192 Pa. Superior Ct. 490 (1960)
Carle
v.
Carle, Appellant.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued March 24, 1960.
June 15, 1960.
*492 Before RHODES, P.J., GUNTHER, WRIGHT, WOODSIDE, ERVIN, WATKINS, and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
James Lenahan Brown, with him Robert J. Hourigan, and Flood, Brown, Hourigan & Farrell, for appellant.
James P. Harris, Jr., for appellee.
OPINION BY WOODSIDE, J., June 15, 1960:
This appeal is from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County which granted a divorce a.v.m. to the plaintiff-husband, Nelson F. Carle, against the defendant-wife, Rita R. Carle, on the ground of indignities.
The wife-appellant raises eight questions. The second question relates to cruel and barbarous treatment. Since we are disposing of the case on the issue of indignities, as did the master and the court below, we shall confine our consideration to the remaining seven questions.
The defendant's initial contention is that the lower court erred in failing to sustain her preliminary objections *493 to the bill of particulars. She contended that paragraphs 1, 2 and 10 of the bill of particulars contained multiple allegations of fact and that various paragraphs were vague, indefinite and speculative. No proof was produced of paragraph #1, and it was, therefore, not considered by the master or the court below. Regardless of this, a reading of all three paragraphs reveals no possible harm or prejudice to the defendant from these paragraphs. See Lynch v. Wolfinger, 163 Pa. Superior Ct. 405, 62 A. 2d 95 (1948).
The defendant's contentions in regard to the vagueness and indefiniteness of the bill of particulars pertain to the identity of parties before whom the alleged indignities took place, the time and place of their occurrence and the failure to particularize such terms as "vile and obscene names" and "scorn and contempt." It must be remembered that in cases of divorce on the grounds of indignities, the acts upon which an action is based usually occur over a long period of time  in this case, fifteen years. It would be virtually impossible to detail and date precisely each act of the defendant which would tend to show a settled hate and estrangement. We have reviewed the bill of particulars carefully. It contains approximate dates for most of the alleged incidents. A number of specific acts are set forth in detail with approximate dates and witnesses. The bill of particulars was sufficiently specific to inform the defendant of the nature of the cause of action against her and of the acts alleged to have been committed by her. We are convinced that she suffered no harm or prejudice from any technical defects therein.
The defendant's third through seventh questions pertain basically to whether the plaintiff has established legal grounds for divorce including his own status as an innocent and injured spouse.
*494 The defendant contends that the plaintiff was not an innocent nor injured spouse because: (1) he "deserted the defendant" on October 6, 1956, and has persisted in the desertion since that time; (2) he neglected his wife by spending an excessive amount of his spare time at the grocery store of one Charles Gosart, a friend of the plaintiff; (3) he has "rebuffed every effort at reconciliation."
The first of these contentions begs the question. If the wife was guilty of a course of conduct amounting to indignities, plaintiff's departure from the common abode is not desertion. Paterson v. Paterson, 178 Pa. Superior Ct. 615, 115 A. 2d 919 (1955).
The issue of whether or not the defendant has given the plaintiff grounds for divorce on indignities is also determinative of the third contention. The plaintiff was under no obligation to return to a situation which made his condition intolerable and life burdensome.
The testimony does not indicate that the plaintiff neglected his wife by his visits to Gosart's store. He stated that his wife complained about his going there on "different occasions. So I stayed away a while." (Emphasis supplied). There was evidence that the defendant at times encouraged the plaintiff to go to the store and on several occasions told Charles Gosart to "keep [plaintiff] busy, give him something to do, he drives me crazy around the house at night."
The defendant complains of many of the factual conclusions reached by the court below. It is, of course, our duty to make an independent investigation of the evidence in order to determine whether it does establish a legal cause for divorce. Dash v. Dash, 357 Pa. 125, 53 A. 2d 89 (1947); McElroy v. McElroy, 185 Pa. Superior Ct. 78, 138 A. 2d 299 (1958). This we have done. Even ignoring the evidence to which the defendant objects in her brief, we are led to the same conclusions *495 expressed by the court below as follows: ". . . arguments arose between the parties and after one such argument defendant assaulted plaintiff with a deer rifle, hitting him across the face and cutting and scarring his lip. This altercation was followed by a long series of arguments . . . Thereafter, . . . defendant suggested that they move and as a result plaintiff purchased a lot in Idetown and erected a home there doing most of the work himself . . . She also complained about the village of Idetown stating that she was dissatisfied and wanted no part of it . . . Finally, after one . . . argument, while plaintiff was taking a bath, defendant went into the bathroom and hammered him over the head with a shoe. Plaintiff was stunned and when he regained his full consciousness defendant was splashing water on his face and removing the water from the tub. Later that night, the defendant left home and did not return until the following night . . .
"Shortly thereafter defendant suggested that they move from Idetown and as a result plaintiff sold this house and lot and purchased a lot in Dallas on which he erected another home . . .
"On several occasions during [their residence in Dallas] defendant requested that plaintiff `get the hell out of the house' stating that she was still young and wanted to play the field. On other occasions defendant would herself leave home for varying periods of time without telling plaintiff where she was going or where she had been. Defendant on one occasion took from plaintiff's wallet money which belonged to his employer, and when he took it from her, she struck him with a wrought iron table, scratched him violently and told him, among other things, that she hoped he would die of cancer of the throat. The evening of the last mentioned incident defendant left home and was gone for three days.
*496 "On October 6, 1956 at about 10:00 p.m. plaintiff had gone to his friend's store where he was helping to unload a late delivery of merchandise. While there defendant drove into the driveway, got out of the car in her negligee and in the presence of others threw a bundle of clothes toward plaintiff and cursed at him telling him `You son of a bitch, here's your clothes and don't ever come near me again' . . .
". . . defendant continuously degraded and belittled plaintiff in front of others . . . she called him a `whoremaster', referred to his car as a `whorehouse on wheels' and referred to his first wife as a `God damned whore'.
"After the separation and on occasions when plaintiff was visiting his son, Charles, defendant repeatedly started arguments with plaintiff and used obscene language toward him in the presence of their son and others. On one occasion defendant even attacked plaintiff with a blunt instrument apparently because plaintiff did not want to discuss their marital differences at that particular time."
The record in this case is replete with many acts of the defendant in addition to those quoted above which indicate a settled hate and estrangement on her part and which constitute indignities to the person of sufficient weight to sustain a decree of divorce.
The testimony of Nelson F. Carle, supported by the testimony of disinterested corroborating witnesses, clearly establishes that the defendant's conduct has been such as entitles the plaintiff to a divorce on the ground of indignities. Although the defendant and the parties' eleven year old son, Charles, offered testimony contradictory to that of the plaintiff and his witnesses, we find, as did the master and the court below, that the plaintiff's testimony, corroborated by witnesses who had no stake in the outcome of this case, is more worthy *497 of belief. Charles Carle, the parties' invalid son, has been in the exclusive custody of the defendant since June of 1957, and because of his disability, is particularly dependent upon her.
Where, as in this case, the credibility of the witnesses is an important, if not determinative issue, the demeanor of witnesses may well be the deciding factor in appraising trustworthiness. Robinson v. Robinson, 183 Pa. Superior Ct. 574, 133 A. 2d 259 (1957). The master's report, although advisory only, is to be given the fullest consideration as regards the credibility of witnesses, and where his findings as to credibility are not at variance with the record, they should not be lightly disregarded. D'Alessandro v. D'Alessandro, 187 Pa. Superior Ct. 194, 144 A. 2d 445 (1958); Leslie v. Leslie, 184 Pa. Superior Ct. 18, 132 A. 2d 379 (1957). In the present case, the master presented a through analysis of the testimony and discussed fully the question of credibility. The record reveals no reason to reject, and every reason to accept, his appraisal of the credibility of the witnesses.
The defendant attempts to bring this case within the doctrine of Moyer v. Moyer, 181 Pa. Superior Ct. 400, 124 A. 2d 632 (1956), which holds that acts of a spouse resulting from ill health do not furnish a ground for divorce. The record in this case does not warrant an inference that defendant's course of conduct over a period of fifteen years resulted from any physical or mental ailment. There is no evidence of any illness of the defendant during much of the time when the indignities occurred. Nor did this court mean to imply by its decision in the Moyer case that a wife was free to assault, with rifle, shoe, or wrought iron table, her spouse and thereafter excuse her conduct on the basis that she was suffering from an "emotional upset." To be a defense to an action for divorce, physical *498 or mental illness must be the cause of defendant's conduct. The ailment must have produced the acts complained of and have prevented the defendant from conducting herself in a normal and proper relationship toward her spouse. Such was not the case here.
The defendant also appeals from the order of the lower court of November 3, 1959, providing for additional counsel fees for the defendant's counsel in the amount of $375. Under this order and a prior order the plaintiff has been ordered to pay his wife's counsel fees in the amount of $725 in addition to considerable costs of the proceedings. Unlike our review of the divorce decree, our review of this order is limited, and we can reverse it only for a manifest abuse of discretion by the court below. Cox v. Cox, 187 Pa. Superior Ct. 177, 188, 144 A. 2d 458 (1958). A review of the record including the depositions taken on this question does not reveal any such abuse of discretion. The lower court need not require the husband to pay the full amount which the wife's counsel may reasonably demand of her or which she has actually paid. Cox v. Cox, supra. The order of the court below directed the plaintiff to assume the cost of "mimeographing briefs and extracts of testimony, in connection with [this] appeal . . ." The briefs were ordered printed by this Court, and the plaintiff should, therefore, pay the cost of printing the briefs.
The decree and order are affirmed.


                    United States Court of Appeals
                            FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
      ___________

      No. 09-2560
      ___________

United States of America,              *
                                       *
            Appellee,                  *
                                       *
      v.                               *
                                       *
Vondra D. Alexander,                   *
                                       *
            Appellant.                 *

      ___________                          Appeals from the United States
                                           District Court for the
      No. 09-2744                          Eastern District of Arkansas.
      ___________
                                           [UNPUBLISHED]

United States of America,              *
                                       *
            Appellee,                  *
                                       *
      v.                               *
                                       *
Sharon L. Alexander,                   *
                                       *
            Appellant.                 *

                                  ___________

                             Submitted: March 8, 2010
                                Filed: March 15, 2010
                                 ___________
Before BYE, ARNOLD, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.
                           ___________

PER CURIAM.

      Sharon and Vondra Alexander appeal the respective 61-month and 43-month
sentences they received for conspiracy to commit bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1344 and 1349. Vondra Alexander argues the district court1 erred by imposing an
excessive sentence relative to others involved in the case and by failing to consider
mitigating circumstances. Sharon Alexander contends the court erred by failing to
properly weigh factors justifying a variance such as her mental and physical health
and her family responsibilities. We affirm.

       The facts underlying this appeal are more fully stated in the Alexanders'
previous appeal, United States v. Alexander, 556 F.3d 890 (8th Cir. 2009). Sharon
and Vondra Alexander, who are sisters, were indicted along with ten others on
multiple charges in connection with stealing and passing stolen checks. Sharon and
Vondra each pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud and the government
moved to dismiss the remaining charges against them. The district court sentenced
Vondra to 63 months of incarceration and Sharon to 87 months of incarceration, each
at the bottom of their respective Guidelines ranges. On appeal, this Court vacated the
sentences and remanded because the district court committed plain error by applying
a presumption of reasonableness to the advisory Guidelines. Alexander, 556 F.3d at
893-894. On remand, the district court gave Vondra and Sharon each a 30 percent
downward variance from the Guidelines, resulting in a sentence of 43 months of
incarceration for Vondra and 61 months of incarceration for Sharon.

      1
        The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Arkansas.

                                         -2-
       We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting the
additional grounds for variances proposed by the Alexanders. United States v.
Zastrow, 534 F.3d 854, 855 (8th Cir. 2008) (setting forth the standard of review). The
district court did not commit any significant procedural error because it properly
calculated the Guidelines ranges and weighed the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
In Vondra's case, we reject the assertion the district court ignored the facts of the case
in imposing an excessive sentence relative to others and failed to consider mitigating
factors. The court stated it found the disparity among the sentences to be a compelling
factor, and accordingly it granted a 30 percent downward variance for both Vondra
and Sharon. The court justified the remaining disparity in sentences as being a result
of Vondra and Sharon's roles in the offense, their offense levels and criminal histories,
and the enhancements they received. The court also referred to the original sentencing
hearing, at which it considered Vondra's caretaking role in her family as a mitigating
factor. However, the court determined Vondra's caretaking role did not justify an
additional variance. These are precisely the type of defendant-specific determinations
more appropriately suited for the sentencing court, and we find no procedural error in
the court's analysis. United States v. White, 506 F.3d 635, 644 (8th Cir. 2007) ("In
reviewing whether the district court's variance fell outside the range of choice dictated
by the facts of the case, we are mindful of the fact that the sentencing judge has access
to, and greater familiarity with, the individual case and the individual defendant before
him than the Sentencing Commission or the appeals court.").

      Similarly, we reject Sharon's argument regarding the district court's improper
weighing of her physical and mental health condition and her family responsibilities.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), courts are required to consider "the history and
characteristics of the defendant," including consideration of a defendant's medical
condition. Id. at 644. We cannot conclude the district court abused its discretion in
weighing Sharon's health condition and family responsibilities. To the contrary, the
court was presented with extensive information including testimony from Sharon and

                                           -3-
her daughter indicating the nature of Sharon's health issues and family responsibilities.
The court acknowledged the genuine nature of Sharon's health problems. See United
States v. Wahlstrom, 588 F.3d 538, 547 (8th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the claim the district
court abused its discretion in weighing the defendant's background where the court
was presented with extensive information and acknowledged the defendant's personal
history). The record indicates the court considered the appropriate factors and
provided adequate justification for granting a 30 percent downward variance. White,
506 F.3d at 648. Giving deference to the district court's determination, we find the
sentences of 43 months of incarceration for Vondra Alexander and 61 months of
incarceration for Sharon Alexander are not unreasonable and are not an abuse of
discretion. Zastrow, 534 F.3d at 856.

      Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
                     ______________________________

                                          -4-


604 S.E.2d 462 (2004)
278 Ga. 641
GERISCH
v.
MEADOWS.
No. S04A1071.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
October 25, 2004.
Reconsideration Denied November 11, 2004.
*463 Keith E. Gerisch, Hardwick, pro se.
Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Julie A, Adams, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.
James C. Bonner Jr., Sarah L. Gerwig, Mark A. Rogers, amici curiae.
THOMPSON, Justice.
We granted a certificate of probable cause to appeal in this habeas corpus action to determine whether Keith Edwain Gerisch was denied constitutionally effective assistance of trial counsel in connection with Gerisch's guilty plea to aggravated battery. Because we conclude that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to recognize and fully investigate a double jeopardy claim, and in failing to reasonably inform petitioner of the merits of that defense prior to the entry of his guilty plea, we reverse the judgment of the habeas court.
On June 21, 1998, Gerisch was involved in a fight with Lara Robinson and he was charged with the municipal offenses of disorderly conduct by fighting and "public drunk." On July 6, 1998, he pled guilty to those charges in the City Court of Nashville, Georgia; he was sentenced to 12 months probation, and ordered to pay a fine of $1,000, plus $761 as restitution for the victim's medical expenses.
On June 25, 1998 Gerisch was charged in a two-count indictment in Berrien County Superior Court with aggravated battery arising from the June 21, 1998 fight with Robinson; and with simple battery arising from another altercation with Robinson which occurred on a different day. In addition, he was charged in a separate indictment with felony possession of marijuana and DUI. Gerisch was appointed counsel who entered into plea negotiations with the prosecutor to dispose of all pending charges. As a result of the plea negotiations, the prosecutor recommended a sentence of 20 years on the aggravated battery charge (10 to serve, 10 on probation); plus concurrent terms on the remaining offenses.
While in court to enter his plea, Gerisch, who was functionally illiterate, told his attorney that he had been punished in city court for the conduct underlying the aggravated battery (June 21, 1998 attack on Robinson), and he asked counsel why the State could indict him on the same charges. Counsel subsequently advised Gerisch that a double jeopardy claim would be fruitless, and if he were to raise the issue and fail, the prosecutor would withdraw his plea recommendation and seek greater punishment. On that day, Gerisch entered guilty pleas to all charges and he was sentenced in accordance with the prosecutor's recommendations, plus a fine of $1,500 and costs and surcharges on the aggravated battery count.
Gerisch appended to his habeas petition, a non-certified copy of the incident report underlying the disorderly conduct charges in city court, as well as the disposition sheet reflecting his guilty plea to the charge and sentence. At the habeas hearing, Gerisch directed the court to the documents, arguing, "I was already charged one time and then ... I'm back and charged twice again for the same crime ... same date, same time, same address, same person, same incident report, same everything." In its order denying habeas relief, the court found that the entry of the guilty plea waived consideration of the double jeopardy claim; that "there is no credible evidence" of the events that took place in city court, as the documents proffered by Gerisch were merely hearsay; and that Gerisch was not denied effective assistance of counsel in the plea proceedings in superior court. We certified those rulings for review.
*464 1. First we look to whether there was credible evidence before the habeas court of the city court conviction, which would demonstrate that both the disorderly conduct by fighting and the aggravated battery charges emanated from the same conduct. While a non-certified copy of a conviction may be subject to the hearsay rule (see generally OCGA § 24-3-17 and Brown v. State, 274 Ga. 31(1), 549 S.E.2d 107 (2001)), here Gerisch offered original evidence of the circumstances of his conviction by his own testimony. The evidence was uncontested and respondent voiced no objection to its admissibility. The value of the petitioner's testimony regarding the circumstances of his plea in city court depends on his own credibility, not that of another. "The hearsay rule does not prevent a witness from testifying to what he has heard; it is rather a restriction on the proof of fact through extrajudicial statements. From the viewpoint of the Confrontation Clause, a witness under oath, subject to cross-examination, and whose demeanor can be observed by the trier of fact, is a reliable informant not only to what he has seen but also to what he has heard." (Punctuation omitted.) Castell v. State, 250 Ga. 776, 779(1)(b), 301 S.E.2d 234 (1983). Thus, petitioner's own sworn testimony was enough to establish his plea of guilty to the city charges and the conduct underlying that plea. Id. See generally Jackson v. Lowry, 171 Ga. 349, 155 S.E. 466 (1930).
2. Gerisch asserts that he was twice punished for the same crime, in violation of the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. "[A] person who has been convicted of a crime having several elements included in it may not subsequently be tried for a lesser-included offensean offense consisting solely of one or more of the elements of the crime for which he has already been convicted... the reverse is also true; a conviction on a lesser-included offense bars subsequent trial on the greater offense." (Punctuation omitted.) State v. Burroughs, 246 Ga. 393, 394, 271 S.E.2d 629 (1980). See also Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977), applying the test in Blockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (in determining whether there are two offenses or only one for double jeopardy purposes under the Fifth Amendment, we look to whether each provision "requires proof of a fact which the other did not" (emphasis deleted)). Thus, if all the elements of aggravated battery are contained in the municipal crime of disorderly conduct, Gerisch may not be tried on the state court offense. Id. That is because the constitution prohibits "successive prosecutions as well as cumulative punishment." Brown v. Ohio, supra 432 U.S. at 166, 97 S.Ct. 2221.
Relying on U.S. v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989) and Clark v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 612, 193 S.E.2d 816 (1972), the habeas court reached the conclusion that Gerisch's entry of the guilty plea to aggravated battery waived consideration of his constitutional double jeopardy claim. The dissent adopts that analysis. But the critical distinction is that the guilty pleas in both Broce and Clark were knowingly and voluntarily entered with the benefit of competent counsel. As noted in Broce: "A failure by counsel to provide advice may form the basis of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, but absent such a claim it cannot serve as the predicate for setting aside a valid plea." (Emphasis supplied.) 488 U.S. 563 at 574, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927.
A federal double jeopardy claim was held to survive a guilty plea in Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 96 S.Ct. 241, 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975). The reason is that the United States Constitution precludes a state from "haling a defendant into court on a charge" for which he has already pled guilty and been punished. Id., 423 U.S. at 62, 96 S.Ct. 241. See also Hooten v. State, 212 Ga.App. 770, 771(1), 442 S.E.2d 836 (1994) (an unconditional guilty plea generally does not preclude appeal grounded on "double jeopardy-type errors"), citing Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974). Compare Addison v. State, 239 Ga. 622, 238 S.E.2d 411 (1977) (valid guilty plea will stand where no constitutional violation or ineffective assistance of counsel claim asserted).
It follows that the habeas court erroneously concluded that the entry of the guilty plea *465 to aggravated battery in all circumstances waived consideration of the constitutional double jeopardy claim.
3. The two-prong test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) applies to guilty pleas. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); Thompson v. Greene, 265 Ga. 782(2), 462 S.E.2d 747 (1995). Under that test a defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Rollins v. State, 277 Ga. 488(2), 591 S.E.2d 796 (2004).
Counsel testified at the habeas hearing that when she and Gerisch were in court for the plea proceedings, he expressed "confusion as to whyunderstandably so ... would he have faced some charges in City Court and then how could the State of Georgia come back and then indict him on these charges." As a result of Gerisch's inquiry, counsel had a discussion with the district attorney, who advised her that a double jeopardy claim would have no merit. Counsel also contacted the city court judge to verify that there had been proceedings against Gerisch in that court. What she learned was that Gerisch had been charged with disorderly conduct under a municipal ordinance. Because the prior prosecution was for a violation of a municipal ordinance, and not a state offense, counsel did not believe that there was a potential double jeopardy defense: "I felt like his double jeopardy issue would come in if he had been charged with [the State offense of] simple battery and then the aggravated battery later." She did not, however, obtain any of the city court records, and there is no indication that she researched or evaluated the issue any further.[1] Counsel subsequently advised Gerisch that a double jeopardy claim would be fruitless, and if he were to raise the issue and fail, the prosecutor would withdraw his plea recommendation and seek greater punishment. Counsel testified that "based on what advice she gave," Gerisch decided to enter a plea.
Contrary to the expansive and conclusory statements of the dissent that counsel properly investigated and advised her client as to the viability of a double jeopardy claim, the undisputed evidence shows that, other than a cursory inquiry into the city court proceedings, counsel utterly failed to research and evaluate evidence of the elements of the city court offense or the facts underlying it. Instead, she relied on the advice from the district attorney who was prosecuting Gerisch in superior court, and counsel's own misapprehension that the prosecution in city court could not provide a basis for a valid double jeopardy claim. See Brown v. Ohio, supra. The giving of misleading advice through the failure to conduct basic research, and "to investigate [her] options and make a reasonable choice between them," Turpin v. Christenson, 269 Ga. 226, 239(12)(B), 497 S.E.2d 216 (1998), was erroneous and was not within the range of competence required of attorneys in criminal cases. Benham v. State, 277 Ga. 516, 591 S.E.2d 824 (2004); Rollins, supra. Therefore, counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
As for the prejudice prong, it is clear from Gerisch's argument before the habeas court, and from his counsel's testimony, that but for counsel's error, it is reasonably probable Gerisch would not have pled guilty to the charge of aggravated battery. Rollins supra.
Judgment reversed.
All the Justices concur, except FLETCHER, C.J., who concurs in judgment only and CARLEY, J., who dissents.
*466 CARLEY, Justice, dissenting.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689(III)(A), 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the Supreme Court of the United States cautioned that
[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. [Cit.]
The record in this case shows that the habeas corpus court fully complied with this admonition, by "judg[ing] the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Strickland v. Washington, supra at 690(III)(A), 104 S.Ct. 2052. Today, however, this Court ignores the express warning in Strickland, and does indeed conduct its own de novo hindsight assessment of trial counsel's performance. Based solely upon that improper analysis, the majority "conclude [s] that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to recognize and fully investigate a double jeopardy claim, and in failing to reasonably inform petitioner of the merits of that defense prior to the entry of his guilty plea...." Majority opinion, p. 463. I submit that such a conclusion is not only contrary to the undisputed facts of this case, it is also inconsistent with the well-established legal principles applicable to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Moreover, and maybe more important from an overall perspective of habeas corpus jurisprudence, today's opinion is completely inconsistent with the well-recognized principle that,
"[i]n a habeas corpus hearing there is a presumption in favor of the conviction or judgment unreversed, and that the decision of the court convicting the prisoner was well founded, ... and the burden is upon the prisoner to overcome this presumption." [Cit.]
Broome v. Matthews, 223 Ga. 92, 94(2), 153 S.E.2d 721 (1967). The habeas court found that Gerisch did not produce any probative documentary evidence to rebut the presumption that his state court conviction was valid, and that he even failed to prove the relevant facts and circumstances of his municipal court conviction upon which he based his claim of a double jeopardy violation. He submitted only uncertified and inadmissible copies of an incident report and disposition sheet, even though a "certified copy of a conviction is primary evidence, ... and is the best proof. [Cits.]" Howard v. State, 204 Ga.App. 743(1), 420 S.E.2d 594 (1992). The majority concedes that there was not any documentary evidence to support the claim, but, relying entirely on Gerisch's own testimony, it nevertheless reverses the habeas court's conclusion that he failed to carry his burden of proof. Thus, the habeas courts of this state should be apprised that, from this day forward, they are no longer authorized to enforce the rules of evidence and to make credibility determinations, but that, as a matter of law, they must now accept the self-serving oral testimony of a petitioner, standing alone, as sufficient to shift the evidentiary burden to the respondent to prove that the conviction and sentence are constitutional. I submit that this is a radical departure from controlling authority and, in effect, creates an entirely new presumption that a conviction is invalid and places on the respondent the burden of overcoming this presumption of invalidity. I further submit that, when the proper standard of review and the correct analysis are applied to the evidence that appears in the record in this case, it is absolutely clear that the denial of habeas corpus relief should be affirmed.
In the municipal court, Gerisch pled guilty to disorderly conduct for fighting. In the superior court, he subsequently entered guilty pleas to several state charges, including aggravated battery. The municipal and state charges are based upon the same incident. Under the circumstances, however, the more expansive principle of statutory double jeopardy does not apply, because the initial conviction was for a municipal offense. State v. Burroughs, 244 Ga. 288, 289(1), 260 S.E.2d 5 (1979), vacated on other grounds, 448 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 3044, 65 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1980), on remand, 246 Ga. 393, 271 S.E.2d *467 629 (1980). Thus, all double jeopardy issues raised by Gerisch are controlled by the more limited constitutional standard. State v. Burroughs, supra at 289-291 (2, 3), 260 S.E.2d 5.
The habeas court determined that Gerisch did not have a viable double jeopardy claim under the Fifth Amendment, because he pled guilty in the superior court. By this holding, the habeas court correctly applied the principle that where, as here, a constitutional double jeopardy violation is not apparent on the face of the existing record, "`a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked.' "United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 574(II)(A), 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989). Since Gerisch waived his constitutional double jeopardy defense, he does not have a viable habeas claim unless he proved that that waiver was the result of a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of trial counsel. "A failure by counsel to provide advice may form the basis of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, but absent such a claim it cannot serve as the predicate for setting aside a valid plea." United States v. Broce, supra at 574(II)(A), 109 S.Ct. 757.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Gerisch was required to show that his attorney's performance in connection with the double jeopardy defense was deficient and that, but for that deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty. Strickland v. Washington, supra. The habeas court specifically determined that Gerisch's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea proceeding was without merit. In Division 3, the majority concludes that, notwithstanding the habeas court's findings, Gerisch made a sufficient showing of trial counsel's deficient performance, because "she relied on the advice from the district attorney who was prosecuting Gerisch in superior court, and counsel's own misapprehension that the prosecution in city court could not provide a basis for a valid double jeopardy claim." Majority Opinion, p. 465. What this pronouncement of counsel's deficiency lacks, however, is any proof that the prosecutor's advice or the attorney's own concern about the viability of the double jeopardy defense was misplaced. If the District Attorney and defense counsel were correct and Gerisch did not have a viable double jeopardy defense, then there was certainly no deficiency in recommending that he plead guilty to the aggravated battery charge. Nothing cited in the majority opinion remotely points to the conclusion that the double jeopardy defense Gerisch waived was valid.
The constitutional prohibition is against being twice placed in jeopardy for the "same offense." .... "`The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not ...'" [Cit.]
State v. Burroughs, supra at 290(3), 260 S.E.2d 5. As the habeas court correctly noted, Gerisch failed to submit any credible evidence as to his prosecution for the municipal offense, even with regard to the terms of the ordinance that he was alleged to have violated. "The proper method of proving a city ordinance is by production of the original or of a properly certified copy. [Cit.]" Police Benevolent Assn. of Savannah v. Brown, 268 Ga. 26, 27(2), 486 S.E.2d 28 (1997). The majority concedes that Gerisch's testimony cited in Division 1 constitutes evidence only as to the "conduct" which led to the initiation of the disorderly conduct charge against him. Majority opinion, p. 464. As such, that testimony is completely irrelevant to the issue of whether, as a matter of constitutional law, his prosecution for that crime was for the "same offense" as the aggravated battery to which he pled guilty. The dispositive issue is not his "conduct," but the elements of the offense which underlay his prosecution in the municipal court. There was no proof that the physical injury to the victim which formed the basis of the subsequent charge of aggravated battery was an element of the previously prosecuted crime of disorderly conduct. Such documentary evidence as Gerisch did produce regarding the proceedings in the municipal court was hearsay and lacking in *468 any probative value. Brown v. State, 274 Ga. 31, 32(1), 549 S.E.2d 107 (2001) (narrative portions of police reports inadmissible, non-probative hearsay). Therefore, on the record before the habeas court and now before this Court, it is simply impossible to determine whether "disorderly conduct," as defined in the ordinance, is the "same offense" as "aggravated battery," as defined in OCGA § 16-5-24. Compare State v. Burroughs, supra at 290(3), 260 S.E.2d 5. Moreover, absent some probative evidence of what actually transpired in the municipal court, it cannot be said that any evidence necessary to prove an element of aggravated battery was "used up" in proving the violation of the disorderly conduct charge. Thus, Gerisch completely failed to show that he had a valid constitutional double jeopardy defense. If he did not have such a defense, his attorney was not ineffective for recommending that he not pursue it. Moreover, absent a showing of a double jeopardy claim which was viable, there is no "reasonable" probability that he would have rejected the State's plea bargain and entered a not guilty plea. The anomalous result of today's opinion is that habeas relief is now available in this state to a petitioner who simply claims that he or she would not have pled guilty because plea counsel did not fully inform the petitioner about a possibly viable defense.
Furthermore, even assuming that Gerisch had proved that he waived a valid double jeopardy defense, that still would not necessarily show that his attorney's performance was deficient. The Constitution only guarantees effective, not errorless, counsel. Jackson v. State, 276 Ga. 94, 96(6), 575 S.E.2d 447 (2003). Here, Gerisch's trial lawyer testified that, after she investigated the double jeopardy issue and concluded that it was unlikely to prevail, she so advised her client, and apprised him that, if it was not successful, the State would withdraw its offer of a plea bargain, which encompassed all of the offenses and not just aggravated battery. However, she also informed Gerisch that she would assert the defense if he was prepared to forgo the prosecution's offer. After receiving all of this information, Gerisch decided to enter a plea.
This undisputed evidence of record clearly supports the habeas court's finding that counsel was not ineffective.
Counsel has a duty to investigate and to provide informed legal advice to the client and "first must evaluate potential avenues and advise the client of those offering possible merit." [Cit.] However, after having been informed, the defendant, and not his attorney, makes the ultimate decision about, for example, what line of defense to pursue, [cit.] ....
Morrison v. State, 258 Ga. 683, 686(3), 373 S.E.2d 506 (1988). As the habeas court correctly noted, Gerisch "was given his options and he decided to plead guilty to aggravated battery." Accordingly, even assuming for the sake of argument that trial counsel may have been wrong in her assessment of the viability of the double jeopardy defense, that does not constitute a basis for setting aside Gerisch's guilty plea. "`Particularly in regard to matters of trial strategy and tactic, effectiveness is not judged by hindsight (or) result.' [Cit.]" Slade v. State, 270 Ga. 305, 307(2), 509 S.E.2d 618 (1998). The decision either to plead guilty and accept the State's plea bargain or to gamble and risk losing a plea of constitutional double jeopardy was a fundamental matter of strategy and tactics. It is entirely understandable that Gerisch's attorney was circumspect in assessing the validity of the double jeopardy claim, since the defense would not be judged under the more expansive statutory provisions, but would have to satisfy the stricter constitutional standard. The majority errs in engaging in hindsight and second-guessing so as to characterize that strategic and tactical decision as ineffectiveness on the part of defense counsel who appears to have been a conscientious, competent and well-intentioned advocate for her client. Therefore, I respectfully dissent to the reversal of the judgment of the habeas corpus court.
NOTES
[1]  Both Gerisch and his counsel testified that these discussions took place in superior court on the day that Gerisch was taken there to enter his plea. In fact, Gerisch testified that he was not even aware that the plea agreement included a charge of aggravated battery, thus prompting his question about double punishment. Instead, he believed that he was pleading guilty to the other pending offenses.


770 F.2d 177
Edwardsv.Veterans Admin.
85-557
United States Court of Appeals,Federal Circuit.
4/18/85
MSPB, 22 M.S.P.R. 651
Affirmed


33 So.3d 656 (2008)
JERRY L. JEWS
v.
STATE.
No. CR-07-1857.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
October 28, 2008.
Decision of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeal Without Published Opinion Dismissed.


772 N.W.2d 879 (2009)
2009 ND 171
Randall SCHLEUTER, Plaintiff and Appellant
v.
NORTHERN PLAINS INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Defendant and Appellee and
Charlotte Schleuter, Defendant.
No. 20090060.
Supreme Court of North Dakota.
September 23, 2009.
*882 Anthony Joseph Weiler (argued), and David S. Maring (on brief), Bismarck, N.D., for plaintiff and appellant.
Clark Jay Bormann, Bismarck, N.D., for defendants and appellees.
CROTHERS, Justice.
[¶ 1] Randall Schleuter appeals from a summary judgment dismissing his action against Northern Plains Insurance Company ("Northern Plains") for coverage for injuries arising out of an automobile accident. Because we conclude the applicable insurance policy's "out-of-state coverage" provision precludes application of the policy's "household exclusion" in order to conform to North Dakota law, we reverse.

I
[¶ 2] The parties stipulated that in November 2006, Randall Schleuter was a passenger in a motor vehicle driven by his wife, Charlotte Schleuter, and owned by Randall Schleuter. Charlotte Schleuter lost control of the motor vehicle near Casselton, North Dakota, the vehicle rolled, and Randall Schleuter was injured. It is undisputed that at the time of the accident, Northern Plains, a South Dakota company, insured Schleuter's vehicle under an automobile liability policy issued in South Dakota, and the Schleuters purchased the policy while residents of South Dakota. The parties do not dispute that North Dakota's involvement with this proceeding is limited to the site of the accident and the location of Randall Schleuter's initial medical treatment. Since his release from a Fargo hospital, Randall Schleuter has received medical treatment at South Dakota facilities.
[¶ 3] In October 2007, Randall Schleuter sued Northern Plains and Charlotte Schleuter, alleging that Charlotte Schleuter was negligent and responsible for Randall Schleuter's injuries and declaring that Northern Plains was required under the policy to pay him no-fault benefits and was required to defend and indemnify Charlotte Schleuter for his claims. Randall Schleuter and Northern Plains filed cross-motions for summary judgment, agreeing that resolution of the insurance coverage issues would resolve the litigation.
[¶ 4] The liability coverage provision of Northern Plains' policy contains the following "household" or "family" exclusion:
"When Liability Coverage Does not Apply
In addition to the limitations of coverage in `Who Is an Insured'
THERE IS NO COVERAGE
. . . .
"2. FOR ANY BODILY INJURY TO:
. . . .
c. ANY INSURED OR ANY MEMBER OF AN INSURED'S FAMILY RESIDING IN THE INSURED'S HOUSEHOLD."
The liability coverage provision also includes an "out-of-state coverage" or "conformity" clause in a subsection entitled "Motor Vehicle Compulsory Insurance Law or Financial Responsibility Law." That provision states:
"1. Out-of-State coverage
If an insured under the liability coverage is in another state or Canada and, as a non-resident, becomes subject to its *883 motor vehicle compulsory insurance, financial responsibility or similar law:
a. the policy will be interpreted to give the coverage required by the law; and
b. the coverage so given replaces any coverage in this policy to the extent required by the law for the insured's operation, maintenance or use of a car insured under this policy.
Any coverage so extended shall be reduced to the extent other coverage applies to the accident. In no event shall a person collect more than once.
"2. Financial Responsibility Law
When certified under any law as proof of future financial responsibility, and while required during the policy period, this policy shall comply with such law to the extent required."
(Emphasis added.)
[¶ 5] The district court granted Northern Plains' summary judgment motion, ruling South Dakota has more significant contacts and therefore South Dakota law should apply, permitting application of the policy's "household exclusion" to coverage for a responsible family member.

II
[¶ 6] Under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56, summary judgment is "`a procedural device for promptly resolving a controversy on the merits without a trial if either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and if no dispute exists as to either the material facts or the inferences to be drawn from the undisputed facts, or if resolving disputed facts would not alter the results.'" Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs. Ltd., 2007 ND 135, ¶ 7, 737 N.W.2d 253 (quoting ACUITY v. Burd & Smith Const., Inc., 2006 ND 187, ¶ 6, 721 N.W.2d 33).
"The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding whether the district court appropriately granted summary judgment, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and the opposing party will be given the benefit of all favorable inferences that can reasonably be drawn from the record. On appeal, we decide `whether the information available to the district court precluded the existence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitled the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.'"
Farmers Union, at ¶ 7 (citations omitted). Whether summary judgment was properly granted is question of law that this Court reviews de novo on the entire record. Id.; Ernst v. Acuity, 2005 ND 179, ¶ 7, 704 N.W.2d 869.

III
[¶ 7] This case involves the interpretation of Northern Plains' policy to determine whether the policy's "conformity" or "out-of-state coverage" clause provides the "coverage" required under North Dakota law, or whether the policy's "family or household exclusion" excludes coverage. Randall Schleuter argues the district court erred in granting Northern Plains summary judgment because the policy's conformity clause provides the coverage required under North Dakota law, which holds a family or household exclusion in a liability policy is void. See Hughes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 236 N.W.2d 870, 885 (N.D.1975). Northern Plains responds that the district court did not err as a matter of law in determining South Dakota law governed this case and in applying the household exclusion to preclude coverage.
[¶ 8] Under North Dakota law, the interpretation of an insurance contract *884 is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal. Burd & Smith Constr., 2006 ND 187, ¶ 7, 721 N.W.2d 33. "This Court independently examines and construes an insurance policy to determine if the district court erred in its construction." Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Lynne, 2004 ND 166, ¶ 20, 686 N.W.2d 118. We summarized the standards for construing an insurance contract in Ziegelmann v. TMG Life Ins. Co., 2000 ND 55, ¶ 6, 607 N.W.2d 898 (citations omitted):
"Our goal when interpreting insurance policies, as when construing other contracts, is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting. We look first to the language of the insurance contract, and if the policy language is clear on its face, there is no room for construction. `If coverage hinges on an undefined term, we apply the plain, ordinary meaning of the term in interpreting the contract.' While we regard insurance policies as adhesion contracts and resolve ambiguities in favor of the insured, we will not rewrite a contract to impose liability on an insurer if the policy unambiguously precludes coverage. We will not strain the definition of an undefined term to provide coverage for the insured. We construe insurance contracts as a whole to give meaning and effect to each clause, if possible. The whole of a contract is to be taken together to give effect to every part, and each clause is to help interpret the others."
"Exclusions from coverage ... must be clear and explicit and are strictly construed against the insurer." Nationwide Mut. Ins. Cos. v. Lagodinski, 2004 ND 147, ¶ 9, 683 N.W.2d 903 (quoting Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Center Mut. Ins. Co., 2003 ND 50, ¶ 10, 658 N.W.2d 363). Although exclusionary provisions are strictly construed, we "will not rewrite a contract to impose liability on an insurer if the policy unambiguously precludes coverage." Lagodinski, at ¶ 9.
[¶ 9] Likewise, under South Dakota law, the interpretation of an insurance contract presents a legal question, reviewed de novo on appeal. MGA Ins. Co., Inc. v. Goodsell, 2005 SD 118, ¶ 9, 707 N.W.2d 483. Ambiguous language in an insurance contract is construed liberally in favor of the insured. Northland Ins. Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2007 SD 126, ¶ 13, 743 N.W.2d 145. "The existence of the rights and obligations of parties to an insurance contract are determined by the language of the contract, which must be construed according to the plain meaning of its terms. Thus, in deciphering the language of the insurance contract, the court must employ a plain meaning approach." State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Harbert, 2007 SD 107, ¶ 17, 741 N.W.2d 228 (citation and quotation omitted).
[¶ 10] "In determining coverage under the contract, [the Court] must look to the contractual intent and objectives of the parties as expressed in the contract." Northland Ins. Co., 2007 SD 126, ¶ 13, 743 N.W.2d 145. "`Limits to coverage, whether in exclusions, limitations, riders, or endorsements, should be set forth clearly and explicitly.'" Fall River County v. South Dakota Pub. Assur. Alliance, 2001 SD 40, ¶ 8, 623 N.W.2d 735 (quoting Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Lyon, 1997 SD 50, ¶ 9 n. 4, 562 N.W.2d 888).
[¶ 11] Northern Plains argues this case presents a "choice of law" issue under this Court's decision in Nodak Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wamsley, 2004 ND 174, ¶¶ 14-23, 687 N.W.2d 226, which held North Dakota and not Montana law governed the right to stack underinsured motorist coverages, where the policies were issued to North Dakota residents by a North Dakota insurance company and the accident occurred in Montana. In Wamsley, this Court reiterated *885 "the choice-influencing considerations [for purposes of North Dakota's choice-of-law analysis, including] predictability of results, maintenance of interstate and international order, simplification of the judicial task, advancement of the forum's governmental interests, and application of the better rule of law." Id. at ¶ 11 (discussing Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 267, 282 (1966); Issendorf v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750, 754-56 (N.D. 1972)). In Wamsley we also discussed our prior decision in Plante v. Columbia Paints, 494 N.W.2d 140, 141 (N.D.1992), which involved a declaratory judgment action to determine insurance coverage for injuries occurring in a North Dakota explosion.
[¶ 12] In Plante, this Court held the significant contacts approach was appropriate in cases with "multi-state factual contacts," concluding the most significant contacts were those bearing on the contractual relationship because North Dakota's contacts were primarily related to the underlying tort, and the contacts between the parties to the insurance contract were primarily out-of-state. See Wamsley, 2004 ND 174, ¶ 12, 687 N.W.2d 226 (discussing Plante, 494 N.W.2d at 142). "[O]ur significant contacts test for deciding choice-of-law questions requires a two-pronged analysis." Wamsley, 2004 ND 174, ¶ 13, 687 N.W.2d 226 (citing Daley v. American States Preferred Ins. Co., 1998 ND 225, ¶ 10, 587 N.W.2d 159). First, we identify the relevant contacts which might logically influence the decision on the applicable law, and then we apply the choice-influencing considerations "to determine which jurisdiction has the more significant interest with the issues in the case." Wamsley, at ¶ 13 (quoting Daley, at ¶ 12).
[¶ 13] In this case, it is undisputed that Randall and Charlotte Schleuter are residents of South Dakota, that Randall Schleuter's vehicle was registered in South Dakota, that the vehicle was insured through a policy with Northern Plains liability, that Northern Plains is a South Dakota company that does not do business in North Dakota, that the policy was negotiated, purchased, issued and paid for by the Schleuters as South Dakota residents, and that Randall Schleuter's medical treatment after being released from a Fargo hospital has been through South Dakota facilities. Further, North Dakota's contacts are limited to the initial underlying accident and injuries in North Dakota and to Randall Schleuter's initial treatment and one-night stay at a Fargo hospital before returning home to South Dakota.
[¶ 14] Under a North Dakota choice-of-law analysis, we conclude South Dakota law applies to interpret the policy language at issue in this case. That conclusion requires this Court to construe the competing provisions of the policy under South Dakota rules for interpreting insurance contracts. We reject Northern Plains' assertion that based upon Wamsley, 2004 ND 174, 687 N.W.2d 226, South Dakota law automatically requires application of the policy's household exclusion. The Wamsley case involved application of North Dakota law, including statutory and policy prohibition on stacking underinsured motorist coverage, and did not address an "out-of-state coverage" clause. This case, however, involves the interpretation of specific policy language including the "out-of-state coverage" clause and the household exclusion. We initially consider the out-of-state coverage clause.

IV
[¶ 15] In concluding the policy's "household exclusion" applied to limit coverage, the district court held "North Dakota's conformity clause does not trump the *886 contract voluntarily entered into by the parties and which is in compliance with South Dakota law." (Emphasis added.) The district court's opinion misinterprets the contractual nature of the "conformity" or "out-of-state coverage" clause, which is also an important part of the insurance contract between Northern Plains and the Schleuters. That clause provides, in part, that when an insured under the liability coverage "becomes subject to [another state's] motor vehicle compulsory insurance, financial responsibility or similar law," the policy is "interpreted to give the coverage required by the law" and "replaces any coverage in this policy to the extent required by the law." Northern Plains argues this language only requires the policy to conform to the minimum limits required by North Dakota's financial responsibility law and does not require "full application" of North Dakota law. We disagree.
[¶ 16] Having concluded South Dakota law applies to interpret this policy, we look to the plain language of the policy. The "out-of-state coverage" clause is not ambiguous, and if the insured is in another state and becomes subject to that state's insurance law, the policy provides "coverage" "required by the law" and "replaces any coverage in this policy to the extent required by the law" for the insured's "operation" or "use" of a vehicle. Here, "required by the law" refers to the "coverage" that is required by the law where the Schleuters were, North Dakota. The policy does not provide a general definition of the term "coverage." In the insurance context, the term "coverage" has been defined as "normally refer[ring] ... to the amount and extent of risk included in the scope of a policy." Aid Ass'n for Lutherans v. United States Postal Serv., 321 F.3d 1166, 1176 (D.C.Cir.2003); see Black's Law Dictionary 394 (8th ed.2004) (defining "coverage" as "[i]nclusion of a risk under an insurance policy; the risks within the scope of an insurance policy"); Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 288 (11th ed.2003) (defining "coverage" as "something that covers: as ... inclusion within the scope of an insurance policy or protective plan"). See also In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litigation, 993 F.2d 313, 314 (2d Cir.1993) ("`[C]overage'... is the amount and extent of the risk [an insurer] contractually assumed, as specified in the insuring clause and exclusions."); Traders State Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 448 F.2d 280, 283 (10th Cir. 1971) ("The word coverage is, indeed, a term of art in the insurance industry, meaning `the sum of all the risks assumed under the policy.'"); Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Bayside Resort, Inc., 635 F.Supp. 1456, 1458 (D.Virgin Islands 1986) ("The universal definition of `coverage' is the amount and extent of risk contractually assumed by the carrier."); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 77 Hawai`i 490, 889 P.2d 67, 69 n. 3 (1995) ("Coverage refers to `the "assumption of risk of occurrence of the event insured against before its occurrence."'"); Illinois Farmers Ins. Co. v. Tabor, 267 Ill.App.3d 245, 204 Ill. Dec. 697, 642 N.E.2d 159, 163 (1994) ("[C]overage is the amount and extent of risk contractually assumed by an insurer," and "`limits of liability' refers to the `bounds or restrictions' of [an insurer's] duty to pay, assuming the existence of certain conditions."); Seabaugh v. Sisk, 413 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Mo.Ct.App.1967) ("`[C]overage' refers to the `aggregate of risks covered by the terms of a contract of insurance'" or "`the sum of risks which an insurance policy covers.'"); New York University v. Continental Ins. Co., 87 N.Y.2d 308, 639 N.Y.S.2d 283, 662 N.E.2d 763, 772 (1995) ("[C]overage is the net total of policy inclusions minus exclusions. ..."); D'Angelo v. Cornell Paperboard Prods. Co., 59 Wis.2d 46, 207 N.W.2d 846, 849 (1973) ("Coverage or coverages *887 as that word is generally used refers to the sum of risks which an insurance policy covers."); Miller v. Amundson, 117 Wis.2d 425, 345 N.W.2d 494, 497 (1984) ("The word `coverage' includes the policy's dollar limits of liability.").
[¶ 17] The term "coverage" as used in the policy's provision for out-of-state coverage is broader than the "minimum limits" of liability. Rather, coverage includes the risks and contemplates "the coverage required by the law" of the state in which the insured is in as a non-resident, which in this case was North Dakota. Northern Plains could have used language to clearly restrict the change in the policy for out-of-state use or operation of a motor vehicle to the "limits of its liability," but did not. Instead, the policy purports "to give the coverage required by the law" and "the coverage so given replaces any coverage in this policy to the extent required by the law for the insured's operation, maintenance or use of a car insured under this policy." By using this language, Northern Plains obligated itself to protect its insureds from changing liabilities and to conform with various states laws, here North Dakota law, by "replacing" coverage in the policy with that "required by the law." Therefore, if Charlotte Schleuter became "subject" to North Dakota's "motor vehicle compulsory insurance, financial responsibility or similar law," the policy's provisions will be subject to the requirements of North Dakota law for the claims brought by Randall Schleuter against Charlotte Schleuter under the policy.
[¶ 18] "North Dakota law requires that no person shall drive a motor vehicle without a valid motor vehicle liability insurance policy in the amount required by Chapter 39-16.1, N.D.C.C. Section 39-08-20, N.D.C.C." Richard v. Fliflet, 370 N.W.2d 528, 534 (N.D.1985). Specifically, N.D.C.C. § 39-08-20(1) provides:
"A person may not drive, or the owner may not cause or knowingly permit to be driven, a motor vehicle in this state without a valid policy of liability insurance in effect in order to respond in damages for liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of that motor vehicle in the amount required by chapter 39-16.1."
Chapter 39-16.1, N.D.C.C., provides the minimum coverage required to satisfy North Dakota's financial responsibility law. See Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Farm & City Ins. Co., 2000 ND 163, ¶ 16, 616 N.W.2d 353; RLI Ins. Co. v. Heling, 520 N.W.2d 849, 852 (N.D.1994). Section 39-16.1-10, N.D.C.C., provides:
"1. The nonresident owner of a motor vehicle not registered in this state may give proof of financial responsibility by filing with the director a written or electronically transmitted certificate of an insurance carrier authorized to transact business in the state in which the motor vehicle or motor vehicles described in the certificate is registered, or if the nonresident does not own a motor vehicle, then in the state in which the insured resides, provided the certificate otherwise conforms to the provisions of this chapter, and the director shall accept the same upon condition that the insurance carrier complies with the following provisions with respect to the policies so certified:
. . . .
b. The insurance carrier shall agree in writing that the policies conform with the laws of this state relating to the terms of motor vehicle liability policies issued herein.
. . . .
"3. Notwithstanding the requirement of subsection 1, the nonresident owner of a motor vehicle not registered in *888 this state may file proof of future financial responsibility of an insurance company or other state-authorized entity providing insurance and authorized or licensed to do business in the nonresident's state of residence as long as such proof of future financial responsibility is in the amounts required by this state."
(Emphasis added.) Section 39-16.1-11, N.D.C.C., states, in part:
"1. A `motor vehicle liability policy' as said term is used in this chapter means an owner's or an operator's policy of liability insurance, certified as provided in sections 39-16.1-09 and 39-16.1-10 as proof of financial responsibility, and issued, except as otherwise provided in section 39-16.1-10, by an insurance carrier duly authorized to transact business in this state, to or for the benefit of the person named therein as insured.
"2. Such owner's policy of liability insurance:
a. Must designate by explicit description or by appropriate reference all motor vehicles with respect to which coverage is thereby to be granted; and
b. Must insure the person named therein and any other person, as insured, using such motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied permission of such named insured, against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such motor vehicles within the United States of America or the Dominion of Canada, subject to limits exclusive of interest and costs, with respect to each such motor vehicle, as follows: twenty-five thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident and subject to said limit for one person, fifty thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident, and twenty-five thousand dollars because of injury to or destruction of property of others in any one accident.
"3. Such operator's policy of liability insurance must insure the person named as insured therein against loss from the liability imposed upon the person by law for damages arising out of the use by the person of any motor vehicle, either unlimited, or limited by excluding certain classes or types of motor vehicles, within the same territorial limits and subject to the same limits of liability as are set forth above with respect to an owner's policy of liability insurance."
See also N.D.C.C. § 39-16-01(6), (7) (defining "nonresident" and "nonresident's operating privilege" for purposes of the financial responsibility law); N.D.C.C. § 39-16-05 (providing for suspension of operating privilege of nonresident driver involved in an accident unless compliance with financial responsibility laws "affording substantially the same coverage required for proof of financial responsibility under chapter 39-16.1").
[¶ 19] We construe the above sections to require a "non-resident" to provide insurance that "conforms to the provisions of this chapter." Based upon the statutory language and applying South Dakota insurance contract interpretation principles, we conclude Charlotte Schleuter became subject to the financial responsibility laws of North Dakota and is entitled under the out-of-state coverage clause to the coverage required by North Dakota for non-resident motor vehicle operators. It is undisputed that Charlotte Schleuter was operating the vehicle owned by Randall *889 Schleuter in North Dakota at the time of the accident that injured Randall Schleuter. Because the accident occurred in North Dakota, Charlotte Schleuter was subject to North Dakota's motor vehicle compulsory insurance, financial responsibility or similar law. To the extent that claims are brought against Charlotte Schleuter under the liability section of the policy, Charlotte Schleuter is entitled to the protection and coverage which North Dakota requires for operation of a vehicle on North Dakota highways.
[¶ 20] We next interpret the policy to determine whether the "household or family exclusion" applies in this case. The "household exclusion" in Northern Plains' policy states that there is no coverage for any bodily injury to "any insured or any member of an insured's family residing in the insured's household." This exclusion is permissible, but not required, under South Dakota law. See S.D.C.L. § 32-35-70 ("The policy may exclude or limit coverage pursuant to § 58-11-9.3, or for a relative residing in the named insured's household."); Goodsell, 2005 SD 118, ¶¶ 12-13, 23, 707 N.W.2d 483 (holding S.D.C.L. § 32-35-70 clearly delineated between a "named insured" and an "insured" and permitted an insurer to limit coverage only for a "relative residing in `the named insured's household'"); see also Isaac v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 522 N.W.2d 752, 756 n. 1 (S.D.1994).
[¶ 21] Under North Dakota law, however, such a provision in an insurance policy is void. See Hughes, 236 N.W.2d 870, 885 (N.D.1975). In Hughes, this Court held a "`household, or family, exclusion clause' contained in a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance issued and delivered in this State is void as violative of public policy and the statutes of this State." Id.
"We recognized that the basic purpose of Chapters 39-16 [Financial Responsibility of owners and operators] and 39-16.1 [Proof of Financial Responsibility for the Future], N.D.C.C., was to protect innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents from financial disaster. We said that the license suspension sanctions imposed by Chapter 39-16, N.D.C.C., were intended to guarantee financial responsibility for a first accident, in contrast to the requirements of Chapter 39-16.1, N.D.C.C., which were designed to establish proof of financial responsibility for future accidents involving a motor vehicle owner or operator who has already had an accident, or who has been convicted of certain traffic offenses. We concluded that our financial responsibility laws and public policy required a motor vehicle liability policy purchased to avoid the sanctions in Section 39-16-05, N.D.C.C., to provide the named insured, and any other person using the insured motor vehicle with permission of the named insured, with minimum coverage for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the insured motor vehicle. We held that the `household or family exclusion' clause violated our financial responsibility laws and public policy because that clause excluded coverage for a class of beneficiaries suffering damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the insured motor vehicle."
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. LaRoque, 486 N.W.2d 235, 238-39 (N.D.1992) (discussing Hughes, 236 N.W.2d 870). In Hughes this Court held the family exclusion clause was contrary to public policy because it failed to meet the minimum coverage required under this state's financial responsibility laws in N.D.C.C. chs. 39-16 and 39-16.1. Although Northern Plains essentially argues the family or household exclusion applies to this case because Hughes is limited to policies issued and delivered in this State, we conclude *890 the "out-of-state coverage" clause requires application of Hughes to fully conform to the requirements of North Dakota law.
[¶ 22] In this case, because the "out-of-state coverage" clause of the policy applies, the claims brought against Charlotte Schleuter are governed by North Dakota law. The "coverage" required by North Dakota law is thus available to claims under the liability policy. North Dakota's financial responsibility insurance law is a compulsory law and applies to non-resident operators of motor vehicles in this state. See N.D.C.C. §§ 39-08-20, 39-16.1-10, 39-16.1-11. See also N.D.C.C. § 26.1-41-02(1), (3) ("1. The owner of a motor vehicle required to be registered in this state, or the owner of a motor vehicle operated in this state by the owner or with owner's permission, shall continuously provide with respect to the motor vehicle during the period in which operation is contemplated in this state security for payment of basic no-fault benefits and the liabilities covered under the motor vehicle liability insurance." and "3. If the motor vehicle is registered in another state, the security may be provided by an insurance policy issued by an insurer authorized to transact business in either this state or the state in which the motor vehicle is registered, or, by self-insurance as approved by the insurance department of the state in which the motor vehicle is registered."). Under Hughes and North Dakota law, that coverage may not be limited by a household or family exclusion.
[¶ 23] Based on the plain language of the "out-of-state coverage" clause in the coverage section of the policy, we conclude members of the household who have claims under the liability policy against Charlotte Schleuter are not precluded from bringing those claims. We reach this conclusion based upon policy language that plainly states the insurance required under North Dakota law "replaces" the coverage provided in the policy, and based upon North Dakota law that requires the coverage of family members. Other courts have reached similar conclusions. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. McNeal, 491 F.Supp.2d 814, 824-25 (S.D.Ind.2007); Cartner v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 123 N.C.App. 251, 472 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1996); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ballard, 132 N.M. 696, 54 P.3d 537, 542 (2002). But see Draper v. Draper, 115 Idaho 973, 772 P.2d 180, 184-85 (1989).
[¶ 24] Under the plain language of the policy, we conclude the broad grant of coverage in the policy's out-of-state coverage clause, by its own terms, "replaces any coverage" in the policy, grants the coverage required under North Dakota law and precludes application of the household exclusion.

V
[¶ 25] We have considered the remaining arguments raised by Northern Plains and determine they are either unnecessary to our decision or without merit. The district court judgment is reversed.
[¶ 26] GERALD W. VANDE WALLE, C.J., SONJA CLAPP, D.J. DALE V. SANDSTROM, and CAROL RONNING KAPSNER, JJ., concur.
[¶ 27] The Honorable SONJA CLAPP, D.J., sitting in place of MARING, J., disqualified.