40 B.R. 945 (1984)
In re Thomas D. GUINTHER and Diane D. Guinther, Debtors.
Thomas D. GUINTHER and Diane D. Guinther, Plaintiffs,
v.
CARPET BRAGGERS, INC., Defendant.
Bankruptcy No. 1-80-00609, Adv. No. 1-83-0018.
United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.
August 2, 1984.
*946 Lawrence V. Young, York, Pa., for plaintiffs.
Carpet Braggers, Inc., Gettysburg, Pa., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM GRANTING LIEN AVOIDANCE
ROBERT J. WOODSIDE, Bankruptcy Judge.
The debtors sought relief by filing a petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. On February 21, 1981, the debtors received a discharge of their indebtedness under the provisions of Chapter 7. After their discharge, the debtors filed an "Application to Avoid Judicial Lien" on January 10, 1983. Carpet Braggers, Inc., the defendant, then filed an answer. At a pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to stipulate to the facts and brief the legal issues. The parties agreed as follows: That the lien in question is a judicial lien; that the real estate in question is a lot valued at approximately $7,800 which the debtors claimed as exempt on schedule B-4; and that the debtors were discharged by order of court dated February 11, 1981.
The issue before us is, Whether the discharge afforded the debtors bars them from seeking to avoid the judicial lien in favor of the defendant? The defendant, however, has couched this issue in terms that the debtors may not reopen a case after discharge in order to exercise lien avoidance. We note from the outset that this case or bankruptcy proceeding has not been closed. A discharge is not an adversary proceeding nor a contested matter; in and of itself, it does not terminate a bankruptcy case. Nothing needs to be reopened because no closing of the overall case has yet occurred.
The defendants cite three cases to support its proposition that a discharge bars the debtors from initiating a lien avoidance action: In re Porter, 11 B.R. 578 (Bankr. W.D.Okl.1981); In re Krahn, 10 B.R. 770 (Bankr.E.D.Wis.1980); and, In re Adkins, 7 B.R. 325 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1980). We, however, think that those cases express a distinctly minority view[1] and are grounded on erroneous interpretations of provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. We think that section 522(f) is silent as to any time limitations on the debtors' implementation of its provisions.
The debtors cite two cases in favor of the proposition that no time limitations are imposed by either the Bankruptcy Code or the Bankruptcy Rules on the debtor's time in which to file a lien avoidance action under section 522(f). Those two cases emanate from the Bankruptcy Courts for the Western District of Pennsylvania and Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See In re Russell, 20 B.R. 537 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1982); and, In re Hall, 22 B.R. 701 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1982).
The Russell decision is analogous to the case at bar. Where the discharge was granted but the case had not closed, the court permitted the debtor to bring an application to avoid a judicial lien. Moreover, the Russell court expressly rejected the rationale of Adkins and Porter. In re Russell, 20 B.R. at 538, 539.
Although the Hall decision did not consider the cases of Adkins and Porter, the decision allowed debtors to reopen their closed Bankruptcy case for the purpose of *947 avoiding a judicial lien. In re Hall, 22 B.R. 702. In the past, we have routinely granted the reopening of Bankruptcy cases to afford debtors more complete relief in order to facilitate their fresh start.
We therefore conclude that the debtors' discharge by no means bars their action for lien avoidance under section 522(f). Not only is the action appropriate and timely, but we will grant the lien avoidance of the defendant's judicial lien impairing the debtor's exemptions in their real estate. Since the value of the real estate has been stipulated to be $7,800, the avoidance of this judicial lien will effectively null and void the defendant's judicial lien. Accordingly, we will enter an appropriate order.
NOTES
[1]  See, contra, In re Bledsoe, 28 B.R. 210 (Bankr. S.D.Ohio 1983); In re Peterson, 26 B.R. 942 (Bankr.D.Minn.1983); In re Leeman, 25 B.R. 180 (Bankr.E.D.Wis.1982); In re Keller, 24 B.R. 720 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1982); In re Hall, 22 B.R. 701 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1982); In re Stephenson, 19 B.R. 185 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn.1982), In re Russell, 20 B.R. 537 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1982); In re Barner, 20 B.R. 428 (Bankr.E.D.Wis.1982); In re Tarrant, 19 B.R. 360 (Bankr.D.Alaska, 1982); In re Holyst, 19 B.R. 14 (Bankr.D.Conn.1982); In re Johnson, 18 B.R. 555 (Bankr.D.Md.1982); In re Brown, 18 B.R. 323 (Bankr.E.D.Cal.1982); In re Conley, 17 B.R. 387 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1982); and In re Montney, 17 B.R. 353 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1982); as exhaustively cited in the debtor's brief.


86 S.W.3d 494 (2002)
Margaret HAMPTON, Plaintiff-Garnishor-Respondent,
v.
Charles DAVENPORT, d/b/a The King Royal Brothers Circus, Defendants-Respondents, and
T.H.E. Insurance Company, Defendant-Garnishee-Appellant.
No. 24867.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division Two.
October 16, 2002.
*495 John L. Oliver, Jr., Cape Girardeau, for appellant.
Hal E. Hunter, III, New Madrid, for respondent.
JOHN E. PARRISH, Judge.
T.H.E. Insurance Co., a garnishee defendant, (the garnishee) filed a notice of appeal directed to a Circuit Court order denying its motion to quash a garnishment.[1]*496 The appeal is dismissed.
Rule 84.04 mandates what an appellant's brief shall contain. "Violations of Rule 84.04 are grounds for a court to dismiss an appeal." Shochet v. Allen, 987 S.W.2d 516, 518 (Mo.App.1999). Whether an appeal will be dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 84.04 is discretionary. Keeney v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Com'n, 70 S.W.3d 597, 598 n. 1 (Mo.App. 2002). "That discretion is generally not exercised unless the deficiency impedes disposition on the merits. `A brief impedes disposition on the merits where it is so deficient that it fails to give notice to [the court] and to the other parties as to the issue presented on appeal.'" Id., quoting Wilkerson v. Prelutsky, 943 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Mo. banc 1997).
The garnishee's appellant's brief impedes disposition of the case on its merits. It does not identify any issue that permits meaningful review. It is the appellant's obligation to identify, with particularity, the proposition on which the party relies and to provide accurately referenced authority for the proposition. Likewise, an appellant's obligation includes providing authority in support of alleged trial court errors with accurate citations to that authority. Were the appellate court to undertake these things when an appellant has failed to do them, the appellate court would be assuming the role of advocate. "It is not the function of the appellate court to serve as advocate for any party to an appeal." Thummel v. King, 570 S.W.2d 679, 686 (Mo. banc 1978).
The garnishee's appellant's brief states one point relied on. Although Rule 84.04(d) states explicitly what a point relied on shall include and includes pattern formats that prescribe the form which points are required to substantially follow, the garnishee's brief does not comply with the rule's requirements. Rule 84.04(d)(1) is applicable here. It provides:
(1) Where the appellate court reviews the decision of a trial court, each point shall:
(A) identify the trial court ruling or action that the appellant challenges;
(B) state concisely the legal reasons for the appellant's claim of reversible error; and
(C) explain in summary fashion why, in the context of the case, those legal reasons support the claim of reversible error.
The point shall be in substantially the following form: "The trial court erred in [identify the challenged ruling or action ], because [state the legal reasons for the claim of reversible error], in that [explain why the legal reasons, in the context of the case, support the claim of reversible error]."
The garnishee's point relied on states:
When the trial court, on March 4, 2002, denied [the garnishee's] motion to quash the garnishment on the basis that the trial court was without jurisdiction, the trial court erred because the plaintiff, in plaintifft's [sic] original garnishment proceeding failed to file exceptions or to deny [the garnishee's] answers within ten (10) days as required by Rule 90.13(c). Such failure to file timely exceptions deprived the Circuit Court of New Madrid County of further jurisdiction and constituted a complete abandonment or discontinuance of the garnishment, *497 thus conclusively terminating the matter in favor of [the garnishee].
The point relied on identifies Rule 90.13(c). The sentence that includes that reference does not state a concise legal reason for a claim of reversible error. Rule 90.13 has no subparagraph (c). Rule 90.13 allows general execution against a garnishee defendant following judgment being rendered against that garnishee defendant. This court's review of the facts recited in the garnishee's brief reveals nothing to which Rule 90.13 would apply. Without a concise statement of a legal reason for a claim of reversible error, there can be no explanation, in the context of the case, supportive of a claimed error. Kline v. Casey's General Stores, Inc., 998 S.W.2d 140, 142 (Mo.App.1999).
The garnishee's inattention was not limited to requirements of Rule 84.04(d). Its argument includes at least two incorrect page citations for cases on which it sought to rely. The garnishee referred this court to a quotation from State ex rel. Bagnell Investment Co., Inc. v. Luten, 647 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. banc 1983), supposedly at "Page 547, Paragraph 3." The opinion ends on page 542. Similarly, the garnishee provided the citation to Whiteley v. Whiteley as "325 S.W.2d 501 (Mo.App.1959)." Whiteley begins on page 502.
An appellant is expected to reasonably comply with rules for appellate practice. Sutton v. Goldenberg, 862 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Mo.App.1993); Thompson v. Thompson, 786 S.W.2d 891, 892 (Mo.App.1990). Judicial impartiality, judicial economy, and fairness to all parties require reasonable compliance. Schneller v. GEICO, 873 S.W.2d 679, 680 (Mo.App. 1994). "[I]t is not the duty of an appellate court to become an advocate for the appellant and search the record for error; the judgment rendered is presumptively correct and the appellant has the burden to demonstrate that it is erroneous." Thompson, supra. The appeal is dismissed.
PREWITT, P.J., and RAHMEYER, C.J., concur.
NOTES
[1]  The judgment that is the basis for the garnishment action that is the subject of this appeal was against "Charles Davenport, d/b/a The King Royal Brothers Circus, Defendant." The notice of appeal erroneously designates "defendants" as "The King Royal Brothers Circus and Charles Davenport."


269 F.2d 317
Ruth HOLLEY, Administratrix of the Estate of Edward J. Holley, deceased, Appellant,v.THE Steamship MANFRED STANSFIELD, her engines, boilers, etc., in rem and Reederei Blumenfeld, G.M.B.H., in personam, Appellees.
No. 7822.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
Argued April 10, 1959.
Decided July 9, 1959.

Howard I. Legum, Norfolk, Va. (Fine, Fine, Legum, Weinberg & Schwan, Norfolk, Va., on brief), for appellant.
Walter B. Martin, Jr., Norfolk, Va. (Vandeventer, Black & Meredith, Norfolk, Va., on brief), for appellees.
Before SOBELOFF, Chief Judge, SOPER, Circuit Judge, and THOMPSON, District Judge.
SOBELOFF, Chief Judge.

1
While helping to unload the German SS Manfred Stansfield in South Norfolk, Virginia, Edward J. Holley, a longshoreman, was killed. His widow, as administratrix of his estate, filed a libel against the vessel and its owner charging that Holley's death resulted from the unseaworthiness of the ship and the failure to furnish the decedent a safe place to work. The District Court dismissed the libel on the ground that Holley had been guilty of contributory negligence which was held to be an absolute bar to recovery under the Virginia Code provision governing Death by Wrongful Act.1 This appeal challenges both the court's finding of fact and its conclusion of law.

2
The ship docked at South Norfolk on September 13, 1956, to discharge potash which it had brought from Hamburg, Germany. At an earlier stop in Baltimore, a substantial portion of the cargo of potash had been removed from the square of number 2 hatch. When the ship arrived in South Norfolk it was noted that the cargo had not been trimmed or leveled in Baltimore. While the square of the hatch was relatively clear, the remaining potash, both fore and aft and in the wings, had been left piled 12 to 20 feet high.

3
By reason of its hydroscopic nature, the potash had solidified during the voyage, and in places was extremely hard, like concrete. Recognizing the difficulties and dangers involved in discharging this type of cargo, the stevedore's superintendent requested permission to use small charges of dynamite to loosen the potash — a method sometimes resorted to in such circumstances. When this request was refused by the ship's officers, it was decided to employ air hammers, picks and shovels for the loosening operation.

4
As the potash had earlier been substantially removed from the square of the hatch, "payloaders" were lowered into the ship and Holley was assigned to operate one of them. A "payloader" is a small bulldozer with a scoop on the front which is used to bring loose cargo to the square of the hatch so that it may be loaded into the clam shell or grab of the crane. In addition to collecting loose cargo, "payloader" operators often use their scoops to assist in breaking the mass at the floor level. Holley used his scoop in this manner. While there was evidence that this is a usual method — some said the only possible method — there was other testimony, offered by the ship, to show that the practice followed by Holley is frowned upon by experienced stevedores because cutting away at the base of a bulk cargo creates the danger of an "overhang." There was no evidence that when he was assigned to the hold the deceased was given any specific instructions, and the testimony as to instructions on other occasions is not clear. However, it was plainly established that he was an experienced "payloader" operator.

5
Holley met his death when an overhanging block of potash, described as about the size of the court-room desk, fell on him and overturned the machine. The accident happened at a point where the potash was from 12 to 15 feet high. He was not at the moment actually digging or hitting the potash with his machine, and no other men were then working in the area, either on the top side of the cargo or at the floor level, picking at the potash or applying air hammers to loosen it.

6
Without ruling on the question of unseaworthiness or the failure to provide a safe place to work, the District Court held that the decedent's "failure to take reasonable precautions for his own safety undeniably contributed to the accident." For this reason the court dismissed the libel, 165 F.Supp. 660, 664.

7
It plainly appears that there was a cave in the potash at the point where the decedent was working when he was fatally injured. There is no description of the cave as to size, and it was not established clearly when and by whom the cave and the overhang were made. There was evidence that the cave might have been created the day before, either by Holley or by someone else. There was, on the other hand, some evidence that he was digging in the cave shortly before the accident. The testimony is not altogether satisfactory for, as the District Judge commented, it is difficult to assess how much of the witnesses' recitals on the stand was based on actual observation and how much on inferences which they drew from having seen the decedent working in or near the cave before the accident. However, the problem while not free from difficulty, is not unusual and latitude must be allowed the trier of fact who heard and observed the witnesses. We are not prepared to say that it was clearly erroneous to find that the decedent's conduct constituted "a proximate cause of the accident," contributing in some degree, in conjunction with the condition of the cargo, to its collapse and the accident which followed. McAllister v. United States, 1954, 348 U.S. 19, 75 S.Ct. 6, 99 L.Ed. 20; United States v. Ladd, 4 Cir., 1952, 193 F.2d 929.

8
We turn to the question of the legal effect of the finding of contributory negligence — whether it constitutes an absolute bar as at common law, or brings into operation the maritime rule of comparative negligence.

9
Since admiralty provides no remedy for the death of a longshoreman resulting from an act committed on inland navigable waters, the admiralty court must look to the state law to see if it provides relief. The Harrisburg, 1886, 119 U.S. 199, 7 S.Ct. 140, 30 L.Ed. 358; Death on the High Seas Act, Title 46 U.S.C.A. § 761; Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688; The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 1959, 358 U.S. 588, 79 S.Ct. 503, 3 L.Ed.2d 524. The District Court ruled in this case that since under the general law of Virginia contributory negligence has been held an absolute bar to recovery, the same rule is applicable here. In this ruling, the court followed decisions of the Third Circuit applying the Pennsylvania Wrongful Death Statute, 12 Pennsylvania Statute Annotated § 1601, in Curtis v. A. Garcia Y. Cia, 3 Cir., 1957, 241 F.2d 30; Hill v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 3 Cir., 1958, 251 F.2d 655 and Klingseisen v. Costanzo Transp. Co., 3 Cir., 1939, 101 F.2d 902. These cases dealt with a statute somewhat different from Virginia's and, even more significantly, they were decided before Skovgaard and did not examine the question in light of the considerations there pointed out.

10
While it cannot be disputed that the Virginia Courts have declared contributory negligence a bar in suits brought under the state's wrongful death statute, all such cases arose in situations where the Virginia common law would have applied had death not resulted. We have been unable to find any case in which the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, or even a lower court of that state, has held contributory negligence a complete bar to recovery in a wrongful death action where, as here, the maritime doctrine of comparative negligence would have controlled if death had not ensued. Paraphrasing the Supreme Court's language in Skovgaard, there is no way of knowing whether Virginia would impose uniform legal standards throughout its jurisdiction, or would apply in this case rules different from those that would govern, if, instead of meeting his death aboard the ship, Holley had been killed on the adjacent dock. The District Judge did not have the benefit of the Skovgaard decision, which came some months later.

11
Even though there are no state decisions directly concerned with this point, we are not without guides in approaching the problem. It is noteworthy that the Virginia statute specifically covers, among other things, "wrongful acts or defaults of any ship or vessel" and speaks of the right "to proceed in rem against the ship or vessel" — a procedure available only in admiralty. It is too obvious to escape attention that the statute was drafted by one well versed in admiralty law. We find ourselves unable to reconcile the result contended for by the appellees with the language of the statute. Basically, it provides that if death is caused by an act which would have entitled the injured party to maintain an action, then the person who would have been liable for the injury will continue to be liable notwithstanding the death of the person injured. Undeniably, had Holley survived, the admiralty rule would have governed under which contributory negligence merely reduces the damages.

12
Since the accident proved fatal, however, it is argued that the harsh common law rule must control to bar recovery. The Second Circuit rejected this argument in Halecki v. United New York & New Jersey S. H. P. Ass'n, 2 Cir., 1958, 251 F.2d 708 under the New Jersey Wrongful Death Statute, decided about the same time that the Third Circuit decided Skovgaard.

13
Speaking for the court in Halecki, Judge Hand said:

14
"* * * Although, as we have said, we are not dealing with `federal maritime law,' we should remember that so far as we can we ought to construe the statute so as to avoid capricious and irrational distinctions. We leave open whether New Jersey is without power to take as much or as little of the rights `rooted in federal maritime law' as it chooses as the model for the right it confers upon the next of kin; but the courts of that state have never passed upon the question, and to deny the exemption [from contributory negligence] to the next of kin seems to us to the last degree capricious and irrational * * *. We are aware that Curtis v. A. Garcia, 241 F.2d 30, 36* is to the contrary, but as neither it nor O'Leary v. United States Lines Co., supra [1 Cir., 215 F.2d 708], is authoritative, we are free to choose. Obviously, the answer is not certain; we must do as best we can with what we have, and we hold that the New Jersey statute should be construed as taking over as a part of the model it accepted the exemption of contributory negligence as a bar." (251 F.2d at page 713).

15
This part of the case was affirmed by the Supreme Court on the same day as Skovgaard, in United New York & New Jersey Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n, 1959, v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613, 79 S.Ct. 517, 3 L.Ed.2d 541 although the judgment was vacated and the case remanded on other grounds.2

16
A like interpretation of the Virginia statute seems to us natural and correct. The State is one with considerable marine business. A declared purpose of the enactment was, we repeat, to preserve rights which the decedent would have had if his injuries had not proved fatal. What the Second and Third Circuits found implicit in the New Jersey Wrongful Death Statute, i. e., the rule of comparative negligence where the injury resulting in death occurs on navigable waters of the state, is even more unmistakably indicated in the language of the Virginia statute.3

17
If presented with this problem we think that the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia would hold that this statute was intended not only to take away from the wrongdoer the common law immunity resulting from the death of an injured party, but to grant recovery in all instances where a decedent would have recovered. The statute appears not to concern itself with which law, local or maritime, would have supported the recovery, but only whether there would have been a recovery.

18
It follows therefore that the judgment of the District Court must be reversed and the case remanded for the application of the rule of comparative negligence. In measuring the extent to which the decedent's negligence contributed to his death, regard should be had for the admonition of Mr. Justice Holmes in Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester, &c. Ry., 1907, 205 U.S. 1, 12-13, 27 S.Ct. 407, 409, 51 L.Ed. 681.

19
"* * * unless great care be taken, the servant's rights will be sacrificed by simply charging him with assumption of the risk under another name. * * *"

20
Bearing this in mind, the contributory negligence of the decedent is a defense pro tanto; but assumption of risk is not to be charged against him.

21
On remand it will become necessary for the court to make findings on unseaworthiness and failure to provide a safe place to work. While the District Court based its disposition of the case solely on the decedent's contributory negligence and found it unnecessary to decide other questions, unseaworthiness was discussed. We neither approve nor disapprove at this time any intimations in the District Court's opinion as to the law or the facts pertaining to this phase of the case, and the District Court is at liberty in its discretion to permit further testimony to be offered by either side.

22
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views expressed in this opinion.

Notes:

1
 Code of Virginia. "Article 3. Death by Wrongful Act. § 8-633. Action for death by wrongful act. — Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of any person or corporation, or of any ship or vessel, and the act, neglect, or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action, or to proceed in rem against such ship or vessel or in personam against the owners thereof or those having control of her, and to recover damages in respect thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who, or corporation or ship or vessel which, would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, or, if a ship or vessel, to a libel in rem, and her owners or those responsible for her acts or defaults or negligence to a libel in personam, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances, as amount in law to a felony. * * *"

*
 This is one of the Third Circuit cases relied on by the appellees here, see Supra

2
 Dealing with the same New Jersey statute, the majority of the Third Circuit in Skovgaard v. The M/V Tungus, 3 Cir., 1957, 252 F.2d 14 held that the warranty of seaworthiness, also a principle rooted in the admiralty law, was included within the meaning of "wrongful act, neglect or default." This conclusion was affirmed by the Supreme Court in The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 1959, 358 U.S. 588, 79 S.Ct. 503, 3 L.Ed.2d 524

3
 We set forth here the relevant portion of the New Jersey statute, for comparison with the Virginia statute, for which see Footnote 1. New Jersey Statute Annotated 2A:31-1
"When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default, such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the person injured to maintain an action for damages resulting from the injury, the person who would have been liable in damages for the injury if death had not ensued shall be liable in an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured and although the death was caused under circumstances amounting in law to a crime."


21 So.3d 813 (2009)
SPIVEY
v.
STATE.
No. SC09-1322.
Supreme Court of Florida.
October 15, 2009.
Decision Without Published Opinion Review denied.


808 F.2d 1119
55 USLW 2494, 6 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1202
Chester R. ROBINSON and wife, Frances Earline Robinson,Plaintiffs-Appellants,andRoy K. Ewart and David B. Black, Appellants,v.The NATIONAL CASH REGISTER COMPANY, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 85-2019.
United States Court of Appeals,Fifth Circuit.
Feb. 4, 1987.Rehearing Denied March 5, 1987.

David B. Black, Roy K. Ewart, Black & Ewart, Houston, Tex., for Black and Ewart.
Chester R. Robinson, pro se.
Sarah B. Duncan, Fulbright & Jaworski, Brian S. Greig, Austin, Tex., for Nat. Cash Register Co.
William Drew Perkins, Lufkin, Tex., for Henderson Development Corp.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.
Before GEE and HILL, Circuit Judges, and HUNTER,* District Judge.
ROBERT MADDEN HILL, Circuit Judge:

1
In this case plaintiffs Chester and Frances Robinson (the Robinsons) appeal from a judgment of the district court that barred their suit on res judicata grounds.  The Robinsons and their attorneys, David Black and Roy Ewart, also appeal the sanctions imposed upon them by the district court pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11.  We affirm in part and reverse in part.

I.

2
On August 31, 1981, the Robinsons filed a diversity action against National Cash Register (NCR) in the federal district court for the Eastern District of Texas, seeking $4 million for damages allegedly incurred as a result of NCR's contamination of the air breathed by the Robinsons in the office space subleased to them by NCR.  NCR leased the Robinsons' space from Henderson Development Corporation (HDC).  The Robinsons alleged that NCR's conduct was negligent, constituted a nuisance, and also breached the implied warranties of habitability in the sublease.  On May 10, 1983, a jury verdict was returned in favor of NCR and judgment accordingly entered on the verdict for NCR, from which there was no appeal.

3
On February 8, 1984, Bookkeepers Tax Services, Inc.  (BTS) and the Robinsons filed an action against NCR and HDC in state court in Angelina County, Texas.  Chester Robinson is the majority stockholder and president of BTS, while Frances Robinson is secretary-treasurer of the company and serves on its board of directors.  BTS and the Robinsons sought $4 million in damages from NCR and HDC alleging that the defendants had breached the express warranties in the original lease between HDC and NCR and in the sublease between NCR and the Robinsons.  BTS and the Robinsons also alleged that HDC and NCR violated the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.

4
NCR removed the second action to the federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction and then filed a motion to dismiss the action on res judicata grounds as to NCR and to dismiss HDC on the grounds that no claim against them was possible.  The Robinsons and BTS filed a motion to remand the case to state court alleging that there was a lack of diversity because the Robinsons were Texas citizens and HDC was a Texas corporation.  The district judge, who also presided over the Robinsons' 1981 suit against NCR, denied the plaintiffs' motion to remand, dismissed NCR on res judicata grounds, and dismissed HDC because it was not a real party to the suit.  The court also imposed sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 in the amount of $4,246.25 jointly and severally against the Robinsons, BTS and their attorneys, David Black and Roy Ewart.  In this appeal, BTS, the Robinsons, David Black and Roy Ewart contend that the district court erred in (1) refusing to remand the case to state court, (2) dismissing the case on res judicata grounds, and (3) imposing sanctions against them under rule 11.1

5
Before we examine the merits of this appeal, an additional issue must be addressed.  On May 8, 1985, we stayed further proceedings in the appeal pending consummation of settlement negotiations which had been ongoing since January 1985.  Following a purported settlement, NCR filed a motion to dismiss the appeal.  The Robinsons opposed dismissal and claimed that an alleged mutual release growing out of the settlement negotiations was invalid.  We subsequently directed the parties to file briefs setting forth their positions on the validity of the mutual release.2   We now turn to that issue.

II.

6
The parties agree that Texas law determines whether the mutual release is valid.  Under Texas law a contract may arise before execution of a writing even where the parties contemplate that a formal writing will be done later.   Garner v. Boyd, 330 F.Supp. 22, 25 (N.D.Tex.1970), aff'd, 447 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir.1971) (per curiam).  In order for the later writing to be considered merely a "convenient memorial" of previously agreed upon terms, the parties must agree upon all material considerations and must intend to be bound.   Garner, 330 F.Supp. at 26.  The intent of the parties to make a binding agreement is the ultimate issue.   Hemenway Co., Inc. v. Sequoia Pac.  Realco, 590 S.W.2d 545 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

7
NCR asserts that a binding settlement agreement was reached on May 2, 1985, when Brian Greig, NCR's counsel, contacted Ewart and indicated acceptance of the Robinsons' settlement offer of March 13, 1985, with some minor changes.  Subsequently, a proposed mutual release was drafted by Greig and sent to Black on June 19.  NCR also points to Ewart's letter of May 2 to Greig and Ewart's letter of July 1, 1985, to the clerk of the court as evidence that both parties had agreed upon all the material terms and that the later writing was a mere formality.  BTS and the Robinsons, however, argue that the settlement negotiations never reached a final settlement.  They point to:  (1) a letter sent by Greig to Black on August 28, 1985, that stated that the proposed settlement documents were unsatisfactory;  (2) the fact that the Robinsons instructed Black and Ewart not to send a proposed second Mutual Release to NCR in October 1985;  and (3) a letter that Ewart sent to the clerk of the court on January 6, 1986, informing the clerk that the parties were deadlocked in settlement negotiations as evidence that no "meeting of the minds" had taken place.

8
In their supplemental brief, Black and Ewart admit that in January 1986 Black told Greig that the Robinsons' prior settlement offer was still open for acceptance.  However, after communicating with the Robinsons and BTS, Black allegedly mailed a letter to Greig on or about January 22, 1986,3 withdrawing the mutual release.  On or about January 25, 1986, Greig informed Ewart that the mutual release had already been forwarded to NCR.  Black and Ewart contend that the notice of withdrawal of the settlement offer precluded NCR from accepting the Robinsons' offer to settle as set forth in the mutual release.

9
The evidence that appellee NCR points to as indicating an intention to be bound is ambiguous.  For example, the May 2 letter from Greig to Black, which in NCR's view represents a settlement agreement between the parties, contains some changes in the terms of the settlement that could be characterized as further negotiations.  In his July 1 letter to the clerk of the court, Ewart wrote that the settlement "is almost completed" (emphasis added).  The other letters that the parties provide in their supplemental briefs are subject to the same varying interpretations.  We have carefully examined the evidence that the parties have provided us and we conclude that the parties had never agreed on the terms of the mutual release.  Since there was no "meeting of the minds," the mutual release was invalid.4   Consequently, we proceed to the merits of the controversy.

III.

10
The Robinsons first assert that the district court erred in refusing to remand the case to the state court because there was a lack of diversity between the parties.  The Robinsons are residents of Texas;  NCR is a Maryland corporation with its principal place of business in Ohio;  and at the time relevant to this appeal HDC was a Texas corporation.  Generally, there must be complete diversity between the parties for a federal district court to have jurisdiction.  28 U.S.C. Sec. 1332(a)(1).  Thus, the fact that HDC is a Texas corporation and the Robinsons are citizens of Texas would normally prevent NCR from removing the case to a federal court from a Texas state court.  Where, however, the removing party can prove that there is "absolutely no possibility" that the non-diverse defendant will be liable to plaintiff in state court, Green v. Amerada Hess Corp., 707 F.2d 201, 205 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1039, 104 S.Ct. 701, 79 L.Ed.2d 166 (1984), or when there is "no arguably reasonable basis" that state law might impose liability on the non-diverse defendant, Tedder v. FMC Corp., 590 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir.1979), removal is allowed without complete diversity.  The district court, relying on Tedder, held that HDC was not a real party in interest because BTS and the Robinsons could not recover against HDC for breach of the lease and thus removal was proper.  We agree.

11
The Robinsons allege in their complaint that the warranties made by HDC to NCR in the original lease between those two parties also applied to them through their sublease with NCR.  As the district court correctly noted, however, there is no privity of contract between a sublessee and original lessor under Texas law.   Zeidman v. Davis, 342 S.W.2d 555, 558 (Tex.1961).  Furthermore, a provision in the sublease between NCR and the Robinsons released HDC from any liability to the Robinsons.5   All of the sublease sections that the Robinsons assert show a breach of duty on the part of HDC are unconvincing.  The Robinsons first point to section 9 of the sublease, in which, they argue, HDC covenanted to maintain the premises in good repair.  Section 9, however, concerns not HDC's but NCR's obligations:

12
Subject to the obligations of Lessor under Section five (5) of the original lease,6 Sublessor, unless herein specified to the contrary, shall maintain the premises in good repair and tenantable condition during the continuance of this Sublease, except in case of damage arising from acts or negligence of Sublessee or the agents of Sublessee.

13
(emphasis added).  Contrary to the assertions of the Robinsons, section 9 simply does not obligate HDC to maintain or repair the interior of the subleased space.

14
The Robinsons next argue that HDC's right of entry for inspection, repairs, and alterations established a duty on the part of HDC towards the Robinsons.  Section 12 of the sublease, however, merely gives HDC the right of reentry;  it does not bind HDC to inspect, repair, or alter the subleased premises.7   Similarly, section 22 of the sublease merely provides that, in the event of a default by sublessee and reentry by sublessor or lessor, the reentering lessor or sublessee has the right to remove the sublessee's personal property.8

15
In short, no contractual duty running from HDC to the Robinsons existed.  HDC's disclaimer of all responsibility for maintaining and repairing the interior of the subleased space in the original lease was not abrogated but affirmed by the sublease.9   Since the Robinsons could not recover from HDC under Texas law, the district court properly ruled that the joinder of HDC did not prevent NCR from removing the suit to federal court.   Tedder 590 F.2d at 116-17.

IV.

16
After the district court dismissed HDC because the Robinsons had no cause of action against it, the court held that the claim by the Robinsons in the 1984 suit was identical to the claim made in their 1981 suit against NCR, and dismissed the suit on res judicata grounds.  The Robinsons assert that the district court improperly applied res judicata.  We disagree.

17
Federal law determines the res judicata effect of a prior federal court judgment.   Sidag Aktiengesellschaft v. Smoked Foods Products Co., Inc., 776 F.2d 1270, 1273 (5th Cir.1985).  In Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, Mississippi, 701 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1983) (en banc), we established a standard for determining the applicability of res judicata:

18
For a prior judgment to bar an action on the basis of res judicata, the parties must be identical in both suits, the prior judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, there must have been a final judgment on the merits and the same cause of action must be involved in both cases.

19
Id. at 559 (quoting Kemp v. Birmingham New Company, 608 F.2d 1049, 1052 (5th Cir.1979)).

20
The Robinsons' main contention is that the parties are not the same in both suits since BTS is a plaintiff in the 1984 suit and was not a party to the 1981 suit.  The district court, however, held that BTS is the "alter ego" of the Robinsons.  In reaching its decision, the court found that Chester Robinson is the majority stockholder, controlling shareholder, and president of BTS.  In addition, the court noted that Frances Robinson was an original incorporator of BTS and served on its board of directors and as its secretary-treasurer.

21
A person may be bound by a judgment even though not a party if one of the parties to the suit is so closely aligned with his interests as to be his "virtual representative."   See Aerojet-General Corporation v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 719 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Metropolitan Dade County, Florida v. Aerojet-General Corporation, 423 U.S. 908, 96 S.Ct. 210, 46 L.Ed.2d 137 (1975).  The question whether a party's interests are virtually representative of the interests of a nonparty is one of fact for the court.  Id.  Given the relationship of the Robinsons to BTS, the district court's finding that the Robinsons were the "virtual representatives" of BTS in the prior suit is not clearly erroneous.   See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518, 528 (1985);  Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a).

22
The district court also found that the causes of action asserted in the two suits were similar substantively.  We apply the transactional test to determine whether two suits involve the same claim such that res judicata applies to bar the second suit. Southmark Properties v. Charles House Corp., 742 F.2d 862, 870-71 (5th Cir.1984);  Nilsen, 701 F.2d at 559-60 n. 4.10   Substance, not technicalities, governs the application of this test.   Astron Industrial Associates, Inc. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 405 F.2d 958 (5th Cir.1968);  Ray v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 677 F.2d 818 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147, 103 S.Ct. 788, 74 L.Ed.2d 994 (1982).

23
Under this test res judicata was properly invoked.  The Robinsons' 1984 suit is basically the same as the 1981 suit that they tried and lost;  in both suits the Robinsons sought to recover for claimed personal injuries, loss of business, and loss of profits arising out of the contamination of the subleased air space by NCR.  The same nucleus of facts is involved, and the relief requested in the two suits is identical.  Under the transactional approach to res judicata, moreover, the fact that some claims or theories were not adjudicated in the first suit does not preclude a res judicata effect.  The fact that these claims or theories could have been brought in the 1981 suit is controlling.   See Nilsen, 701 F.2d at 560.  Therefore, the district court properly held that res judicata barred the Robinsons' 1984 suit.

V.

24
Finally, the Robinsons, Black, and Ewart assert that the district court erred in awarding attorney's fees to NCR in the amount of $4,246.25 against them as sanctions pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11.  Black signed all the pleadings and papers filed with the court.  Although Ewart did not sign any papers filed with the court, he apparently was present at a pretrial conference.11   Ewart was also involved in the settlement negotiations.  The district court held that the Robinsons, Black and Ewart were jointly and severally liable for the sanctions.

25
In addition to arguing that the district court erred in awarding sanctions, Ewart argues separately that rule 11 sanctions cannot be imposed on him because of his trivial role in the Robinsons' suit.  We agree with Ewart that the sanctions imposed on him raise some unanswered questions about the scope of persons subject to sanctions under rule 11.  Consequently, we find it necessary to examine the text, history, and cases under the rule in order to determine whether or not the district court erred in imposing sanctions against the Robinsons, Black and Ewart.

A.
Rule 11 provides, in part, that:

26
Every pleading, motion, or other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated....  The signature of an attorney ... constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper, that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation....

27
Fed.R.Civ.P. 11.  In reviewing an order imposing sanctions, we must examine the aspect of the order that is being reviewed.  Findings of fact used by the district court to determine that rule 11 has been violated are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.  See Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a);  City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. at 573, 105 S.Ct. at 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d at 528 (1985).  The legal conclusion of the district court that a particular set of facts constitutes a violation of rule 11 is reviewed de novo.12   Accord Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir.1986).  The amount and type of the sanction imposed is examined under the abuse of discretion standard.   Davis v. Veslan Enterprises, 765 F.2d 494, 500 (5th Cir.1985).13

28
The language of the current rule, which was amended in 1983, is sharply different than its predecessor.14   Prior to the 1983 amendment, the only proper inquiry was the subjective belief of the attorney at the time the pleading was signed.  Sanctions could only be imposed where there was a showing of bad faith.   E.g., Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 348 (2d Cir.1980).  In essence, an honest but incompetent attorney would be immune from rule 11 sanctions.  The problems with a subjective test were clear.  As one court noted, "there is no position--no matter how absurd--of which an advocate cannot convince himself." Wells v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 101 F.R.D. 358, 359 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y.1984), vacated on other grounds, 106 F.R.D. 258 (S.D.N.Y.1985).

29
The revised rule 11 changes the standard used to test a pleading for frivolousness.  The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 11, 97 F.R.D. 165 (1983), makes clear that the purpose of the revised version of rule 11 is to expand the reach of the former rule and to place a more stringent duty on attorneys.  The Note points out that the revised language of rule 11 is "intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions ... by emphasizing the responsibilities of the attorney."    97 F.R.D. at 198.  (emphasis added).  The comment also notes that while the standard of whether an attorney has made a sufficient inquiry into the facts and law "is one of reasonableness under the circumstances," the revised rule 11 standard "is more stringent than the original good-faith formula and thus ... a greater range of circumstances will trigger its violation."    Id. at 198-99.  Thus, we have held, consistent with the view of most other circuits, that the revised rule 11 imposes an objective, rather than subjective, standard of reasonableness.   Veslan Enterprises, 765 F.2d at 494.   See also Stevens, 789 F.2d at 1060;  Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 829;  Eastway, 762 F.2d at 253-54.   But see Nelson v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 750 F.2d 1234, 1238 (4th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1116, 105 S.Ct. 2358, 86 L.Ed.2d 259 (1985);  Suslick, 741 F.2d at 1001 (continuing to analyze rule 11 violations under a bad faith standard).15   An attorney's good faith is no longer enough to protect him from rule 11 sanctions.

30
Rule 11 applies to the filing of a "pleading, motion, and other paper" in a civil action.  The affirmative duty on an attorney to conduct a "reasonable inquiry" into both the factual and legal basis of any document16 before signing it does not mean that an attorney must be correct in his view of the law.  As the Ninth Circuit recently noted, a reasonable inquiry is "that amount of examination into the facts and legal research which is reasonable under the circumstances of the case.  Of course, the conclusion drawn from the research undertaken must itself be defensible.  Extended research alone will not save a claim that is without legal or factual merit from the penalty of sanctions."   Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 830.  An attorney's signature represents that this inquiry has been performed.  Furthermore, attorneys must realize that the inquiry required by rule 11 is not a one time only obligation.  Counsel have a continuing obligation to review and reevaluate their position as the case develops.   Southern Leasing Partners v. McMullan, 801 F.2d 783, 788 (5th Cir.1986);  Woodfork v. Gavin, 105 F.R.D. 100, 104 (N.D.Miss.1985).  Thus, a document that initially satisfies the requirements of rule 11 may later turn out to be the basis for rule 11 sanctions as new facts are discovered which show that there is no longer a good faith basis for the document.  Upon discovering that a good faith basis no longer exists, it is incumbent upon the appropriate counsel and party to take necessary actions to ensure that the proceedings do not continue without a reasonable basis in law and fact.17

31
If a party is represented, the required signature must be that of an attorney, not a firm, who is one of the attorneys of record for the party.  Furthermore, a party appearing pro se must sign the documents he files;  the rule gives the same effect to his signature as to that of an attorney.  The purpose of the signature is to allow a court to easily identify the person or people upon whom it can place responsibility for a particular document.

32
The Advisory Committee Note makes it clear that rule 11 sanctions can also be imposed on the client that the attorney who signed the document represents.  It is unclear, however, whether rule 11 sanctions can only be imposed on the attorney who actually signs a document, or whether sanctions can also be imposed on an attorney who did not sign the document deemed to violate rule 11 but who made an appearance in the suit.  This appears to be a matter of first impression for this or any other circuit.

The Advisory Committee Note states that:

33
If the duty imposed by the rule is violated, the court should have the discretion to impose sanctions on either the attorney, the party the signing attorney represents, or both, or on an unrepresented party who signed the pleading, and the new rule so provides.

34
97 F.R.D. at 200.  The Note also states that "Rule 11 has provided for the striking of pleadings and the imposition of disciplinary sanctions to check abuses in the signing of pleadings" and that "[a]mended Rule 11 continues to apply to anyone who signs a pleading, motion, or other paper."    97 F.R.D. at 199 (emphasis added).  Indeed, the text of the rule itself speaks in terms of signing both in making it a requirement to prevent a document from being stricken and in the corresponding representations associated with the signature.  Furthermore, in almost all of the cases that we have found where an attorney was sanctioned under the revised version of rule 11, it appears that the attorney who was sanctioned had signed the documents in question.    See, e.g., Veslan Enterprises, supra, Southern Leasing Partners, supra, Westmoreland, supra.

35
Our research has found only one case where it is not clear whether the attorney who had sanctions imposed upon him had also signed the document in question.  In Pravic v. U.S. Industries-Clearing, 109 F.R.D. 620 (E.D.Mich.1986), the court imposed sanctions upon an attorney who represented a corporation which had removed a case to federal court following involuntary dismissal of a nonresident defendant.  The court, finding that the law on removal was well settled contrary to the corporation's position and that the attorney had not made the reasonable inquiry required by rule 11, imposed sanctions upon the attorney.  In doing so, the court held that the attorney did not satisfy the "reasonable inquiry" standard by relying on a memorandum of law prepared by another law firm.   Id. at 623.  It is unclear from the opinion, however, whether the sanctioned attorney signed the removal motion, or whether another attorney did.  The court relied on an "analogous" situation in Long v. Quantex Resources, Inc., 108 F.R.D. 416 (S.D.N.Y.1985), where the court noted that local counsel had "relied on foreign counsel before signing papers and representing them to the court."   Pravic, 109 F.R.D. at 623 (emphasis added).  In discussing the case before it, in contrast, the Pravic court held that "an attorney may not rely on a legal memorandum prepared by a second lawyer without independently verifying the reasoning of the cases cited...."  Id.    Thus, it is possible that the Pravic court thought that an attorney does not need to sign a document in order to have rule 11 sanctions imposed upon him.

36
Regardless of this possible ambiguity in Pravic, we believe that the text of the rule, the Advisory Committee Note, and the cases decided under rule 11 make it clear that an attorney must actually sign a "pleading, motion, [or] other paper" in order to have sanctions imposed against him under rule 11.18   The only other support we have found for the opposite view comes from a thorough article that Judge Schwarzer has written on the revised version of rule 11.  Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Rule 11--A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985) (hereinafter cited as Sanctions).  In his article Judge Schwarzer gives two examples that suggest that an attorney need not have signed a document to have sanctions imposed upon him.  In one example he suggests that in a situation where an associate in a law firm charged with preparing a document for filing is carrying out the instructions of a partner who made the decision to file it, sanctions are more appropriately imposed on the partner rather than the associate who carried out orders and signed the document.  Sanctions, 104 F.R.D. at 185.  In his second example Judge Schwarzer deals with a case where a document is signed and filed by local counsel at the direction of out-of-state counsel.  Judge Schwarzer appears to believe that while local counsel would have primary responsibility for the document, sanctions could also be imposed upon the out-of-state counsel.  Id. at 186.

37
To the extent that Judge Schwarzer suggests that an attorney who does not sign a document can be sanctioned under rule 11, we must respectfully disagree.  Although his view is arguably consistent with the purpose of rule 11, the text of the rule and the Advisory Committee Note indicate that the attorney whose signature the document bears has the full responsibility for it.  While the potential problems that Judge Schwarzer raises in his examples are realistic, there are alternative solutions to these problems other than judicially expanding the scope of rule 11 beyond its express terms.  Instead, counsel should be selective in the documents that they sign.  Where responsibility for a suit is divided among several law firms or attorneys, counsel would be well advised to make sure that the attorney responsible for the contents of the document is the one who signs it.  Alternatively, counsel may have several attorneys sign a document so that it is clear to the court exactly who is taking responsibility for it.

38
Our view that an attorney must sign a document in order to have rule 11 sanctions imposed upon him is also consistent with the rule's concern about satellite proceedings.  The Advisory Committee Note states that:

39
To assure that the efficiencies achieved through more effective operation of the pleading regimen will not be offset by the cost of satellite litigation over the imposition of sanctions, the court must to the extent possible limit the scope of sanction proceedings to the record.    Thus, discovery should be conducted only by leave of the court, and then only in extraordinary circumstances.

40
97 F.R.D. at 201 (emphasis added).  Limiting rule 11 sanctions to the attorney who signs the document reduces the need for satellite litigation over exactly who was responsible for a particular document.  If this view of rule 11 were not adopted, an inquiry would have to be made of the relative culpability of attorneys who did not sign but who were nevertheless involved with a particular document.  This would necessitate the type of satellite litigation that rule 11 expressly discourages.

41
The instant suit provides another example where separate proceedings would be necessary to determine the relative culpability of Ewart.  As we have indicated, Ewart was present only at a pretrial conference, which was not transcribed.  In order to effectively review this sanction order as to Ewart, the district court would have to hold an on the record hearing which would make clear the extent of Ewart's involvement in the suit.  We believe that requiring such a proceeding would be contrary to the intent of the drafters of rule 11.  Thus, we hold that rule 11 sanctions can be imposed only on the attorneys who sign a document, or on the clients that the signing attorneys represent.19

42
An additional issue concerning rule 11 must be discussed.  Rule 11 is addressed to two separate problems:  first, the problem of frivolous filings;  and second, the problem of misusing judicial procedures as a weapon for personal or economic harassment.  In its opinion the district court rested its sanctions on the ground that the Robinsons' argument "was not well grounded in fact and ... warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for an extension of that law."    The terms of rule 11 state that the signature of an attorney acts as a certificate that the motion "is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension ... of existing law and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose."    Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 (emphasis added).  In Veslan Enterprises we specifically reserved the question of whether violation of one of these two clauses is sufficient for a district court to impose sanctions.   Veslan Enterprises, 765 F.2d at 500 n. 10.  Since the district court specifically rested its sanctions on only the first clause--that the Robinsons' argument was not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for its extension--we must resolve this question.

43
We hold that violation of only one of the two clauses in rule 11 is sufficient for a district court to impose sanctions.  By signing a document, we believe that an attorney certifies that both of the representations contained in rule 11 are satisfied.  The two clauses state independent obligations, each of which must be satisfied.  While we recognize that there is overlap between the two parts of rule 11, our approach also allows the unique purposes behind each clause to be implemented.  For example, it is entirely plausible that the filing of successive motions, each of which is individually well founded in fact and law, could under various circumstances constitute an improper purpose under rule 11 such as harassment or delay.  Furthermore, our approach is consistent with the cases and commentary on the revised rule 11.   See, e.g., Eastway, 762 F.2d at 254;  WSB Electric Co. v. Rank & File Committee to Stop the 2-Gate System, 103 F.R.D. 417, 420 (N.D.Cal.1984) (Schwarzer, J.);    Sanctions at 185-96 (noting the different purposes behind the two clauses).20

44
Finally, we note that rule 11 says that "[i]f a ... paper is signed in violation, the court ... shall impose ... an appropriate sanction."    Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 (emphasis added).  By employing the word "shall" the drafters intended to stress the mandatory imposition of sanctions when the requirements of rule 11 have been violated.  Thus, where a district court finds that a party's or signing attorney's conduct is improper or unreasonable under rule 11, the court is required to fashion an appropriate sanction. Accord Unioil v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 802 F.2d 1080, 1091 (9th Cir.1986);  Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217, 1221-22 (6th Cir.1986);  Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 831;  Westmoreland v. CBS Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (D.C.Cir.1985);  Eastway, 762 F.2d at 254 n. 7;  Advo System, Inc. v. Walters, 110 F.R.D. 426, 430 (E.D.Mich.1986).

45
We acknowledge that sanctions should not be lightly imposed given the impact that they may have on both the attorney's and party's reputations.   Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1540 (9th Cir.1986);  Gilmer v. City of Cleveland, 617 F.Supp. 985, 988 (N.D.Ohio 1985).  Rule 11 is "not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity."    97 F.R.D. at 199.  Nor is it meant to make lawyers strictly liable if a court rules against them on the merits.  However, while enthusiasm and innovation in advocacy are to be encouraged, an attorney is under the correlative obligation to conduct himself in a manner consistent with the proper functioning of the judicial system.  See Sanctions at 184.  A person cannot proceed with impunity when his argument has no merit.

B.

46
Now that we have set out the appropriate standards to be used in reviewing rule 11 sanctions, we review the sanctions imposed on the Robinsons, Black and Ewart in this case.

1.

47
We affirm the sanctions imposed upon the Robinsons and Black.  Black signed all the pleadings and papers filed on behalf of the Robinsons.  As our discussion above makes clear, the attorney who signs the pleading and/or the client he represents are the appropriate people to sanction if rule 11 is violated.  The district court noted in its opinion that Black was fully aware of the 1981 suit that the Robinsons had filed against NCR.  Furthermore, NCR's counsel made several attempts to inform Black of the substance of the 1981 suit.  Black was also given an opportunity to withdraw the suit but did not do so.  We accept these findings of fact as they are not clearly erroneous.  As we have noted, the district court imposed sanctions because it felt that Black's argument was not well grounded in fact and law.  We agree with the district court that Black's conduct violated rule 11.  The law is clear that res judicata bars all claims that were or might have been asserted by the parties to the prior action.  In the 1981 suit the Robinsons sued NCR and lost.  In the instant suit the Robinsons sued NCR again on the basis of the identical factual situation despite their defeat in the earlier suit.

48
A "reasonable inquiry" by Black would have made it obvious that res judicata barred the instant suit against NCR by the Robinsons.  The fact that HDC was named as an additional defendant and BTS was named as an additional plaintiff in the instant suit is irrelevant;  res judicata clearly precluded the Robinsons' second suit against NCR.  Black's persistence in litigating the Robinsons' claim against NCR when res judicata clearly barred the suit violated rule 11.   See also McLaughlin v. Bradlee, 602 F.Supp. 1412, 1417 (D.D.C.1985) (noting that sanctions are "especially appropriate" in these situations).  Furthermore, the district court acted within its discretion in holding the Robinsons jointly liable for the sanctions imposed under rule 11.

2.

49
The sanctions against Ewart, however, must be reversed.  As our discussion above indicates, an attorney must sign a document in the case before rule 11 sanctions can be imposed against him.  Ewart did not sign any document involved in the suit.  His only role in the course of the proceedings was that he was present at a pretrial conference.  See n. 11 supra.    Nevertheless, NCR argues that the sanctions against Ewart should be upheld because Ewart's name was on the original petition filed in state court, though he did not sign it, and also because Ewart was actively involved in the settlement negotiations between the parties after the district court handed down its decision.

50
We disagree with both of NCR's reasons.  First, the only mention of Ewart's name on the original petition in state court, or on any of the papers filed in the suit, is that the law firm's name, Black & Ewart, is mentioned.21   Rule 11 requires a pleading, motion, or paper to be signed by at least one attorney "in his individual name."    Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 (emphasis added).  Thus, it is the attorney who signs the document, not the firm to which that attorney belongs, that certifies that the document conforms to the requirements of the rule and accepts the responsibility if it does not.  Black's signature indicates that he, not everyone at Black & Ewart, is responsible for the pleadings he signed.

51
Second, the fact that Ewart was involved in the settlement negotiations does not necessarily mean that he was effectively involved in the litigation in the district court.  It is Ewart's conduct before the district court imposed sanctions, not his conduct afterward, that is relevant in determining whether he violated rule 11.  The public policy in favor of negotiated settlements would be jeopardized if the conduct of parties during settlement negotiation proceedings could form the basis for judicial sanctions.  Cf. Fed.R.Evid. 408 (evidence of offers to compromise is not admissible to prove liability in order to encourage settlement negotiations).  Consequently, Ewart's involvement in the settlement negotiations is not relevant in determining whether or not he violated rule 11.  Since Ewart did not sign any documents involved in the proceedings of the case, the district court erred in imposing rule 11 sanctions on him.

VI.

52
The rule 11 sanctions imposed upon Ewart are REVERSED;  in all other respects, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.22   We REMAND the case to the district court for the sole purpose of entering an amended order consistent with this opinion.

53
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

*
 District Judge of the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation

1
 BTS has subsequently been dismissed from this appeal for want of prosecution pursuant to an order of this court.  See 5th Cir.Loc.R. 42.3

2
 This court allowed Black and Ewart, who represented the Robinsons during the second suit and settlement negotiations with NCR, to withdraw as counsel for the Robinsons and BTS in this appeal after the possibility of a conflict of interest was raised regarding the settlement of the Robinsons' appeal and the effect of the mutual release.  Consequently, the Robinsons filed their reply brief and their brief on the validity of the mutual release, discussed in Part II infra, as pro se appellants

3
 A copy of this letter is not contained in the exhibits submitted to the court by the Robinsons, nor was a copy of this letter provided to the court by Black or Ewart

4
 Since we conclude that a complete understanding of the settlement issue may be had from the supplementary briefs and material provided us, a remand to the district court is unnecessary.   Cf. Armstrong v. Collier, 536 F.2d 72, 77 (5th Cir.1976) (remand to district court unnecessary where rule 52(a) is not complied with but record is clear);  see also Gupta v. East Texas State University, 654 F.2d 411, 415 (5th Cir.1981) (same);  Rothenberg v. Security Management Co., Inc., 736 F.2d 1470, 1472 (11th Cir.1984)

5
 Section 6 of the sublease reads in pertinent part:
Lessor (HDC) and Sublessor (NCR) shall not be liable for any damage to property or any injury to persons, sustained by Sublessee (BTS and the Robinsons), its employees or others, caused by conditions or activities on the premises or the ways adjacent thereto.  Sublessee shall hold harmless and indemnify Lessor and Sublessee against all claims and costs arising therefrom....

6
 Section 5 of the original lease provides:
LESSOR shall make all necessary exterior repairs, including but not limited to, the roof, foundation, exterior walls, paved and blacktopped areas, gutters and downspouts, including drainage of the same, and those repairs necessary because of structural defects of the building.  LESSOR shall pay any and all taxes, levies, licenses, and other charges which may be legally levied, assessed, charged, or imposed on the premises by the State where the premises are located, or any political subdivision thereof, or by the United States of America, or by any governmental [sic] authority having jurisdiction over the premises.  (emphasis added).

7
 Section 12 of the sublease provides:
Sublessee shall allow Lessor or Sublessor or the agents or employees of either the free access to the premises at all reasonable times for the purpose of inspecting or of making repairs, additions, or alterations to the premises or any property owned by or under the control of either party.

8
 Section 22 of the sublease provides in relevant part:
Sublessor or Lessor shall have the right, but not the obligation, to remove from the premises all personal property located therein belonging to Sublessee....  (emphasis added).

9
 Section 10 of the original lease provides:
LESSEE [NCR] shall make, at its own expense during the term of this lease, all interior repairs of the building leased hereby, reasonable wear and tear, and damage by the elements, fire, or other casualty excepted, and shall replace all plate glass damaged during said term unless the damage is caused by fire or structural failure of the building.  (emphasis added).

10
 Under the transactional approach, a claim is defined in factual terms instead of by the rights infringed.  Consequently, res judicata can apply to a certain factual situation even though that single factual situation could support different legal theories.  See generally Restatement (Second) of Judgments, Sec. 24 (1982).   Cf. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) (a single "cause of action" for pendent jurisdiction purposes occurs when state and federal claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact")

11
 The extent of Ewart's participation at the pretrial conference is unclear.  There is no record of who was present or of what events occurred at the pretrial conference.  At oral argument, the attorneys for both sides agreed that Ewart was present at the pretrial conference but did not participate in any meaningful way

12
 The standard of review we set out here is not inconsistent with our statement in Davis v.Veslan Enterprises 765 F.2d 494 (5th Cir.1985), that says "in determining whether the district court erred in imposing such sanctions, this Court's review is limited to determining whether the district court abused its discretion."    765 F.2d at 498.  In determining whether factual, dilatory, or bad faith reasons exist which give rise to rule 11 sanctions, the district court is accorded wide discretion because "the district court has tasted the flavor of litigation and is in the best position to make these kinds of determinations."   Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (D.C.Cir.1985).  However, as we discuss infra, rule 11 requires that sanctions of some sort be imposed when rule 11 is violated.  "A court does not have discretion as it would under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1927, or its inherent powers to conclude that sanctions are unwarranted and to deny them."    Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11--Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 Geo.L.J. 1313, 1321 (1986) (footnote omitted).  Thus, the decision whether a document is legally sufficient involves a question of law and is subject to de novo review.   See Westmoreland, 770 F.2d at 1175;  see also Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217, 1221-22 (6th Cir.1986);  Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 n. 7 (2d Cir.1985).  The rule 11 cases that have been decided in this circuit are consistent with our analysis
Abuse of discretion may invoke a broad spectrum of review standards and applications.  As Judge Friendly has indicated,
[t]here are half a dozen different definitions of "abuse of discretion" ranging from ones that would require the appellate court to come close to finding that the trial court had taken leave of its senses to others which differ from the definition of error by only the slightest nuance, with numerous variations between the extremes.
Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 Emory L.J. 747, 763 (1982).   See also Metlyn Realty Corp. v. Esmark, Inc., 763 F.2d 826, 830-32 (7th Cir.1985);  United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 817 (3d Cir.1981).  We believe our statement in Veslan Enterprises was speaking in general terms of our standard of review and that it encompasses the more refined analysis we set forth above.  The standard we set forth today builds upon Veslan Enterprises and makes clear that our standard of review is consistent with that used by several other circuits.

13
 The abuse of discretion standard for reviewing the amount and type of sanctions imposed is also used in several other circuits.   See, e.g., Stevens v. Lawyers Mutual Liability Insurance Co. of North Carolina, 789 F.2d 1056, 1060 (4th Cir.1986);  Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217, 1221-22 (6th Cir.1986);  Zalvidar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir.1986);  Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1175 (D.C.Cir.1985);  Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 n. 7 (2d Cir.1985);  Suslick v. Rothschild Securities Corp., 741 F.2d 1000, 1006 (7th Cir.1984)

14
 Before the 1983 amendment, rule 11 provided in relevant part that:
The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading;   that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it;  and that it is not interposed for delay....  For a wilful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action.
For a general discussion of the revised rule 11, see Symposium, Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 Fordham L.Rev. 1, 1-33 (1985);  Rothschild, Fenton & Swanson, Rule 11:  Stop, Think and Investigate, Litigation, Winter 1985, at 13.

15
 The validity of the Suslick holding is in doubt.  It appears that Suslick in fact dealt with the pre-1983 version of rule 11.   Frazier v. Cast, 771 F.2d 259, 265 n. 4 (7th Cir.1985).  The potential for confusion was apparently created because the Suslick court quoted the 1983 version of rule 11 when it intended to quote the older version of the rule.   See In Re Ronco, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 493, 497 (N.D.Ill.1985).   See also Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc., 771 F.2d 194, 205 (7th Cir.1985) (applying objective standard)
We also view Nelson as an anomaly in its reliance on a bad faith standard, particularly in light of the Fourth Circuit's more recent holding in Stevens.

16
 We use the term "document" throughout this opinion as a standard term that encompasses all the filings covered by rule 11

17
 For example, in some cases it may be necessary for a party to make a motion to withdraw a prior motion when additional legal research comes to light which undermines the basis for the prior motion.  The actions that need to be taken when this occurs necessarily depend on the circumstances of each case

18
 We agree, however, with the holding in Pravic that reliance on another attorney's work does not preclude per se the imposition of sanctions under rule 11.  The Advisory Committee Note makes clear that this is one factor that a district court should consider in deciding whether rule 11 has been violated.  97 F.R.D. at 199.  The Note lists four factors that the district court should consider:  how much time for investigation was available to the signer;  whether he had to rely on a client for information as to the facts underlying the pleading, motion, or other paper;  whether the pleading, motion, or other paper was based on a plausible view of the law;  and whether he depended on forwarding counsel or another member of the bar.  We agree that district courts should take the four factors listed in the Advisory Committee Note into account in ruling on rule 11 motions;  no one single factor, however, is determinative as to whether rule 11 has been violated

19
 We do not think that our view that rule 11 sanctions are limited to the attorney who actually signs a document, or to the client he represents, will unduly hamper the ability of a district court to impose sanctions where justified.  Rule 11 is only one of many grounds upon which a district court can impose sanctions when necessary.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1927, Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 (discovery sanctions).  See generally J. Johnson & G. Cassady, Frivolous Lawsuits and Defensive Responses to Them--What Relief is Available?, 36 Ala.L.Rev. 927 (1985)

20
 In Zaldivar the court explicitly reserved the question whether the filing of successive motions could constitute harassment under rule 11 or be sanctionable under some other provision of law.   Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 832 n. 10.  The court concluded, however, that if an initial complaint in a suit satisfies the "well-grounded in fact and warranted by ... law" clause of rule 11, the complaint by itself cannot constitute harassment under the rule.  We agree with this statement

21
 For example, the original petition in state court was signed--
Respectfully submitted,
Black & Ewart
By /s/ David B. Black

22
 We do not disturb the amount of the sanctions imposed by the district court about which there is no argument on appeal.  However, only Black and the Robinsons will be jointly and severally liable for the sanctions.  On remand, an amended order to that effect should be entered by the district court


                     NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                             In re the Marriage of:

              JOHN ALAN GRIFFITHS, Petitioner/Appellant,

                                        v.

               MICHELLE HEYWOOD, Respondent/Appellee.

                           No. 1 CA-CV 14-0556 FC
                               1 CA-CV 14-0655 FC
                                (Consolidated)
                                FILED 2-16-2016

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                          No. FC2010-090193
            The Honorable Emmet J. Ronan, Judge (Retired)

              DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART

                                   COUNSEL

The Law Office of Kyle T. Green, PLLC, Mesa
By Kyle Green
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Udall Shumway, PLC, Mesa
By Barry C. Dickerson, David R. Schwartz
Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
                       GRIFFITHS v. HEYWOOD
                         Decision of the Court

                     MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Peter B. Swann delivered the decision of the court, in which
Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

S W A N N, Judge:

¶1            These consolidated appeals arise from several post-decree
orders in a dissolution proceeding. John Alan Griffiths (“Father”) appeals
in 1 CA-CV 14-0556 FC from the family court’s appointment of a real
estate special commissioner (“special commissioner”) and its grant of
attorney’s fees. In 1 CA-CV 14-0655 FC, Father appeals two family court
orders awarding attorney’s fees. For the following reasons, we affirm the
award of attorney’s fees in 1 CA-CV 14-0655 FC and the appointment of
the special commissioner in 1 CA-CV 14-0556 FC. We dismiss the
remainder of the issues in 1 CA-CV 14-0556 FC for lack of jurisdiction.

                FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2            In January 2010, Father petitioned the family court for
dissolution of marriage from Michelle Heywood (“Mother”). In April
2010, the family court entered a consent decree in which it awarded the
marital residence to Father.

¶3           In August 2012, the family court modified the decree,
ordering Father to “continue his best efforts” to remove Mother’s name
from the two mortgages on the marital residence within six months.
Nearly a year later, Father had failed to have Mother’s name removed
from the mortgages. She then filed a post-decree petition, requesting the
appointment of a special commissioner to sell the marital residence and
requesting attorney’s fees. She also filed petitions for civil contempt to
enforce Father’s obligation to pay child support. Thereafter, the court
issued several rulings relevant to this consolidated appeal.

             The May 1, 2014 Ruling

¶4            In a signed order on May 1, the family court ordered Father
to relinquish the marital residence to the lender by a deed in lieu of
foreclosure, and awarded attorney’s fees to Mother. The ruling did not
specify the amount of attorney’s fees and did not include Ariz. R. Fam.

                                      2
                        GRIFFITHS v. HEYWOOD
                          Decision of the Court

Law P. 78(B) language. Father filed his first notice of appeal challenging
the May 1 ruling, but later voluntarily dismissed it.

             The June 25, 2014 Rulings

¶5            As Father’s noncompliance with the order to have Mother
removed from the mortgages continued, Mother filed an emergency
motion for appointment of a special commissioner and again requested
attorney’s fees. In an unsigned minute entry, the family court ordered the
appointment of the special commissioner and awarded Mother attorney’s
fees. The court also entered a signed order appointing a special
commissioner the same day. Father filed his second notice of appeal
challenging the family court’s appointment of the special commissioner
and the award of attorney’s fees, giving rise to 1 CA-CV 14-0556 FC. In
his opening brief to this court, Father added that he was appealing the
order for the deed in lieu of foreclosure.

             The August 1, 2014 Ruling

¶6            Pursuant to its June 25 unsigned minute entry awarding
attorney’s fees and costs for Mother’s emergency motion for appointment
of the special commissioner, the family court awarded her $3,046.87 in a
signed order entered on August 1. Father did not appeal from the August
1 ruling.

             The August 4, 2014 Rulings

¶7            On August 4, the family court entered a signed order
awarding Mother $15,607.38 in attorney’s fees and costs as authorized by
the May 1 ruling related to Mother’s efforts to remove her name from the
mortgages. That same day, the family court also awarded Mother
$2,928.60 in attorney’s fees relating to Mother’s petition for contempt for
non-payment of child support. Father filed his third notice of appeal
challenging the attorney’s fees entered in both orders, giving rise to 1 CA-
CV 14-0655 FC.

                              DISCUSSION

I. PARTIAL DISMISSAL AND PARTIAL AFFIRMATION OF 1 CA-CV
   14-0556 FC

¶8           In his opening brief, Father challenges the family court’s
order of “a Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure and appointment of the [special
commissioner],” as well as the award of attorney’s fees. Mother argues

                                     3
                        GRIFFITHS v. HEYWOOD
                          Decision of the Court

that we lack jurisdiction to consider these issues. She contends that
Father’s second notice of appeal challenged only the family court’s
unsigned June 25, 2014 ruling appointing the special commissioner and
awarding an unspecified amount of attorney’s fees and that the appeal
therefore was premature and a nullity. Further, she asserts that because
the deed in lieu of foreclosure was not mentioned in the notice of appeal,
we lack jurisdiction to review it.

¶9            We agree that Father’s second notice of appeal was
ineffective to challenge the award of fees from the unsigned June 25
minute entry. The minute entry did not resolve the amount of attorney’s
fees stemming from Mother’s motion for appointment of a special
commissioner, and it did not contain Rule 78(B) finality language. Father
did not appeal the family court’s August 1 ruling, which resolved the
amount of attorney’s fees related to the June 25 ruling, and the time to do
so has long since passed. We therefore lack jurisdiction to review the
award of fees from Father’s second notice of appeal, and dismiss that
portion of his appeal. We also agree that we lack jurisdiction to review
the deed in lieu of foreclosure. The court ordered the deed in an order
entered May 1, which Father appealed and voluntarily dismissed. He did
not include the May 1 order in his notice of appeal from the June 25 order,
but even had he included the May 1 order, the appeal would have been
untimely.

¶10           But the court also entered a signed order appointing a special
commissioner on June 25. That order was final and appealable, and
Father’s appeal from it was timely. We review measures to enforce prior
orders for an abuse of discretion. See Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 91(A), (H); cf.
In re Marriage of Priessman, 228 Ariz. 336, 338, ¶ 7 (App. 2011). Abuse of
discretion exists when the record, viewed in a light most favorable to
upholding the court’s decision, demonstrates no evidence to support the
decision. Little v. Little, 193 Ariz. 518, 520, ¶ 5 (1999). Mother first
requested a court-appointed special commissioner in 2011 to assist in the
sale of the house, and the court ordered Father to have Mother’s name
removed from the mortgages through refinance, foreclosure, deed in lieu
of foreclosure, sale or short sale within six months after June 15, 2012. As
of June 25, 2014 when the court appointed the special commissioner,
Father still had not complied with the court’s order to remove Mother’s
name from mortgages. Based on the evidence in this record, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in appointing the special commissioner to
enforce its orders, and we affirm the order.

                                     4
                        GRIFFITHS v. HEYWOOD
                          Decision of the Court

II. ATTORNEY’S FEES AWARD IN 1 CA-CV 14-0655 FC

¶11           We next turn to Father’s timely appeal from the two August
4, 2014 rulings awarding attorney’s fees. We review an award of
attorney’s fees under A.R.S. § 25–324 for an abuse of discretion. Rinegar v.
Rinegar, 231 Ariz. 85, 90, ¶ 22 (App. 2012).

¶12            The court may award reasonable attorney’s fees “after
considering the financial resources of both parties and the reasonableness
of the positions each party has taken throughout the proceedings.” A.R.S.
§ 25-324(A). Either prong of the statute may justify an award. Magee v.
Magee, 206 Ariz. 589, 591 n.1, ¶ 8 (App. 2004). Income disparity may
support an award of attorney’s fees even when the opposing party’s
positions have been reasonable. In re Marriage of Pownall, 197 Ariz. 577,
583, ¶ 29 (App. 2000). When considering the parties’ financial resources
under § 25-324, “the court is obligated to consider factors such as the
degree of the resource disparity between the parties, the ratio of the fees
owed to the assets and/or income of each party, and other similar
matters.” Magee, 206 Ariz. at 592, ¶ 17. The family court need not make
express findings of fact in support of an award unless such findings are
specifically requested. A.R.S. § 25-324(A).

¶13            Here, though the parties did not request and the family
court did not make any findings establishing Mother’s entitlement to fees
under A.R.S. § 25-324(A), the record contains Mother and Father’s
affidavits of financial information, filed within the same year as Mother’s
petitions concerning child support and the marital residence. The
affidavits show significant financial disparity: Father’s income was more
than double Mother’s income. Father listed no outstanding debt in his
affidavit, and Mother listed many thousands of dollars of debt. This
disparity was sufficient to justify an award of fees. See Pownall, 197 Ariz.
at 583, ¶ 29.

¶14          We discern no abuse of discretion in the amount of fees the
court awarded. Father argues that the family court’s August 4 ruling that
awarded Mother $2,928.60 for Mother’s contempt petition for non-
payment of child support permitted recovery of fees only for “pleadings
generated after the child support issue was raised.” He therefore argues
that Mother could only recover fees for the contempt petition itself, but
not time spent on ancillary tasks such as phone calls, emails, or hearing
preparation. The family court considered Father’s objection to Mother’s
request for attorney’s fees and correctly rejected it. The family court’s

                                     5
                       GRIFFITHS v. HEYWOOD
                         Decision of the Court

order awarded fees for Mother’s petition and all related legal efforts, and
those fees were reasonable. We discern no abuse of discretion.1

¶15           Father further challenges the reasonableness of the family
court’s August 4 ruling awarding Mother $15,607.38 in attorney’s fees
arising out of Mother’s efforts to remove her name from the mortgages.
He argues that the fees were “excessive” and “exorbitant” because the
court found Mother acted in bad faith. But the court did not find Mother
acted in bad faith, only that Mother had been “somewhat uncooperative,”
and that both parties had “at times, been unreasonable in their positions.”
Father further argues the family court should have reduced the fee award
due to Father’s financial situation. Father also contends Mother’s
counsel’s fee affidavit contained inconsistencies, duplicative entries, and
billed excessive time for drafting the petition and a related motion to
consolidate. Ultimately, the family court exercised its discretion by
awarding Mother $7,662 less than she requested. In view of the fact that
Father created the need for Mother’s attorney’s fees by his long
noncompliance with court orders, we find his arguments unavailing and
perceive no abuse of discretion.

III. REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES ON APPEAL

¶16           Mother requests attorney’s fees on appeal pursuant to § 25-
324. In the exercise of our discretion, we deny her request for fees.

1       Father also alerts us to an alleged billing error for a single time
entry, wherein Mother’s counsel’s paralegal’s rate is incorrectly listed as
$90 an hour instead of her usual $80 per hour rate. Examination of the
affidavit, however, shows that although the paralegal’s hourly rate is
listed incorrectly for the one time entry, the mathematical computation of
her fee is correct.

                                    6
                      GRIFFITHS v. HEYWOOD
                        Decision of the Court

                           CONCLUSION

¶17         For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the appointment of the
special commissioner (1 CA-CV 14-0556 FC) and the awards of attorney’s
fees (1 CA-CV 14-0655 FC). We award Mother her costs on appeal upon
compliance with ARCAP 21.

                                :ama

                                   7


948 F.2d 730
Kimv.U.S.*
NO. 90-3875
United States Court of Appeals,Eleventh Circuit.
OCT 22, 1991

1
Appeal From:  M.D.Fla.

2
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.

*
 Fed.R.App.P. 34(a);  11th Cir.R. 34-3