474 S.E.2d 919 (1996)
196 W.Va. 739
STATE of West Virginia ex rel. William Edward SOWARDS II, Relator,
v.
COUNTY COMMISSION OF LINCOLN COUNTY; Paul D. Duncan, President, and Buster Stowers and Doug Waldron, Members; and Kim Cecil, Respondents.
STATE of West Virginia ex rel. Lewis WALKER, Jr., Relator,
v.
Paul LAMBERT, Clerk of the Circuit Court of McDowell County; and Pete J. Beavers, Respondents.
Nos. 23525, 23541.
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted June 25, 1996.
Decided July 17, 1996.
*922 James M. Casey, Point Pleasant, for Relator Sowards.
J. David Cecil, Armada & Cecil, Hurricane, for Respondent Kim Cecil.
James M. Casey, Point Pleasant, and Charles H. Damron, Hamlin, for Relator Walker.
Lacy W. Wright, Jr., Welch, for Respondent Pete J. Beavers.
Sidney H. Bell, Pros. Atty. for McDowell County, Welch, for Respondent Paul Lambert. *920
*921 CLECKLEY, Justice:
This case involves two mandamus actions challenging the eligibility of two candidates for elected offices in West Virginia. Both candidates are alleged to have maintained their civil service status while running for office. Finding common issues of law, we consolidated these actions for purposes of consideration and decision.

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The relator in the first mandamus action, William E. Sowards II, is a citizen and taxpayer of Lincoln County, West Virginia. Mr. Sowards argues that Respondent Kim Cecil who appears to have received the most votes in the May 14, 1996, primary election for the Democratic nominee for sheriff[1] is ineligible to serve because Mr. Cecil did not resign his civil service position as deputy sheriff when he ran for the Office of Sheriff. Although Mr. Cecil was laid off from his deputy sheriff position at all times during his bid for sheriff, Mr. Sowards alleges Mr. Cecil continued to maintain his rights under the civil service system including accruing retirement time, vacation time, and seniority. Mr. Sowards claims he also is a laid off deputy sheriff who *923 desired to run for sheriff but forewent the opportunity because he did not want to break the law by running without resigning and he did not want to resign and lose his civil service standing.
Mr. Sowards requests this Court to declare the Respondents County Commission of Lincoln County, West Virginia, sitting as a Board of Canvassers; Paul D. Duncan, President thereof, and Buster Stowers and Doug Waldron, Members thereof, (hereinafter Lincoln County Commission), whose responsibility it is to ascertain the true and actual results of the primary election, have a clear legal duty to not certify a winner as the Democratic nominee for sheriff. In addition, Mr. Sowards asks this Court to declare the Democratic nomination for Sheriff of Lincoln County as vacant and available to be filled by the appropriate Democratic committee.
In response to Mr. Sowards' petition, Mr. Cecil states he was a "provisional" deputy sheriff and is not entitled to recall under the civil service system because he was not working under the system. Mr. Cecil denies maintaining any rights of retirement time, vacation time, and seniority under the system except to the extent he may be recalled under the relevant deputy sheriff's civil service statute. Mr. Cecil admits to being qualified to receive unemployment compensation while laid off and states he has been informed by the current sheriff, Jackie Cooper, that his name is on the list of deputy sheriffs to be recalled if sufficient funds become available. In addition, Mr. Cecil asserts that before he ran for sheriff he received an opinion from the Chief of Staff of the Office of Secretary of State, William H. Harrington, informing him that he was not prohibited from seeking public office. Mr. Cecil attached an affidavit from Mr. Harrington confirming this fact.
Mr. Cecil admits that mandamus is the appropriate action to test a candidate's eligibility for public office, but he challenges Mr. Sowards' use of mandamus in this case. Mr. Cecil argues the Lincoln County Commission is not a proper party to this action but, instead, Mr. Sowards should have named the Circuit Clerk of Lincoln County (hereinafter Lincoln Circuit Clerk). Mr. Cecil asserts the Lincoln County Commission has no authority to withhold the name of the successful Democratic sheriff nominee on the grounds alleged in the petition. Moreover, Mr. Cecil claims the petition only challenges his "right to continued coverage by the deputy sheriff's civil service system and has no bearing on his eligibility for public office." Therefore, Mr. Cecil moves this Court to dismiss or deny Mr. Sowards' petition and award Mr. Cecil costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
The second mandamus action before this Court was filed by Lewis Walker, Jr., who asserts he is a citizen and taxpayer of McDowell County, West Virginia. This action was brought against the Circuit Clerk of McDowell County (hereinafter McDowell Circuit Clerk), Paul Lambert, who is responsible for preparing and printing the ballot for the November general election, and Pete J. Beavers, who received the most votes to become one of the Democratic nominees for three available magistrate positions. Mr. Walker challenges the nomination of Mr. Beavers on the grounds Mr. Beavers merely received a leave of absence from his position as a deputy sheriff under the civil service system instead of resigning from that position to run for magistrate. Mr. Walker claims Mr. Beavers continued to accrue retirement time, vacation time, and seniority while on leave, and "has drawn compensation as a deputy while filing for and running a partisan campaign for magistrate." Mr. Walker asserts Mr. Beavers should have resigned his position prior to filing and, because he did not resign, he was not eligible to run and the McDowell Circuit Clerk has a clear legal duty to remove Mr. Beavers' name from the November ballot. Mr. Walker requests this Court to declare the nomination vacant and subject to being filled by the appropriate Democratic committee. Mr. Walker attached an affidavit from himself attesting to many of the above facts.
In response, Mr. Beavers asks this Court to deny Mr. Walker's petition and award Mr. *924 Beavers attorney's fees and costs for the following reasons. Mr. Beavers claims he requested and received a leave of absence to run for a magistrate position. By letter dated December 20, 1995, Donald L. Hicks, the current Sheriff of McDowell County, informed the Honorable William Kendrick King, Judge of the Circuit Court of McDowell County, that Mr. Beavers would be granted a leave of absence and would not be covered by civil service. On December 26, 1995, Judge King replied to Sheriff Hicks' letter and said Mr. Beavers would be retained as a civilian bailiff in the circuit court. Mr. Beavers officially requested his leave of absence by letter dated January 7, 1996. Sheriff Hicks replied by letter dated that same day and stated, in part, Mr. Beavers' "leave of absence will begin on January 8, 1996 and continue until the day after the 1996 Primary Election, provid[ed] [he is] unfortunate in [his] bid[.]" If successful in the primary, Mr. Beavers' leave is to continue until his political involvement ceases. By letter dated January 10, 1996, Sheriff Hicks informed the McDowell County Commission that Mr. Beavers was granted a leave of absence and would not be covered under the civil service system.
An affidavit was filed by Judge King which states Mr. Beavers has worked as a civilian bailiff for the circuit court since he took a leave of absence as deputy sheriff. Judge King also stated he told Mr. Beavers he saw no impediment to him running for the Office of Magistrate but, by seeking office, Mr. Beavers may forfeit his right to be returned to the position of a civil service deputy sheriff. Another affidavit from Philip A. LaCaria, the Chairperson of the Deputy Sheriffs' Civil Service Commission, was submitted on behalf of Mr. Beavers. Mr. LaCaria stated there was "no objection or problem insofar as the Commission was concerned" with Mr. Beavers taking a leave of absence and relinquishing his coverage under civil service while he campaigned.
The McDowell Circuit Clerk also responded to this action. In addition to making statements in support of Mr. Beavers' eligibility to run for office, the McDowell Circuit Clerk argues mandamus to remove Mr. Beavers from the ballot is not an appropriate remedy in this case because, in the alternative, an action should be brought before the Deputy Sheriffs' Civil Service Commission pursuant to W. Va.Code, 7-14-15 (1971), to determine if Mr. Beavers should be discharged from his employment. The McDowell Circuit Clerk also asserts the doctrine of laches should apply in that Mr. Beavers' candidacy was not challenged until after the primary election. Thus, the McDowell Circuit Clerk requests this Court to deny Mr. Walker's petition.

II.

DISCUSSION
The relators petition this Court for writs of mandamus directing the Lincoln County Commission and the McDowell Circuit Clerk to vacate the present Democratic nominees, Kim Cecil, for Sheriff of Lincoln County, and Pete J. Beavers, for Magistrate in McDowell County, from the official ballot of each respective county. In their petitions, they claim both candidates have acted illegally and in violation of state law prohibiting them from engaging in political activities. As urged by the relators, the only appropriate remedy are writs of mandamus ordering their disqualification as candidates for the political offices for which they were nominated. We find that the relators have standing to bring this action:
"`A citizen, tax payer and voter has such interest as entitles him to maintain mandamus to compel a board of ballot commissioners to discharge their duties lawfully in respect to the preparation of ballots for a general election.'" Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. Zickefoose v. West, 145 W.Va. 498, 116 S.E.2d 398 (1960), quoting Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Pack v. Karnes, 83 W.Va. 14, 97 S.E. 302 (1918).[2]
For the reasons set forth below, however, we deny the relators' requests for the writs of mandamus.

*925 A.

Standard for Granting a Writ of Mandamus.
W.Va.Code, 53-1-2 (1933), and Section 3 of Article VIII of the West Virginia Constitution vest this Court with original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus. See State ex rel. Summerfield v. Maxwell, 148 W.Va. 535, 135 S.E.2d 741 (1964). W. Va.Code, 3-1-45 (1963), as amended, specifically sanctions writs of mandamus in election disputes. See Marquis v. Thompson, 109 W.Va. 504, 155 S.E. 462 (1930) (the remedy particularly is appropriate in election disputes where speedy settlement is required). As we recently stated in McComas v. Board of Education of Fayette County, ___ W.Va. ___, ___, 475 S.E.2d 280, 284 (1996):
"[M]andamus is a drastic remedy to be invoked only in extraordinary situations[; therefore], a party seeking such a writ must satisfy three conditions: (1) there are no adequate means for the party to obtain the desired relief; (2) the party has a clear and indisputable right to the issuance of the writ; and (3) there is a legal duty on the part of the respondent to do that which the petitioner seeks to compel. See Syl. Pt. 1, State ex rel. Billings v. Point Pleasant, 194 W.Va. 301, 460 S.E.2d 436 (1995)."
"The issuance of a writ of mandamus is normally inappropriate unless the right or duty to be enforced is nondiscretionary." McComas, ___ W.Va. at ___, 475 S.E.2d at 280. The significance of the term "nondiscretionary" cannot be overstated in election cases that seek to restrict candidacies. The fundamental and constitutional right to run for public office cannot be denied unless necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. It is only when the writ has been invoked to preserve the right to vote or to run for political office that this Court has eased the requirements for strict compliance for the writ's preconditions, especially those relating to the availability of another remedy. Billings, 194 W.Va. at 303 n. 1, 460 S.E.2d at 438 n. 1; State ex rel. Thomas v. Wysong, 125 W.Va. 369, 372, 24 S.E.2d 463, 465 (1943) ("[i]f the relator has a clear legal right to the office claimed by him and from which he is legally excluded, mandamus is the appropriate remedy." (Citations omitted)); Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. Bromelow v. Daniel, 163 W.Va. 532, 258 S.E.2d 119 (1979) ("[b]ecause ... there is an important public policy interest in determining the qualifications of candidates in advance of an election, this Court does not hold an election mandamus proceeding to the same degree of procedural rigor as an ordinary mandamus case").[3] Thus, the public policies in protecting fundamental rights, preserving electoral integrity, and promoting both political and judicial economy have prompted a practical approach in assessing whether an election case is appropriate for mandamus relief. Although we believe that W. Va.Code, 7-14-15(b),[4] provides the exclusive remedy for the relators under these *926 circumstances, we nevertheless proceed to review these consolidated cases because a decision on the merits "may be especially appropriate to further supervisory and instructional goals" of our political and governmental institutions when handling similar questions raised in these petitions. Billings, 194 W.Va. at 304 n. 2, 460 S.E.2d at 439 n. 2.

B.

Analysis
The merits of the present controversy raise intriguing and significant problems. We must determine the propriety of disqualifying two Democratic Party nominees because, at the time of their campaigns and elections, a term of their employment barred them from participating in partisan political activities. Our resolution must come as close as possible to striking a balance between maintaining the integrity of the election process and preventing our civil service laws from being unjustly compromised. Although we cannot ignore the fact, as urged by the respondents, that the challenges presented herein should have come before the election,[5] Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. Zickefoose, supra, to provide guidance for future purposes, "we *927 prefer to rest our determination of the issue in [these] case[s] on the question of ... [the respondent nominees'] eligibilit[ies] which [are] fairly raised on the record and which we believe cannot be ignored." State ex rel. Thomas v. Wysong, 125 W.Va. at 375, 24 S.E.2d at 467.
Any effort to strike a candidate's name from a ballot quite obviously invokes serious constitutional concerns. As we have often noted, the West Virginia Constitution "confers a fundamental right to run for public office,"[6] and the provisions of the Constitution provide the primary, if not the exclusive, authority for determining who may or may not seek public office. E.g., Sturm v. Henderson, 176 W.Va. 319, 342 S.E.2d 287 (1986); Marra v. Zink, 163 W.Va. 400, 256 S.E.2d 581 (1979); cf. United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995) (term limits on congressional candidates violate the United States Constitution).
The issue raised by the relators not only implicates the right to seek public office but also the right of citizens to vote for candidates of their choice. The right to vote, in turn, helps to preserve all other rights because it provides the people with the ultimate means of expressing their will and directing the public policy of the State and its subsidiary units. Consequently, as Chief Justice Warren put it: "The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1378, 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 523 (1964); see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17, 84 S.Ct. 526, 535, 11 L.Ed.2d 481, 492 (1964) ("[o]ther rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined"). Neither the right to candidacy nor franchise, however, are immune from regulation. "[A]s a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes." Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 1279, 39 L.Ed.2d 714, 723 (1974). To that end, the State retains the authority to prescribe reasonable rules for the conduct of elections, reasonable procedures by which candidates may qualify to run for office, and the manner in which they will be elected. See Syl. pt. 2, Adkins v. Smith, 185 W.Va. 481, 408 S.E.2d 60 (1991) (the power of the Legislature to prescribe essential qualifications to be possessed by candidates in order to be eligible to be nominated or elected is plenary within constitutional limitations).
The State has a valid interest in preserving the integrity and reliability of both the electoral process and its civil service laws. Certainly, the West Virginia Legislature may place limits on campaigning by public employees if the limits substantially serve state interests that are "`important' enough to outweigh the employee's First Amendment rights." Magill v. Lynch, 560 F.2d 22, 27 (1st Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063, 98 S.Ct. 1236, 55 L.Ed.2d 763 *928 (1978), citing United States Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 564, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 2889-90, 37 L.Ed.2d 796, 808 (1973). See also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). In Letter Carriers and Broadrick, the United States Supreme Court recognized that our history as a democratic nation demonstrates that prohibiting partisan political activity of public employees ensures they serve the public and not a political party. Thus, a legislative body may bar a public employee from becoming a candidate for an elected office not only to prevent potential conflict in the workplace between the employee and the supervisor-incumbent during the campaign, but also to prohibit any tacit coercion of fellow employees and subordinates to assist in a political campaign. This policy promotes efficiency and integrity in law enforcement ranks and also prevents both "danger to the service in that political rather than official effort may earn advancement and to the public in that governmental favor may be channeled through political connections." United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 98, 67 S.Ct. 556, 569, 91 L.Ed. 754, 772 (1947).
Similarly, the history of this Court's interpretation of W. Va.Code, 7-14-15(a), makes it abundantly clear that the Legislature has the power to regulate partisan political activities of deputy sheriffs. See Deeds v. Lindsey, 179 W.Va. 674, 371 S.E.2d 602 (1988); Weaver v. Shaffer, 170 W.Va. 107, 290 S.E.2d 244 (1980). The necessity for legislation in this area has been amply demonstrated. See Hall v. Protan, 156 W.Va. 562, 195 S.E.2d 380 (1973). The State has a greater interest in regulating the political activities of its police officers than it would have in regulating the political activities of its citizenry in general. See Weaver, 170 W.Va. at 109, 290 S.E.2d at 246, citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). The possibility of coercion of employees by superior officers remains a strong factor in state, county, and municipal elections; hence, it is in the interest of the State that employees achieve advancements on their merit and that they be free from coercion and prospective favor from political activity. See Weaver, 170 W.Va. at 112, 290 S.E.2d at 249 (without civil service laws prohibiting political activities, officers could "achieve increases in salary, lavish perquisites, and opulent working conditions through political extortion").
The Legislature also has an interest in removing even the implication of impropriety from law enforcement whose very effectiveness and success is dependent upon its freedom from political influence. That is, the State has a compelling interest in preserving the political neutralityand avoiding even the appearance of political partisanshipin stocking and maintaining the ranks of those charged with enforcing the law. Weaver, supra; cf., e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (reliance on political patronage as a basis for most county employment violates public employees' First Amendment rights). For these reasons, it is constitutionally permissible to suspend, or even to discharge, a deputy sheriff who seeks political office. As long as the political activity limitation does not infringe on the deputy sheriff's access to the ballot box or his or her ability to participate in nonpartisan political discussions and activities, the requirement of orderly management of law enforcement personnel outweighs the limited infringement on the First Amendment. Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 94, 99, 67 S.Ct. at 566, 569, 91 L.Ed. at 772-73.
Against this backdrop, we proceed to consider the specifics of the relators' challenges. Their claims are not that the nominees should be sanctioned as deputy sheriffs for engaging in political activities. Rather, the relators contend that, because the law regulating the deputy sheriffs' employment precluded them from simultaneously serving as deputy sheriffs and running for office (and assuming their leave status did not alter their status as deputy sheriffs), they are unable to legally qualify as candidates for the offices they seek. Because the relators have *929 presented us with no direct authority for this proposition, we must assume they believe that disqualification as a candidate inexorably flows from deputy sheriffs' engaging in political activities. In essence, the relators contend that the statutory scheme prohibiting political activity of deputy sheriffs would be ineffective if the deputies were allowed to reap the fruits of their political activities. Thus, granting relief to the relators would call on courts to impose sanctions on politically active deputy sheriffs over and above the sanctions explicitly provided by the Legislature. In the relators' view, the public's only effective safeguard against this type of political activity by deputy sheriffs is disqualification. On the other hand, the respondents caution us there is no direct authority in the West Virginia Constitution giving this Court (or the Legislature, for that matter) authority to establish qualifications to seek office in excess of those imposed by the Constitution and we should be ever reluctant to impose our will in violation of the freedom of speech and assembly provisions of the Constitution. See generally Sturm v. Henderson, supra.
We decline to exercise the power the relators urge upon us. The Legislature fully and carefully set forth in W. Va.Code, 7-14-15, what are the appropriate sanctions for deputy sheriffs who engage in partisan politics. Subsection (a) provides, in pertinent part:
"[N]o deputy sheriff covered by the provisions of this article shall engage in any political activity of any kind, character or nature whatsoever, except to cast his vote at any election or shall act as an election official in any municipal, county or state election. Any deputy sheriff violating the provisions of this section shall have his appointment vacated and he shall be removed, in accordance with the pertinent provisions of this section." (Emphasis added).
In addition, subsection (b) gives the public a means for enforcing the substantive proscription of subsection (a) by authorizing any three residents of a county to initiate a petition for removal of any deputy sheriff believed to be engaging in partisan politics. See note 3, supra, quoting subsection (b). We believe W. Va.Code, 7-14-15, therefore, captures all the Legislature concluded was necessary to give effect to its regulation, and we see no reason for inferring any additional power on the courts. We also reject any contention there is some abstract constitutional right of the public to have deputy sheriffs who are otherwise qualified to hold office thrown off the ballot. As this Court stated in Isaacs v. Board of Ballot Commissioners, 122 W.Va. 703, 707, 12 S.E.2d 510, 512 (1940): "The inhibition of the constitution should not be given a more far-reaching meaning and effect than its wording and spirit require."[7]
Moreover, we believe the nominees' rights, to which we alluded above, warrant a rejection of the requested relief. In characteristically pithy terms, the Honorable Oliver Wendell Holmes, Justice, long ago penned that the "petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." McAuliffe v. Mayor, City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892). Although that epigram no longer captures the state of the free speech doctrine,[8] its converse certainly remains vital: Even if an individual does not have a constitutional right to be a police officer, he or she does have a right to talk and engage inpolitics. It is one thing to disqualify a candidate from being a deputy sheriff, it is quite another to disqualify a nominated deputy sheriff from being a candidate. Moreover, voters have a right to expect their electoral choices to be honored by the State.
*930 To achieve the goal of enfranchisement wherever possible, we believe judicial authority to take a candidate off the ballot, especially after the voters have expressed their preference, should be sparingly used. Referring to restraint in this area as a "just and magnanimous judicial approach[,]" this Court in Isaacs stated: "The right of a citizen to hold office is the general rule; ineligibility the exception. Courts are hesitant to take action resulting in deprivation of the privilege to hold office, except under clear and explicit constitutional ... requirement." 122 W.Va. at 705, 12 S.E.2d at 512. Political candidacy is a fundamental interest which can be trod upon only if less restrictive alternatives are not available. It is only when an election has been subverted by a candidate's clear constitutional or statutory disqualification, bribery, fraud, intimidation, or similar unlawful conduct that a court should invalidate the preference of the voters and, in effect, annul the election. Therefore, we hold that a mere violation of W. Va.Code, 7-14-15(a), is insufficient to set aside an election and, in effect, disenfranchise the voters of a county. The sanctity of the ballot, which is the keystone of our democracy, must be preserved.
We are not prepared to say that a violation of W. Va.Code, 7-14-15(a), can never lead to a successful nominee's disqualification. However, in the absence of egregious conduct amounting to fraud, bribery, or coercion, we remain reluctant to declare the disqualification of a nominee. It is our constitutional obligation to construe the laws of West Virginia, whenever reasonable, consistent with the right to vote and to seek office. See State ex rel. Thomas v. Wysong, 125 W.Va. at 377, 24 S.E.2d at 467 ("[i]n our own jurisdiction a liberal view with respect to eligibility to office has been adopted"); MacCorkle v. Hechler, 183 W.Va. 105, 106, 394 S.E.2d 89, 90 (1990) ("`[a] liberal application of any statute should be made so as to afford the citizens of this State ... an opportunity to vote for the persons of their choice.'" (Citation omitted)).

III.

CONCLUSION
Parties seeking a writ of mandamus bear the burden of proving that the right to the desired relief is clear and indisputable. Far from being clear and indisputable, we are unable to find any abuse of discretion or usurpation of administrative or executive power justifying the imposition of this drastic remedy. Because we have determined that W. Va.Code, 7-14-15(b), provides the exclusive remedy for violations under W. Va.Code, 7-14-15(a), we deny the petitions for writs of mandamus. We express no opinion as to whether further proceedings under W. Va. Code, 7-14-15(b), may be brought at this juncture.[9]
Writs denied.
NOTES
[1]  Mr. Cecil and Paul D. Duncan were the top vote getters in the Democratic primary for sheriff. Each candidate has filed for a recount of the votes. Mr. Cecil leads in the vote totals. At the time of this action, a winner had not been certified.
[2]  Both State ex rel. Zickefoose and Pack were overruled on other grounds in State ex rel. Booth v. Board of Ballot Comm'rs of Mingo County, 156 W.Va. 657, 196 S.E.2d 299 (1973).
[3]  As we stated in Billings, 194 W.Va. at 304, 460 S.E.2d at 439, "[o]nce [the mandamus] prerequisites are met, this Court's decision whether to issue the writ is largely one of discretion." (Footnote omitted). However, there can be no doubt that mandamus is an appropriate remedy in election dispute cases. See Benson v. Robertson, 159 W.Va. 674, 226 S.E.2d 447 (1976); State ex rel. Smoleski v. County Court of Hancock County, 153 W.Va. 21, 166 S.E.2d 777 (1969); State ex rel. Summerfield, supra; Kirkpatrick v. Deegans, 53 W.Va. 275, 44 S.E. 465 (1903). The principal purpose of the liberalized election mandamus is to provide an expeditious pre-election hearing to resolve eligibility of candidates, so that voters can exercise their fundamental franchise rights as to all eligible candidates. State ex rel. Bromelow, supra.
[4]  W. Va.Code, 7-14-15(b), provides, in pertinent part:

"Any three residents of the county may file their written petition with the civil service commission thereof setting out therein the grounds upon which a deputy sheriff of such county should be removed for a violation of subsection (a) of this section.... The commission at the conclusion of the hearing, or as soon thereafter as possible, shall enter an order sustaining in whole or in part the charges made, or shall dismiss the charges as unfounded. In the event the charges are sustained in whole or in part, the order shall also declare the appointment of such deputy to be vacated and thereupon the sheriff shall immediately remove the deputy from his office and from the payroll of the county."
[5]  There are at least two valid grounds for the summary rejection of these petitions. First, "[o]nce an election is held, ... sound public policy dictates that newly elected officials not be vexed by continuing law suits" of matters that could have been raised before such an election. Marra v. Zink, 163 W.Va. 400, 402, 256 S.E.2d 581, 583 (1979).

Second, there are practical, as well as legal, reasons to hold that the provisions of W. Va. Code, 7-14-15, are inapplicable to a deputy sheriff who has obtained a leave of absence from that position expressly for the purpose of running for political office and to a deputy sheriff who was laid off from his employment at the time he engaged in the alleged political activity. W. Va. Code, 7-14-2(a)(2) (1978), provides, in part, that "`[d]eputy sheriffs' or `deputies' shall mean persons appointed by a sheriff as his deputies whose primary duties as such deputies are within the scope of active, general law enforcement and as such are authorized to carry deadly weapons, patrol the highways, perform police functions, make arrests or safeguard prisoners." (Emphasis added). It reasonably could be argued that at the time of the political activity neither respondent candidate was "active" nor permitted to engage in the law enforcement duties required of deputy sheriffs.
More significantly, W. Va.Code, 7-14-15, does not directly address the issue relevant here: Whether its provisions apply to persons who are on furlough or leave of absence, with or without pay. Unquestionably, the Legislature under its plenary powers could provide that persons laid off or on a leave of absence are subject to the "political activity" prohibition. Indeed, this very issue has been the subject of conflicting federal opinions and debate on the floor of Congress. In Johnson v. Cushing, 483 F.Supp. 608, 611 (D.Minn.1980), the court held the Hatch Political Activities Act (the Hatch Act), "while it applies to persons presently employed by the State Department of Economic Security, does not apply to persons who have been granted leaves of absence[.]"
On the other hand, the same court, but a different judge, determined that the legislative history of the Hatch Act supports the conclusion that a covered employee on leave of absence without pay is subject to the Act. In Minnesota Department of Jobs and Training v. United States Merit Systems Protection Board, 666 F.Supp. 1305 (D.C.Minn.1987), rev'd on other grounds 858 F.2d 433 (8th Cir.1988), the court observed that at the time of the passage of the Hatch Act, the Honorable Orrin G. Hatch, Senator for the State of Utah, himself offered as part of its legislative history an interpretive summary suggesting the Act's coverage include "[t]emporary employees, substitutes, and persons on furlough or leave of absence with or without pay[.]" 666 F.Supp. at 1308, quoting 86th Cong. Rec. § 2942-43 (Daily ed. March 15, 1940) (statement of Senator Hatch). Although an amendment offered would have made the Hatch Act inapplicable to persons on leave of absence without pay, the amendment was withdrawn when the Honorable Lewis B. Schwellenbach, Senator for the State of Washington, vehemently argued he knew "of nothing which might involve more impure politics than a man who occupies an executive position, who has under him a large number of employees, to take a leave of absence with the understanding that he is going to run for office and then come back and again hold his office if he is defeated in the election." 86th Cong. Rec. § 2872 (Daily ed. March 14, 1940) (statement of Senator Schwellenbach). Based on this legislative history, the court held an "employee, as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 1501(4), who runs for public office in a partisan election, even if on approved leave without pay, is in violation of federal law." 666 F.Supp. at 1309.
Obviously, the danger of coercion and implicit intimidation envisioned by Senator Schwellenbach is even more pronounced when a deputy sheriff on leave of absence is seeking the position of sheriff or magistrate, positions that may very well determine fellow deputy sheriffs' future success or failure in law enforcement. Nevertheless, we do not have the benefit of any legislative history to discern legislative intent. A fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and, if possible, give effect to the intention and purpose of the Legislature as expressed in a statute. Absent plain language that would indicate a legislative intent to extend coverage of W. Va.Code, 7-14-15, to one on an unpaid leave of absence, we will not assume the intent to do so from legislative silence. To do so would suggest the Legislature lacks the ability to graft a statute with such clarity, and we refuse to indulge in so cynical a view of the legislative process.
Another compelling reason to reject the relators' efforts to apply W. Va.Code, 7-14-15, to the respondent nominees is the absence of bad faith or willfulness on their part. It appears to this Court that the respondent nominees were acting in good faith, taking all possible steps known to them to comply with the laws of this State. We must conclude that their acts, even if violative of State law, were not willful, and it would be profoundly unfair to hold that their acts constitute the kind of grievous misbehavior that would justify our nullification of a popular election by mandamus.
[6]  State ex rel. Billings v. Point Pleasant, 194 W.Va. at 305, 460 S.E.2d at 440.
[7]  The claim in Isaacs was much stronger than exists in this case. At least in Isaacs the relators could point to candidate qualifications specifically stated in the Constitution. Such situation is not the case here.
[8]  E.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents of University of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967); William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 Harv. L.Rev. 1439 (1968).
[9]  Additionally, we reject the respondent nominees' claims for attorneys' fees. Although not directly applicable, we find guidance in State ex rel. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection, 193 W.Va. 650, 458 S.E.2d 88 (1995), wherein we suggested in Syllabus Point 4 that a primary factor in considering the propriety of an attorney's fee award arising out of a mandamus action is "the relative clarity by which the legal duty was established[.]" At the time this action was filed, this Court had made no definitive ruling regarding the exclusivity of W. Va.Code, 7-14-15(b), and its implication to the electoral process. We, therefore, exercise our discretion and deny the requested awards of attorneys' fees.


19 Cal.App.3d 339 (1971)
96 Cal. Rptr. 848
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
RUBIN ALVIN WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.
Docket No. 19360.
Court of Appeals of California, Second District, Division Four.
August 19, 1971.
*341 COUNSEL
Clifford Douglas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and Alan V. Hager, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
*342 OPINION
KINGSLEY, J.
Defendant and Ernest Melvin Wilkerson were jointly charged with two counts of burglary, in violation of section 459 of the Penal Code, and with two counts of arson, in violation of section 448a of the Penal Code. The information was later amended to allege a prior felony conviction against defendant (Health & Saf. Code, § 11910). One count of burglary and one count of arson were later dismissed.
Defendant's motion pursuant to Penal Code section 995 was denied; he pled not guilty. The jury found defendant guilty of burglary as charged in count I of the information (determined to be second degree), and guilty of arson as charged in count III of the information.[1]
Defendant's motions for a new trial and probation were denied. He was sentenced to state prison for the term prescribed by law on both counts, the sentences to run concurrently. He has appealed. We vacate the sentence on the burglary count and affirm the judgment on the arson count.
On the evening of September 14, 1969, Clarence Johns was employed as a custodian at Carver Junior High School in Los Angeles. Part of his duties included locking the administration building and the auditorium building at the school. When the buildings and main gate were locked (by 6 p.m.) Mr. Johns noticed that the school property was in good condition and to his knowledge there were no metal cans containing combustible material. Mr. Johns testified that he never gave defendant or any other persons permission to enter the buildings after he left on the evening of September 14.[2]
Testimony at trial indicated that defendants Rubin Williams and Ernest Wilkerson, together with Pamela Erwing, Clarence Thomas, Jr., and Roosevelt Jones, had been at a party at the residence of Sherri Williams on the evening of September 14, 1969, and the early morning hours of September 15, 1969. Pamela Erwing testified that she and the men left the party in the early morning of September 15 and as they were driving near Carver Junior High School she saw smoke or fire coming from the direction of the school. At this point Ernest Wilkerson stopped the car and there was some conversation about mugging or robbing a pedestrian. Ernest and defendant exited the car, were gone about one minute, and returned to the car. Pamela testified that she did not see any cans taken from the car, nor did she see the trunk of the car opened at that time. The prosecution impeached Pamela *343 through a statement previously given to the police at variance with her trial testimony. Pamela indicated that she had not read the statement before she signed it and that her testimony in court was the truth.
At the trial Clarence Thomas, Jr., gave conflicting testimony. He first testified that, although he was in the car with defendant and the others, he did not participate in setting the fires. He was impeached by the prosecution's use of statements made by Clarence to the police that he, Roosevelt Jones, Ernest Wilkerson, and defendant had broken into Carver Junior High School, poured gasoline in the building and lit the gasoline with torches. At trial, Mr. Thomas at first testified that his statements to the police were untrue, and then changed his testimony to conform to the version given to the police. In addition, he stated that the gasoline was taken from the trunk of Ernest's car, as were the torches. However, he steadfastly maintained that he had seen smoke coming from Carver Junior High School before he and his companions arrived there.
Roosevelt Jones, called by the prosecution, stated that he had been at the same party as defendant and that he left with Pamela, Ernest, Clarence, and defendant. He further testified that he helped take cans containing gasoline from the trunk of Ernest's car, that defendant gained access to the school by breaking a window, and that they all poured gasoline inside the building and set both it and the auditorium on fire.
Cheryl Williams (the person whose party defendant attended) testified that she saw smoke coming from the direction of Carver Junior High School prior to the time defendant and his companions were ready to leave. She gave the approximate time as 2:30 a.m.
Codefendant Ernest Wilkerson testified that he did not leave the party until 2:30 a.m., and that prior to that time Cheryl had pointed out smoke coming from the direction of Carver Junior High School. He denied having the gas cans, entering the school grounds, or setting the fires. He stated that he and defendant stopped near the school for purposes of mugging a pedestrian, but when they saw police and firemen they changed their minds.
Defendant testified in his own behalf that before leaving the party he saw smoke coming from the direction of the Carver Junior High. He confirmed the story of Ernest Wilkerson as to the possible mugging. However, he denied having anything to do with the fires.
Robert Lee Criswell testified that he was driving near Carver Junior High School between 1:45 a.m. and 2 a.m. on September 15 and that he saw *344 smoke coming from the school. He watched two people run to and over the fence surrounding the school and get into a car containing two people in the back seat. The car appeared to have the license number OSC 906. He described the persons entering the car as two young males in their twenties, standing approximately 5'7" and 5'9" in height. It was later stipulated that an automobile with license number OSC 906 was registered to Kenneth Rucker Wilkerson and that Ernest Wilkerson drives it most of the time.
Leslie Lewis, a fireman for the Los Angeles City Fire Department, testified that, on September 15th, he investigated the fire at Carver Junior High School. He concluded that two major fires had been set by hand. He smelled a heavy gasoline odor in the burned structures, several five-gallon containers, newspapers rolled up in the form of torches, and burn patterns on the floors which were caused by flammable liquid. He concluded that the fires had been set by human hands and that it would have taken between 15 and 30 minutes for one person to start the fires and between 10 and 20 minutes for two persons to start the fires.
Sergeant Raymond Callahan of the Los Angeles Police Department went to Carver Junior High School on the morning of September 15 to investigate the fire. He testified that on some of the doors in the Carver building he found marks which indicated to him that the doors had been pried open with an instrument. Near the northeast corner of the Carver building he found footprints in the soft dirt.
Donald Hale, a criminalist for the Los Angeles Police Department, testified that certain footprints near the fence surrounding the school could have been made by defendant's shoes, and further, that a screwdriver found in Ernest Wilkerson's car probably had made the marks found on the forced door of the Carver building.
Officer Daniel P. Mahoney, a Los Angeles police officer, testified that he talked with Cheryl Williams on September 15 at which time she stated that defendant and the other car occupants left her house at approximately 1:30 a.m. She did not know the exact time because she did not have a watch.
Dr. Andrew Anderson, principal of Carver Junior High School, testified that when he arrived at the school on September 15, he found that the Carver building and the auditorium building had suffered severe fire damage. In addition to structural damage, all student records were destroyed. It was estimated that the total damage amounted to $70,000 to $80,000.

*345 I
Defendant contends, and the Attorney General agrees, that the dictates of Penal Code section 654 were violated when defendant was sentenced to state prison on counts of both arson and burglary.[3] As the punishment prescribed for arson is greater than that for second degree burglary, the latter sentence must be set aside.

II
Pursuant to Penal Code section 448a, the court defined arson as follows: "Every person who willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns any building is guilty of the crime of arson."
(1a) Defendant assigns as error the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the meaning of the word "maliciously," according to Penal Code section 7, subdivision 4. That section provides: "The words `malice' and `maliciously' import a wish to vex, annoy, or injure another person, or an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law;..."
A similar contention was raised and rejected in People v. Bowman (1966) 240 Cal. App.2d 358 [49 Cal. Rptr. 772]. In that case defendant offered instructions on the meaning of the words "willfully" and "maliciously" as used in the definition of arson.[4] The reviewing court conceded that the statutory definition of arson required that the act of setting fire to or burning be done maliciously. However, as related to the crime of arson, the court noted that the word "malice" denotes nothing more than a deliberate and intentional firing of a building (or other such structure) as contrasted with an accidental or unintentional ignition. (People v. Bowman (1966) supra, 240 Cal. App.2d 358, 387; People v. Andrews (1965) 234 Cal. App.2d 69, 75 [44 Cal. Rptr. 94].)
(2) The corpus delicti of arson is sufficiently proven where the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the fire was of incendiary origin. (People v. Andrews (1965) supra, 234 Cal. App.2d 69, 76.) (1b) No evidence was presented from which the jury could legitimately infer that *346 the fire resulted from accidental ignition. The testimony of the custodian and the principal, as well as the presence of gasoline cans, impells a contrary finding.
Noting that an instruction on intent was given, the court in People v. Bowman, supra, at page 387, concluded that the jury must necessarily have understood that arson involved an intentional and deliberate firing of a building. In the present case the court gave instructions on both intent and wilfullness, thus presenting an even stronger case than People v. Bowman. There was no error.

III
Defendant next urges that the admission into evidence of statements made by codefendant Ernest Wilkerson to Officer Mahoney, violated Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974], and that the court's failure to instruct on limited admissibility violated People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 [47 Cal. Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265].
Outside the presence of the jury, testimony of Officer Mahoney, the arresting officer, indicated that, following the fire at Carver Junior High School, a Mr. Criswell obtained the license number of a car leaving the scene. The police department ran a check on the vehicle, and as a result of this check Officer Mahoney went to a residence at 743 East 94th Street. The men leaving the scene were described as Negro males in their late twenties. While conducting his investigation at the above address, Officer Mahoney encountered defendant and codefendant approaching the residence in the vehicle in question. Officer Mahoney asked Ernest Wilkerson where he had been the previous evening. Mr. Wilkerson stated that he was at his girl friend's house with defendant until 5 a.m. Ernest Wilkerson was then asked whether he was in the vicinity of Carver Junior High School in the early morning hours. He replied that he had transmission trouble and parked in front of the school. At this time Officer Mahoney arrested defendant and Ernest Wilkerson and advised them of their Miranda rights. Both stated they wished to waive their rights.
(3) Defendant first contends that at the time Officer Mahoney encountered defendant and Ernest Wilkerson the accusatory stage had been reached. Defendant reaches this conclusion by alleging that the investigation had ceased to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and had begun to focus on defendant (People v. Dorado (1965) 62 Cal.2d 338 [42 *347 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361]; Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478 [12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758].) Defendant has standing to challenge the admissibility of statements of a codefendant. (People v. Aranda (1965) supra, 63 Cal.2d 518.)
The case of People v. Davis (1965) 235 Cal. App.2d 214 [45 Cal. Rptr. 297] (decided after Dorado and Escobedo) is directly in point. In that case a car was observed driving from the scene of a murder. Police officers spotted the car at defendant's residence and asked defendant about his activities on the previous evening. In concluding that the admission of defendant's statements to police officers did not violate his constitutional rights pursuant to Escobedo v. Illinois, supra, the court stated that the police had justification for their interview with defendant and that suspicion had not yet focused on him as the prime suspect. Similarly, Officer Mahoney's questioning of Ernest Wilkerson was not accusatory nor asked for the purpose of eliciting a confession or obtaining admissions. In conducting his investigation, Officer Mahoney was entitled to ascertain whether the car had been at Carver Junior High and, if so, the occupants of the car. It was only after Wilkerson's response that Officer Mahoney had reason to believe that defendant and Wilkerson were prime suspects. At this point, both defendant and Wilkerson were informed of their Miranda rights. Therefore, the Escobedo situation is not present as defendants were not in custody, were not prime suspects during the initial inquiry, and were not asked questions for the purpose of eliciting a confession. (People v. Dorado (1965) supra, 62 Cal.2d 338, 354 [as to when Escobedo applies]; People v. Oster (1968) 260 Cal. App.2d 539, 544 [67 Cal. Rptr. 361]; People v. Davis (1965) supra, 235 Cal. App.2d 214, 226.)
Thus, there was no error in admitting Wilkerson's statements into evidence, as the accusatory stage had not yet been reached.
(4) Defendant next urges prejudicial error in the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that the statements were to be used only against Wilkerson. While there may have been error in the court's failure to so instruct, any such error was not prejudicial. At the police station, after defendant had been informed of his Miranda rights, defendant agreed with Wilkerson's story and then elaborated on it. This statement was elicited through testimony of Officer Mahoney and no objection was made at the trial. It is thus difficult to see how any prejudice occurred.

IV
(5a) Clarence Thomas, Jr., an accomplice in the commission of the burglary and arson at Carver Junior High, testified in behalf of the prosecution. He was asked by counsel for the People if a juvenile court petition *348 (filed against him regarding the Carver fire) had been sustained. After an affirmative answer by Mr. Thomas, both defendants moved for a mistrial. That motion was denied and the trial court declined to give an admonition so as not to unduly emphasize the matter. Defendant contends that the admission of this testimony constituted prejudicial error by indicating to the jury that an accomplice had already been found guilty of the alleged crimes.
Ordinarily it is improper to bolster the credibility of "ordinary" witnesses until there is some indication that their testimony is suspect. Such an indication will generally appear on cross-examination. However, if there is no cross-examination, the need does not arise, and the credibility of the witness is evaluated by the jury.
In contrast, judicial interpretation of Penal Code section 1111 indicates in the first instance that the testimony of an accomplice is to be viewed with distrust. Testimony given by an accomplice is subject to the statutory requirement of corroboration. (Pen. Code, § 1111.) (6) The necessity of corroboration is based primarily on experience which has shown that evidence given by an accomplice should be viewed with care, caution and suspicion because it comes from a tainted source and is often given in the hope of immunity from prosecution or leniency. (People v. Robinson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 132, 141 [271 P.2d 865]; People v. Wallin (1948) 32 Cal.2d 803, 808 [197 P.2d 734]; People v. Chrisman (1967) 256 Cal. App.2d 425, 438 [64 Cal. Rptr. 733].)
(7) Consequently, where the accomplice is called as a witness by the prosecution, the trial court is required to give an instruction that testimony of the accomplice should be viewed with caution. (People v. Gonzales (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 593, 607 [84 Cal. Rptr. 863]; People v. Cuellar (1968) 262 Cal. App.2d 766, 770 [68 Cal. Rptr. 846].) (5b) The jury was so instructed and was also told that Clarence Thomas, Jr., was an accomplice as a matter of law and that his testimony required corroboration.
It is thus obvious that Mr. Thomas was not an "ordinary" witness. As an accomplice, he was subject to a presumption that his testimony would be viewed with caution.
Even though the rationale for the rule of corroboration may not have been fully applicable to the facts of this case (as the testimony could not have been given in the hope of immunity), the cautionary instruction was nevertheless required. It was entirely possible that the defense would not cross-examine Mr. Thomas and that the People would therefore be unable on redirect to dispel the effect of the required instruction. Consequently, *349 the People referred to the juvenile court petition in order to lend credence to the initially suspect testimony of Mr. Thomas by showing he had nothing to gain, except a desire to tell the truth.
Under these circumstances, there was no error.
The sentence on the burglary count (count I) is vacated; the judgment on the arson count (count III) is affirmed.
Jefferson, Acting P.J., and Dunn, J., concurred.
NOTES
[1]  Apparently there was no disposition of the prior felony conviction as there is no indication that defendant was ever arraigned on that matter.
[2]  The only persons who could enter the buildings would be someone with a key, for example, a school teacher.
[3]  Penal Code section 654 provides: "An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than one; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under one bars prosecution for the same act or omission under any other."
[4]  Although in People v. Bowman defendant's conviction was based on Penal Code section 447a rather than 448a, this distinction is immaterial as both sections define arson in the same manner, except that 447a refers to arson of a dwelling house while 448a refers to arson of other types of buildings.


456 So.2d 58 (1984)
REPUBLIC NATIONAL BANK OF DALLAS
v.
Gaines L. HOWELL.
83-533.
Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 7, 1984.
Jerry L. Turner, Chatom, for appellant.
Wallace H. Lindsey, III, Butler, for appellee.
MADDOX, Justice.
This is a suit to enforce a judgment on a promissory note rendered by the district court of Dallas, Texas.
On August 10, 1973, Republic National Bank of Dallas (Republic) obtained a consent judgment against Gaines L. Howell in the amount of $106,278.55. The judgment stemmed from a loan made by Republic to Howell of $78,000 and included unpaid interest accruing thereon since 1969.
Republic did not collect the judgment, but on January 29, 1980, the parties entered into an agreement of release and satisfaction of the judgment. Although the agreement recites only $10.00 as monetary consideration, Howell's undisputed testimony is that he actually paid $2,500 for the release. Contemporaneous with the release, Howell executed two promissory *59 notes in the amount of $68,017.26 and $92,916.72 respectively.
In April 1980, Howell moved from Dallas to Chatom, Alabama, in Washington County. On November 14, 1980, Republic obtained a judgment on the two notes against Howell in the district court of Dallas, Texas. The judgment was in the amount of $166,336.68, plus interest, and attorney's fees of $16,630.77, plus interest.
On April 6, 1981, Republic brought suit in Washington County to enforce the November 14 judgment. Howell answered with a general denial, and he subsequently amended his answer to include fraud as a defense. Republic twice moved for summary judgment, presenting certified copies of the Texas judgment. Both motions were denied, as was its motion for reconsideration.
The case was tried before a jury, which found for Howell. Republic appeals here, asserting that it was entitled to enforcement of the Texas judgment as a matter of law. We agree.
As we stated in Morse v. Morse, 394 So.2d 950 (Ala.1981):
"The Constitution of the United States, Article IV, Section 1, requires that `full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state.' The judgment of the court of another state having jurisdiction of the subject matter and persons is entitled to full faith and credit in Alabama courts."
The full faith and credit clause generally requires every state to give foreign judgments at least the res judicata effect which the judgment would have been accorded in the state in which it was rendered. Wilson v. Lee, 406 So.2d 416 (Ala.Civ.App.1981).
It is undisputed that Howell received service of process, that he had notice of the November 14 hearing, that he appeared through his attorney at that hearing and that he entered only a general denial, choosing not to raise affirmative defenses or attack the jurisdiction of the Texas court. By so doing, he submitted himself to the jurisdiction of that court. Hazen Research, Inc. v. Omega Minerals, 497 F.2d 151 (5th Cir.1974).
Therefore, the properly authenticated judgment of the Texas court, that court having jurisdiction, is conclusive as to the question of Howell's indebtedness, Mason v. Calhoun, 213 Ala. 491, 105 So. 643 (1925), and is res judicata in Alabama. Wilson, supra. No other defenses, such as fraud, are now open to inquiry. Helton v. Turner, 228 Ala. 403, 153 So. 866 (1934). Consequently, Howell's claim that prior to execution of the notes in question, an officer of Republic told him that the bank would take no action to collect on the notes could not be raised in the Alabama proceeding. This defense might have been valid if timely raised at the Texas hearing, but the defense clearly goes to the merits of the cause of action litigated in Texas, and it should have been raised at the Texas hearing and may not be raised here to attack the validity of the judgment resulting from that hearing. Tongue, Brooks & Co. v. Walser, 410 So.2d 89 (Ala.Civ.App.1982).
Because the Texas judgment is res judicata, there was no material issue left in dispute, and summary judgment should have been granted. The trial court's failure to grant summary judgment was error, Wilson, supra, and its judgment entered upon the jury verdict is due to be reversed and the cause remanded.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TORBERT, C.J., and JONES, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ.


607 So.2d 230 (1992)
Ex parte Otis Randy CURRY.
(In re Otis Randy CURRY v. INTERSTATE EXPRESS, INC.)
1910784.
Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 21, 1992.
*231 Benton H. Persons, Andalusia, for petitioner.
W. Bartlett Taylor, Andalusia, for respondent.
SHORES, Justice.
We granted the petition for certiorari review to determine whether the Court of Civil Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's order denying worker's compensation benefits in this case. Otis Randy Curry sued Interstate Express, Inc. ("Interstate"), seeking worker's compensation benefits after he was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident. Curry claims he was an employee of Interstate; Interstate contends that Curry was an independent contractor and was thus not entitled to benefits.
The case was tried on October 12, 1990, and the trial court held that Curry had not proved he was an employee within the coverage of the Alabama Workmen's Compensation Act, § 25-5-1 et seq., Code of Alabama 1975. Curry appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case on the grounds that the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law failed to comply with § 25-5-88, Code of Alabama 1975, 582 So.2d 565. On remand, the trial court issued a second order denying Curry's claim for benefits. Curry appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which affirmed, 607 So.2d 228. We reverse and remand.
In Ex parte Eastwood Foods, Inc., 575 So.2d 91, 93 (Ala.1991), we clarified the standard of appellate review in worker's compensation cases:
"The standard of appellate review in workmen's compensation cases is a two-step process. Initially, the reviewing court will look to see if there is any legal evidence to support the trial court's findings. If such evidence is found, then the reviewing court determines whether any reasonable view of that evidence supports the trial court's judgment."
We also stated that "a trial court's `findings of fact' that are, in reality, an application of the law to the facts, or that are, stated differently, legal conclusions, do not come within the purview of the `presumption of correctness' standard." Id.
The issues on appeal are: 1) whether the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were in compliance with § 25-5-88, Code of Alabama 1975; and 2) whether there is any evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that Curry was not an employee of Interstate within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The procedure in disputed claims arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act is set out in § 25-5-88, Code of Alabama 1975, and must be complied with. The statute reads in pertinent part:
"At the hearing or any adjournment thereof the court shall hear such witnesses as may be presented by each party, and in a summary manner without a jury, unless one is demanded to try the issue of willful misconduct on the part of the employee, shall decide the controversy. This determination shall be filed in writing with the clerk of said court, and judgment shall be entered thereon in the same manner as in civil actions tried in the said circuit court and shall contain a *232 statement of the law and facts and conclusions as determined by said judge."

(Emphasis added.) Section 25-5-88 requires that a judgment in a worker's compensation case contain findings of fact and conclusions of law. Dale Motels, Inc. v. Crittenden, 49 Ala.App. 51, 268 So.2d 834 (1972). While the appellate courts have reversed worker's compensation decisions in which the trial court's findings of fact were completely unresponsive to the issues (see, Dennis v. Gamble's Inc., 389 So.2d 142 (Ala.Civ.App.1980)), they have also held that substantial compliance with § 25-5-88 will suffice. Dees v. Daleville Florist, 408 So.2d 155 (Ala.Civ.App.1981); Fordham v. Southern Phenix Textiles, Inc., 387 So.2d 204 (Ala.Civ.App.), cert. denied, 387 So.2d 206 (Ala.1980). When the trial court's findings are merely meager or omissive, the appellate court will look to the evidence to see if the trial court's judgment can be sustained. Harbin v. United States Steel Corp., 356 So.2d 179 (Ala.Civ.App. 1978).
The order from the trial court appears as follows:
"Pursuant to the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals entered May 3, 1991, the prior judgment previously entered in this cause is hereby set aside and the following judgment is hereby entered:
"This is a claim for benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Laws of Alabama. For the Plaintiff to recover it is necessary for him to establish that he is an employee within the definitions set forth in the Workmen's Compensation Laws of Alabama; and, to be entitled to benefits, that he received an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment as an employee under the Workmen's Compensation Laws of Alabama.
"The Court finds as a fact that the Plaintiff is not an employee within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Laws of Alabama but was an independent contractor; and that the Plaintiff is not entitled to any benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Laws of Alabama.
"It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that judgment is entered in favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiff and that this cause be and the same is hereby dismissed, with any unpaid costs taxed to the party at whose instance said costs were incurred."
We agree with the Court of Civil Appeals that the findings of fact are "meager" at best. Therefore, we must determine whether there is any evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that Curry was an independent contractor, rather than an employee of Interstate.
The Worker's Compensation Act defines "employee" in § 25-5-1, Code of Alabama 1975, as follows: "(6) EMPLOYEE, WORKER, WORKMEN and WORKMAN.... Such terms include every person not excluded by section 25-5-50, in the service of another under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written...." As the Court of Civil Appeals said in Ford v. Mitcham, 53 Ala.App. 102, 298 So.2d 34 (1974), this definition is not totally clear, but it does indicate that a contractual relationship between two parties is essential.
It is well established law in this state that, in determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists, the court looks to the right of control, either actually exercised or reserved. In the last analysis, it is the reserved right of control rather than its actual exercise that provides the answer. Tuscaloosa Veneer Co. v. Martin, 233 Ala. 567, 172 So. 608 (1937); C.E. Adams & Co. v. Harrell, 257 Ala. 25, 57 So.2d 83 (1952); Craig v. Decatur Petroleum Haulers, Inc., 340 So.2d 1127 (Ala.Civ. App.1976), cert. denied, Ex parte Decatur Petroleum Haulers, Inc., 340 So.2d 1130 (Ala.1977). The factors tending to demonstrate a right of control are: (1) direct evidence that demonstrates a right or the exercise of control, (2) the method by which the injured individual received payment for his services, (3) whether the equipment is furnished by the alleged employer or not, and (4) whether the individual has the right *233 to terminate. White v. Henshaw, 363 So.2d 986, 988 (Ala.Civ.App.1978).
Applying these factors to this case, we find: (1) Direct evidence demonstrates a right of control, or the exercise of control, by Interstate; this evidence consists of the terms of the lease agreement executed between the parties on April 3, 1987, and the testimony given in the case. Curry testified that Interstate controlled what loads he picked up and where he picked them up, as well as the place of delivery of the cargo. The president of Interstate, John Mann, Jr., stated at trial, "[O]nce the lessor accepts the load we tell him where to pick it up, where to deliver it and how to handle that load, as the customer tells us." On the day of the accident, Curry was transporting dog food from Chicago, Illinois, to Jacksonville, Florida. Curry testified that the cargo was not properly secured, and that he was nervous about hauling it. Curry contacted Interstate and expressed his concern. He was instructed by Interstate to be careful, but to go ahead and take the load to its proper destination. (2) As to the method by which Curry, the injured individual, received payment for his services, the lease agreement provided that Interstate would book a contract to haul cargo and then assign the hauling of the cargo to Curry. Following completion of the task, Interstate would be paid and then Interstate would pay Curry 78% of the proceeds, less any expenses advanced by Interstate. Interstate would retain 22% of the proceeds. Thus, Interstate controlled payment under the lease agreement. (3) As to whether the equipment was furnished by the alleged employer, Interstate, the record indicates that, besides the truck, Interstate provided equipment, fuel/mileage taxes and permits, oversize permits, and Public Service Commission-type permits. In addition, Interstate provided lilability, cargo, and "bobtail" insurance. (4) As to whether Curry had the right to terminate, the lease agreement provided that the lease agreement "shall terminate upon 30 [days'] written notice."
We conclude that no reasonable view of the evidence supports the trial court's judgment, and that Curry was, in fact, an employee of Interstate under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Hays v. Deaton Truck Line, 264 Ala. 442, 87 So.2d 825 (1956); Adams & Co. v. Harrell, supra; Deaton Truck Line v. Acker, 261 Ala. 468, 74 So.2d 717 (1954); Stevens v. Deaton Truck Line, 256 Ala. 229, 54 So.2d 464 (1951).
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is due to be reversed and the cause remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and ADAMS, HOUSTON and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.
MADDOX and INGRAM, JJ., dissent.


19 A.3d 1262 (2011)
129 Conn.App. 364
Quentin STEPNEY
v.
COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.
No. 31748.
Appellate Court of Connecticut.
Submitted on Briefs April 15, 2011.
Decided June 7, 2011.
Gennaro Bizzarro, special public defender, filed a brief for the appellant (petitioner).
Scott J. Murphy, state's attorney, and John A. East III and Angela R. Macchiarulo, senior assistant state's attorneys, filed a brief for the appellee (respondent).
DiPENTIMA, C.J., and BISHOP and ESPINOSA, Js.
PER CURIAM.
The petitioner, Quentin Stepney, appeals following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment *1263 of the habeas court denying his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court (1) abused its discretion in denying certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court and (2) improperly concluded that he had received effective assistance of counsel. We dismiss the appeal.
In an amended petition filed June 5, 2009, the petitioner set forth a claim, inter alia, of ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner had been convicted of sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the second degree and risk of injury to a child. He alleged that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel from attorney Claude Chong.[1] On November 10, 2009, the habeas court issued a memorandum of decision denying the habeas petition. The court also denied the petition for certification to appeal the denial of the writ of habeas corpus.
"Faced with the habeas court's denial of certification to appeal, a petitioner's first burden is to demonstrate that the habeas court's ruling constituted an abuse of discretion. . . . A petitioner may establish an abuse of discretion by demonstrating that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason . . . [the] court could resolve the issues [in a different manner] . . . or . . . the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.. . . The required determination may be made on the basis of the record before the habeas court and applicable legal principles." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Koslik v. Commissioner of Correction, 127 Conn.App. 801, 804, 16 A.3d 753 (2011).
"A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel consists of two components: a performance prong and a prejudice prong. To satisfy the performance prong, a claimant must demonstrate that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed . . . by the [s]ixth [a]mendment. . . . Put another way, the petitioner must demonstrate that his attorney's representation was not reasonably competent or within the range of competence displayed by lawyers with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law. . . . To satisfy the prejudice prong, a *1264 claimant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.. . . With respect to the prejudice component, [i]t is not enough for the [petitioner] to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceedings. . . . Because both prongs . . . must be established for a habeas petitioner to prevail, a court may dismiss a petitioner's claim if he fails to meet either prong. . . . A court need not determine the deficiency of counsel's performance if consideration of the prejudice prong will be dispositive of the ineffectiveness claim." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gooden v. Commissioner of Correction, 127 Conn.App. 662, 668, 14 A.3d 1066 (2011).
On appeal, the petitioner argues that Chong was ineffective because he failed to investigate and to offer into evidence a DNA report, failed to cross-examine adequately employees of the state crime laboratory about that report and failed to cross-examine adequately the victim and her friend regarding discrepancies between their testimony at trial and statements made to the police. The court determined that the decisions made by Chong with respect to these issues were matters of trial strategy. We agree that the petitioner has failed to overcome the strong presumption of sound trial strategy that this court consistently has refused to second-guess. See Santiago v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn.App. 641, 648, 9 A.3d 402 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 910, 12 A.3d 1006 (2011); Crocker v. Commissioner of Correction, 126 Conn. App. 110, 131-32, 10 A.3d 1079, cert. denied, 300 Conn. 919, 14 A.3d 333 (2011). We note that these strategic decisions by experienced counsel were made in the context of "overwhelming evidence of guilt. . . ."
After reviewing the record and the briefs, we conclude that the court properly denied certification to appeal from the denial of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner has failed to show that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason, that the court could resolve the issues in a different manner or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.
The appeal is dismissed.
NOTES
[1]  In the petitioner's direct appeal, we set forth the following facts underlying his conviction. "On September 12, 2002, the victim was fifteen years of age. At approximately 2:30 p.m., she arrived home from school. She was home alone, speaking on the telephone with her friend, A, when the [petitioner] rang the doorbell at approximately 3 p.m. She and the [petitioner] were acquaintances; the [petitioner] was a friend of A and had provided handyman services for the victim's mother. The [petitioner] told the victim that he was there to use the bathroom; he asked her to permit him to enter the home. The victim permitted the [petitioner] to speak with A on the telephone and ultimately complied with the [petitioner's] request to enter the home.

"Upon entering the home, the [petitioner] asked the victim to research something for him on her computer and went into the bathroom. When the [petitioner] returned from the bathroom, the victim was in her bedroom. The [petitioner] entered the bedroom, exposed his penis and told the victim that there was `something he has been wanting to do, but . . . never got the chance to.' The victim attempted to leave the room, but the [petitioner] forcefully prevented her from doing so. The [petitioner] struck the victim. The [petitioner] pushed the victim onto her bed, where he pulled her pants and underwear to her knees. Despite the victim's verbal and physical protests, the [petitioner] partially inserted his penis into the victim's vagina and performed cunnilingus on the victim. The [petitioner] thereafter took possession of a photograph of the victim that was in the bedroom, warned the victim that he would `get back' at her if she told anyone about what had occurred and left the victim's home." State v. Stepney, 94 Conn.App. 72, 74, 891 A.2d 67, cert. denied, 278 Conn. 911, 899 A.2d 40 (2006).