12 B.R. 973 (1981)
In re ADANA MORTGAGE BANKERS, INC., Debtor.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,
v.
ADANA MORTGAGE BANKERS, INC., Defendant.
Bankruptcy No. 80-00324A, Adv. No. 80-0273A.
United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.
August 14, 1981.
*974 David Epstein, Kenneth Oestreicher, Attys., Civ. Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff.
Carr, Abney, Tabb & Schultz, Benjamin C. Abney, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant.

ORDER
WILLIAM L. NORTON, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.
Following hearings, evidence, briefs, and oral indication of the ruling by this Court in the debtor's motion to find the Government National Mortgage Association (hereinafter "GNMA") and several of its agents in contempt of the automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. 362(a), this action was first filed on March 17, 1980. Following dismissal for failure to provide service of summons, this adversary proceeding was filed.
Thus, on March 31, 1980, the United States of America brought this action seeking relief from the stay so as to "allow it to exercise its rights to terminate its contracts with Adana and to recover its mortgages and related accounts."
The debtor moved to dismiss for three reasons:
(1) failure to state a claim;
(2) failure to name the real party in interest; and
(3) failure to join indispensible parties.
This opinion is limited to the debtor's motion to dismiss. The merits of the case will be addressed in a later opinion, if the United States of America complies with this order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.
The joinder of all the holders of Government National Mortgage Association (hereinafter "GNMA") securities issued by the debtor is not necessary for complete relief to be accorded to the present parties.

2.
The absence of the holders of all GNMA securities issued by the debtor will not, as a practical matter, impair or impede their ability to protect their interest in their right to payment under the securities issued by the debtor.

3.
The absence of the holders of all GNMA securities issued by the debtor will not expose any of the parties presently before the court to any risk of double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations.

4.
All of the rights the complaint seeks to enforce arose out of a contract between the debtor and GNMA.

5.
GNMA delivered a letter to the debtor on February 7, 1980 which purported to terminate the debtor's servicing and issuing contract with GNMA.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

The holders of all of the GNMA securities assessed by the debtor are not indispensable parties.
The debtor has argued that all of the holders of all of the GNMA securities issued by the debtor (hereinafter "the Certificate Holders") are indispensable parties to this adversary proceeding. The debtor bases this argument upon its contention that: (a) if the relief sought by the Government *975 is granted, the debtor "will be forced" to bring preference actions and post-petition transfer actions with respect to payments made to the Certificate Holders since November 1979; and (b) if such actions by the debtor are successful, the Certificate Holders would lose "millions of dollars for which no reimbursement would be available," because the Government guaranty of payment is not broad enough to cover the situation in which an otherwise proper and timely payment is later avoided by the operation of the Bankruptcy Code. Neither part of the debtor's argument is persuasive
First, whether the plaintiff is granted relief from the stay to terminate its guaranty agreements with the debtor would have no effect upon the characterization of payments heretofore made by the debtor, and the debtor's threat to bring actions for recovery of such payments, in the event the relief sought by the Government is granted, is irrelevant to the issues raised in the debtor's motion to dismiss.
Second, the GNMA guaranty is broad enough by its own terms to require GNMA to reimburse any loss suffered by a Certificate Holder as a result of an issuer's timely and accurate payment being recovered by the debtor as a preferential transfer or avoidable post-petition transfer. The GNMA guaranty guarantees timely and accurate payment of all amounts due under the GNMA securities; there is no qualification to this guaranty, which guarantees complete payment. If a payment were to be later pulled back into the estate, there would be a failure to complete payment to the Certificate Holders, who would, therefore, have recourse against GNMA under the guaranty. Perry v. Van Norden Trust Co., 118 A.D. 288, 103 N.Y.S. 543, 545; Swarts v. Fourth National Bank, 117 F. 1 (8th Cir. 1902). This interpretation of the guaranty agreements has been expressly admitted by the Government in its briefs submitted in opposition to debtor's motion to dismiss. Since the Certificate Holders would continue to have recourse against the only party liable to them for payment under the securities, their absence from this proceeding would not as a practical matter impair or impede their ability to protect their interests in the payments under the securities.

2.

The real party in interest is GNMA and not the United States of America.
The debtor argues that the United States of America has no right to bring a proceeding to have the stay lifted so that the contract between GNMA and the debtor can be terminated. The debtor argues that its contract was with GNMA and not with the United States of America, and that all of the rights in the contract are bestowed on GNMA and not the United States of America.
The plaintiff argues that it has the right to bring this action in the name of the United States of America and that it is the real party in interest within the meaning of Bankruptcy Rule 717 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a). The plaintiff contends that, despite the logic of the debtor's position, federal law gives the United States of America the right to bring this action.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 provides that the United States of America is the real party in interest "where a statute of the United States provides an action for the use and benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the United States." The plaintiff cites 28 U.S.C. § 451 as authority for its argument that it may bring this action in the name of the United States of America. The cited statute merely defines the term "agency" as used in Title 28 of the United States Code, and provides that the term "agency" includes any corporation in which the United States has an interest "unless the context shows that such term was intended to be used in a more limited sense." 28 U.S.C. § 451. This statute does not even address the issue of whether the United States of America can bring an action on behalf of GNMA. 28 U.S.C. § 451 is not the type of statute contemplated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 as authorizing the United States of America to bring an action in its own name.
*976 This Court is aware of cases that have held that, even when an agency might have proceeded in its own name, the United States may also be a real party in interest. The plaintiff has cited several such cases, placing particular emphasis upon Cherry Cotton Mills v. United States, 327 U.S. 536, 66 S.Ct. 729, 90 L.Ed. 835 (1945). This Court is of the opinion that Cherry Cotton Mills should be restricted to its own particular facts, which involved a claim brought against the United States by a petitioner in the Court of Claims. It was held that under a particular statute granting jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals to adjudicate such claims, the United States was permitted to assert a counterclaim on behalf of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The rationale for such an interpretation of the statute involved was that it "accomplishe[d] among other things such useful purposes as avoidance of `circuity of action, inconvenience, expense, consumption of the courts' time, and injustice.'" Cherry Cotton Mills, supra, at 539, 66 S.Ct., at 730.
Here, it was GNMA that initiated this adversary proceeding and made the decision to sue in the name of the United States, rather than in its corporate name. Of course, a federal agency that lacks the capacity to sue must bring the action in the name of the United States. U.S. v. Morrisdale Coal Co. (D.C. Pa. 1942) 46 F.Supp. 356, affd. per. cur., 135 F.2d 921 (3rd Cir. 1943). Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 1562. But, by creating GNMA as a special purpose corporation to operate with broad and flexible powers in the mainstream of the competitive and free enterprise world of mortgage lending, without the cloak of federal sovereign immunity, and by expressly authorizing GNMA to sue in its own corporate name (12 U.S.C. § 1723a(a)) to enforce and defend its contract rights, Congress did not intend for GNMA to sue in the name of the United States whenever it finds the use of that august and supreme title beneficial. There is no indication that Congress intended to give to GNMA chameleon powers to at will convert itself to the United States of America to adapt to changed environments. Instead, undoubtedly Congress expected that GNMA should fly the same colors in the structured berth of the charted, familiar harbor of the federal courts as it is authorized to fly in the open, commercial seas for which it was chartered. This court will not permit the assumption of such an improper role as plaintiff. In the contempt proceeding in this court, and herein, GNMA has contended that it has ownership interests, and powers coupled with an interest, in (1) the 40 Guaranty Agreements, (2) in the mortgages in the 40 mortgage pools, and (3) in the custodial bank accounts of the debtor in the three line banks. The prayers for relief here present these substantial issues. It was GNMA, the corporate entity chartered by Congress, not the United States of America, which entered into these Guaranty Agreements with this Chapter 11 debtor. The contracting party, GNMA, is the only party which presently at least has any rights to enforce through this proceeding. The relief sought can be granted only to GNMA, not the United States of America. The issues raised in this proceeding arise from the commercial business conduct of this separate, independent federal corporate agency, GNMA, which is clearly not a federal instrumentality carrying out a purely governmental function. GNMA is not the United States, has not the sovereign immunity of the United States, possesses not the powers and defenses available to the United States in proceedings in this Court; the United States, therefore, is not the real party in interest (or any party in interest) in this proceeding.
This is an instance of a federal agency being over zealous in aggregating to itself the unwarranted, improper and unauthorized presence in this court proceeding of the protective title of the United States of America. Thus, under the circumstances of this case, and consistent with Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that "the capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law under which it was organized, this Court concludes that 28 U.S.C. § 1723a(a) requires that this proceeding be initiated in *977 the name of GNMA and not the United States of America. See generally, Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1553.
However, this defect in the complaint is not grounds for dismissal. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) provides that such a defect may be cured by substituting the real party in interest within a reasonable time. Accordingly, this court grants the United States of America twenty (20) days from the entry of this order to substitute GNMA as the plaintiff in this action. If such substitution has not been accomplished by an amendment to the complaint, which amendment is hereby expressly authorized by this order, the complaint shall be dismissed with prejudice as to both GNMA and the United States of America.

3.

The complaint, but for the failure to name the real party in interest, does state a claim for relief.
The debtor argues that the complaint fails to state a claim. The debtor reasons that since the complaint seeks relief from the stay so as to allow the United States to terminate its contracts with the debtor and recover its mortgages and related documents and since the United States has no interest in any of the debtor's mortgages and documents that no claim has been stated. This argument is merely a reassertion of the debtor's basic contention that the United States of America is not the real party in interest.
This defect will be cured when and if the United States amends its complaint by substituting GNMA as the plaintiff in this action. If this substitution is accomplished within twenty (20) days after the entry of this order, the debtor's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is denied. However, if the complaint is not amended, the debtor's motion is granted.


544 U.S. 951
MONEYv.CALIFORNIA.
No. 04-8239.
Supreme Court of United States.
March 28, 2005.

1
Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


657 F.Supp. 441 (1987)
Walter L. KACZOR, Plaintiff,
v.
The CITY OF BUFFALO, a Municipal Corporation; and James D. Griffin, in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Buffalo; John B. Myers, in his capacity as Police Commissioner, City of Buffalo Police Department; and Michael L. Broderick, Anthony J. Colucci, and Paschal C. Rubino, in their capacities as Commissioners, City of Buffalo Civil Service Commission, Defendants.
No. CIV-84-1117C.
United States District Court, W.D. New York.
April 7, 1987.
*442 William A. Price, Buffalo, N.Y., for plaintiff.
Samuel F. Houston, Corp. Counsel of the City of Buffalo (Russell Sciandra, and Rosemary Gavigan Bis, of counsel), Buffalo, N.Y., for defendants.
CURTIN, Chief Judge.
Plaintiff Walter Kaczor, a retired City of Buffalo Police Officer, brought this action against the City of Buffalo and certain of its officers in their official capacities, claiming that he has not been reinstated as a police officer due to his age. Plaintiff alleged that defendants' actions violated his rights under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act [ADEA], 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., and the New York State Human Rights Law, NYExec.Law § 296.
A trial was held, and on October 24, 1986, the jury found that the defendants willfully discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of his age, in violation of federal and state law. Defendants have filed several post-trial motions involving the sufficiency of the evidence, jurisdictional issues, and the jury's computation of damages. Oral argument was held on these motions on February 20, 1987.
The following facts emerged at trial. Mr. Kaczor was born on October 31, 1931, and was 54 years old at the time of trial. On January 2, 1982, he retired from the Buffalo Police Department, where he had served for 25 years, to accept a position as a security guard with a private company. Shortly thereafter, the company closed, and Mr. Kaczor was out of work.
In April of 1982, Mr. Kaczor wrote a letter to then Police Commissioner James B. Cunningham, requesting reinstatement, for which there was a provision in Buffalo Civil Service Commission rules. Plaintiff wrote a second letter in May of that year. On May 26, 1982, Commissioner Cunningham wrote to the Civil Service Commission advising that he had approved the reinstatement of Mr. Kaczor and asking the Commission to certify him. Plaintiff passed the required physical, and the Administrative Director of the Civil Service Commission sent a letter to Commissioner *443 Cunningham approving Mr. Kaczor's reinstatement.[1]
A short time later, plaintiff was advised that there was some further paperwork to be completed and was told to speak with Richard Planavsky, Commissioner of Administration and Finance for the City of Buffalo. Mr. Planavsky told plaintiff that a "personnel requisition" had to be completed before he could be reappointed. Plaintiff was never reinstated.
Plaintiff testified that he next saw Commissioner Planavsky at a political rally in the summer of 1983. Mr. Kaczor testified that, in response to his question as to why he had not been rehired, Commissioner Planavsky responded: "I could hire two for the price of you." Planavsky denied making this statement.
As Commissioner of Administration and Finance, Mr. Planavsky is responsible for preparing the City's annual budget and for overseeing labor relations. He reports to the Mayor. When a department, such as the Police Department, is planning to hire someone, a personnel requisition form is submitted to Commissioner Planavsky's office. After review, Commissioner Planavsky makes a recommendation to the Mayor. Planavsky testified that he recommended against Mr. Kaczor's reinstatement, but not on the basis of age. According to Planavsky, his decision was based upon other considerations, such as Civil Service requirements and concern that rehiring Mr. Kaczor could set a bad labor precedent.
At trial, plaintiff took the position that he was not reinstated due to his age and the economic incentive to the City to hire younger individuals. Plaintiff also produced evidence of economic saving associated with hiring younger individuals who started at a lower salary and who were entitled to fewer benefits than were veteran officers.
The jury found that defendants discriminated against Mr. Kaczor on the basis of his age and that the discrimination was willful so as to entitle Mr. Kaczor to liquidated damages. The jury answered a series of questions as to damages, finding that no jobs held by plaintiff from 1982 to 1986 should be used in mitigation of the damages, and that plaintiff was entitled to be reimbursed for his insurance expenses. They also found, under New York State Human Rights law, that plaintiff should be awarded damages for mental anguish and humiliation in the amount of $200,000.00 (see Verdict Sheet, Item 21). The precise calculation of back pay and lost benefits was left to the court and the parties, as is the question of reinstatement/front pay. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).

DEFENDANTS' POST-TRIAL MOTIONS

1. Motions for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
Defendants have moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the jury's findings on liability and willfulness. In considering these motions, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Kaczor. A motion for judgment n.o.v. shall be granted only if, without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the evidence, the court concludes that the evidence is such that reasonable people could not have reached the verdict which was rendered. Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir.1970); Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, New York, 783 F.2d 319, 328-29 (2d Cir.1986).

(a) Liability
There was ample evidence to support the jury's verdict as to liability. Plaintiff's testimony as to Commissioner Planavsky's statement about hiring two for the price of one provided direct evidence of age discrimination. Although Planavsky denied making these comments, this was an issue of credibility solely for the jury. There was also evidence that the City was concerned with reducing personnel costs, that the City saves by hiring individuals with no seniority as opposed to veterans, and that rookies were hired to fill vacancies while plaintiff was not reinstated.
*444 Although defendants offered evidence of other reasons for the failure to reinstate plaintiff, the jury could have reasonably found that age was a "but for," determining factor in the decision not to reinstate plaintiff. Hagelthorn v. Kennecott Corp., 710 F.2d 76, 83 (2d Cir.1983). Defendants' motion for judgment n.o.v. on this ground is denied.

(b) Willfulness
Defendants also move to set aside the jury's finding that the discrimination against Mr. Kaczor was willful. The ADEA provides for the payment of liquidated damages if the violation is willful. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). Since the jury found that there was willfulness, Mr. Kaczor is entitled to recover double for lost wages and other benefits. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b) and 626(b).
A violation of the ADEA is willful if the employer knew or showed reckless disregard for whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA. Trans World Airlines Ins. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 128-29, 105 S.Ct. 613, 625-26, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985). The jury was instructed as to this standard. Its verdict is supported by the evidence.
At the time of trial, Commissioner Planavsky had two years' experience as Commissioner of Administration and Finance, one year as an aide to the Mayor of the City of Buffalo, and one year as Labor Relations Commissioner for the City. (Transcript, Vol. 4, pp. 9, 44, 62, and 71.) When questioned about his familiarity with age discrimination laws, Planavsky testified:
I was aware generally that you're not supposed to discriminate in certain areas. I was not familiar with the specific law, specifically what was written as far as age discrimination....
Transcript, Vol. 4, p. 82. The issue of Commissioner Planavsky's credibility was for the jury. Furthermore, a finding of willfulness does not depend upon a showing that a defendant acted with a specific intent to violate the Act. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 126, n. 19, 105 S.Ct. at 624, n. 19.
Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, or even from a neutral stand point, the evidence permitted a finding that, given Commissioner Planavsky's background and his failure to fully investigate the law despite the resources available to him as an official in City government, he either knew that his conduct violated the ADEA or acted with reckless disregard as to whether his conduct violated the Act. Thurston, supra. This finding is further bolstered by the direct evidence of intentional discrimination in this case.
Counsel for the City cites Dreyer v. Arco Chemical Co., 801 F.2d 651 (3d Cir.1986), for the proposition that a more stringent standard of willfulness (i.e., a showing of outrageous conduct), should be applied in cases in which the employer's action is directed at a particular individual, as opposed to the adoption of a broad-based policy which has a discriminatory effect. Such a standard is too strict and is essentially equivalent to the "intentional violation" standard rejected by the Court in Thurston, 469 U.S. at 126, n. 19, 105 S.Ct. at 624, n. 19. See Lindsey v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 810 F.2d 1094 (11th Cir. 1987).
Defendants' motion for judgment n.o.v. on the issue of willfulness is denied.

2. Motions to Dismiss on Procedural and/or Jurisdictional Grounds

(a) The ADEA Claim
Defendants claim that plaintiff failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the ADEA, mandating dismissal of his cause of action under the ADEA. Defendants' post-trial motion is the first time this issue was raised.
Before an action is brought, an individual must file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC]. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). It is not disputed that Mr. Kaczor filed a timely charge with the EEOC (Plaintiff's Exh. 8). In addition, if an individual resides in a state which has laws prohibiting discrimination, the ADEA requires that proceedings be commenced in accordance with that state's laws before an *445 action is brought. Since New York has its own age discrimination laws, it is a "deferral state" under 29 U.S.C. § 633(b). In this case, Mr. Kaczor himself never filed a complaint with an appropriate state agency. The EEOC, acting pursuant to a work-sharing agreement, sent a copy of Mr. Kaczor's complaint to the New York State Division for Human Rights.
The parties are in essential agreement as to the procedures followed in Mr. Kaczor's case, as was set forth in affidavits from agency representatives. The EEOC follows a standard procedure when a charge is filed. A clerical worker sets up a file and, within ten days, forwards a copy of the charge to both the employer and the New York State Division of Human Rights. The cross-filing with the State Division of Human Rights is automatic, and is done to fulfill ADEA requirements. The complainant is not given a choice as to whether the charge is filed with the state agency. The filing is mandatory under EEOC regulations (see 29 CFR § 1601.13) and the work-sharing agreement with the New York State Division of Human Rights. According to the terms of the work-sharing agreement, the agency which first receives the charge investigates and conciliates the charge. This same procedure was followed in 1983, when Mr. Kaczor filed his charge with the EEOC. See Affidavit of Kathleen L. Jackson, EEOC Specialist who investigated Mr. Kaczor's complaint (Item 25, Exh. B).
The Federal Contact Unit of the New York State Division of Human Rights received copies of plaintiff's EEOC charges, assigned its own case numbers to the charges, and forwarded the charges to the Case Control and Statistical Information Unit, where they were received on December 20, 1983. In 1983, when copies of charges were forwarded from the EEOC for dual filing purposes, the State Division of Human Rights filed the charge for the record and took no further action. See Affidavit of Richard E. Clark, Regional Director of the New York State Division of Human Rights (Item 32).
This type of referral system between federal and state agencies has been approved by both the Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the context of Title VII cases. Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522, 92 S.Ct. 616, 30 L.Ed.2d 679 (1972); New York Gaslight Club v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 64, 100 S.Ct. 2024, 2031, 64 L.Ed.2d 723 (1980); and Voutsis v. Union Carbide, 452 F.2d 889, 892 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918, 92 S.Ct. 1768, 32 L.Ed.2d 117 (1972). Like the ADEA, Title VII also requires filing with an appropriate state agency.[2] In Love v. Pullman, the Court concluded that the referral procedure was an acceptable way to proceed, in that it both gave state agencies "a prior opportunity to consider discrimination complaints" and ensured "expedition in the filing and handling of these complaints." Love, 404 U.S. at 526, 92 S.Ct. at 619.
Defendants contend that the procedure followed in this case, in which the State Division of Human Rights simply filed Mr. Kaczor's charges for record-keeping purposes with no review of its own, is not enough to satisfy the requirements of the ADEA. However, the state agency was provided with the opportunity to consider the complaint, consistent with Love, supra. See also Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 764, 99 S.Ct. 2066, 2075, 60 L.Ed.2d 609 (1979). The State Division of Human Rights chose to act pursuant to a work-sharing agreement with the EEOC by recording the charge but leaving investigation and conciliation with the EEOC. This satisfied the requirements of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 633(b).

(b) The Claim under New York State Human Rights Law
Defendants also challenge this court's jurisdiction over plaintiff's pendent state *446 claim under the New York State Human Rights law, Exec.Law § 296. The standard of proof for the state law claim mirrors that of the standard of proof for the ADEA claim. For the most part, the remedies are the same under both federal and state law. The exception is recovery for emotional distress, which is prohibited under the ADEA, but permitted under New York Exec.Law § 296. Johnson v. Al Tech Specialties Corp., 731 F.2d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 1984); see Cullen v. Nassau County Civil Service Commission, 53 N.Y.2d 492, 496, 442 N.Y.S.2d 470, 472, 425 N.E.2d 858, 860 (1981); Batavia Lodge No. 196 v. New York State Division of Human Rights, 35 N.Y.2d 143, 145-46, 359 N.Y.S.2d 25, 316 N.E.2d 318 (1974).
Defendants failed to raise the jurisdictional issue before trial or even during the course of the trial. A question regarding jurisdiction over the state law claim first arose during discussion of the jury charges. It was agreed to let the jury pass upon the issue, and to permit the parties to brief the jurisdictional issues after trial. The jury awarded Mr. Kaczor damages for emotional distress, an award which may stand only if this court had jurisdiction over plaintiff's pendent state law claim.
In determining whether there is jurisdiction over plaintiff's pendent state law claim, this court must follow New York law. The sticking point is an election of remedies provision in the NYExec.Law § 297(9), which provides:
Any person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice shall have a cause of action in any court of appropriate jurisdiction for damages and such other remedies as may be appropriate, unless such person had filed a complaint hereunder [with the State Division for Human Rights], or with any local commission on human rights ... [unless] the division has dismissed such complaint on the grounds of administrative convenience.
In accordance with this provision, New York courts have held that plaintiffs who first file with the State Division of Human Rights or with a local agency lose their right to proceed de novo in a judicial forum. Once a complaint is filed with a state agency, the plaintiff is deemed to have selected his remedy and must proceed through the administrative procedures. He may ultimately seek review in the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division. NYExec.Law § 298. He may not withdraw his administrative complaint and turn to the courts. The only exception to this rule is a dismissal of the complaint by the agency on the grounds of administrative convenience. See Emil v. Dewey, 49 N.Y.2d 968, 428 N.Y.S.2d 887, 406 N.E.2d 744 (1980).
The election of remedies provision of New York Human Rights law is frequently at odds with the federal scheme, which requires individuals to file with the state agency before bringing suit. Federal district courts faced with either an ADEA or Title VII case in which a plaintiff had, at some point, first filed a complaint with a state agency, have almost uniformly dismissed the pendent state law claim. Marin v. New York State Department of Labor, 512 F.Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y.1981); Collins v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 542 F.Supp. 663 (S.D.N.Y.1982); Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 609 F.Supp. 1191 (S.D.N.Y.1985); Klotsche v. New York City, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985); Hunnewell v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 628 F.Supp. 759 (S.D.N.Y.1986).
Courts have commented on the puzzling outcome this produces:
Thus, although it may seem anomalous, because of the requirements of ADEA § 633(b), a plaintiff who brings an ADEA claim in federal court cannot bring a New York State claim in either state or federal court.
Hunnewell, 628 F.Supp. at 761.
In Meschino v. International Telephone and Telegraph, 563 F.Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), the court discussed the issue but did not rule upon its jurisdiction, pending determination of whether plaintiff's complaint came within the "dismissal for administrative convenience" exception. The court noted:
Construing the ADEA and the state statute literally, their combined effect seems to be that a plaintiff may not bring a court action asserting both federal and *447 state age discrimination in employment claims.... [W]e think it appropriate to resolve the question of whether the administrative convenience exception has been met and not attempt, at this point, to determine whether the convergence of state and federal law should be read to produce the anomalous result a literal reading seems to yield.
Id. at pp. 1074-75.
I agree with those courts which have found that the interrelationship between federal and state law in this instance yields a result which is somewhat bewildering and neither practical nor, in many cases, equitable. However, there is a distinction between the circumstances in the instant action and those in the cases cited above: Mr. Kaczor did not himself file a complaint with the State Division of Human Rights. As discussed above, it is undisputed that the EEOC filed a copy of Mr. Kaczor's charges with the State Division of Human Rights. Plaintiff maintains that this is a crucial distinction. Plaintiff claims that since he did not file the charges with the state agency, he cannot be deemed to have exercised his right of election under New York State Exec.Law § 297(9).
In those cases in which the charges were filed with the state agency by the EEOC, courts have held, as plaintiff urges, that section 297(9) does not preclude court action and have refused to dismiss state law claims on that basis. Selbst v. Touche Ross & Co., 587 F.Supp. 1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), and People v. Holiday Inns, 656 F.Supp. 675 (W.D.N.Y.1984, Elfvin, J.).
My research has revealed only two New York State court cases in which the plaintiff first filed with the EEOC, after which the EEOC automatically filed his charge with a state human rights agency. In both cases, the plaintiff then sought to bring his claims under NYExec.Law § 296 in state court. Both courts found that, on these facts, NYExec.Law § 297(9) did not mandate dismissal of the claims. Rodriguez v. Altman & Co., NYLJ May 7, 1984, at 14, Col. 2, (Sup.Ct., New York City), and Scott v. Carter-Wallace, 511 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct.1986). Both found that the language of section 297(9)  "unless such person had filed a complaint"  applies only to those plaintiffs who themselves filed a complaint with a state agency.
The ordinary meaning of this subdivision's words does not readily admit any exception to the requirement that before the bar to institution of an action may be said to operate, the aggrieved person must be the one who filed the charge with the Division. Furthermore, the phrase "any person claiming to be aggrieved" has been held to include only the victim of the illegal discriminatory practice.
Rodriguez, supra (citations omitted). Both courts also concluded that, when the EEOC automatically files the charge with the state agency, an individual has no choice in the matter, and therefore, it is not a meaningful election of remedies.
This court agrees that the plain language of section 297(9) makes the bar to court action applicable only when the plaintiff himself files with the state agency, and not when a third party (i.e., the EEOC) files on his behalf. However, this conclusion results in yet another anomaly.
The practical distinction between those cases in which the individual files the charge and those in which the EEOC files the charge is slim. The EEOC automatically files charges with the State Division of Human Rights to be of assistance to victims of discrimination, effectively acting as their agent. See Voutsis, 452 F.2d at 892. However, the EEOC could have adopted a policy whereby it notified complainants that they must make their own filings with a state agency. In that case, individuals from New York would be barred by NYExec.Law § 297(9) from having their state human rights claim heard in court.
The distinction becomes particularly thin when an individual files his charges without assistance of counsel. In many cases, his decision as to whether to file with a state (or local) agency or with the EEOC may be fortuitous, yet could result in his losing the right to have certain claims heard in court. There would be no meaningful election of remedies in either event.
Nonetheless, the language of the election of remedies provision is clear. Those courts which have addressed the issue *448 have concluded that a filing with a state agency by the EEOC does not trigger the section 297(9) bar to court action. Given the "anomalous" results when the federal and state requirements are construed together, this court agrees that NYExec.Law § 297(9) should be read narrowly. Since Mr. Kaczor, the aggrieved individual, did not file a charge with the State Division of Human Rights, section 297(9) does not apply to bar this court from hearing his state law claims.
Defendant's motion to vacate the jury verdict awarding Mr. Kaczor damages for emotional distress under New York State Human Rights Law, on the ground that this court lacks jurisdiction over the claim, is denied.

3. Motions on Damages
Finally, there were motions related to excessiveness of damages on the federal claim and on the pendent state claim. During argument, the court related to counsel that it appeared from the trial record that there should be a reduction in the amount of verdict on both claims.
On the ADEA claim, the trial record revealed that when Mr. Kaczor was working as a Buffalo Police Officer, he also worked a part-time job. Mr. Kaczor appears to be entitled to some credit for part-time work he would have done had he continued as a Buffalo Police Officer. After he retired, some of the jobs he took were full-time, and he testified that he could not have held some of them had he been employed by the Buffalo Police at that time. Based upon this, the City is entitled to some reduction.
Although the jury was given an opportunity to make a full or partial reduction for each job held, no reduction was made. This was against the weight of the evidence.
On the state claim, the jury awarded plaintiff $200,000.00 for emotional distress. Plaintiff himself testified as to the emotional distress he claimed to have suffered. Under New York law, this is sufficient to support an award for emotional distress. Cullen, supra, 442 N.Y.S. at 473, 425 N.E.2d at 861. Nonetheless, it is clear that the evidence in support of his emotional distress award was quite limited, and it certainly may be argued that the jury's award is greatly excessive.
The court believes that it will be to the benefit of both plaintiff and defendants to ernestly attempt to negotiate the money value of these claims. For that reason, these questions are referred to United States Magistrate Edmund F. Maxwell for the purpose of conducting settlement negotiations. If the amount of the award cannot be settled by May 29, 1987, the court shall be notified and a decision will then be made on the merits.
To summarize, defendants' motions for judgment n.o.v. on the issues of liability and willfulness are denied. Defendants' motion to dismiss the ADEA claim is denied, as is defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's pendent state claim for lack of jurisdiction. The damages issues shall be taken up with Magistrate Maxwell, as set forth above.
So ordered.
NOTES
[1]  Police Commissioner Cunningham passed away sometime before this case came to trial.
[2]  Although both Title VII and the ADEA contain provisions mandating filing with an appropriate state agency, Title VII is more restrictive. Under Title VII, a charge must be filed with the state agency 60 days before it is filed with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). The ADEA requires that the charge be filed with the EEOC 60 days before the lawsuit is brought. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b). Under the ADEA, the charges may be filed concurrently with the state agency and the EEOC.


                            UNPUBLISHED

                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                      FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                            No. 16-7090

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                Plaintiff - Appellee,

          v.

GARY VINCENT WHORLEY, a/k/a Tyrone,

                Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, Chief
District Judge. (3:15-cr-00010-GMG-RWT-1)

Submitted:   October 13, 2016             Decided:   October 18, 2016

Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Gary Vincent Whorley, Appellant Pro Se. Paul Thomas Camilletti,
Assistant United States Attorney, Martinsburg, West Virginia,
for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

     Gary   Vincent     Whorley   appeals   the   district    court’s    order

denying his “motion to produce notarized document.”                   We have

reviewed the record and find no reversible error.               Accordingly,

we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court.                 United

States v. Whorley, No. 3:15-cr-00010-GMG-RWT-1 (N.D.W. Va., Aug.

1, 2016).     We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal    contentions    are   adequately    presented    in   the   materials

before   this   court   and   argument   would    not   aid   the   decisional

process.

                                                                    AFFIRMED

                                     2


                              UNPUBLISHED

                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                      FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                              No. 12-4628

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                Plaintiff - Appellee,

          v.

VICTOR DAVIS SPENCER,

                Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Elizabeth City.   Terrence W.
Boyle, District Judge. (2:11-cr-00047-BO-2)

Submitted:   March 26, 2013                 Decided:   April 5, 2013

Before DAVIS, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.

Sean P. Vitrano, VITRANO LAW OFFICES, PLLC, Wake Forest, North
Carolina, for Appellant.     Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant
United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

               Victor Davis Spencer pled guilty, pursuant to a plea

agreement,      to    conspiracy        to    distribute       and     to    possess       with

intent    to    distribute        more    than      twenty-eight        grams      of     crack

cocaine,       in    violation     of    21    U.S.C.     §    846     (2006),      and     was

sentenced to 132 months’ imprisonment.                        On appeal, counsel has

filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967),     asserting      that    there      are    no   meritorious            grounds    for

appeal, but questioning the validity of Spencer’s guilty plea

and whether the district court committed plain error by failing

to   rule       on    Spencer’s         objection       to     the     career       offender

designation.          Although advised of his right to file a pro se

supplemental brief, Spencer has not done so.                         The Government has

moved to dismiss the appeal of Spencer’s sentence on the basis

of the waiver of appellate rights contained in Spencer’s plea

agreement.           For   the     reasons        that       follow,        we    grant     the

Government’s         motion      and     dismiss      the      appeal        of    Spencer’s

sentence, and we affirm his conviction.

               A defendant may, in a valid plea agreement, waive the

right to appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006).                         United States v.

Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990).                            This Court reviews

the validity of an appellate waiver de novo, and will enforce

the waiver if it is valid and the issue appealed is within the

scope thereof.          United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th

                                              2
Cir.    2005).           An    appeal      waiver            is    valid      if    the     defendant

knowingly and intelligently agreed to it.                                       Id. at 169.            To

determine      whether         a    waiver     is       knowing         and   intelligent,            this

Court examines the background, experience, and conduct of the

defendant.        United States v. Broughton–Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146

(4th Cir. 1995).              We have thoroughly reviewed the plea agreement

and the transcript of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing.                                          Based on

the totality of circumstances in this case, we conclude that

Spencer       knowingly            and   voluntarily               entered         into     the       plea

agreement      and       understood       the       waiver.             See     United     States       v.

General, 278 F.3d 389, 400 (4th Cir. 2002).

              We further conclude that Spencer’s challenge to the

district      court’s         handling         of       his       objection        to     the     career

offender designation falls within the scope of the waiver.                                              In

his    plea    agreement,           Spencer      waived           the    right      to    appeal       his

sentence, including any claims related to the determination of

his    advisory      Guidelines           range,         reserving         only      the    right      to

appeal     from      a    sentence        greater             than      the     Guidelines           range

established at sentencing.                      Spencer argues that the district

court     committed           plain      error          by     failing        to     rule       on     his

outstanding objection to the career offender designation.                                             See

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B).                       However, because Spencer received

a   sentence      well        below      his    Guidelines              range      and    this       issue

relates to the establishment of that range, his discretion falls

                                                    3
within the purview of the waiver provision.                             Accordingly, we

grant the Government’s motion to dismiss in part and dismiss the

appeal of Spencer’s sentence.

           Although      the     appeal       waiver       precludes     our    review    of

Spencer’s sentence, the waiver does not bar review of Spencer’s

conviction.      Because Spencer did not move to withdraw his guilty

plea in the district court, we review the Rule 11 hearing for

plain error.      United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th

Cir. 2002).      “To establish plain error, [Spencer] must show that

an error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the error

affected his substantial rights.”                    United States v. Muhammad,

478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2007).                   We have reviewed the record

and   discern    no     error    warranting          correction        on     plain    error

review.

           In accordance with Anders, we have thoroughly reviewed

the entire record for any other potentially meritorious issues

outside   the    scope    of    Spencer’s         appeal     waiver     and    have    found

none.     We therefore affirm Spencer’s conviction.                            This Court

requires that counsel inform Spencer, in writing, of his right

to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further

review.     If   Spencer       requests       that     a    petition     be    filed,    but

counsel   believes       that    such     a       petition     would     be    frivolous,

counsel   may    move    in     this    Court      for     leave   to       withdraw    from

representation.       Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof

                                              4
was served on Spencer.       We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials   before   this   Court   and   argument   would   not   aid   the

decisional process.

                                                      DISMISSED IN PART;
                                                        AFFIRMED IN PART

                                    5


187 P.3d 530 (2008)
EUROFRESH, INC., a Delaware corporation, fka Bonita Nurseries, Inc., a corporation, Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
GRAHAM COUNTY, Defendant/Appellant.
No. 1 CA-TX 06-0002.
Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department T.
October 25, 2007.
Reconsideration Denied January 11, 2008.
Review Denied June 3, 2008.
*531 Fennemore Craig, P.C. By Paul J. Mooney, Jim L. Wright, Paul Moore, Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellee.
Helm & Kyle, Ltd. By Roberta S. Livesay, Lisa J. Bowey, Tempe, Attorneys for Appellant.

OPINION
JOHNSEN, Judge.
¶ 1 This is an appeal from a Tax Court decision granting a challenge to Graham County's assessments of the full cash value of a large hydroponic greenhouse in Willcox. The owner of the property, Eurofresh, Inc., challenged the County's assessments for tax years 2004 and 2005. During trial in the Tax Court, the parties generally agreed on the replacement cost of the greenhouse, but Eurofresh argued that the replacement cost should be reduced by 40 percent for ad valorem tax purposes because of external obsolescence. We hold that as a matter of law, proof of external obsolescence requires a showing of the cause of the asserted obsolescence and proof that it affects the value of the subject property. Because Eurofresh offered no such proof, we reverse the judgment of the Tax Court and remand for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶ 2 Eurofresh is the leading year-round producer and seller of greenhouse tomatoes in the United States. Although it has distribution centers at several locations throughout the country, Eurofresh operates greenhouses in only two locations, both in Arizona: the Willcox facility and another greenhouse in Snowflake that the company purchased in 2002. The greenhouses are hydroponic, meaning that the tomato plants are grown without soil.
¶ 3 The full cash value of real property is assessed as of January 1 of the preceding year. Ariz.Rev.Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 42-11001(15) (2003).[1] As of the January 1, 2003 valuation date for tax year 2004, Eurofresh owned 120 acres "under glass" in Willcox, and the County assessed the greenhouse at $36,229,693. Eurofresh added 48 acres of greenhouse in time for the January 1, 2004 valuation; for tax year 2005, the County valued Eurofresh's 168 acres of greenhouse at $51,884,078.
¶ 4 Eurofresh timely appealed the County's full cash value assessments for both tax years by filing complaints in the Tax Court.[2] After consolidating the appeals for the two tax years, the Tax Court held a nine-day bench trial.
¶ 5 Among the evidence at trial was a confidential offering memorandum issued by Banc of America Securities in April 2004 in connection with a $100 million loan to Eurofresh. According to the offering memorandum, in 2003 Eurofresh sold 80 million pounds of tomatoes grown in Arizona. The company's chief financial officer, Frank Van Straalen, testified that Eurofresh has a 20 percent share of the U.S. grocery-store greenhouse-tomato market. It is the largest U.S. supplier of greenhouse tomatoes; its Arizona operations give it 77 percent more productive acreage than its next largest competitor *532 in this country. According to the offering memorandum, the fact that Eurofresh is able to produce its greenhouse tomatoes year-round affords it "a unique competitive advantage." "As a result of year-round production, technologically advanced operations and premium positioning, Eurofresh believes it is the most consistently profitable hydroponic greenhouse tomato producer in North America."
¶ 6 Eurofresh's Willcox greenhouse is the largest of its kind in the world. Evidence at trial established that Willcox provides what Eurofresh calls an "ideal location" for its greenhouse. There it enjoys a "vast" supply of groundwater and abundant sunlight, "including the highest amount of winter sunlight in North America (average of 330 days of sunlight per year)." In addition, Willcox "provides cooler temperatures in the summer and frost in the winter, which helps the biological pest control program." According to the offering memorandum, "No other greenhouse competitor is able to generate a consistent, high volume supply of premium quality tomatoes throughout each month of the calendar year." This is a particularly valuable competitive advantage in the winter, when some competitors shut down and tomato prices rise. More than half of Eurofresh's projected revenues come from fixed-price purchase agreements with major U.S. grocers and "big-box" stores.
¶ 7 As Eurofresh described in its offering memorandum, the fresh produce market in the U.S. "is characterized by consistent underlying demand and favorable growth dynamics." Since 2000, the fresh tomato segment of that market experienced a 12 percent compounded annual growth rate. Greenhouse tomatoes represented 29 percent of the $2.5 billion average weekly grocery-store tomato sales. To take advantage of market growth, in 2004 Eurofresh was mapping a long-term plan to add up to 200 more acres of production capacity in Arizona.
¶ 8 At trial the County and Eurofresh agreed the most appropriate appraisal technique to apply to the Willcox greenhouse was the "replacement cost" method. As the Tax Court noted, both sides presented roughly equivalent estimates of the greenhouse's replacement cost. Both sides also agreed that when valuing real property using the cost method, one must take depreciation into account. According to Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate (12th ed.) (2001), which both sides agreed was authoritative, three categories of depreciation must be considered: physical depreciation, functional obsolescence and external (or "economic") obsolescence. See id. at 363-65.[3] The County and Eurofresh's expert appraiser witness, Paul Bierschwale, agreed that physical depreciation was minimal at the subject greenhouse and functional obsolescence was non-existent. The parties vigorously disagreed, however, about whether the replacement cost of the greenhouse should be reduced on account of external obsolescence.
¶ 9 Eurofresh characterized its expert witness, Bierschwale, as a national expert in the appraisal of large (20+ acres) greenhouses, and the County did not seriously dispute Bierschwale's qualifications. Bierschwale testified that the replacement cost of the Willcox greenhouse should be reduced by 40 percent for property tax purposes because of external obsolescence. He arrived at that conclusion based on his study of three recent sales of smaller greenhouses, a 20-acre greenhouse in Snowflake,[4] a 20-acre greenhouse in Fort Lupton, Colorado, and a pair of 20-acre greenhouses (sold together) in Grant and Estancia, New Mexico.[5] Bierschwale calculated the replacement costs of each of the three greenhouses and compared those values with the prices for which they recently had sold. After adjusting for physical depreciation and other factors, Bierschwale concluded *533 that the three greenhouses had sold for between 40 and 58 percent less than their adjusted replacement cost. He attributed the differential to market-wide external obsolescence, and, on that basis, conservatively estimated that the replacement cost of the Willcox greenhouse should be reduced by 40 percent to arrive at its full cash value.
¶ 10 The County vigorously disputed Bierschwale's analysis. The County contended it was inappropriate to use the other greenhouse sales to calculate external obsolescence because each of the three greenhouses was in some way "distressed," each had been sold by a lender out of foreclosure or bankruptcy, and in fact, only one of the greenhouses was in operation at time of sale. More broadly, while not disputing that external obsolescence can be appropriately applied to a replacement cost analysis, the County argued that as a matter of law, Eurofresh failed to show that whatever external obsolescence that impaired the value of the other three greenhouses actually affected the value of the Willcox greenhouse.
¶ 11 The Tax Court found that Eurofresh had presented substantial competent evidence to overcome the presumption of correctness that attached to the County's valuations of the greenhouse for the tax years in question. It found that by failing to deduct from replacement cost for external obsolescence, the County had failed to correctly apply standard appraisal methods. The court noted Bierschwale's qualifications and adopted his conclusions, valuing the greenhouse at $22,291,500 for 2004 and $33,000,000 for 2005. Finally, the court awarded Eurofresh its reasonable attorney's fees, costs and expenses pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-348(B) and 12-332 (2003).
¶ 12 The County timely appealed the trial court's final judgment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-170(C) and 12-2101(B) (2003).

DISCUSSION
¶ 13 The County argues that reducing replacement cost for external obsolescence without proof of the specific cause of the obsolescence and proof that it affects the subject property contravenes standard appraisal methods. Eurofresh counters that under standard appraisal methods, it is not necessary to identify a cause of external obsolescence when such obsolescence is market-wide. Thus, we are asked to decide whether a party seeking an adjustment in property value for ad valorem tax purposes based on external obsolescence must prove the cause, effect and quantity of such obsolescence. We hold that it must. Therefore, we reverse the Tax Court's conclusion as to full cash value and direct that court to reinstate the full cash value assessed by the County for the years 2004 and 2005, respectively, as $36,229,693 and $51,884,078.

A. Standard of Review.
¶ 14 "We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court's judgment," Cimarron Foothills Cmty. Ass'n v. Kippen, 206 Ariz. 455, 457, ¶ 2, 79 P.3d 1214, 1216 (App.2003) (quoting Sw. Soil Remediation, Inc. v. City of Tucson, 201 Ariz. 438, ¶ 2, 36 P.3d 1208 (App.2001)), and will "defer to the trial court's factual findings as long as the record supports them," In re the Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 198 Ariz. 330, 337, ¶ 15, 9 P.3d 1069, 1076 (2000). However, we review de novo pure questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact. See Robson Ranch Mountains, L.L.C. v. Pinal County, 203 Ariz. 120, 125, ¶ 13, 51 P.3d 342, 347 (App.2002).

B. The Presumption in Favor of the County's Assessment.
¶ 15 Pursuant to A.R.S. § 42-13051 (2006), the County assessor annually determines the full cash value of all property within the county that is subject to taxation. "`Full cash value' for property tax purposes means the value determined as prescribed by statute. If no statutory method is prescribed, full cash value is synonymous with market value which means the estimate of value that is derived annually by using standard appraisal methods and techniques." A.R.S. § 42-11001(5).
¶ 16 The valuation "as approved by the appropriate state or county authority is *534 presumed to be correct and lawful." A.R.S. § 42-16212(B) (2006). The taxpayer may overcome this presumption by presenting competent evidence that the taxing authority's valuation is excessive. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue, 147 Ariz. 216, 219, 709 P.2d 573, 576 (App.1985), superseded by statute on other grounds, A.R.S. § 12-348(A) (2003), 1990 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 360, § 1 (2d Reg.Sess.). "Evidence is competent for the purposes of rebutting the statutory presumption and of showing that the Department's valuation was excessive when it is derived by standard appraisal methods and techniques which are shown to be appropriate under the particular circumstances involved." Id. at 223, 709 P.2d at 580.
¶ 17 If the taxpayer uses a different valuation method than the taxing authority, the taxpayer's evidence is not competent unless it demonstrates that its method was appropriate under the circumstances. Id. at 219, 709 P.2d at 576. Conversely, if the taxpayer and taxing authority use the same appraisal method "but differ as to the correct treatment of factors utilized in such method, the taxpayer's evidence is nevertheless competent and sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption." Id.
¶ 18 The court may not independently value the property until the taxpayer presents competent evidence to rebut the statutory presumption that the taxing authority's valuation is correct. Recreation Ctrs. of Sun City, Inc. v. Maricopa County, 162 Ariz. 281, 285, 782 P.2d 1174, 1178 (1989); Inspiration, 147 Ariz. at 219, 709 P.2d at 576 (evidence must be competent). Thus, not only must the taxpayer show that the taxing authority's valuation is incorrect, the court also must find the taxing authority's valuation either excessive or insufficient before it may adopt the taxpayer's assertion as to the property's full cash value. Recreation Centers, 162 Ariz. at 285, 782 P.2d at 1178.

C. External Obsolescence.

1. The definition of external obsolescence.
¶ 19 Both parties used the replacement cost method ("cost approach" or "cost method") to calculate the value of the Willcox greenhouse. "In the cost approach, the appraiser compares the cost to develop a new property or a substitute property with the same utility as the subject property" to arrive at a value for the subject property. Appraisal Institute, supra, at 349.
¶ 20 According to the Appraisal Institute treatise, once a value is derived using the cost method, one or more other methods, including the market extraction method, may be used to estimate depreciation, including external obsolescence. Id. at 363. Once depreciation is calculated, it is subtracted from replacement cost to arrive at the full cash value.
¶ 21 The market extraction method of calculating depreciation, which Bierschwale employed in this case, analyzes sales of properties similar to the subject property. The appraiser subtracts each such property's adjusted sales price from its estimated replacement cost. The difference, expressed in a percentage of cost, represents depreciation. Id. at 389-92. Bierschwale concluded that because the three other greenhouses sold for between 40 and 58 percent less than their replacement costs, it was appropriate to reduce the replacement cost of the Willcox greenhouse by at least 40 percent to account for what he called market-wide external obsolescence.
¶ 22 The Appraisal of Real Estate defines "external obsolescence" to mean "a temporary or permanent impairment of the utility or salability of an improvement or property due to negative influences outside the property." Appraisal Institute, supra, at 363. The treatise further explains, "External obsolescence may be caused by economic or locational factors. It may be temporary or permanent, but it is not usually considered curable on the part of the owner, landlord, or tenant." Id. at 412. See Ariz. Dep't of Revenue v. Questar S. Trails Pipeline Co., 215 Ariz. 577, 580, ¶ 12, 161 P.3d 620, 623 (App. 2007) (economic obsolescence is "a loss in value caused by forces external to the property and outside the control of the property owner" (quoting Magna Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Pima County, 128 Ariz. 291, 293, 625 P.2d *535 354, 356 (App.1981))); Black's Law Dictionary 1107 (8th ed. 2004) ("Obsolescence that results from external economic factors, such as decreased demand or changed governmental regulations.").[6]

2. Application of external obsolescence.
¶ 23 As noted, the issue before the Tax Court was whether under Arizona law, A.R.S. § 42-11001, it was proper pursuant to standard appraisal methods to reduce replacement cost for external obsolescence without proof that the cause of such obsolescence affected the subject property. That issue is a mixed question of fact and law that we review de novo.
¶ 24 Although the County does not dispute that an appraiser using standard appraisal methods should consider the existence of external obsolescence, it contends that reducing a property's replacement cost for external obsolescence is not a standard appraisal method when the taxpayer cannot show that external obsolescence actually affects the subject property. In support, the County cites several Indiana tax court cases, including Wal Mart Stores, Inc. v. Wayne Township Assessor, 825 N.E.2d 485 (Ind. T.C. 2005), and Heart City Chrysler v. Department of Local Government Finance, 801 N.E.2d 215 (Ind. T.C.2004).[7] The County asserts that because there are no indications that Eurofresh's Willcox greenhouse suffered from external obsolescence, its full cash value for ad valorem property tax purposes is its replacement cost (adjusted only for physical depreciation).
¶ 25 For its part, Eurofresh asserts that the external obsolescence evidenced by the three other greenhouse sales is market-wide and for that reason, must necessarily affect the value of the Willcox greenhouse. It disputes that standard appraisal techniques require it to show a cause for external obsolescence observed elsewhere or prove that the cause actually affects the Willcox greenhouse.
¶ 26 We have found no Arizona cases addressing the legal standards that govern the application of external obsolescence to full cash value for ad valorem tax purposes. See Questar, 215 Ariz. 577, 161 P.3d 620 (when pipeline valuation statutes, A.R.S. §§ 42-14201 to -14204, provided exclusive method for calculating full cash value, external obsolescence need not be considered); Magna Inv. & Dev. Corp., 128 Ariz. 291, 625 P.2d 354 (when taxpayer's expert testified that subject property, a department store space, was too large for modern-day leases, existence of legal link between asserted external obsolescence and subject property was not disputed).
¶ 27 Eurofresh objects to the County's suggestion that we rely on decisions of the Indiana tax court for guidance, but that court has written frequently on issues of obsolescence, and we recently looked to it for instruction on that topic. See Questar, 215 Ariz. at 580, ¶ 12, 161 P.3d at 623 (quoting Indiana court's definition of external obsolescence). In this case, we begin our analysis by looking again to the sound reasoning of the Indiana court on a matter of external obsolescence.
¶ 28 As the County argues, the Indiana cases apply a three-part test by which a taxpayer must prove obsolescence of any nature: (1) it must identify the cause of obsolescence; (2) it must quantify the amount of obsolescence; and (3) it must show that the subject property has suffered an actual loss of value due to the obsolescence. See, e.g., Wal-Mart, 825 N.E.2d 485; Heart City, 801 *536 N.E.2d 215; Clark v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 694 N.E.2d 1230 (Ind. T.C.1998), abrogated on other grounds by Inland Steel Co. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 739 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. T.C.2000).[8]
¶ 29 At issue in Wal Mart were two stores, a standard-sized store that had been operating for some time, and a super-sized store built to replace the old store that was just about to open for business as of the valuation date. 825 N.E.2d at 486-87. The assessor valued both properties for tax purposes. The taxpayer appealed the assessments, arguing that both stores were entitled to deductions for obsolescence, the old store because it was to be demolished and the new store because it was not yet generating income. Id. at 488-89. The court denied the taxpayer's appeal, finding that even if the taxpayer was entitled to some measure of obsolescence, it had not offered proof of the amount of obsolescence to which it was entitled under standard appraisal methods. Id. 489-90. The court noted that when a taxpayer asserts that obsolescence affects its property, it must show "a connection to an actual loss in property value." Id. at 488. In a commercial property, the court said, "this loss of value usually means a decrease in the property's income generating ability." Id.
¶ 30 In Heart City the court explained that a taxpayer that sought an obsolescence adjustment "was necessarily required to explain its causes of obsolescence in order to translate its improvements' loss in value (due to those causes) into a quantifiable amount of obsolescence depreciation." 801 N.E.2d at 218. Put differently, the court stated:
A taxpayer cannot quantify its obsolescence depreciation without relating the causes of obsolescence, and the actual loss in value to the improvement incurred as a result of those causes, to the amount of obsolescence it seeks.
Id. (citing Clark, 694 N.E.2d 1230). The court denied the taxpayer's appeal because it found that although the taxpayer's appraiser calculated a numerical obsolescence factor, he did not attribute the claimed obsolescence to any specific cause. Id. "Instead, Heart City presented an [a]nalysis concluding it was entitled to obsolescence depreciation based on a mathematical calculation bearing no relationship to causes of obsolescence depreciation alleged to exist." Id.
¶ 31 In Clark, the owner of an apartment building asserted the building suffered from obsolescence because it had inadequate parking and lacked an elevator. 694 N.E.2d at 1238. In rejecting the taxpayer's appeal, the court noted evidence that the building was almost fully occupied, from which it could be inferred that "the additional alleged causes of obsolescence did not cause the [property] to experience a loss in value, i.e., a loss of earning capacity." Id. at 1239. The court expressed its concern with obsolescence claims asserted without proof of a specific cause and a demonstrated effect:
The administration of this state's property taxation system is best served by having taxpayers make detailed factual presentations of a given improvement's obsolescence. . . . For these reasons, this Court will not consider taxpayer complaints concerning obsolescence . . . unless the taxpayer has identified the causes of the alleged obsolescence and presented probative evidence that would support a quantification of obsolescence at the administrative level.
Id. at 1241. See Indian Indus., Inc. v. Dep't of Local Gov't Fin., 791 N.E.2d 286, 289-90 (Ind. T.C.2003) (given requirement that taxpayer must prove by way of "probative evidence that . . . factors are causing an actual loss of value to its property," taxpayer's claim for more external obsolescence failed when record was "completely devoid of any evidence indicating and explaining [property's] *537 actual loss of value"); Deer Creek Developers, Ltd. v. Dep't of Local Gov't Fin., 769 N.E.2d 259, 263 (Ind. T.C.2002) (taxpayer's burden was "to present probative evidence showing the cause" of alleged external obsolescence); Pedcor Invs.-1990-XIII, L.P. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 715 N.E.2d 432, 437 (Ind. T.C.1999) (in valuation challenge brought by owner of public housing project, which argued that external obsolescence resulted from deed restrictions that required leasing to low-income tenants, federal tax incentives also must be taken into account "when evaluating whether the deed restrictions do, in fact, cause the apartment complex to experience economic obsolescence").
¶ 32 Courts in other jurisdictions have imposed much the same proof requirements in analyzing taxpayers' assertions of external obsolescence. In Higbee Co. v. Cuyahoga County Board of Revision, 107 Ohio St.3d 325, 839 N.E.2d 385 (2006), for example, the taxpayer's appraiser calculated external obsolescence by subtracting a "market" rent he calculated based on comparable leased properties from the amount of rent required for a reasonable return on the subject property. Id. at 393. The court affirmed the tax board's rejection of the taxpayer's calculation because the taxpayer had not demonstrated that the rental properties its appraiser had used "to develop a market rent are indeed comparable to the subject property." Id. (citing differences in size and market area between subject property and proposed comparables). Similarly, in Alta Pacific Associates, Ltd. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 931 P.2d 103 (Utah 1997), the court rejected a tax appeal by the owner of an apartment building operated under federal housing programs for elderly and poor. Although the taxpayer had sought a 31 percent reduction in value due to external obsolescence, it "failed to describe how each regulatory restriction impacted" income from the property. Id. at 113.
¶ 33 A Kansas court likewise rejected a taxpayer's claimed external obsolescence reduction in a property tax case that like this one, involved an uncommon property. At issue in Sunflower Racing, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners of Wyandotte County, 256 Kan. 426, 885 P.2d 1233 (1994), was a newly constructed racetrack designed for both horse- and dog-racing. The owner of the track had sought a 75 percent reduction in value based on sales of a handful of other tracks. The court accepted the taxing authority's conclusion that because the comparables involved distressed sales, meaning the other tracks were "in financial difficulty," "idleness or bankruptcy," they were "not a credible indicator of economic obsolescence." Id. at 1236, 1244.
¶ 34 Finally, a South Dakota court affirmed a tax board's decision rejecting a taxpayer's claimed external obsolescence based on sales of "comparable" properties when the subject property enjoyed environmental attributes superior to the comparables. The issue in National Food Corp. v. Aurora County Board of Commissioners, 537 N.W.2d 564 (S.D.1995), was the valuation of heavy farm equipment taxed as real property. As the court held, quoting the tax board, "Because of environmental factors, and labor-available labor, available land, available feed stuffs, and other reasons, . . . a location like this probably is the best location that [the taxpayer] could build on." Id. at 569.
¶ 35 These authorities together teach that a taxpayer claiming external obsolescence must prove both the cause of the asserted obsolescence and that the subject property is actually affected by that cause. Nevertheless, Eurofresh argues that the Tax Court's finding that Bierschwale employed standard appraisal methods puts an end to the matter. The company argues that because Bierschwale used the cost method and the market extraction method, both of which are standard appraisal methods, his opinion was necessarily sufficient to overcome the presumption in favor of the County's assessed value.[9]
*538 ¶ 36 We conclude Eurofresh's argument is misplaced because the issue is not whether one computation of external obsolescence should be chosen over another but instead, whether, as a matter of law, the external obsolescence Bierschwale testified he observed in the other three greenhouses he studied actually affects the greenhouse at issue. Put differently, the issue here is not about how to apply an appraisal method but whether to apply it.[10]
¶ 37 As the Tax Court observed during trial, no Arizona court has yet established the legal requirements for proving that a property's value for ad valorem tax purposes has been impaired by external or economic obsolescence. We hold that, as a matter of law, a taxpayer claiming external obsolescence must offer probative evidence of the cause of the claimed obsolescence, the quantity of such obsolescence, and that the asserted cause of the obsolescence actually affects the subject property.
¶ 38 Our conclusion is based not only on the authorities cited above but also on the appraisal treatise relied upon by both sides' experts. The Appraisal of Real Estate permits the use of the market extraction method to calculate depreciation, including external obsolescence. Appraisal Institute, supra, at 389-92 (describing the market extraction method as a means of calculating depreciation) and 363 ("depreciation" includes external obsolescence). But the treatise warns that the market extraction method should be used only when the comparable properties relied upon "have incurred similar amounts and types of depreciation" as the subject property. Id. at 391. It explains:
When sales data is plentiful, the market extraction method provides a reliable and convincing estimate of depreciation. However, the comparable properties should have similar physical, functional, and external characteristics as the subject, and they should have incurred similar amounts and types of depreciation.
When the comparable properties differ in design, quality, or construction, it is difficult to ascertain whether differences in value are attributable to these differences or to a difference in depreciation. The market extraction method is also difficult to apply when the type or extent of depreciation varies greatly among the comparable properties.
Id.[11]
¶ 39 It seems to us that the treatise's warning that market extraction requires that the subject property have similar "amounts and types" of obsolescence as the comparables used to calculate obsolescence is a reflection of the concern that underlies the rule applied by courts in Indiana and the other jurisdictions discussed above. It is not sufficient, these authorities teach, to simply assert that a property's value should be reduced because of external obsolescence observed elsewhere. Particularly when, as here, a taxpayer calculates obsolescence based on other "comparable" properties, the taxpayer must prove that the subject property actually is affected by the obsolescence seen in the other properties.

3. Application of the correct legal standard to the valuation of the Willcox greenhouse.
¶ 40 As noted above, after gathering data to substantiate the replacement cost of the Willcox greenhouse, Bierschwale, on behalf of Eurofresh, examined recent sales of three other greenhouses. Only one of the three greenhouses was operating as of the date of the sale, and one of the other two was in very rundown condition. Even so, and although all three were sold by lenders after foreclosures and had been on the market for more than a year, Bierschwale testified that *539 all three sales were "arms' length" and each fetched the best available price in the applicable market.
¶ 41 At trial and on appeal, the County argued that Bierschwale's use of the market extraction method was inappropriate in part because the three greenhouses on which he relied were so dissimilar to the Willcox greenhouse that the sales were not comparable.[12] Bierschwale, however, testified that he adjusted the sales price of each greenhouse to account for dissimilarities. For example, he adjusted upward the sales price of the greenhouse that was in disrepair to account for necessary refurbishment costs. Given his testimony, we will defer to the Tax Court's implicit conclusion that Bierschwale adequately performed the mechanical adjustments required by this step of the market extraction method.[13]
¶ 42 Nevertheless, even accepting as true Bierschwale's conclusion that the three other greenhouses sold for at least 40 percent less than their replacement value, Eurofresh failed to offer sufficient proof of the cause of the external obsolescence assertedly seen in the other properties or that external obsolescence actually affected the Willcox property. The company offered no evidence that its Willcox greenhouse in fact had incurred (in the language of the treatise) "similar amounts and types" of external obsolescence as the three other greenhouses that formed the basis of the company's economic obsolescence calculations. Instead, its appraiser simply asserted that the Willcox greenhouse must have incurred external obsolescence because he observed external obsolescence in the other greenhouses.
¶ 43 At trial, Bierschwale initially declined to offer any reason for the external obsolescence he said he calculated from the other sales; instead, he testified simply that "the market indicates" the existence of the obsolescence. He continued, "That's the beauty of the market is that the market does the indicating and the appraiser does not specifically have to identify those factors. . . . [T]here's no requirement that we come up with a specific reason why some phenomenon exists in the market, which the market tells us."
¶ 44 During Eurofresh's rebuttal case, Bierschwale testified that it "would be impossible to identify all of" the causes of external obsolescence when the obsolescence affects an entire market. He testified that among such factors were "barriers to entry," which he said meant that it "costs a lot of money to get into" the greenhouse vegetable business. He identified another factor he called "grower capability," meaning expertise in the greenhouse vegetable industry, expertise he said is relatively rare in the United States. Another barrier to entry that causes external obsolescence in a tomato greenhouse, he said, is the requirement, due to the crop's relatively brief life, that a producer have sale contracts lined up in advance. Bierschwale did not purport to link any of the market factors he identified to Eurofresh's Willcox greenhouse.
¶ 45 On appeal, Eurofresh offers no explanation for the cause of the external obsolescence that Bierschwale testified he observed in the other greenhouses. It argues instead that his testimony that he followed standard appraisal methods in calculating obsolescence is sufficient, by itself, to prove that the value of the Willcox greenhouse should be reduced on account of obsolescence. As stated above, we reject Eurofresh's contention that the value of a property for ad valorem tax purposes may be reduced because of external obsolescence in the absence of proof of the cause of the purported obsolescence, quantification of the obsolescence, and proof that the *540 obsolescence has in fact affected the subject property.
¶ 46 The facts of this case demonstrate the logic of the rule that we adopt. Even accepting as true Bierschwale's conclusion that the other three greenhouses sold for at least 40 percent below their adjusted replacement cost, Eurofresh offered no evidence that its Willcox greenhouse suffered from the same impairment. Bierschwale and Van Straalen both conceded that under the company's valuation theory, the Willcox greenhouse lost 40 percent in value immediately upon completion of construction, but they were unable to offer any explanation of how or why that might be so.[14]
¶ 47 Moreover, The Appraisal of Real Estate, whose authority Bierschwale acknowledged, teaches that external obsolescence is either temporary or permanent, yet Bierschwale offered no opinion whether the "market-wide" external obsolescence he observed in the other sales was one or the other. Without proof that purported external obsolescence is either temporary or permanent, the trier of fact cannot determine whether obsolescence calculated from past sales comparables might affect a subject property's current value.
¶ 48 Pressed on rebuttal to state some cause for the external obsolescence he testified was market-wide, Bierschwale ultimately offered a handful of possible causes, supra ¶ 43. Asked whether Eurofresh suffered from any of those difficulties, however, Bierschwale testified that none of them afflicted Eurofresh. That he failed to attribute to the Willcox greenhouse any of the market factors he identified is no surprise given the superior performance Eurofresh has reaped from that greenhouse. See supra ¶¶ 5-6 (inter alia, production from the company's Willcox greenhouse has made it the top year-round greenhouse tomato producer in the nation). When, for example, the company boasts that more than 50 percent of its production is subject to fixed-price contracts, it can hardly be said that it suffers from a shortage of reliable markets.[15] Bierschwale effectively conceded that whatever may have caused the external obsolescence he observed in the other sales might not affect the Willcox property when he testified on cross-examination that it "certainly, possibly might happen sometimes" that market factors that exist in some locations do not exist in other locations or at other times.
¶ 49 Finally, Eurofresh offers no legal authority, and we have found none, approving application of an external obsolescence factor derived entirely from other sales using the market extraction method that Bierschwale employed to calculate full cash value for ad valorem tax purposes. In other words, in no other case that we have located has a court approved reducing a subject property's replacement cost because of external obsolescence calculated solely from data relating to other properties.[16] When a taxpayer *541 seeks a reduction in the full cash value of its own property based on such a calculation, reason and logic demand that it prove that the specific factors that caused the obsolescence observed in the comparable properties also affect the subject property. Because Eurofresh offered no such evidence in this case, we must reverse the Tax Court's judgment adopting the company's proposed full cash value.

CONCLUSION
¶ 50 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand the Tax Court's judgment and direct that on remand, the court affirm the County's valuation of the Willcox greenhouse for tax years 2004 and 2005. We also reverse the Tax Court's award to Eurofresh of its attorney's fees and costs.
CONCURRING: JON W. THOMPSON and SUSAN A. EHRLICH, Judges.
NOTES
[1]  With the exception of A.R.S. § 42-11001, we cite the current versions of statutes throughout this decision because no revisions material to this decision have since occurred. We cite the 2003 version of section 42-11001 because the current version adds language that was not in effect at the time of the assessments. See 2006 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 143, § 2 (2d Reg.Sess.). The current version of the statute can be found at A.R.S. § 42-11001 (Supp.2006).
[2]  Eurofresh initially appealed to the Graham County Board of Equalization, which affirmed the assessor's assessment.
[3]  Throughout the trial, the parties and the court used the terms "external obsolescence" and "economic obsolescence" interchangeably.
[4]  This greenhouse was purchased by Eurofresh in 2002; the company subsequently refurbished the greenhouse and expanded it by 24 acres.
[5]  Bierschwale also considered a resale of the Estancia greenhouse that took place after the valuation date.
[6]  An Indiana court explained the possible causes of external obsolescence in this manner:

[E]conomic obsolescence (or a loss of value resulting from factors external to the property) could be caused by the fact that an improvement was located in an inappropriate area, subject to inoperative or inadequate zoning ordinances or deed restrictions, constructed for a need which has subsequently been terminated due to actual or probable changes in economic or social conditions, or the manufacture of the product for which the improvement was originally constructed has suffered from decreased market acceptability.
Hometowne Assocs., L.P. v. Maley, 839 N.E.2d 269, 273 (Ind. T.C.2005).
[7]  We note the correct name of the party in the first cited case is Wal-Mart, not Wal Mart, as it is spelled in the reporter. We will correctly spell the party's name in subsequent references to the case.
[8]  While we adopt the analytical reasoning of the Indiana court, we note that the standard of review imposed in the cited cases is significantly different from that applied by our Tax Court. Compare, e.g., Wal Mart, 825 N.E.2d at 487 ("This Court gives great deference to final determinations of the Indiana Board.") with Magna, 128 Ariz. at 293, ¶ 1, 625 P.2d at 356 (notwithstanding statutory presumption of correctness, Tax Court may make independent valuation of full cash value if taxpayer presents evidence to rebut the presumption and court determines that valuation is excessive or insufficient).
[9]  Similarly, Eurofresh argues that its 40 percent deduction for obsolescence is merely a treatment of an element within a standard appraisal method. See Inspiration, 147 Ariz. at 223, 709 P.2d at 580 ("Evidence is competent for the purposes of rebutting the statutory presumption . . . when it is derived by standard appraisal methods and techniques which are shown to be appropriate under the particular circumstances involved.").
[10]  We noted in Questar that obsolescence is a factor to be addressed when applying standard appraisal methods, 215 Ariz. at 579, ¶ 12, 161 P.3d at 622, but did not hold in that case that reducing a valuation due to obsolescence would be appropriate when the taxpayer has not established the cause of the purported obsolescence or that it affects the subject property.
[11]  In relating how the market extraction method is performed, the first step described by the treatise is "Find and verify sales of similarly improved properties that appear to have incurred a comparable amount of depreciation as the subject property." Appraisal Institute, at 389.
[12]  When sales comparables are used, "many factors including but not limited to the climatic, economic, and population patterns of the comparables should be examined to insure that they are sufficiently comparable to the property in question when the comparables are distant from the property at issue." Maricopa County v. Sperry Rand Corp., 112 Ariz. 579, 581 n., 544 P.2d 1094, 1096 n. (1976).
[13]  The County also disputed Bierschwale's characterization of the three sales as "arms' length," given that each greenhouse was sold by a lender after many months on the market. Although the County's contentions might prevail under other circumstances, on this record, we defer to the Tax Court's finding that the sales were in fact arms' length.
[14]  Asked at trial what became of the roughly $21 million represented by the 40 percent reduction in value he attributed to the greenhouse, Bierschwale testified that as the owner of the greenhouse, Eurofresh experienced an increase in its "business value" to the same extent.
[15]  As noted, Eurofresh itself was the buyer of one of the three greenhouses on which Bierschwale based his external obsolescence opinion. Bierschwale did not explain how it could be that, under the ownership of Eurofresh, the Snowflake greenhouse would experience inept management or other barriers to entry that he testified might have caused the external obsolescence he calculated based in part on the Snowflake greenhouse sale price. In fact, the evidence offered concerning Eurofresh was to the contrary; that its management, superior expertise, superior facilities and fixed contracts are among the strengths that make it successful and secure its dominant place in the business.
[16]  Asked during oral argument for any case authority that supported the approach that Eurofresh's appraiser took in this case, its counsel cited only Meridian Towers East & West v. Washington Township Assessor, 805 N.E.2d 475 (Ind. T.C.2003), and Canal Square Ltd. Partnership v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 694 N.E.2d 801 (Ind. T.C.1998). In neither case, however, did the court endorse the application of external obsolescence calculated from comparable sites, let alone grant such a deduction in value when the taxpayer was unable to identify the cause of the obsolescence or offer proof that the subject property was likewise affected. In Meridian Towers, the court noted that the taxpayer and the assessor "agreed that causes of obsolescence existed" within the subject property. 805 N.E.2d at 478 (emphasis added). Moreover, the taxpayer in that case quantified the purported obsolescence by comparing the replacement cost of the subject property with a capitalization value calculated based on income data from the same property, not, as here, based on data from other properties. Id. at 479. In Canal Square, the taxpayer's appraiser testified about specific causes of the external obsolescence he attributed to the subject property. 694 N.E.2d at 806 (presence of an electrical power station on the site; excessive construction features per city code). Moreover, as in Meridian Towers, the appraiser quantified external obsolescence by comparing the subject building's replacement cost with the subject building's capitalized value. Id. at 806-07. For these reasons, the cases on which Eurofresh relies have little relevance to the valuation of the Willcox greenhouse.