510 F.3d 442 (2007)
Edwin Perrow BOSIGER, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
US AIRWAYS, Incorporated; US Airways Group, Incorporated; Allegheny Airlines, Incorporated; Piedmont Airlines; Midatlantic Airways, Incorporated; US Airways Leasing And Sales, Incorporated; Material Services Company, Incorporated; PSA Airlines, Incorporated; Airways Assurance, Ltd; The Plan Inaccurately Titled Non-qualified Top Retirement Plan, Defendants-Appellees, *443 and
Tom G. Davis, Party in Interest.
No. 06-2085.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued: October 31, 2007.
Decided: December 14, 2007.
*444 ARGUED: Sara Pikofsky, Thelen, Reid, Brown, Raysman & Steiner, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Christopher Alan Weals, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Sherwin S. Kaplan, Byron L. Pickard, Thelen, Reid, Brown, Raysman & Steiner, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Bridgit M. DePietto, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellees.
Before WILKINSON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and Louise W. FLANAGAN, Chief United States District Judge for the Eastern District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge WILKINSON wrote the opinion, in which Judge MOTZ and Judge FLANAGAN joined.

*445 OPINION
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
In August 2002, U.S. Airways filed for bankruptcy. In order to secure the financing necessary to emerge from bankruptcy, U.S. Airways was forced to terminate the pension plans it administered for its active and retired pilots. A bankruptcy court approved this termination, and this court eventually held that a claim to reverse the termination was equitably moot. In September 2004, U.S. Airways again filed for bankruptcy. A year later, U.S. Airways emerged from this second bankruptcy with a second plan of reorganization.
Six months after U.S. Airways's emergence from its second bankruptcy, Edwin Perrow Bosiger, Jr., brought suit in federal district court contending that U.S. Airways had improperly terminated his pension during its first bankruptcy. The district court dismissed Bosiger's claim, holding that it was barred because Bosiger failed to file a proof of claim during U.S. Airways's second bankruptcy. After careful consideration, we agree with the district court and affirm its decision. It is simply too late in the day for Bosiger to challenge the termination of his pension: unwinding U.S. Airways's second bankruptcy at this stage would not only unduly lengthen the airline's restructuring, but it would also upset the legitimate interests of those creditors who relied on U.S. Airways's reorganization plan.

I.

A.
In the mid-1990s, U.S. Airways Group, Inc. ("US Airways"), and the Air Line Pilots Association ("ALPA"), an international union representing U.S. Airways's active pilots, reached an agreement on retirement benefits. This agreement called for retired pilots to receive, on a monthly basis, a share of their final salary adjusted for the length of their tenure with U.S. Airways.
In order to provide these monthly benefits, U.S. Airways established a pension plan referred to as the Non-Qualified Top Hat Retirement Plan ("Non-Qualified Plan"). The Non-Qualified Plan supplemented the pre-existing Retirement Income Plan for Pilots of U.S. Airways ("Pilots Defined Benefit Plan"). The Pilots Defined Benefit Plan was a tax-qualified pension plan capped by the Internal Revenue Code, such that it alone could not provide the total retirement benefits promised to U.S. Airways's pilots under the agreement with ALPA.
The Non-Qualified Plan, on the other hand, paid retirement benefits above and beyond those payable by the Pilots Defined Benefit Plan. Although never memorialized in a written contract, the Non-Qualified Plan was maintained pursuant to the original collective bargaining agreement and subsequent letters of agreement between U.S. Airways and ALPA. These letters recognized that the Non-Qualified Plan was necessary "to pay benefits which cannot be paid from the [Pilots Defined Benefit Plan] due to [limitations imposed by the] Internal Revenue Code."
On August 11, 2002, U.S. Airways filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.[1] In order to continue its operations during its reorganization and successfully emerge from Chapter 11, U.S. Airways needed almost $1.75 billion in financing. US Airways was able to assemble a syndicate of lenders willing to provide this amount, but the lenders were only willing to extend the credit if *446 U.S. Airways was able to meet certain financial targets.
A major threat to U.S. Airways's ability to access the loans was an escalating pension funding problem, particularly with respect to its pilots, who accounted for a substantial portion of U.S. Airways's outstanding pension obligations. At the same time passenger revenues had dropped precipitously in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks, lower interest rates and a poor stock market had greatly decreased the performance of U.S. Airways's defined benefit pension plans, increasing the airline's projected contribution to the plans. This left U.S. Airways with insufficient cash flow to both meet its pension obligations and achieve the financial targets necessary to access the required funding. After exploring various potential solutions to this problem, U.S. Airways determined that, so long as its pilot pension plans were in place, it would be unable to secure the financing it needed to emerge from Chapter 11.
US Airways thus sought to restructure its pilot pension obligations, with its ultimate goal being the termination of the two existing pension plans (Pilots Defined Benefit Plan and Non-Qualified Plan) and their replacement with a defined contribution plan. To do so, U.S. Airways petitioned the bankruptcy court to allow a "distress termination" of its Pilots Defined Benefit Plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(ii)(IV) (2000). US Airways did not specifically request the "distress termination" of the Non-Qualified Plan because it was under the belief that the Non-Qualified Plan was a "top hat" plan, terminable simply pursuant to an express agreement between U.S. Airways and ALPA approved by the bankruptcy court.
In March 2003, the bankruptcy court ruled that U.S. Airways satisfied ERISA's standards for distress termination. The court therefore allowed U.S. Airways to terminate the Pilots Defined Benefit Plan, subject to a determination that the proposed termination did not violate the collective bargaining agreement with ALPA. U.S. Airways and ALPA subsequently issued Letter of Agreement #85, which approved the termination of both pilot pension plans. The letter stated that the Pilots Defined Benefit Plan "will be terminated . . . and merged into" a new defined contribution plan available only to active and non-retired pilots, while "the [Non-Qualified Plan] will be terminated, and payments will permanently cease, effective March 31, 2003."
In light of this letter, the bankruptcy court authorized U.S. Airways's "distress termination." At about the same time, the bankruptcy court also approved U.S. Airways's reorganization plan, one part of which stated that all retirement plans sponsored by U.S. Airways "will continue in effect except, to the extent terminated in accordance with applicable law, the Retirement Income Plan for Pilots of U.S. Airways, Inc. and related (non-qualified) Top Hat Plan." Finally, on March 31, 2003, U.S. Airways emerged from bankruptcy, stopped paying benefits on the old Pilots Defined Benefit and Non-Qualified Plans, and started contributing to the new defined contribution plan for non-retired pilots. At this point, retired pilots began to receive benefits from the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, which had guaranteed the Pilots Defined Benefit Plan.
As U.S. Airways emerged from bankruptcy, U.S. Airways's retired pilots appealed the district court's distress termination decision, seeking to have their old pension benefits restored. But since the retired pilots had neglected to have the termination and reorganization orders stayed, and since the orders had been *447 implemented and relied on by third parties, the district court held that the suit was equitably moot. This court affirmed on the same grounds in In re U.S. Airways Group, Inc., 369 F.3d 806, 807 (4th Cir.2004).
In September 2004, U.S. Airways again filed for bankruptcy. A year later, in September 2005, U.S. Airways emerged from its second bankruptcy with a new plan of reorganization.

B.
Petitioner Edwin Perrow Bosiger, Jr., is a retired U.S. Airways pilot who, before U.S. Airways's first bankruptcy, had received benefits from both the Pilots Defined Benefit Plan and the Non-Qualified Plan. During U.S. Airways's second bankruptcy, U.S. Airways notified Bosiger by letter of (1) the Chapter 11 filing date and the bar date for filing general unsecured claims and (2) entry of the order confirming the second Plan of Reorganization, the effective date of the Plan of Reorganization, and the bar date for filing certain administrative and rejection damage claims. Though provided with these two notices, Bosiger did not file a claim during the second bankruptcy.
Bosiger instead chose to bring suit against U.S. Airways six months later, filing a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on March 27, 2006. Bosiger argued that U.S. Airways had improperly terminated the Non-Qualified Plan during its first bankruptcy because the Non-Qualified Plan was a "top hat" plan in name only, and therefore not terminable merely through express agreement between U.S. Airways and ALPA. Bosiger therefore contended that he was still entitled to his benefits under the Non-Qualified Plan.
US Airways responded by filing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, alleging that Bosiger's complaint failed to state a claim for various reasons. Most relevant to this appeal, U.S. Airways argued that, even if the termination of the Non-Qualified Plan was unlawful, Bosiger had waived any right to challenge the termination of the Plan by failing to file a proof of claim during U.S. Airways's second bankruptcy.
In September 2006, after considering Bosiger's reply to U.S. Airways's motion to dismiss and argument at a hearing on the matter, the district court granted U.S. Airways's motion. The district court articulated two grounds for its holding. First, the court stated that U.S. Airways appropriately considered the Non-Qualifed Plan to be a "top hat" plan. Thus, U.S. Airways had properly terminated the Plan during its first bankruptcy, pursuant to its Letter of Agreement #85 with ALPA and the bankruptcy court's approval of U.S. Airways's reorganization plan.
Second, and in the alternative, the district court held that Bosiger's "claim is barred because he failed to file a proof of claim during U.S. Airways's second bankruptcy." The court reasoned that, to the extent Bosiger had a valid claim after the Non-Qualified Plan was terminated on March 31, 2003, he became a creditor when U.S. Airways entered Chapter 11 a second time in September 2004. Thus, Bosiger was required to file a proof of claim during the second bankruptcy proceeding; his failure to do so led to his claims being discharged along with the rest of U.S. Airways's debts when U.S. Airways emerged from bankruptcy a second time in September 2005.
Bosiger now appeals the district court's order dismissing his complaint, arguing that each of the court's alternate grounds for its holding constituted error. In particular, Bosiger challenges the court's finding that the Non-Qualifed Plan was a "top hat" plan, and argues that his failure to file a proof of claim during U.S. Airways's *448 second bankruptcy should not bar his present suit.

II.
We review Bosiger's appeal from the district court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo, Smith v. Sydnor, 184 F.3d 356, 360-61 (4th Cir.1999), and affirm. In reaching this decision, it is not necessary for us to address whether U.S. Airways appropriately classified the Non-Qualified Plan as a "top hat" plan, because we find that the district court's alternate ground for its holding is sufficient to support our ruling.
As the district court stated, when Bosiger failed to file a proof of claim during U.S. Airways's second bankruptcy, any potential claim he had to payments under the Non-Qualified Plan was extinguished. One of the primary purposes of bankruptcy is the discharge of debts, and the Bankruptcy Code and Rules explicitly state  in several places  that all of a debtor's pre-existing obligations terminate upon the debtor's emergence from bankruptcy. Bosiger does not contest the fact that he failed to file a claim. Instead, he argues that he was not on proper notice of U.S. Airways's second bankruptcy, and it was therefore improper for the district court to dismiss his claim. We find, however, that the district court did not err in determining that Bosiger had received adequate notice and properly dismissed Bosiger's suit on these grounds.

A.
The "principal purpose" of bankruptcy is straightforward: "to grant a `fresh start' to the `honest but unfortunate debtor.'" Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1105, 1107, 166 L.Ed.2d 956 (2007) (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286, 287, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991)). To this end, successful completion of the reorganization process allows a debtor, burdened with "`the weight of oppressive indebtedness,'" to restructure its financial obligations, discharge its pre-existing debt, and emerge from bankruptcy with a new capital structure that better reflects financial reality. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244, 54 S.Ct. 695, 78 L.Ed. 1230 (1934) (quoting Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554, 35 S.Ct. 289, 59 L.Ed. 713 (1915)). "Replacing the old capital structure with a new one requires the termination of the rights inherent in the old structure." Douglas G. Baird, et al., Bankruptcy: Cases, Problems, and Materials 562 (Revised 3d ed.2001).
Several provisions of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and the Bankruptcy Code work in unison to ensure that debtors receive a "fresh start" after emerging from bankruptcy. First, Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c) requires that "claimants against an estate in bankruptcy . . . file timely proofs of claim in order to participate in a reorganization." Chemetron Corp. v. Jones, 72 F.3d 341, 346 (3d Cir. 1995). Failure to bring forward such a claim  defined broadly as any "right to payment," see 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2000)  before the claims bar date established by the bankruptcy court forfeits a claimant's right to participate in a bankruptcy reorganization. See Fed. R. Bankr.P. 3003(c)(3); see also Chemetron, 72 F.3d at 346. Second, the Bankruptcy Code specifically states that a bankruptcy court's confirmation of a restructuring plan discharges "the debtor from any debt that arose before" the confirmation of the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (2000); see also United States v. Carolina Parachute Corp., 907 F.2d 1469, 1474 (4th Cir.1990). Third, the Bankruptcy Code further insulates a debtor from his pre-bankruptcy obligations by stating that the discharge of debts "operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an *449 action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover, or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived." 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2000). Taken together, these three provisions prevent pre-petition creditors from hounding a debtor after restructuring, ensuring that the Bankruptcy Code provides a true "fresh start."
In light of the directives of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules, it is clear that Bosiger's claim for payment under the Non-Qualified Plan is foreclosed by U.S. Airways's second bankruptcy. If U.S. Airways improperly terminated the Non-Qualified Plan during its first bankruptcy, as Bosiger alleges, Bosiger's injury made him an unsecured creditor of U.S. Airways, and therefore the holder of a "claim" within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A), during the second bankruptcy. As the holder of a bankruptcy "claim," Bosiger was required, under Fed. R. Bankr.P. 3003(c)(3), to file a proof of that claim with the bankruptcy court before the bar date in order to participate in U.S. Airways's reorganization. He did not do so, and thus, as the bankruptcy court recognized in its Bar Date Order, U.S. Airways was "forever discharged from any and all indebtedness or liability with respect to" any claims not brought to the court's attention.
Although this alone is sufficient to foreclose Bosiger's claim, the bankruptcy court's confirmation of U.S. Airways's second Plan of Reorganization offers further proof that Bosiger's claim is barred. In its Confirmation Order, the bankruptcy court explicitly cited 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) and stated that U.S. Airways's emergence from bankruptcy served to extinguish all pre-existing "Claims and Causes of Action, whether known or unknown." Moreover, the Confirmation Order mirrors 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) in further noting that the discharge of U.S. Airways's debts serves to enjoin "any Person" from "commencing or continuing any action . . . to collect, offset, or recover any Claim . . . discharged under this Plan." It is thus clear that U.S. Airways's second bankruptcy discharged any claim Bosiger had to payment under the Non-Qualified Plan.
The bankruptcy court in this case  and the Bankruptcy Code and Rules in general  both recognize the dramatic consequences that would result if Bosiger were able to circumvent U.S. Airways's bankruptcy proceedings. To begin, allowing individual creditors to opt out of a formal bankruptcy proceeding in order to bring a subsequent civil lawsuit against a debtor only serves to make bankruptcy proceedings more complex and more costly. Such an outcome directly contradicts the Supreme Court's teaching that the prompt and efficient administration and settlement of a debtor's estate is a principal goal of bankruptcy law. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328, 86 S.Ct. 467, 15 L.Ed.2d 391 (1966).
More importantly, unwinding the finality of bankruptcy upsets not only the expectations of the creditors who actually do participate in the bankruptcy proceedings, but also the reliance interests of the creditors who have advanced funds based on the new capital structure laid out in the reorganization plan. See In re U.S. Airways Group, Inc., 369 F.3d 806, 810 (4th Cir. 2004). This upsetting of reliance interests could ultimately reduce the incentives for anyone to participate in the bankruptcy process. If individual, pre-existing creditors were able to avoid the diminution of their assets inherent in the bankruptcy process by pursuing a separate legal claim, there would be no incentive for anyone to participate in a corporate reorganization. Likewise, lenders would be much less likely to extend financing to debtors faced *450 with uncertain liabilities on pre-petition claims not discharged through their bankruptcy. At the very least, allowing claims such as Bosiger's would greatly increase the cost of capital to debtors emerging from bankruptcy, diminishing their prospects of becoming viable, liquid enterprises. It is thus no exaggeration to say that the very functioning of the bankruptcy system is dependent on its finality.

B.
It would be difficult for any claimant to challenge directly the critical role played by finality in the bankruptcy process. Instead, Bosiger simply contests the district court's conclusion that he was on notice of U.S. Airways's second bankruptcy. Since notice consistent with the Due Process Clause is a prerequisite for the discharge of a creditor's debts in bankruptcy, Bosiger argues that it was improper to dismiss his claim if he did not receive constitutionally adequate notice.
Bosiger's argument proceeds as follows. First, Bosiger notes that a court is not to consider matters outside the pleadings or resolve factual disputes when ruling on a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir.1999). Second, Bosiger claims that the determination of whether a creditor received proper notice is a heavily fact-dependent matter. Bosiger therefore contends that his general denial of having received notice is sufficient to defeat U.S. Airways's Rule 12(b)(6) motion. This is because the district court would have to consider evidence outside the pleadings and resolve a fact-dependent question to overcome Bosiger's denial, something the court is forbidden to do when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

1.
It is well settled that district courts may convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, allowing them to assess whether genuine issues of material fact do indeed exist. See, e.g., George v. Kay, 632 F.2d 1103, 1106 (4th Cir.1980); see also 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1366, at 159-65 & n. 17 (3d ed.2004) (listing multiple cases from every circuit recognizing the district court's discretionary power to convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a Rule 56 motion). While it may be preferable for a district court to trigger this conversion explicitly, appellate courts may take the district court's consideration of matters outside the pleadings to trigger an implicit conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to one under Rule 56. See, e.g., Smith v. Blackledge, 451 F.2d 1201, 1202 (4th Cir.1971); 5C Wright & Miller, supra, § 1366, at 167-78. The ability of appellate courts to perform this conversion sua sponte serves judicial economy  a value critically important in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding  by sparing the district court an unnecessary remand. As the Supreme Court has noted: "It would be wasteful to send a case back to a lower court to reinstate a decision which it had already made but which the appellate court concluded should properly be based on another ground within the power of the appellate court to formulate." See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943).
In this case, we find that the district court's consideration of matters outside the pleadings did convert U.S. Airways's Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. Both parties had ample opportunity to present material relevant to the question of notice. US Airways submitted extensive briefing along with its motion to dismiss, and Bosiger did likewise in his opposition to that motion. The district court considered this briefing, and also held, on July 7, 2006, a *451 hearing on the motions at which both sides presented argument. Furthermore, both parties presented facts relevant to the question of notice in their briefing to this court.
Given the development of the record on the question of notice, we feel confident that we can apply the summary judgment standard in this case. We thus reject Bosiger's contention that the procedural posture of this case makes his general denial sufficient to resolve the question of notice. Indeed, to rule otherwise would promote the very circumvention of the bankruptcy process through subsequent civil actions that the Bankruptcy Code and Rules were designed to prevent.

2.
The district court did not err in concluding that Bosiger received adequate notice in this case. US Airways presented substantial evidence that it provided constitutionally sufficient notice to Bosiger that his claim to payment under the Non-Qualified Plan was in danger of being discharged. Bosiger does not effectively rebut this evidence. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ("One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose."). We therefore find that "there is no genuine issue" of material fact as to the question of notice, and that U.S. Airways is thus "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
On the general need for notice, there is little dispute. A pre-existing debt can be discharged through bankruptcy only if the creditor was on notice of a debtor's bankruptcy filing and the claims bar date. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), the Supreme Court held that a judicial proceeding affecting property interests, to be consistent with due process, must afford any interested party "notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise [the party] of the pendency of the action and afford [him] an opportunity to present [his] objections." Id. at 314, 70 S.Ct. 652. Since a Chapter 11 bankruptcy affects creditors' property interests, these creditors must receive notice consistent with Mullane for the outcome of a bankruptcy reorganization, including the discharge of pre-existing debts, to be binding on them. See, e.g., In re R.H. Macy & Co., 161 B.R. 355, 359 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1993).
Courts have interpreted the Mullane standard flexibly in the bankruptcy context, measuring the adequacy of notice against the certainty of a creditor's claims. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315, 70 S.Ct. 652 ("The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it."). If a creditor possesses either a "conjectural or future" interest that "do[es] not in due course of business come to [the] knowledge" of the debtor, id. at 317, 70 S.Ct. 652, courts have held that notice by publication is sufficient, see Chemetron, 72 F.3d at 346. Conversely, if the "name[ ], interest[], and address[ ]" of a creditor is known, actual written notice is required. See City of New York v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293, 296, 73 S.Ct. 299, 97 L.Ed. 333 (1953); see also Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 489-90, 108 S.Ct. 1340, 99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988).
While the flexibility of the Mullane standard can make it difficult, in certain cases, to determine if a creditor received proper notice in a bankruptcy proceeding, it does not do so in this case. This is because Bosiger clearly received notice sufficient to meet the requirements of *452 Mullane given the circumstances of his case. During U.S. Airways's second bankruptcy, Bosiger was sent two timely letters: the first, sent on October 15, 2004, notified him of the Chapter 11 filing date and the bar date for filing general unsecured claims, see In re U.S. Airways, Inc., Case No. 04-13819-SSM (Bankr.E.D.Va.) (Docket # 571), and the second, sent on October 4, 2005, notified him of the entry of the order confirming the second Plan of Reorganization, the effective date of the Plan of Reorganization, and the bar date for filing certain administrative and rejection damage claims, see id. (Docket # 3301). These letters are sufficient to establish that Bosiger received actual notice of U.S. Airways's second bankruptcy, to say nothing of the fact that, as the district court pointed out, U.S. Airways's bankruptcy was very well-publicized and that Bosiger, as a retired U.S. Airways pilot, could be expected to possess more than a passing interest in those proceedings.
Furthermore, the very event that prompted Bosiger to bring this suit  the termination of his payments under the Non-Qualified Plan  occurred almost 18 months before U.S. Airways declared bankruptcy for the second time and nearly three years before Bosiger brought suit in district court. The termination of payments could reasonably be expected to place a recipient or beneficiary such as Bosiger on the alert. Moreover, the termination of U.S. Airways's pilot pension plans was already the subject of a lengthy litigation, ultimately resolved by this court, between U.S. Airways and its retired pilots. See In re U.S. Airways Group, Inc., 369 F.3d 806 (4th Cir.2004). Thus, while the termination of Bosiger's benefits and the subsequent litigation in the first bankruptcy concerning that termination may not have provided Bosiger with official notice of U.S. Airways's second bankruptcy, it certainly should have made him aware that he was potentially a creditor of U.S. Airways and that he bore the same responsibility as every other creditor: to file a proof of claim during U.S. Airways's second bankruptcy.
The primary evidence Bosiger offers to rebut the foregoing is his own deposition testimony that he cannot "recall receiving any notice of the second bankruptcy." This general denial is insufficient to overcome the substantial evidence indicating that Bosiger received adequate notice. To begin, we must presume, absent strong evidence to the contrary, that Bosiger received the letters of notice mailed to him. FDIC v. Schaffer, 731 F.2d 1134, 1137 (4th Cir.1984) (noting that, for notice purposes, an individual is presumed to have received mail "delivered to [a home] in the regular course of mail delivery"); see also Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 430, 52 S.Ct. 417, 76 L.Ed. 861 (1932) ("The rule is well settled that proof that a letter properly directed was placed in a post office, creates a presumption that it reached its destination in usual time and was actually received by the person to whom it was addressed."); In re Eagle Bus Mfg., Inc., 62 F.3d 730, 735-36 (5th Cir.1995) (same); In re Bucknum, 951 F.2d 204, 206-07 (9th Cir.1991) (same).
Bosiger's general denial does not constitute the strong evidence needed to overcome the presumption of receipt.[2] If we *453 were to hold that Bosiger's general denial was sufficient, it would make it discernibly more difficult for any court to grant summary judgment in any case where proper notice is required. The result would be to prolong and undercut the bankruptcy process by civil actions on the part of creditors who failed to pursue their claims when it was timely and appropriate for them to do so. The district court was right to recognize this danger, and its decision is
AFFIRMED.
NOTES
[1]  This court considered an earlier dispute arising from U.S. Airways's first bankruptcy in In re U.S. Airways Group, Inc., 369 F.3d 806 (4th Cir.2004). Many of the facts described here are taken from that opinion.
[2]  At the July 7, 2006 motions hearing to discuss U.S. Airways's motion to dismiss, Bosiger's counsel indicated that the two letters providing notice of U.S. Airways's bankruptcy may have been mailed to the wrong address. Bosiger's counsel mentioned that the notice letters were mailed to the Florida address of an "Ed Bosiger," and Bosiger's counsel represented that Edwin Bosiger, Jr., who is the Plaintiff-Petitioner in this case, resides in Virginia. However, Bosiger's counsel admitted during the hearing that he had not spoken to his client on this point, and that he was therefore unable to confirm whether the letters had, in fact, been erroneously mailed to the wrong location.

Bosiger did not reiterate this argument in his briefing before this court. Bosiger's counsel did, however, under direct questioning at oral argument, state that she "believed" that Bosiger lived in Virginia when the notice was mailed to Florida. US Airways's counsel noted that Bosiger testified during a deposition that he lived in the residence in Florida in 2004 (when the first notice was mailed), and that he still owned the Florida residence as of 2006.
Given the tentative nature of the claims put forward by Bosiger's counsel, we accord little weight to the argument that Bosiger's notice was mailed to the wrong address. At the very least, the speculative nature of the claims demonstrate that they do not offer sufficient evidence that Bosiger did not receive his notice letters.


                              In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                For the Seventh Circuit
                    ____________________
No. 18-2825
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                 Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                v.

MAURICE WALKER,
                                             Defendant-Appellant.
                    ____________________

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the
            Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
       No. 1:16-cr-00783-1 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.
                    ____________________

   ARGUED FEBRUARY 22, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 11, 2019
                ____________________

   Before RIPPLE, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.
    RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. A grand jury indicted Maurice
Walker on one count of possessing a firearm as a convicted
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). During his deten-
tion awaiting trial, the Government discovered that
Mr. Walker, his associates, and a family member had bribed
multiple witnesses to testify falsely on his behalf at his up-
coming trial. The grand jury therefore returned a superseding
indictment, which added one count charging Mr. Walker with
2                                                               No. 18-2825

conspiring to obstruct justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(k). He subsequently pleaded guilty to both counts of
the superseding indictment. The district court imposed sen-
tences of 80 months’ imprisonment for each count, to be
served concurrently, and to be followed by a three-year term
of supervised release.1 The district court recommended to the
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) that Mr. Walker should not receive
credit for time served prior to June 29, 2017, the date the su-
perseding indictment was filed, because of his conduct lead-
ing to the addition of the obstruction of justice charge.
     Mr. Walker now contends that the district court improp-
erly left to the BOP the calculation of credit for his time served
before trial. He also submits that he should receive credit for
all the time he spent in custody between his arrest and the su-
perseding indictment. For the reasons set forth in more detail
in this opinion, we cannot accept these contentions; they are
controlled by settled law. Congress has committed the re-
sponsibility for the calculation of credit for pretrial confine-
ment to the BOP. The district court therefore lacked the au-
thority to make such a determination. The court does have,
however, the discretion to make a recommendation to the
BOP as to whether pretrial credit is appropriate. The district
court therefore acted well within its discretion when it made
such a recommendation. We therefore affirm its judgment.2

1   The jurisdiction of the district court is grounded in 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
2   Our jurisdiction is grounded in 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
No. 18-2825                                                   3

                               I.
                      BACKGROUND
    On June 11, 2016, while Mr. Walker was on parole for
prior state convictions, Chicago police officers arrested him
after he fled with a gun in hand and attempted to discard the
weapon before being apprehended. On December 1, 2016, a
grand jury returned an indictment charging Mr. Walker with
one count of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On January 5, 2017, he
pleaded not guilty to the indictment, and the court remanded
him into federal custody. The district court scheduled his trial
to begin on July 11, 2017.
     While awaiting trial, Mr. Walker was detained at the
Kankakee County Jail, where his phone calls were recorded.
The government listened to these recordings, which revealed
that Mr. Walker had communicated with a family member
and associates about locating individuals to testify falsely on
his behalf at his upcoming trial. Specifically, the defendant’s
mother, a close associate, and others deposited money into the
commissary account of another inmate, who agreed to sign a
false affidavit and to testify falsely that the gun belonged to
him and not to Mr. Walker. Another individual received ap-
proximately $500 to testify falsely that she had witnessed
Mr. Walker’s arrest and that he had not been carrying a gun
at the time. Mr. Walker also conferred with his family and as-
sociates about finding other witnesses to provide false testi-
mony. As a result, on June 29, 2017, a grand jury returned a
superseding indictment, which charged Mr. Walker with an
additional count of conspiracy to obstruct justice, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k).
4                                                       No. 18-2825

    On February 20, 2018, Mr. Walker filed a pro se plea dec-
laration, and on April 2, 2018, he pleaded guilty to both counts
of the superseding indictment. The probation office prepared
a presentence report, calculating a guidelines range of 92 to
115 months based on a total offense level of 23 and a criminal
history category of VI. The presentence report recommended
a sentence of 103 months’ imprisonment per count, to run
concurrently.
    On August 8, 2018, the district court conducted a sentenc-
ing hearing. The Government recommended a sentence
within the guidelines range. Mr. Walker requested a sentence
of 41 months. After considering the sentencing factors set
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court imposed a sen-
tence of 80 months’ imprisonment for each count, to be served
concurrently and to be followed by a three-year term of su-
pervised release. Noting that the grand jury had returned the
superseding indictment on June 29, 2017, the district court
further concluded:
           So this Court is going to recommend that any
           credit time start from there [June 29, 2017] to the
           present, not from the time he went in. The rea-
           son I’m doing that, sir, is because again, you
           were in there plotting and planning to try to
           subvert these proceedings. And this Court does
           not recommend you get time for that. And so I
           don’t know if they give it to you anyway, but I
           do recommend that since the indictment, you
           do get [credit] for [time] served.3

3   R.94 at 66.
No. 18-2825                                                 5

Neither Mr. Walker nor his counsel objected to this recom-
mendation.
    On August 10, 2018, the district court entered its final
judgment. It committed Mr. Walker to the custody of the BOP
for a term of 80 months on each count with those terms to run
concurrently. The judgment further reiterated the court’s rec-
ommendation to the BOP: “Defendant to receive credit for
time being served beginning 6/29/2017 when the superseding
indictment was filed (and not sooner), as conduct charged in
Count 2 of the superseding indictment occurred while De-
fendant was detained in federal custody.”4 Mr. Walker filed a
timely notice of appeal on August 21, 2018.
                             II.
                       DISCUSSION
                             A.
    Mr. Walker contends that the district court erred by leav-
ing to the BOP the decision of how much sentencing credit he
should receive and by recommending to the BOP that he
should not receive credit for time served prior to June 29,
2017, the day on which the superseding indictment was filed.
In Mr. Walker’s view, we should review these issues de novo
because these issues raise questions of law. The Government
contends, however, that we should review the district court’s
sentencing decision only for plain error because Mr. Walker
failed to object to his sentence in the district court.

4   R.77 at 2.
6                                                            No. 18-2825

    The Government is correct. Before the sentencing hearing,
Mr. Walker filed a pro se motion for a downward departure
from the recommended guidelines range, but that motion fo-
cused exclusively on the “substandard conditions of confine-
ment” at the Livingston County Detention Center.5 At the sen-
tencing hearing, neither Mr. Walker nor his counsel objected
to the district court’s recommendation to the BOP that he
should not receive credit for time served prior to June 29,
2017. Therefore, we review the district court’s sentence for
plain error.6 Mr. Walker therefore must demonstrate that “(1)
there was error, (2) it was plain, (3) it affected his substantial
rights and (4) the court should exercise its discretion to correct
the error because it seriously affected the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v.
Jumah, 599 F.3d 799, 811 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–35 (1993); United States v.
Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 847–49 (7th Cir. 2005)).
                                          B.
     Mr. Walker believes the district court erred by leaving it
to the BOP to determine whether he should receive credit for
all of the time he served in federal custody awaiting trial. He
reasons that the BOP “is not authorized to determine penal-
ties” and that “that is a duty that is bestowed upon the district

5   R.72 at 1 (capitalization omitted).
6 See United States v. Jumah, 599 F.3d 799, 811 (7th Cir. 2010) (“When no
objection to sentencing guidelines calculations is made at trial, we review
those calculations for plain error.”); United States v. Wainwright, 509 F.3d
812, 815 (7th Cir. 2007) (reviewing for plain error because the defendant
failed to object to the enhancement at sentencing).
No. 18-2825                                                     7

court.”7 Mr. Walker points to the federal statute governing the
calculation of a term of imprisonment, which provides that:
          A defendant shall be given credit toward the
          service of a term of imprisonment for any time
          he has spent in official detention prior to the
          date the sentence commences—
              (1) as a result of the offense for which the
          sentence was imposed …
          that has not been credited against another sen-
          tence.
18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).
    The first of the plain error requirements is outcome-deter-
minative here. Mr. Walker’s position conflicts directly with
the established precedent of the Supreme Court and of our
court. In United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992), the peti-
tioner submitted that, when Congress enacted the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 and replaced 18 U.S.C. § 3568 with 18
U.S.C. § 3585, “Congress expressed a desire to remove the At-
torney General from the process of computing sentences” and
transferred that responsibility to the district court. Id. at 336.
The Supreme Court specifically rejected this argument. It held
that “§ 3585(b) does not authorize a district court to compute
the credit at sentencing.” Id. at 334. The Court observed that
§ 3585(b) “indicates that a defendant may receive credit
against a sentence that ‘was imposed’” and that “the amount of
the credit depends on the time that the defendant ‘has spent’
in official detention ‘prior to the date the sentence com-
mences.’” Id. at 333 (emphasis in original). Congress thus

7   Appellant’s Br. 3.
8                                                               No. 18-2825

“indicated that computation of the credit must occur after the
defendant begins his sentence.” Id. The Court reasoned that
because “[f]ederal defendants do not always begin to serve
their sentences immediately,” the district court at sentencing
could only “speculate[] about the amount of time that Wilson
would spend in detention prior to the commencement of his
sentence.” Id. at 333–34. Elaborating further, the Court ex-
plained that after sentencing, the Attorney General, acting
through the BOP, “has the responsibility for administering
the sentence.” Id. at 335. “Because the offender has a right to
certain jail-time credit under § 3585(b), and because the dis-
trict court cannot determine the amount of the credit at sen-
tencing, the Attorney General has no choice but to make the
determination as an administrative matter when imprisoning
the defendant.” Id. Wilson made clear that the Attorney Gen-
eral, acting through the BOP, must compute the credit for
time served under § 3585(b). Id. at 334. Therefore, even if it
had wanted to give Mr. Walker credit for the time in question,
the district court could not have done so.
     Relying on Wilson, we have repeatedly recognized that “it
is the Attorney General,” acting through the BOP, “and not
the sentencing court, that computes the credit due under
§ 3585(b).” United States v. McGee, 60 F.3d 1266, 1272 (7th Cir.
1995) (citing Wilson, 503 U.S. at 334).8 This is consistent with
the approach in every other circuit.9 Therefore, “[t]he district

8 See also Manuel v. Terris, 803 F.3d 826, 828–29 (7th Cir. 2015); United States

v. Ross, 219 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Jones, 34 F.3d 495,
499 (7th Cir. 1994).
9 See, e.g., Barnes v. Masters, 733 F. App’x 93, 98 (4th Cir. 2018) (“The sen-
tencing court has no authority ‘to compute the amount of the credit’ or ‘to
award credit at sentencing.’” (quoting United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329,
No. 18-2825                                                                  9

333–34 (1992))); United States v. Haipe, 769 F.3d 1189, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(holding that defense counsel correctly “acknowledged in the district
court that the issue of time served was to be addressed by the Attorney
General through the Bureau of Prisons”); Pierce v. Holder, 614 F.3d 158, 160
(5th Cir. 2010) (“Only the Attorney General, through the BOP, may com-
pute a prisoner’s credits.”); United States v. Alexander, 609 F.3d 1250, 1259
(11th Cir. 2010) (“Authority to calculate credit for time served under sec-
tion 3585(b) is vested in the Attorney General, not the sentencing court.”
(citing Wilson, 503 U.S. at 334)); United States v. Mills, 501 F.3d 9, 12 (1st
Cir. 2007) (relying on Wilson to conclude the district court “should not
have taken into account Mills’s custody in its sentencing decision, but
should have instead left the determination of Mills’s eligibility for credit
for time served to the Attorney General and the Bureau of Prisons”);
United States v. Tindall, 455 F.3d 885, 888 (8th Cir. 2006) (“The Bureau of
Prisons is responsible for computing the sentence credit after the defend-
ant has begun serving his sentence.”); United States v. Pineyro, 112 F.3d 43,
45 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that after sentencing, “it falls to BOP, not the
district judge, to determine … whether the defendant should receive
credit for time spent in custody before the sentence ‘commenced’” (citing
§ 3585(b))); United States v. Jenkins, 38 F.3d 1143, 1144 (10th Cir. 1994) (re-
jecting defendant’s position as “ignor[ing] the Supreme Court’s unequiv-
ocal statement in Wilson that a district court does not have the authority
to grant a sentence credit at sentencing”); United States v. Brann, 990 F.2d
98, 103–04 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding that Brann’s claim seeking credit for
prior custody was “not ripe” because “[t]he Attorney General has the
power to grant credit for pretrial custody in the first instance”); McClain
v. Bureau of Prisons, 9 F.3d 503, 505 (6th Cir. 1993) (“The district court cor-
rectly concluded that the Attorney General, not the court, has the author-
ity to compute sentence credits for time in detention prior to sentencing.”);
United States v. Checchini, 967 F.2d 348, 350 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding, “in
accord with Wilson,” that “the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant
Checchini credit for the time spent under house arrest”).
10                                                             No. 18-2825

court had no authority to order the BOP to give [Mr. Walker]
the credit because that authority rests exclusively with the
BOP.” United States v. Ross, 219 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2000).10
                                       C.
     Mr. Walker also challenges the substance of the district
court’s recommendation to the BOP and contends that he
should “receive credit for the time he served from the time of
his arrest through when he was sentenced, including through
and including June 29, 2017.”11 Of course, this appeal is not
the proper mechanism for Mr. Walker to challenge the
amount of sentencing credit he ultimately received from the
BOP.12 Instead, he first must seek relief through the BOP’s ad-
ministrative procedures. See Jake v. Herschberger, 173 F.3d
1059, 1063 (7th Cir. 1999). Once he has exhausted his admin-
istrative remedies, he then may challenge the BOP’s determi-
nation by filing a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for habeas
relief in the district where he is incarcerated. United States v.
Koller, 956 F.2d 1408, 1417 (7th Cir. 1992).13
                                   Conclusion
   The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Because the
BOP has exclusive authority over the computation of credit

10 See also United States v. Evans, 1 F.3d 654, 654–55 (7th Cir. 1993) (per cu-
riam).
11   Appellant’s Br. 4.
12At oral argument, counsel for the United States informed us that the
BOP had given Mr. Walker partial credit for his pretrial confinement. Be-
cause this credit is less than the credit he seeks in this appeal, this case is
not moot.
13   See also Jones, 34 F.3d at 499.
No. 18-2825                                                  11

for time served under § 3585, the district court committed no
error, let alone plain error, in leaving to the BOP the ultimate
calculation of Mr. Walker’s sentencing credit.
                                                   AFFIRMED


41 So.3d 806 (2010)
Jacqueline Lee MOSLEY
v.
BUILDERS SOUTH, INC.
2080284.
Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
January 15, 2010.
*807 J. Michael Newton, Mobile, for appellant.
Joe E. Basenberg and Katie L. Hammett of Hand Arendall LLC, Mobile, for appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Jacqueline Lee Mosley appeals from the trial court's order requiring her to deliver the deed to certain real property to Builders South, Inc. ("Builders South").
The disposition of this appeal is dependent upon the procedural history of this case, which is as follows. Mosley and her husband, Gerald M. Mosley ("the husband"), divorced in 1997. The divorce judgment awarded Mosley, among other things, 168 acres, known as the "Arden Road property." The husband appealed from the divorce judgment, claiming that the trial court had abused its discretion in dividing the marital property, including the assets of the parties' construction business, Builders South.[1]Mosley v. Mosley, 747 So.2d 894 (Ala.Civ.App.1999).
In Mosley, this court affirmed the trial court's judgment awarding Mosley the Arden Road property, analyzing the arguments of the parties as follows:
"The dispute at trial centered on how the business assets should be divided. The evidence as to the net value of Builders South was highly disputed. While the parties generally agreed as to the worth of the corporation's assets, they disagreed as to the amount of its liabilities. The corporate assets, including office equipment, construction machinery, vehicles, tools, receivables, and cash deposits (but excluding real estate and improvements) were valued at approximately $990,000.
"The parties owned 168 acres on Arden Road in Chunchula, Alabama. The headquarters of Builders South is situated on five of those acres. The five-acre tract is valued at $10,000. Improvements on the five-acre tract include an office building with an attached living space that was the parties' homeplace, valued at $65,000; a commercial warehouse valued at $100,000; and a garage with a small apartment, valued at $36,000. An area of 3 additional acres provides highway frontage for the business site. The remaining area of 160 acres in the 168-acre parcel is timberland, and it is valued at $170,000. The parties owned the following additional real property: a two-acre lot in Chunchula that had belonged to [Mosley's] *808 family, valued at $7,000; a lot on Highway 45 in Eight Mile, Alabama, valued at $140,000; and a lot on Ziegler Road valued at $25,000.
"[Mosley] testified that she was not requesting, and did not want, periodic alimony. She stated that, in lieu of alimony, she preferred to have income-producing property, such as the 160 acres of timberland, or a piece of construction equipment, such as a crane, that she could lease to another contractor. The trial court awarded the husband all the assets of Builders South except for the five-acre tract and the improvements constituting the business premises, which it awarded to [Mosley]. The trial court also awarded the husband the commercial lot on Ziegler Road. The trial court awarded [Mosley] the remaining real estate: the 160 acres of timberland on Arden Road, the two-acre lot in Chunchula that had belonged to [Mosley's] family; and the lot on Highway 45 in Eight Mile. The husband's award, excluding debts and liabilities, totals approximately $1,215,000. [Mosley's] award totals approximately $428,000. There are no outstanding debts or liabilities on the property awarded to [Mosley].
"The husband maintains that the debts and liabilities on the property awarded to him amount to $784,644.69. Even if we accepted the husband's debt-and-liability figure as accurate, the husband's net award would amount to $430,355.31, a figure very close to [Mosley's] net award. The husband contends that the property division was inequitable because, although the trial court gave him the assets of Builders South, it failed to include the premises on which Builders South is located, its office, warehouse, and garageall of which are, according to the husband, necessary to the continued operation of the business. He claims that if the business has to pay the expense of relocation, as well as having to shoulder its other liabilities, it may not survive. The award of the business premises to [Mosley], of course, does not necessarily require the business to relocate. The husband may buy [Mosley's] interest or pay her rent. Cf. James v. James, [764] So.2d [549, 554] (Ala.Civ.App.1999) [reversed on other grounds, Ex parte James, 764 So.2d 557 (Ala.1999)] (observing that the trial court's order `does not prohibit the husband from ... buying out [Mosley's] ... interest'). The latter option could, in fact, be what the trial court had in mind by awarding the [Mosley] the property. She unequivocally stated that she wanted income-producing property instead of alimony."
Id. at 899-900.
In the years after the entry of the divorce judgment and the issuance of our decision in Mosley, the parties filed multiple contempt petitions and motions to modify the divorce judgment. See Moss v. Mosley, 948 So.2d 560, 563 (Ala.Civ.App. 2006).[2] In Moss, this court discussed the parties' postdivorce filings that are pertinent to the instant appeal.
"Many of the contempt petitions stemmed from the parties' disagreement over the true ownership of the 168 acres of real property on Arden Road. On May 20, 2002, the parties had pending before the trial court, among other things, cross-petitions seeking to hold the other in contempt when, on that date, Builders South, Inc., moved to intervene, alleging that it was the owner of the real property located on Arden Road and averring *809 that, on information and belief, [Mosley] had trespassed on the property and had harvested an unknown quantity of timber belonging to Builders South. Neither party objected to the proposed intervention, and, on July 8, 2002, the trial court granted Builders South's motion to intervene.
"On November 18, 2002, the trial court entered an order `restraining all parties from cutting timber from the real property, the title to which is in question, pending further orders of th[e] court.' The order further required [Mosley] to provide an accounting of all timber cut on the property and set the matter for a hearing on all pending motions. The matter was continued and reset several times. The parties submitted briefs to the trial court outlining their respective positions. Builders South argued that the judge who had tried the divorce case had no jurisdiction to distribute property titled in Builders South when Builders South was not a party to the divorce action and the judge had made no express finding that the corporation and its assets were marital property."
Id.
On November 29, 2004, the trial court entered an order determining that it had no jurisdiction to make any further orders with respect to property titled to Builders South and denying all other pending motions. On March 30, 2005, four months after that order had been entered, Builders South filed a "Motion for Clarification" as to whether the November 29 order applied to all orders of the trial court regarding property owned by Builders South or only to future orders regarding such property. On June 29, 2005, the trial court granted the motion for clarification, finding that the divorce judgment was
"`flawed in its inconsistent and improper distributions of the property of the intervenor, Builders South, Inc., when Builders South was not a party to the action, and when neither the corporation nor its assets were found to be marital assets of the parties. The Judgment purported to award the assets of Builders South to the [husband] but, in other paragraphs, awarded property to [Mosley], without acknowledging that the property was owned by Builders South, Inc. The Court, therefore reaffirms paragraph 14 of the original Judgment of Divorce which awarded "to the [husband] the business known as Builders South, Inc.[,] and the assets of said company..." Since paragraph 9 and 11 of the original Judgment are inconsistent with the clear intent of paragraph 14, paragraphs 9 and 11 of the Judgment of Divorce are hereby void, as are any other paragraphs in the original Judgment which, without acknowledgment of ownership, awarded assets of Builders South, Inc. to [Mosley].'"
Moss, 948 So.2d at 565.
Mosley (under the name "Moss," see supra note 2) appealed from the trial court's June 29, 2005, judgment. This court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction and explained its rationale as follows:
"Despite being labeled a `motion for clarification,' the March 30, 2005, motion by Builders South sought more than a clarification of the trial court's November 29, 2004, order. A `motion for clarification' is just what the name implies: a request for an explanation from the trial court as to the meaning of a prior, allegedly unclear, order. A `motion for clarification' does not seek to persuade the trial court that a prior judgment should be changed, modified, or invalidated. If it does seek to do any of those things, *810 then it is not a `motion to clarify' a judgment, but a motion to alter, amend, or vacate a judgment, one that, pursuant to Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., must be filed not later than 30 days after entry of the judgment. If a trial court's response to a `motion for clarification' is to explain, rather than to alter, amend, or vacate a prior order, then that response is a strong indicator that the motion was, in fact, one seeking clarification. See Gold Kist, Inc. v. Crouch, 671 So.2d 695, 696 (Ala.Civ.App.1995) (noting that `the original order was not modified by [the request for clarification]; the court simply clarified what we conclude was an abundantly clear order'). The converse is also true. If the trial court's response to a motion for clarification does `more than merely clarify the trial court's previous order,' by making, for example, `modifications that [are] more substantial in nature than the correction of a mere mechanical mistake,' then such corrections must be made pursuant to either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b), Ala. R.App. P. Pate v. Pate, 849 So.2d 972, 976 (Ala.Civ.App.2002).
"The motion by Builders South sought oral argument and attached a `proposed order' aimed not only at altering the trial court's November 29, 2004, order, but also at amending the eight-year-old divorce judgment. The motion accomplished that aim when the trial court, in purporting to amend the divorce judgment on June 29, 2005, adopted, verbatim, Builders South's proposed order. We can hardly imagine a motion less deserving of the designation `motion for clarification'; we conclude that it was a postjudgment motion to alter, amend, or vacate a judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e), Ala. R.App. P. The motion cannot be construed as one pursuant to Rule 60(b), Ala. R.App. P., because it did not allege any of the grounds for relief under that rule. See Luker v. Carrell, 25 So.3d 1148 (Ala.Civ.App.2006) [reversed on other grounds, Ex parte Luker, 25 So.3d 1152 (Ala.2007)].
"The motion was filed on March 30, 2005, 121 days after the court's November 29, 2004, order, long past the time for filing either a postjudgment motion pursuant to Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., or a notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a), Ala. R.App. P., and long after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to alter, amend, or vacate the November 29, 2004, order. See George v. Sims, 888 So.2d 1224 (Ala.2004):
"`"A final judgment is an order `that conclusively determines the issues before the court and ascertains and declares the rights of the parties involved.'" Lunceford v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 641 So.2d 244, 246 (Ala.1994) (quoting Bean v. Craig, 557 So.2d 1249, 1253 (Ala.1990)). Generally, a trial court has no jurisdiction to modify or amend a final order more than 30 days after the judgment has been entered, except to correct clerical errors. See Rule 59(e) and Rule 60, Ala. R. Civ. P.; Cornelius v. Green, 477 So.2d 1363, 1365 (Ala.1985) (holding that the trial court had no jurisdiction to modify its final order more than 30 days after its final judgment); Dickerson v. Dickerson, 885 So.2d 160, 166 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (holding that, absent a timely postjudgment motion, the trial court has no jurisdiction to alter, amend, or vacate a final judgment); and Superior Sec. Serv., Inc. v. Azalea City Fed. Credit Union, 651 So.2d 28, 29 (Ala. Civ.App.1994) ("It is well settled that after 30 days elapse following the entry of a judgment, the trial court no longer has authority to correct or *811 amend its judgment, except for clerical errors.").'
"888 So.2d at 1226-27.
"Because the trial court's November 29, 2004, order became final before Builders South ever filed its `Motion for Clarification,' the court had no jurisdiction to amend its November 29, 2004, order and its June 29, 2005, order purporting to do so and to amend the divorce judgment is void. An appeal from a void judgment must be dismissed. See, e.g., Ex parte Citizens Bank, 879 So.2d 535, 540 (Ala.2003); and Carter v. Hilliard, 838 So.2d 1062 (Ala.Civ.App. 2002)."
Moss, 948 So.2d at 565-66.
On May 30, 2007, subsequent to the issuance of this court's opinion in Moss, Builders South filed a motion to require Mosley to deliver to it the deed to the Arden Road property that she had been awarded in the divorce judgment. On November 14, 2008, after a hearing on the motion, the trial court entered on order finding that, because Builders South had held title to the Arden Road property at the time of the divorce and because it had not been made a party to the divorce action, the trial court had lacked jurisdiction to award Mosley the Arden Road property in the divorce judgment. Accordingly, the trial court stated, that portion of the divorce judgment awarding Mosley the Arden Road property was void, and she was ordered to deliver the deed to that property to Builders South. Mosley timely appealed from the trial court's order.
Mosley contends that the November 14, 2008, order requiring her to deliver to Builders South the deed to the Arden Road property that she was awarded in the divorce judgment is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Builders South counters that, because it was not a party to the original divorce action, res judicata is inapplicable.
In Roubicek v. Roubicek, 246 Ala. 442, 449, 21 So.2d 244, 251 (1945), our supreme court recognized the general rule that a divorce court lacks jurisdiction to divide property legally titled in the name of a third party not joined in the divorce action. 246 Ala. at 449, 21 So.2d at 251. The supreme court later explained the holding in Roubicek as follows:
"It is obvious that the court would be guilty of denying due process to the [third party] if the court should take property of the [third party] and give it to another in a proceeding where the [third party] was not a party and was not given the elemental right to be heard."
Boswell v. Boswell, 280 Ala. 53, 60, 189 So.2d 854, 860 (1966). Consistent with that reasoning, later Alabama cases have carved out an exception to the general rule that allows a divorce court to enter a judgment affecting property titled in the name of a third party when the third party appears in the divorce proceeding and, as the Boswell court put it, is "given the elemental right to be heard." See, e.g., Moody v. Moody, 339 So.2d 1030 (Ala.Civ. App.1976) (holding that, because the attorney to whom the husband had purportedly conveyed a cabin lot represented the husband throughout the divorce proceeding in which ownership of the lot was litigated and passed to wife, the divorce court did not err in entering a judgment disposing of the cabin lot without formally joining the attorney as party).
In Owen v. Miller, 414 So.2d 889 (Ala. 1981), a divorcing husband and his sister held joint legal title to several bank accounts. The sister appeared at the divorce trial for the purposes of attempting to gain ownership of those accounts. Also, the sister filed a successful motion with the *812 divorce court to release funds in a bank account she singly owned that the divorce court had mistaken for marital property. After the trial, the divorce court awarded ownership of the disputed bank accounts to the wife and the children of the husband. 414 So.2d at 890. The sister then filed an action against the wife, the children, and the bank holding the accounts, claiming ownership of the funds in the accounts. Our supreme court concluded that, although the sister had never been made a party to the divorce proceedings, she was bound by the divorce judgment under the doctrine of res judicata as "[a] non-party who has an interest sufficiently close to the matter litigated and who had an adequate opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding." 414 So.2d at 891.
In Lyons v. Lyons, 340 So.2d 450 (Ala. Civ.App.1976), a husband argued on appeal that the circuit court that had adjudicated his divorce case "was without authority to direct conveyance of corporate property in a proceeding to which the corporation was not a party." Id. at 451. This court recognized the general rule asserted by the husband but held that an exception to that rule applied when one or both spouses treat a closely held corporation as an alter ego. Id. at 451-52. This court recognized that, in such cases, a divorce court has the authority to pierce the corporate veil and to divide corporate property without adding the corporation as a party so long as the principal of the corporation was properly before the court. Id. at 452. Lyons has often been cited as authorizing divorce courts to divide corporate assets under the alter-ego theory.
There is no evidence in this case, however, that, in dividing the assets of Builders South between the parties in the divorce judgment, the trial court treated Builders South as an alter ego of either party; indeed it does not appear that the issue whether Builders South was an alter ego of either party was even raised at trial. Instead, as indicated in this court's opinion in Mosley, supra, both the parties and the trial court simply treated Builders South, which was wholly owned by the parties, as the largest marital asset. However, the holding in Lyons does not preclude this court from applying the rule in Moody and Owen.
In this case, the sole owners of Builders South were before the trial court on the issue of the division of Builders South's assets. If Builders South had any objection to the treatment of its assets as marital property, the husband or Mosley could have raised that objection on behalf of the corporation and could have been heard on that issue. Like the attorney in Moody, the principals in the corporation sat by silently while a court took action affecting property titled in the corporation's name. Like the sister in Owen, Builders South is bound by the judgment as a nonparty who had an interest sufficiently close to the matter litigated and who had an adequate opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.
The parties to the divorce action incorporated Builders South during the course of their marriage. The husband and Mosley were the only two corporate officers, and Mosley owned all the shares of stock in Builders South. Builders South was a significant marital asset of the parties; therefore, it was subject to equitable distribution between the divorcing parties. See, e.g., TenEyck v. TenEyck, 885 So.2d 146, 154 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (The parties' business, a limited liability corporation, was the "only significant marital asset; [thus,] the trial court was free to include its worth in its computation of the parties' marital assets and its equitable distribution of those assets."); see also Shewbart *813 v. Shewbart, 19 So.3d 223 (Ala.Civ.App. 2009) (fair market value of husband's sole proprietorship, taking into consideration all of its assets, must be used in fashioning an equitable division of marital property); Petrey v. Petrey, 989 So.2d 1128 (Ala.Civ. App.2008) (affirming trial court's judgment holding the wife in contempt for her failure to transfer to the husband a business she owned, as ordered in the divorce judgment equitably distributing the marital property); Combs v. Combs, 4 So.3d 1141, 1149 (Ala.Civ.App.2008) (the husband's landscaping business was a "major" marital asset subject to consideration in equitable division of marital property); and Wolf v. Wolf, 666 So.2d 17 (Ala.Civ.App.1995) (parties' dry-cleaning business used for the benefit of the marriage was a marital asset subject to equitable distribution between the parties). This court affirmed the trial court's division of the parties' marital assets. See Mosley, supra.
Now, more than 11 years after this court affirmed the divorce judgment, the husband, through Builders South, has attempted to have the division of marital property reallocated to his benefit. Although mentioned above, it is worth noting again that, in affirming the trial court's division of the marital property in the divorce judgment, this court said of the Arden Road property:
"The award of the business premises to [Mosley], of course, does not necessarily require the business to relocate. The husband may buy [Mosley's] interest or pay her rent. Cf. James v. James, [764] So.2d [549, 554] (Ala.Civ.App.1999) [reversed on other grounds, Ex parte James, 764 So.2d 557 (Ala.1999)] (observing that the trial court's order `does not prohibit the husband from ... buying out [Mosley's] ... interest'). The latter option could, in fact, be what the trial court had in mind by awarding [Mosley] the property. She unequivocally stated that she wanted income-producing property instead of alimony."
Mosley, 747 So.2d at 900.
There is merit to Mosley's assertion that the husband's business, Builders South, cannot now claim that it owns the Arden Road property that was awarded to Mosley in the divorce judgment when the parties' assets were divided between them. The practical effect of the trial court's decision to void that provision of the divorce judgment awarding Mosley the Arden Road property is to allow the husband to attain that parcel of property in the name of the business, Builders South.
"`The elements of res judicata, or claim preclusion, are (1) a prior judgment on the merits, (2) rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) with substantial identity of the parties, and (4) with the same cause of action presented in both suits. Hughes v. Allenstein, 514 So.2d 858, 860 (Ala.1987). If those four elements are present, any claim that was or could have been adjudicated in the prior action is barred from further litigation.'
"Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 566 So.2d 723, 725 (Ala. 1990) (emphasis added). `"Res judicata applies not only to the exact legal theories advanced in the prior case, but to all legal theories and claims arising out of the same nucleus of operative facts."' Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 790 So.2d 922, 928 (Ala.2000) (quoting Wesch v. Folsom, 6 F.3d 1465, 1471 (11th Cir.1993))."
Gatlin v. Joiner, 31 So.3d 126, 133 (Ala. Civ.App.2009).
"This court, in Whisman v. Alabama Power Co., 512 So.2d 78, 81 (Ala.1987), restated the elements of res judicata:

"`[R]es judicata ... involves prior litigation between a plaintiff and a defendant, *814 which is decided on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction, and then a subsequent attempt by the prior plaintiff to relitigate the same cause of action against the same defendant, or perhaps to relitigate a different claim not previously litigated but which arises out of the same evidence. Alabama law is well settled that this will not be allowed. A valid, final judgment on the merits of the claim extinguishes the claim. If the plaintiff won, the claim is merged into the judgment; if the defendant won, the plaintiff is barred from relitigating any matter which could have been litigated in the prior action.'
"(Citations omitted. Emphasis in original.) This statement from Whisman is consistent with a long line of cases holding that whether the second action presents the same cause of action depends on whether the issues in the two actions are the same and on whether substantially the same evidence would support a recovery in both actions."
Equity Res. Mgmt., Inc. v. Vinson, 723 So.2d 634, 636-37 (Ala.1998).
"The purposes and policies promoted by the doctrine of res judicata include the interests of both the public at large and the parties to a particular action in (a) finality of judgments, (b) reducing waste of private and judicial resources, and (c) avoiding inconsistent rulings. Hughes v. Martin, 533 So.2d 188, 190 (Ala.1988)."
Herring-Malbis I, LLC v. TEMCO, Inc., 37 So.3d 158, 167 (Ala.Civ.App.2009).
"`The principles of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the finality of judgments prohibit a trial court from disturbing a final judgment. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Atkins, 435 So.2d 1275 (Ala.1983); State v. Morrison Cafeterias Consolidated, Inc., 487 So.2d 898 (Ala.1985). In Louisville & N.R.R. v. Atkins this Court held that the doctrine of res judicata would be violated if the law as it evolves were made retroactive to reopen, for another trial, matters that had been laid to rest under theories of liability existing at the time they were tried must not be reopened. 435 So.2d at 1279. This Court, in State v. Morrison Cafeterias, citing Farrior v. New England Mortgage Security Co., 92 Ala. 176, 9 So. 532 (1891), stated that where a party has acted upon the law as clearly declared by a judicial decision, that party will be protected even if the decision is thereafter overruled. Matters laid to rest under theories of liability existing at the time the matters were tried must not be reopened. State v. Morrison Cafeterias, supra, 487 So.2d at 903. To reopen such matters would not only conflict with settled Alabama law, but also would defeat public policy considerations: "`[t]he quieting of litigation; the public peace and repose; respect for judicial administration of the law, and confidence in its reasonable certainty, stability and consistency.' Bibb v. Bibb, 79 Ala. 437, 444 (1885)." Stallworth v. Hicks, 434 So.2d 229, 230 (Ala.1983).'
"[Ex parte] Americold [Compressors Co.], 684 So.2d [140] at 144 [(Ala. 1996)]."
Osborn v. Roche, 813 So.2d 811, 819 (Ala. 2001).
The division of marital assets between Mosley and the husband, including Builders South and the Arden Road property, has been decided by a judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. Whether Builders South constituted marital property subject to equitable division was clearly decided in the affirmative by *815 the trial court in 1997, and that decision was affirmed by this court in Mosley, supra.
Under the facts of this case, the doctrine of res judicata precludes the divorce judgment awarding Mosley the Arden Road property from being reopened to modify the division of marital property. The trial court's order of November 14, 2008, requiring Mosley to deliver to Builders South the deed to the Arden Road property is improper and is reversed, and the cause is remanded for the trial court to enter a judgment consistent with this opinion.
Mosley has requested an attorney's fee on appeal. In this case, Mosley was required to litigate the issue of the division of marital property, which was determined in the initial divorce proceedings and subsequent appeal 11 years ago. Therefore, Mosley's request for an attorney's fee is granted in the amount of $2,500.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
THOMPSON, P.J., and PITTMAN, BRYAN, THOMAS, and MOORE, JJ., concur.
NOTES
[1]  The husband was the president of Builders South; Mosley was the secretary-treasurer. Mosley owned all the shares of stock, so that Builders South was considered a minority business enterprise. Mosley v. Mosley, 747 So.2d 894, 895 (Ala.Civ.App.1999).
[2]  Mosley had remarried and had taken the name "Moss" at the time of the 2006 appeal. In this action, she once again goes by the name of "Mosley."


                  THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

                                   13-15-00282-CV

                                   Teresia O'Riley
                                         v.
                                Thomas Rex Forehand

                                  On Appeal from the
                       36th District Court of Bee County, Texas
                          Trial Cause No. B-12-1092-CV-A

                                     JUDGMENT

      THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on

appeal, concludes the appeal should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The Court

orders the appeal DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION in accordance with its

opinion. Costs of the appeal are adjudged against appellant.

      We further order this decision certified below for observance.

September 1, 2015