter, Angelica, and three-year-old son,
Eduardo (children). After reviewing the entire record, mother’s court-appointed appellate
counsel informed this court he could find no arguable issues to raise on mother’s behalf.
Counsel requested and this court granted leave for mother to personally file a letter
setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error did exist. (In
re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844.)
       Mother has since submitted a letter in which she disputes certain facts from an
earlier stage of the dependency proceedings. Her letter otherwise neither addresses the
termination proceedings nor sets forth a good cause showing that any arguable issue of
reversible error at the termination hearing does exist. (In re Phoenix H., supra, 47
Cal.4th at p. 844.) As discussed below, we will dismiss the appeal for lack of any
arguable issue.
                     PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
       Domestic violence and mother’s suspected mental health problems brought then
one-year-old Angelica and newborn Eduardo to the juvenile court’s attention in the
spring of 2010. In May of that year, the juvenile court exercised its dependency
jurisdiction over the children but ordered them returned to parental custody under a plan
of family maintenance. The plan included a parenting education program, anger
management and/or domestic violence program, and a mental health evaluation for
mother.
       By January 2011, family maintenance proved ineffective in protecting the
children, as the parents admittedly argued with and physically fought one another while
they lived together with the children. Consequently, the court removed the children from
parental custody and ordered reunification services for both parents.

1     All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise indicated.

                                             2
       By the end of 2011, mother completed programs in parenting education and
domestic violence, making sufficient progress that the court returned the children once
more to her care and ordered continued family maintenance services. Meanwhile, father
had been deported to Mexico. Prior to his deportation, he did not consistently participate
in services, leading the court to terminate his services.
       During the first half of 2012, Merced County Human Services Agency (agency)
received several reports concerning the children’s safety, including reports that mother
allowed Angelica to go to the store with a man who was going to give her candy, left the
gas on in the home while the children were present, allowed an alleged male gang
member to live with her, and physically abused the children. The agency determined
these reports were unfounded. However, the agency observed mother had difficulty
processing information. The juvenile court approved an amended family maintenance
services plan requiring mother to complete a psychological evaluation and follow any
recommended treatment.
       In August 2012, the agency received a call from mother’s day care provider stating
that mother arrived intoxicated and over three hours late to pick up the children. Mother
admitted drinking alcohol and feeling depressed, however, she later denied any problem
with alcohol. She also reportedly said she heard voices, had horrible dreams, and did not
“belong to this world.”
       Consequently, the agency once again took the children into protective custody. In
October 2012, the juvenile court, having found the agency provided mother reasonable
services, terminated those services and set a section 366.26 hearing to select and
implement a permanent plan for the children. This court upheld the juvenile court’s
reasonable services finding in an extraordinary writ proceeding (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.452). (N.M. v. Superior Court (Feb. 4, 2013, F066019) [nonpub. opn.].)
       At the permanency planning hearing, the juvenile court terminated parental rights
having found the children were likely to be adopted.

                                              3
                                       DISCUSSION
       An appealed-from judgment or order is presumed correct. (Denham v. Superior
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) It is up to an appellant to raise claims of reversible
error or other defect and present argument and authority on each point made. If an
appellant does not do so, the appeal should be dismissed. (In re Sade C. (1996) 13
Cal.4th 952, 994.) Here, mother does not raise any claim of error or other defect against
the termination order from which she appeals.
       Instead, she claims there are arguable issues about: “1. Leaving the gas on the
stove on[;] ¶ 2. Allowing an alleged gang member to live with me and my children[;] ¶
3. Mother was reportedly hours late for picking up the children from the day care
providers[;] ¶ 4. That I became angry and yelled at the care provider in front of the
children[; and] ¶ Also that I hit and was abussing [sic] on my kids and that’s a lie. I
never hit my son he felt [sic] and he hit his nose and face with the floor because the floor
was hard.” We disagree. None of mother’s claims amount to legal issues.
       Rather, mother appears to dispute reports about her conduct prior to the juvenile
court’s October 2012, setting order. As noted above, the agency determined many of
these reports were unfounded. In any event, the time to challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence before the juvenile court when it made its setting order has long since passed
and is not reviewable on this appeal. (§ 366.26, subd. (l).)
       At the permanency planning hearing, the court’s proper focus was on the children
to determine whether it was likely they would be adopted and if so, order termination of
parental rights. Once reunification services are ordered terminated, the focus shifts to the
needs of the children for permanency and stability. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th
295, 309.) If, as in this case, the children are likely to be adopted, adoption is the norm.
Indeed, the court must order adoption and its necessary consequence, termination of
parental rights, unless one of the specified circumstances provides a compelling reason

                                              4
for finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the children. (In re
Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) Here, there was no compelling reason.
       Given the lack of any arguable issue in this appeal, we will dismiss it. (In re Sade
C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 994.)
                                      DISPOSTION
       The appeal is dismissed. This opinion is final forthwith as to this court.

                                             5


                                                                        Digitally signed by
                                                                        Reporter of
                                                                        Decisions
                                                                        Reason: I attest to
                      Illinois Official Reports                         the accuracy and
                                                                        integrity of this
                                                                        document
                              Appellate Court                           Date: 2019.10.08
                                                                        11:43:17 -05'00'

                    In re J.S., 2019 IL App (1st) 190059

Appellate Court   In re J.S., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-
Caption           Appellee, v. Cynthia S., Respondent-Appellant).

District & No.    First District, Sixth Division
                  Docket No. 1-19-0059

Filed             July 12, 2019

Decision Under    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 17-JA-1046; the
Review            Hon. Nicholas Geanopoulos, Judge, presiding.

Judgment          Affirmed.

Counsel on        Amy P. Campanelli, Public Defender, of Chicago (Greg Koster,
Appeal            Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.

                  Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg,
                  Gina DiVito, and Leslie Billings, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of
                  counsel), for the People.

                  Charles P. Golbert, Public Guardian, of Chicago (Kass A. Plain and
                  Mary Brigid Hayes, of counsel), guardian ad litem.
     Panel                     JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
                               Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Connors concurred in the
                               judgment and opinion.

                                              OPINION

¶1        Respondent, Cynthia S., appeals the circuit court’s determination that it had jurisdiction to
      rule on the State’s petition for adjudication of wardship under the Uniform Child-Custody
      Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) (750 ILCS 36/201 (West 2016)). On appeal,
      Cynthia contends the trial court erred in finding it had jurisdiction where she had established
      her residency in Indiana when J.S. was born. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶2                                           JURISDICTION
¶3        After a finding of neglect, the trial court adjudicated J.S. a ward of the court on December
      4, 2018. Cynthia filed a notice of appeal that same day. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction
      pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) and Rule 303 (eff. July 1,
      2017), governing appeals from final judgments entered below.

¶4                                          BACKGROUND
¶5        J.S. was born on September 24, 2017, at University Health Methodist Hospital (Methodist
      Hospital) in Indianapolis, Indiana. On October 11, 2017, the State filed a petition for
      adjudication of wardship, alleging neglect due to an injurious environment and abuse due to
      substantial risk of physical injury. In support, the petition stated that J.S.’s mother, Cynthia,
      has three children not in her care. One child is under private guardianship following a finding
      of neglect in 2006. Two children are currently under the care of the Department of Children
      and Family Services (DCFS) in Illinois after findings of neglect and abuse were entered on
      January 24, 2014. Their foster parent is Cynthia’s grandmother. Cynthia was offered mental
      health, abuse, and parenting services, but she had not successfully completed those services.
¶6        On November 21, 2017, the trial court appointed a public defender to represent Cynthia.
      The assistant public defender objected, arguing the court had no jurisdiction because J.S. was
      not currently in, or had ever been in, Chicago. The petition was amended to reflect that J.S.
      had never left the hospital where she was born. At the adjudication hearing, the court allowed
      testimony by DCFS caseworker Belinda Childs regarding the jurisdiction issue.
¶7        Childs testified that she has been the caseworker for J.S.’s siblings since July 2017. They
      came into the system as a result of inadequate supervision, and they reside in Illinois. The
      contact information for Cynthia she had was at “115 and Elizabeth” in Chicago, and her phone
      number had a 312 area code. Childs testified that Cynthia did not complete her drug treatment
      program or individual therapy or parenting services. Referrals were based in Illinois, and
      visitation occurred in Illinois.
¶8        On July 31, 2017, Childs called Cynthia at a “773” phone number regarding a referral for
      anger management services at “Knock at Midnight,” a place in Chicago. She also discussed
      Cynthia’s pregnancy, informing her that because her other children were in care, the new baby
      would come into care as well. Cynthia told Childs that she was not having the baby in Illinois

                                                  -2-
       and refused to provide her due date. On August 14, 2017, Cynthia contacted Childs regarding
       a referral for anger management services, telling her the building was closed. Cynthia did not
       indicate she was living anywhere other than Chicago.
¶9         On September 24, 2017, Cynthia left a voicemail for Childs stating that she was in a
       hospital giving birth to a girl but no location was provided. On October 2, 2017, Childs spoke
       with Cynthia, and Cynthia told her she had not yet given birth and the due date was October 9.
       Cynthia further stated that DCFS would not get her baby and she was moving to Arizona. At
       the time, Childs’s agency was recommending that temporary custody of J.S. be taken because
       Cynthia had not completed services for her other children and J.S. would be at risk of harm if
       released to her. Childs subsequently learned that J.S. was born on September 24, 2017, at
       Methodist Hospital in Indianapolis. DCFS was granted temporary custody of J.S. on October
       11, 2017. After custody of J.S. was granted, Cynthia faxed Childs a copy of an “interim
       extension Indiana regular ID card” dated October 13, 2017, with an expiration date of
       November 12, 2017.
¶ 10       DCFS child protection specialist, Minnie Carr, testified that she was assigned to J.S.’s case
       on October 4, 2017, while J.S. was at Methodist Hospital. The report she had listed Cynthia’s
       address as 11550 South Elizabeth Street in Chicago. She went to that address and spoke with
       Betty Moore, who identified herself as Cynthia’s aunt. Moore did not give an alternate address
       for Cynthia. Carr spoke with Cynthia on October 10, 2017, and Cynthia told her that she signed
       away her rights to J.S. but did not provide paperwork. She also told Carr that she had not seen
       her other children for three months and she had signed away her rights to them as well. She
       informed Carr that she was in Indiana but gave her official address as 11550 South Elizabeth
       Street in Chicago. Carr also spoke with J.S.’s biological father, Dwayne B., whose cell phone
       number had a 630 area code. He refused to provide his date of birth or his address.
¶ 11       Medical records from Methodist Hospital, dated September 26, 2017, to December 4, 2017,
       were admitted into evidence. The records showed that J.S. was born on September 24, 2017,
       and she had “fetal alcohol exposure and polysubstance exposure,” neurological issues, and
       “worsening feeding issues.” The records indicated that Cynthia stated she drank a lot of wine
       coolers during the first two-thirds of her pregnancy. Cynthia has a history of possible
       schizophrenia, but stopped taking medications prior to her pregnancy, and is THC positive.
       Cynthia acted inappropriately with hospital staff respecting J.S.’s care and fell asleep while
       holding J.S.
¶ 12       On September 26, 2017, the hospital’s social worker notified Indiana Child Protective
       Services because (1) Cynthia reported that she had an open case with DCFS in Chicago, (2) her
       inconsistent reporting about the location of her other children, (3) Cynthia’s unaddressed
       mental health needs, and (4) her lack of prenatal care. Cynthia’s medical record noted that she
       “has Illinois Medicaid, Illinois food stamps, and Illinois WIC.” She told hospital personnel that
       she recently moved to Indianapolis from Chicago to live with her mother. The social worker
       planned to collaborate with Cynthia and DCFS regarding J.S.’s care and discharge.
¶ 13       J.S.’s medical records dated October 3, 2017, stated that her “MDS” returned positive for
       THC and she was “not yet taking [food] 100% by mouth.” Therefore her discharge would be
       delayed. On October 11, 2017, the record stated that J.S. could not be discharged until October
       13, and the hospital was informed that DCFS now had protective custody of J.S. The record
       indicated that J.S. was to be released to Carr upon discharge. Discharge was again delayed
       because J.S. could not take in food by mouth. After a “safe discharge” plan was in place, which

                                                   -3-
       included having a pediatrician for J.S. and follow-up appointments, Methodist Hospital
       released J.S. to her foster parents in Illinois on December 2, 2017.
¶ 14       The State and public guardian rested. Frederick Armstrong then testified on behalf of
       Cynthia. He stated that although he and Cynthia dated on and off in the past, they were now
       just friends. On July 17, 2017, he took Cynthia to Indianapolis because she no longer wished
       to live in Chicago. They returned to Chicago the next day to pack up Cynthia’s belongings,
       and then he took her back to her mother’s house in Indianapolis. Armstrong testified that he
       made sure Cynthia “got her proper IDs and got her food stamp card” on July 19, 2017. He
       stated that she lost her ID and had to get another one when “she lost her wallet.”
¶ 15       Relying on In re D.S., 217 Ill. 2d 306 (2005), the trial court determined it had jurisdiction
       to consider the State’s petition. It found that the case cited by Cynthia, Maksym v. Board of
       Election Commissioners, 242 Ill. 2d 303 (2011), did not apply because “it’s apples to oranges,
       especially in light of the fact that there is a specific child custody jurisdiction act, and that’s
       what this Court has to apply.” The court found that J.S. “did not have a home state” and “[i]t
       just happened—she happened to be born in that hospital in Indianapolis.” The trial court took
       into consideration Armstrong’s testimony, finding it “interesting that none of the documents
       that would have substantiated the fact that [Cynthia] moved in July, *** all those documents
       magically disappeared because [Cynthia] keeps losing her wallet.” The court also noted that
       Cynthia’s temporary Indiana ID card “was issued *** two days after this Court took temporary
       custody or at least entered the order,” and its expiration date indicates it “was acquired after
       the fact in this matter.” The court reasoned that “[i]t would be a different situation if I had a
       voter’s registration card, gas bills, public aid information months before the child was born
       and had those things in evidence.”
¶ 16       The trial court also found that Cynthia has a significant connection with Illinois. It pointed
       to evidence that she has other children who reside in Illinois and noted that substantial evidence
       exists in Illinois regarding Cynthia’s parental fitness and mental health. Cynthia’s history of
       prenatal care regarding J.S. is located in Illinois. Furthermore, the court noted “that I was the
       judge on two of the sibling’s cases *** so I’m aware of the history of the case. *** And I think
       that is important to note for the record.”
¶ 17       The court then found J.S. to be neglected due to an injurious environment, based on the
       theory of anticipatory neglect. At the disposition hearing, the trial court heard evidence to
       determine whether to adjudge J.S. a ward of the court. Oji Eggleston, employed with Lutheran
       Social Services of Illinois, testified that she is the assigned worker for J.S. and the family. J.S.
       is presently in an appropriate foster home and is doing well. J.S. requires a G-tube for feedings
       but is gaining weight. She also receives speech and developmental therapy. In the past six
       month period, J.S. has had two visitations with Cynthia in Chicago. However, J.S. visits with
       her two siblings in DCFS care every other week, and there are discussions for extended visits.
       J.S. also visits with her biological father. Eggleston testified that communication with Cynthia
       had been inconsistent and she had not engaged in any recommended services. When asked
       about Cynthia’s current living situation, Eggleston responded that she lives with her mother in
       Indianapolis. Eggleston had never visited Cynthia in Indianapolis, nor had she sent any mail
       to that address. The trial court subsequently found Cynthia unable and unwilling to care for
       J.S. and adjudged J.S. a ward of the court. Cynthia appeals the trial court’s determination but
       only on the issue of jurisdiction.

                                                    -4-
¶ 18                                              ANALYSIS
¶ 19        Cynthia contends that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the
       State’s petition. To clarify, while the UCCJEA uses the term “jurisdiction” to describe
       conditions that must be met before an Illinois court can decide a question of initial child
       custody, “jurisdiction” here does not mean “a precondition to the exercise of the court’s
       inherent authority.” McCormick v. Robertson, 2015 IL 118230, ¶ 27. Rather, “jurisdiction”
       under the UCCJEA is “simply a procedural limit on when the court may hear initial custody
       matters.” Id. To define the term more broadly would conflict with well-established law holding
       that the circuit court has the authority, pursuant to our constitution, to consider all justiciable
       matters that do not fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of our supreme court. Id.
       ¶¶ 20, 27. In finding that it has jurisdiction, the trial court interpreted provisions of the
       UCCJEA. Therefore, we review the trial court’s determination de novo. In re D.S., 217 Ill. 2d
       at 313.
¶ 20        Section 201(a) of the UCCJEA outlines the circumstances in which “a court of this State
       has jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination.” 750 ILCS 36/201(a) (West
       2016). Illinois has jurisdiction if:
                    “(1) this State is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of
                the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the
                commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this State but a parent
                or person acting as a parent continues to live in this State;
                    (2) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction under paragraph (1) *** and:
                            (A) the child and the child’s parents, or the child and at least one parent or
                    a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this State other than
                    mere physical presence; and
                            (B) substantial evidence is available in this State concerning the child’s
                    care, protection, training, and personal relationships;
                    (3) all courts having jurisdiction under paragraph (1) and (2) have declined to
                exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this State is the more appropriate
                forum to determine the custody of the child under Section 207 or 208; or
                    (4) no court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified
                in paragraph (1), (2), or (3).” Id.
¶ 21        The UCCJEA defines “home state” as
                “the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least
                six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child-custody
                proceeding. In the case of a child less than six months of age, the term means the state
                in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned.” Id. § 102(7).
       J.S. was born in Indiana, and Cynthia remained in Indiana while J.S. was in the hospital. We
       first determine whether Indiana has jurisdiction under the UCCJEA because it is the home state
       of J.S. Like the trial court, we find In re D.S. instructive.
¶ 22        In that case, the respondent lived in Hoopeston, Illinois, and was pregnant. She also had
       eight other children. Two lived with their father in Tennessee, and the remaining six children
       were wards of the State of Illinois following findings of neglect. When respondent asked her
       DCFS caseworker what would happen if she had her baby in Illinois, the caseworker told her
       the DCFS investigative unit would determine whether the baby should be taken into custody.

                                                    -5-
       Concerned that DCFS would take custody of her unborn child, respondent made plans to move
       to Tennessee. In re D.S., 217 Ill. 2d at 309.
¶ 23        At an appointment with her obstetrician in Champaign, Illinois, respondent was told to
       report to the hospital immediately as the birth of her baby was imminent. Respondent instead
       got into her car and headed for Tennessee. She was in Crawfordsville, Indiana, when her
       contractions became unbearable. Respondent checked herself into a local hospital and gave
       birth to D.S. that night. Id. When respondent could not provide a local address to hospital
       personnel, other than saying she was from Hoopeston, a caseworker with the Indiana Child
       Welfare Service called Hoopeston police. The police were familiar with respondent because
       her doctor had called them the day before when respondent failed to report to the hospital as
       instructed. Id.
¶ 24        The Vermilion County State’s Attorney’s Office was contacted, and the State filed a
       petition for adjudication of wardship in the circuit court. The court held an emergency shelter
       care hearing after which the trial court found that it was a matter of immediate necessity to
       temporarily remove D.S. from respondent’s custody due to the prior neglect findings against
       respondent and the possibility that respondent would flee with D.S. and conceal him from
       Illinois authorities. Id. at 310. At the adjudication hearing, evidence was presented of
       respondent’s mental illness, “ ‘which directly impact[s] her ability to care for the child and her
       children.’ ” Id. at 311. The trial court found D.S. neglected due to an injurious environment,
       as supported by evidence of respondent’s mental condition “ ‘that remains untreated’ ” and her
       decision to “ ‘hide the birth of this child by leaving the State without making any provision or
       arrangement for the birth of the child elsewhere.’ ” Id. The trial court found it was in the best
       interest of D.S. to be made a ward of the court. Id. at 312.
¶ 25        On appeal, respondent argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction under the UCCJEA
       because at the time the state filed its petition, D.S. had never lived in Illinois. Id. Rather,
       respondent argued, D.S.’s statutory home state was Indiana because he was born in Indiana
       and while in the hospital lived with respondent in Indiana prior to being brought to Illinois by
       DCFS.
¶ 26        The “home state” of a child less than six months of age is the state in which the child lived
       from birth with any parent or person acting as a parent. 750 ILCS 36/102(7) (West 2016). In
       construing the term “lived,” the supreme court looked at cases from other jurisdictions and
       determined that “lived” meant “something more like ‘to occupy a home.’ ” In re D.S., 217 Ill.
       2d at 317 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1323 (1993)). The court
       reasoned that “[w]hen people speak of where a mother and newborn baby ‘live,’ they do not
       speak of the maternity ward. Instead, they speak of the place to which the mother and baby
       return following discharge from the hospital.” Id. Furthermore, “allowing a temporary hospital
       stay to confer ‘home state’ jurisdiction would undermine the public policy goals of the
       UCCJEA, which include ensuring that ‘a custody decree is rendered in that State which can
       best decide the case in the interest of the child.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 317-18 (quoting
       Unif. Child-Custody Jurisdiction & Enf’t Act § 101 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 657 (1999)). Finding that
       a mere hospital stay is sufficient to confer home state jurisdiction would “turn[ ] the UCCJEA
       on its head, conferring jurisdiction on a state with a de minimis interest in the child.” Id. at 318.
¶ 27        The supreme court thus rejected respondent’s argument that Indiana was the home state of
       D.S. The court pointed to respondent’s testimony that she had no connection to Indiana and
       had no intention to remain in that state following D.S.’s birth. Instead, she intended to move

                                                     -6-
       to Tennessee. Our supreme court agreed with the State that, for purposes of the UCCJEA, D.S.
       had no “home state.” Id. at 314.
¶ 28        Since Indiana did not have jurisdiction as the “home state,” the court looked at the factors
       set forth in section 201(a)(2) to determine if Illinois had jurisdiction. It found that D.S.’s father
       and six of his half-siblings lived in Illinois and respondent was a longtime Illinois resident.
       Also, substantial evidence existed in Illinois concerning D.S.’s care, especially since his half-
       siblings are the subject of termination proceedings in the same circuit that determined D.S.’s
       initial custody, and “those proceedings have generated a substantial record relating to
       respondent’s parental fitness and mental health.” Id. at 319. Respondent’s records were in
       Illinois, and she received prenatal care in Illinois before D.S. was born. Due to these significant
       connections, the trial court had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to rule on the petition. Id. at
       319-20.
¶ 29        Like the child in In re D.S., J.S. was born in an Indiana hospital to a mother who was a
       resident of Illinois and had substantial ties to Illinois. Also, J.S. was in the hospital when DCFS
       initiated proceedings and never left the hospital before being released into DCFS custody in
       Illinois. A temporary hospital stay in itself is insufficient to confer jurisdiction. Id. at 319. A
       factual difference exists, however, between this case and In re D.S. In that case, the respondent
       did not intend for the actual birth state, Indiana, to be her home. She was merely passing
       through Indiana on her way to Tennessee. In contrast, Cynthia contends that she intended for
       Indiana to be her residence, and had J.S. been discharged from the hospital after birth, she
       would have gone home to live with Cynthia in Indiana. Cynthia therefore argues that Indiana
       is J.S.’s home state and In re D.S. is distinguishable.
¶ 30        Our supreme court in In re D.S. did not consider this situation because the respondent there
       did not give birth in Tennessee, the state where she intended to move. However, the court did
       make clear that a parent’s established residence is a relevant factor in determining a child’s
       home state. See id. at 317-18. The court reasoned that the state where a parent lives, works,
       pays taxes, attends church, and sends children to school is the state which can best decide a
       case in the interest of the child. Id. at 318. “[T]o establish residency, two elements are required:
       (1) physical presence, and (2) an intent to remain in that place as a permanent home.”
       (Emphasis omitted.) Maksym, 242 Ill. 2d at 319. There is no dispute regarding Cynthia’s
       physical presence in Indiana. As for the second element, a person’s intent in establishing a
       residence is shown primarily by her acts as well as testimony of her own intent, “though such
       testimony is not necessarily conclusive.” Id. Instead, a person’s “acts and surrounding
       circumstances should be given more weight in making the factual determination of intent.”
       Delk v. Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago, 112 Ill. App. 3d 735, 738
       (1983).
¶ 31        Although Cynthia told Methodist Hospital staff that she recently moved to Indianapolis
       from Chicago to live with her mother, this evidence did not conclusively establish her intent
       to reside in Indiana as her permanent home. Rather, Cynthia’s stated intent was contradicted
       by her actions and other statements. A little more than a month before J.S. was born, Cynthia
       asked her caseworker a question about a referral for anger management services in Illinois.
       Cynthia did not indicate she would be living anywhere other than Chicago. In October 2017,
       after J.S. was born, caseworker Carr went to Cynthia’s address in the report, 11550 South
       Elizabeth Street in Chicago, where she spoke with Cynthia’s aunt. Ms. Moore did not give an
       alternate address for Cynthia at the time. Although she had given birth on September 24, 2017,

                                                     -7-
       in Indiana, Cynthia told her caseworker on October 2, 2017, that she had not yet given birth
       and was planning a move to Arizona. Cynthia’s record at Methodist Hospital noted that she
       “has Illinois Medicaid, Illinois food stamps, and Illinois WIC.”
¶ 32       The trial court gave no credence to Cynthia’s claim that she had moved to Indiana
       permanently in order to live with her mother. Evidence was presented that Cynthia simply
       wanted to leave Illinois to give birth so that DCFS could not investigate her case. Cynthia’s
       caseworkers testified that while pregnant with J.S., Cynthia told them she was not having the
       baby in Illinois because she did not want DCFS to get custody of her unborn baby. The trial
       court noted that the only evidence supporting Cynthia’s intent to move was “a fax of [an ID]
       card that was issued after” J.S. was born. The court acknowledged Armstrong’s testimony that
       he helped move Cynthia to Indiana in July, and at the time he helped her to get “her proper IDs
       and got her food stamp card.” It also acknowledged his explanation that she did not have those
       documents because she lost her ID and had to get another one when “she lost her wallet.”
¶ 33       The trial court, however, questioned the veracity of Armstrong’s testimony. The court
       stated that “for all I know, he took the mother, [and] based on the testimony [of the
       caseworkers], he might have taken her there after the fact to help her in this endeavor to keep
       the child.” The trial court did not find Armstrong’s testimony credible, given the fact that no
       evidence such as bills paid, a voter’s registration card, or public aid information existed to
       support Cynthia’s intent to make Indiana her residence. The trial court is in the best position
       to judge the credibility of witnesses, and this court will not overturn its decision unless it is
       against the manifest weight of the evidence. Department of Public Aid ex rel. Davis v. Brewer,
       183 Ill. 2d 540, 557 (1998). We agree with the trial court’s finding that Indiana was not the
       home state of J.S. and thus had no jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.
¶ 34       Since Indiana was not the home state of J.S., we look at whether Illinois could exercise
       jurisdiction due to a significant connection with Cynthia and J.S. See 750 ILCS 36/201(a)(2)
       (West 2016); In re D.S., 217 Ill. 2d at 319-20. The trial court noted that substantial evidence
       exists in Illinois regarding Cynthia’s parental fitness and mental health. The record shows that
       Cynthia, a long time resident of Illinois, has three other children not in her care after findings
       of abuse and neglect against her. One child is under private guardianship in Illinois, and two
       are currently under the care of DCFS in Illinois. Cynthia was offered mental health, abuse, and
       parenting services in Illinois, but she had not successfully completed those services.
       Furthermore, Cynthia’s history of prenatal care involving J.S. is located in Illinois. The trial
       judge who ruled on the state’s petition in J.S.’s case is the same judge presiding over the cases
       of Cynthia’s two other children in DCFS custody. This evidence, similar to the evidence relied
       on by our supreme court in In re D.S., supports the trial court’s finding that Cynthia and J.S.
       have a significant connection with Illinois. Therefore, the court had jurisdiction under the
       UCCJEA to consider the State’s custody petition.
¶ 35       Cynthia disagrees, pointing to the stated purpose of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987
               “to secure for each minor subject hereto such care and guidance, preferably in his or
               her own home, as will serve the safety and moral, emotional, mental, and physical
               welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community; [and] to preserve and
               strengthen the minor’s family ties whenever possible.” 705 ILCS 405/1-2 (West 2016).
       She argues that finding Illinois has jurisdiction conflicts with the legislature’s intent to place
       J.S. “at or near the home of her mother and grandmother in Indianapolis, and not 180 miles
       away in Chicago.” She further complains that the state’s position shows a disregard for her

                                                   -8-
       right as “a free person who can choose to live where she pleases” by treating her like “chattel
       of the State of Illinois, whose ‘flight’ is sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the
       Illinois courts.”
¶ 36        Cynthia’s argument, however, ignores the fact that she has three other children in Illinois
       who are J.S.’s siblings. Two of those siblings, whose foster parent is Cynthia’s grandmother,
       are currently in DCFS care in Illinois. There have been regular and positive visits between J.S.,
       her siblings, and the foster parents in Illinois. J.S. also visits with her biological father. The
       statute’s purpose to preserve and strengthen J.S.’s family ties is clearly furthered by these
       visitations.
¶ 37        Furthermore, the state has not interfered with Cynthia’s right “to live where she pleases.”
       Although Cynthia would like to live in Indiana with her mother and J.S., she cannot simply
       erase the fact that she has two other children in DCFS care. Cynthia wanted to leave Illinois
       because she knew that the state would conduct an investigation after J.S.’s birth, which it was
       obliged to do given her involvement with DCFS. As our supreme court recognized, a “parents’
       rights are secondary to the State’s strong interest in protecting children when the potential for
       abuse or neglect exists.” American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v.
       Department of Central Management Services, 173 Ill. 2d 299, 312 (1996).
¶ 38        For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

¶ 39      Affirmed.

                                                    -9-


207 P.3d 1008 (2009)
Patsy WERNECKE, Claimant-Appellant,
v.
ST. MARIES JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT # 401, Employer, and State Insurance Fund, Surety, Defendants, and
State of Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, Defendant-Respondent.
No. 34539.
Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, January 2009 Term.
April 14, 2009.
*1011 Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham, P.A., Moscow, for appellant. Charles L. Graham argued.
Mallea Law Offices, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth L. Mallea argued.
J. JONES, Justice.
This is an appeal from an order of the Idaho Industrial Commission holding that a 1994 settlement agreement between Patsy Wernecke and the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) barred all future claims by Wernecke against ISIF. We reverse the order and remand for further proceedings.

I.
In 1990, Patsy Wernecke suffered an industrial injury while employed as a nurse's aide. She filed a worker's compensation complaint against her employer, the State Insurance Fund, and ISIF. Disputes arose between the parties regarding pre-existing impairment, causation, and total and permanent disability. Once she reached medical stability, three physicians evaluated Wernecke and all concluded that despite her injury she was capable of light work, subject to certain physical restrictions. Wernecke settled with her employer and the State Insurance Fund. She later entered into a lump sum settlement agreement (the Agreement) with ISIF, compromising her claim of total and permanent disability for the sum of $6,500.00.
The Agreement states: "Claimant [Wernecke] contends, and the Fund [ISIF] denies, that Claimant is totally and permanently disabled and unable to work and that the Fund is liable for a portion of Claimant's disability *1012 due to [pre-existing] conditions." The Agreement continues:
It is the contention of the Fund that there are disputes concerning: (1) whether Claimant suffered injuries as a result of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment on June 28, 1990; (2) whether Claimant is totally and permanently disabled; (3) whether Claimant has a pre-existing permanent physical impairment within the meaning of Section 72-332 Idaho Code; (4) if Claimant has a pre-existing physical impairment, whether said pre-existing impairment was manifest and constituted a hindrance or obstacle to Claimant obtaining employment; (5) whether in the event Claimant is totally and permanently disabled, Claimant has pre-existing impairments within the meaning of Section 72-332, Idaho Code, which contributed to said disability....
The Agreement goes on to bar Wernecke from recovering any additional compensation from ISIF for any claim of any nature. Wernecke, who was represented by an attorney, signed the Agreement, which the Commission approved in 1994.[1]
Wernecke returned to work under the restrictions recommended by the examining physicians. Unfortunately, she sustained another injury in 2002 while working as a custodian. She filed a complaint against ISIF, her employer, and the State Insurance Fund, asserting that her pre-existing ailments, combined with a new shoulder injury, rendered her totally and permanently disabled. She settled her claims against the State Insurance Fund and her employer. ISIF, on the other hand, argued that the Agreement barred any further recovery from ISIF and filed a petition for a declaratory ruling pursuant to Rule 15 of the Commission's Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure.[2] Wernecke argued that the Agreement violated the Worker's Compensation Act (the Act), and was therefore void. The Commission granted ISIF's petition, finding the Agreement valid. It further held that Wernecke's present claim against ISIF was barred by the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and quasi-estoppel, and that she had waived her right to pursue another claim against ISIF. Wernecke appeals from the Commission's order.

II.

A. Standard of Review
We do not disturb the Commission's factual findings that are supported by substantial and competent evidence, but we exercise free review over the Commission's legal conclusions. Arel v. T & L Enters., Inc., 146 Idaho 29, 31, 189 P.3d 1149, 1151 (2008).
This case requires us to consider whether the Agreement is violative of the Act. Whether a contract violates a statute is a question of law for the Court to determine from all the facts and circumstances of each case. Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6, 56 P.3d 765, 768 (2002). A contract made for the purpose of furthering any matter prohibited by statute is illegal, unenforceable, and void. Kunz v. Lobo Lodge, Inc., 133 Idaho 608, 611, 990 P.2d 1219, 1222 (Ct.App.1999) (citing Porter v. Canyon County Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 45 Idaho 522, 525, 263 P. 632, 633 (1928)). When a court is faced with an illegal contract, it denies enforcement of the contract.[3]Trees, 138 Idaho at 9, 56 P.3d at 771.
*1013 In order to determine if the Agreement violates the Act, we must engage in statutory interpretation, which is an issue of law over which we exercise free review. In re Daniel W., 145 Idaho 677, 679, 183 P.3d 765, 767 (2008). Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute. Paolini v. Albertson's, Inc., 143 Idaho 547, 549, 149 P.3d 822, 824 (2006). The statute should be considered as a whole, and words should be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. Id. When the statutory language is unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute must be given effect, and the court need not consider rules of statutory construction. Payette River Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 557, 976 P.2d 477, 483 (1999). It should be noted that the court must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. AmeriTel Inns, Inc. v. Pocatello-Chubbuck Auditorium Dist., 146 Idaho 202, 204, 192 P.3d 1026, 1028 (2008).
When interpreting the Act, we must liberally construe its provisions in favor of the employee in order to serve the humane purpose for which it was promulgated. Reese v. V-1 Oil Co., 141 Idaho 630, 633, 115 P.3d 721, 724 (2005); Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., 125 Idaho 333, 337, 870 P.2d 1292, 1296 (1994). The Act is designed to provide sure and certain relief for injured workers and their families and dependents. Davaz, 125 Idaho at 337, 870 P.2d at 1296; I.C. § 72-201. The primary objective of an award of permanent disability benefits is to compensate the claimant for his or her loss of earning capacity. Davaz, 125 Idaho at 337, 870 P.2d at 1296. The purposes served by the Act leave no room for narrow technical constructions. Reese, 141 Idaho at 633, 115 P.3d at 724.

B. The Agreement Is Violative of the Act
Wernecke argues that Idaho Code section 72-318(2) prohibits any agreement wherein an employee waives his or her rights to compensation for future injuries. ISIF contends that section 72-318 applies only to agreements between employees and employers; that it does not prohibit employees from waiving claims arising from future injuries; and that, with regard to agreements between an employee and ISIF, an employee must be allowed to waive claims arising from future injuries since ISIF only pays compensation once for any covered employee.

1. Idaho Code Section 72-318(2) Applies to All Agreements Purporting To Waive Rights to Compensation Under the Act
Wernecke argues that the Agreement is void under Idaho Code section 72-318(2) because it relieves ISIF from its obligation to her resulting from any future injury or subsequent disability. ISIF asserts that section 72-318 only applies to agreements between employers and employees, and furthermore that it does not prohibit settling future claims. That section reads:
(1) No agreement by an employee to pay any portion of the premiums paid by his employer for workmen's compensation, or to contribute to the cost or other security maintained for or carried for the purpose of securing the payment of workmen's compensation, or to contribute to a benefit fund or department maintained by the employer, or any contract, rule, regulation or device whatever designed to relieve the employer in whole or in part from any liability created by this law, shall be valid. Any employer who makes a deduction for such purpose from the remuneration of any employee entitled to the benefits of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
(2) No agreement by an employee to waive his rights to compensation under this act shall be valid.

I.C. § 72-318 (emphasis added).
ISIF maintains that the only type of agreement prohibited by section 72-318 is one that relieves an employer of its obligations under the Act. Wernecke argues that ISIF's proffered interpretation is not supported by the case law and, further, that such an interpretation would render subsection (2) meaningless. According to Wernecke, subsection (1) addresses particular contracts between employers and employees, while subsection (2) addresses all agreements *1014 by an employee to waive his or her rights to compensation.
The cases on which ISIF relies to support its argument do not consider the issue of whether section 72-318(2) only applies to agreements between an employee and an employer. In Osick v. Public Employee Retirement System of Idaho, 122 Idaho 457, 835 P.2d 1268 (1992), we held that an agreement offsetting the amount an employee was receiving under worker's compensation against the employee's public employee retirement benefits did not violate section 72-318. Id. at 461, 835 P.2d at 1272. The agreement did not relieve the employer from its liability under the Act or otherwise reduce the employee's worker's compensation benefits. Id. Instead, only PERSI (the Public Employee Retirement system) was relieved of part of its liability to pay disability retirement benefits and the relevant Idaho law did not prohibit a reduction of disability retirement benefits. Id. Therefore, the claimant received his full entitlement of worker's compensation, and no violation of section 72-318 occurred. Id. Notably absent from the case is any discussion of whether section 72-318(2) applies to employee agreements with parties other than the employer. ISIF, however, extracts the following quote from Osick: "I.C. § 72-318 does not, however, prohibit a reduction of disability retirement benefits. It only prohibits an agreement by an employee to relieve an employer of an obligation that the employer has because of the [worker's] compensation laws." Osick, 122 Idaho at 461, 835 P.2d at 1272. Based on this quote, ISIF argues that the statute "only" prohibits certain agreements between employees and employers. When reading Osick in its entirety, however, it is apparent that ISIF's position is incorrect. The rationale behind the Court's holding was that because the obligation and amount of worker's compensation benefits were not affected by offsetting the amount PERSI was obligated to pay for disability retirement benefits, no violation of Idaho Code section 72-318 occurred. Id.
The second case referenced by ISIF likewise does not address whether section 72-318(2) applies only to agreements between employers and employees. See Burdick v. Thornton, 109 Idaho 869, 712 P.2d 570 (1985). The Court merely noted that "[n]o [agreement between an alleged employee and employer] can constitute a waiver by an employee of any rights he might otherwise have under the workmen's compensation law." Id. at 873, 712 P.2d at 574 (citing I.C. § 72-318). The Court did not discuss the types of agreements covered by section 72-318(2). Since no case considers whether the prohibitions of section 72-318(2) apply to all agreements entered into by employees, the issue is one of first impression before this Court.
Section 72-318 contains two subsections: the first lays out a detailed list of prohibited acts and agreements, while the second contains only a simple statement indicating that "[n]o agreement by an employee to waive his rights to compensation under this act shall be valid." In keeping with the purposes of the Act, section 72-318(2) must be interpreted to prohibit all agreements that waive an employee's rights to compensation under the Act. To hold otherwise would mean that subsection (2) is mere surplusage and would require a tortured interpretation of the statutory language.

2. Idaho Code Section 72-332 Provides a Narrowly-Defined Exception to the General Rule that a Claimant Cannot Waive Rights to Compensation for Future Injuries
While Wernecke concedes, based on this Court's holding in Emery v. J.R. Simplot Co., 141 Idaho 407, 111 P.3d 92 (2005), that section 72-318 permits a claimant to compromise a claim arising out of a past injury, she insists that it does not allow a claimant to waive claims arising from future injuries. Therefore, Wernecke argues that the Agreement violates section 72-318(2) and, accordingly, is void. ISIF counters that because Emery did not expressly state that an agreement similar to the one in this case is violative of section 72-318(2), the Agreement is valid.
While parties may compromise claims arising from past injuries, they generally may not compromise claims arising from future injuries. Emery, 141 Idaho at 410, *1015 111 P.3d at 95. We held in Emery that a stipulation dismissing a claim with prejudice, even without payment of compensation, did not violate Idaho Code section 72-318(2). Id. In so holding we emphasized that the stipulation merely dismissed Emery's claim with respect to the injury he suffered on a specific occasion. Id. Notably, this Court found it significant that "[t]he stipulation did not relieve [the employer] of liability for any injury [Emery] might suffer in the future while employed by [the employer]. Emery and [the employer] agreed to resolve the specific claim at issue in this case." Id. Despite ISIF's argument that Emery did not explicitly disallow stipulations dismissing claims for benefits arising out of future injuries, the case indicates such agreements are violative of section 72-318(2). The language of the statute specifies that "[n]o agreement by an employee to waive his rights to compensation under this act shall be valid." I.C. § 72-318(2) (emphasis added). Therefore, agreements attempting to waive compensation rights stemming from future, unknown injuries are generally invalid.
Despite the general rule, it is permissible for settlements involving ISIF to waive rights arising from future injuries due to ISIF's unique role under the Act.[4] ISIF is liable to provide compensation to a worker only when the claimant shows that he or she is totally and permanently disabled because of the combination of a permanent pre-existing physical impairment and a new industrial injury. See I.C. § 72-332; Garcia v. J.R. Simplot, Co., 115 Idaho 966, 968, 772 P.2d 173, 175 (1989) (holding that the four critical elements of a prima facie case against ISIF include: (1) a pre-existing impairment; (2) that the impairment was "manifest"; (3) that the alleged impairment was a "subjective hindrance"; and (4) that the alleged impairment combines in causing total disability). Therefore, according to ISIF, it cannot be liable for multiple successive suits by the same claimant because an injured worker may only be classified as totally and permanently disabled once.
The section describing ISIF's role in the worker's compensation system reads:
(1) If an employee who has a permanent physical impairment from any cause or origin, incurs a subsequent disability by an injury or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his employment, and by reason of the combined effects of both the pre-existing impairment and the subsequent injury or occupational disease or by reason of the aggravation and acceleration of the pre-existing impairment suffers total and permanent disability, the employer and surety shall be liable for payment of compensation benefits only for the disability caused by the injury or occupational disease, including scheduled and unscheduled permanent disabilities, and the injured employee shall be compensated for the remainder of his income benefits out of the industrial special indemnity account.
I.C. § 72-332. Based on this statute, ISIF argues that a claimant may waive his or her claim to future benefits from ISIF, regardless of the possibility of future injuries, because ISIF only pays once per employee. When the Commission finds that the requirements of section 72-332 have been satisfied, this position is correct.[5]
This case, however, involves a lump sum settlement agreement with no finding by the Commission to invoke ISIF's liability under *1016 section 72-332. The validity of a waiver of future claims under such circumstances has not been considered by this Court. Therefore, ISIF's assertion must be considered in the context of the purposes behind the Act and the purpose for the creation of ISIF.[6]

3. An Agreement that Attempts to Compromise Claims Arising from Future Injuries Is Void Unless the Commission Makes the Findings Necessitated by Idaho Code Section 72-332
Wernecke contends that an agreement between an injured claimant and ISIF, waiving the claimant's rights to compensation for future injuries, is violative of the Act when ISIF denies the claimant is totally and permanently disabled, the Commission makes no finding of total and permanent disability, and no evidence exists that would support such a finding. Such agreements, according to Wernecke, defeat the Legislature's purpose in creating ISIF and subvert the Act's policy of providing "sure and certain relief" to employees. See I.C. § 72-201. ISIF asserts that its responsibility to compensate a claimant under section 72-332 is contingent upon the claimant providing proof that he or she is totally and permanently disabled and otherwise establishing a prima facie case against ISIF. However, ISIF argues that this does not prevent parties from entering into lump sum settlement agreements as the parties did in this case.
The purpose of establishing ISIF was to relieve an employer of the burden of paying for total permanent disability compensation to an employee rendered totally and permanently disabled because of a pre-existing handicap coupled with a subsequent industrial injury. Cox v. Intermountain Lumber Co., 92 Idaho 197, 200, 439 P.2d 931, 934 (1968). The goal was to encourage employers to hire handicapped people by reducing the employer's obligation to pay for industrial accidents in the amount it would pay to an employee who had not been previously handicapped. Id. The statute specifies that "the injured employee shall be compensated for the remainder of his income benefits out of the industrial special indemnity account." I.C. § 72-332(1).
Wernecke argues that the word "shall" means that ISIF must pay the remainder of the income benefits pursuant to the statute. However, ISIF argues, and we agree, that it has no obligation until its liability under section 72-332 is established. That requires the finding of four critical elements: (1) a pre-existing impairment; (2) that the impairment was "manifest"; (3) that the alleged impairment was a "subjective hindrance"; and (4) that the alleged impairment combines in causing total disability. Garcia v. J.R. Simplot, Co., 115 Idaho at 968, 772 P.2d at 175. Whether or not ISIF's liability is established is the primary concern in determining whether the Agreement is valid.
Reading the Act with its humane purposes in mind, we conclude that, until ISIF's liability is established under section 72-332, an agreement waiving an employee's rights to claims against ISIF is violative of section 72-318(2). To hold otherwise would result in the payment of questionable claims. Claimants and ISIF do not have absolute freedom to contract because the duties of the parties arise under the Act. As one worker's compensation expert states in his treatise:
it must be stressed that the objective of the legislation is not to see how much money can be transferred to workers as a class; it is to ensure that those with truly compensable claims get full compensation. If there is doubt about the compensability of the claim, the solution is not to send the claimant away half-compensated, but to let the Compensation Board decide the issue. That is the Board's job.
8 ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 132.04[2] (2008).[7]
*1017 Section 72-318(2) sets out the State's policy that agreements purporting to waive an employee's rights to compensation under the Act are void. Section 72-332 provides a narrow exception for cases that meet the requirements therein specified. ISIF's liability may only be invoked when the conditions specified in the statute, as defined in Garcia, are present. That requires findings by the Commission.[8] Unless the Commission finds that the requisite elements exist, it may not approve a lump sum settlement agreement involving ISIF. Such findings are for the benefit of both the claimant  to protect him or her from himself or herself  and of ISIF  to keep it from making unwarranted payments when there are no findings establishing ISIF's liability.[9] In this regard, the Commission plays a gatekeeper role and must scrupulously perform that function. The requisite findings may be made by the Commission upon a hearing on the merits or upon a stipulation of the parties considered and approved by the Commission.
In this case, the Commission erred by approving an agreement that clearly failed to contain the requisite elements to invoke ISIF's liability under section 72-332. In the text of the Agreement, ISIF specifically denied that Wernecke suffered an accident on January 28, 1990, that she was unable to work, that it was liable for a portion of her disability, that she had a pre-existing permanent physical impairment within the meaning of section 72-332, and that she was totally and permanently disabled. ISIF cannot deny each and every element required in order to invoke the provisions of section 72-332 and at the same time assert that by virtue of a lump sum settlement agreement the injured worker is precluded from making a claim under that section for a subsequent injury. ISIF's liability under section 72-332 is not invoked unless the four elements requisite to such a claim are found by the Commission to be present. If the Commission does not make the requisite findings, it has no authority or jurisdiction to hold ISIF liable on a claim. In this case, the Commission merely gave its stamp of approval to the Agreement, making no findings as to whether ISIF's liability under section 72-332 had been properly invoked. Without such findings, the Commission lacked statutory authority to approve the Agreement and its order purporting to do so is void.[10]
*1018 Although ISIF asserts that Wernecke will receive an unconscionable windfall if she is permitted to avoid the waiver, Wernecke argues that allowing her to keep the $6,500.00 already paid to her by ISIF in 1994 is not unconscionable. That amount did not compensate her for total and permanent disability, since there was no admission or determination that she was totally and permanently disabled. Wernecke does not expect a double recovery, she simply aims to bring her current claim against ISIF and, if she succeeds in showing the Commission that she is permanently and totally disabled, then ISIF's liability for total and permanent disability can be properly apportioned and ISIF will be credited for the $6,500.00 it already paid. See, e.g., Southern v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 39 Wash.2d 475, 236 P.2d 548, 551 (1951) ("If the claimant is classified as totally permanently disabled, the nine hundred dollars already paid to him must be considered as an advance on the award to which he is entitled by virtue of this classification."). Therefore, should Wernecke be determined on remand to be totally and permanently disabled, ISIF will be credited the $6,500.00 already paid.[11]

C. Because the Agreement Violates the Act, the Common Law Doctrines of Waiver and Estoppel do not Bar Wernecke's Current Claim
Wernecke argues that the Commission erred by holding that the common law doctrines of quasi-estoppel and waiver bar her from filing her current claim against ISIF because section 72-318(2) renders the Agreement void. ISIF maintains that Wernecke's decision to enter into the Agreement amounted to a waiver of any claims arising from future injuries. ISIF also claims that the doctrine of quasi-estoppel bars Wernecke from seeking benefits, since such a stance is contrary to the one she previously took when signing the Agreement.
Waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage. Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782, 839 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1992). The doctrine of quasiestoppel precludes a party from asserting to another's disadvantage a right inconsistent with a position previously taken by him or her. Mitchell v. Zilog, Inc., 125 Idaho 709, 715, 874 P.2d 520, 526 (1994).
However, neither of these doctrines applies in the case of a contract that violates the law. If a contract is illegal and void, the court will leave the parties as it finds them and refuse to enforce the contract. The contract cannot be treated as valid by invoking waiver or estoppel. Whitney v. Cont'l Life & Accident Co., 89 Idaho 96, 105, 403 P.2d 573, 579 (1965). Therefore, because the Agreement was illegal and violative of the Act, ISIF cannot rely on the doctrines of waiver and estoppel to enforce the Agreement against Wernecke. Absent limited circumstances not present here, this Court will not enforce an illegal contract, *1019 regardless of the fact that the parties knowingly entered into that contract.[12]

D. The Doctrine of Res Judicata is Inapplicable
ISIF insists that the doctrine of res judicata bars Wernecke's current claim. Wernecke maintains that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not bar her from asserting her claim against ISIF. The doctrine of res judicata covers both claim preclusion  true res judicata  and issue preclusion  collateral estoppel. Each will be considered in turn.

1. Res Judicata Does not Bar Wernecke's Claim
Wernecke argues that because the Commission made no determination that she was totally and permanently disabled, and ISIF specifically denied that she was, res judicata cannot bar her current claim. Additionally, no claims stemming from the future injury were actually adjudicated by the Commission because the injury had not occurred yet. Further, Wernecke argues that if the final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation is void, she cannot now be precluded from raising the issue in her current claim. ISIF argues that Wernecke is trying to litigate the same claim as in the prior suit, namely, her right to worker's compensation benefits against ISIF, which arises only in the event of total and permanent disability.
A valid final judgment rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim. Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). Claim preclusion, or res judicata, bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613, 617 (2007).
In order for claim preclusion to bar a subsequent action there are three requirements: (1) same parties; (2) same claim; and (3) a valid final judgment. Id. at 124, 157 P.3d at 618. Claim preclusion generally bars adjudication not only on the matters offered and received to defeat the claim, but also as to matters relating to the claim which might have been litigated in the first suit. Id. at 126, 157 P.3d at 620. However, Idaho Code § 72-718 varies the doctrine of res judicata as applied to worker's compensation cases. See Sund v. Gambrel, 127 Idaho 3, 7, 896 P.2d 329, 333 (1995). Decisions by the Commission are conclusive only as to matters actually adjudicated, not as to all matters which could have been adjudicated. Id.; see also Woodvine v. Triangle Dairy, Inc., 106 Idaho 716, 720-21, 682 P.2d 1263, 1267-68 (1984).
Because we have determined that the Agreement and ensuing order were void, there is no "valid final judgment," and res judicata does not bar the present claim.

2. Collateral Estoppel Does not Bar Wernecke's Claim
Wernecke claims that the issue of ISIF's liability regarding future injuries was not, and could not have been decided. She emphasizes that a future claim for compensation involves a new injury with new facts, the merits of which could not be considered before they even occurred. Additionally, she alleges that the issue of her total and permanent disability could not have been addressed by the Agreement because ISIF denied that she was totally and permanently disabled. Wernecke insists that, if the Agreement and the judgment are void, her claim cannot be barred by collateral estoppel, since the doctrine applies only when there is a valid underlying judgment.
ISIF claims that the issue to be estopped is Wernecke's ability to raise new claims of total disability against ISIF  not the future injury itself or the facts surrounding that injury. Thus, ISIF maintains, since the issue regarding Wernecke's ability to raise a *1020 second claim of total disability against ISIF has been fully litigated and actually decided, Wernecke is barred from re-litigating this issue.
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, protects litigants from litigating an identical issue with the same party or its privy. Ticor Title, 144 Idaho at 123, 157 P.3d at 617. Five elements are required in order for issue preclusion to bar the relitigation of an issue determined in a prior proceeding, but only one is relevant in this case. One of the five elements is that there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation. Id. Whether collateral estoppel bars the litigation of an issue is a question of law which we freely review. Maroun v. Wyreless Sys., Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 617, 114 P.3d 974, 987 (2005). In this case, the Agreement and order were void and cannot be the basis for imposing collateral estoppel because there is no valid final judgment.

III.
Because the Agreement violates the Act and because the Commission's order is void, we vacate the Commission's decision and remand the case for further proceedings.
Justices BURDICK, W. JONES and HORTON, and Justice Pro Tem TROUT concur.
NOTES
[1]  Wernecke was represented by James Westberg at that time, and is currently represented by another attorney from the same firm, Charles Graham. Although ISIF insists that this is a vital fact, the identity and professional affiliations of Wernecke's attorney are of little import.
[2]  That rule allows a person with an interest in a statute, rule, regulation or order to seek a declaratory ruling from the Commission concerning the construction, validity, or applicability of any worker's compensation statute, rule, regulation or order.
[3]  ISIF asserts that parties should not be allowed to argue that their prior agreements are unlawful because doing so is unfair. This argument lacks merit because the issue of contract illegality cannot be waived, but may be raised at any stage of the litigation. Trees, 138 Idaho at 6, 56 P.3d at 768; Whitney v. Cont'l Life & Accident Co., 89 Idaho 96, 105, 403 P.2d 573, 579 (1965) (noting that an illegal contract cannot be "treated as valid by invoking estoppel").
[4]  Sections 72-318 and 72-332 were enacted at the same time and, therefore, must be construed together. Section 72-332, when properly invoked, constitutes a narrowly-defined exception to the prohibition in section 72-318(2). See, 1971 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 124.
[5]  In his authoritative work, Mike Wetherell notes in a discussion about ISIF:

Lump sum settlements are, of course, possible, but the claimant's counsel should recognize that a settlement on a lump sum basis with [ISIF] involves an admission on the part of the Claimant that he is totally and permanently disabled. This means that [ISIF] can place language in its lump sum settlement agreements foreclosing any ability of the claimant at any future date, based on any future accident or aggravation, from seeking any further benefits from [ISIF]. Any lump sum agreement entered into with [ISIF] will contain language forever barring the claimant from any future claims against [ISIF].
MIKE WETHERELL, THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS OF IDAHO 339 (2001).
[6]  ISIF argues that its position must be correct because over the past twenty-eight years during which computerized records have been kept, ISIF has entered into over 1,045 compensation agreements. To now hold its actions void would result in uncertainty regarding all those settlements, according to ISIF. This concern, however, is unwarranted, because our holding is limited to the unique facts in this case. Therefore, the outcome does not necessarily affect other agreements.
[7]  Indeed, such considerations were cited by the dissenting opinion in the Commission's Order in this case. Commissioner Maynard stated:

[I]t is axiomatic that ISIF's lump sum agreements should not be entered into as a means to unreasonably limit its liability. ISIF should not be assessing whether it is better to enter into a lump sum agreement with the claimant now because, in the future, he or she might suffer an injury that puts ISIF on the hook for greater liability. That is, in fact, why ISIF was created  to pay benefits to a claimant who suffers a work injury that combines with a pre-existing condition that renders him or her totally and permanently disabled. Settling a case prematurely (i.e. before there is some amount of evidence that the claimant is actually totally and permanently disabled and unable to return to work) as a "business decision" does not follow the intent for the creation and purpose of the ISIF.
[8]  As ISIF's counsel stated in a brief submitted in another case presently before the Court (Hagadone Corp. v. ISIF, Docket No. 34335) "ISIF liability only arises upon a finding that there was, in fact, a manifest permanent, pre-existing physical impairment which combined with the last industrial accident to render the claimant permanently and totally disabled." Counsel affirmed that statement in oral argument in that case on February 13, 2009.
[9]  These issues were recognized by Commissioner Maynard in his dissent:

The majority would have you believe that a claimant's assertion of total and permanent disability is adequate information for all parties, including the Commission, to proceed with the settlement. On the contrary, it is proper for the Commission "to consider the underlying merits of the [claimant's] claims when making its statutorily required determination as to whether the settlement agreements were `for the best interest of all parties.' Without some preliminary inquiry into the merits of the claim, the Commission cannot properly judge whether an injured worker is surrendering a strong claim for too small a settlement, or whether the ISIF is unwisely satisfying spurious claims at great cost."
(quoting Owsley v. Idaho Indus. Comm'n, 141 Idaho 129, 137, 106 P.3d 455, 463 (2005)).
[10]  Although ISIF asserts that Wernecke is attempting an impermissible collateral attack of the Commission's order approving the Agreement, we disagree because we find the order to be void. A void judgment can be attacked at any time. Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 486, 65 P.3d 502, 508 (2003). "A void judgment ... may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it.... It may be attacked by a person adversely affected by it, in any proceeding, direct or collateral, and at any time." Martin v. Soden, 81 Idaho 274, 281, 340 P.2d 848, 852 (1959) (quoting 30A Am.Jur. Judgments § 45). A judgment is void if there is some jurisdictional defect in the court's authority to enter the judgment, either because the court lacks personal jurisdiction or because it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. Hartman v. United Heritage Prop. & Cas. Co., 141 Idaho 193, 197, 108 P.3d 340, 344 (2005); see also Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455, 459, 680 P.2d 1355, 1359 (1984) ("[A] judgment by a tribunal without authority, or which exceeds or lies beyond its authority, is necessarily void, and may be shown to be so in collateral proceedings, even though it be a court of general jurisdiction, because no authority derived from the law can transcend the source from whence it came.") (quoting Wright v. Atwood, 33 Idaho 455, 462, 195 P. 625, 627 (1921)). An administrative agency is limited to the power and authority granted it by the legislature. Welch v. Del Monte Corp., 128 Idaho 513, 514, 915 P.2d 1371, 1372 (1996). Orders by an administrative agency which authorize something prohibited by the statute are not merely erroneous, but are void. C.J.S. Public Administrative Law & Procedure § 122. Therefore, because we determine that the Agreement approved by the Commission violates the Act, and the Commission is not authorized to approve agreements that violate the Act, the Commission acted outside its statutory authority and the Agreement is void and subject to collateral attack.
[11]  On the other hand, should Wernecke be determined ineligible for ISIF benefits, she will be required to repay the $6,500.
[12]  This Court has recognized a certain limited exception to the illegality doctrine when public policy requires that some relief be granted. Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 200 P.3d 1153 (2009). Additionally, when parties are not "in pari delicto" or when fraud, undue influence, or duress are present relief may be granted to the innocent party. Barry v. Pac. W. Constr., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 833, 103 P.3d 440, 446 (2004). Finally, this Court has allowed some relief to insureds who signed void insurance contracts, in cases where unenforceability would "defeat the purpose for which a statute has been enacted." Id.