60 Wn.2d 66 (1962)
371 P.2d 938
THE CITY OF TACOMA, Respondent,
v.
THE TAXPAYERS OF TACOMA, Appellants,
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON et al., Intervenor-appellants.[*]
No. 36305.
The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.
May 23, 1962.
*67 Richard R. Hodge, Earl D. Mann, Lee Olwell, John Hedrick, The Attorney General, Stephen M. Reilly and Ernest M. Furnia, Assistants, and Smithmoore P. Myers, Special Assistant, for appellants.
Marshall McCormick, Paul J. Nolan, and Quinby R. Bingham, for respondent.
HILL, J.
For a history of the prior "Cowlitz" litigation see State of Washington Department of Game v. Federal Power Comm. (1953), 207 F. (2d) 391 (C.A. 9th); Tacoma v. Taxpayers (1953), 43 Wn. (2d) 468, 262 P. (2d) 214; Tacoma v. Taxpayers (1957), 49 Wn. (2d) 781, 307 P. (2d) 567; and Tacoma v. Taxpayers (1958), 357 U.S. 320, 2 L.Ed. (2d) 1345, 78 S.Ct. 1209.
Suffice it to say that at this point the City of Tacoma, a municipal corporation armed with a license issued November 28, 1951, by the Federal Power Commission which authorized it to build two dams[1] on the Cowlitz River[2], has proceeded to erect one of the dams and is ready to proceed with the other in violation of the expressed desires of a considerable segment of the people of the state of Washington[3], the will of the legislature[4], and the will of the people of the state[5], that no dams be built on that river more than *68 25 feet in height. Ironically enough, the City of Tacoma did not go into the federal courts to secure a determination[6] that its authority to proceed with the dams on the Cowlitz River, under its license from the Federal Power Commission, was unaffected by Initiative No. 25 with its prohibition of any person, including municipal corporations, from building dams more than 25 feet in height. Instead it invoked the jurisdiction of the courts of the state, whose public policy it had persistently flouted, to again give assurance to prospective bond purchasers[7] that the city is empowered *69 by its license from the Federal Power Commission to disregard the law of this state. The right of the city to maintain the action is unquestioned.
The court in the first Cowlitz case[8], recognized that the federal government's constitutional authority to regulate commerce and navigation gave it the right  acting through the Federal Power Commission  to issue a license to the City of Tacoma to construct dams which would be in excess of 25 feet in height (the limit imposed by the state in the exercise of its police power to preserve the fishery resources of the state).
Implicit in both the first and second[9] Cowlitz cases is the holding that since the City of Tacoma was a municipality empowered to construct, maintain, and operate power facilities[10], and had a license from the Federal Power Commission empowering it to construct the Mossyrock and Mayfield dams on the Cowlitz River, the state  even by the exercise of its police power  could not prevent the building of such dams.
The trial court, in the present case, very ably spelled this all out again in its findings, conclusions of law, and judgment.
The defendant taxpayers, the intervenor State of Washington, and the other intervening taxpayers all appeal.
The appellants now concede the federal government's "paramount" power to determine the height of dams, but take the position on this appeal that the city is a "creature" of the state, hence subject to its control; and the state, by adopting Initiative No. 25 (see footnote 5), has divested the city of its right to proceed to build the dams.
*70 This court had proceeded on a variation of that theory (and, if we may say so, a much more logical one) in the second Cowlitz case, in which we held that the city had no power to condemn property, except such as the legislature granted to it; and that it had been granted no power to condemn state property, already dedicated to a public use; in short, that the "creature" could not condemn the "creator's" property, when the "creator" was using it for a public purpose, i.e., a fish hatchery.
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed this court[11], without meeting that issue, by saying that the state and its citizens were foreclosed by the judgment in the Court of Appeals[12] from litigating further the power and the authority of the City of Tacoma to proceed under its Federal Power Commission license to build the dams. The Supreme Court quoted the following language from the Court of Appeals decision[12],
"`... we conclude[[13]] that the state laws cannot prevent the Federal Power Commission from issuing a license or bar the licensee from acting under the license to build a dam on a navigable stream since the stream is under the dominion of the United States....'"
[1] We summarized the situation, with painful accuracy, when  following the reversal and remand  we entered a judgment in the second Cowlitz case, which read in part as follows:
"1. The United States has exclusive and paramount jurisdiction over navigable waters, under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, and, therefore, any State laws are inapplicable to the Mayfield and Mossyrock [Cowlitz dams] Hydroelectric Project insofar as the same conflict with the provisions of the Federal Power Act or the terms and conditions of the appellant's license for said project, or *71 which would enable the State of Washington or any State official thereof to exercise a veto over said project, ..." (Italics ours.)
We would have thought that this language was sufficiently explicit to answer the present question for bond counsel, and, in the words of the United States Supreme Court in reversing this court, that attacks on the right of the City of Tacoma to proceed with the construction of these dams were "impermissible collateral attacks upon" the final judgment of the United States Court of Appeals.
Apparently the sovereign State of Washington recognized that "paramount jurisdiction" meant "paramount jurisdiction." Despite the fact that Initiative No. 25 became effective December 8, 1960, and clearly prohibited any person, which included the City of Tacoma, from constructing or completing any dam over 25 feet in height on the Cowlitz River, the state stood by (from December 8, 1960, until June 8, 1961) while the City of Tacoma rushed the completion of the Mayfield dam (185 feet above tail water and 240 feet above bedrock) without seeking to stop what it urged in its answer as an intervenor, and now urges on this appeal, to be a violation of the initiative.
This matter comes before the courts again, not because anybody attempted to stop Tacoma's construction of a 185-foot dam, now practically completed, but because Tacoma needed more money to construct the 325-foot Mossyrock dam. Prospective investors in Tacoma's revenue bonds, and their timorous counsel, were apparently not certain that "paramount jurisdiction" meant "paramount jurisdiction," so Tacoma  to reassure them  brought this declaratory judgment action (filed May 12, 1961). Not until Tacoma commenced this action was there any suggestion, implemented by legal action, that Tacoma should be enjoined from violating Initiative No. 25.
[2] The trial court, by its judgment, gave the necessary reassurance to the prospective investors and their counsel: That the federal government still had "paramount jurisdiction" over navigable streams, despite the passage of Initiative *72 No. 25 by the voters of the state. We quote, approvingly, three conclusions of law made by the trial court:
"Congress had the constitutional power to enact the Federal Power Act, and in so doing it intended to exercise its full jurisdiction to authorize the Federal Power Commission to supersede state laws purporting to prohibit or limit the construction of dams on navigable streams. By passing the act, Congress preempted the entire field and authorized the Power Commission to issue licenses for such construction upon such conditions as it deemed proper, and the Federal Power Commission, in issuing its license to the Plaintiff [city of Tacoma], exercised that right and delegated to the Plaintiff, its licensee, as its agent and the agent of the Federal Government, the right and power to complete and to thereafter operate the Cowlitz Project in accordance with the terms and conditions of its license." (Conclusion of Law VIII)
"There are no state laws, measures or regulations, including Initiative 25 (Chapter 4, Laws of 1961) that limit, control or affect in any way, or that bar the rights of the Plaintiff to finance, construct, complete and operate the Cowlitz Project under the provisions of the Federal Power Act and in accordance with the terms and conditions of its Federal Power License (Project No. 2016.)" (Conclusion of Law IX)
"The United States has exclusive and paramount jurisdiction over navigable waters under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution and under the supremacy clauses of the United States and Washington State Constitutions, and, therefore, any state laws, measures or regulations, whether such laws be in the form of prohibitions or curtailment or limitation of powers, or in any other form, are inapplicable to the Mayfield and Mossyrock hydroelectric project insofar as the same are in conflict with the provisions of the Federal Power Act or the terms and conditions of Plaintiff's license for said project or which would enable the State of Washington or any State official thereof or the citizen voters to exercise a veto over said project." (Conclusion of Law X)
We agree, as heretofore indicated, that the decision of the United States Court of Appeals (see footnote 12) was res judicata of the issues raised. We agree, for the further reasons indicated in the foregoing conclusions of law, that *73 the trial court properly dismissed the cross-complaints, which challenged the right of the City of Tacoma to proceed under its license to construct the Cowlitz project and erect the Mayfield and Mossyrock dams, as provided in that license.
[3] However, we do not agree with the trial court's further conclusion that Initiative No. 25 is unconstitutional. It is a constitutional exercise of the state's police power to protect its fishery resources, and valid except to the extent that it is superseded by the exercised "paramount jurisdiction" of the United States with reference to the Cowlitz project. There are, doubtless, nonnavigable streams tributary to the Columbia River[14] below the McNary dam where the initiative could be effective; and, perhaps, navigable streams where it could be enforced until such time as the federal government should choose to exercise its "paramount jurisdiction" or "dominant servitude."[15]
We go no further than to hold that Initiative No. 25 is superseded and is inoperative when it comes into conflict with the exercised "paramount jurisdiction" of the United States to determine who shall build dams on navigable streams and at what heights.
Within the limitations indicated, the judgment of the trial court  that Initiative No. 25 did not in any way affect the right or authority of the City of Tacoma, under its license from the Federal Power Commission, to proceed with the Cowlitz project and to erect and operate the Mossyrock and Mayfield dams in accordance with such license  is affirmed.
WEAVER, FOSTER, HUNTER and HAMILTON, JJ., concur. DONWORTH, J. (concurring in the result)
My reasons for affirming the trial court's judgment are stated in the majority opinion in the first Cowlitz case (43 Wn. (2d) 468, *74 262 P. (2d) 214 (1953)), and in the dissenting opinion in the second Cowlitz case (49 Wn. (2d) 781, 307 P. (2d) 567 (1957)).
The dissenting opinion (49 Wn. (2d) at page 802) was based on three grounds (1) that the majority opinion in the first Cowlitz case had established the law of the case, (2) that the decision of the Court of Appeals in 207 F. (2d) 391, reviewing the proceedings before the Federal Power Commission in granting the license to the City of Tacoma (respondent here) and upholding the commission's action, was res judicata[16], and (3) that, under the Federal Power Act, the City of Tacoma had authority to condemn state-owned property already devoted to public use.
The sole question now before us is whether the enactment of Initiative No. 25 by the voters of this state effective December 8, 1960, prohibited the further exercise of the city's authority to complete the construction of the Mayfield and Mossyrock dams on the Cowlitz River under the license granted it by the Federal Power Commission in 1951 (Project No. 2016).
By Initiative No. 25, the State of Washington attempted to accomplish the same purpose as Laws of 1949, chapter 9, which was held invalid in the first Cowlitz case in 1953. The only difference is that Initiative No. 25 purports to prohibit any person, including municipal corporations, from building dams in the area described therein more than twenty-five feet in height. The object of Initiative No. 25 is to divest the City of Tacoma, as a municipal corporation of the State of Washington, of its authority to construct, maintain, and operate these dams which it had acquired in 1951 from the Federal Power Commission under the provisions of the Federal Power Act.
If such a statute had been enacted prior to the issuance and acceptance of the license in 1951, a very different question would have been presented. But it is not disputed that, for more than forty years prior to 1951, the City of Tacoma *75 had statutory authority from the State of Washington to operate works, plants, and facilities for furnishing gas, electricity, and other means of power. See RCW 35.92.050 and prior acts. The Federal Power Commission made a finding to the effect that the city had complied with all applicable state laws necessary to carry out the purpose of a license for the project. See finding No. 53, which is quoted at page 803 of 49 Wn. (2d).
The history of the proceedings leading to the issuance of the license by the commission and of the subsequent litigation clearly shows that the state cannot now exercise a veto over the rights acquired by the city and the government under the Federal Power Act.
This historical background is set forth in the dissenting opinion in the second Cowlitz case (49 Wn. (2d) at page 802, et seq.). I would, in the interests of brevity, incorporate that opinion by reference in this concurring opinion.
The issue presented to this court on this appeal is controlled by the unanimous decision of the United States Supreme Court which reversed the decision of the majority of this court in the second Cowlitz case. In Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 357 U.S. 320, 2 L.Ed. (2d) 1345, 78 S.Ct. 1209 (1958), the Supreme Court held that the question of whether the city, under its license, had power to condemn state-owned land already devoted to public use was foreclosed by the decision of the Court of Appeals in State of Washington Department of Game v. Federal Power Comm., 207 F. (2d) 391 (C.A. 9th) (1953).
It is my opinion that that decision also compels our affirmance of the trial court's judgment in this case.
The Supreme Court, after holding that, under the Federal Power Act, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had exclusive jurisdiction to affirm, set aside or modify, in whole or in part, orders of the Federal Power Commission, said:
"The State participated in the hearing before the Commission. It there vigorously objected to the issuance of the license upon the grounds, among others, `[t]hat the reservoirs which would be created by the proposed dams would inundate a valuable and irreplaceable fish hatchery owned *76 by the State' and, hence, necessarily require the taking of it by the City under the license sought; that the City had not complied with the applicable laws of the State respecting construction of the project and performance of the acts necessarily incident thereto (note 11); and that the City was not authorized by the laws of the State to engage in such business. The Commission rejected these contentions of the State and made all the findings required by the Act to support its order granting the license (note 9) including the finding that:
"`The applicant ... has submitted satisfactory evidence of compliance with the requirements of all applicable State laws insofar as necessary to effect the purposes of a license for the project; and it is a municipality within the meaning of Section 3 (7) of the Act.'
The State then petitioned the Commission for a rehearing, reviving the foregoing contentions and raising others. The petition was denied.
"Thereafter, the State, following the procedures prescribed by § 313(b), petitioned the proper Court of Appeals for review of the Commission's findings and order. After full hearing, that court rejected all contentions there raised by the State, did not disturb any of the Commission's findings, and affirmed its order without modification. Washington Department of Game v. Federal Power Comm'n, 207 F.2d 391. It made particular mention of, and approved, the Commission's finding, as rephrased by the court, that the City had submitted `such evidence of compliance with state law as, in the Commission's judgment, would be "appropriate to effect the purposes of a Federal license on the navigable waters of the United States."' Id., at 396.
"Moreover, in its briefs in the Court of Appeals, the State urged reversal of the Commission's order on the grounds that the City `has not shown, nor could it show, that [it] has availed itself of ... any right to take or destroy the property of the State of Washington [and that] Tacoma, as a creature of the State of Washington, cannot act [under the license] in opposition to the policy of the State or in derogation of its laws.' (Emphasis added.) In rejecting these contentions  that the City does not have `any right to take or destroy property of the State' and `cannot act' in accordance with the terms of its federal license  the Court of Appeals said:
"`Again, we turn to the First Iowa case, supra. There, too, the applicant for a federal license was a creature of the state and the chief opposition came from the state itself. *77 Yet, the Supreme Court permitted the applicant to act inconsistently with the declared policy of its creator, and to prevail in obtaining a license.
"`Consistent with the First Iowa case, supra, we conclude that the state laws cannot prevent the Federal Power Commission from issuing a license or bar the licensee from acting under the license to build a dam on a navigable stream since the stream is under the dominion of the United States.' Id., at 396. (Emphasis added.)
We think these recitals show that the very issue upon which respondents stand here was raised and litigated in the Court of Appeals and decided by its judgment. But even if it might be thought that this issue was not raised in the Court of Appeals, it cannot be doubted that it could and should have been, for that was the court to which Congress had given `exclusive jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or set aside' the Commission's order. And the State may not reserve the point, for another round of piecemeal litigation, by remaining silent on the issue while its action to review and reverse the Commission's order was pending in that court  which had `exclusive jurisdiction' of the proceeding and whose judgment therein as declared by Congress `shall be final,' subject to review by this Court upon certiorari or certification. After the Court of Appeals' judgment was rendered, the State petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari which was denied. 347 U.S. 936.
"These were precisely the proceedings prescribed by Congress in § 313(b) of the Act for judicial review of the Commission's findings and order. They resulted in affirmance. That result, Congress has declared, `shall be final.'"
After referring to certain language in the Court of Appeals' decision to the effect that the Commission had no power to adjudicate certain questions relating to the city's power to act under the license after its issuance (such as indebtedness limitations),[17] the Supreme Court continued:
"... We believe that respondents' construction of this language is in error. The questioned language expressly refers to possible `indebtedness limitations' in the *78 City's Charter and `questions of this nature,' not to the right of the City to receive and perform, as licensee of the Federal Government under the Federal Power Act, the federal rights determined by the Commission and delegated to the City as specified in the license. That this was the meaning of the court, if its meaning might otherwise be doubtful, is made certain by the facts that the court did not disturb a single one of the Commission's findings; affirmed its order without modification; and said, in the sentence immediately preceding the questioned language: `Consistent with the First Iowa case, supra, we conclude that the state laws cannot prevent the Federal Power Commission from issuing a license or bar the licensee from acting under the license to build a dam on a navigable stream since the stream is under the dominion of the United States.' Id., at 396. (Emphasis added.)
"The final judgment of the Court of Appeals was effective, not only against the State, but also against its citizens, including the taxpayers of Tacoma, for they, in their common public rights as citizens of the State, were represented by the State in those proceedings, and, like it, were bound by the judgment....
"We conclude that the judgment of the Court of Appeals, upon this Court's denial of the State's petition for certiorari, became final under § 313(b) of the Act, and is binding upon the State of Washington, its Directors of Fisheries and of Game, and its citizens, including the taxpayers of Tacoma; and that the objections and claims to the contrary asserted in the cross-complaints of the State, its Directors of Fisheries and of Game, and the Taxpayers of Tacoma, in this bond validation suit, were impermissible collateral attacks upon, and de novo litigation between the same parties of issues determined by, the final judgment of the Court of Appeals. Therefore, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion."
As I read this decision, it means that, since the Federal Power Commission made its finding that:
"`The Applicant ... has submitted satisfactory evidence of compliance with the requirements of all applicable State laws insofar as necessary to effect the purposes of a license for the project; and it is a municipality within the meaning of Section 3(7) of the Act.'" *79 and the Court of Appeals approved his finding (and also all sixty-five other findings), the Cowlitz project became a federal project upon the issuance and acceptance of the license by the city in 1951. The relative rights and obligations of the United States and the City of Tacoma became fixed at the time as provided in the Federal Power Act. See, particularly, sections 3, 4(e), 6, 9 (b), 10 (a), 14, 23 (b), and 27 thereof.
The following portion of the dissenting opinion in the second Cowlitz case, in my opinion, correctly describes the relationship between the United States and the city as it has existed since 1951 and as it presently exists:
"Without further reviewing the provisions of the Federal power act, it is apparent that Congress intended to and did exercise its full power under the commerce clause in providing for the licensing of the projects described therein. When the power commission has made a finding as required by § 9(b) that the licensee has complied with state laws with respect to the right to engage in the business of developing, transmitting, and distributing electric power and any other business necessary to effect the purposes of the licensee under the act, then the licensee becomes the agent of the Federal government in regard to the project. Upon the issuance of the license, all rights and obligations of the licensee are derived from congressional constitutional powers, and not those of the state where the project is located. See First Iowa case [328 U.S. 152, 90 L.Ed. 1143, 66 S.Ct. 906].
"The project for which the license is issued is a Federal project and is to be considered as if it were to be constructed and operated by the government itself. The government has an option to buy the project works at the end of the license period, as provided in § 14 of the act. Every detail of the project must be carried out by the licensee in strict accordance with the terms of the license and the maps and drawings identified therein. The comprehensive plan adopted by the power commission for the development of the waterway may not be deviated from by a licensee without permission of the commission."
Ever since the Supreme Court held, in 1946, in the case of First Iowa Hydro-Electric Co-op. v. Federal Power Comm., 328 U.S. 152, 90 L.Ed. 1143, 66 S.Ct. 906, that the *80 United States has plenary power over the use of the water of navigable streams and may deny the privilege of constructing an obstruction in those waters, the states may not regulate or license such matters.
The power of the United States in the premises being paramount, and the state having no power to exercise any control over navigable streams, it necessarily follows that the state may not interfere with or frustrate the functioning of a municipal licensee under its federal license nine years after its issuance and acceptance by attempting, through Initiative No. 25, to deprive the municipality of its authority to construct dams over twenty-five feet in height on the Cowlitz River.
Since the Federal Power Commission, in its finding No. 53, found that the City of Tacoma was a municipal corporation within the meaning of section 3(7) of the power act, and that it had submitted satisfactory evidence of its compliance with all applicable state laws to effect the purpose of a license for project No. 2016, and since that finding was sustained by the Court of Appeals (207 F. (2d) 391), no court of the State of Washington can re-examine and decide a question which has been finally determined by the only court of competent jurisdiction qualified to decide it, to wit, the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit. Subsequent legislation by the state cannot change the status which the city attained in 1951 under the Federal Power Act.
In my opinion, Initiative No. 25 is ineffective to prohibit the City of Tacoma from proceeding to complete its two dams under its license from the Federal Power Commission (project No. 2016). I do not think that we are called upon in this case to discuss the validity or effect of Initiative No. 25 as to other projects than the one now before us.
I concur in affirming the judgment of the trial court, which (for the second time) upholds the validity of the utility bonds of the City of Tacoma, authorized by Ordinance No. 14386, as amended.
FINLEY, C.J., concurs with DONWORTH, J.
*81 OTT, J. (dissenting)
In this appeal, we are concerned with this single issue: Can this court approve an act of a municipal corporation which, under the laws of this state, is ultra vires?
The City of Tacoma is a municipal corporation, organized and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Washington. Being an entity created by the legislative bodies of the State of Washington, its powers are limited to those which the legislature or the people, by initiative, have authorized it to perform. Othello v. Harder, 46 Wn. (2d) 747, 284 P. (2d) 1099 (1955).
At the November election in 1960, the people of the State of Washington, by Initiative No. 25, limited to 25 feet the height of dams that Washington municipal corporations, engaged in the hydroelectric power business, would be permitted to construct on the Cowlitz River and certain other streams, "nor shall any such person [municipal corporation] obtain or use a federal license for such purpose." Laws of 1961, chapter 4, RCW 75.20.110, 75.20.120.
The City of Tacoma requests this court to approve bonds for the construction of a dam on the Cowlitz River which the Federal Power Commission has authorized it to build, and which will exceed 25 feet in height.
The Congress of the United States has only such powers as are enumerated in Art. 1, § 8, of the United States Constitution. All other legislative authority is reserved unto the several states. U.S. Const. Tenth Amendment. The laws of the State of Washington which define the powers of its corporations cannot be amended by resolution or by grant of a license from the Federal Power Commission. The powers of municipal corporations in Washington can be increased or diminished only by Washington legislative enactments. Const. Art. 2.
The fact that the Federal Power Commission has granted to the City of Tacoma a right to construct a higher dam on the Cowlitz River than the sovereign State of Washington has authorized it to build, does not legalize that which is illegal and in excess of the authority granted to the city by the sovereign.
*82 Since the proceeds of the bonds are to be used by the municipal corporation for purposes which the people have expressly forbidden the corporation to perform, the trial court and this court have no power to approve the bonds as legal obligations of a corporate entity of this state.
Nor do I find any merit in the contention that, since the limitation was enacted by the people of the State of Washington subsequent to the grant of the license by the Federal Power Commission, the application of equitable principles requires that the city's bonds be now approved to provide funds to construct the dam. Both the city and the Federal Power Commission were fully aware, at the time the license was granted and construction commenced, that the city had not acquired title to the land it contemplated inundating or arranged for adequate financing of the proposed hydroelectric project. Inability to accomplish either of these essential conditions precedent would prevent the city from completing the facility. The statutory prohibition against the construction of high dams was in effect for more than five months before the city commenced this action to have its contemplated financial program approved by the courts. Equitable principles cannot be applied when their application is in direct conflict with a statutory mandate. Norlin v. Montgomery, 59 Wn. (2d) 268, 273, 367 P. (2d) 621 (1961), and cases cited.
In my opinion, the judgment should be reversed.
ROSELLINI, J., concurs with OTT, J.
NOTES
[*]  Reported in 371 P. (2d) 938.
[1]  Mossyrock (to be 325 feet above tail water and 510 feet above bedrock), and Mayfield (to be 185 feet above tail water and 240 feet above bedrock).
[2]  A navigable stream, but which for its entire course is within the state of Washington.
[3]  The Attorney General of the State of Washington, representing the State Game Department, appeared in opposition to the issuance of the permit to build the dams and, together with the Washington State Sportsmen's Council, petitioned for the review of the license by the Court of Appeals (207 F. (2d) 391).
[4]  Laws of 1949, chapter 9, p. 38, "An Act relating to the protection of anadromous fish life in the rivers and streams tributary to the lower Columbia River," which prohibited the erection of dams over 25 feet in height in all streams and rivers tributary to the Columbia River downstream from McNary Dam; and reserved such streams as an anadromous fish sanctuary against undue industrial development.
[5]  Initiative No. 25, adopted by the people of the state of Washington at the November election in 1960, effective December 8, 1960 (Laws of 1961, chapter 4), which sought to accomplish the same purpose as Laws of 1949, chapter 9, by prohibiting any person from erecting any dam over 25 feet high in any of the streams referred to in that act and defining "person" to include a municipal corporation.

We quote § 1 of the initiative:
"For the purpose of conserving the State's fishery resources the powers of any person authorized to construct or operate dams or to appropriate water in the State are hereby limited in that no such person shall construct, complete or operate, either for himself or as an agent or independent contractor for another, any dam or other obstruction over 25 feet high on any tributary stream of the Columbia River downstream from McNary Dam, including the Cowlitz River and its tributaries, within the migration range of anadromous fish as jointly determined by the Directors of Fisheries and Game, ... nor shall any such person obtain or use a federal license for such purpose. ..." (Italics ours.)
[6]  Tacoma could have maintained such an action. See Ex parte Young (1908), 209 U.S. 123, 52 L.Ed. 714, 28 S.Ct. 441. See extensive annotation entitled "What actions arise under the Constitution of the United States so as to vest jurisdiction of Federal Courts" (1950), 13 A.L.R. (2d) 390 to 611.

In Doud v. Hodge (1956), 350 U.S. 485, 100 L.Ed. 577, 76 S.Ct. 491, it is held that a three-judge federal district court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 2281 and 2284 of a suit in equity to enjoin enforcement of a state statute on grounds of alleged repugnancy to the federal constitution, even though the state courts have not yet rendered a clear or definitive decision as to the meaning or federal constitutionality of the statute.
See also Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Jacobsen (1960), 362 U.S. 73, 4 L.Ed. (2d) 568, 80 S.Ct. 568 (with annotation pp. 1931 to 1965).
[7]  The present action is a declaratory judgment action brought by the City of Tacoma under the provisions of RCW 7.24 and 7.25 for the purpose of determining the right of the city  in view of the enactment of Initiative No. 25  to issue and sell its revenue bonds for the completion of the Cowlitz project.
[8]  43 Wn. (2d) 468, 262 P. (2d) 214.
[9]  49 Wn. (2d) 781, 307 P. (2d) 567.
[10]  RCW 35.92.050 empowers the cities of the state to "... construct, condemn and purchase, purchase, acquire, add to, maintain and operate works, plants, facilities for the purpose of furnishing the city or town and its inhabitants, and any other persons, with gas, electricity and other means of power and facilities for lighting, heating, fuel, and power purposes, public and private, with full authority to regulate and control the use, distribution, and price thereof, ..."
[11]  Tacoma v. Taxpayers (1958), 357 U.S. 320, 2 L.Ed. (2d) 1345, 78 S.Ct. 1209.
[12]  State of Washington Department of Game v. Federal Power Comm. (1953), 207 F. (2d) 391 (C.A. 9th), cert. den. 347 U.S. 936, 98 L.Ed. 1087, 74 S.Ct. 626 (1954).
[13]  This conclusion was based on: First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Federal Power Comm. (1946), 328 U.S. 152, 90 L.Ed. 1143, 66 S.Ct. 906.
[14]  For a decision relative to state rights on nonnavigable streams tributary to the Columbia River, see Federal Power Comm. v. Oregon (1955), 349 U.S. 435, 99 L.Ed. 1215, 75 S.Ct. 832.
[15]  Federal Power Comm. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (1954), 347 U.S. 239, 98 L.Ed. 666, 74 S.Ct. 487.
[16]  See Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 357 U.S. 320, 2 L.Ed. (2d) 1345, 78 S.Ct. 1209 (1958).
[17]  The bonds being considered in this case are utility revenue bonds payable solely out of the gross revenues of the utility as provided in RCW 35.92.100 and prior acts.

No general municipal indebtedness is involved.
See Twichell v. Seattle, 106 Wash. 32, 179 Pac. 127 (1919); Asia v. Seattle, 119 Wash. 674, 206 Pac. 366 (1922).


900 A.2d 1212 (2006)
STATE
v.
Jeffrey ALSTON a/k/a Kam Ausar.
No. 2004-97-C.A.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
June 30, 2006.
*1213 Diane Daigle, Esq., for Plaintiff.
Susan B. Iannitelli, Esq., for Defendant.
Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., and GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION
Justice ROBINSON for the Court.
The defendant, Jeffrey Alston, a/k/a Kam Ausar,[1] appeals from a jury verdict finding him guilty of felony conspiracy, breaking and entering a dwelling, and felony assault. For the reasons set forth herein, we vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this case to the Superior Court for retrial.

Facts and Travel
The defendant and one Jerry Coleman were both charged by criminal information with the following crimes: (1) conspiracy to break and enter in violation of G.L.1956 § 11-1-6; (2) breaking and entering without consent of the owner in violation of G.L.1956 § 11-8-2; (3) assault with a dangerous weapon in violation of G.L.1956 § 11-5-2; (4) assault and battery resulting in serious bodily injury in violation of § 11-5-2; and (5) driving a vehicle without the consent of the owner in violation of *1214 G.L.1956 § 31-9-1 and G.L.1956 § 31-27-9. The following are the facts, as developed at trial, from which those charges stemmed.
On July 3, 2001, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Dennis and Suzanne Laven returned to their Warwick home following an evening of shopping and noticed an unfamiliar vehicle parked by the side of the road near the bottom of their driveway. As they were turning into their driveway, the Lavens also noticed that the door of their house was ajar. After they pulled into the driveway, Mr. Laven exited the vehicle and walked up the stairs leading to the open door. Mrs. Laven opened the garage door, ran into the garage, and turned on the exterior lights of their residence. Mrs. Laven then entered the home and retrieved a portable telephone, which she brought back outside with her.
Mr. Laven testified that he was about halfway up the stairs leading to the door which had been left ajar when he observed two people running out of the sliding glass door at the back of the house. Mr. Laven testified that he then ran back down the stairs and around the house to the backyard. Mr. Laven testified that he then heard some rustling in the woods behind his home but could not see anything because it was too dark. Mr. Laven further testified that he then ran back to the front of the house and down his driveway towards the unfamiliar vehicle that was parked by the side of the road. According to Mr. Laven's testimony, he approached the vehicle, reached in through the open window on the driver's side, and pulled the keys out of the ignition.
Mrs. Laven testified that she called 911 on the portable telephone which she had retrieved from the house and then walked down to the bottom of the driveway towards where her husband was standing. Mr. Laven testified that, after removing the keys from the ignition of the unfamiliar vehicle, he stood in the center of his driveway and waited for the people who had been in his house to emerge from the woods, and they eventually did. Mr. Laven testified that two men came out of the woods and approached the vehicle at the bottom of his driveway. Mr. Laven said that he yelled to the men, "I got the keys, and the police are on their way." According to Mr. Laven's testimony, one of the men, whom he described as being "the larger of the two," started to run towards him saying that he had a knife and was going to stab him. Mr. Laven testified that he then threw the keys into the woods and prepared himself because he knew that there was going to be a fight.
Mr. Laven described what happened next as follows: "[It was like] a collision; and then there was a flurry of punches." Mr. Laven said that, at some point while he and the larger man were fighting, the second perpetrator came up behind him and hit him on the head, causing him to fall to the ground and bang his head. Mr. Laven testified that, while he was on the ground, each of the two men was kicking his head and upper body. According to Mr. Laven's testimony, he eventually rose to his feet, at which point the smaller of the two men went back towards the vehicle while Mr. Laven continued fighting with the larger man. After approximately one or two minutes, the larger perpetrator also went back towards the vehicle. Mr. Laven testified that it appeared as though the two men were trying to find the keys to the vehicle.
According to the testimony of Mr. Laven, the larger of the two men then came back towards him and told him that he had a gun and was going to shoot him. At this point, Mr. Laven testified, he and the larger man started to fight again. Mr. Laven testified that the man then approached his *1215 wife, who was standing in the driveway screaming into the telephone, and threatened to shoot her. Mr. Laven testified that he then yelled to the larger man, "I'll find the keys," at which point the man once again approached Mr. Laven and they engaged in another violent encounter, which Mr. Laven described as "more of a shoving than it was a fighting situation."
At this point, Mr. Laven testified, his wife yelled out to the man: "I've got the keys. Here are the keys." Mr. Laven testified that the larger man then approached his wife, took the keys from her, and went back to the vehicle, where the two men tried to start the car with the keys that Mrs. Laven had given them.[2] According to Mr. Laven's testimony, one of his neighbors then drove into their driveway and the two men, unable to start their vehicle, retreated into the woods on foot. Mrs. Laven gave testimony about the evening's events that was similar to that given by her husband.
Within a minute or so after the perpetrators' final retreat into the woods, the police arrived. Mr. Laven testified that he was "dazed" from being beaten and was taken by ambulance to Kent County Hospital, where he remained for approximately six hours. At the hospital, Mr. Laven dictated a statement to the police, which his wife wrote out, since his own hands were sore from the attack. Mrs. Laven also provided her own separate statement to the police.
As a result of this attack, Mr. Laven suffered lacerations on his face, leg and hands, a bloody nose, injury to his inner ear, immobility of his thumb, and soreness of his wrist. Mr. Laven testified that he later discovered that the ligaments in his right thumb had been severed, and he had to wear a splint for approximately two months while it healed. Mr. Laven also said that he underwent arthroscopic surgery to reattach torn tendons inside his left wrist. By the time he testified at trial Mr. Laven said that he had fully recovered from the wrist injury, but that he still only had about 70 percent range of motion in his thumb. Doctor Manuel DaSilva, the orthopedic surgeon who treated Mr. Laven, testified similarly at trial, stating that, as of May of 2002, Mr. Laven had regained approximately 90 percent range of motion in his wrist, but that "he never recovered full mobility" of his thumb.
The Lavens were unable to identify either of the two assailants. They did, however, provide the police with descriptions of the two men. In the statement that she gave to police a few hours after the incident, Mrs. Laven described the perpetrators as being two black men in their twenties. She described the larger of the two men as being "perhaps six-two or six-three" and the smaller man as being "five-eight to five-nine." At trial, Mr. Laven described the larger man as being "between about five-eleven to six-three," and the smaller of the two as being "five-nine, five-ten." Mr. Laven further described both men as being "somewhat agile" and athletic.
Detective Daniel Gillis, a member of the Warwick Police Department's Bureau of Criminal Identification, responded to the Laven home to investigate the crime scene. Detective Gillis testified as to certain items that he found inside the vehicle that was parked on the side of the road in front of the Lavens' house. These items included a rental agreement for the vehicle, a cellular telephone, and a wallet.
*1216 Amy Smith, a friend of defendant's, testified at trial that defendant had called her on June 25, 2001 and asked her to rent a car for him, and she agreed to do that for him. According to Ms. Smith's testimony, she met defendant at Alamo Rental in Warwick that same day and signed a rental agreement for a vehicle. Ms. Smith testified that she listed defendant on the rental agreement as an authorized driver of the car. Ms. Smith further testified that she left Alamo after the necessary paperwork was completed, but before the rental vehicle was delivered to defendant.
According to Ms. Smith's testimony, the next time she spoke with defendant was at 4:45 a.m. on July 4, 2001  at which time defendant called to inform her that the rental vehicle that she had rented for him had been stolen. Based upon this information, Ms. Smith testified, she called Alamo Rental and was told that the vehicle was in the possession of the Warwick Police Department. Ms. Smith testified that she then contacted the Warwick Police Department and was informed that it was necessary for her to go to the police station and provide a statement, which she did.
Ms. Smith testified that defendant called her later that same day to inquire as to whether or not the vehicle had been returned to her. She testified that she informed defendant that the vehicle had not been returned to her and that the vehicle was part of an investigation into a breaking and entering. Ms. Smith further testified that, upon hearing this news, defendant responded, "I got to go," and he hung up the telephone.
William Harrell testified that, in July of 2001, he and defendant were "best friends" and would see each other every day. Mr. Harrell testified that, in the days leading up to July 3, 2001, he had seen defendant driving a rented brown Oldsmobile Alero with Massachusetts plates. On July 4, Mr. Harrell was watching television and saw a news bulletin about the breaking and entering at the Laven home. Mr. Harrell testified that the news bulletin showed a vehicle that had been involved in the crime  which he concluded was the same rental vehicle that he had seen defendant driving in the preceding days.
Later that same day, Mr. Harrell testified, defendant and Jerry Coleman, another friend of theirs, stopped by Mr. Harrell's house. According to Mr. Harrell's testimony, defendant admitted to him that he had been involved in the breaking and entering that had been described on the news. Mr. Harrell testified that defendant described how he and Mr. Coleman had broken into the Lavens' home and had assaulted Mr. Laven. Mr. Harrell further testified that defendant described how he and Mr. Coleman fled the scene of the crime on foot, ran through the woods, and then eventually stole a screwdriver from a truck and used it to steal another vehicle. Mr. Harrell testified that he initially offered to serve as an alibi witness for defendant. He further stated, however, that in January of 2002 he and defendant had a dispute which left him concerned for the safety of his family. Because of that dispute, Mr. Harrell contacted the police in March of 2002 and spoke with them about defendant's involvement in the crime that was committed in Warwick in July of 2001. Detective Eric Johnson of the Warwick Police Department testified that he interviewed Mr. Harrell on March 4, 2002. According to Detective Johnson's testimony, Mr. Harrell was aware of details about the crime that were not known by the general public.
Karen Lurie, a representative of Verizon Wireless, testified about defendant's Verizon Wireless billing statement for the month of July 2001, which was admitted as a full exhibit at trial. Based upon this *1217 document, Ms. Lurie testified that a call was made at 7:35 p.m. on July 3 from defendant's cellular telephone to a particular telephone number. Robert Hayes, who worked for Verizon Corporate Security, testified that the particular telephone number referenced by Ms. Lurie had a service address of 34 Alexander Street, Providence. Detective Johnson testified that Jerry Coleman resided at that address.
Detective Johnson testified that he had interviewed Mr. Coleman at the Providence Police Station on February 15, 2002. Detective Johnson testified that, at the time of that interview, he had advised Mr. Coleman of his Miranda[3] rights and then had him sign a preprinted Miranda rights form. Detective Johnson testified that, during his interview at the police station, Mr. Coleman provided him with a written statement regarding the break-in at the Lavens' home. The trial justice then permitted Detective Johnson to read Mr. Coleman's written statement to the jury. Shortly after reading that statement to the jury, in response to questioning by the prosecutor, Detective Johnson testified that the next thing he did after interviewing Mr. Coleman was to complete an arrest warrant affidavit for defendant.[4] That warrant was effectuated by the Providence police on March 6, 2002.
On June 5, 2003, defendant's counsel filed a motion to sever his client's case from that of Jerry Coleman. Significantly, in his memorandum in support of said motion, defense counsel specifically cited the leading case of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). The defendant's motion to sever was granted.[5]
The defendant was tried before a jury in the Superior Court for Kent County in July of 2003. The jury convicted defendant of felony conspiracy, breaking and entering a dwelling, and felony assault. On July 29, 2003, the trial justice denied defendant's motion for a new trial. The defendant was then sentenced to consecutive terms of ten years on the conspiracy charge (five years to be served at the Adult Correctional Institutions and five years suspended, with probation), fifteen years on the breaking and entering charge (five years to be served and ten years suspended, with probation), and ten years on the assault charge (seven years to be served and three years suspended, with probation).
On appeal, defendant argues that his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and under article 1, sections 2 and 10 of the Rhode Island Constitution were violated when the trial justice allowed Detective Johnson to read to the jury the written statement that Jerry Coleman had provided to the police. The defendant also contends that the trial justice erred in permitting the state to question Detective Gillis as to whether or not anyone had come forward to retrieve the personal effects that had been found in the vehicle that was left outside the Lavens' home by the perpetrators. The defendant further argues that it was error for the *1218 trial justice not to have provided the jury with statements made by Mr. and Mrs. Laven with respect to the physical description of the two perpetrators after the jury requested said statements during deliberations.

Analysis

I

The Admission of Jerry Coleman's Statement
The defendant's first argument on appeal is that the trial justice erred, and thereby violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and under article 1, sections 2 and 10 of the Rhode Island Constitution, when she allowed the written statement of Jerry Coleman to be read to the jury by Detective Johnson of the Warwick Police Department.
It will be recalled that, during defendant's trial, Detective Johnson was permitted to read to the jury the written statement that Mr. Coleman, whose case had been severed prior to defendant's trial, had provided to the police while he was being interrogated regarding the break-in at the Lavens' home.[6] In addition, shortly after Detective Johnson finished reading the statement to the jury, the following colloquy took place:
"Q Detective, what was your next what did you do next, with regard to Mr. Alston, in your investigation?
"A After interviewing Mr. Coleman?
"Q Yes.
"A I completed an arrest warrant affidavit for Jeffrey Alston."
Defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds both to the introduction of Mr. Coleman's statement and to the subsequent questioning of Detective Johnson as to what he "did * * * next with regard to Mr. Alston, in [his] investigation[.]"[7]
*1219 After careful consideration of the record and after reviewing the pertinent authorities, we are in agreement with defendant's argument that the trial justice erred in allowing Detective Johnson to read Mr. Coleman's written statement to the jury. We conclude that the admission of Mr. Coleman's statement in this case cannot be reconciled with the principles articulated by the United States Supreme Court in its seminal opinion in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968).[8]
In Bruton, the United States Supreme Court held that the trial court committed reversible error when, during a joint trial, it admitted the codefendant's confession, which implicated defendant Bruton. 391 U.S. at 124, 126, 88 S.Ct. 1620. The Court held that the admission of the codefendant's confession constituted a violation of the defendant's "right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 126, 88 S.Ct. 1620. In that case, the confession of Bruton's codefendant was admitted into evidence through the testimony of a third party to whom the codefendant had orally confessed. Id. at 124, 88 S.Ct. 1620. The Supreme Court noted that the codefendant's confession "added substantial, perhaps even critical, weight to the Government's case in a form not subject to cross-examination, since [the codefendant] did not take the stand." Id. at 128, 88 S.Ct. 1620. In view of this scenario, the Court held that the defendant "was denied his constitutional right of confrontation." Id.
In the present case, the Superior Court had granted defendant's motion to sever Mr. Coleman's case from defendant's case before defendant's trial began. The defendant's memorandum in support of his motion to sever had explicitly referenced Bruton. It is our opinion that, once a Bruton-based decision to sever trials is made, then it is presumptively prejudicial to allow into evidence a confession made by the person whose case has been severed. Accordingly, given the granting of the motion to sever and given the principles set forth in Bruton, it was error to then allow Detective Johnson to read to the jury Mr. Coleman's statement to the police.[9]
In our judgment, the admission of Mr. Coleman's statement in the instant case cannot be reconciled with the constitutional principles articulated in Bruton. See 391 U.S. at 126, 88 S.Ct. 1620. Similar to the confession of the codefendant at issue in Bruton, the statement of Mr. Coleman, which Detective Johnson read to the jury, added substantial weight to the prosecution's case in a form that was not subject to cross-examination by defendant. Accordingly, applying the principles set *1220 forth in Bruton, it is our opinion that defendant was denied his constitutional right to confrontation in this case. It is further our opinion that this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.[10]
The trial justice's error in admitting the Coleman statement was magnified in this case by the subsequent questioning of Detective Johnson as to what he did "next with regard to Mr. Alston," which questioning occurred shortly after the detective had read Mr. Coleman's statement to the jury. This questioning of Detective Johnson, along with the elicited testimony which revealed that what he did "next" was to complete "an arrest warrant affidavit for Jeffrey Alston," demonstrates how potentially prejudicial to defendant was the admission of Mr. Coleman's statement. The shift from the reading of Mr. Coleman's statement about his own involvement in the break-in to the testimony of Detective Johnson that what he did "next" was to prepare for the arrest of defendant had the highly probable effect of further inculpating defendant in the eyes of the jury without his having the chance to cross-examine Mr. Coleman. In effect, the jury was told that Mr. Coleman's statement was the basis for defendant's arrest.
For this reason, we vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this case to the Superior Court for retrial.
Although we are reversing and remanding for a new trial on Bruton grounds, we will nevertheless proceed to address one of defendant's other appellate contentions because it involves an issue that may well present itself once again upon the retrial of this case. However, we choose not to comment upon defendant's third contention (namely, that the trial justice erred in not granting the jury's request to review the statements that the Lavens made to the police with respect to the physical description of the two men whom they encountered at their home), because there is no reasonable likelihood that the same scenario will be repeated upon retrial.

II

The Questioning of Detective Gillis Regarding Retrieval of the Items Found in the Vehicle
The defendant's next contention on appeal is that the trial justice erred in permitting the state to question Detective Gillis as to whether or not anyone had come forward to retrieve the items that had been found in the vehicle that was parked by the side of the road near the bottom of the Lavens' driveway.
Detective Gillis testified at trial that a rental agreement, a cellular telephone, and a wallet were found inside the vehicle. Detective Gillis further testified that these items were seized from the vehicle and were taken into the custody of the Warwick Police Department along with the vehicle itself. Detective Gillis also testified that a representative from Alamo Rental later came to the police station and retrieved the vehicle. The prosecutor then questioned Detective Gillis as follows: "Aside from the representative from Alamo, did anyone else at any point in time come to the Warwick Police Department to try and retrieve evidence?" At that point, defense counsel objected. Following a lengthy bench conference, during which the jury was not in the courtroom, the trial *1221 justice allowed the state to pursue this line of questioning. Detective Gillis then testified that, other than the Alamo representative and Shannon Laven (the Lavens' daughter), no one else had come to the Warwick Police Department to retrieve any of the property that had been seized by the police.
The defendant makes essentially the same argument on appeal regarding this questioning of Detective Gillis as he made to the trial justice  namely, that the above-quoted question and answer had the effect of permitting the jury to make an inference of guilt based upon defendant's failure to retrieve his belongings from the police department. The defendant argued at trial, and argues before us on appeal, that the posing of this question coupled with the answer of Detective Gillis in effect permitted the state to comment upon his invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. The trial justice rejected this argument on the ground that evidence that defendant had not retrieved his belongings from the police department was "not testimonial" in nature.
It is our view that the trial justice correctly allowed the challenged questioning of Detective Gillis, because the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was inapplicable in the above-described situation. Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have clearly established that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination extends only to evidence that is testimonial or communicative in nature. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); State ex rel. Widergren v. Charette, 110 R.I. 124, 132, 290 A.2d 858, 862 (1972).
In Schmerber, the United States Supreme Court explicitly held that the Fifth Amendment "privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature." 384 U.S. at 761, 86 S.Ct. 1826. Similarly, in Charette, this Court stated that "the great weight of authority supports the conclusion that the `[Fifth Amendment] privilege is a bar against compelling "communications" or "testimony" * * *.'" 110 R.I. at 132, 290 A.2d at 862 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764, 86 S.Ct. 1826).
In the present case, the fact of the defendant's failure to retrieve his belongings that had been left in the rental vehicle certainly did not constitute "communication" or "testimony." Accordingly, admitting evidence of the defendant's inaction in the context that we have described did not violate his rights under the Fifth Amendment.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the defendant's appeal is sustained. We vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this case to the Superior Court for retrial. The record may be returned to that court.
NOTES
[1]  On November 2, 2005, this Court issued an order granting defendant's motion to amend the record to reflect his change of name from Jeffrey Alston to Kam Ausar.
[2]  In actuality, the keys which Mrs. Laven handed to the perpetrators were the keys to the vehicle that she and Mr. Laven had been driving that night and not the keys to the vehicle which the perpetrators had been using.
[3]  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
[4]  As will be made clear in Part I of the "Analysis" section of this opinion, Detective Johnson's testimony that the next thing he did after interrogating Mr. Coleman was to complete an arrest warrant affidavit for defendant is not without significance.
[5]  Mr. Coleman's case proceeded to a jury trial in Superior Court. At the conclusion of his trial, Mr. Coleman was found guilty of felony conspiracy, breaking and entering a dwelling, simple assault, and driving without the consent of the owner.
[6]  The following is the text of the written statement that Mr. Coleman provided to the police, as transcribed by the court reporter when Detective Johnson read it to the jury:

"I, Jerry Coleman, on or about July, did break into a house in Warwick, R.I. Upon entering the house, the front door was open. I went inside. People return home, a man and a woman. At this point I became afraid, and went out of the back door and down the driveway, went to J.C. car; notice keys were missing. Then two people came to car and questioned as to what was happening. Notice they had the keys. At this point, I became physically violent with the two people, because I could not find the keys to the car. So I ran on foot into some woods, until I was clear out of sight; and then proceeded to make my way back to Providence, not before taking a car somewhere in Warwick. I'm not sure where in Warwick I gotten the car, but drove it to Route 10. I then went home to 34 Alexander Street. I had a call from the prison as to what had taken place the night before. And the discussion went, as follows: `Are you okay?'
"I said, `Yes.'
"This phone call was between eight and eleven a.m. from Priscilla Sims, who told me that her brother Charles Sims was on the phone, and wanted to talk to me about the night before, what was on the news about a break, quote, `house break,' in Warwick, R.I. What I can recall was the concern about my being okay."
[7]  Defense counsel objected to both the Coleman statement and to the questioning of Detective Johnson as to what he did "next with regard to Mr. Alston * * *." The objections were essentially based on the rule against hearsay evidence rather than specifically on the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). However, given what had already transpired by that point (most notably the granting of the motion to sever), we choose to overlook the absence of a more finely tuned objection in this instance.

It is significant to us that, in the course of articulating his objection to the admission of Mr. Coleman's statement, defendant's counsel did state: "[If] they want testimony from Coleman, he should be here." That sentence is redolent with Confrontation Clause implications. See U.S. Const. Amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to be confronted with the witnesses against him * * *.").
[8]  Since we are deciding this case on the basis of long-recognized principles, we need not and do not decide whether or not defendant could also have successfully contended that our "raise or waive rule" is inapplicable in this situation so that he could present to us an argument based on the 2004 decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004).
[9]  In a recorded colloquy with the trial justice out of the presence of the jury, the prosecutor in the instant case candidly acknowledged that "the trial was severed for Bruton problems * * *." Given the Superior Court's decision to sever the trials of Mr. Coleman and defendanta decision with which we do not quarrelthe rationale underlying that decision should have called for the utmost caution with respect to the principles set forth in Bruton.
[10]  The potential prejudicial impact of the reading of the Coleman statement (even prescinding from our discussion in the text infra as to the magnifying effect of the subsequent questioning of Detective Johnson as to what he did "next with regard to Mr. Alston") is of such magnitude that in our judgment it could not have been adequately palliated by the giving of an immediate curative instruction, even if one had been given.


810 F.2d 199
NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit.Natty BUMPPO, Jennifer Coffee, Kevin Kilpatrick and MalachiBumppo, Plaintiffs-Appellants,v.KENTUCKY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;  Drexell Davis, KentuckySecretary of State, as Chairman thereof;  Edmonson CountyBoard of Elections;  and Richard A. Sanders, Edmonson CountyCourt Clerk, as Chairman thereof, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 85-5486.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Nov. 6, 1986.

Before KEITH and NELSON, Circuit Judges, and CONTIE, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:

1
Appellants appeal the order upholding the constitutionality of certain Kentucky statute regulating voting.   We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

2
The appellants filed suit in the district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.   The complaint against appellees alleged violations of rights secured by the Declaration of Independence and the first, fifth, ninth, eleventh, twelfth, fourteenth, fifteenth, nineteenth, twenty-third, twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth amendments to the United States Constitution.   Specifically, appellants alleged that:

3
1. The officials' enforcement of Kentucky Revised Statutes (hereinafter KRS) Chapter 117, Section 265(3) [KRS 117.265(3) ], purporting to prohibit write-in voting for President and Vice President of the United States, deprived them of rights secured to them by the Constitution of the United States of America.

4
2. The county officials customarily neglected to count write-in votes, even those allowed by Kentucky statute.

5
3. The officials' enforcement of KRS 116.055(1), purporting to prohibit voting in primary elections by qualified voters not members of the primary's political party, deprived them of rights secured to them by the Constitution of the United States of America.

6
4. The officials' enforcement of KRS 116.025(1) and Section 145 of the Kentucky Constitution, purporting, by the officials' interpretation, to prohibit voting by persons under the age of 18 years, deprived them of rights secured to them by the Constitution of the United States of America.  (This allegation applied particularly to appellants Kevin Kilpatrick and Malachi Bumppo, who were 13 and 1 years of age, respectively.)

7
The state officials filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a cause of action.   The district court entered judgment for the officials on the pleadings.

8
Upon examination of the district court opinion and the record in this case, we note that the district court did not consider all of appellant's claims.   Specifically, the district court did not address Count I, Paragraph (4) of the complaint which states:

9
(4) That the custom of defendants Edmonson County Board of elections and Richard A. Sanders is never to count "write-in" votes anyway, even for those offices for which they have been allowed, in violation of Kentucky Revised Statutes Chapter 117, Section 265(1) [KRS 117.265(1) ], and that said custom deprives plaintiffs and other qualified voters of rights secured them by the Declaration of Independence and the 1st, 5th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 14th, 15th, 19th, 23rd, 24th and 26th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America.

10
Since appellants allege that write in votes customarily were not counted, and since that claim has not been properly adjudicated, the action has not been terminated and there is no applicable final judgment.   Rule 54(b) Federal Rules of Civil Prejudice, 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

11
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.


738 N.W.2d 237 (2007)
Barry GLISSON, Successor Personal Representative of the Estate of Scott Glisson, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Dianne GERRITY, M.D., Defendant-Appellee, and
Robert Stuart Levy, M.D., Robert Levy, M.D., P.C., Daniel N. Scaff, M.D., and Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine, Defendants.
Docket No. 133991. COA No. 264433.
Supreme Court of Michigan.
September 21, 2007.
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 6, 2007 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE part IV(A) of the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we VACATE parts III and IV(B) of the judgment as unnecessary in light of our reversal of part IV(A). The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff's June 2, 2004 complaint should be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Geralds v. Munson Healthcare, 259 Mich.App. 225, 673 N.W.2d 792 (2003), and Mouradian v. Goldberg, 256 Mich.App. 566, 664 N.W.2d 805 (2003). We overruled Geralds and Mouradian in Kirkaldy v. Rim, 478 Mich. 581, 734 N.W.2d 201 (2007). As Kirkaldy states, "[u]nder MCL 600.5856(a) and MCL 600.2912d, the period of limitations is tolled when a complaint and affidavit of merit are filed and served on the defendant." Kirkaldy, 478 Mich. at 585, 734 N.W.2d 201. Even a defective affidavit of merit will "toll the period of limitations until the validity of the affidavit is successfully challenged in `subsequent judicial proceedings.'" Id. at 586, 734 N.W.2d 201. In this case, the limitations period was tolled when the plaintiff filed and served the June 2, 2004 complaint and affidavit of merit. As a result, the limitations period had not expired when the plaintiff filed and served the August 9, 2005 amended complaint, accompanied by the June 3, 2005 amended affidavit of merit. Accordingly, we DISMISS without prejudice those claims concerning Dianne Gerrity, M.D. in the June 2, 2004 complaint, and we REMAND this case to the Wayne Circuit Court for further proceedings with regard to the amended pleadings. In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.


                                                                        FILED
                                                            United States Court of Appeals
                                                                    Tenth Circuit
                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                 February 24, 2014
                                   TENTH CIRCUIT
                                                                Elisabeth A. Shumaker
                                                                    Clerk of Court

 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

          Plaintiff - Appellee,
                                                         No. 13-2066
 v.                                             (D.C. No. 12-CR-00696-JAP-1)
                                                           (D.N.M.)
 ABRAHAM SEDILLO,

          Defendant - Appellant.

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, EBEL and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

      Defendant-Appellant Abraham Sedillo pleaded guilty to robbery and was

sentenced to 51 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release. He

appeals from the sentence, challenging a firearm enhancement imposed under

U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C). The district court imposed the enhancement after

finding that Mr. Sedillo brandished a handgun during a restaurant robbery.

United States v. Sedillo, No. 1:12-cr-00696-JAP-1 (D.N.M. May 31, 2013). Mr.

Sedillo argues that the enhancement was improper as it was based on

      *
        This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
uncorroborated hearsay. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we

affirm.

                                    Background

      Mr. Sedillo pleaded guilty to a September 2011 robbery of Blake’s

Lotaburger in Moriarty, New Mexico, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and 18

U.S.C. § 2. 1 R. 7, 9. He received a five-level sentencing enhancement under §

2B3.1(b)(2)(C). According to the presentence report, two men robbed the

restaurant, taking $300 in rolled coins kept in a plastic container called the “safe.”

2 R. 7-8. One robber, who was carrying a folding knife with an orange handle,

stayed at the front of the restaurant with a counter employee while a second

robber, later identified as Mr. Sedillo, went to the back of the restaurant where a

second employee was washing dishes. 2 R. 7-8. Mr. Sedillo grabbed the second

employee by the arm, pointed a gun at him, and took him to the front of the

restaurant, after which the two robbers soon fled. 2 R. 8. The second employee

identified Mr. Sedillo as a former employee of the restaurant. 2 R. 8. Mr. Sedillo

was described as wearing a blue bandana and black gloves and carrying a .357- or

.38-caliber revolver. 2 R. 7-8.

      In a subsequent search of the getaway car—registered to Mr. Sedillo’s

wife—police found a folding knife with an orange handle and a bag containing

about $40 worth of coins. 2 R. 8, 10. A black glove, along with drug

                                        -2-
paraphernalia, was discovered in a search of Mrs. Sedillo’s home. 2 R. 9. No

gun was ever recovered. 2 R. 12.

      In February, 2012, an agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms

and Explosives (“ATF agent”) traveled to Moriarty to interview the second

employee, accompanied by an officer with the Moriarty police department. 2 R.

11. During the interview, the second employee “reported the same information as

before,” adding details about his working with Mr. Sedillo at the restaurant and

Mr. Sedillo’s knowledge of closing patterns. 2 R. 11. The ATF agent also

listened to recorded telephone conversations Mr. Sedillo had with his wife while

in custody. 2 R. 12. During one phone call, the two discussed a firearm,

bandanas, and sweatshirts that had been in the getaway vehicle but not yet found

by police. 2 R. 12.

      Several months later, the ATF agent re-interviewed the second employee by

telephone “to determine his knowledge of firearms.” 2 R. 12. During the

interview, the second employee stated that he (1) once owned a .38 caliber

revolver, (2) had been around firearms for many years, and (3) completed basic

training in the military, which furthered his knowledge of weapons. 2 R. 12. The

second employee explained that the revolver Mr. Sedillo was carrying was either

a .357- or .38-caliber but that the two guns were very similar and could be

distinguished only by further inspection. 2 R. 12. Mr. Sedillo declined to

provide his version of events, 2 R. 13, although he admitted during police

                                        -3-
questioning that he worked the evening shift at the restaurant, giving him direct

knowledge of closing procedures, 2 R. 6.

      Before sentencing, Mr. Sedillo filed a sentencing memorandum objecting to

the firearm enhancement on two grounds: (1) that no gun was ever recovered;

therefore, the government failed to provide evidence that an actual gun was used

in the robbery; and (2) that the enhancement required a factual finding by a jury,

which did not occur. 1 R. 12.

      The ATF agent was present at the sentencing hearing; the second employee

was not. In order to “speed this up,” the district court had the government proffer

the substance of the testimony of the ATF agent with an opportunity for the ATF

agent to agree or disagree with the proffer and add to it. 3 R. 5-8. Mr. Sedillo’s

counsel then cross-examined the ATF agent. There was no objection to this

procedure.

      According to the proffer, the ATF agent would testify that the second

employee was knowledgeable about weapons and identified Mr. Sedillo as

carrying either a .357- or .38-caliber revolver during the robbery. 3 R 6-7, 8. In

addition, the ATF agent would testify that he listened to Mr. Sedillo’s recorded

telephone conversations from jail regarding items not yet found by police,

including a gun. 3 R. 7-8. Based on this evidence, the ATF agent would testify

that he thought that the second employee’s testimony was reliable and that Mr.

Sedillo did indeed posses a weapon during the robbery. 2 R. 7.

                                        -4-
      On cross examination, the ATF agent agreed with Mr. Sedillo that (1) other

devices, such as pellet guns and BB guns, can look like handguns; (2)

misidentifications can occur in emotionally charged environments such as

robberies; and (3) a gun was never recovered. 3 R. 9-11. Mr. Sedillo made no

other objections to the presentence report, which the district court adopted. 1 3 R.

13.

      The district court found by a preponderance that the second employee was

knowledgeable about guns and identified Mr. Sedillo as brandishing a revolver in

connection with the Lotaburger robbery. 3 R. 13-14. Accordingly, the district

court applied the firearm enhancement to Mr. Sedillo’s sentencing calculation. 3

R. 14. This appeal followed.

                                     Discussion

      Factual findings supporting a sentence enhancement must be proven by a

preponderance of the evidence, and we review such findings for clear error.

United States v. Tindall, 519 F.3d 1057, 1063-64 (10th Cir. 2008).

      Mr. Sedillo acknowledges that reliable hearsay may be used in determining

a non-capital sentence. Aplt. Br. 7 (citing United States v. Bustamante, 454 F.3d

1200, 1202 (10th Cir. 2006)). However, Mr. Sedillo argues that the district court

      1
         Mr. Sedillo made an earlier objection to the presentence report that is not
relevant to this appeal. 3 R. 2-4.

                                        -5-
erred because the evidence it considered failed to provide the “minimal indicia of

reliability” required by the Sentencing Guidelines, based primarily on our holding

in United States v. Fennell, 65 F.3d 812, 813 (10th Cir. 1995). Aplt. Br. 8-10. In

his reply brief, Mr. Sedillo also argues that (1) the ATF agent only talked with the

second employee over the phone, (2) the government did not provide an affidavit

by the second employee, (3) the second employee’s allegations about a firearm

are not corroborated, (4) the government cannot explain why the firearm was not

recovered, (5) the government did not provide testimony from the other

Lotaburger employee who was at the counter, (6) the robbery took only 30

seconds to complete, (7) the second employee was under incredible stress, (8) the

ATF agent conceded that a person familiar with firearms could mistakenly

identify an item made to look like a firearm as a real firearm, (9) Mr. Sedillo’s

wife denied that Mr. Sedillo owned or had access to firearms at the time of the

robbery, (10) the ATF agent interviewed the second employee almost a year after

the robbery, and finally, (11) the district court did not explain its credibility

finding. Aplt. R. Br. 2-7. We are not persuaded.

      In Fennell, we held that the unsworn testimony of a defendant’s girlfriend

used to support a sentencing enhancement lacked the required “minimal indicia of

reliability” because the probation officer who prepared the presentence report

took her testimony over the telephone and did not personally observe her

demeanor such that he could determine her veracity, and no other evidence

                                          -6-
corroborated the girlfriend’s unsworn testimony. Fennell, 65 F.3d at 813. Rather,

other evidence in the record—namely, the decision by the state to sentence the

defendant to a lesser charge—seemed to undermine the girlfriend’s testimony. Id.

      This case is readily distinguishable. Here, an experienced ATF agent—and

not merely the probation officer writing the presentence report—interviewed the

second employee twice, once in person and once over the phone, and found him to

be credible. Second, the second employee’s statements were corroborated by Mr.

Sedillo’s conversations with his wife, during which they specifically discussed

that a gun was one of the three items not yet recovered by the police. Third, the

second employee knew Mr. Sedillo, having worked with him. Finally, nothing in

the record supports a contrary conclusion. The victim’s statements were

consistent both to the ATF agent and to other police officers, and Mr. Sedillo

offered no evidence to the contrary. Thus, we conclude that the district court did

not commit clear error by relying on the hearsay statements for the firearm

enhancement. See United States v. Cook, 550 F.3d 1292, 1297 (10th Cir. 2008).

      Mr. Sedillo makes much of the fact that it was critical to cross-examine the

second victim because the gun was never found and the victim may have mistaken

a gun for a gun-like weapon. Aplt. Br. 10. But as noted, reliable hearsay is

permissible for sentencing purposes, and the district court is free to accept or

reject it. See, e.g., United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1179-81 (10th Cir.

1990). Explicit findings as to why the district court found the ATF agent credible

                                         -7-
are not required. 2 Allied Van Lines, Inc. v. Small Bus. Admin., 667 F.2d 751,

753 (8th Cir. 1982) (“It is well established that the trial court does not need to

make specific findings on all facts but only must formulate findings on the

ultimate facts necessary to reach a decision.”); cf. Woods Constr. Co. v. Pool

Constr. Co., 314 F.2d 405, 406-07 (10th Cir. 1963).

      Mr. Sedillo also challenges whether the ATF agent who appeared before the

district court actually met with the second employee in person, Aplt. R. Br. 2;

whether the recorded jailhouse conversations mentioned a firearm, Aplt. R. Br. 4;

and whether the record provides any basis that the second employee made a

statement about the gun to anyone other than the ATF agent, Aplt. R. Br. 7.

      2
          Mr. Sedillo relies on United States v. Palmer, 248 F.3d 569, 571 (7th Cir.
2001) (holding that a district court’s finding on the quantity of crack cocaine was
clearly erroneous in part because it did not explain why a gang member’s
statements about quantity were credible). Palmer is easily distinguished in two
ways. First, in reversing the district court, the Palmer court stressed that a
sentencing court must explicitly demonstrate how it arrived at a particular drug
quantity because of the importance of quantity in sentencing—findings that the
district court failed to provide, including any explanation as to why the drug
amount offered by one gang member was credible. Id. The sentencing
enhancement in this case does not require such a calculation. Second, nothing in
Palmer stands for the proposition that a sentencing court must make a finding of
witness credibility; it merely noted that, among other things, no explanation was
provided as to why a particular witness’ statements were considered credible,
given contrary evidence in the record. Id.

                                         -8-
These issues were not raised below, and we will not address them on appeal. See

United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2002).

      AFFIRMED.

                                     Entered for the Court

                                     Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
                                     Circuit Judge

                                      -9-


ft’   *   -
.
:                             TRH         ATWRNEY                   GENERAL
                                             OWTEXAE

                                                  November      29, 1973

              The Honorable    John Park        Davir                      Opinion    No. H-   163
              County Attorney
              Montague   County                                            Re:    Application     of Article
              Montague,   Texan 76251                                             236&,     V. T. C. S., to
                                                                                purchare     if paid for
                                                                                with funda on hand,
                                                                                creating    no obligation
              Dear   Mr.     Davis:                                                  or debt for county

                     Your     request for an opinion  porer the following   question:   Are bid@
              for road machinery      coating over $2,000.00     required  if it will be paid for
              out of county fundr on hand and the purchare        ir not being made out of funds
              creating  an obligation    or liability on the county7

                     The controlling rtatute ir Article            236&,     ( 2, Vernon’r     Texar     Civil
              Stetutee, which provider   in part:

                                       “No county,     acting through itr Commiraionerr
                               Court, , , . rball hereafter         make any contract         calling
                               for or requiring      the expenditure       or payment      of Two
                               Thouaand Dollars        ($2,000.00)     or more out of any fund
                               or funds of any . , . county or subdivirion               of any county
                               creating    or imposing      an obligation     or liabilitv   of any
                               nature or character        upon ouch countvor         any subdivirion
                                of ruch county,     . . . without firrt ebmitting           much pro-
                                pored contract     to competitive      bids.    . . . Provided,
                               however,      that the provieions     of thin Act shall not apply
                                to counties having a population          of more than three hun-
                                dred fifty thourand      (350,000) inhabitant8       according      to
                                the lart preceding      or any future Federal         Cenaur.”

               Section     2b provider:

                                                          p. 754
.   -

        The Honorable John Park Davh,              pago 2 (H-169

                                 “Contracta    for the purchare     of machinery     for
                        the conrtruction      and/or   maintenance     of roadr and/or
                        rtreetr,    may be made by the governing          bodier of all
                        countier    and citier within the State in accordance          with
                        the proviaionr      of thir Section.    The order for purchase
                        and notice for bid* rhall provide         full rpecification     of
                        the machinery       desired   and contract8    for the purchare
                        thereof ahall be let to the lowert and bert bidder.”

                Your quertion  indicate8 an interpretation     of the above quoted             language
        wherein    the phrare “creating  or imporing     an obligation  or liability.            , . ‘I
        would refer to “fund or fundr. . . .I’ We disagree.

                The worda of Article      2368a, $2, “creating     or imposing    an obligation
        or liability . . . upon ouch county . . . . ‘I, referr to the contract and not
        to the fund.    The word8 “out of any fund or fundr of any . . . county or any
        rubdivi#ion   of any county” were not included        in $2 until it was amended      in
        1947 (Actr 1947, 50th Leg.,        p. 283, ch. 173). A reading of $2 leaving out
        those words maker it clear that the phrare “creating            or imporing   an obli-
        gation or liability     of any nature or character     upon ruch county.    . . .‘I muat
        have originally     referred   to the word “contract.    ”

                  Moreover,    a contract by ita very      nature   create8   an obligation     or
        liability   wherear    a fund doer not.

                  Our conrtruction     ir bolrtered    by the language     of 5 5 of Article    236ga
        which     provides:

                               “The notice required    in Section 2 . . . shall
                        not be applicable  to expenditures    payable out of
                        current fundr. . . .‘I

        If bidding were not required for expenditures          out of current funds, it would
        be fruitlera    to specifically    eliminate the notice requirement    for ruch expen-
        diturer.     See Attorney      General Opinicnr M-172 (19671, V-1082 (1950).

                  It ir our opinion that competitive bidding ir required            for road machinery
        costing      over $2000 which ir paid out of fundr on hand.

                                                  p. 755
f’   -   -

             The Honorable John Park     Davlr,   pago   3 (H-163)

                                            SUMMARY

                                 Bidr for road machinery     carting $2,000 or
                          more are required   even if it will be paid for out of
                          county fundr oa hand.

                                                   V ry truly   youra,
                                                   A

             APPROVED:

             Opinion   Committee

                                                  p. 756