112 Wn.2d 731 (1989)
774 P.2d 10
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Petitioner,
v.
MARCUS DWAYNE PATTERSON, Respondent.
No. 54111-6.
The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.
June 15, 1989.
Arthur D. Curtis, Prosecuting Attorney, and Richard Melnick, Deputy, for petitioner.
Eric J. Nielsen of Washington Appellate Defender Association, for respondent.
*732 Norm Maleng, Prosecuting Attorney for King County, and William L. Downing, Senior Deputy, amici curiae for petitioner.
Richard Hansen and David Allen on behalf of Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amici curiae for respondent.
UTTER, J.
The State seeks review of a Court of Appeals decision affirming a trial court's suppression of evidence based on the State's failure to show that exigent circumstances necessitated searching a parked, secured, unoccupied car without a warrant. We reverse and find there were enough additional factors in this case to constitute "exigent circumstances."
The facts are stipulated. At 6:06 a.m. on November 16, 1982, Officers Abernathy and Krueger were dispatched to respond to a burglary at the American Music Company. Officer Krueger arrived at the scene within 30 seconds of dispatch. En route, Krueger noticed a white over blue Cadillac going the wrong way on a 1-way street two blocks from the music store. At the store, Krueger observed the display window was broken. He advised responding units about the white over blue Cadillac but did not give the license number or other identifying information. After the owner of the store arrived, he told Krueger that two "P.A. Boards" were missing.
At 6:11 a.m., Officer Abernathy located a white over blue Cadillac parked at an apartment complex 6 blocks from the music store. Officer Ferrell arrived shortly thereafter. The officers noticed a white amp pigtail hanging outside the right front door of the car. The treads of the car were wet but the sidewalls and hubcaps were dry. The ground under the car was dry. Without entering the car, the officers observed two stereo amplifiers on the passenger seat, one with a price tag attached and both apparently new. They also observed that the front floor mats were wet, the driver's side wetter than the passenger's side. The apartment *733 manager told the officers that her husband's car had been parked in the same parking space until shortly before 6 a.m. when he had left for work. The officers did not know the whereabouts of the driver of the vehicle.
Officers Kandoll and McNicholas joined Abernathy and Ferrell. No officer attempted to obtain a search warrant through any means. Officer Ferrell entered the car and found a receipt made out to Marcus Patterson in the glove box and an address book on the floorboard. A radio check showed the car registered to Victor Dolezal. The address book led the officers to Cheryl Thomas's apartment where they found Marcus Patterson. The officers arrested Patterson approximately 20 minutes after they had located the Cadillac. After being advised of his constitutional rights, Patterson stated that he understood them and confessed.
On November 19, 1982, Patterson pleaded not guilty to charges of second degree burglary and second degree theft. After he failed to appear for trial, he was arrested on a bench warrant in January 1986. He moved to suppress both the evidence found in his car and his confession. The trial court found that although the officers had probable cause to search the car, there were no exigent circumstances that made it impractical for the officers to obtain a warrant. Consequently, the court suppressed the evidence. Because the ruling on suppression disposed of the case, the trial court dismissed it with prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. We granted the State's petition for review.
A recent case from our sister state discusses the availability of constitutional protections where there is a parked, unoccupied car. State v. Kock, 302 Or. 29, 725 P.2d 1285 (1986). At 5:30 a.m., two officers were watching the parking and entry area of a store. They knew that the defendant, an employee, had no authority to remove merchandise from the store. At 5:42 a.m., the defendant left the store carrying a box covered with newspaper. He approached his car, removed something from the box, placed it in the car, and *734 partially covered the item with clothing. After the defendant returned to the store, the officers approached the car. Without entering the car, they could not identify the item. They opened the door, seized the item, and found it contained merchandise. An arrest of the defendant followed. 725 P.2d at 1286.
The Oregon court rejected an argument that this was a search incident to arrest and focused on the narrow issue that is also before us. They assumed there was probable cause for the search of the automobile, as exists in our case, but stated:
We nevertheless hold that any search of an automobile that was parked, immobile and unoccupied at the time the police first encountered it in connection with the investigation of a crime must be authorized by a warrant issued by a magistrate or, alternatively, the prosecution must demonstrate that exigent circumstances other than the potential mobility of the automobile exist.
Kock, at 33. The court relied on Oregon's constitution to decline to follow California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 85 L.Ed.2d 406, 105 S.Ct. 2066 (1985).
[1] Our preexisting case law compels us to reach the same conclusion as the Oregon court in Kock. Pursuant to the unique language of our own constitution, we have carefully restricted automobile searches to balance an individual's privacy interest against a real state and societal need to search; mere convenience is simply not enough. See Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 755 P.2d 775 (1988) (an individual's privacy interest in a vehicle outweighed the State's interest in regulating vehicles by instituting a sobriety checkpoint program); State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 726 P.2d 445 (1986) (an officer's "objective reasons" for believing an investigatee might be hiding a weapon, and a risk of danger to officers, warranted a Terry stop search for weapons within the immediate control of the investigatee or a companion); State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986) (potential danger to officers and destructibility of evidence warranted a bright-line rule for a search incident *735 to arrest); State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980) (search of a VIN [serial] number located inside the door of a parked, locked, unoccupied truck when the defendant was in custody violated Const. art. 1, § 7 and the Fourth Amendment).
Necessity, a societal need to search without a warrant, provides the underlying theme in these decisions. Against societal need, we balance privacy interests provided by article 1, section 7 of our own constitution. Both analysis under the factors outlined in State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986), and scholarly commentary support our independent interpretation of that provision. See Gunwall (analyzing Const. art. 1, § 7); see also Nock, Seizing Opportunity, Searching for Theory: Article I, Section 7, 8 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 331, 366 (1985).
In the areas of search incident to arrest and Terry stops, we found that concerns for the safety of officers and potential destructibility of evidence do outweigh privacy interests and warrant a bright-line rule permitting limited searches. See State v. Stroud, supra; State v. Kennedy, supra. However, the concerns are not the same when officers approach a parked, immobile, unoccupied, secured vehicle. In such a situation no bright-line rule is necessary. If exigencies in addition to potential mobility exist, they will justify a warrantless search.
[2] Given this background, the only remaining question is whether there were particularized exigent circumstances that would excuse the officers' failure to seek a warrant. The facts of this case provide such circumstances when we focus on the proximity in time and place and on the immediacy of the defendant's flight from the car.
Only 5 minutes elapsed between the time the officers responded to the alarm and Officer Abernathy located the white over blue Cadillac described by Officer Krueger. When found, the car was within six blocks of the music store. Several factors indicate that the suspect had, within less than 5 minutes, fled the vehicle and might be hiding in the immediate area. The treads of the car were wet, but the *736 sidewalls and hubcaps were dry; the ground under the car was dry; and the front floor mats were wet. The apartment manager had told the officers that her husband's car had been parked in that parking space until shortly before 6 a.m. The white amp pigtail hanging out of the door indicated the occupant had left in a hurry.
The freshness of the pursuit is apparent. Had the officers delayed the search by applying for a warrant, the suspect could have moved far from the immediate scene. The evidence found by searching the car enabled the officers to arrest the suspect in the neighborhood within 20 minutes of finding the car.
Taken together, these factors constitute exigent circumstances sufficient to allow a warrantless search of a parked, secured, unoccupied vehicle. Courts have found exigency "when there is an immediate need to continue a promising criminal investigation." McCary v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 219, 228, 321 S.E.2d 637, 642 (1984) (listing decisions). "This exigency is said to be `within the spirit, though not the text, of the "hot pursuit" exception.'" McCary, at 229 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 533 F.2d 578, 583 (D.C. Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 956, 47 L.Ed.2d 362, 96 S.Ct. 1432 (1976). In both McCary and Robinson, the courts focused on the gravity of the offense (bank robberies); the immediacy of the investigation (cars found within 1 to 2 hours); the belief that the suspects were armed; the likelihood that the suspects, who were at large, would escape; and peaceable entry.
In this case there is no indication that the suspect was armed, and the offense may be somewhat less grave. However, as the Robinson court noted, no one factor is conclusive. 533 F.2d at 584. Similarly, factors will be weighted differently in varying fact patterns. Here, the time frame and probability that the defendant was nearby, though not conclusive, deserve significant weight. There was a need to proceed as quickly as possible to apprehend the defendant who had burglarized the store only minutes before the *737 search. See Love v. State, 487 S.W.2d 677, 678 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for continuation of the trial.
CALLOW, C.J., and BRACHTENBACH, DOLLIVER, PEARSON, and SMITH, JJ., concur.
DORE, J. (concurring)
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but I write separately because the analysis presented in its opinion unjustifiably expands the warrant requirement for automobile searches in this state. While the majority holds that a warrantless automobile search was justified in this case, dicta in its opinion suggests that such searches will be upheld only in rare circumstances. Majority at 735, 736. Furthermore, the majority's analysis places the burden on law enforcement officials to show, in each individual case, that the warrantless automobile search was justified. Through this dicta and skewed logic, the majority effectively overrules State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 152, 720 P.2d 436 (1986), which formulated a much broader authorization for warrantless automobile searches.
In Stroud, we abandoned case-by-case analysis and committed ourselves to developing per se, bright-line rules in this area. We recognized that case-by-case analysis of warrantless automobile searches requires police officers to predict, in effect, how a court sitting after the fact will gauge their situation when close calls concerning searches are made in the field. We saw then that such a demand is unreasonable in itself and that, by creating uncertainty, it necessarily harms both effective law enforcement and civil liberties. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d at 152. I cannot understand how that obvious conclusion escapes the majority now.
The majority's error is particularly unfortunate because this case presents an excellent opportunity to finish the task we undertook 3 years ago. The facts presented here permit us to define a bright-line rule to govern automobile *738 searches under exigent circumstances; a rule which would complement the bright-line rule on searches incident to arrest which we articulated in Stroud. For reasons set out below, I propose the following rule: A search of the passenger compartment, including an unlocked glove compartment, may be conducted without a warrant whenever probable cause to conduct the search arises contemporaneously with the stop or initial open-view inspection of the subject automobile. This rule would validate the search challenged here. Accordingly, I would reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for trial on the merits.

WARRANTLESS AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES UNDER CONST. ART. 1, § 7
Rather than advancing the development of a clear, reliable standard for warrantless automobile searches, the majority has lurched backward. To see this, it is helpful to have an overview of the applicable law.
Const. art. 1, § 7 provides: "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law." We held early on that the term "private affairs" encompasses "the person ... and the possession of his automobile and all that was in it, while upon a public street ..." State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 187, 203 P. 390 (1922).
While Gibbons imposed a warrant requirement on all automobile searches, we soon recognized a broad exception to that requirement. Strictly speaking, it was not a separate "automobile exception" like the federal rule, but only a particular application of the general exception for searches incident to arrest.
It has always been held that a peace officer, when he makes a lawful arrest, may lawfully, without a search warrant, search the person arrested and take from him any evidence tending to prove the crime with which he is charged. If a search may be made of the person or clothing of the person lawfully arrested, then it would follow that a search may also be properly made of his grip or *739 suitcase which he may be carrying. From this it seems to us to follow logically that a similar search, under the same circumstances, may be made of the automobile of which he has possession and control at the time of his arrest.
State v. Hughlett, 124 Wash. 366, 370, 214 P. 841 (1923). See also State v. Cyr, 40 Wn.2d 840, 843, 246 P.2d 480 (1952). Cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151, 69 L.Ed. 543, 45 S.Ct. 280, 39 A.L.R. 790 (1925).
Given the broad rationale of Hughlett, it was construed for many years to authorize automobile searches incident to arrest regardless of where the suspect actually happened to be at the time of the search. See, e.g., State v. McCollum, 17 Wn.2d 85, 136 P.2d 165, 141 P.2d 613 (1943) (arrestee in hospital). Later, however, we restricted the scope of automobile searches to the "immediate environs" of the suspect at the time of arrest. State v. Michaels, 60 Wn.2d 638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962). In this we anticipated the restrictions placed on searches incident to arrest by the United States Supreme Court in Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367, 11 L.Ed.2d 777, 84 S.Ct. 881 (1964), wherein the Court held that, under the Fourth Amendment, a search beyond what is necessary to seize weapons and prevent the destruction of evidence is not permissible without a warrant.
We explicitly incorporated Preston's limitations into our analysis under Const. art. 1, § 7 in State v. Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686, 699, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983), overruled in part in State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986).
Based on our understanding of Const. art. 1, § 7, we conclude that, when a lawful arrest is made, the arresting officer may search the person arrested and the area within his immediate control. See State v. Michaels, supra [60 Wn.2d 638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962)]. A warrantless search in this situation is permissible only to remove any weapons the arrestee might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect an escape and to avoid destruction of evidence by the arrestee of the crime for which he or she is arrested.
*740 In this respect, Ringer merely confirmed a trend begun 23 years earlier in Michaels.
However, Ringer also marked a departure from our earlier line of cases. Where from Hughlett on we had analyzed warrantless automobile searches solely under the "incident to arrest" exception, Ringer went on to approve an exception based on exigent circumstances. Like the earlier analysis, this too was not a separate automobile exception to the warrant requirement, but a well established general exception applied to the case of automobiles.
We have recognized ... that where police have probable cause to conduct a search, they may do so without a warrant when "they are confronted by emergencies and exigencies which do not permit reasonable time and delay for a judicial officer to evaluate and act upon probable cause applications for warrants by police officers." State v. Smith, 88 Wn.2d 127, 135, 559 P.2d 970 (1977).
100 Wn.2d at 701. The existence of exigent circumstances was to be determined in a case-by-case inquiry into the "totality of the circumstances". The burden of showing exigent circumstances was placed on the State. 100 Wn.2d at 701.
Ringer was a major advance in the evolution of automobile search doctrine under Const. art. 1, § 7, because it carefully defined and defended two grounds on which warrantless searches of automobiles could be justified. However, within 3 years we reexamined Ringer and overruled it in part. State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986).
The defect in Ringer that prompted our reconsideration was its "totality of the circumstances" standard. While that case-by-case approach arguably permitted courts to decide warrantless search cases with great precision  weighing a range of factors and making fine distinctions  it required police officers, in effect, to predict how all the second-guessing would come out. If the officers, acting in good faith in a difficult situation, happened to judge their situation *741 differently from the reviewing court, an otherwise proper, fruitful investigation would be ruined. If the police wished to avoid this risk, their only option was to adopt an overly cautious approach to automobile searches. Either way, effective law enforcement suffered. Thus, while Ringer's holding that exigent circumstances could justify a warrantless automobile search was basically sound, the terms of that holding  the "totality of the circumstances" test for exigencies  undermined it.
Consequently, Justice Goodloe's opinion in Stroud articulated a bright-line rule to govern warrantless automobile searches.
To weigh the actual exigent circumstances against the actual privacy interests on a case-by-case basis would create too difficult a rule to allow for both effective police enforcement and also protection of individual rights. However, a reasonable balance can be struck. During the arrest process, including the time immediately subsequent to the suspect's being arrested, handcuffed, and placed in a patrol car, officers should be allowed to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle for weapons or destructible evidence. However, if the officers encounter a locked container or locked glove compartment, they may not unlock and search either container without obtaining a warrant.
106 Wn.2d at 152.
While four Justices signed two separate opinions in Stroud, a clear majority voted to overrule Ringer and to abandon a case-by-case approach to warrantless automobile searches. Justice Durham submitted a separate opinion, also signed by four Justices, in which she wrote:
There are conceptual difficulties for courts, as well as practical difficulties for the police, in applying Ringer's case-by-case analysis of the permissible scope of an automobile search incident to arrest....
...
At any rate, Ringer's case-by-case approach to search and seizure questions appears, upon reflection, to be theoretically unsound. I agree with the majority that a *742 clearer set of rules is needed to aid the police. Majority opinion, at 150-51.
106 Wn.2d at 153, 166-67 (Durham, J., concurring).
The question which Stroud raises, however, is whether it overruled the "totality of the circumstances" test for both of Ringer's grounds, or only for searches incident to arrest.

THE MAJORITY HAS TAKEN A STEP BACKWARD
The majority opinion confines Stroud to the narrowest possible interpretation. In taking this position, the majority abandons the attempt to provide law enforcement with a workable standard for warrantless automobile searches and forces police officers to cope once again with the impossible situation prevailing under Ringer.
The majority reads Stroud as addressing only the "incident to arrest" part of Ringer. It states Stroud's holding this way: "[P]otential danger to officers and destructibility of evidence warranted a bright-line rule for a search incident to arrest". Majority, at 734-35. It goes on to say:
In the areas of search incident to arrest and Terry stops, we found that concerns for the safety of officers and potential destructibility of evidence do outweigh privacy interests and warrant a bright-line rule permitting limited searches. See State v. Stroud, supra; State v. Kennedy [107 Wn.2d 1, 726 P.2d 445 (1986)].
Majority, at 735. According to the majority, then, Stroud overruled the case-by-case "totality of the circumstances" approach only as it might apply to the question whether the warrantless search was truly incidental to an arrest. For example, Stroud eliminates the question whether certain areas or objects actually were within the suspect's reach during the arrest. Under the majority's interpretation though, Stroud has no bearing on the "exigent circumstances" leg of Ringer.
Strictly speaking, the majority is correct. The search challenged in Stroud was made incident to an arrest. There was no sign of exigency in the record and the State did not attempt to justify the search with a showing of exigent circumstances, as Ringer would have permitted. We are free, *743 in terms of stare decisis, to do what the majority has done: to adopt a bright-line rule to govern the "incident to arrest" inquiry and a case-by-case, totality of the circumstances rule to govern the "exigent circumstances" issue.
The only question is whether it makes any sense to do so.
Abolishing Ringer's "totality of the circumstances" approach for one of its grounds but not for the other accomplishes nothing. The danger we are concerned with is uncertainty. The "totality" approach places the police in a dilemma, forcing them to risk ruining good investigations or to refrain from conducting searches they would otherwise make. Clearly, unless a clear rule is provided for both grounds on which a warrantless search might be conducted, the uncertainty has not been removed. The dilemma has not been resolved. The harm to law enforcement has not been avoided. In short, there is no principled basis for the majority's not following the underlying logic of Stroud and holding that the question of exigencies should also be governed by a bright-line rule.
The majority attempts to distinguish Stroud by claiming that it rests on a concern for police officers' safety during arrests; something which purportedly is not a concern of the exigent circumstances exception. Majority, at 735. This is only half true. The Stroud court was, to judge from the opinions, primarily concerned with the uncertainty that a "totality of the circumstances" rule creates in the business of law enforcement. Justice Goodloe wrote:
The Ringer holding makes it virtually impossible for officers to decide whether or not a warrantless search would be permissible. Weighing the "totality of circumstances" is too much of a burden to put on police officers who must make a decision to search with little more than a moment's reflection. As the United States Supreme Court stated in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458, 69 L.Ed.2d 768, 101 S.Ct. 2860 (1981), quoting LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 127, 142:

*744 A highly sophisticated set of rules ... requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they may be `literally impossible of application by the officer in the field.'"
We agree with the Supreme Court's decision to draw a clearer line to aid police enforcement, although because of our state's additional protection of privacy rights we must draw the line differently than did the United States Supreme Court.
106 Wn.2d at 151. Justice Durham expressed a concern for police officers' safety, but she also shared the view that a case-by-case rule creates "practical difficulties for the police," 106 Wn.2d at 166, and that "a clearer set of rules is needed to aid the police." 106 Wn.2d at 167 (Durham, J., concurring).
Therefore, while the facts of Stroud presented a search incident to arrest, our decision was governed primarily by a concern which applies equally to warrantless searches made under exigent circumstances: the impossibility, from a police officer's point of view, of drawing the fine distinctions which a court applying a "totality of the circumstances" test will make in determining the search's validity. While we can, if we wish, read Stroud narrowly and adopt a "totality of the circumstances" test for the exigent circumstances leg of Ringer, it is not wise or consistent on our part to do so. We will not have relieved law enforcement of an impossible burden, as we undertook to do in Stroud. In not fulfilling that commitment, the majority has taken an unprincipled step backward.

THE RELEVANCE OF OREGON LAW
Before moving on to my own analysis of warrantless automobile searches, it is worthwhile, for two reasons, to consider Oregon law on the question. First, the majority relies on an Oregon case, but it presents the case out of context. Returned to context, the case fails to support the majority. Second, Oregon has taken an approach to this question which, in general, I propose we follow.
*745 The majority relies on State v. Kock, 302 Or. 29, 725 P.2d 1285 (1986), and correctly points out that Kock involved facts similar to those presented in the case before us. The police, acting with probable cause but without a warrant, searched a parked car prior to arresting the suspect. Contrary to the majority's suggestion, however, the resemblance ends there.
The majority states that: "The Oregon court rejected an argument that this was a search incident to arrest and focused on the narrow issue that is also before us." Majority, at 734. This is incorrect. Kock and this case do not present the same issue for the simple reason that the governing law in Oregon is vastly different from the governing law in Washington.
The relevant provision of the Oregon constitution reads as follows:
No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
Oregon Const. art. 1, § 9. Obviously, this provision is modeled on the Fourth Amendment, which it paraphrases almost exactly. As we have often noted, however, our own constitutional convention expressly rejected the Fourth Amendment model in favor of an express guaranty of privacy. Const. art. 1, § 7; Ringer, 100 Wn.2d at 690; Stroud, 106 Wn.2d at 148.
In the course of construing Oregon's search and seizure provision, the Oregon court has fashioned a state law automobile exception which, not surprisingly, is similar to that recognized by the Supreme Court under the Fourth Amendment.
This case presents for us the heretofore unanswered question: Is there an "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement of Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution? We hold that there is such an exception, provided (1) that the automobile is mobile at the time it *746 is stopped by police or other governmental authority, and (2) that probable cause exists for the search of the vehicle. By adopting such a position, we align ourselves with the traditional federal "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement set forth in the seminal case of Carroll v. United States [267 U.S. 132, 69 L.Ed. 543, 45 S.Ct. 280, 39 A.L.R. 790 (1925)].
State v. Brown, 301 Or. 268, 274, 721 P.2d 1357 (1986).
Oregon's state law automobile exception is entirely distinct from either the warrant exception for searches incident to arrest or the exception for searches conducted under exigent circumstances. This much is evident from the Oregon court's statement of the issues in Kock.
We allowed review to decide whether the warrantless entry of the car to retrieve the suspected stolen property was lawful as a search incident to arrest and whether the search of defendant's car was lawful either under the "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement as described in State v. Brown [301 Or. 268, 721 P.2d 1357 (1986)], or, alternatively, under an individualized showing of exigent circumstances.
302 Or. at 32.
The principal issue before the court in Kock was whether actual mobility is a necessary minimum for the application of the state law automobile exception. Put another way, the question was whether Oregon, in construing its own constitution, would follow the United States Supreme Court in concluding that "inherent mobility" is sufficient to trigger the automobile exception for warrantless searches. See Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 73 L.Ed.2d 750, 102 S.Ct. 3079 (1982); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 807 n. 9, 72 L.Ed.2d 572, 102 S.Ct. 2157 (1982); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 26 L.Ed.2d 419, 90 S.Ct. 1975 (1970). Declining to follow the federal rule, the court in Kock decided to require actual mobility.
Although logically it can be argued that the rationale of the seminal case of Carroll v. United States [267 U.S. 132, 69 L.Ed. 543, 45 S.Ct. 280, 39 A.L.R. 790 (1925)], and its progeny, including United States v. Ross [456 U.S. 798, 72 L.Ed.2d 572, 102 S.Ct. 2157 (1982)], would *747 justify extending the automobile exception to automobiles that are capable of mobility, we elect to draw the so-called bright line of Brown just where we left it in that case: Searches of automobiles that have just been lawfully stopped by police may be searched without a warrant and without a demonstration of exigent circumstances when police have probable cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband or crime evidence.
Kock, at 32-33.
The foregoing shows why it is incorrect to say that the court in Kock "focused on the narrow issue that is also before us." Majority, at 734. The issue before the Oregon court was the scope of its state law automobile exception; specifically whether to follow a rule of inherent mobility. As for the issue before us  whether or not to require an individualized showing of exigent circumstances to justify warrantless automobile searches  Oregon had already decided it in Brown. And, as the majority does not say, Brown reached the same conclusion that Stroud implies. A case-by-case approach to exigent circumstances where automobiles are concerned is unrealistic from a police officer's point of view and unwise from society's point of view.
We are convinced that adoption of a "per se exigency rule" is a sound approach which provides the clearest guidelines for police in conducting automobile searches. Exigencies should not be determined on a case-by-case basis. Police need clear guidelines by which they can gauge and regulate their conduct rather than trying to follow a complex set of rules dependent upon particular facts regarding the time, location and manner of highway stops.
301 Or. at 277.
Consequently, the majority is correct in spite of itself. We should follow our sister state. We should abide by the logic of Stroud and Brown and avoid foolish experiments with case-by-case analysis in this area. Instead, we should formulate a comprehensive bright-line rule to govern warrantless automobile searches. We have already articulated a bright-line rule for the "incident to arrest" leg of Ringer. *748 We should use this case to articulate a bright-line rule for the "exigent circumstances" leg.

A BRIGHT-LINE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES RULE
For reasons I have already noted, we cannot follow Brown in articulating a state law equivalent of the federal automobile exception. Oregon's search and seizure provision is a Fourth Amendment equivalent, while our constitution contains a broader express guaranty of privacy.
The fact that privacy is expressly guaranteed does not imply, however, that the guaranty is absolute. We have recognized before that Const. art. 1, § 7 prohibits only "unreasonable" invasions of privacy.
In contrast, due to the explicit language of Const. art. 1, § 7, under the Washington Constitution the relevant inquiry for determining when a search has occurred is whether the State unreasonably intruded into the defendant's "private affairs."
(Italics mine.) State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506, 510, 688 P.2d 151 (1984). In State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 726 P.2d 445 (1986) we noted:
There is no historical evidence that the framers of our constitution, had they contemplated the existence of the automobile, would have completely exempted it from a reasonable search or seizure.
(Italics mine.) 107 Wn.2d at 5.
Therefore, in formulating a rule to govern warrantless searches of automobiles, the first question is the scope of the reasonable expectation of privacy in one's automobile. The Supreme Court's rationale for the Fourth Amendment "automobile exception" consists in part of an evaluation of reasonable expectations of privacy in automobiles. That discussion is relevant to the question before us, and should be taken into account.[1]
*749 In the recent case of California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391-92, 85 L.Ed.2d 406, 105 S.Ct. 2066 (1985) the Court noted that the "automobile exception" originally rested on the mobility of automobiles and the exigencies  loss of evidence and the escape of suspects  that that mobility entailed. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 69 L.Ed. 543, 45 S.Ct. 280, 39 A.L.R. 790 (1925). Since Carroll, however, the rationale has evolved to stress instead the reduced expectation of privacy which people have in their cars. This results in part from pervasive government regulation of automobiles. The Carney Court quoted the following passage from South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000, 96 S.Ct. 3092 (1976), the leading inventory search case:
Automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and controls, including periodic inspection and licensing requirements. As an everyday occurrence, police stop and examine vehicles when license plates or inspection stickers have expired, or if other violations, such as exhaust fumes or excessive noise, are noted, or if headlights or other safety equipment are not in proper working order.
428 U.S. at 368. See also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 37 L.Ed.2d 706, 93 S.Ct. 2523 (1973).
The Carney Court also noted that the physical configuration of automobiles indicates a reduced reasonable expectation of privacy. 471 U.S. at 391. The Court referred to Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 41 L.Ed.2d 325, 94 S.Ct. 2464 (1974), in which it stated:
One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view.
417 U.S. at 590.
This reduced expectation of privacy  which exists and should be taken into account regardless of whether the issue arises under the Fourth Amendment or Const. art. 1, *750 § 7  is the primary justification for a bright-line rule in this area. Under any such rule, by definition, police will conduct some warrantless automobile searches in the absence of actual exigencies. Those searches not justified by actual exigencies are nonetheless reasonable under Const. art. 1, § 7 because the privacy interest invaded in such searches is not as great as that involved, for example, in a search of one's home. However, since the privacy interest in automobiles is reduced, not nonexistent, the rule must be narrowly drawn to cover only those cases where exigent circumstances are most likely to arise, without authorizing warrantless searches in cases where exigencies are only a remote possibility.
Cases of exigent circumstances include  in addition to the imminent escape of a suspect involved here  danger to the public, danger to the officers involved or the imminent loss of evidence and any other circumstance which necessitates quick action on the part of the police in the performance of their duties. These cases are characterized by the need to act almost reflexively, on the officer's judgment, rather than on complex legal standards. They are also often characterized by an absence of complete information and a need, accordingly, to assume and act on a worst case scenario.
Formulating a general rule to cover such cases is not easy, but I find the majority's characterization of this particular case quite helpful. In pursuing the burglar of the music store, the police were involved in a fresh investigation. The burglary had occurred minutes before the car was discovered. Probable cause to search the car was arrived at on an initial open-view inspection of it. The officers involved had good reason to conclude that the suspect was nearby. The police were dealing with an emergent situation, on the basis of incomplete information, and time was of the essence. It is in cases such as this, involving a fresh investigation, that exigencies of the kind described above are most likely to arise.
*751 A rule that warrantless automobile searches are permissible wherever the police are engaged in a fresh investigation would be too vague and probably too broad. I believe, however, that the following rule would capture most of the cases we are concerned with, without unreasonably intruding on legitimate privacy interests: A search of the passenger compartment may be conducted without a warrant whenever probable cause to conduct the search arises contemporaneously with the stop or initial open-view inspection of the automobile.[2]
This rule would complement Stroud's rule that such a search may be made during the arrest process, including the time immediately subsequent to the suspect's being arrested, handcuffed, and placed in a patrol car. In accord with Stroud, locked containers discovered in the automobile would not fall within the scope of the lawful search. However, unlocked compartments of the car, such as the glove compartment (and, less often, the trunk) would be included in the scope of the lawful warrantless search. State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 152, 720 P.2d 436 (1986). Individualized showings of actual exigent circumstances in cases not falling under the bright-line rule would be permitted. The purpose of the rule is to define a floor, not a ceiling.
Under this proposed bright-line rule, warrantless automobile searches would be permitted where the stop or initial nonintrusive inspection itself launches the investigation, or where the investigation is so fresh that facts concerning the car sufficient to constitute probable cause have not been uncovered by other means.[3] The rule is intended *752 to limit warrantless automobile searches to those cases where the decision and authority to search arise unexpectedly, in circumstances not fully within the police officer's control, where he or she necessarily is operating on less than complete information in an emergent situation. In other words, the rule is designed to permit a search in cases likely to contain exigent circumstances, without requiring a showing of actual exigent circumstances.
The rule would not authorize warrantless searches where the police have developed probable cause in advance of locating the subject automobile. In those cases they usually will have the opportunity to obtain a warrant and  due to greater police control over the situation as a whole  actual exigent circumstances are less likely to arise. The key term "contemporaneously" is flexible, but certainly clear enough to preclude pretext warrantless automobile searches in long-term, ongoing investigations. In this sense the rule is narrowly tailored to those situations where it is actually necessary.
Unlike the federal automobile exception, this bright-line exigency rule would not obliterate the warrant requirement where automobiles are involved. See United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 491 (9th Cir.1985) ("[P]robable cause alone justifies a warrantless search or seizure of a vehicle lawfully parked in a public place."), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1023 (1986). In addition, like the rule we stated in Stroud, this rule would not authorize the opening of locked containers; something which the federal "automobile exception" does permit. United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 83 L.Ed.2d 890, 105 S.Ct. 881 (1985); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 72 L.Ed.2d 572, 102 S.Ct. 2157 (1982). In *753 these respects, the bright-line rule for exigent circumstances reflects the higher degree of privacy guaranteed by Const. art. 1, § 7 as compared to the Fourth Amendment.
Most importantly, the proposed rule carries out the task we set for ourselves in Stroud, rather than abandoning it, as the majority does. It would give front line law enforcement officials the concise, reliable guide they deserve.

CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that it upholds the search in question here, the majority unjustifiably expands the warrant requirement for automobile searches through its dicta and the basic logic of its analysis. It effectively overrules State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 152, 720 P.2d 436 (1986), which stated broad authorization for warrantless automobile searches.
Instead, we should hold unequivocally that police in situations such as that presented here can enter and search an automobile without obtaining a warrant. We can and should formulate a bright-line rule to govern warrantless automobile searches under exigent circumstances.
Under the rule proposed here, the search in question was valid. Probable cause for the search arose contemporaneously with the initial open-view inspection of the car. The car matched the description of one observed near the scene of a burglary minutes before. From outside the car, police officers observed electronic equipment matching the description of goods taken in the burglary. Given the reduced expectation of privacy in automobiles, this probable cause was sufficient to justify a warrantless search. Consequently, the suspect's apprehension was not poisonous fruit. Therefore, I would reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for trial on the merits.
ANDERSEN and DURHAM, JJ., concur with DORE, J.
NOTES
[1]  Doing so in no way commits us to adopting the sweeping federal rule. Differences between the per se rule of exigent circumstances and the federal automobile exception are discussed infra, at 751-52.
[2]  For the distinction between plain-view and open-view searches, see State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 9-10, 726 P.2d 445 (1986). The proposed rule contemplates open-view inspections, i.e., an inspection from outside the car.
[3]  This does not imply that all the facts entering into probable cause must arise from the first contact; it only requires that the "last straw" raising the level of suspicion to probable cause result from the initial stop or open-view inspection. In this case, for example, the nature of the articles taken from the music store and the description of the car seen near the scene of the crime entered into the probable cause determination. Those facts were not revealed in the first stop or open-view inspection of the car. However, the sight of similar articles in the backseat of the car, combined with other facts evident in the initial contact (its being parked facing the wrong way; the dry pavement underneath) raised the level of suspicion to probable cause and, under the rule proposed here, justified a warrantless search.


                                                                           FILED
                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             SEP 6 2011

                                                                        MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS

                             FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ELIZABETH ZABALA CADA;                           No. 09-70454
RAYMUNDO R. CADA; JEREMY JOHN
CADA; APRIL ROSE CADA,                           Agency Nos. A072-120-911
                                                             A073-401-565
              Petitioners,                                   A073-401-566
                                                             A073-401-567
  v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,           MEMORANDUM *

              Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                             Submitted August 11, 2011 **

Before: THOMAS, SILVERMAN, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.

       Elizabeth Zabala Cada, her husband Raymundo R. Cada, and their two

children petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order

dismissing Cada’s appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying her

        *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
        **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
application for asylum, withholding of removal, relief under the Convention

Against Torture (“CAT”), and cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. When the Board adopts and affirms the IJ’s decision

and adds its own reasons, we review both decisions. See Nuru v. Gonzales, 404

F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 2005). Reviewing jurisdictional questions de novo, Luu-

Le v. INS, 224 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 2000), and findings of fact for substantial

evidence, Zhang v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir. 2005), we deny in part

and dismiss in part the petition for review.

      The agency’s determination that Cada did not suffer past persecution is

supported by substantial evidence. See Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1020-21

(9th Cir. 2006) (holding that one detention, beating, and interrogation, which did

not require medical treatment or result in adverse employment consequences, did

not constitute past persecution); Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1995)

(holding that one detention, beating, and interrogation, when no medical treatment

was required and it appeared the Fijian government had no continuing interest in

petitioner, did not constitute past persecution). Additionally, the agency’s

determination that Cada did not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution

is supported by substantial evidence. Cada failed to “adduc[e] credible, direct, and

specific evidence in the record of facts that would support a reasonable fear of

                                           2
persecution.” Gu, 454 F.3d at 1019 (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted); see also id. at 1022; Prasad, 47 F.3d at 339.

      Because Cada failed to establish eligibility for asylum, “it follows that [she]

cannot meet the more stringent standard of withholding of” removal. Prasad, 47

F.3d at 340. Similarly, substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of relief

under CAT, because Cada has not presented evidence that shows she will more

likely than not be tortured if removed to the Philippines. See Nahrvani v.

Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2005).

      Finally, regarding Cada’s cancellation of removal claim, this court lacks

jurisdiction to review the agency’s discretionary determination as to whether her

removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to her father.

Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 2003).

      PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

                                          3


(2008)
In re EL COMANDANTE MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC, et al., Debtors.
Don Drew, as the Plan Administrator, Appellant,
v.
Latimer, Biaggi, Rachid & Godreau, Appellee.
Civil No. 07-1784 (JAG).
United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.
September 2, 2008.

OPINION AND ORDER
GARCIA-GREGORY, District Judge.
Pending before the Court is a set of consolidated appeals from an Opinion and Order issued by the Bankruptcy Court denying Don Drew, the Plan Administrator's ("Appellant") request that the fees and expenses requested by the law firm of Latimer, Biaggi, Rachid & Godreau ("Appellee") be denied. The appeals were referred to a Magistrate Judge, which recommended that the Bankruptcy Court's holding be affirmed. Furthermore, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the case be remanded to the Bankruptcy Court in order to determine if interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961 should be imposed. For the reasons set forth below, the Court ADOPTS in part and DENIES in part the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. The Bankruptcy Court's holding will be AFFIRMED.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 22, 2007, Appellee filed its final application for compensation and sought the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico's authorization for payment in the amount of $550,301.91 in connection with services rendered from July 1, 2006 through January 2007 on behalf of the debtors in the jointly administered cases of Housing Development Administration, El Commandante Management Corp., and El Commandante Capital Corp. ("ECCC") (collectively "Debtors"). On March 5, 2007, Appellant in his capacity as the Plan Administrator objected to the final application for compensation filed by Appellee and requested the disgorgement of all fees and expenses incurred by said law firm since November 23, 2005. On April 17, 2007, Appellee responded to Appellant's objection and requested that the Bankruptcy Court summarily dispose of this contested matter. On May 1, 2007, Appellant filed a reply and a cross motion for summary judgment.
Appellant objected to the fee application by arguing that Appellee had a conflict of interest from, at least, November 23, 2005, which remained undisclosed until January 2007, when Appellee filed a motion withdrawing representation. According to Appellant, on November 23, 2005, FirstBank confirmed via letter that on October 4, 2005, it issued a financing commitment to Camarero Race Track Corp. ("Camarero") for the purpose of acquiring Debtor's assets. Camarero purchased Debtor's assets on January 4, 2007 in accordance with the confirmed plan and FirstBank financed the asset purchase. Appellant averred that in Appellee's request for withdrawal it informed the Bankruptcy Court for the first time that FirstBank is Appellee's principal client in other matters, and that FirstBank requested Appellee not to file any pleadings which might affect the relationship between them and Camarero.
Appellant alleged that the fees and expenses requested by Appellee should be denied in light of Appellee's relationship with FirstBank. Specifically, Appellant claimed that all fees and expenses incurred and paid since, November 23, 2005 should be disgorged, as they were incurred during the existence of the undisclosed conflict of interest. Furthermore, Appellant averred that the potential conflict of interest became an actual conflict of interest when the Indenture Trustee's Plan became a competition plan to Debtor's Plan of Reorganization and Appellee filed objections on behalf of Debtors requesting that the court deny the approval of the Indenture Trustee's Plan, which proposed the sale of Debtor's assets to Camarero with FirstBank's financing.
In addition, Appellant argued before the Bankruptcy Court that Appellee was not entitled to compensation or payment for services rendered to ECCC because the case converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding. Appellant argues that fees incurred by Appellee in connection with representing ECCC must be sought within ECCC's Chapter 7 case. Furthermore, Appellant claimed that Appellee should be required to allocate the fees among the three Debtors.
The Bankruptcy Court held that Appellee complied with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2014(a)[1] because Appellee did not have a duty to disclose its connection with FirstBank before the asset purchase took place on January 2007. The Court determined that FirstBank was not a debtor, creditor, even a party in interest, or an attorney or accountant, the United States Trustee or any person employed in the office of the United States Trustee. Furthermore, the Court noted that prior to the asset purchase, FirstBank was a mere observer of the proceedings waiting to see if its potential client would need the credit offered. Moreover, the Court stressed that FirstBank was represented by different counsel in the proceedings. As such, the Court failed to see how FirstBank's interest were adverse to the interests of the estate. Additionally, the Court determined that FirstBank did not have a conflict of interest that warranted disqualification. Additionally, the Court stressed that Appellee "at all times during the case, showed its undivided loyalty to Debtors evidenced by the multiple oppositions to the Indentured Trustee's proposal, and appeals of orders in favor of the Indentured Trustee and consequently, Camarero."
Further, the Court held that Appellant waived his claim that fees incurred by Appellee in connection with representing ECCC must be sought within ECCC's Chapter 7 case. Likewise, the Court determined that Appellant waived his request that Appellee should be required to allocate the fees among the three Debtors. The Court stressed that these objections were waived because they did not appear in any subsequent pleading nor were they argued at a status conference held by the Court. In addition, the Court noted that it would be impractical for professionals hired in the case to apportion the fees claimed among the three debtors. Furthermore, the Court clarified that all another professionals appointed by the Court had not apportioned their fees among the three Debtors. (Docket No. 11-6).
Separate appeals from the Opinion and Order issued by the Bankruptcy Court (Bankr. No. 04-10938, Docket No. 2901, appendixed in Civil Case No. 07-1784, Docket No. 11-6) were filed by Appellant, Appellee, and Housing Development Associates. (Civil Case No. 07-1841, Docket No. 13). The appeals were consolidated on motion by Appellee. (Civil Case No. 07-1784, Docket Nos. 17 and 31). Appellant appeals the Bankruptcy Court's opinion for two reasons: first, Appellant argues that the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding that Appellee did not have a conflict of interest in the proceedings below. Appellant claims that such conflict existed because FirstBank, Appellee's principal client in unrelated cases, became a party in interest when it filed a claim against the estate and entered into a loan relationship with Camarero acquiring the right to grant Camarero a $60 million loan to finance the purchase of estate assets. Furthermore, Appellant alleges that FirstBank was a party in interest because its name appeared twice in the Master List. Appellant avers that these conflicts of interest require Appellee to disgorge all fees and expenses related to the proceedings, "at least from the date such disclosure was required[.]"[2] Second, Appellant contends that the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding that he waived his argument that fees incurred by Appellee in connection with representing ECCC must be sought within ECCC's Chapter 7 case. Moreover, Appellant claims that Appellee should be required to allocate the fees among the three debtors. (Civil Case No. 07-1784, Docket No. 5).
Appellee filed a reply brief to the Appellant's brief, (Civil Case No. 07-1784, Docket No. 21), and the Appellant filed a reply to Appellee's reply brief. (Civil Case No. 07-1784, Docket No. 36). In its appeal from the Bankruptcy Court's opinion, Appellee argues only that the Bankruptcy Court failed to impose interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961 against Appellant on the payments to be made to Appellee. (Civil Case No. 07-1841, Docket No. 13). Appellant filed a reply to Appellee's appeal, arguing that neither the reorganization plan nor the Bankruptcy Code allow for interest to be paid to Appellee. (Civil Case No. 07-1784, Docket No. 37). On April 2, 2008, this case was referred to a Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation. (Civil Case No. 07-1784, Docket No. 33).
On July 31, 2008, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation. First, the Magistrate Judge did not consider Appellant's argument that FirstBank was a party in interest because it was a creditor and because its name appeared twice on the Master List. The Magistrate Judge concluded that these arguments were deemed waived by Appellant because they were brought for the first time on appeal. The Magistrate Judge also dismissed Appellant's argument that FirstBank was a party in interest because of its substantial financial interest in the outcome of the case. The Magistrate Judge determined that the fact that FirstBank had a prospective loan commitment with Camarero did not make it a party in interest. Additionally, the Magistrate Judge concurred with the Bankruptcy Court's holding and determined that Appellant waived its argument that fees incurred by Appellee in connection with representing ECCC must be sought within ECCC's Chapter 7 case. Moreover, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the Bankruptcy Court did not err in not requiring Appellee to allocate the fees as requested by Appellant. Finally, the Magistrate Judge recommended that Appellee's claim for interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961 should be remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings. (Docket No. 38).
On August 11, 2008, Appellant filed its objections to the Report and Recommendation. First, Appellant opposes the Magistrate Judge's failure to address its claim that FirstBank was a party in interest because of his status as a creditor. Appellant stresses that FirstBank became a creditor when it filed a proof of claim with the Bankruptcy Court on or about December 22, 2004. In addition, Appellant argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in not considering his argument that First Bank was a creditor because it was brought for the first time on appeal. Likewise, Appellant objected to the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that his argument that FirstBank was a party in interest because its name appeared twice in the Master List could not be addressed on appeal because it was not raised before the Bankruptcy Court. Appellant avers that both arguments may be considered by this Court because they are not new legal theories and, therefore, they can be brought up for the first time on appeal.
Additionally, Appellant rehashed the argument presented to the Bankruptcy Court and addressed by the Magistrate Judge when he objected to the Magistrate Judge's finding that FirstBank was not a party in interest even though it had a prospective loan commitment. Finally, Appellant objected to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that Appellee's request for interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961 be remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings. According to Appellant, interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 is not applicable to the allowance of attorneys' fees as an administrative expense in bankruptcy cases. (Docket No. 39).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

1) Standard for Reviewing a Magistrate-Judge's Report and Recommendation

A District Court may refer pending dispositive motions to a Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Loc. Rule 72(a). Any party adversely affected by the report and recommendation may file written objections within ten days of being served with the Magistrate Judge's report. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party that files a timely objection is entitled to a de novo determination of "those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which specific objection is made." Sylva v. Culebra Dive Shop, 389 F.Supp.2d 189, 191-92 (D.P.R.2005)(citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980)). Failure to comply with this rule precludes further review. See Davet v. Maccarone, 973 F.2d 22, 30-31 (1st Cir.1992). In conducting its review, the Court is free to "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(b)(1). Templeman v. Chris Craft Corp., 770 F.2d 245, 247 (1st Cir.1985); Alamo Rodriguez v. Pfizer Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 286 F.Supp.2d 144, 146 (D.P.R.2003). Furthermore, the Court may accept those parts of the report and recommendation to which the parties do not object. See Hernandez-Mejias v. General Elec., 428 F.Supp.2d 4, 6 (D.P.R.2005)(citing LaCedra v. Donald W. Wyatt Detention Facility, 334 F.Supp.2d 114, 125-126 (D.R.I.2004)). However, a Petitioner "may not simply restate the arguments that the Magistrate Judge considered and expect the Court to treat the filing seriously." Rosado-Lebron v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 193 F.Supp.2d 415, 418 (D.P.R.2002).

DISCUSSION

1) Appellee's Compensation

In its brief, Appellant claimed Appellee had a legal and ethical obligation to disclose to the court and third parties, its significant professional, economic and financial connections with FirstBank. Appellant argues that FirstBank is a party in interest for two fundamental reasons: (1) as a creditor of the estate; and (2) because of its substantial financial interest on the outcome of the case. According to Appellant, FirstBank was a creditor of the estate since December 22, 2004, when it filed a proof of claim. Appellant further averred that FirstBank became a party in interest because it acquired the right to grant Camarero a $60 Million loan to finance the purchase of the estate assets. Appellant argues that this supports the contention that FirstBank acquired a substantial financial and economic interest that was dependent in the outcome of the case. In addition, Appellant stressed that the fact that FirstBank appeared twice in the Master Address List is evidence that it was a party in interest because only creditors and parties in interest are included in the Master Address List. According to Appellant, Appellee's failure to: (1) timely disclose its connections with FirstBank; (2) timely disclose the simultaneous client-attorney relationship with Debtors and FirstBank; (3) advocate on behalf of Debtors without limitation; and (4) seasonably disclose its relationship and instead wait until the end of the case, i.e. the entry of the Confirmation Order, to disclose the existence of its relationship with FirstBank and its potential conflict of interest, constituted a blatant violation of its fiduciary duties under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2014(a) that warrants the denial of compensation, and the disgorgement of all fees and expenses.
"An attorney employed as a bankruptcy professional must comply with the disclosure requirements of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure." In re El San Juan Hotel Corp., 239 B.R. 635, 647 (1st Cir. BAP 1999). Rule 2014(a) requires that an application requesting authority to employ a professional person state "all of the person's connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party in interest, [and] their respective attorneys and accountants ..." Fed. R.Bankr.P. 2014(a). The application must be accompanied by a "verified statement ... setting forth the [attorney's] connections" to all parties in interest. Id. "Although an attorney need not disclose every past or remote connection with every party in interest, he must disclose those presently or recently existing, whether they are of business or personal in nature, which could reasonably have an effect on the attorney's judgment in the case." In re El San Juan Hotel Corp., 239 B.R. at 647. Under Rule 2014(a) a professional is also required to update any circumstance suggesting an actual or potential conflict of interest which could reasonably have an effect on the attorney's judgment in the case. See Rome v. Braunstein, 19 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir.1994).
Section 328(c) provides a penalty for professional persons found to be under a conflict of interest. Section 328(c) provides, in pertinent part:
The court may deny allowance of compensation for services and reimbursement of expenses of a professional person employed under section 327 or 1103 of this title if, at any time during such professional person's employment under section 327 or 1103 of this title, such professional person is not a disinterested person, or represents or holds an interest adverse to the interest of the estate with respect to the matter on which such professional person is employed. 11 U.S.C. § 328(c).
Pursuant to Section 328(c), a Court may deny an attorney some or all compensation if the attorney develops a disqualifying conflict of interest at any time in the case. Similarly, an attorney that fails to make inadequate disclosures as required by Rule 2014(a) "may be penalized in a variety of ways, including ... total or partial denial of compensation, or disgorgement of fees and expenses. In re El San Juan Hotel Corp., 239 B.R. at 647.[3]
In order to determine whether Appellee failed to comply with Rule 2014(a), this Court must first determine whether FirstBank is a debtor, creditor, or any other party in interest. The Magistrate Judge determined in his Report and Recommendation that Appellant's argument that FirstBank was a party in interest because: (1) it became a creditor when it filed a proof of claim and (2) its name appeared twice in the Master List could not be considered because they were brought to the Court's attention for the first time on appeal. Appellant objected to the Magistrate Judge's finding and argued that only new legal arguments are barred from being brought for the first time on appeal. Appellant alleges that his claims that FirstBank is a party in interest because it was a creditor and its name appeared twice in the Master List do not constitute new legal theories and, thus, are not precluded from being brought up for the first time on appeal. This Court agrees with Appellant's contention that their two aforementioned arguments are not new legal theories.
The First Circuit Court holds that legal theories not raised squarely in the lower court cannot be brought for the first time on appeal. Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local No. 59 v. Superline Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir.1992). Appellant's legal theory has always been that Appellee's compensation should be denied because it failed to comply with its obligation to disclose its relationship to FirstBank, who is an alleged party in interest. At the Bankruptcy Court, Appellant brought in support of this argument evidence that proved that FirstBank had a future loan commitment with Camarero. On appeal, Appellant brought to this Courts attention that there is additional evidence in this case that supports Appellee's failure to comply with its duty to disclose its relationship with FirstBank. Specifically, Appellant brings to this Court's attention that there is a proof of claim filed by FirstBank which qualifies him as a creditor. Furthermore, Appellant points this Court's attention to the fact that FirstBank's name appears twice on the Master List.
However, this evidence was not brought to the Bankruptcy Court's attention and it is well settled that "new evidence, which could have been offered in the trial court, is not supposed to be proffered for the first time in an appellate setting." In re Colonial Mortg. Bankers Corp., 186 F.3d 46, 50 (1st Cir.1999). The review of a district court's disposition of a summary judgment should be done on the record as it was developed by the parties in the district court. Travis v. Park City Police Dep't, 277 Fed.Appx. 829, 832 n. 4 (10th Cir.2008). FirstBank's proof of claim and evidence that its name appeared twice in the Master List could have certainly been brought to the Bankruptcy Court's attention. Hence, a Court such as ours, which is now in an appellate setting cannot review evidence that was not before the trial court, i.e. the Bankruptcy Court, when the various rulings at issue were made. See id. (citing Boone v. Carlsbad Bancorp., Inc., 972 F.2d 1545, 1549 n. 1 (10th Cir.1992)). As such, this Court will not entertain Appellant's argument that Appellee failed to comply with full disclosure as mandated by Rule 2014(a) because FirstBank is party in interest since it filed a proof of claim and its name appears twice in the Master List.
However, this Court may address Appellant's argument that FirstBank's future loan commitment with Camarero made it a party in interest because said entity had substantial financial interest in the outcome of the case. However, the Court notes that Appellant's objection to this portion of the Report and Recommendation is a mere restatement of the arguments considered by the Magistrate-Judge. See Castro-Rivera v. Citibank, 195 F.Supp.2d 363, 365 (D.P.R.2002) (finding that the Court need not seriously consider an objecting party's filing where it simply restates the arguments that the Magistrate-Judge previously considered). Nonetheless, this Court will effect a de novo review of Appellant's claim that FirstBank became a party in interest because it acquired the right to grant Camarero a $60 Million loan to finance the purchase of the estate assets.
The central statutory provision governing conflicts of interest of counsel can be found in Section 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code which provides in pertinent part that: "the trustee, with the court's approval, may employ one or more attorneys... that do not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that are disinterested persons, to represent or assist the trustee in carrying out the trustee's duties under this title." 11 U.S.C. § 327(a). The requirements that an attorney employed as a bankruptcy professional be a "disinterested person" and that it hold no interest adverse to the estate serve the important policy of ensuring that all such professionals tender undivided loyalty and provide untainted advice and assistance in furtherance of their fiduciary responsibilities. Rome, 19 F.3d at 58. Bankruptcy Code § 101(14) defines a "disinterested" party as "one who is `not a creditor, an equity shareholder, or an insider,' nor presently, or `within two years before [bankruptcy], an ... officer ... of the debtor,' and does not have `an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate or of any class of creditors or equity security holders' for `any reason.'" Rome, 19 F.3d at 58 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)). Hence, section 101(14) requires that professionals be free of any "scintilla of personal interest" which might impact their decisions in estate matters. In re El San Juan Hotel Corp., 239 B.R. at 646.
The phrase "interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate" is not defined in the Code. Our Circuit interprets it as "the possessing or asserting of any economic interest that would tend to lessen the value of the bankruptcy estate or that would create either an actual or potential dispute in which the estate is a rival claimant or possessing a predisposition under circumstances that render such a bias against the estate real." Id. (internal citations omitted). Additionally, "an `adverse interest' has been described in pragmatic terms as the `possession or assertion [of] mutually exclusive claims to the same economic interest, thus creating either an actual or potential dispute between rival claimants as to which ... of them the disputed right or title to the interest in question attaches under valid and applicable law; or (2) [the possession of] a predisposition or interest under circumstances that render such a bias in favor of or against one of the entities.'" Rome, 19 F.3d at 58 n. 1.
The Bankruptcy Court has the duty to determine using a fact specific inquiry whether any such conflict exists. Id. To determine whether the requirements of disinterestedness and absence of a materially adverse interest have been met, the Court must examine whether the targeted interest creates a "meaningful incentive to act contrary to the best interests of the estate and its sundry creditors  an incentive sufficient to place those parties at more than acceptable riskor the reasonable perception of one." In re El San Juan Hotel Corp., 239 B.R. at 646 (citing In re Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 180 (1st Cir.1987)). As mentioned above, if the fact-specific inquiry leads the bankruptcy court to conclude that an impermissible conflict of interest looms or exists, available sanctions include disqualification and the denial or disgorgement of all fees. Id. We review the Bankruptcy Court's factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Id.
As mentioned previously, Appellant argues that FirstBank's future loan commitment with Camarero made it a party in interest because it had a economic interest in the outcome of the case. Appellant brings to this Court's attention the fact that during the Chapter 11 proceedings Debtors filed a plan of reorganization which proposed to keep the assets of the estates and continue to operate the racetrack. On the other hand, the Indentured Trustee proposed a Plan where Camarero was the purchaser of Debtor's assets and FirstBank was the financing institution. According to Appellant, this situation created a potential and actual conflict of interest because Appellee in order to protect the interests of Debtors, its clients in the case at bar, would have to litigate against the interests of FirstBank, which is its principal client in other matters. This Court disagrees.
This Court finds that Appellee did not fail to comply with Rule 2014(a)'s continuous disclosure requirement because FirstBank was not a party in interest before the estate's asset purchase took place. The term "parties in interest" includes entities holding "claims" against the debtor and those whose pecuniary interests might be directly and adversely affected by the proposed action. See In re Savage Indus., 43 F.3d 714, 720 (1st Cir.1994). Prior to the asset purchase that took place on January 2007, FirstBank was not a party in interest even though it had a future loan commitment with Camarero. As the Bankruptcy Court correctly noted, FirstBank's relationship with Camarero made it a mere observer of the proceedings waiting to see if their potential client would need the credit offered. Furthermore, it is important to stress that FirstBank was represented by different counsel in the proceedings. As such, Appellee did not have a meaningful incentive to act contrary to the Debtors' best interests even though FirstBank was one of Appellee's principal client in other matters not related to the present case. This is further evidenced by the fact that the Bankruptcy Court specifically noted at the end of its Opinion and Order that Appellee "at all times during the case, showed its undivided loyalty to Debtors evidenced by the multiple oppositions to the Indentured Trustee's proposal, and appeals of orders in favor of the Indentured Trustee and consequently, Camarero." Hence, this Court finds that the important policy of ensuring that all professionals tender undivided loyalty and provide untainted advice and assistance in furtherance of their fiduciary responsibilities has been met here.
Bankruptcy courts have been accorded wide discretion in determining whether a conflict exists which warrants sanctions. In re Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 182 (1st Cir. 1987). The bankruptcy judge is on the front line and, therefore, in the best position to gauge the ongoing interplay of factors and to make this delicate judgment call. Id. "If he perceives a materially adverse interest, he has at his disposal an armamentarium of permissible remedies, including (but by no means limited to) disqualification, disallowance of all or some fees, and invalidation of the security interest." Id. at 182-183. In the case at bar, the Bankruptcy Court determined that there was no conflict of interest which warranted sanctions. This Court sees no reason to disturb the Bankruptcy Court's judgment. For these reasons, the Court will adopt the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that the Bankruptcy Court's decision be affirmed. Appellee's compensation will be provided as stated by the Bankruptcy Court's Opinion and Order.

2) Post-Judgment Interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961

Now, we shall proceed to address Appellant's final objection to the Report and Recommendation. Namely, Appellant avers that post-judgment interest should not be imposed on the Bankruptcy Court's Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961. According to Appellant, 28 U.S.C. § 1961 is not applicable to the allowance of attorneys' fees as an administrative expense in bankruptcy cases. This Court agrees.
28 U.S.C. § 1961 provides for interest on money judgments in civil cases. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Vaughn, 779 F.2d 1003, 1010 (4th Cir. 1985). That statutory provision applies to some judgments entered by Bankruptcy Courts. In re Thrall, 196 B.R. 959, 962 (Bankr.D.Colo.1996)(internal citations omitted). However, judgements which do not involve monetary awards are not subject to 28 U.S.C. § 1961. Id. Section 1961 is inapplicable to the grant of attorneys' fees in a bankruptcy case because attorneys' fees in bankruptcy are an expense of administering the estate and, therefore, do not constitute a money judgment. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 779 F.2d at 1010.
Thus, post-judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961 cannot be awarded to Appellee because the Bankruptcy Court's Order is not a monetary award since Appellee's compensation is an expense of administering the estate. Consequently, this Court will reject the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that Appellee's request for post-judgment interest be remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for determination.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court hereby ADOPTS in part and REJECTS in part the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. (Docket No. 38). The Bankruptcy Court's Opinion and Order granting Appellee's request for compensation of attorneys' fees shall be AFFIRMED. Appellee's request for post-judgment interest shall be DENIED. Judgment shall be entered AFFIRMING the Bankruptcy Court's Judgement and DISMISSING the case at bar.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
NOTES
[1]  Rule 2014(a) requires that an application requesting authority to employ a professional person state "all of the person's connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party in interest, [and] their respective attorneys and accountants ..." Fed.R.Bankr.P. 2014(a).
[2]  (Docket No. 5, at 33).
[3]  "[T]he First Circuit Court of Appeals has declined to adopt a per se or brightline rule invariably requiring denial of all compensation because of a conflict of interest, recognizing that bankruptcy judges, being on the front line, should have wide discretion in regard to professional employment issues." In re El San Juan Hotel Corp., 239 B.R. at 648.


                                                                           FILED
                           NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              NOV 15 2012

                                                                        MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS

                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARILYN JO CHINIVASAGAM,                         No. 11-15645

              Plaintiff-counter-defendant -      D.C. No. 5:09-CV-03136-JW
Appellant,

  v.                                             MEMORANDUM *

EQUILON ENTERPRISES, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company, DBA
Shell Oil Products U.S.,

              Defendant-counter-claimant -
Appellee,

PALAMAS INVESTMENTS, INC., a
California corporation,

              Counter-defendant -
Appellant.

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of California
                      James Ware, District Judge, Presiding

                      Argued and Submitted October 19, 2012
                            San Francisco, California

        *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Before: D.W. NELSON, N.R. SMITH, ** and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

      Marilyn Jo Chinivasagam appeals the district court’s (1) grant of summary

judgment to Equilon on Chinivasagam’s Petroleum Marketing Practices Act claim,

(2) denial of Chinivasagam’s motion to dismiss Equilon’s state law claims, (3)

grant of summary judgment to Equilon on its conversion claim and (4) award of

attorneys’ fees to Equilon. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and

we affirm.

      The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Equilon on

Chinivasagam’s complaint. The Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (“PMPA”)

“establishes minimum federal standards governing the termination and nonrenewal

of petroleum franchises,” Mac’s Shell Serv., Inc. v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 130

S. Ct. 1251, 1255 (2010), and enumerates the circumstances in which a franchisor

may terminate a franchise, 15 U.S.C. § 2802. Equilon lawfully terminated the

franchise based on its loss of the underlying lease and complied with the statutory

requirements for termination. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2802(b)(2)(C), 2802(c)(4),

2804(a)(2). Equilon was not required to make a bona fide offer to sell its

improvements to Chinivasagam, id. § 2802(c)(4)(C), because Palamas Investments,

       ** Judge N.R. Smith was drawn to replace Judge Betty Binns Fletcher.
Judge Smith has read the briefs, reviewed the record and listened to oral arguments
that were held on October 19, 2012.

                                          2
not Chinivasagam, acquired possession of the property when the lease expired,

Union Bank v. Anderson, 283 Cal. Rptr. 823, 827 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).

      The district court also did not err in denying Chinivasagam’s motion to

dismiss Equilon’s counterclaim. The PMPA preempts “all state law inconsistent

with” it. Atl. Richfield Co. v. Herbert (In Re Herbert), 806 F.2d 889, 892 (9th Cir.

1986) (emphasis in original); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2806(a). But this preemptive

effect applies “only [to] those state or local laws that govern the termination of

petroleum franchises or the nonrenewal of petroleum franchise relationships.”

Mac’s Shell Serv., 130 S. Ct. at 1260. Equilon’s state law claim for conversion

does not relate to the PMPA’s regulation of the termination or nonrenewal of

petroleum franchise agreements. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Superior Court, 234 Cal.

Rptr. 482, 484–85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).

      The district court correctly granted summary judgment to Equilon on its

state-law counterclaim for conversion. All of the elements of conversion exist:

(1) Equilon’s ownership right in the improvements it made to the property; (2) the

unlawful exercise of control over Equilon’s personal property; and (3) damages.

See Plummer v. Day/Eisenberg, LLP, 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 455, 460 (Cal. Ct. App.

2010). The district court reasonably calculated damages at ten percent of the

                                           3
reasonable rental value of the property. See Finn v. Witherbee, 271 P.2d 606,

608–10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954).

      Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys’

fees and costs to Equilon. Where a contract contains an explicit fees provision, the

prevailing party is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees fixed by the court.

Cal. Civ. Code § 1717(a). The district court reviewed Equilon’s time records for

reasonableness, Chalmers v. City of L.A., 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986), and

then calculated fees using the lodestar method, Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96

F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996).

      AFFIRMED.

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