395 F.Supp. 773 (1975)
EPIC ENTERPRISES, INC., an Oklahoma Corporation, Plaintiff,
v.
Dr. John E. BROTHERS et al., Defendants.
No. 74-C-296.
United States District Court, N. D. Oklahoma, Civil Division.
January 6, 1975.
*774 Richard T. Sonberg, Tulsa, Okl., for plaintiff.
Robert H. Tips, Tulsa, Okl., for Holbrook.
John R. Richards, Tulsa, Okl., for other defendants; Sneed, Lang, Trotter and Adams by James C. Lang and J. David Trotter, of counsel.

ORDER
DAUGHERTY, District Judge.
Upon consideration of Defendants' Motion To Dismiss, the Court finds and concludes that the same should be granted.
The claims asserted by the Plaintiff are alleged to arise under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a),[1]a fortiori Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 14 (a)-9, 17 CFR § 240.14a-9, promulgated thereunder.[2] Prior to September 29, 1973 Defendants were the duly elected and acting Directors of the Plaintiff corporation. On September 29, 1973 Plaintiff held its Annual Stockholders' Meeting for the purpose of electing Directors to serve the following year and to vote on certain proposed amendments to Plaintiff's Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws. In connection with this Annual Stockholders' Meeting Defendants *775 prepared and distributed a Proxy Statement wherein they solicited proxies on their behalf. It is alleged that this Proxy Statement contained a false statement and a misleading omission in violation of Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 14(a)-9, 17 CFR § 240.14a-9.
The proxy statement is alleged to be false in that it stated that management would spend no more than $6,000 on proxy solicitation and that as of the date of mailing no more than $3,500 had been spent; whereas, in fact more than $6,000 had already been spent on proxy solicitation as of the date of the mailing and more than $16,000 in total expense would be incurred by the management in proxy solicitation. The alleged misleading omission is the failure of the Proxy Statement to disclose that the management had approved an illegal and unauthorized loan transaction with Defendant Holbrook while he was a Director and officer of Plaintiff, said loan transaction allegedly being in violation of a specific provision of the Oklahoma Business Corporations Act (18 Oklahoma Statutes § 1.175).
It is Plaintiff's contention that the abovementioned false and misleading statement and omission were material violations of § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that these violations caused it damages of $10,000, that being the amount of proxy solicitation overexpenditures, and of $18,000, that being the amount of the illegal loan to Defendant Holbrook. Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or in the Alternative to Stay the Proceedings as there is another action pending involving the same parties and same issues.
With regard to the Motion to Dismiss, it is Defendants' position that in order to maintain a private action based on an alleged § 14(a) violation a Plaintiff must establish these four elements:
(i) a solicitation of proxies,
(ii) containing a false or misleading statement or omission,
(iii) which is material, and
(iv) which causes injury to the Plaintiff.
Defendants concede that the first two of these four requirements have been met by Plaintiff, but contend that the last two, materiality and causation, are lacking and, therefore, the Complaint should be dismissed as a matter of law. It appears that Defendants' interpretation of the law is essentially correct. The first three of the four requirements are found in Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 14(a)-9, 17 CFR 14(a)-9 as shown by the italics below:
"(a) No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or oral, containing any statement which at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary to make the statements therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which has become false or misleading."
The fourth requirement of causation is found in the case law dealing with private § 14(a) actions and has been recognized by the Supreme Court in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 84 S.Ct. 1555, 12 L.Ed.2d 423 (1964) and in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 616, 24 L.Ed.2d 593 (1970). Although the Court merely tacitly assumes the necessity of causation in these cases, the rule has been firmly announced in lower courts that an essential element of a private § 14(a) action *776 is causation. It was frequently stated prior to the Mills case, supra, and in at least one case subsequent to it, that the requisite degree of causation in a private § 14(a) action is that the alleged § 14(a) violation result in the damage claimed. Barnett v. Anaconda Company, 238 F.Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y.1965), Weiss v. Sunasco Incorporated, 295 F.Supp. 824 (S.D.N.Y.1969). In light of the Court's statement in Mills, supra, that:
". . . Where there has been a finding of materiality, a shareholder has made a sufficient showing of causal relationship between the violation and the injury for which he seeks redress if, as here, he proves that the proxy solicitation itself, rather than the particular defect in the solicitation materials, was an essential link in the accomplishment of the transaction . . .",
the correct rule appears to be that in order to maintain a private § 14(a) action there must be a causal connection between a proxy statement containing a § 14(a) violation and the transaction causing the damage for which a plaintiff seeks redress. This is the rule of Smith v. Murchison, 310 F.Supp. 1079 (S.D.N. Y.1970), and Beatty v. Bright, 318 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.Iowa 1970).
The transactions of which Plaintiff herein complains are (1) an over-expenditure on proxy solicitations and (2) an illegal loan to Defendant Holbrook. The alleged violations of § 14(a) are said to be contained in a proxy statement wherein the directors of Plaintiff solicited the proxies of shareholders in Plaintiff for the purpose of being reelected as Directors and in connection with certain amendments to corporate articles and bylaws. Assuming, arguendo, that the proxy solicitation did contain a material violation of § 14(a), it is apparent that Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted for the facts as plead do not show causation between the alleged false and misleading proxy statement and the alleged transactions causing the harm of which Plaintiff complains. The proxy solicitation was not a link in the accomplishment of either the (1) alleged overexpenditures or (2) the alleged illegal loan. These actions were taken by virtue of the Defendants' position in the corporation and not through an authorization obtained through alleged false proxy statements.
For the purposes of a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and its allegations are taken as true. However, it is only the allegations of fact which are accepted as true and conclusions of law are not accepted as true. 5 Federal Practice and Procedure, Wright and Miller, 1357. Plaintiff's allegations of fact do not show causal connection between the transactions allegedly causing its damages and the proxy solicitations. Plaintiff's allegation of causation is a mere conclusion of law unsupported by any factual allegations.[3]
The classic example of causation is where authorization for a disadvantageous *777 merger is obtained through a false proxy solicitation. See Mills, supra. This is the type of causation contemplated for the maintenance of a private § 14(a) action.
"`It has been held repeatedly that one whose liability creating conduct is the violation of a statute which makes certain conduct a public offense does not, while engaged in such violation, become an insurer against all harm. The situation is not like that of one who, engaged in a felony, unintentionally causes the death of a human being and is, nevertheless, subject to punishment as a murderer. As Dean Thayer pointed out a number of years ago "Criminal conduct which had no effect in causing the injury can no more be a ground of liability than non-causative negligence. In either case the wrongdoing is without legal significance as between the parties." Our statute-breaker is civilly liable only if his law violation causes another harm of the sort which it was the presumed intention of the Legislature to protect against and that injury occurred in a way proscribed by the statute.' (Footnotes omitted)." Downing v. Howard, 162 F.2d 654 (Third Cir. 1947), quoted in Barnett v. Anaconda Company, supra.

The injuries of which Plaintiff complains are not of the sort § 14(a) was designed to protect against. J. I. Case v. Borak, supra, holds:
"The purpose of § 14(a) is to prevent management or others from obtaining authorization for corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate disclosure[s] in proxy solicitation[s]."
There being no causation shown between the proxy solicitation containing the alleged violation and the transactions allegedly causing Plaintiff's damages, there can be no liability based on the alleged violation. The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is sustained and accordingly it is ordered that Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed this 6th day of January, 1975.
NOTES
[1]  This Statute provides:

"It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 78l of this title."
[2]  This Rule provides:

"(a) No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or oral, containing any statement which at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary to make the statements therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which has become false or misleading."
[3]  Accepting as true Plaintiff's allegations of fact, which are that Defendants prepared and distributed proxy statements containing misstatements and omissions, construing the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff in considering that the omissions and misstatements were material, and disregarding Plaintiff's conclusion of law that its damages were caused by the proxy violations, it must be concluded that Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted, for the alleged facts do not show any causal connection between the proxy solicitation and the transactions which caused the damages of which Plaintiff complains. The well pleaded facts do not show that Defendants obtained "authorization for corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate disclosures in proxy solicitations". It may well be that the alleged misstatements and omissions constitute material violations of § 14(a), but Defendants while engaged in such conduct do not become "insurer(s) against all harm."


                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                                                                Fifth Circuit
                                                             F I L E D
               IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                       FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT               September 21, 2006

                                                         Charles R. Fulbruge III
                                                                 Clerk
                           No. 06-40333
                         Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                    Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SERGIO RIVERA-CERDA, also known as Gabriel Garza
Mejia-Cerda, also known as Sergio Hernandez-Garcia,

                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                      --------------------
          Appeal from the United States District Court
               for the Southern District of Texas
                    USDC No. 1:01-CR-249-ALL
                      --------------------

Before DeMOSS, STEWART, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

     Sergio Rivera-Cerda appeals from the sentence imposed

following revocation of his term of supervised release.       Rivera-

Cerda argues that his sentence was clearly unreasonable, both in

terms of its length and the fact that it was to run consecutively

to his other sentence, because:   (1) it was unfair in light of

the relevant facts; (2) the district court failed to give due

consideration to the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), as required

by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); (3) the district

     *
       Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
                           No. 06-40333
                                -2-

court rigidly adhered to the relevant policy statements in the

Sentencing Guidelines; (4) it was grossly disproportionate to the

crime, thereby violating the Eighth Amendment; and (5) the

Sentencing Commission and the Sentencing Guidelines violate the

separation of powers doctrine and the due process clause of the

Fifth Amendment.

     The Government has moved for dismissal of the appeal or for

summary affirmance on the ground that this court lacks

jurisdiction to consider Rivera-Cerda’s appeal under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3742(a)(4).   Because Rivera-Cerda cannot prevail on the merits

of his appeal, we pretermit consideration of the jurisdictional

issue.   See United States v. Weathersby, 958 F.2d 65, 66 (5th

Cir. 1992).   The Government’s motion for dismissal of the appeal

or for summary affirmance is therefore denied.   The Government’s

alternative request for an extension of time to file an appeal

brief is also denied as unnecessary.

     The district court properly considered the 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) factors when imposing Rivera-Cerda’s sentence.      See

United States v. Gonzalez, 250 F.3d 923, 930 (5th Cir. 2001).

Rivera-Cerda’s sentence was neither unreasonable nor plainly

unreasonable.   See United States v. Hinson, 429 F.3d 114, 120

(5th Cir. 2005).   Moreover, his sentence was not

unconstitutionally disproportionate.   See United States v.

Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1030, 1031-32 (5th Cir. 1990).
                           No. 06-40333
                                -3-

     Rivera-Cerda’s separation of powers challenge to the

Sentencing Commission and the Sentencing Guidelines is foreclosed

under Booker.   543 U.S. at 242-43.   Moreover, this court will not

consider Rivera-Cerda’s due process argument because it was

inadequately briefed.   See United States v. Torres-Aguilar, 352

F.3d 934, 936 n.2 (5th Cir. 2003); FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(9).

     AFFIRMED; MOTION FOR DISMISSAL OR SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE DENIED;

ALTERNATIVE REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF TIME DENIED AS UNNECESSARY.


568 F.2d 772
Braggv.Bordenkircher
No. 77-1742
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
1/11/78

1
N.D.W.Va.

AFFIRMED


142 So.2d 50 (1962)
Mrs. Hilda A. SELLE, widow of George O. Selle
v.
Peter T. KLEAMENAKIS et al.
No. 585.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
June 4, 1962.
David H. MacHauer, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellee.
Roy F. Cook, New Orleans, for defendants-appellants.
Before McBRIDE. YARRUT and JOHNSON, JJ.
YARRUT, Judge.
Plaintiff sues the owners of the property adjoining her home, as well as their piledriving contractor, to recover damage for injury to the inside walls, ceiling and bathroom tiling in her home, allegedly caused by the pile-driving operation.
Defendants filed a plea of prescription of one year which was overruled; whereupon, answer was filed admitting ownership of the property, the pile-driving, but denying responsibility for the damage to Plaintiff's home.
Judgment was rendered in solido only against the owners, for $680.50, from which they have taken this appeal.
*51 As the only Appellants are the owners of the property, their liability is fixed by LSA-C.C. Art. 667, reading:
"Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases, still he can not make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of any damage to him."
Therefore, Plaintiff can recover if she proves her damage was caused by the pile-driving, whether or not Defendant-owners were guilty of fault. In such case, the owners are liable without fault, if causation is proved. LSA-C.C. Art. 667, quoted supra; Elysian Cocktail Lounge and Restaurant v. Sciambra & Masino, Inc., La. App., 124 So.2d 149; Bruno v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., La.App., 67 So.2d 920; Hauck v. Brunet, La.App., 50 So.2d 495.
The plea of prescription appears to have been abandoned, not having been urged here, hence the case on appeal must be considered only on its merits.
On the merits, the testimony preponderates that the vibrations from the pile-driving caused or aggravated the damage. Notwithstanding Plaintiff's residence was on a main highway, and Plaintiff admitted vibrations from traffic could be felt, no visible damage resulted nor appeared until the pile-driving operation began a few feet away.
Two artisans who examined the damage, estimated the cost of repair and painting would total $680.50.
Defendants offered insufficient evidence to overcome Plaintiff's proof of causation, and the cost of repair. Defendants' liability depends on proof of causation only, even without fault.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the district court is affirmed; Defendants to pay costs in both courts.
Affirmed.


802 F.2d 583
55 USLW 2261, 15 Bankr.Ct.Dec. 465, Bankr.L. Rep.  P 71,516
Marguerite C. SHINE, Plaintiff, Appellee,v.Louis M. SHINE, Defendant, Appellant.
No. 86-1287.
United States Court of Appeals,First Circuit.
Submitted Sept. 12, 1986.Decided Oct. 6, 1986.

Luke S. O'Neill, Jr., Manchester, N.H., on brief, for defendant, appellant.
Richard Y. Uchida and Rinden Professional Ass'n, Concord, N.H., on brief, for plaintiff, appellee.
Before COFFIN, BOWNES and BREYER, Circuit Judges.
BOWNES, Circuit Judge.

1
In this appeal, we must determine whether an obligation incurred because of the failure to pay court-ordered support is dischargeable in bankruptcy where the support order was not explicitly embodied in "a separation agreement, divorce decree, or property settlement agreement," the language of the bankruptcy statute then in effect, 11 U.S.C. Sec. 523(a)(5) (1978).

2
The plaintiff, Marguerite Shine, and the defendant, Louis Shine, were married in the District of Columbia on September 20, 1969.  They did not have any children and, on October 30, 1972, they divided their property and separated without making any agreement regarding support.  In December of 1972, plaintiff commenced an action for separate maintenance from defendant in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia where defendant was a resident.  The Superior Court issued an order requiring defendant to pay $250 per month to plaintiff beginning in April 1973.  In 1975, plaintiff, then a resident of Virginia, was granted a decree of divorce from defendant by the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia.  The decree made no provision for alimony and support.  It stated:  "the parties hereto have not entered into a Property Settlement Agreement [and] ... there are no property rights to be determined by the Court."    At the time of the divorce, defendant was a resident of New Hampshire.

3
Throughout this period, the District of Columbia support order continued in effect with defendant in arrears.  Plaintiff brought suit on the arrearage in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia in 1976 and judgment was entered for $9,045, the payments due as of June 1, 1976.  By a consent decree entered in August of 1976, the Superior Court vacated the order of support first entered in 1973 for payments due subsequent to June 1, 1976, leaving the judgment for the arrearage untouched.  No payment was made on the judgment.  In 1982, plaintiff brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire to collect the arrearage.  A judgment for $12,112, plus interest and costs, issued and plaintiff then proceeded to sue in the New Hampshire Merrimack County Superior Court to collect the judgment.  This suit was stayed when defendant filed for bankruptcy.

4
Plaintiff then filed a complaint in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Hampshire seeking to have the support obligation declared nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 523(a)(5) (1978).  Section 523(a)(5) excepted from discharge any debt "to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree, or property settlement agreement...."  The Bankruptcy Court initially held that the debt was not dischargeable because it "relates to the oral separation agreement between the parties."   In re Shine, 43 B.R. 686, 688 (Bankr.D.N.H.1984).  Upon motion for reconsideration, however, it held that the debt was dischargeable because it was not created by a "separation agreement which itself embodies an agreed arrangement between the parties for the obligation to make support payments."   In re Shine, 49 B.R. 978, 980 (Bankr.D.N.H.1985).  Upon appeal, the district court held that the debt was not dischargeable because "to allow the defendant's debt to be discharged would be contrary to Congressional intent and public policy."   In re Shine, 57 B.R. 386, 389 (D.N.H.1986).  Defendant has appealed.

5
To our knowledge, no circuit court has yet addressed the dischargeability of support debts which implicated the scope of the "in connection" clause of Sec. 523(a)(5), although numerous bankruptcy courts have considered the dischargeability of such debts.  The question has arisen in cases where child or spousal support has been ordered by a court independent of any legal dissolution of a marriage or where child support has been ordered as the result of a paternity suit.  The bankruptcy courts are divided.  The courts finding the debt dischargeable have used different rationales.  Some have looked primarily to the words of the statute itself, In re Antikainen, 48 B.R. 630 (Bankr.D.Minn.1985);  In re Leach, 15 B.R. 1005 (Bankr.D.Conn.1981).  Some have been guided by the general rule that exceptions to discharge in bankruptcy should be narrowly construed against the creditor and in favor of the bankrupt, In re Marino, 29 B.R. 797 (N.D.Ind.1983);  In re Brown, 43 B.R. 613 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn.1984);  In re Fenstermacher, 31 B.R. 77 (Bankr.D.Neb.1983), overruled on other grounds, In re Pierson, 47 B.R. 258 (Bankr.D.Neb.1985).  Others have found in the legislative history of Sec. 523(a)(5) an intent that Congress meant to exclude from protection support debts not specifically originating in a formal separation agreement or divorce decree.   In re Bruner, 43 B.R. 143 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1984);  In re Brown, 43 B.R. 613 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn.1984);  In re Richards, 33 B.R. 56 (Bankr.D.Or.1983), rev'd on other grounds, 45 B.R. 811 (D.Or.1984).

6
Those courts finding the debt not dischargeable have also relied upon the legislative history of Sec. 523(a)(5), finding a basic intent upon the part of Congress to except spousal and child support debts from discharge and no specific intent to exclude from that protection support debts arising outside of divorce or formal separation.   In re Pierson, 47 B.R. 258 (Bankr.D.Neb.1985);  In re Balthazor, 36 B.R. 656 (Bankr.E.D.Wisc.1984);  In re Mojica, 30 B.R. 925 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1983);  In re Cain, 29 B.R. 591 (Bankr.N.D.Ind.1983);  but see In re Marino, 29 B.R. 797.  Other courts finding the debt nondischargeable have found the requisite "connection" in a variety of circumstances in which the obligation derived from a source other than the main divorce decree or separation agreement.   In re Jackson, 27 B.R. 892 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.1983);  In re Graham, 14 B.R. 246 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.1981);  In re Morris, 14 B.R. 217 (Bankr.D.Col.1981).  Where child support arising out of a paternity suit has been at issue, an additional factor leading at least two courts to hold the support debt not dischargeable has been the possible unconstitutionality of a law which protects support for children of married parents but does not protect support for children of unmarried parents.   In re Mullally, 56 B.R. 271 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1985);  In re Pierson, 47 B.R. 258.  This is not a consideration relevant to this case.

7
These conflicting interpretations of the statute derive from the two established public policies in this area.  The general bankruptcy rule of construing exceptions to discharge against the creditor and in favor of the debtor, Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 562, 35 S.Ct. 287, 289, 59 L.Ed. 717 (1915), In re Hunter, 780 F.2d 1577, 1579 (11th Cir.1986), In re Delano, 50 B.R. 613, 617 (Bankr.D.Mass.1985), supports a narrow construction of the statute.  This general rule implements "[t]he overriding purpose of the bankruptcy laws ... to provide the bankrupt with comprehensive, much needed relief from the burden of his indebtedness by releasing him from virtually all his debts."   In re Cross, 666 F.2d 873, 879 (5th Cir.1982).  On the other hand, the long-standing policy of excepting spousal and child support from discharge in bankruptcy supports a more liberal construction:

8
The bankruptcy law should receive such an interpretation as will effectuate its beneficient purposes and not make it an instrument to deprive dependent wife and children of the support and maintenance due them from the husband and father, which it has ever been the purpose of the law to enforce.  ...  Unless positively required by direct enactment the courts should not presume a design upon the part of Congress in relieving the unfortunate debtor to make the law a means of avoiding enforcement of the obligation, moral and legal, devolved upon the husband to support his wife and to maintain and educate his children.

9
Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77, 25 S.Ct. 172, 175, 49 L.Ed. 390 (1904).

10
The exception from discharge for alimony and payments for maintenance and support has long been an accepted part of bankruptcy law.  Even prior to the 1903 Amendment to Sec. 17 of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, which explicitly incorporated this exception, Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, Sec. 5, 32 Stat. 797, 798, the majority of courts held that such payments constituted a nondischargeable "duty" rather than a provable "debt."    1A Collier on Bankruptcy 1668-69 (14th ed. 1978).  In Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575, 21 S.Ct. 735, 45 L.Ed. 1009 (1901), the Supreme Court found this exception to be implied in the 1898 Act, which discharged all debts "founded ... upon a contract, expressed or implied," Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, Sec. 63(4), 30 Stat. 544, 563:

11
Alimony does not arise from any business transaction but from the relation of marriage.  It is not founded on a contract, express or implied, but on the natural and legal duty of the husband to support the wife.  The general obligation to support is made specific by the decree of the Court of appropriate jurisdiction.  ...  But its obligation in that respect does not affect its nature.

12
Id. at 577-78, 21 S.Ct. at 736.  And in Wetmore, 196 U.S. 68, 25 S.Ct. 172, 49 L.Ed. 390 the Court found that the 1903 Amendment explicitly including the exception was "declaratory of the true meaning and sense of the statute," id. at 76-77, 25 S.Ct. at 175, rather than indicating the exception's absence prior to 1903.

13
Litigation arose under amended Sec. 17 concerning the definition of "alimony."    Cases were decided on the basis of whether the payments in question constituted genuine "alimony" or, rather, dischargeable "property settlements."   E.g., Goggans v. Osborn, 237 F.2d 186, 188 (9th Cir.1955).  In making this determination courts looked at the substance, rather than the formal designation, of the payments.   In re Alcorn, 162 F.Supp. 206, 208 (N.D.Cal.1958);  In re Adams, 25 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.1928).

14
Under the interpretation of the statute urged by the appellant, the 1978 Amendment would be viewed as reversing this long-standing differentiation between property settlements and alimony or payments for maintenance and support.  Under appellant's interpretation, property settlements, traditionally dischargeable, would have become nondischargeable, while alimony and payments for maintenance and support, traditionally nondischargeable, would have been limited by a strictly construed "in connection" clause.  We, therefore, examine the history of the 1978 Amendment to determine whether such a reversal was intended by Congress.

15
In 1970, the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States was charged with recommending changes in the statute.  Act of July 24, 1970, Pub.L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468.  The Commission proposed amending Sec. 17(a)(7) to make nondischargeable "any liability to a spouse or child for maintenance or support, for alimony due or to become due, or under a property settlement in connection with a separation agreement or divorce decree."    Report of the Commission, H.R. Doc.  No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.  (1973), reprinted in 2 Appendix Collier on Bankruptcy I-1, Part II of the Report, I-136.  The Commission's proposal left untouched the existing broad exemption for any liability for maintenance or support.  Its changes concerned the prevailing status of "property settlements."    As the Commission explained:

16
12.   Clause (6) of subdivision (a) overhauls Sec. 17a(7) of the present Act.  Under the proposed Act debts denied dischargeability under the clause are limited to family support obligations;  debts "for seduction of an unmarried female, or for breach of promise of marriage accompanied by seduction, or for criminal conversation" are eliminated as no longer responsive to prevailing social policy.  The clause is broadened, however, to include any liability to a "spouse or child ... under a property settlement in connection with a separation agreement or divorce decree."    Under the present Act such property settlements are dischargeable.  The change recognizes that obligations to support family dependents in the future may take the form of either a duty to make periodic payments based on need or an obligation to pay a settlement based on the debtor's present or anticipated wealth.  The choice of form frequently turns on tax considerations or other factors not directly related to the duty to provide support.

17
Id. at Part II of the Report, I-139.  The Commission intended to expand nondischargeable support debts beyond the support, maintenance and alimony obligations which had traditionally been nondischargeable.  The proposal included property settlements in divorce or separation agreements which were in the nature of support but which did not take the form of periodic payments.  The Commission did not intend to limit the nondischargeability of the traditionally protected categories.  It sought, rather, to broaden the bankruptcy law's protection of the families of the bankrupt spouse in accordance with changing times.

18
The version of the Amendment that originally passed the House of Representatives, H.R. 8200, retained the traditional exception to dischargeability:

19
(a) A discharge ... does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt--

20
....

21
(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child....

22
H.R. 8200, Sec. 523, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1978, p. 5787 (1977).

23
In the Senate, the original version of the Amendment substantially repeated the Commission's language, making nondischargeable "any liability to a spouse or child for maintenance or support, or for alimony due or to become due, or under a property settlement in connection with a separation agreement or divorce decree...."  S. 2266, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.  (1977).  When it was reported out of committee, the Amendment read:

24
(a) A discharge ... does not discharge an individual debtor from ...--

25
....

26
(6) any liability to a spouse or child for maintenance or support, or for alimony due or to become due, in connection with a separation agreement or divorce decree.

27
S. 2266, Sec. 523, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.  (1978).

28
The final text of the bill was an amalgam of the Commission, House and Senate versions.  The first part of the new Sec. 523(a)(5) derived from the House language, while the "in connection" clause combines the wording of the House and Senate.  The result, if construed narrowly, could convey a meaning not intended by anyone.

29
This final version, produced in the "harried and hurried atmosphere" in which the bill was finally enacted,1 should not be read to effect a reversal of the long-standing principles governing this area.  Such a reversal would surely have been noted in the congressional discussions.  Yet, neither the House nor Senate Committee Reports accompanying the final version make any reference to a limitation upon support debts considered nondischargeable.  The Senate Report does not even mention the "in connection" language in its discussion of the section nor does it suggest that any kind of new limitation had been imposed.  S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.  News 5787, 5865.  The House Report follows the Senate Report in its general discussion, H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 364, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5963, 6320.  In its section-by-section discussion of Sec. 523(a)(5), the House Report merely restates the "in connection" language without explaining any effect it might have on dischargeability.  Id. at 6454.

30
In 1984, the statute was amended again, clearly making nondischargeable the kind of court-ordered debts involved in this case.  Spousal or child support debts incurred "in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree, or other order of a court of record or property settlement agreement" are now nondischargeable.  11 U.S.C. Sec. 523(a)(5) (Supp. II) (as amended by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub.L. 98-353, effective July 10, 1984).2   This Amendment should not be read as proof of a contrary state of the law from 1978 through 1984.  Rather, as the Supreme Court, in Wetmore, analogously noted in relation to the 1903 Amendment, it simply declares and clarifies the "true meaning and sense" of the law, allowing it to "effectuate its beneficent purposes."    196 U.S. at 77, 25 S.Ct. at 175.

31
After this examination of the legislative history of Sec. 523, as well as of the established principles in this area, we cannot agree with the Bankruptcy Court's view of the requirements for nondischargeability under the 1978 statute.  Congressional policy in this area has always been to ensure that genuine support obligations would not be discharged.  Interpreting the statute to require the test proposed would violate the principle that in bankruptcy law, "substance will not give way to form ... technical considerations will not prevent substantial justice from being done."   Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 305, 60 S.Ct. 238, 244, 84 L.Ed. 281 (1939).3   While the wording of the statute may have given rise to some confusion, "[t]he result of an obvious mistake should not be enforced, particularly when it 'overrides common sense and evident statutory purpose.' "   In re Adamo, 619 F.2d 216, 222 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843, 101 S.Ct. 125, 66 L.Ed.2d 52 (1980) (quoting United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 26, 68 S.Ct. 376, 380, 92 L.Ed. 442 (1948)).

32
We hold, therefore, that this support obligation is not dischargeable in bankruptcy.

33
Affirmed.

1
 The final version of the new Bankruptcy law was arrived at in October, 1978 as the deadline for Congressional action drew near.  If a final bill had not been approved by both houses prior to adjournment it would have been necessary to begin anew the following year.  It was in this harried and hurried atmosphere that the Bankruptcy Reform Act as we now know it was produced in its final form.   In re Mojica, 30 B.R. at 930

2
 This case was filed in 1982.  Since the 1984 Amendment became effective for cases filed ninety days after its enactment, Pub.L. 98-353, Sec. 552, it does not directly govern this case

3
 We need not choose between the ways in which courts have effectuated the substantive principles of bankruptcy laws in related cases.  As we noted above, some have reasoned in a manner similar to In re Mojica, in which the "in connection" clause was viewed as not exclusive of genuine obligations for alimony "not expressly enumerated in the statute."    In re Mojica at 928-29.  Others have construed the "connection" as a simple "causal nexus," In re Morris, 14 B.R. at 218 n. 3, requiring that the obligations be related to the underlying divorce or separation at issue.   In re Graham, 14 B.R. at 248.  The principle that the dischargeability of "ancillary obligations such as attorney's fees and interest" depend "on the status of the primary debt," In re Hunter, 771 F.2d 1126, 1131 (8th Cir.1985), has also been used to construe the meaning of the "in connection" clause.   DuPhily v. DuPhily, 52 B.R. 971, 978 (D.Del.1985).  Under any of these formulations, the principle is clear and consistent with a long legislative and adjudicatory history:  genuine support obligations are not to be discharged


439 So.2d 125 (1983)
Kenneth W. UNDERWOOD, Jr.
v.
STATE of Alabama, et al.
82-186.
Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 30, 1983.
*126 Kenneth W. Underwood, Jr., pro se.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Thomas R. Allison, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees.
ADAMS, Justice.
Plaintiff filed this action for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. He asked the court to declare that he was not in violation of Code 1975, § 36-25-7(a), a section of the Ethics Act.[1] The trial court held that the plaintiff's status placed him in violation of the statute, and denied him the relief he sought. The plaintiff appealed. We find that the facts of this case did not present to the trial court a justiciable controversy, and dismiss the appeal.
The facts of the case, as presented at trial, are as follows:
The plaintiff, Kenneth W. Underwood, Jr., was employed by South Central Bell Telephone Company, and had been so employed since May, 1956. At the time of trial, his title was Assistant Vice President, Governmental Affairs, for the Alabama operating area of the company. In this capacity he served as liaison between the company and state and federal governments. He also appeared before legislative committees and offered testimony in favor of or in opposition to proposed legislation affecting his employer. In addition, his duties required that he entertain members of the *127 legislature. Underwood was registered as a lobbyist with the State Ethics Commission.
Underwood also served as associate member on the Board of Appeals of the Alabama Department of Industrial Relations (the Board). He was classified as a representative of employers. He had held that position since 1968. Members of the Board of Appeals can receive up to $8,000.00 per year for their service, plus $.20 per mile in travel pay and $30.00 per diem.
In October, 1982, the Ethics Commission (the Commission) rendered and adopted advisory opinion # 652, advising that for Underwood to occupy both his position on the Board and his position as a lobbyist put him in violation of § 36-25-7(a). The executive director of the Commission then wrote to the director of the Department of Industrial Relations, informing him of the opinion and requesting that the director remove Underwood from the Board. That same day, Underwood filed his complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief.
The case was submitted on testimony of the plaintiff, briefs filed by the parties, and oral argument. At the hearing, counsel stipulated that the court had jurisdiction of the case, that an actual controversy existed, and that the claim was ripe for declaratory judgment.
In deciding that the case was not properly before the court, we call attention to the following details, all of which were noted in the memorandum opinion of the trial judge:
Underwood, in his complaint, did not challenge the constitutionality of § 36-25-7(a) on its face or in its application to him. Likewise, he did not contend that the Ethics Commission exceeded its authority in rendering the advisory opinion or in requesting that the director of the Department of Industrial Relations remove Underwood from the Board. He merely challenged the correctness of the conclusion expressed in the advisory opinion.
The Ethics Commission is granted the authority in Code 1975, § 36-25-4(9), to render advisory opinions. Such an opinion has the effect of protecting "such person to whom it is directed from liability to either the state, county or municipal subdivision of the state because of any official action or actions performed as directed or advised in such opinion." § 36-25-4(9). The Commission has no authority to enforce its opinions, but is limited to reporting suspected violations of law to the appropriate law-enforcement authorities (§ 36-25-4(8)), and reporting its findings to the director and the appointing authority. Underwood, having been appointed to the Board by the governor, is subject to removal only by action of the governor (§ 36-13-7) or by impeachment (§ 25-2-12). Therefore, as pointed out by the trial court, the Commission's request that the director remove Underwood from the Board was a nullity.
The trial court, in its opinion, stated:
Inasmuch as the Commission has exhausted its power and has no enforcement authority, it is difficult to ascertain what bona fide justiciable controversy exists to be resolved by this court inasmuch as there exists merely a difference of opinion between the Commission and the plaintiff. It is well to point out, however, that in these circumstances the plaintiff may either resign his position on the Board, he may resign his private employment, he may request his employer to assign him different responsibilities which do not include lobbying before the legislature, or he may risk prosecution in the event the proper authorities agree with the Commission's interpretation of § 7(a) and the authorities conclude that prosecution is warranted under the circumstances.
The trial court then went on to note that the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, under which this case was brought, is a remedial act that is to be liberally construed and administered. Code 1975, § 6-6-221. Because of this, the court concluded that, although Underwood was merely requesting the court to resolve a difference of opinion as to the interpretation of the law, it should proceed to construe § 36-25-7(a) as it applies to Underwood. We disagree.
*128 This court has held many times that the declaratory judgment statutes do not empower courts to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to give advisory opinions, however convenient it might be to have the questions decided for the government of future cases. State ex rel. Baxley v. Johnson, 293 Ala. 69, 300 So.2d 106 (1974); Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. City of Huntsville, 275 Ala. 184, 153 So.2d 619 (1963); Birmingham Trust National Bank v. Garth, 263 Ala. 121, 81 So.2d 590 (1955). The anticipation of a justiciable controversy is not sufficient to warrant a judicial declaration of rights. See Smith v. Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 293 Ala. 644, 309 So.2d 424 (1975); Talton v. Dickinson, 261 Ala. 11, 72 So.2d 723 (1954).
As pointed out by the trial court, at the time of trial Underwood had several options open to him. While Underwood might prefer not to have to exercise any of these options, it is obvious that he had several choices which would eliminate the possibility of a controversy altogether. In the absence of the power of enforcement of the Commission's advisory opinion, it is uncertain at this point whether a controversy would arise, even if he chose to disregard the opinion.
While Alabama law has recognized the right of a plaintiff to test a rule or regulation of an administrative board which carries with it the power of law or authority for enforcement (see Gibbs v. Cochran, 281 Ala. 22, 198 So.2d 607 (1967)), such a situation is not presented in this case. The validity of the statute which was interpreted in the Commission's opinion was not challenged, nor was the authority of the Commission to render the opinion. An advisory opinion alone, having no force of law, is not subject to review by the courts, either by appeal or by action for declaratory judgment. Under the circumstances, we find that there was no justiciable controversy before the trial court, and, thus, that court had no jurisdiction. See Wallace v. Burleson, 361 So.2d 554 (Ala.1978).
Since the judgment of the trial court was void because of the lack of a justiciable controversy between the parties, and since a void judgment will not support an appeal, it follows that the appeal is due to be dismissed. Smith v. Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., supra; State ex rel. Baxley v. Johnson, supra; City of Mobile v. Scott, 278 Ala. 388, 178 So.2d 545 (1965).
APPEAL DISMISSED.
TORBERT, C.J., and JONES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, ALMON and SHORES, JJ., dissent.
FAULKNER and EMBRY, JJ., recused.
NOTES
[1]  § 36-25-7(a) states:

No public official or employee or his family shall solicit or receive any money in addition to that received by the official or employee in his official capacity for advice or assistance on matters concerning the legislature, an executive department or any public regulatory board, commission or other body.


298 F.Supp. 26 (1969)
John DODGE et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
Raymond NAKAI, Allen V. Adams, and Graham Holmes, Defendants.
No. Civ-1209 Pct.
United States District Court D. Arizona.
March 1, 1969.
*27 *28 Jeremy E. Butler and Monroe G. McKay, of Lewis, Roca, Beauchamp & Linton, Phoenix, Ariz., for plaintiffs.
Harold E. Mott, Albuquerque, N. M., and Edmund D. Kahn, Window Rock, Ariz., for the Navajo Tribe of Indians.

OPINION, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT
CRAIG, District Judge.
The above entitled cause was instituted by certain named plaintiffs, members of the Navajo Tribe of American Indians, residents of the Navajo Indian Reservation in the District of Arizona; Dinebeiina Nahiilna Be Agaditahe, Inc., an Arizona nonprofit corporation, hereinafter referred to as DNA, serving as a delegate agency under the United States Office of Economic Opportunity for the purpose of providing legal services to indigent Navajo Indians; two Navajo Indians, residents of the Navajo Indian Reservation in the District of Arizona, representing a class of indigent Navajo Indians receiving legal services from DNA; and Theodore R. Mitchell, the Program Director of DNA, residing at Fort Defiance, Arizona within the boundaries of the Navajo Indian Reservation, for the purpose of enjoining defendants Raymond Nakai, Allen V. Adams and Graham Holmes from enforcing an order of removal directed against plaintiff Mitchell, issued by the Advisory Committee of the Navajo Tribal Council August 7, 1968, and an exclusion order issued against plaintiff Mitchell by the Advisory Committee of the Navajo Tribal Council August 8, 1968.
Plaintiffs also seek damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000) and such further relief as to the Court may seem appropriate.
The defendant Raymond Nakai is Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council, residing at Window Rock, Arizona, within the Navajo Indian Reservation.
Allen V. Adams is the Superintendent of the Navajo Police Department, also residing within the Navajo Indian Reservation at Window Rock, Arizona.
Defendant Graham Holmes is the Area Director of the Navajo Indian Reservation for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and resides within the Navajo Indian Reservation at Window Rock, Arizona.
Defendants previously filed a motion to dismiss, which was argued to the Court, memoranda briefs filed by the several parties, submitted and denied by this Court.
The matter was thereafter tried to the Court and at the conclusion of plaintiffs' case, the defendant Holmes renewed the motion to dismiss which was granted.
The resolution of August 7, 1968 by the Advisory Committee of the Navajo Tribal Council directed the defendant Nakai to cause the immediate removal of plaintiff Mitchell from the Reservation, and to notify Mitchell that a hearing would be held August 8, 1968, in order to allow Mitchell to show cause why he should not be permanently excluded from the Reservation. Mitchell was removed from the Reservation, pursuant to the resolution of August 7th at the direction of defendant Nakai and defendant Adams. He was allowed to return for the hearing of August 8th in the company of a Navajo policeman, and at the conclusion of the hearing, on August 8th, he was permanently excluded from the Reservation.
Defendants assert that the exclusion orders were within the scope of the authority of the Navajo Tribe as set forth in Article II of the Treaty of 1868 between the United States of America and the Navajo Tribe of Indians (15 Stat. 667). The defendants also assert that the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 et seq., is not applicable in the instant case.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(1), 1343(4), 1361 and 1651.

*29 I.
Article II of the Treaty of 1868 between the United States of America and the Navajo Tribe of Indians (15 Stat. 667) provides that the Navajo Reservation shall be set aside for the "use and occupation" of the Navajo Tribe. In addition the United States agreed in that provision that "no persons except those herein so authorized to do, and except such officers, soldiers, agents and employees of the government, or of the Indians, as may be authorized to enter upon Indian Reservations in discharge of duties imposed by law, or the orders of the President, shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in, the territory described in this article." This provision reserves to the Navajo Tribe the power to exclude non-Navajos from the Navajo Reservation, with the exception of those persons authorized to enter thereon by virtue of the treaty itself, a law of the United States, see Navajo Tribe v. N. L. R. B., 109 U.S.App.D.C. 378, 288 F.2d 162 (1961), or an order of the President of the United States.
Congress may modify the manner in which Indian tribes may exercise their quasi-sovereign powers. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959); Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965). In enacting Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03, Congress imposed upon Indian tribes exercising powers of self-government many of the restrictions imposed upon the Federal Government by the Bill of Rights and upon the states through judicial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whatever may have been the autonomy of the Navajo Tribe prior to the passage of this legislation, this Act of Congress imposed new responsibilities upon the Tribe with respect to both the manner in which it could exercise its governmental powers and the objectives that it could pursue through their implementation.
The power to exclude non-Navajos from the Navajo Reservation was exercised by the Advisory Committee of the Navajo Tribal Council and was clearly an exercise of the "powers of self-government" possessed by the Navajo Tribe. The question before this Court, therefore, is whether the exclusion of Mitchell from the Navajo Reservation was lawful in light of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.

II.
DNA is a nonprofit legal services corporation organized under the laws of the State of Arizona. DNA was created to act as a delegate agency to receive funds made available by the Office of Economic Opportunity, hereinafter referred to as OEO, to the Office of Navajo Economic Opportunity, hereinafter referred to as ONEO, for the purpose of conducting a legal services program for indigent Navajo Indians. On or about February 25, 1967, the first delegate agency contract between DNA and ONEO was executed. On or about March 3, 1967, plaintiff Mitchell was named by the Board of Directors of DNA to be its Director.
From its inception DNA maintained a degree of independence from Navajo tribal governmental agencies. The independence of DNA was thought to be essential if DNA was to avoid conflicts of interest that might arise if DNA provided effective legal assistance to indigent Navajos who sought its services.
The policy of independence adopted by DNA became a matter of concern to members of the tribal government. A series of events point to the increasing opposition of tribal leaders to the operation of DNA and the retention of Mitchell as its Director.
(1) On August 31, 1967, the delegate agency contract between ONEO and DNA expired. A prolonged period of negotiations for renewal of the contract commenced. One of the principal issues in these negotiations was the independence of DNA and the continued employment of its Director.
*30 (2) On October 17, 1967, Peter MacDonald, Executive Director of ONEO, informed the ONEO Executive Board that it was the opinion of defendant Nakai that DNA has embarrassed him very much in some instances, and that the contract under negotiations should correct these misunderstandings. Other members of the ONEO Executive Board expressed the view that DNA was too independent and indicated a desire that Mitchell be removed as its Director. (Exhibit 6).
(3) On February 5, 1968, Nakai informed ONEO's Executive Board that he would sign a new delegate agency contract with DNA only on condition that at the end of the contract period Mitchell be removed as Director and the Board of Directors be reorganized. (Exhibit 10).
(4) On February 7, 1968, the Navajo Tribal Council approved a resolution calling for a report on the activities of DNA.
(5) On April 16 and 17, 1968, the Navajo Tribal Council convened to consider the operation of DNA and the performance of Mitchell as its Director. After extended discussion of the serious allegations set forth in Exhibit 12, the Council tabled a resolution that called for the discharge of Mitchell as Director and the termination of the ONEO-DNA delegate agency contract. (Exhibit 13).
(6) On April 17, 1968, outside the Council Chambers, Mrs. Annie Wauneka, a member of the Advisory Committee, told Mitchell that it was her desire that he leave the Navajo Reservation.
(7) On June 28, 1968, the Advisory Committee passed a resolution demanding that Mitchell be dismissed as Director of DNA. This demand was the direct result of the Advisory Committee's disapproval of the participation of DNA in a dispute with respect to the operation of the Chinle School system. (Exhibit 15).
(8) On July 3, 1968, Nakai notified Mitchell that in the event he did not accede to the Committee's demand within fourteen days, the Advisory Committee "shall be forced to take further action against you." (Exhibit 20). While the June 28th resolution does not refer to Mitchell's exclusion from the Navajo Reservation, Nakai interpreted that resolution as instructing him to take whatever steps were necessary to remove Mitchell from the Navajo Reservation. (Exhibits 18 and 23).
(9) On July 17, 1968, the Navajo Tribal Council passed a resolution authorizing the execution of a delegate agency contract with DNA for the period September 1, 1967, to August 31, 1968. (Exhibit 25).
(10) On July 20, 1968, the Board of Directors of DNA refused to discharge Mitchell, stating that insufficient grounds existed to warrant that action. (Exhibit 24).
(11) On August 2, 1968, a member of the Advisory Committee requested a report from the Legal Department of the Navajo Tribe as to the status of the Committee's demand that Mitchell be discharged as Director of DNA. Edmund Kahn, assistant general counsel to the Tribe, informed the Advisory Committee that its only recourse was the drastic step of excluding Mitchell from the Navajo Reservation. (Exhibit 26, pp. 57-60).
(12) On August 5, 1968, the Advisory Committee met with representatives of the Department of the Interior to discuss the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Mrs. Annie Wauneka inquired whether the Act would prevent the Navajo Tribe from evicting someone from the Navajo Reservation. Durard Barnes, Acting Associate Solicitor on Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior, began his answer with what appeared to be a question as to whether Mrs. Wauneka had a particular individual in mind. Mrs. Wauneka interrupted to state that she did not. The record of the meeting reflects the existence of laughter at this point. The testimony before this Court indicates that several individuals laughed on this occasion, including two members *31 of the Advisory Committee. The laughter of Mitchell is acknowledged as the loudest and most noticeable. Mrs. Wauneka addressed Mitchell, admonishing him for laughing in the Council Chambers. Significantly, the meeting continued without further interruption. There appeared to be no necessity for the presiding officer to call the meeting to order following the "interruption." (Exhibit 3, pp. 84-85).
(13) On August 6, 1968, the Advisory Committee reconvened to continue discussions with the Washington delegation. During this meeting, Mrs. Wauneka rose from her seat, walked to the entrance of the Council Chambers where Mitchell was seated, and made inquiry as to whether Mitchell intended to laugh once again. Mitchell attempted to apologize for his laughter of the previous day, but Mrs. Wauneka replied that she was not interested in an apology. She then struck Mitchell several times and ordered him to leave the Council Chambers; Mitchell left. After a recess, the Advisory Committee discussed the Mitchell incident. Several members noted a history of difficulty between Mitchell and the Navajo Tribe, and the suggestion was made that Mitchell be removed from the Reservation. After adoption of a motion calling for the submission of a resolution to the Advisory Committee on the next day, the Committee adjourned. (Exhibit 3, pp. 121, 126-28, 132-33).
(14) On August 7, 1968, the Advisory Committee convened and, in a thirty minute session, passed nine resolutions without debate. One of these resolutions called upon defendant Nakai (1) to cause the immediate removal of Mitchell from the Reservation, and (2) to serve notice upon Mitchell that he could reenter the Reservation on August 8, 1968, in the company of a Navajo policeman, for the purpose of presenting himself before the Advisory Committee to show cause why he should not be permanently excluded therefrom. (Exhibit 3, pp. 134-48).
(15) On August 8, 1968, the Advisory Committee convened to conduct a hearing. The Committee heard from several of its members, including a description of the events by Mrs. Wauneka. Mitchell was permitted to make a statement in his own behalf, but his request to bring witnesses before the Committee after the noon recess was rejected. By a vote of 12-3, the Committee permanently excluded Mitchell from the Reservation. (Exhibit 3, pp. 162-181).

III.
Defendants contend that the "obnoxious conduct" of Mitchell in the Council Chambers on August 5, and the subsequent assault on August 6, form the sole basis for the temporary removal order of August 7 and the permanent exclusion order of August 8. They contend that Mitchell's laugh was in the nature of a guffaw, full of ridicule and scorn for the Advisory Committee, and so obnoxious as to provoke the assault by Mrs. Wauneka. Assuming arguendo that defendant's description of the laugh is correct, and that the laugh and the subsequent assault formed the sole basis for Mitchell's exclusion, this Court would hold that the exclusion of Mitchell from the Navajo Reservation by the Advisory Committee was in violation of 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
Under 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8), the Navajo Tribe is prohibited from depriving any person of liberty or property without due process of law. Due process requires governmental entities to utilize reasonable means in seeking to achieve legitimate ends. Banishment is a severe remedial device. By virtue of the Treaty of 1868, the substantial (and rapidly increasing) number of non-Navajos living and working on the Navajo Reservation are subject to the possible invocation of the Tribe's power of exclusion. By virtue of 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8), these individuals are entitled to the assurance that they are not subject to be summarily ejected from their homes and separated from their employment because of the disfavor of the ruling segment of the Navajo Tribe. At the very least these individuals are entitled to believe that *32 they are secure in their homes and work so long as they do not run afoul of one of the grounds for exclusion set forth in Title 17, Section 1782 of the Navajo Tribal Code. Under defendant's version of this case, it is difficult to construe the action of the Advisory Committee as being based upon anything other than a personal dislike for the conduct of Mitchell, conduct in the form of laughter that was deemed to be disrespectful to members of the Advisory Committee. Invocation of the drastic power of exclusion for this reason is wholly unreasonable. This view is supported by the fact that no ground for exclusion enumerated in the Navajo Tribal Code justifies the exclusion of Mitchell for this reason or for any other reason that might be deduced from the facts presented to this Court.
In addition, non-Navajos living on the Navajo Reservation look to the tribal government for goods and services normally provided by state and local governments; the quality of life for all persons living on the Reservation is directly affected by the actions taken by tribal agencies. Under 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1), these individuals possess the right to express views as to the wisdom and propriety of the policies and programs adopted by tribal governmental agencies. It is important to note, therefore, that defendants do not seek to justify the exclusion of Mitchell on the ground that his laughter disrupted the decorum required in a meeting of the Advisory Committee.[1] Thus, this case is unlike United States v. Woodard, 376 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1967) and State v. Smith, 46 N.J. 510, 218 A.2d 147, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 838, 87 S.Ct. 85, 17 L.Ed.2d 71 (1966), where criminal penalties were held to have been properly imposed on persons disrupting legislative meetings because of the disturbance created. Rather, defendants appear to justify Mitchell's exclusion upon their interpretation of his laughter, i. e., because it was an expression of ridicule and scorn for members of the Advisory Committee. No one would deny that a laugh similar to one described by defendants is reprehensible, and that the laughing party is to be properly disapproved.
Assuming arguendo that defendants' version of the case is correct, this Court holds that Mitchell's exclusion from the Navajo Reservation was unlawful under 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) as lacking in due process and under 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1) as abridging freedom of speech.
This Court does not accept defendants' version of the case; nor does the Court accept plaintiffs' view of the dispute. The facts demonstrate a disagreement between the tribal government and the administration of DNA as to the proper objectives of a legal services organization operating on the Navajo Reservation. The tribal officials thought the program should be directed toward protecting Navajo Indians from forces beyond the Reservation (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 30 and 41); DNA thought the program should include the representation of indigent Navajo Indians before agencies of the tribal government itself. This disagreement, and the desire of the Tribe to both limit the independence of DNA and restrict its sphere of activities through negotiation of the new ONEO-DNA contract, does not constitute an unlawful effort to destroy DNA or to deny indigent Navajo Indians their right to effective legal assistance. The tribal government, through ONEO, is entitled to negotiate for provisions in the ONEO-DNA contract that may curtail DNA's activities or subject that organization to closer supervision by ONEO. Similarly, the demands by the Advisory Committee that Mitchell be removed as Director of DNA do not constitute unlawful activities. Just as members of the Advisory Committee are subject to criticism for the manner in which they perform *33 their functions, the Director of DNA may be subject to charges of incompetence and unsuitability for the position that he occupies.
On June 28, 1968, the Advisory Committee demanded the removal of Mitchell as Director of DNA, and this demand was based upon the opinion of the Advisory Committee that Mitchell had improperly involved himself in the so-called Chinle School dispute. On July 20, 1968, the Board of Directors of DNA refused to accede to the demand of the Advisory Committee, finding no cause to remove Mitchell. Not being able to secure its desired aims through the presentation of a demand upon the Board of Directors of DNA, the Advisory Committee then sought to achieve its goal through the order of exclusion. That Mitchell's exclusion was but an extension of the Advisory Committee's desire that he be removed as Director of DNA seems incontrovertible. Chairman Nakai believed from the beginning that the resolution of June 28 demanding Mitchell's removal as Director of DNA contemplated his eventual removal from the Reservation. Indeed, Nakai informed Mitchell that further action would be taken by the Advisory Committee should he refuse to accede to the Committee's demand. The Advisory Committee's meeting of August 2, only five days prior to the order of exclusion, discussed exclusion as the only remaining means by which Mitchell could be removed as Director of DNA. The Advisory Committee meeting of August 6th reveals that the laughing incident and the subsequent assault was viewed by the members of the Committee as merely one event in a long standing dispute with Mitchell. Finally, the resolution calling for the removal of Mitchell from the Reservation refers to his refusal to resign as Director of DNA, terming this refusal an act of defiance of the Advisory Committee. In short, Mitchell was excluded from the Reservation because of the Advisory Committee's continuing disapproval of his involvement in the Chinle School dispute. This action by the Advisory Committee constitutes an abridgment of free speech on the Navajo Reservation, both the freedom of speech of the lawyer who is representing his clients in a manner deemed acceptable to his employer, and the freedom of speech of the clients who seek out that lawyer to act as their spokesman in the community.
Under 25 U.S.C. § 1302(9), Indian tribes exercising powers of self-government are prohibited from passing "any bill of attainder or ex post facto law."
"A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial." Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 323, 18 L.Ed. 356 (1867). See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 85 S.Ct. 1707, 14 L.Ed.2d 484 (1965).
"[L]egislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial are bills of attainder * * *." United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315-316, 66 S. Ct. 1073, 1079, 90 L.Ed. 1252, (1946).
The Advisory Committee is an executive committee of the Navajo Tribal Council and, as such, possesses legislative authority on the Navajo Reservation. However, with respect to enforcement of the power of exclusion, the Navajo Tribal Code vests the Advisory Committee with judicial powers. Navajo Tribal Code, Title 17, Sections 1781-86. Thus, the form of government utilized on the Navajo Reservation does not lend itself to the nice categorizations that may be made where the branches of government are more distinct.[2] Two questions arise: was the August 8th exclusion order a "legislative act" of the Navajo *34 Tribe, and if so, did it impose "punishment" upon Mitchell without a judicial trial?
The reasons for exclusion set forth in the August 7th order, which became the basis for the August 8th order, do not come within any of the grounds for exclusion set forth in the Navajo Tribal Code, Title 17, Section 1782. At no time prior to Mitchell's exclusion did the Advisory Committee act in a rule-making capacity by amending the Code's enumeration of the grounds for exclusion. No rule of general application subjects other non-Navajos to possible exclusion for engaging in the conduct allegedly committed by Mitchell. Therefore, it is impossible to conclude that the Advisory Committee in ordering Mitchell's exclusion, was acting in a judicial capacity, a role characterized by the interpretation and individual application of existing rules of general application. Rather, the Advisory Committee acted in a legislative capacity, and the order of August 8th constituted a "legislative act" of the Navajo Tribe.
The factors to be considered in determining whether a legislative act imposes "punishment" on a person are set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963). Upon consideration of those factors, the Court concludes that the exclusion of Mitchell from the Navajo Reservation constitutes "punishment" as that term has been interpreted by the Courts.
The Court concludes that the August 8th order of exclusion constitutes an unlawful bill of attainder. In reaching this conclusion the Court has considered and rejected the view that this order may be justified as an exercise of the power to punish persons in contempt of the legislative or judicial process. The facts in this case simply do not support the acceptance of that view.

IV.
The orders of exclusion of August 7th and August 8th were unlawful under the Civil Rights Act of 1968, and the action undertaken by defendants Nakai and Adams, pursuant to those orders, were without lawful authority.
The foregoing statement shall constitute findings of fact and conclusions of law herein.
It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the defendants Nakai and Adams, their officers, agents, servants, employees and attorneys, and those persons in active concert or participation with them, are permanently enjoined and restrained from threatening, ordering, attempting, or in any manner acting to enforce the orders of removal and exclusion issued by the Advisory Committee of the Navajo Tribal Council, dated August 7, 1968, and August 8, 1968.
It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that plaintiffs take nothing by way of damages.
It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that plaintiffs shall have and recover their costs herein expended.
NOTES
[1]  The permanent exclusion of Mitchell from the Reservation could hardly be considered a reasonable means of restoring order in the Council Chambers in light of many equally effective, less drastic alternatives that could have been employed to do so.
[2]  The Navajo Tribe is not required to establish distinct branches of government. Cf. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84, 23 S.Ct. 28, 47 L.Ed. 79 (1902).