201 P.3d 517 (2009)
LEAGUE OF ARIZONA CITIES AND TOWNS, Petitioner,
v.
Dean MARTIN, Arizona State Treasurer, in his official capacity and Janet Napolitano, Governor of the State of Arizona, Respondents.
No. CV-08-0379-SA.
Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc.
February 3, 2009.
*518 Perkins, Coie, Brown, & Bain, P.A. by Paul F. Eckstein, Charles A. Blanchard, Steven J. Monde, Aaron S. Welling, Phoenix, Attorneys for League of Arizona Cities and Towns.
Terry Goddard, Arizona Attorney General by Mary R. O'Grady, Solicitor General, Christopher Munns, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for Dean Martin, State Treasurer.
Lewis and Roca, L.L.P. by Robert G. Schaffer, Kimberly A. Demarchi, Emily S. Cates, Stefan M. Palys, Sarah E. Selzer, Phoenix, Attorneys for Janet A. Napolitano, Governor.
BERCH, Vice Chief Justice.
¶ 1 We have been asked to decide whether a statutory measure requiring Arizona's incorporated cities and towns to deposit money into the state general fund is an appropriation that may be included in the general appropriations bill. See Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 20. We hold that it is not such an appropriation.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶ 2 On June 26, 2008, the Arizona Legislature passed House Bill 2209 ("HB 2209"), which is the general appropriations act for the 2008-2009 fiscal year. 2008 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 285 (2d Reg.Sess.). Section 47 of the bill requires the petitioning cities and towns to pay approximately eighteen million dollars into the state general fund during the current fiscal year:
A. Notwithstanding any other law, in fiscal year 2008-2009, counties, incorporated cities and towns shall deposit $29,748,400 into the state general fund. The amount transferred to the state general fund by each county, incorporated city and town shall be calculated by the joint legislative budget committee staff, who shall publish the allocations by August 31, 2008. The joint legislative budget committee staff shall base its allocation on the distributions provided under section 28-6538, subsection A, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, Arizona Revised Statutes.[[1]]
B. Notwithstanding any other law, a county may meet any statutory funding requirements of this section from any source of county revenue designated by the county, including funds of any county wide special taxing district in which the board of supervisors serves as the board of directors.
C. Contributions made pursuant to this section are excluded from the county expenditure limitations.
*519 Id. § 47. The Governor signed HB 2209 into law on June 27, 2008. The legislature then promptly adjourned sine die. Four days later, the 2008-2009 fiscal year began. It ends on June 30, 2009. See Ariz. Const. art. 9, § 4; Ariz.Rev.Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 35-102 (2000).
¶ 3 Two weeks after the passage of HB 2209, the League of Arizona Cities and Towns (the "League") contacted the Governor's Office to express concern over § 47's constitutionality. The League and its counsel met with the Governor's staff at least four times between August and October 2008 to discuss the dispute over § 47. When discussions failed to resolve the issue, the League filed a special action in this Court on November 14, approximately four and one-half months after HB 2209 was signed into law.[2] The petition named as respondents the Governor of Arizona and the Arizona State Treasurer.[3] Following oral argument, we issued an order accepting jurisdiction. This opinion explains our grant of relief.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Special Action Jurisdiction
¶ 4 Our decision to accept jurisdiction of a special action is highly discretionary. Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 3, State Bar Committee Note; see also Forty-Seventh Legislature v. Napolitano, 213 Ariz. 482, 485, ¶ 11, 143 P.3d 1023, 1026 (2006). Several factors support our exercise of jurisdiction in this matter. The case presents novel constitutional issues of statewide importance. See Forty-Seventh Legislature, 213 Ariz. at 485, ¶ 11, 143 P.3d at 1026; Randolph v. Groscost, 195 Ariz. 423, 425, ¶ 6, 989 P.2d 751, 753 (1999). In addition, "this case involves a dispute at the highest levels of state government" and requires a swift determination because it concerns the state budget for the current fiscal year. Rios v. Symington, 172 Ariz. 3, 5, 833 P.2d 20, 22 (1992); see also State Comp. Fund v. Symington, 174 Ariz. 188, 192, 848 P.2d 273, 277 (1993) (noting that "prompt resolution is needed [in cases affecting the state budget] so that the legislative and executive branches will know where they stand and can take such action as they determine necessary relative to budgetary matters").
¶ 5 The Governor urges us to decline jurisdiction because of the League's delay in filing suit. Although the Governor frames the issue as a jurisdictional challenge, we analyze it under our laches jurisprudence because it does not implicate our authority to decide the case; rather, it relates to our exercise of discretion whether to take the case.
¶ 6 "Laches will generally bar a claim when the delay [in filing suit] is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party." Sotomayor v. Burns, 199 Ariz. 81, 83, ¶ 6, 13 P.3d 1198, 1200 (2000). Delay alone will not establish a laches defense, however. Id. at ¶ 8; Harris v. Purcell, 193 Ariz. 409, 412, ¶ 16, 973 P.2d 1166, 1169 (1998). Rather, in determining whether the delay was unreasonable, "we examine the justification for delay, including the extent of plaintiff's advance knowledge of the basis for challenge." Harris, 193 Ariz. at 412, ¶ 16, 973 P.2d at 1169. The delay must also result in prejudice, either to the opposing party or to the administration of justice, id., which may be demonstrated by showing injury or a change in position as a result of the delay. Flynn v. Rogers, 172 Ariz. 62, 66, 834 P.2d 148, 152 (1992) (citing Jerger v. Rubin, 106 Ariz. 114, 117, 471 P.2d 726, 729 (1970)); Tovrea v. Umphress, 27 Ariz.App. 513, 521, 556 P.2d 814, 822 (1976); see also Lubin v. Thomas, 213 Ariz. 496, 497, ¶ 10, 144 P.3d 510, 511 (2006) (finding prejudice to system).
¶ 7 The Governor contends that by waiting to bring its action until November, the League prevented prompt judicial resolution of the matter and exacerbated the already precarious budget situation. The *520 League counters that the parties' ongoing negotiations justified the delay. It further maintains that no prejudice has occurred because substantial budget adjustments are still required before the end of the fiscal year to balance the State budget.
¶ 8 Section 47 requires the cities and towns to deposit roughly $18.3 million into the general fund by the end of the current fiscal year, which concludes on June 30, 2009. When the petition was filed, more than seven months remained before the League members' payments were due. Even now, nearly five months remain. Thus, while we recognize the complexities associated with balancing the budget during the course of the fiscal year, in this case, adequate time remains for the legislature to make adjustments. The time remaining before the payment deadline distinguishes this case from other cases in which we have found delays in filing suit unreasonable. Those cases often dealt with last-minute challenges to ballot propositions filed shortly before impending printing deadlines. See, e.g., Sotomayor, 199 Ariz. at 83, ¶ 7, 13 P.3d at 1200 (holding unreasonable petitioners' failure to file a special action until the day before the voter information pamphlet printing deadline); Mathieu v. Mahoney, 174 Ariz. 456, 459, 851 P.2d 81, 84 (1993) (finding unreasonable filing the complaint days before the absentee ballot printing deadline). Here, the League did not wait until an imminent deadline approached to file its special action.
¶ 9 But even had the delay been unreasonable, delay alone will not satisfy the test for laches. Sotomayor, 199 Ariz. at 83, ¶ 8, 13 P.3d at 1200. The complaining party must also prove prejudice. Id. In this case, the Governor has not demonstrated prejudice because she has not shown substantial harm caused by the League's delay. When § 47 was passed, the State's budget deficit was projected to be approximately $400 million. The anticipated deficit has steadily grown and is currently reported to be nearly $1.6 billion. JOINT LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COMM., JLBC  MONTHLY FISCAL HIGHLIGHTS: JANUARY 2009, at 1 (2009), http://www.azleg.gov/jlbc/mfh-jan-09.pdf. Section 47 requires the cities and towns to make a payment that represents only a small fraction of the current deficit.
¶ 10 The Governor suggests that measures might have been taken to find alternate sources of revenue to replace the amount at issue here had it been known that the League would challenge § 47. Yet she knew months before the special action was filed of the League's claim that § 47 is unconstitutional. Governor Napolitano did not exercise her constitutional authority to convene an extraordinary session of the legislature to address this issue, see Ariz. Const. art. 5, § 4 (authorizing extraordinary session). Even after this action was filed, neither she nor the legislature requested a special session, see id. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(2) (authorizing a special session upon petition of two-thirds of members of each house). If a special session was not called during that time to resolve a $1.6 billion deficit it seems unlikely one would have been called to find an alternate source for funding the $18.3 million payment at issue here. We therefore do not find that the delay in this case caused prejudice.
¶ 11 The availability of an alternative remedy also undermines the Governor's claim of prejudice. The cities and towns receive payments from the State through the Urban Revenue Sharing Fund (the "URSF"), A.R.S. § 43-206 (Supp.2008). For the current fiscal year, the legislature appropriated $727,677,400 from the general fund to the URSF. See 2006 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 351, § 14 (2d Reg.Sess.).[4] The Treasurer distributes monies from the URSF to the cities and towns in a proportional amount each month. A.R.S. § 43-206(C). At this time, the URSF contains several months' worth of appropriated monies that have not yet been distributed. See id. The legislature could suspend, reduce, or eliminate part of the remaining payments to the incorporated cities and towns. If that were to happen, contrary to the Governor's prejudice claim, funds of other state *521 entities would not be required to offset the expected $18.3 million deposit from the League's members.[5]
¶ 12 The Governor urges us not to overlook the burden that the League's delay imposes on the state budget process. We agree that parties wishing to challenge the budget must do so in a timely manner and, in some circumstances, a four-month delay will be too long. See Mathieu, 174 Ariz. at 460, 851 P.2d at 85 ("Litigants and lawyers involved in [public] litigation must be keenly aware of the need to bring such cases with all deliberate speed or else the quality of judicial decision making is seriously compromised."). But we disagree with the Governor's conclusion that the League's delay was unreasonable or caused prejudice under the circumstances of this case.
¶ 13 Laches is an equitable doctrine based on the principle of fundamental fairness. Harris, 193 Ariz. at 414, ¶ 24, 973 P.2d at 1171. When determining whether laches should preclude a claim, we consider all factors, including not only the length of the League's delay, but also the magnitude of the problem at issue. Employing this approach leads us to conclude that the League's delay does not bar this action.

B. Is § 47 an Appropriation?
¶ 14 The Arizona Constitution strictly limits the contents of general appropriations bills: "The general appropriation bill shall embrace nothing but appropriations for the different departments of the State, for State institutions, for public schools, and for interest on the public debt. All other appropriations shall be made by separate bills, each embracing but one subject." Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 20. Any legislation in a general appropriations bill that is neither an appropriation of money for a specific purpose nor a provision necessary for the proper expenditure of that money is improper. State v. Angle, 54 Ariz. 13, 21, 91 P.2d 705, 708 (1939).
¶ 15 We have set forth the standards for determining whether legislation is an "appropriation" on several occasions. In Hunt v. Callaghan, we defined an appropriation as "the setting aside from the public revenue of a certain sum of money for a specified object, in such manner that the executive officers of the government are authorized to use that money, and no more, for that object, and no other." 32 Ariz. 235, 239, 257 P. 648, 649 (1927) (citations omitted). The essential parts of this definition are the "certain sum," the "specified object," and the "authority to spend." Rios, 172 Ariz. at 7, 833 P.2d at 24 (quoting Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 25 Ariz. 381, 406, 218 P. 139, 148 (1923) (Lockwood, J., dissenting)). The legislature may set aside money from the public revenue by "authoriz[ing] spending from the general fund or ... authoriz[ing] payments of ascertainable amounts from a special fund." Forty-Seventh Legislature, 213 Ariz. at 487, ¶ 20, 143 P.3d at 1028. We have also determined that under certain circumstances the legislature may make an appropriation by transferring money from a previously appropriated sum back into the general fund. See Rios, 172 Ariz. at 9, 833 P.2d at 26.
¶ 16 In Rios v. Symington, we addressed whether fund transfers shifting money from special funds into the general fund constituted appropriations. Id. at 8-9, 833 P.2d at 25-26. In that case, we applied the three-part test for an appropriation to each special fund at issue and ruled that all were created by appropriations. Id. at 6-8, 833 P.2d at 23-25. We then held that fund transfers reducing the amount of a prior appropriation also constituted appropriations. Id. at 8, 833 P.2d at 25. The reason was apparent: *522 "When the Legislature transfers monies from a previously-made appropriation, the obvious effect is to reduce the amount of the previous appropriation." Id. at 9, 833 P.2d at 26. Rios emphasized that before a transfer of funds from a special fund may be considered an appropriation, the special fund itself must meet the test for an appropriation. Id. at 6, 9, 833 P.2d at 23, 26. Rios thus obliges the legislature to identify some appropriation that must be reduced to make the payment demanded by § 47 if it wishes to include the transfer in the general appropriations bill.
¶ 17 While § 47 identifies an ascertainable sum to be paid, the question remains whether § 47 identifies and reduces something that meets the definition of an appropriation. We conclude that it does not. The legislature did not expressly attach the assessed amount to any public revenue that it had previously set aside for the cities and towns. Because § 47 fails to identify any prior appropriation, it fails to meet the definition of an appropriation.
¶ 18 The Governor argues that the cities and towns received monies from the State far exceeding the $18.3 million at issue, and the Court should infer that these were the prior appropriations intended to be reduced by § 47. The Governor first identifies $17.7 million of additional funding to the Urban Revenue Sharing Fund as a specific appropriation for fiscal year 2008-2009 that § 47 could constitutionally reduce. See supra note 4. But the Governor admits that this extra funding does not cover the total $18.3 million requirement imposed on the cities and towns, leaving a portion of the § 47 payment obligation unattached to any prior appropriation. More importantly, § 47 does not identify the additional urban revenue sharing funding as an appropriation that the legislature designated for reduction. The Governor also points to various discretionary grants made for the benefit of the cities and towns as appropriations that § 47 might be deemed to reduce. Those funds, however, are often subject to restrictions, such as use or reimbursement limitations imposed by the federal government, and many are not appropriated to the cities and towns themselves, but to various executive agencies for use by the cities and towns. And again, those grants are not identified in § 47 as the prior appropriations now being reduced. Because § 47 does not reduce any identified prior appropriation, it violates Article 4, Part 2, Section 20, and is therefore unconstitutional.[6]See Angle, 54 Ariz. at 21, 91 P.2d at 708.

C. Attorneys' Fees
¶ 19 The League has requested an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-348(A) (2003). That section requires an award of attorneys' fees "to any party other than ... a city, town or county which prevails by an adjudication on the merits in ... [a] special action proceeding brought by the party to challenge an action by the state against the party." Id. (emphasis added). Under the statute, the cities and towns are prohibited from recovering fees. Accordingly, the League, which asserted standing in this matter as the representative of the cities and towns, cannot be awarded attorneys' fees under § 12-348(A).

III. CONCLUSION
¶ 20 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that § 47 is not an appropriation and therefore was not properly included in the general appropriations bill. It therefore violates Article 4, Part 2, Section 20 of the Arizona Constitution. The League's request for attorneys' fees is denied.
CONCURRING: RUTH V. McGREGOR, Chief Justice, MICHAEL D. RYAN, ANDREW D. HURWITZ, and W. SCOTT BALES, Justices.
BALES, Justice, Concurring.
¶ 21 While joining in the Court's opinion, I write briefly to explain why I conclude this action is not barred by laches. The legislature *523 has ample time within this fiscal year to remedy the identified constitutional problem and to achieve nearly the same budget reduction sought by § 47 without impacting recipients of appropriations other than the cities and towns.
¶ 22 As a general matter, I would be inclined to accept the Governor's argument that a party cannot wait several months to challenge the validity of an appropriations bill. Delay in bringing such challenges obviously poses the risk of unduly prejudicing governmental entities that could be forced to absorb significant budget adjustments over the remaining fiscal year. These concerns, however, are not implicated here given the unique circumstances of this case.
¶ 23 The legislature, as the Court recognizes, see n. 6 supra, could achieve almost all the $18.3 million budget savings intended by § 47 by instead rescinding $17.7 million from the existing $728 million appropriation to the Urban Revenue Sharing Fund (URSF). Because monies are distributed to cities and towns from the URSF on a monthly basis, there are hundreds of millions of dollars still remaining in the URSF for this fiscal year. The legislature could, by a majority vote of each house, reduce the outstanding appropriation by some $17.7 million, the difference between the amount the legislature appropriated in 2006 and the amount calculated by the statutory formula in A.R.S. § 43-206(A).
¶ 24 If the Legislature can achieve nearly the same result by reducing this year's urban revenue sharing appropriation to cities and towns, one might ask if our decision unduly elevates form over substance. This is an area, however, in which the form of legislation has constitutional significance. Section 47 does not identify any appropriation of state funds from which the cities and towns are to provide the mandated deposit of money. This fact readily distinguishes § 47 from lump sum reductions that can be linked to identifiable appropriations to departments or subunits of the state. Such reductions are treated as "appropriations" that may be included in a general appropriations bill and are subject to the Governor's line item veto. Rios v. Symington, 172 Ariz. 3, 10-11, 833 P.2d 20, 27-28 (1992). By today holding that § 47 cannot be included in a general appropriations bill because it does not reduce any identifiable appropriation, the Court's decision not only honors the language of Article 4, Part 2, Section 20 of the constitution, but also promotes accountability and transparency in the state's budgeting process.
CONCURRING: ANDREW D. HURWITZ, Justice.
NOTES
[1]  The allocations are based on the formula used to determine distributions from the Arizona Highway User Revenue Fund ("HURF") to the counties, incorporated cities, and towns. Under that formula, the cities and towns must deposit $18,329,822 into the general fund, while the counties are responsible for $11,418,578.
[2]  The League represents only the cities and towns. The counties are not parties to this action and have not challenged the constitutionality of § 47.
[3]  The Treasurer agrees with the League that § 47 violates Article 4, Part 2, Section 20 of the Arizona Constitution. Since this lawsuit was briefed and argued, Janice K. Brewer has succeeded Janet Napolitano as Governor of Arizona. The Court has received no filings by the Office of the Governor indicating a change in legal position.
[4]  This appropriation was made in lieu of the transfer required by § 43-206(A). 2006 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 351, § 14. Under the formula provided in § 43-206(A), the URSF would have contained $709,936,400 for the current fiscal year, $17,741,000 less than the amount the legislature appropriated. House Fact Sheet for S.B. 1160, 48th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (2008).
[5]  The League argues that any reduction in the existing URSF appropriation of approximately $728 million would require a two-thirds vote of each house of the legislature because it would change the allocation of taxes among the state and cities. See Ariz. Const. art. 9, § 22(7). We need not decide that issue because Chapter 351 of the 2006 session laws appropriates monies from the general fund for fiscal year 2008-2009 in lieu of an amount equal to fifteen percent of net state income taxes for fiscal year 2006-2007. Thus, even if reducing the URSF appropriation below the formula-based amount might be subject to a supermajority vote, an issue we do not decide here, reducing the appropriation to that amount would not change the allocation of taxes among the State and cities for purposes of Article 9, Section 22.
[6]  In its petition for special action, the League also argued that § 47 violates Article 9, Section 22 of the Arizona Constitution because it imposes a new tax, fee, or assessment without approval by a two-thirds vote of both houses of the legislature. Because we conclude that § 47 is unconstitutional under Article 4, Part 2, Section 20, we do not reach this issue.


792 N.E.2d 22 (2003)
Brian MAJORS, et al., Appellants (Plaintiffs Below),
v.
Marsha ABELL, et al., Appellees (Defendants Below).
No. 94S00-0303-CQ-94.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
July 24, 2003.
*23 Robbin Stewart Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellants.
W. Russell Sipes, Indianapolis, IN, Deborah Goldberg J.J. Gass, New York, NY, Amicus Curiae Common Cause/Indiana.
Steve Carter, Attorney General, Frances Barrow, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellees.

ON CERTIFIED QUESTION BOEHM
BOEHM, Justice.
The United States for the Seventh Circuit has requested our response to the following certified question:
Is the term "persons" in Ind.Code §§ 3-9-3-2.5(b)(1), (d) limited to candidates, *24 authorized political committees or subcommittees of candidates, and the agents of such committees or subcommittees, or does it have a broader scope, and, if so, how much broader?
The certified question arises in a lawsuit brought by several individuals challenging Indiana Code section 3-9-3-2.5 (Supp. 2001) as violating their rights to free speech guaranteed under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana dismissed the complaint for lack of standing as to some plaintiffs and mootness as to others. The Seventh Circuit concluded that neither standing nor mootness precluded consideration of the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, but noted that resolution of an issue of interpretation of the statute might control the disposition of the constitutional issues the plaintiffs seek to raise. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit certified this question to this Court pursuant to 7th Cir. Rule 52 and Ind. R.App. Proc. 64. Majors v. Abell, 317 F.3d 719, 725 (7th Cir.2003).
Section 2.5 is a part of the Indiana Election Laws. In broad brush, it provides that any "person" must include a "disclaimer" in "general public political advertising" if the person either "solicits a contribution" or finances "communications expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate." This "disclaimer" must disclose who paid for the ad, and, under some circumstances, who authorized it. The section provides a number of exemptions and definitions and includes detailed provisions requiring different disclosures depending on whether the material is authorized and/or financed by a candidate, a candidate's committee, a political committee (PAC), or a party organization.[1]
The issue as framed by the Seventh Circuit appears as an abstract question of statutory construction. Indeed, as that court observed, on its face, the statute seems quite plainly to apply to communications financed by every individual and every form of legal entity. That is the meaning ordinarily given to "person" in statutes, and is the meaning provided by section 36 of the "Definitions" Chapter of the Election Laws. According to Indiana Code section 3-5-2-36, "`person' means an individual or an organization." Section 1 of the same Chapter provides that its definitions "apply throughout this title," and "this title" inescapably refers to Title 3 ("Elections").[2] This definition has been in the Election Laws since the election laws were overhauled in 1986.[3] It is in substance the same as earlier more prolix but equally broad definitions of "person."[4]
The State points out that Section 2.5 is found in Article 9, Chapter 3, and Section 1 of that Chapter entitled "Application of chapter"[5] includes the following provision:

*25 (a) ... this chapter applies to candidates in all elections and caucuses and to the following types of committees:
(1) Candidate's committees.
(2) Regular party committees.
(3) Political action committees.
(4) An auxiliary party organization.
(5) A legislative caucus committee.
Ind.Code § 3-9-3-1 (1998).[6] The State contends that this section has the effect of including only candidates and the listed types of committees among the "persons" required by Section 2.5 to include a disclaimer. Indeed, the State claims the "Application" section is meaningless unless given that construction. We find this contention difficult to fit within the statutory framework. We have already noted the seemingly ironclad and purposeful use of "person" as all-inclusive. The "Application" section the State cites is not inconsistent with the conclusion that "person" has its usual meaning. Language identical to the quoted portion of Chapter 3, Section 1(a) appears in Section 1(a) of each of the other four Chapters in Article 9.[7] It seems clear that these "Application" provisions serve to identify the types of elections to which the various chapters apply, but do not limit the reference to "persons" within those chapters. Several of the provisions in these statutes would make no sense whatever if "person" were limited as the State suggests. For example, the Treasurer of a committee is required to file a report listing every "person" who contributed over $100.[8] A committee may remove a "person" as chair or treasurer without cause.[9] Every "person" who accepts a contribution for a committee must get it to the Treasurer within thirty days.[10] And so on. "Person" in section 2.5 is the same term introduced by the same application section found in other sections of the same "Election Campaigns" Chapter where it can only be read to mean everybody and everything. As a matter of statutory interpretation, there is little wiggle room here.
In the face of this rather overwhelming statutory evidence, both the plaintiffs and the State nevertheless contend that constitutional doctrine should govern our interpretation of the statute. As the Seventh Circuit noted, courts, including this one, sometimes find elasticity to preserve constitutionality. See, e.g., A Woman's Choice-East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 671 N.E.2d 104, 107 (Ind. 1996) ("we would construe the ... [statute] in a constitutional manner insofar as the statutory language would permit."). Accordingly, we consider whether constitutional considerations drive us to find the statute to be more limited than appears on its face.
The State argues for its less expansive reading on the ground that the statute, if applicable to political advertising by anyone, *26 may fall under the plaintiffs' First Amendment attack. In order to understand the State's contention it is necessary to review the federal constitutional doctrine surrounding regulation of campaign literature. In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995), the Supreme Court invalidated an Ohio statute regulating campaign literature. Mrs. McIntyre was a classic "lone pamphleteer" who printed up some materials opposing her local school tax levy. Some of these identified her as the author and others bore only the legend "CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX PAYERS". She was convicted and fined $100 under an Ohio statute making it a misdemeanor to omit identification of the source of any campaign materials in any candidate or public question election. Although she died before the case reached the Supreme Court of the United States, her estate carried on and ultimately prevailed in her contention that her activity was constitutionally protected.
McIntyre recognized that election disclosure laws raised different considerations from those presented by the general prohibition of anonymous pamphlets that had been held unconstitutional in Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 80 S.Ct. 536, 4 L.Ed.2d 559 (1960). Laws prohibiting anonymous communications at least to some extent burden speech and raise First Amendment concerns. If the speech is political, as it undoubtedly is in an election, it enjoys the highest level of protection, and any restriction of that speech requires a compelling governmental interest. Ohio sought to justify what is obviously an abridgment of speech principally on the ground that its statute guarded against misinformation in campaigns, and was therefore narrower than the general ban that Talley had invalidated. This contention did not carry the day.
The election in McIntyre was a school tax referendum. The focus of that election was a single issue, not individual candidates and their character or their stances on multiple issues. In such an election, the Supreme Court viewed the state interest as principally "[t]he simple interest in providing voters with additional relevant information." McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348, 115 S.Ct. 1511. So viewed, McIntyre found little force to the state interest asserted to justify its regulation of speech. The state cannot compel a speaker to add items of information to those the speaker chooses to present. To the extent completeness of information is the State's concern, requiring identification of the source adds little to the state's justification, and fails to survive the strict scrutiny required of statutes burdening political speech. As the Seventh Circuit noted, the majority in McIntyre described the identity of the author as just one more item of information that the author may choose to include or omit. Majors, 317 F.3d at 724 (citing McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348, 115 S.Ct. 1511). Accordingly, the source of the statement was not particularly useful in evaluating its merits on a referendum issue. The Supreme Court found the state's interest in preserving the accuracy of statements in elections to be "on a different footing" from the general interest in providing more information. Despite its greater force, that interest was not furthered by the Ohio statute, which provided no exemption for truthful communications, and other statutory provisions and common law remedies were available to redress false communications.
Based on its reading of the Seventh Circuit's opinion to suggest that Section 2.5 will be found unconstitutional under McIntyre if it regulates speech by "every individual and organization," the State argues for a construction that would require a "disclaimer" only from those candidates *27 and committees. Because the disclaimer statute burdens core political speech, it is subject to "strict scrutiny." McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347, 115 S.Ct. 1511. However, we are not persuaded that McIntyre necessarily implies that the Indiana statute violates the First Amendment. Section 2.5 was added to the Indiana Code in 1997 in response to McIntyre and the decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District in Stewart v. Taylor, 953 F.Supp. 1047 (S.D.Ind.1997). Previous versions of the Indiana Election Laws had, like the Ohio statute, applied to both candidate elections and votes on public questions, but Section 2.5 is limited to candidate elections. Before its 1997 revision, the Indiana disclaimer requirement had none of the exemptions found in subsection 2.5(a), which now exempts small direct mailings[11] and communications with regard to public questions,[12] among other things.
McIntyre dealt with leafleting in a local referendum. We think somewhat different considerations apply in evaluating a disclaimer requirement in advertising in candidate elections. Indeed, in First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978), the Supreme Court expressly noted that although corruption concerns were a compelling state interest in candidate elections, they were not significant in the context of a referendum. Id. at 790, 98 S.Ct. 1407. McIntyre itself pointed out that in candidate elections the state "can identify a compelling state interest in avoiding the corruption that might result from campaign expenditures." McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 356, 115 S.Ct. 1511. The state has a legitimate concern that anonymous campaign support will become a quid for the quo of post election largesse. Id.: see also Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 297, 102 S.Ct. 434, 70 L.Ed.2d 492 (1981). Thus, McIntyre expressly noted that a "more narrowly drawn statute" might pass constitutional muster. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 356, 115 S.Ct. 1511.
In McIntyre, Justice Ginsburg, concurring separately, expressly noted that the Supreme Court did "not thereby hold that the State may not in other, larger circumstances require the speaker to disclose its interest by disclosing its identity." McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 358, 115 S.Ct. 1511. Four years later, in Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 119 S.Ct. 636, 142 L.Ed.2d 599 (1999), Justice Ginsburg wrote for a five-justice majority that struck down some aspects of Colorado's regulation of solicitors in petition drives to place an issue on the ballot in a referendum. Once again the Court noted the distinction between candidate elections and referenda. Id. at 203, 119 S.Ct. 636. The majority found unconstitutional a requirement that solicitors wear badges with their names. But even in a referendum the majority found constitutional the requirement *28 that a public affidavit disclose the name and address of the solicitor. A post-solicitation affidavit did not expose the solicitor to the risk of intimidation that an identifying badge presented in a face-to-face encounter with potential voters. The affidavit was thus "the type of regulation for which McIntyre left room." Id. at 200, 119 S.Ct. 636.
We think there is a very strong state policy reflected in the 1997 amendment. It was an obvious effort to tailor a more narrowly drawn statute that would serve core state interests in the integrity of candidate races while avoiding the concerns that resulted in the invalidation of the Ohio statute. We also think that the distinctions between Ohio's statute and Indiana's revised version are substantial. The most important of these are that Indiana's law permits some individual pamphleteering and applies only to candidate elections.
The Supreme Court in McIntyre noted some, but not all of the differences for these purposes between issue elections and candidate elections. The Supreme Court pointed out the State's proper concern for the potential of election corruption through anonymous candidate support. This interest was identified as "on a different footing" from the mere desire for more complete information. McIntyre discussed this state interest largely as concern for election finance violations. In distinguishing the Ohio statute from the interests validated in federal campaign finance law in Buckley v. Valeo,[13] the Court identified the "compelling state interest in avoiding the corruption that might result from campaign expenditures." McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 356, 115 S.Ct. 1511.
Deterrence of corruption in candidate elections was first identified as a compelling government interest in Buckley v. Valeo, which found that concern sufficient to justify federal election law restrictions on campaign contributions and the requirement of disclosure of contributors. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66, 96 S.Ct. 612. As Buckley noted, the anonymous advertisement may be a surreptitious campaign contribution violation. Id. at 81, 96 S.Ct. 612. But in addition to concern for outright campaign finance violations and quid pro quo corruption, we think there is also a related but very important state interest in the integrity of public statements in candidate elections that differs from elections in which public questions are put to voters. Several potential abuses are presented by anonymous advertising in a candidate race. Anonymous statements about candidates for public office, even if true, can be very damaging, particularly if launched in the waning days of an election when it may be difficult or even impossible to achieve broad communication of any response. Indiana saw such an attack in the 2000 election when one candidate for attorney general was described in ads by a third-party organization as one who represented convicted drug dealers. This may have been a true statement, but it was an attack that the candidate's opponent disclaimed and disavowed. Its effect was presumably mitigated by the disclosure of the source in compliance with Indiana law. At least the voters could see who was making this claim, and form an assessment as to what its agenda was likely to be. They could then form their own views as to whether the candidate's having served as defense attorney in a case that resulted in conviction for dealing had anything at all to do with the motivation to defeat the candidate. This example of a well-funded interest group taking out advertisements to run a statewide media blitz shortly before an election is a far cry from the "modest *29 resources" of Mrs. McIntyre mustered to oppose her school levy.
There is a second concern with anonymous ads in candidate elections. Charges can be leveled that no candidate would make because the claims would be deemed irresponsible, or would generate support from some groups, but a backlash from others. Anonymity permits personal charges to be leveled at one candidate that may be equally true of another. The voters have redress at the polls if a candidate, the candidate's committee, or a political party engages in irresponsible campaigning. If an identified third party wishes to sling some mud, there is still no practical remedy against the source, but at least the voters can evaluate the claim in light of its source.
Finally, in a candidate election, anonymous advertising permits a candidate to run on an issue without espousing it. By tacit agreement or even without implicit support from the candidate, the anonymous supporter can challenge an opponent's position on a given issue without putting the candidate's position in play. Several pernicious results occur. The candidate may not differ from the views that are being attacked, but does not need to declare a position. Or the candidate may have unspoken ties or obligations to groups whose agendas are well known, but who choose to fund advertising on completely unrelated issues. Only the disclosure of the identity of the funding agency prevents this.
For all of these reasons, we are not persuaded that Section 2.5 as written violates the First Amendment on its face, though one can conceive of some applications that might be invalid. As McIntyre and Talley make clear, to require identification of the source is to burden the core value of free speech. But in a candidate election, there is a powerful countervailing consideration in the State's and the public's interest in election integrity. That interest extends beyond controlling direct corruption to minimizing damage to the integrity of the dynamic and multifaceted marketplace of ideas that drives a candidate election.
We think the 1997 amendment represented a very clear statement by the General Assembly that it regarded campaign disclosure as important. As a matter of separation of powers, we think setting that priority is well within the purview of the legislative body as an expression of state policy. If we construe the statute as the State suggests, we agree it removes most doubt as to the constitutionality of the statute, but we think it also eliminates most of what the statute was seeking to accomplish. In practice we do not have candidates or committees taking out anonymous advertising. It may be the deterrent effect of the law, but it also seems that anonymous advertising by a candidate would be a very high-risk strategy. If a message is such that the candidate would not be willing to be identified with it, presumably if its authorship leaked the effect of the leak would be to brand the candidate a sneak as well as a fool. We think the statute is primarily concerned with anonymous advertising by third parties. Limiting its identification to candidates and committees would free up the very actors the law was written to curtail. State and federal courts have held a variety of views on issues similar, if not identical, to the constitutional claims presented here.[14] We think the Indiana statute is *30 clear and we do not believe that current decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States compel the conclusion that the statute as we construe it is invalid. Accordingly, we answer the Seventh Circuit's question as follows:
The term "person" in Indiana Code section 3-9-3-2.5(b) and (d) is not limited to candidates, authorized political committees or subcommittees of candidates, and the agents of such committees or subcommittees. Rather, it includes any individual or organization.
Finally, the plaintiffs invite us to invalidate the statute on Indiana Constitutional grounds, in effect responding to the Seventh Circuit with "never mind, the statute about which you inquire is void." The plaintiffs note authority that an ambiguous statute should be interpreted in such a manner as to preserve its constitutionality. From this they draw the broader principle that the court should always consider the constitutional implications of a statute and should invalidate a statute if it finds it unconstitutional. This seems quite a stretch to us, but we need not resolve that question because the plaintiffs' contention is more easily disposed of. No state constitutional issue was presented in the district court, and we are not asked by the Seventh Circuit whether the statute runs afoul of either the state or federal constitution. We have no record of the facts of this case before us, and no basis to evaluate whether other grounds may render consideration of the broad state constitutional issue unnecessary. City of New Haven v. Reichhart, 748 N.E.2d 374, 378 (Ind. 2001). Neither the state nor the amicus has addressed any state constitutional issue. Under these circumstances, we will not reach out to answer a question we are not asked.
DICKSON, SULLIVAN, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
SHEPARD, C.J., concurs with separate opinion in which DICKSON, J., joins.
Appendix
Ind.Code § 3-9-3-2.5 (Supp.2001).
(a) This section does not apply to any of the following:
(1) A communication relating to an election to a federal office.
(2) A communication relating to the outcome of a public question.
(3) A communication described by this section in a medium regulated by federal law to the extent that federal law regulates the appearance, content, or placement of the communication in the medium.
(4) Bumper stickers, pins, buttons, pens, and similar small items upon which the disclaimer required by this section cannot be conveniently printed.
(5) Skywriting, water towers, wearing apparel, or other means of displaying an advertisement on which the inclusion of a disclaimer would be impracticable.

*31 (6) Checks, receipts, and similar items of minimal value that do not contain a political message and are used for purely administrative purposes.
(7) A communication by a political action committee organized and controlled by a corporation soliciting contributions to the political action committee by the stockholders, executives, or employees of the corporation and the families of those individuals.
(8) A communication by a political action committee organized and controlled by a labor organization soliciting contributions to the political action committee by the members or executive personnel of the labor organization and the families of those individuals.
(9) A direct mailing of one hundred (100) or less substantially similar pieces of mail.
(b) This section applies whenever a person:
(1) makes an expenditure for the purpose of financing communications expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate; or
(2) solicits a contribution; through a newspaper, a magazine, an outdoor advertising facility, a poster, a yard sign, a direct mailing, or any other type of general public political advertising.
(c) For purposes of this section, a candidate is clearly identified if any of the following apply:
(1) The name of the candidate involved appears.
(2) A photograph or drawing of the candidate appears.
(3) The identity of the candidate is apparent by unambiguous reference.
(d) A communication described in subsection (b) must contain a disclaimer that appears and is presented in a clear and conspicuous manner to give the reader or observer adequate notice of the identity of persons who paid for and, when required, who authorized the communication. A disclaimer does not comply with this section if the disclaimer is difficult to read or if the placement of the disclaimer is easily overlooked.
(e) A communication that would require a disclaimer if distributed separately must contain the required disclaimer if included in a package of materials.
(f) This subsection does not apply to a communication, such as a billboard, that contains only a front face. The disclaimer need not appear on the front or cover page of the communication if the disclaimer appears within the communication.
(g) Except as provided in subsection (h), a communication described in subsection (b) must satisfy one (1) of the following:
(1) If the communication is paid for and authorized by:
(A) a candidate;
(B) an authorized political committee of a candidate; or
(C) the committee's agents;
the communication must clearly state that the communication has been paid for by the authorized political committee.
(2) If the communication is paid for by other persons but authorized by:
(A) a candidate;
(B) an authorized political committee of a candidate; or
(C) the committee's agents;
the communication must clearly state that the communication is paid for by the other persons and authorized by the authorized political committee.
(3) If the communication is not authorized by:
(A) a candidate;

*32 (B) an authorized political committee of a candidate; or
(C) the committee's agents;
the communication must clearly state the name of the person who paid for the communication and state that the communication is not authorized by any candidate or candidate's committee.
(4) If the communication is a solicitation directed to the general public on behalf of a political committee that is not a candidate's committee, the solicitation must clearly state the full name of the person who paid for the communication.
(h) A communication by a regular party committee consisting of:
(1) a printed slate card, a sample ballot, or other printed listing of three (3) or more candidates for public office at an election;
(2) campaign materials such as handbills, brochures, posters, party tabloids or newsletters, and yard signs distributed by volunteers and used by the regular party committee in connection with volunteer activities on behalf of any nominee of the party; or
(3) materials distributed by volunteers as part of the regular party's voter registration or get-out-the-vote efforts;
must clearly state the name of the person who paid for the communication but is not required to state that the communication is authorized by any candidate or committee.
SHEPARD, Chief Justice, concurring.
I join fully in the Court's opinion, and write separately to address a point ably lifted up by the lawyers for Common Cause of Indiana and the Brennan Center for Justice.
The device of certifying questions of state law that are central to a case being litigated in federal court is productive for state and federal tribunals alike. Knowing that our federal colleagues do not make these referrals casually, we have accepted every certification from our District Courts and the Seventh Circuit, as best I can recall. I expect that we will continue to do so.
Still, the mechanism has its limitations. As amici point out, the questions necessarily come in rather abstract form. We answer a question of law, rather than resolve a case. And, of course, facts matter a great deal in the work judges customarily perform.
Here, for example, the statute in question looks very different when one contemplates a lone pamphleteer, some latter-day Thomas Paine, than it does as applied to a regular party candidate.
This problem of abstraction is especially troublesome when the question at hand is, say, one of state constitutional law, or, as today, a statutory question with palpable constitutional implications. On such occasions, it seems to me, we state judges must be especially mindful of the jurisprudential rules we would employ if the full case were pending for resolution in state courtlike avoidance of avoidable constitutional declarations.
We have brushed up against such considerations in the present case, but the language and statutory framework of the law under examination have so strongly suggested an answer that fancier footwork has been unnecessary.
DICKSON, J., joins.
NOTES
[1]  Section 2.5 is rather lengthy. Because its constitutionality may be viewed as turning on the extent to which it is "narrowly tailored" we reproduce the statute in its entirety as an Appendix to this opinion.
[2]  For those unfamiliar with Indiana statutes, the hierarchy of the Indiana Code, in descending order, is Title, Article, Chapter, Section.
[3]  Public Laws 5-1986 and its companions, 6-1986, 7-1986 and 8-1986 fill 315 pages of the 1986 Acts. 1986 Ind. Acts 25-340.
[4]  Public Law 6-1976 included the following definitions for purposes of the then current election law: "[P]erson" includes individuals, business organizations, labor organizations, religious organizations, political organizations, trustees, receivers and any other organization, association, cooperative or group of persons whatsoever. 1976 Ind. Acts 13.
[5]  West Annotated Code uses the same title for this section as the official Indiana Code, ("Application of chapter"). Burns Annotated Code calls it "Applicability."
[6]  Subsection (b) excepted federal candidates from the limitation on the use of contributions imposed by Section (4). Effective July 1, 2003, a new subsection (c) was added to Indiana Code 3-9-3-1 providing that Section 2.5 does not apply to candidates for precinct committeeman or state convention delegate. None of these exceptions are relevant for our purposes.
[7]  All five Subsections (a) are identical except for the exceptions unique to each provision. The only differences, which are irrelevant for these purposes, appear in subsections (b) and (c) of the various Application sections. These have the effect of exempting different types of elections (e.g. school boards) from certain requirements, but not others. Compare I.C. § 3-9-3-1 with I.C. § 3-9-1-1, I.C. § 3-9-2-1, I.C. § 3-9-4-1 and I.C. § 3-9-5-1.
[8]  I.C. § 3-9-5-14(3)(A).
[9]  I.C. § 3-9-1-19.
[10]  I.C. § 3-9-2-9.
[11]  Section 2.5(a)(9) exempts mailings of up to 100 pieces of "mail" that are "substantially similar." We take "mailing" and "mail" to include any form of delivery of any written material, including personal delivery or use of some service other than use of the United States Postal Service. Reading the exemption as limited to materials distributed through the U.S. mail would impose arbitrary and indeed unconstitutional conditions on the exemption in violation of the basic equal protection doctrines invoked by both parties.
[12]  Section 2.5(a)(2). The web site referred to by the Seventh Circuit in Majors, 317 F.3d at 721, www.in.gov/sos/pdfs/Disclaim.pdf (Revised May 2002), is incorrect to the extent it suggests that all of the matters discussed apply equally to both candidate and public question elections. Although many parts of the Indiana Election Laws do apply to political question elections, Indiana Code section 3-9-3-2.5 does not by virtue of Section 2.5(a)(2).
[13]  424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976).
[14]  Compare Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1107 (9th Cir.2003); FEC v. Public Citizen, 268 F.3d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir.2001); Ky. Right to Life v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637, 648 (6th Cir.1997); FEC v. Survival Educ. Fund, Inc., 65 F.3d 285, 298 (2d. Cir. 1995); McConnell v. FEC, 251 F.Supp.2d 176 (D.D.C. 2003); Seymour v. Elections Enforcement Comm'n, 255 Conn. 78, 762 A.2d 880, 892-94 (2000); Doe v. Mortham, 708 So.2d 929, 931-35 (Fla.1998); with Citizens for Responsible Gov't State PAC v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1200 (10th Cir.2000); Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 392 (2d Cir.2000); Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, 950 (10th Cir.1987); N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 108 F.Supp.2d 498, 510 (E.D.N.C.2000); Ark. Right to Life State PAC v. Butler, 29 F.Supp.2d 540, 550 (W.D.Ark. 1998); Stewart, 953 F.Supp. at 1055; W. Va. for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 960 F.Supp. 1036, 1042 (S.D.W.Va.1996); Doe v. Texas, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___, 2003 WL 21077961, 2003 Tex. Crim.App. LEXIS 88 at * 14 (Tex.Crim.App. May 14, 2003).


7 F.3d 236
NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit.UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Ricky WOODS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 93-5237.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Sept. 17, 1993.

Before:  MERRITT, Chief Judge;  BROWN and WELLFORD, Senior Circuit Judges.

ORDER

1
This cause having come on to be heard upon the record, the briefs and the oral argument of the parties, and upon due consideration thereof,

2
The court finds that no prejudicial error intervened in the judgment and proceedings in the district court, and it is therefore ORDERED that said judgment be and it hereby is affirmed.


208 Md. 677 (1956)
119 A.2d 438
BERGEN
v.
WARDEN OF MARYLAND PENITENTIARY
[H.C. No. 16, October Term, 1955.]
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Decided January 6, 1956.
Before BRUNE, C.J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, HENDERSON and HAMMOND, JJ.
COLLINS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an application for leave to appeal from the denial of a writ of habeas corpus by Judge John B. Gontrum of Baltimore County. Petitioner was convicted on one charge of rogue and vagabond and on three charges of burglary, by a jury.
Petitioner contends that the jury was misled by the introduction of certain photographs by the State. This Court has held that alleged error in admitting evidence is reviewable on appeal but not on habeas corpus. Tyson v. Warden, 198 Md. 684, 84 A.2d 59; Stokes v. Warden, 205 Md. 629, 106 A.2d 78; Johns v. Warden, 205 Md. 644, 108 A.2d 906.
Petitioner also contends that the State's Attorney and his attorney entered into agreements which jeopardized his rights. He does not allege that he complained of the *679 services of his attorney at the time of trial, nor does the record show that he made such a complaint at that time. Goodman v. Warden, 190 Md. 746, 60 A.2d 527; Edmondson v. Wright, 193 Md. 710, 66 A.2d 386; Obenstine v. Warden, 198 Md. 648, 80 A.2d 610; Stokes v. Warden, supra. This cannot be reviewed on habeas corpus in the absence of such complaints.
Petitioner further contends that he was refused the right to question the State's witnesses. This goes to the regularity of the proceedings and not to the jurisdiction of the court. It cannot be raised on habeas corpus. Hickman v. Warden, 203 Md. 668, 99 A.2d 730; Wagner v. Warden, 205 Md. 648, 109 A.2d 118; Tyler v. Warden, 206 Md. 635, 109 A.2d 919.
Petitioner finally contends that witnesses testified falsely against him, and that the State's witnesses did not testify that their homes were broken into. Habeas corpus cannot be used for the purpose of an appeal to review the weight of the evidence, or the question of the guilt or innocence of a petitioner. Strahl v. Warden, 202 Md. 655, 97 A.2d 134; Friedel v. Warden, 205 Md. 657, 109 A.2d 50.
Application denied, with costs.


540 U.S. 903
SINCLAIRv.UNITED STATES.
No. 03-5344.
Supreme Court of United States.
October 6, 2003.

1
Appeal from the C. A. 4th Cir.

2
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60 Fed. Appx. 499.


       DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                              FOURTH DISTRICT

                         MICHAEL GONZALEZ,
                             Appellant,

                                    v.

                         STATE OF FLORIDA,
                              Appellee.

                     Nos. 4D17-2117 & 4D17-2118

                              [July 19, 2018]

   Consolidated appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial
Circuit, Okeechobee County; Dan L. Vaughn, Judge; L.T. Case Nos. 47-
2014-CF-000347-A and 47-2014-CF-000745-A.

  Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Benjamin Eisenberg, Assistant
Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

   Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Heidi L.
Bettendorf, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

   Affirmed.

GROSS, CONNER and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur.

                          *          *          *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.


901 N.E.2d 1178 (2009)
BURKETT
v.
LOUTHAIN.
No. 09A02-0802-JV-160.
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
February 12, 2009.
MATHIAS, J.
Disposition of case by unpublished memorandum decision. Remanded.
BAILEY, J. Concurs.
BARNES, J. Concurs.


718 F.Supp.2d 1232 (2009)
Lynn LYONS, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v.
COXCOM, INC., doing business as Cox Communications, Inc.; Cox Enterprises, Inc.; and Does 1-250, Defendants.
Case No. 08-CV-02047-H (CAB).
United States District Court, S.D. California.
June 8, 2009.
*1233 Christopher M. Burke, Scott + Scott LLP, San Diego, CA, Eric S. Somers, Mark N. Todzo, Lexington Law Group, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff.
Richard R. Patch, Susan K. Jamison, Zuzana S. Ikels, Coblentz Patch Duffy and Bass, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants.

*1234 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE, GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, & VACATING ORDER
MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge.
On November 4, 2008, Plaintiff Lynn Lyons ("Lyons") filed a class action complaint against Defendant Coxcom, Inc., doing business as Cox Communications, Inc. ("Cox"). (Doc. No. 1, Compl.) On February 6, 2009, 2009 WL 347285, the Court granted Defendant Cox's motion to dismiss and granted Plaintiff leave to amend. (Doc. No. 34.) Plaintiff filed a first amended class action complaint ("FAC") on March 9, 2009 against Cox Communications, Inc. and Cox Enterprises, Inc. (Doc. No. 35.) On April 2, 2009, Defendant Cox filed a motion to strike the class allegations and dismiss the FAC for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and a motion to dismiss the FAC for failure to state a claim. (Doc. Nos. 40 & 42.) Defendant also filed a request for judicial notice. (Doc. No. 41.) On May 11, 2009, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition and a request for judicial notice. (Doc. Nos. 46-47.) On May 29, 2009, Defendant filed a reply. (Doc. No. 49.) Plaintiff filed a notice of supplemental authority on June 1, 2009. (Doc. No. 52.) On June 7, 2009, Defendant filed a response to Plaintiff's notice of supplemental authority. (Doc. No. 54.)
The Court held a hearing on the matter on June 8, 2009. Richard Patch appeared on behalf of Cox and Mark Todzo appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies without prejudice Defendant's motion to strike class allegations, grants in part Defendant's motion to dismiss the FAC with leave to amend, and vacates the Court's previous order granting Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint.

Background
Plaintiff instituted this class action against Cox, an internet service provider in California, 21 other states, and the District of Columbia. (FAC ¶ 6.) Plaintiff, after seeing and reading Cox's advertisements regrading faster internet speeds, upgraded her internet service to Cox's High Speed Internet Premier with PowerBoost Package in order to obtain faster uploads and downloads to and from the internet. (Id. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff alleges that Cox advertises "blazing fast" internet with PowerBoost speeds up to 20 Mbps for Premier Tier and 12 Mbps for Preferred Tier customers. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 27.) She alleges Cox also advertises that with PowerBoost "you can now enjoy doubled upload speeds and up to 33% faster downloads," and that Cox provides "Racing Speeds: 2.3 X Faster than 3 Mbps DLS." (Id. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff alleges that Cox's terms of service promise customers specific speed tiers that vary in price based on the speed tier purchased. (Id. ¶ 1.) Plaintiff alleges that Cox beaches its promise to provide high speed internet access and specific speeds by selectively targeting and severely impeding the use of certain peer-to-peer ("P2P") file sharing internet applications ("Blocked Applications") by transmitting unauthorized hidden messages known as reset packets to customers' computers who use such applications, which slows such applications to a mere crawl or stops them altogether. (Id. ¶¶ 1-3.) Plaintiff alleges that she uses the Blocked Applications to download and upload large files such as music and video files and that she has experienced severe limitations on the speed of service when she uses such applications. (Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff alleges that Cox impairs use of *1235 Blocked Applications irrespective of bandwith consumption or network congestion. (Id. ¶ 1.) Plaintiff alleges that she has performed her obligations under the terms of the agreements by paying her monthly charges and by not engaging in activities prohibited under the agreements. (Id. ¶ 36.)
As a result of this alleged conduct by Cox, Plaintiff alleges causes of action for: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), California Civil Code § 1750 et seq.; (4) violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq., based on fraudulent acts and practices; (5) violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17500 et seq., based on false and misleading advertising; (6) violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq., based on unlawful acts; and (7) violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq., based on unfair acts and practices.
Defendant Cox moves the Court to strike Plaintiffs class allegations and to dismiss the FAC based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the Court's basis for subject matter jurisdiction rests on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. (Doc. No. 42.) Defendant also moves to dismiss the FAC for failure to state a claim for relief and for failing to plead fraud with specificity. (Id.) In support of its motions, Cox relies on the terms and conditions of the subscriber agreement referenced by Plaintiff in the FAC. In order for a subscriber to purchase Cox's service, the subscriber is required to check two "Customer Authorization" boxes confirming that he or she has read and accepted the Cox Terms and Conditions of Service, Subscriber Agreement ("SA"), and Acceptable Use Policy ("AUP"). (FAC ¶ 31; Doc. No. 41 Exs. C-E.) Cox contends that it is permitted to manage the network under the terms of the subscriber agreement and never promised in its advertising unlimited uploading and downloading ability at the maximum speeds offered. The SA sets forth the terms and conditions of the internet service and as part of the contract the subscriber agrees that Cox provides "Network Management" for the "greatest benefit of the greatest number of subscribers including, specifically, traffic prioritization, and protocol filtering." (FAC ¶ 33; Doc. No. 41, Ex. D ¶¶ 6, 15.) Cox asserts that the contractual provisions directly contradict Plaintiff's allegations, and therefore Plaintiffs claims for breach of contract and inadequate disclosure should be dismissed.

Discussion

I. Motion to Strike Class Allegations
Cox moves to strike Plaintiffs class allegations on the basis that the determination of who would have claims like Plaintiffs would require subscriber-by-subscriber inquiries about reliance, expectations, internet usage, the reasons for and severity of any service interruptions or slowdowns, and the fact of damage. (Doc. No. 42 at 2.) Plaintiff opposes Cox's motion to strike class allegations on the basis that it is premature prior to commencement of discovery and that the class is ascertainable.
Pursuant to Rule 12(f), a party may move to strike from a pleading "any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, or impertinent and scandalous matter." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). Class allegations may be stricken at the pleading stage. Kamm v. California City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205, 212 (9th Cir.1975). However, motions to strike class allegations are *1236 generally disfavored because "a motion for class certification is a more appropriate vehicle." Thorpe v. Abbott Lab., Inc., 534 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1125 (N.D.Cal.2008). As other courts have noted, "the granting of motions to dismiss class allegations before discovery has commenced is rare." Id.; In Re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 505 F.Supp.2d 609, 615 (N.D.Cal.2007).
The Court denies Cox's motion to strike class allegations without prejudice. The Court is granting Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint, Defendant has not yet answered the second amended complaint, discovery has not yet commenced, and no motion for class certification has been filed. A fully briefed record and at least some discovery are necessary for the Court to make a fully informed decision, as class determination "generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiffs cause of action." General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982) (internal quotation omitted). The Court concludes that it cannot determine from the face of the pleadings that a class is not certifiable as a matter of law, as there are factual and legal issues yet to be determined. The issues raised by Defendant are better suited for a determination at the class certification stage.
Cox also moves to strike allegations in the FAC against Cox Enterprises, Inc. on the grounds that the Court granted a joint motion to dismiss Cox Enterprises, Inc. from the original complaint on December 4, 2008. (See Doc. No. 12.) The Court declines at this time to strike allegations against Cox Enterprises, Inc. from the FAC, as the Court dismissed Cox Enterprises, Inc. without prejudice and granted Plaintiff leave to amend its complaint. (See id.; Doc. No. 34.)

II. Motion to Dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6)
Cox moves to dismiss Plaintiffs FAC for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 42 at 17.) A motion to dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir.2001). A complaint generally must satisfy only the minimal notice pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) to evade dismissal under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir.2003). Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading stating a claim for relief contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The function of this pleading requirement is to "give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the `grounds' of his `entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 1965 (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed.2004)). "All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. However, conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat *1237 a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.1996); see also Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65.
"Generally, a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion." Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir. 1990). The court may, however, consider the contents of documents specifically referred to and incorporated into the complaint. Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir.1994). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court may consider evidence on which the complaint "necessarily relies" as long as: (1) the complaint refers to the document; (2) the document is central to the plaintiff's claim; and (3) no party questions the authenticity of the copy attached to the 12(b)(6) motion. Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir.2006). In addition, a court ruling on a motion to dismiss may consider facts that are subject to judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201. A district court may take judicial notice of matters of public record, but cannot use this rule to take judicial notice of a fact that is subject to "reasonable dispute" simply because it is contained within a pleading that has been filed as a public record. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689-90 (9th Cir.2001).
In this case, the complaint specifically refers to the SA, AUP, Terms and Conditions, and Limitations of Service that a subscriber agrees to accept with the purchase of internet service. (FAC ¶¶ 31-33.) These documents are central to Plaintiff's claim and no party questions the authenticity of the copy of the documents attached to Cox's 12(b)(6) motion. (Doc. No. 41, Exs. C-F.) Accordingly, the Court may consider them in ruling on Defendant's motion to dismiss. Defendant also requests the Court take judicial notice of the FAC and a red-line edit comparing Plaintiff's original complaint. The Court takes judicial notice of these documents, as a Court make take judicial notice of court filings. See Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 (9th Cir.2006). Plaintiff requests the Court take judicial notice of the FCC's opinion and order concerning Comcast, released August 20, 2008 and a Policy Statement adopted by the FCC on August 5, 2005. (Doc. No. 47.) Because these are matters of public record, the Court takes judicial notice of the documents.

A. Breach of Contract
Plaintiff's first cause of action alleges Cox breached a written or implied contract. (FAC ¶¶ 42-45.) In a breach of contract claim under California law, a plaintiff must allege (1) a contract, (2) plaintiff's performance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) damages. McDonald v. John P. Scripps Newspaper, 210 Cal. App.3d 100, 257 Cal.Rptr. 473, 475 (Cal.Ct. App.1989). Under the terms of the SA, however, the agreement "shall be exclusively governed by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of the State of Georgia." (Doc. No. 41, Ex. D ¶ 19.) Under Georgia law, "`[t]he elements of a right to recover for a breach of contract are the breach and the resultant damages to the party who has the right to complain about the contract being broken.'" Budget Rent-a-Car of Atlanta, Inc. v. Webb, 220 Ga.App. 278, 280, 469 S.E.2d 712 (1996) (quoting Graham Bros. Constr. Co. v. C.W. Matthews Contracting Co., 159 Ga.App. 546, 550, 284 S.E.2d 282 (1981)). A contract of adhesion is strictly construed against the drafter and as reasonably understood by the consumer. See Hosp. *1238 Auth. of Houston County v. Bohannon, 272 Ga.App. 96, 98-99, 611 S.E.2d 663 (2005) (citations omitted); Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal.3d 807, 820, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604, 623 P.2d 165 (1981).
Plaintiff alleges that she entered into a written or implied contract with Defendants to pay monthly fees in order to obtain the service, which Defendant promises will provide high speed access to the internet for uploads and downloads at specified speeds, that she performed her obligations under the contract by paying monthly fees and by not engaging in any activities prohibited by the Agreement, that Defendant breached the contract by restricting Plaintiff's access to, and use of, the service at speeds promised in the Agreement, and that she was damaged by the breach because she did not receive the service at the speeds for which she paid. (FAC ¶¶ 43-45.) Plaintiff further alleges that the Terms and Conditions, SA, and AUP are required to be accepted by a subscriber in order to purchase the service, the terms of the service explicitly promise specific internet access speeds, and Defendant charges more for faster speeds. (Id. ¶¶ 31-32.) Plaintiff alleges that the "Limitations of Service" state that the Preferred with PowerBoost Package has a maximum downstream speed of 5 to 9 megabits per second and maximum upstream speed of 512 kilobits to 2 megabits per second and that the Premier with PowerBoost Package has a maximum downstream speed of 10 to 20 megabits per second and maximum upstream speed of 1 to 2 megabits per second. (Id. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff alleges that she reasonably believed, based upon the fact that each progressive tier of the service costs more, that each tier of the service will attain a minimum speed that is at least as fast as the maximum speed promised for the tier below. (Id. ¶ 32.)
The SA also contains a provision that Cox has "the right to manage its network for the greatest benefit of the greatest number of subscribers including, without limitation, the following: rate limiting, rejection or removal of `spam' or otherwise unsolicited bulk email, anti-virus mechanisms, traffic prioritization, and protocol filtering." (Id. ¶ 33.) Plaintiff alleges that none of the posted policies or terms of service or use state that Defendant can or will impede, limit, discontinue, block or otherwise impair or treat differently the Blocked Applications, and that Defendant impairs and blocks the Blocked Applications in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner and irrespective of the bandwith consumed by a user of the Blocked Applications. (Id. ¶ 33.) Plaintiff also alleges that by specifically enumerating the circumstances in which Defendant reserves the right to manage the network, Defendant implicitly promises Plaintiff that they will have otherwise unlimited use of the service at the promised speeds, including with respect to the Blocked Applications. (Id. ¶ 34.)
The Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead a breach of contract, as she points to no term of the contract that was breached by Cox. Plaintiff alleges that Cox promised specific speeds of internet access, but as Plaintiff alleges in her complaint and as the Limitations of Service state, the speeds are maximum speeds attainable by each tier of service, not a promise that at all times a customer's service will deliver those maximums. The Limitations of Service also state, "the limitations set forth herein are approximate and may vary from time to time." (Doc. No. 42, Ex. F.) Contrary to Plaintiffs assertions, *1239 Cox never promised a minimum speed for each tier of service and such an implied term cannot be read into a fully-integrated contract. See Collins v. Abel Holding Co., 89 Ga.App. 337, 341-42, 79 S.E.2d 436 (1953); (Doc. No. 42, Ex. D ¶ 20 ("This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement and understanding between the parties with respect to its subject matter and supersedes and replaces any and all prior written or oral agreements.")). Furthermore, Plaintiff does not allege that she never obtained the specified maximums, only that occasionally Defendant sent reset packets that disrupted certain P2P applications while Plaintiff was downloading or uploading large files. The contract specifically states that a user, "must ensure that your activities do not improperly restrict, inhibit, or degrade any other user's use of the Service, nor represent (in Cox's sole judgment) an unusually great burden on the network itself," and Cox specifically reserves the right to manage its network. (Id. Ex. C ¶ 13; Ex. D ¶ 15.) Cox also does not warrant "the service will be uninterrupted or error free ... or any files sent by or to you will be transmitted in uncorrupted form or within a reasonable period of time." (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff subscribed to a service and even construing the contract through the lense of the reasonable consumer as Plaintiff urges, subscribers plainly agreed to use limitations and Cox's discretion to manage its network, including traffic prioritization and decisions concerning overburdening of the network. The agreement makes no promises regarding minimum speeds and never promises that all applications will function at certain speeds at all times. Accordingly, the Court dismisses with leave to amend Plaintiffs breach of contract claim, as she fails to plead a breach of any contract term under Georgia or California law.

B. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Plaintiffs second cause of action is for a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (FAC ¶¶ 46-54.) California recognizes that every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, "`impos[ing] upon each contracting party the duty to refrain from doing anything which would render performance of the contract impossible by any act of his own, but also the duty to do everything that the contract presupposes that he will do to accomplish its purpose.'" 1 Witkin, Summary of California Law, Contracts § 798 (10th ed.2005). In order to state a claim for relief on an implied covenant theory, there must first be a contractual relationship between the parties. Id. § 800 (citation omitted). "The essence of the good faith covenant is objectively reasonable conduct." Id. § 801. A breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires something more than a breach of the contractual duty itself. Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc., 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1394, 272 Cal.Rptr. 387 (1990) (citations omitted). This "implies unfair dealing rather than mistaken judgment." Id.
According to the Georgia Supreme Court, "[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement." Brack v. Brownlee, 246 Ga. 818, 820, 273 S.E.2d 390 (1980). Under Georgia law, where a party cannot maintain a cause of action for breach of contract, that party cannot maintain an independent cause of action for a breach of good faith because the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing "is not an independent contract term." Stuart Enter. Intern., Inc. v. Peykan, Inc., 252 Ga.App. 231, 234, 555 S.E.2d 881 (2001) (quotation omitted).
*1240 The Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to plead a cause of action for a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiffs claim for breach of contract fails, and thus under either California or Georgia law her claim for breach of the implied covenant must also fail. Accordingly, the Court dismisses with leave to amend Plaintiffs claim for breach of contract.

C. Plaintiff's False Advertising Claims
Plaintiffs third through seventh causes of action are for violations of various California consumer protection statutes, including the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, provisions of California's Unfair Competition Law, and California's False Advertising Law. The Court reserves judgment at this time on Cox's motion to dismiss these claims, as the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint based on the dismissal of her contract-based claims. Additionally, the Court vacates its previous Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Doc. No. 34) in light of the Supreme Court's May 18 decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Defendant Cox's motion to strike the class allegations, GRANTS IN PART Defendant Cox's motion to dismiss the FAC, and VACATES the Court's February 6, 2009 Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 34). Plaintiff may file a second amended complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.


995 So.2d 507 (2008)
SHERIFF
v.
STATE.
No. 3D08-1232.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
October 22, 2008.
Decision without published opinion. Affirmed.