369 Mass. 488 (1976)
340 N.E.2d 503
MARIE H. MADDOCKS
vs.
CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT APPEAL BOARD; STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, intervener.
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.
November 7, 1975.
January 7, 1976.
Present: QUIRICO, BRAUCHER, HENNESSEY, & KAPLAN, JJ.
Lawrence E. Katz for Marie H. Maddocks.
Paul A. Good, Assistant Attorney General (Edward Quinlan, Assistant Attorney General, with him) for the Contributory Retirement Appeal Board.
Bernard S. Kaplan, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the State Retirement Board, intervener.
QUIRICO, J.
This is an action commenced in the Superior Court pursuant to G.L.C. 30A, § 14, for judicial review of a decision of the Contributory Retirement Appeal Board (appeal board).[1] The case is before this court on the plaintiff's appeal pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, § 15, as appearing in St. 1973, c. 1114, § 3, from the judgment entered in the Superior Court affirming the appeal board's decision with respect to the plaintiff's retirement classification and dismissing the action.[2] For the reasons hereinafter *490 stated, we affirm the judgment entered in the Superior Court.
We summarize the relevant facts. The plaintiff, a registered nurse, was employed by the Department of Public Health (department) for the Commonwealth for approximately thirty-one years and one month, all but six months of that time being spent at the Westborough State Hospital (hospital). During her employment she held various positions as hospital attendant, head nurse, hydrotherapist, acting supervisor, and supervisor, and on May 2, 1971, she became a chief hospital supervisor, a position which she held until her retirement on July 31, 1972.
On the plaintiff's retirement, a statement describing her title and duties at the hospital was furnished to the State Board of Retirement (retirement board) by the superintendent of the hospital in accordance with G.L.c. 32, § 3 (2) (g). This statement is reproduced in full in the margin.[3] Based on the description furnished by the superintendent, the retirement board classified the plaintiff in Group 1 under G.L.c. 32, § 3 (2) (g). The plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from this classification to the appeal board.
We summarize the evidence presented to the appeal board at its hearing on the plaintiff's appeal. The retirement board introduced copies of letters which it had sent to the plaintiff, one notifying her of her classification in Group 1 and another containing the statement made by the hospital superintendent which described the plaintiff's title and duties while employed at the hospital. The *491 plaintiff testified at length as to the nature of her duties and responsibilities and the length of her service at the hospital. She stated that in the various positions which she held prior to becoming a supervisor in 1958, including that of acting supervisor, her duties required her to spend approximately eighty per cent of her time in direct patient care; that during her service as supervisor, in an average day, above five and one-half out of eight hours were expended in patient care; and that after she became a chief hospital supervisor in May, 1971, the position which she held until her retirement, her average work day "didn't change very much ... [and she] spent maybe a half hour or so more on administrative work...."
On cross-examination, she testified that as a supervisor she had jurisdiction over one registered nurse, and approximately ten licensed practical nurses and twenty-four attendants; that she was responsible for approximately 275 patients; that after she became chief hospital supervisor, she was responsible for the direction and coordination of services of five units housing over 700 patients; and that as chief hospital supervisor she supervised five supervisors.
The plaintiff attempted to introduce in evidence two documents in the nature of a salary form, including a description of duties, and a decision of the retirement board, both relating to the retirement classification of the plaintiff's immediate predecessor as chief hospital supervisor. These documents were excluded by the appeal board.
The appeal board thereafter affirmed the decision of the retirement board to classify the plaintiff in Group 1, and it dismissed the plaintiff's appeal. The two-page decision of the appeal board contained a brief summary of the evidence presented at the hearing and concluded as follows: "After due consideration of all the evidence the Contributory Retirement Appeal Board finds that any testimony about [the plaintiff's] work prior to becoming Chief Hospital Supervisor has no bearing on this case. *492 The Board further finds that the [plaintiff] was properly classified in Group 1."
The plaintiff then commenced the present action in the Superior Court for judicial review of the appeal board's decision and the retirement board filed a notice to intervene as an interested party under G.L.c. 30A, § 14 (2). The action was heard by a judge of the Superior Court who then ordered the entry of judgment affirming the appeal board's decision and dismissing the action. The plaintiff's appeal from the judgment is now before us for decision.
1. The plaintiff contends that the appeal board erred in refusing to consider the duties she performed during the thirty years prior to serving as chief hospital supervisor from May, 1971, until her retirement on July 31, 1972. She claims that her duties in those prior years qualify her for classification in retirement Group 2, rather than in Group 1 as determined by the retirement board and the appeal board. It is undisputed that classification in Group 2 would entitle her to substantially greater retirement benefits. Drawn into issue by the plaintiff's contention are the provisions of G.L.c. 32, § 3 (2) (g), as appearing in St. 1972, c. 284, § 1, the relevant portions of which are reproduced in the margin.[4]
General Laws c. 32, § 3 (2) (g), sets forth the standards for retirement classification of public employees who are *493 members of a contributory retirement system established by the General Laws or by any special law of the Commonwealth. See definition of "member" in G.L.c. 32, § 1. Section 3 (2) (g) contains four groups and all members must be classified in one of those groups. Groups 3 and 4 are clearly inapplicable to the plaintiff and the present inquiry, therefore, centers around Groups 1 and 2. Group 1 is a kind of "catch-all" category applying to "[o]fficials and general employees including clerical, administrative and technical workers ... and all others not otherwise classified." The plaintiff must fall into Group 1 if she does not qualify for a Group 2 classification. She claims entitlement to classification in Group 2, however, on the basis of language which makes that group applicable to "employees of the commonwealth ... whose regular and major duties require them to have the care, custody, instruction or other supervision of ... persons who are mentally ill or mentally defective...." In support of her claim, the plaintiff argues that the above language must be interpreted so as to require a consideration of an employee's "regular and major duties" during the entire period of his or her public employment rather than simply at the date of retirement. We disagree.
The plaintiff's argument ignores the plain language of G.L.c. 32, § 3 (2) (g) (Group 2), a reading of which reveals that the present tense is used throughout the statute in describing the duties of employment which entitle persons to classification in Group 2. More specifically, the statute grants a Group 2 classification to employees "whose regular and major duties require them to have the care, custody, instruction or other supervision of ... persons who are mentally ill or mentally defective...." *494 (emphasis supplied). G.L.c. 32, § 3 (2) (g). We concur with the conclusion of the judge of the Superior Court that "[t]he term `require,' used in the present tense, indicates a legislative intent that the classification be based on current job requirements at the time of retirement." We hold that the plaintiff's classification was properly based on the sole consideration of her duties at the time of retirement.
The plaintiff argues that such an interpretation of G.L.c. 32, § 3 (2) (g), precluding a consideration of her earlier employment duties, is contrary to G.L.c. 32, § 25 (5). That statute, however, protects employees from a deprivation of rights or benefits by virtue of statutory alterations or amendments and is on its face inapplicable to the present case.
The plaintiff attempts to elevate her argument under G.L.c. 32, § 25 (5), to constitutional proportions by contending that the fact that she was not informed (she does not specify whose duty it was to inform her) that her acceptance of the promotion to chief hospital supervisor would have the effect of reducing her benefits on retirement, constitutes a violation of the impairment-of-contract clause and the due process clause of the United States Constitution. In support of this contention she cites Opinion of the Justices, 364 Mass. 847 (1973), in which the Justices considered questions arising under G.L.c. 32, § 25 (5), and the United States Constitution with respect to proposed legislation which would amend G.L.c. 32, §§ 1-28, the provisions on contributory retirement systems for public employees in the Commonwealth. The issues addressed in that opinion were materially different from those involved herein. We perceive no constitutional rights to be implicated in the present circumstances. The plaintiff accepted of her own free will a promotion in status and a concomitant increase in pay without prior inquiry as to the legal consequences of such a promotion. She may not now be heard to complain, *495 on constitutional grounds, of the inevitable consequences of her voluntary act.
2. The plaintiff next claims that the decision of the appeal board to classify her in Group 1, based on an implicit finding that her "regular and major duties" did not require her "to have the care, custody, instruction or other supervision of ... persons who are mentally ill or mentally defective," was unsupported by substantial evidence. Under G.L.c. 30A, § 14 (7) (e), as appearing in St. 1973, c. 1114, § 3,[5] a decision of an administrative agency may be set aside on judicial review if the reviewing court determines that such decision is "[u]nsupported by substantial evidence." General Laws c. 30A, § 1 (6), defines substantial evidence as "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." McCarthy v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 342 Mass. 45, 47 (1961), and cases cited therein. The decision of the appeal board in the present case is fully supported by evidence of this nature and degree. The description of title and duties which was furnished by the superintendent of the hospital to the retirement board and introduced in evidence before the appeal board, as well as testimony of the plaintiff on cross-examination as to the nature and extent of her administrative duties and responsibilities, constituted substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the plaintiff was properly classified in Group 1. The appeal board was not required to believe all of the testimony of the plaintiff. Duato v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 359 Mass. 635, 641 (1971). It alone had the responsibility of deciding preliminary questions relating to credibility and weight of the evidence, and the court cannot review those preliminary decisions. American Nat'l Red Cross v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 363 Mass. 525, 527-528 (1973). Haley's Case, 356 Mass. 678, 680 (1970). Martin v. Director *496 of the Div. of Employment Security, 347 Mass. 264, 268-269 (1964).
The plaintiff contends that the description of her duties (job description) which was furnished by the superintendent of the hospital to the retirement board "by its very nature is hearsay," that the case against her "is based exclusively on this one piece of evidence," that the hearsay was not corroborated by other evidence, and therefore the decision of the appeal board is "unsupported by substantial evidence" within the meaning of G.L.c. 30A, § 14 (8) (e), as amended, and cannot stand. We disagree.
The plaintiff does not contend that the job description was improperly admitted in evidence. This is a document which the superintendent was required by G.L.c. 32, § 3 (2) (g), to furnish to the retirement board. It was admissible in evidence, and we need not decide whether it was admissible because it comes within one of the many exceptions to the hearsay rule (see Commonwealth v. Slavski, 245 Mass. 405, 413-418 [1923], for discussion of admissibility of various records made pursuant to statutory requirements) or because of the special provisions of our administrative procedure statute (G.L.c. 30A, §§ 1 [6] and 11 [2], relating to the rules of evidence applicable to administrative hearings[6]). Neither need we decide whether the rule stated in Sinclair v. Director of the Div. of Employment Security, 331 Mass. 101 (1954), that "[i]f the pertinent evidence is exclusively hearsay, this does not constitute `substantial evidence' even before an administrative tribunal" (at 103), and that a "decision [of an administrative tribunal which] is based *497 wholly on hearsay ... cannot stand" (at 104) has survived or been otherwise affected by the enactment of our administrative procedure statute containing special evidentiary provisions. G.L.c. 30A, enacted by St. 1954, c. 681, § 1, and made effective on July 1, 1955, by § 22 thereof. See Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Util., 363 Mass. 61, 63 (1973); Framingham v. Department of Pub. Util., 355 Mass. 138, 144 (1969); LaPierre v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 354 Mass. 165, 175 (1968).
Our conclusion is that if, for the purpose of this decision, we assume but without so holding that a decision of an administrative tribunal based exclusively on uncorroborated hearsay evidence cannot stand, that rule would not apply to the present case. The appeal board did not base its decision solely on the job description. The summary of evidence in the decision covered both the job description and the plaintiff's own testimony. That testimony, a transcript of which is included in the record, was itself sufficient to provide whatever corroboration might be required therefor if the rule relied on by the plaintiff were applicable. The evidence considered in its entirety, as it was by the appeal board, requires a conclusion that it constituted substantial evidence to support the board's decision.
3. The plaintiff contends that the appeal board failed to state the reasons for its decision or to determine each issue of fact and law necessary therefor, as required by G.L.c. 30A, § 11 (8). We disagree. The appeal board need not set forth a lengthy statement of factual and legal conclusions as long as its decision contains adequate reasons to allow the court to exercise its function of appellate review. Andrade v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 350 Mass. 447, 449 (1966). Leen v. Assessors of Boston, 345 Mass. 494, 502 (1963). Cf. Hamilton v. Department of Pub. Util., 346 Mass. 130, 137 (1963). The appeal board's decision is sufficient for this purpose.
*498 4. The plaintiff's last contention is that the appeal board erred in excluding documentary evidence of the duties of the plaintiff's predecessor as chief hospital supervisor, who was classified in Retirement Group 2. Assuming this issue to be properly raised by the plaintiff's action for review in the Superior Court, we find her contention to be without merit. The admission of such evidence, bearing on issues of a collateral nature, is left largely to the sound discretion of the tribunal before which it is offered. See Leen v. Assessors of Boston, 345 Mass. 494, 506 (1963); Robitaille v. Netoco Community Theatre of No. Attleboro, Inc., 305 Mass. 265, 267-269 (1940). On the record before us it cannot be held that the appeal board abused its discretion in excluding the evidence in question. We have held in several cases that unless the admission or exclusion of evidence at an administrative hearing resulted in a denial of substantial justice, a party claiming to be aggrieved by such action has no valid complaint. Framingham v. Department of Pub. Util., 355 Mass. 138, 144 (1969). Sudbury v. Department of Pub. Util., 351 Mass. 214, 220 (1966). It cannot be said that the exclusion of the evidence at issue in this case resulted in the denial of substantial justice to the plaintiff.
5. The judgment entered in the Superior Court is affirmed.
So ordered.
NOTES
[1]  The present case was commenced by the filing of a "Petition for Review" on January 23, 1974. The new Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, 365 Mass. 730 (1974), adopted by order of this court dated July 13, 1973, took effect on July 1, 1974. We treat the case, however, as though it had been commenced under the new rules, thus allowing us to utilize where appropriate the terminology of the new rules in referring to the "petitioner" as the "plaintiff" and to the "petition" as an "action." See Mass. R. Civ. P. 1A, 2, 365 Mass. 731, 733 (1974); G.L.c. 30A, § 14, as amended by St. 1973, c. 1114, § 3.
[2]  The appeal was originally entered in the Appeals Court and was thereafter removed by us to this court for direct appellate review. G.L.c. 211A, § 10 (A), inserted by St. 1972, c. 740, § 1.
[3]  The statement read as follows: "Chief Hospital Supervisor, Graduate Nurse from May 2, 1971 for the geographic units of this hospital. During this time she was responsible for the direction and coordination of services for five units housing 700 + patients.

"From 1958 until her May, 1971 assignment Mrs. Maddocks was the supervisor of four male wards  2 being disturbed wards each housing 35 patients and 2 wards devoted to the care of the male rehabilitation patient. She spent more than fifty per cent of her time on the wards, planning, directing and supervising the immediate care of these unpredictable, disturbed patients."
[4]  General Laws c. 32, § 3 (2) (g), reads in pertinent part as follows: "(g) Department heads shall furnish to the board within thirty days after the receipt of a written request therefor, a statement giving the name, title, rate of regular compensation, duties, date of birth and length and class of service of each employee in his department and thereupon the board shall classify each member in one of the following groups:

"Group 1. Officials and general employees including clerical, administrative and technical workers, laborers, mechanics and all others not otherwise classified" (as appearing in St. 1958, c. 321, § 3).
"Group 2.... [E]mployees of the commonwealth or of any county, regardless of any official classification, whose regular and major duties require them to have the care, custody, instruction or other supervision of ... persons who are mentally ill or mentally defective or of defective delinquents or wayward children; provided, that no member who attains age sixty-five while classified in Group 1 may thereafter be classified in Group 2, irrespective of change of employment" (as amended through St. 1972, c. 284, § 1).
[5]  The identical statutory provision was contained in G.L.c. 30A, § 14 (8) (e), at the time the present action was commenced.
[6]  The pertinent provisions of G.L.c. 30A as to evidence follow. Section 1 (6) provides: "`Substantial evidence' means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Section 11 (2) provides in pertinent part: "Unless otherwise provided by any law, agencies need not observe the rules of evidence observed by courts, but shall observe the rules of privilege recognized by law. Evidence may be admitted and given probative effect only if it is the kind of evidence on which reasonable persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs."


79 P.3d 511 (2003)
2003 WY 149
John D. AHRENHOLTZ and Pam D. Ahrenholtz; Ahrenholtz Masonry, Inc.; and Point North LLC, Appellants (Plaintiffs),
v.
LARAMIE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a Wyoming non-profit corporation; Robert J. "Joel" Coffey; and Robert Boysen, Appellees (Defendants).
No. 02-165.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
November 19, 2003.
As Amended on Rehearing December 24, 2003.
*512 Representing Appellants: John E. Stanfield of Laramie, Wyoming, and Walter Urbigkit of Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Messrs. Stanfield and Urbigkit.
Representing Appellees: Philip A. Nicholas of Anthony, Nicholas, Tangeman & Yates, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming for appellees Laramie Economic Development Corporation and Robert Boysen; and Mason F. Skiles and Joseph A. Rodriguez of Skiles & Rodriguez, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming, for appellee Robert J. "Joel" Coffey. Argument by Messrs. Skiles and Nicholas.
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.
HILL, Chief Justice.
[¶ 1] John D. Ahrenholtz, Pam D. Ahrenholtz, Ahrenholtz Masonry, Inc. and Point North, LLC appeal an order of the district court granting summary judgment on their complaint that the defendants Laramie Economic Development Corporation (LEDC), Robert J. "Joel" Coffey, and Robert Boysen (collectively defendants) had intentionally interfered with a potential contractual relation or business expectancy relating to the planning and construction of an expansion to the campus of Wyoming Technical Institute (WTI) in Laramie, Wyoming.
[¶ 2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for trial.

ISSUES
[¶ 3] John Ahrenholtz (Ahrenholtz) and his co-appellants present two issues for review:
Issue 1: Whether the Trial Court committed error in making the dual findings that there was no genuine issue of any material fact and that each and all defendants were entitled as a matter of law to summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' claims of intentional interference with their existent or prospective business opportunity as contractually involved in the Wyoming Technical Institute relocation project (Plaintiffs' Vision 2000 project) proposal.
Issue 2: Whether the Trial Court committed error in failure to give the Appellants as Plaintiffs the benefit in a summary judgment decision of recoverable damage concepts provided by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 774A and in particular § 774A(1)(c), Emotional Distress Damages.
Appellees LEDC and Boysen respond with a single statement:
Whether the trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of defendants Laramie Economic Development Corporation and Robert Boysen, and against Plaintiffs' [sic] on their claim for intentional interference with a business expectancy?
Appellee Coffey sets out two issues for review:
1. Whether there were any material facts or any evidence presented in the District Court by Appellants to even support an allegation of intentional interference with a business opportunity let alone defeat a Motion for Summary Judgment by Appellees.
2. Whether Appellants provided any realistic basis for recovery of purported damages from Appellees including the alleged but unsupported claim of emotional distress.

*513 FACTS
[¶ 4] WTI operates an automotive and diesel technology school in Laramie, Wyoming. The principal campus is located on U.S. Highway 287 approximately two miles north of the city limits of Laramie. In 1998, WTI leased a portion of a building adjacent to the campus owned by Ahrenholtz Masonry, Inc. (AMI). AMI is a Wyoming corporation jointly owned by the plaintiff Ahrenholtz and his father and brother.
[¶ 5] In April 1998, Jim Mathis, the President of WTI, contacted John Ahrenholtz about the possibility of constructing an addition to the Ahrenholtz building to accommodate an expansion of WTI. The initial discussion quickly evolved from an addition of 10,000 square feet to AMI's existing building into a large project envisioning a substantial expansion of WTI's facilities, including a new building of 50,000 to 150,000 square feet, along with new dormitories and other facilities.
[¶ 6] Ahrenholtz agreed to assist Mathis with the plans for the proposed expansion. Ahrenholtz called the project "Vision 2000." As the project evolved, it became clear that the land where the AMI building was located was inadequate for the proposed expansion. Since the land was located outside of Laramie's city limits and the size of the project necessitated water and sewer services, it was concluded that annexation by the City of Laramie would be required. Ahrenholtz also began investigating the possibility of purchasing adjoining lands to accommodate the growing size of the project.
[¶ 7] Ahrenholtz hired Robert J. Coffey to perform surveying and engineering work on the project. Because of his limited financial resources, Ahrenholtz also began to seek outside investors. In the fall of 1998, Ahrenholtz contacted Robert Boysen, President of LEDC, a non-profit corporation that seeks to further the economic development of the Laramie area, for assistance in locating potential governmental sources of financing.
[¶ 8] Ahrenholtz encountered difficulty in securing financial commitments from potential investors because he did not have a binding agreement with WTI. Accordingly, Ahrenholtz attempted to obtain a letter of intent from Mathis and WTI. Ahrenholtz submitted several letters of intent with various terms but Mathis declined to sign any of them. Mathis indicated that the owner of WTI, Bankers Trust, was in the process of selling the school and, as a result, would not commit to the expansion project.
[¶ 9] Despite the absence of a binding agreement, Ahrenholtz continued to pursue the project. He developed schematics and plans for the proposed facilities, including various revisions suggested by Mathis. Ahrenholtz also purchased land adjoining the property where AMI's building was located. Ahrenholtz's contemporaneous notes indicate that he was aware that there was a risk inherent in his expenditures on the project without an agreement but that possible revenue, if the project came to fruition, was a significant factor in continuing to pursue it.
[¶ 10] In December 1998, Coffey and Boysen approached Ahrenholtz with an offer to invest in the project by purchasing the real estate upon which the expansion was to be located. Ahrenholtz refused the offer. Several months later, in February 1999, Ahrenholtz asked Coffey and Boysen if they would be interested in investing money in the project. This time, they refused the offer.
[¶ 11] Meanwhile, also in December 1998, LEDC purchased land from the City of Laramie located west of the city. The West Laramie property was officially annexed by the City of Laramie in April 1999. At some point, LEDC's property became a potential site for the WTI expansion project. Mathis insisted that WTI did not begin consideration of that property as an alternative location until June 1999. Ahrenholtz contended that consideration had begun much earlier than that and pointed to the minutes of an LEDC meeting of May 11, 1999:
Gary Crum reported that everything was going as planned with the Wyo. Tech. [e]xpansion project and that recently the City of Laramie approved the annexation of the Wyo. Tech. [p]roperty, which will allow for the development of sewer to the property.
At the time of the meeting, the LEDC West Laramie property had been annexed, but the Ahrenholtz property had not. A potentially *514 complicating factor was that Boysen had resigned as President of LEDC in April 1999 and taken employment with WTI in early May 1999. Mathis stated that Boysen was hired specifically to help with the expansion of WTI. During a trip in April, Boysen had told Ahrenholtz that, "I need you to not tell me any more about your project. I may be in competition with you."
[¶ 12] In January 1999, Bankers Trust had sold WTI, and the new owners had given Mathis permission to pursue the expansion project. Ahrenholtz continued to pursue investors for his proposal but had no success without a commitment from WTI. Accordingly, Ahrenholtz continued to press Mathis to sign a letter of intent. Finally, Mathis delivered a letter to Ahrenholtz on April 19, 1999, setting forth various conditions Ahrenholtz would have to meet by May 15, 1999 in order to be considered for the project. Mathis testified in his deposition that Ahrenholtz's proposal was still in consideration until sometime in July, when he and Ahrenholtz had a "heated" discussion relating to WTI's consideration of other sites for the expansion location.
[¶ 13] In September 1999, WTI contracted with LEDC to purchase the West Laramie property and entered into an agreement with Bob Blake Builders, Inc. to build the new facilities. It was subsequently disclosed that Coffey had done some surveying work in August 1999 for LEDC on the West Laramie property. Coffey also did work for Bob Blake Builders on the construction project itself.
[¶ 14] Ahrenholtz, along with his wife and corporate entities AMI and Point North, subsequently filed suit against LEDC, Boysen, and Coffey.[1] Ahrenholtz asserted six causes of action: (1) intentional interference with a business expectancy; (2) professional misconduct (specific to the defendant Coffey only); (3) conversion; (4) fraud; (5) conspiracy; and (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants responded with a motion to dismiss that was converted into a motion for summary judgment when the defendants attached documents to their initial motion.
[¶ 15] After allowing discovery and the submission of briefs, the district court granted the motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part. Initially, the district court dismissed Ahrenholtz's wife from the proceeding since it was unable to determine that she played any role in any of the events constituting the basis for the action. The district court quickly dismissed the claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy, fraud, and conversion on the basis that there was no evidence to sustain the claims. On Ahrenholtz's main claim of interference with a business expectancy, the district court noted "it would seem that perhaps there is possibly an inference that some kind of interference may have occurred." However, the court noted that when the specific acts of the defendants were broken down, an "impermissible leap of logic" was required to reach that conclusion. Essentially, the district court concluded that the evidence supported a conclusion that Ahrenholtz simply was unable to put together a proposal with the necessary financing and physical infrastructure (sewage, water systems). The court noted that in context the "evidence appear[ed] to be undisputed that none of the Defendants intentionally or improperly interfered with the Plaintiffs' pursuit of their contract or business expectancy with WTI." The final cause of action was the professional misconduct claim against Coffey. The district court denied the motion for summary judgment on that claim because Coffey had failed to provide testimony from an expert witness setting forth the standard of care and establishing that Coffey's actions were not a violation of that standard. The court retained the claim against Coffey and certified the remainder of its decision on the motion for summary judgment as a final order pursuant to W.R.C.P. 54(b) finding that there was no just reason to delay an appeal. Ahrenholtz challenges the district *515 court's decision on the defendants' motion for summary judgment in this appeal.[2]

STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶ 16] We have set out our standard for reviewing summary judgments innumerable times:
The standard of review applied by this Court in reviewing the granting of summary judgment is well-settled. "When a motion for summary judgment is before the supreme court, we have exactly the same duty as the district judge; and, if there is a complete record before us, we have exactly the same material as did he. We must follow the same standards. The propriety of granting a motion for summary judgment depends upon the correctness of a court's dual findings that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This court looks at the record from the viewpoint most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving to him all favorable inferences to be drawn from the facts contained in affidavits, depositions and other proper material appearing in the record. We separate the formal and pretended from the genuine and substantial so only the latter may be considered in eliminating the burden of a formal trial if only questions of law are left to decide; there must be no issue of material fact to decide. A material fact, expressed in various ways, is one having legal significance which would in a given case control the legal relations of the parties; one upon which the outcome of the litigation depends in whole or in part; one on which the controversy may be determined; one which will affect the result or outcome of the case depending upon its resolution; or one which constitutes a part of the plaintiff's cause of action or the defendant's defense. Summary judgment affords an opportunity for prompt disposition of a lawsuit in its early stages, permitting an end to unfounded claims and avoiding the expense of a full-fledged trial to both litigants and the state's judicial machinery." Reno Livestock Corp. v. Sun Oil Co. (Delaware), 638 P.2d 147, 150-51 (Wyo.1981) [ (citations omitted) ].
Hoblyn v. Johnson, 2002 WY 152, ¶ 11, 55 P.3d 1219, ¶ 11 (Wyo.2002) (quoting McLean v. Hyland Enterprises, Inc., 2001 WY 111, ¶ 14, 34 P.3d 1262, ¶ 14 (Wyo.2001)).

DISCUSSION
[¶ 17] The elements of a claim for tortious interference with a prospective contractual relation:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another's prospective contractual relation (except a contract to marry) is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the benefits of the relation, whether the interference consists of
(a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or continue the prospective relation or
(b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the prospective relation.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 766B (1979); Birt v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., 2003 WY 102, ¶ 71, 75 P.3d 640, ¶ 71 (Wyo.2003).
[¶ 18] Ahrenholtz contends that the evidence produced through affidavits, depositions, and documents was sufficient to create an issue of material fact necessitating a trial. His argument is predicated on the inferences one could reasonably draw from the facts noted above. At a minimum, Ahrenholtz contends that these facts and inferences create a material issue of fact as to whether or not there was intentional interference causing a termination of his relationship or business expectancy with WTI.
[¶ 19] The defendants, on the other hand, contend that there was neither a contract nor *516 a business expectancy that could be interfered with by them. They note that Ahrenholtz acknowledged that he did not have any agreement with WTI and that his work on the project was a "gamble" where he had "gone out on a limb." Furthermore, they insist that the district court correctly found that there was no evidence they had intentionally interfered with any relationship Ahrenholtz had with WTI. Specifically, they point out that the West Laramie land was not considered as a potential site until June 1999 and that the President of WTI, Mathis, testified in his deposition that Boysen had no influence over the final decision on where the expansion was to be located or who would be hired to construct the facilities. In short, the defendants contend that there are no facts that could support Ahrenholtz's contentions, and that the district court properly granted the motion for summary judgment.
[¶ 20] Our decision on appeal is guided by our standard of review. As noted above, we are constrained to view the record in a manner that is most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment, Ahrenholtz. The inference that Ahrenholtz draws from the evidence is that Coffey and Boysen used their knowledge of his project and, in the case of Boysen, his position as President of LEDC and later as an employee of WTI, to cause the rejection of Ahrenholtz's proposal in favor of construction of the expansion project on land purchased from LEDC. The facts Ahrenholtz cites in support of his contention include:
 In December 1998, Coffey and Boysen offered to invest in the proposed project by purchasing Ahrenholtz's property. The offer was declined.
 In the same month, LEDC purchased land west of Laramie that was annexed by the City of Laramie in April 1999.
 In February 1999, Ahrenholtz asked Coffey and Boysen if they would invest money in the project. They declined the offer.
 In April 1999, Boysen resigned as President of LEDC and went to work for Mathis at WTI. Boysen was hired specifically to assist WTI with their expansion.
 Also in April, Boysen told Ahrenholtz not to reveal any additional details about his proposal because he might "be in competition with [Ahrenholtz]."
 In early May, a comment was made at an LEDC open meeting that the WTI project was proceeding as planned and "recently the City of Laramie approved the annexation of the [WTI] Property, which will allow for the development of sewer to the property." The LEDC property had been annexed by the City of Laramie several weeks before the meeting. Ahrenholtz's property had not been annexed.
 WTI ultimately rejected Ahrenholtz's proposal and built its new facilities on the West Laramie site, which WTI had purchased from LEDC in September 1999.
 Coffey did survey work for LEDC on the West Laramie property and then, after it was sold to WTI, did work on the construction of the new facilities.
The district court acknowledged there was the possibility of an inference that some kind of interference took place; however, it concluded that when the specific acts of the defendants were examined, it required "an impermissible leap of logic to reach that conclusion." In other words, the court concluded that there was no direct evidence of interference; hence, the inferences were not sufficient to avoid summary judgment.
[¶ 21] We must disagree with the district court's conclusion. We acknowledge that the evidence offered by Ahrenholtz in opposition to the motion for summary judgment was circumstantial in nature. However, "circumstantial evidence is not evidence of a lower order; the law makes no distinction between the weight to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence." John Q. Hammons Inc. v. Poletis, 954 P.2d 1353, 1357-58 (Wyo.1998). The facts of this case are largely not disputed. What is disputed is the meaning of those facts. For example, the parties vigorously dispute the meaning of the statement made at the open meeting of the LEDC in May 1999. This evidence carries some importance because, if true, it would contradict the defendants' testimony as to when WTI began consideration of LEDC's West Laramie property as a potential expansion site (which, in turn, would impact the overall credibility of the defendants). *517 Ahrenholtz notes that the statement must refer to the West Laramie property owned by LEDC because it had been annexed by the city at that time, while the Ahrenholtz property had not. The defendants counter with an affidavit from LEDC's secretary that the reference was to Ahrenholtz's property and a draft annexation relating to that property which was pending at the time. This is a question of credibility. Did the statement mean what it purports to say on its face or did it mean what the person who recorded the statement (but was not its author) says it meant? The fact that the secretary was an employee of one of the parties to this action is a factor that would have to be considered in determining what inferences, if any, should be drawn from this piece of evidence.
Summary judgment should not be granted where contradictory inferences may be drawn from undisputed evidentiary facts. Even where the facts bearing upon the issue of negligence are undisputed, * * * if reasonable minds could reach different conclusions and inferences from such facts, the issue must be submitted to the trier of fact. Evaluative judgment between two rationally possible conclusions from facts cannot be engaged in on summary judgment. Summary judgment is not appropriate where the record, including documents and pleadings, establishes facts which give rise to contradictory inferences, one of which supports the party opposing the motion.
* * * The motion for summary judgment is a drastic remedy and one which is designed to pierce the formal allegations and reach the merits of the controversy but only when no material issue of fact is present. * * * Although both parties are obligated to come forward with their evidence, the burden is on the moving party to demonstrate clearly that there is no genuine issue of material fact and if that is not done, the motion for summary judgment should be denied. This court looks at the record from the viewpoint most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving to him all favorable inferences to be drawn from the facts contained in the affidavits, exhibits, and depositions.
* * * If the evidence is subject to conflicting interpretations or reasonable minds might differ as to its significance, summary judgment is improper.
Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625, 639 (Wyo. 1986) (emphasis in original) (quoting Weaver v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Wyoming, 609 P.2d 984, 986-87 (Wyo.1980) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment on Ahrenholtz's claim for tortious interference with a contract or a business expectancy and remand for a trial.
[¶ 22] In his second issue on appeal, Ahrenholtz challenges the district court's decision granting summary judgment on his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Ahrenholtz concedes that this issue is related to the status of his wife, Pam Ahrenholtz, as a plaintiff.
[¶ 23] In its decision letter, the district court dismissed Pam Ahrenholtz as a party because it was "unable to determine that Mrs. Ahrenholtz played any part in this matter." In a separate section of the decision letter, the district court concluded that there was no evidence that the defendants' conduct rose to a level required to sustain the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
[¶ 24] In order to prevent summary judgment on this claim, Ahrenholtz had to present evidence that the defendants, by extreme and outrageous conduct, intentionally or recklessly caused severe emotional distress. Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 933 P.2d 1098, 1105 (Wyo.1997). Ahrenholtz contends that the Restatement of Torts allows for the recovery of damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress in conjunction with an action for interference with a contract or business expectancy. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A(1)(c) (1979). Ahrenholtz urges this Court to accept that section of the Restatement and reinstate Pam Ahrenholtz as a party.
[¶ 25] The problem with Ahrenholtz's argument is that it presupposes he has presented sufficient evidence of emotional damages to avoid the motion for summary *518 judgment. Our review of the record convinces us that he has not. Quite simply, there is no evidence that we could find anywhere in the voluminous record on appeal that would support a claim for emotional damages. There is only the basic allegation that Pam Ahrenholtz was emotionally damaged. That is not sufficient to avoid the motion. The district court's order dismissing Pam Ahrenholtz from the proceedings and granting the motion for summary judgment on the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is affirmed.

CONCLUSION
[¶ 26] The record discloses the existence of material facts in dispute requiring a trial on the merits of the plaintiffs' claims. The district court's summary judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
NOTES
[1]  Ahrenholtz entered into an agreement with WTI releasing any claims against it. Accordingly, WTI is not a party to this action.
[2]  On appeal, Ahrenholtz has only raised a challenge to the district court's ruling on its claim for intentional interference with a business expectancy and the dismissal of his wife from the litigation that implicates the efficacy of the district court's decision dismissing the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Since Ahrenholtz does not address the district court's ruling on the other claims, we deem them waived and will not consider the district court's decision relating to them. See O'Donnell v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Wyoming, 2003 WY 112, ¶ 8, n. 1, 76 P.3d 308, ¶ 8, n. 1 (Wyo.2003).


538 S.W.2d 134 (1976)
Ex parte James Roger FARRIS.
No. 52246.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
July 7, 1976.
Don L. Jarvis and Ray F. Grisham, Sherman, for appellant.
Joe Max Shelton, County Atty., Ralph Petty, Jr., Asst. County Atty., Sherman, Jim D. Vollers, State's Atty., David S. McAngus, Asst. State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

*135 OPINION
GUPTON, Judge.
This is an application for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to Article 11.07, V.A.C.C.P.
Petitioner's sole contention is that he has been placed in double jeopardy by being convicted of the offense of murder with malice in Cause No. 28,774 and robbery by firearms in Cause No. 28,773, with both offenses arising out of the same transaction upon the same victim, Fred Wright.
The question of law presented in this cause is the same as was decided in the case of petitioner's co-defendant, Michael Jewel. In Ex parte Jewel, 535 S.W.2d 362 (Tex.Cr. App.1976), this Court held that the robbery by firearms conviction must be vacated since petitioner therein had been previously convicted of the murder of Fred Wright, which occurred during the robbery, for the reason that the subsequent prosecution would have been barred by the carving doctrine as set out in Duckett v. State, 454 S.W.2d 755 (Tex.Cr.App.1970).
The facts in the case at bar are exactly the same, except for the trial dates; therefore the same result must occur. The relief sought is granted. Petitioner's conviction in Cause No. 28,733, for the offense of robbery by firearms in which he received a 99 year sentence, is hereby declared void and said indictment is dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.


                                         Slip Op. 14-77

                UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

 STANDARD FURNITURE
 MANUFACTURING CO., INC.,

                Plaintiff,

                v.                                     Before: Timothy C. Stanceu, Judge

 UNITED STATES and UNITED                              Court No. 13-00202
 STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE
 COMMISSION,

                Defendants.

                                   OPINION AND ORDER

[Denying motion to stay]

                                                                   Dated: June 27, 2014

     Jill A. Cramer, Kristin H. Mowry, Jeffrey S. Grimson, Sarah Wyss, and Rebecca M. Janz,
Mowry & Grimson, PLLC, of Washington, DC, for plaintiff.

        Jessica R. Toplin, Trial Attorney, and Franklin E. White, Jr., Assistant Director,
Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of Washington, DC,
for defendant United States. With them on the brief were Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney
General, and Jeanne E. Davidson, Director.
       Neal J. Reynolds, Assistant General Counsel for Litigation, and Patrick V. Gallagher, Jr.,
Attorney-Advisor, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. International Trade Commission, of
Washington, DC, for defendant U.S. International Trade Commission. With them on the brief
was Dominic L. Bianchi, General Counsel.

       Stanceu, Judge: In this action, plaintiff Standard Furniture Manufacturing Co., Inc.

(“Standard”) challenges certain actions by the U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC” or

the “Commission”) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“Customs” or “CBP”) that denied

plaintiff benefits under the now-repealed Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000
Court No. 13-00202                                                                             Page 2

(“CDSOA” or “Byrd Amendment”).1 Specifically, plaintiff brings various statutory and

as-applied constitutional challenges to the Commission’s determination not to include Standard

on a list of parties potentially eligible for “affected domestic producer” (“ADP”) status under the

CDSOA, which status could have qualified Standard for distributions of funds collected under an

antidumping duty order on imports of wooden bedroom furniture from the People’s Republic of

China (“China”). Compl. ¶¶ 47-59 (May 14, 2013), ECF No. 4. Plaintiff also brings various

statutory and as-applied constitutional challenges to CBP’s decision not to provide Standard with

annual CDSOA distributions for Fiscal Year 2011 and Fiscal Year 2012. Id..

       Plaintiffs request that the court stay these proceedings pending the final resolution of a

petition for a writ of certiorari seeking U.S. Supreme Court review of Ashley Furniture Indus.,

Inc. v. United States, 734 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Ashley II”). Pl. Standard Furniture Mfg.

Co., Inc.’s Mot. to Continue the Stay of All Proceedings 1 (Feb. 13, 2014), ECF No. 24 (“Pl.’s

Stay Mot.”). Also before the court is plaintiff’s motion to supplement the motion to stay with

additional exhibits demonstrating the Ashley II appellants’ intent to file a petition for a writ of

certiorari at the Supreme Court. Pl. Standard Furniture Mfg. Co., Inc.’s Mot. to Supplement its

Feb. 13, 2014 Mot. to Continue the Stay of All Proceedings 1 (Mar. 13, 2014), ECF No. 26.

Defendants United States and the ITC oppose both motions. Defs.’ Resp. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot.

to Stay 1 (Mar. 4, 2014), ECF No. 25 (“Defs.’ Stay Opp’n”); Defs.’ Resp. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot.

to Supplement its Mot. to Stay 1 (Mar. 19, 2014), ECF No. 27.

       1
          Pub. L. No. 106-387, §§ 1001-03, 114 Stat. 1549, 1549A-72-75, 19 U.S.C. § 1675c
(2000), repealed by Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-171, § 7601(a), 120 Stat. 4, 154
(Feb. 8, 2006; effective Oct. 1, 2007).
Court No. 13-00202                                                                           Page 3

       For the reasons discussed herein, the court denies plaintiff’s motion to stay these

proceedings. The court also denies as moot plaintiff’s motion to supplement because the

Ashley II appellants have filed the relevant petition with the Supreme Court.

                                        I. BACKGROUND

       In 2003, the ITC initiated an investigation to determine whether imports of wooden

bedroom furniture from China were causing or threatening to cause material injury to a domestic

industry. Compl. ¶ 23. During this investigation, the ITC distributed questionnaires to potential

ADPs, including Standard. Id. at ¶ 24. In its questionnaire responses, Standard indicated that it

opposed the petition that resulted in the antidumping duty order on imports of wooden bedroom

furniture from China.2 Id. Subsequently, the ITC excluded Standard from the list of ADP’s

potentially eligible for CDSOA distributions under the order. Id. at ¶¶ 35, 38. On July 18, 2011,

Standard filed a certification with Customs requesting CDSOA distributions for Fiscal

Year 2011, which Customs subsequently denied. Id. at ¶¶ 8, 36-37. On July 25, 2012, Standard

filed another certification with Customs, this time requesting CDSOA distributions for Fiscal

Year 2012, which Customs also denied. Id. at ¶¶ 10, 39-40.

       Plaintiff commenced this action on May 14, 2013. Summons, ECF No. 1; Compl. On

May 28, 2013, the court granted defendants’ unopposed motion to stay these proceedings

pending issuance of a mandate by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Court of

Appeals”) in Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc. v. United States, CAFC Court No. 2012-1196. Order,

ECF No. 11. That case concerned an appeal of this Court’s decision in Ashley Furniture Indus.,

Inc. v. United States, 36 CIT __, 818 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (2012) (“Ashley I”), in which this Court

       2
         See Notice of Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value &
Antidumping Duty Order: Wooden Bedroom Furniture From the People’s Republic of China,
70 Fed. Reg. 329 (Dep’t of Commerce Jan. 4, 2005).
Court No. 13-00202                                                                             Page 4

dismissed a domestic wooden furniture producer’s claims challenging the denial of CDSOA

distributions on grounds similar to those brought by plaintiff in the instant case. On

August 19, 2013, the Court of Appeals decided Ashley II, a consolidated opinion affirming the

judgments in Ashley I and in Ethan Allen Global, Inc. v. United States, 36 CIT __, 816 F. Supp.

2d 1330 (2012), which also involved claims similar to those in the instant action. Ashley II,

734 F.3d at 1306. After denying petitions for rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals issued its

mandate in Ashley II on January 10, 2014.

       Plaintiff filed its motion to stay these proceedings on February 13, 2014, Pl.’s Stay

Mot. 1, which defendants oppose, Defs.’ Stay Opp’n 1. On May 2, 2014, the Ashley II appellants

filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking Supreme Court review of the decision by the Court

of Appeals in Ashley II. See Pet. for a Writ of Certiorari, U.S. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 13-1367.

                                          II. DISCUSSION

       The court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to section 201 of the Customs Courts

Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4) (2006). The power to stay a case “is incidental to the power

inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of

time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. North American Co.,

299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (“Landis”). Decisions concerning when and how to stay a case rest

“within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. United States,

124 F.3d 1413, 1416 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). In exercising that discretion, the court

must “weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 257.

       Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the circumstances of these proceedings weigh in

favor of a stay. Plaintiff contends that a stay is warranted in this instance because, in plaintiff’s

view, the outcome of the Ashley II appellants’ petition for a writ of certiorari “will have a direct
Court No. 13-00202                                                                             Page 5

impact” on the above-captioned matter. Pl.’s Stay Mot. 2. This is because, according to

plaintiff, “the factual and legal issues underlying Standard’s case are substantially similar” to

those addressed in Ashley II and the petition for a writ of certiorari “could result in a substantive

opinion on the merits by the Supreme Court.” Id.

         Plaintiff’s argument that the petition “will have a direct impact” on the instant case is

mere speculation. The court can have no assurance that the Supreme Court is likely to grant the

Ashley II appellants’ petition. Plaintiff, therefore, has not shown that a stay of this action would

promote judicial economy and efficiency rather than simply cause delay.

                                   III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

         Upon consideration of all papers and proceedings herein, and upon due deliberation, it is

hereby

        ORDERED that plaintiff’s March 13, 2014 motion to supplement the February 13, 2014
motion to stay further proceedings in this action be, and hereby is, denied as moot; and it is
further

        ORDERED that plaintiff’s February 13, 2014 motion to stay further proceedings in this
action be, and hereby is, denied.

                                                               /s/ Timothy C. Stanceu
                                                               Timothy C. Stanceu
                                                               Judge
Dated: June 27, 2014
       New York, New York