664 F.Supp. 572 (1987)
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS, Plaintiff,
v.
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, Defendant.
Civ. A. No. 85-1451.
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
May 6, 1987.
*573 John D. Hawke, Jr., Arnold & Porter, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff.
Theodore C. Hirt, Dept. Justice, Civil Div., Washington, D.C., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JACKSON, District Judge.
This case presents a challenge from another quarter to certain regulations promulgated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") respecting the proper relationship between FDIC-insured banks and their securities-dealing "subsidiaries" or "affiliates" which were also the subject of the controversy in Investment Company Institute v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 815 F.2d 1540 (D.C. Cir.1987) (per curiam) ("ICI").
In ICI the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the regulations substantively (as had the district court) against a claim by trade associations of mutual fund companies and investment bankers, i.e., potential competitors of the subsidiary/affiliates, that, to the extent the regulations purported to sanction the securities businesses of subsidiaries or affiliates of FDIC-insured "nonmember" (i.e., nonmembers of the Federal Reserve System) banks at all, the regulations contravened Section 21 of the Banking Act of 1933 (the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1982)) which generally prohibits investment banks and securities dealers from engaging in the commercial banking business and vice versa. Here, National Council of Savings Institutions ("NCSI"), a trade association representing approximately 273 FDIC-insured savings banks, including 27 now holding federal charters (and an undetermined number of existing state banks that might apply for them), complains that the regulations exceed FDIC's statutory authority in another respect: they constitute, in effect, "regulation" of the business of those "nonmember" savings banks with federal charters which Congress has committed to another agency, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB").[1] The FDIC contends that plaintiff is without "standing" to maintain the action (but only in the sense that the dispute is not "ripe," no FDIC-insured savings bank having yet sought to enter the securities business via a subsidiary or affiliate)[2], and that the regulations are in any event a necessary incident of its power to terminate a bank's insurance coverage to protect its insurance fund from unsafe and unsound banking practices under Section 2[8](a) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a). The case is now before the Court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. The Court finds the reasoning of the court of appeals in ICI to be apposite to *574 the disposition of both issues, albeit by adaption, and concludes for the following reasons that judgment must be given for defendant.
As to NCSI's "standing" here, the Court observes that in ICI the court of appeals held an association-representative of prospective competitors of the savings banks' securities-dealing subsidiaries and affiliates to have standing to challenge the regulations (on the ground that they were more permissive than law allowed), because its constituents would suffer competitive injury if and when the savings banks availed themselves of them. Although the court of appeals did not address the issue in terms of "ripeness," a necessary corollary of ICI's standing there is that the association-representative of the savings banks with whose subsidiaries and affiliates ICI's constituents may eventually be competing (and who would be directly affected by the regulations by having to comply with them to enter the competition),[3] must also have standing to challenge the regulations (as too constraining), even if none has as yet undertaken to do so.
On the merits, ICI is also instructive. The regulations promulgated by the FDIC purport to prescribe the manner in which all "nonmember" FDIC-insured banks (including the federally chartered savings banks under the FHLBB's regulatory control) may engage in securities business activities through subsidiary/affiliates with minimum risk to their own solvency. The regulations require that securities dealings be conducted only through a "bona fide subsidiary," which must, inter alia, have offices physically separate from the bank, have a name different from the bank's, observe all corporate formalities signifying its independence of the bank, maintain separate accounting records, and employ no bank officers or other personnel. The regulations limit the types of securities activities a subsidiary may conduct; they restrict the transactions between the bank and the subsidiary; and they impose an obligation on an FDIC-insured bank to notify the FDIC when it intends to engage in securities activities through a subsidiary. See generally 12 C.F.R. § 337.4 (1987).
NCSI contends that such regulations can only be characterized as an attempt at governance which, as to federally chartered savings banks, Congress has entrusted to the FHLBB by Section 112 of the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub.L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469, 1471-72 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(o) (1982)) (the "Garn Act").[4] The FDIC relies, as noted above, upon its power to terminate a bank's insurance coverage for engaging in "unsafe or unsound [banking] practices" under Section 2[8](a) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a), pointing out that the Comptroller of the Currency has been found to possess authority to give meaning to those same terms by regulation for his purposes and for the edification of the national banks under his supervision. Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (D.C.Cir.1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823, 101 S.Ct. 84, 66 L.Ed.2d 26 (1980). NCSI correctly points out in response that federally chartered savings banks are not subject to the FDIC's general supervision, as the national banks are to the Comptroller's.
The court of appeals, too, was confronted with arguably inconsistent statutory provisions in ICI, and in resolving the conflict adverted to "a venerable line of precedent counseling judicial deference toward an agency's evaluations of the statutes that give it legal life and authority," slip op. at *575 12, most recently culminating in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), the rule of which it paraphrased as follows:
If Congress has spoken clearly to the issue presented in a case, that intent controls. [Citation omitted]. If the agency's interpretation is contrary to the clear intent of Congress, the agency's interpretation is invalid. If, on the other hand, Congress had no clear intent as to the particular question at issue, the courts may invalidate the agency's interpretation only if it is "unreasonable" or "impermissible."
Id. (Citations omitted). The court of appeals found it unnecessary to resort to agency interpretation in ICI, because it was entirely clear to it that, at least with respect to the several provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act the plaintiff thought precluded it, Congress had actually intended the result the regulations contemplated.
Even if the regulations are fully consistent with the Glass-Steagall Act, however, it does not appear with equal clarity to this Court that Congress actually intended the FDIC to issue regulations applicable to federally chartered savings banks at all, particularly where, as here, their primary regulatory authority, the FHLBB, has issued its own regulations on the same subject to which those with FSLIC coverage are expected to adhere.[5] (All that seems clear, in fact, is that Congress intended that pre-existing savings banks taking out federal charters keep their FDIC insurance in force until their FSLIC coverage was in place. See S.Rep. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3054, 3060). But it is similarly unclear that Congress actually intended to prohibit FDIC's use of the rulemaking process to declare the conditions upon which its continued insurance coverage depends. And it is still less clear, now that ICI has been decided, that Congress intended the anomaly that would result should NCSI prevail here: all FDIC-insured segments of the nation's commercial banking community but the least  the federally chartered savings banks  would follow FDIC rules with respect to securities activities by subsidiary/affiliates; federal savings banks would be accountable only to the FHLBB.
Consequently, as ICI instructs, under the Chevron rule the Court must accept the FDIC's own interpretation of its statutory authority as encompassing the power to issue these regulations unless it can be said to be unreasonable. And it is obviously not unreasonable to suppose that a securities business conducted by a savings bank's "subsidiary" or "affiliate" could, in certain circumstances, impair its soundness, and, thus, jeopardize the fund by which its deposits are insured, nor that the insurer whose fund is in jeopardy would want to forewarn such a bank, by published rules, just what those circumstances are which would warrant the termination of its insurance in defense of the fund. The FDIC's interpretation of its authority is reinforced, moreover, by that of the FHLBB, which might be expected to demur at the prospect of a sister agency usurping authority it believed Congress to have conferred upon it alone, but has nevertheless agreed with the FDIC. (See letter of August 7, 1985, from Chairman Gray (FHLBB) to Chairman Isaac (FDIC), Appendix A to Defendant's Reply Memorandum of September 9, 1985).
This Court concludes, therefore, that the FDIC does possess the authority to promulgate the regulations in dispute, and that they are as applicable to those savings institutions which are now, or may in the future become, otherwise subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the FHLBB as they are to the remainder of the institutions whose deposits the FDIC presently insures. Accordingly, it is, this 6th day of May, 1987,
ORDERED, that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED, that defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted, *576 and the complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
NOTES
[1]  Federally chartered savings banks that are neither national banks (which are governed by the Comptroller of the Currency) nor members of the Federal Reserve System (which are subject to the jurisdiction of the System's Board of Governors) are "regulated" by the FHLBB. Their deposits are as a rule insured by FHLBB's own Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC"). Some federal savings banks, however, which began life as state-chartered institutions with FDIC insurance, were allowed by statute to retain their FDIC coverage when they converted to federal charters. The banks find the FHLBB a congenial regulator, but (as the Court was informed at oral argument) its FSLIC insurance is much more expensive than FDIC's.
[2]  It is undisputed that a trade association has standing to sue on behalf of its members who would themselves have standing. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 342-43, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2440-41, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977).
[3]  Cf. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967).
[4]  12 U.S.C. § 1464(o) provides in pertinent part:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the [Federal Home Loan Bank] Board, subject to the provisions of this subsection, may ... provide for the organization, incorporation, operation, examination, and regulation of [FDIC-insured federal savings banks].
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation shall insure the deposit accounts of any Federal savings bank chartered pursuant to this subsection, until such time as the accounts of such institution are insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.
....
[5]  See 12 C.F.R. §§ 545.74, 563.37(a), 570.10 (1986).


904 F.2d 11
HENCO, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Jeffrey C. BROWN, Defendant-Appellant,andJerry Daniels, d/b/a Custom Services, Defendant.
No. 89-2884.
United States Court of Appeals,Seventh Circuit.
Argued April 18, 1989.Decided June 7, 1990.

Frederick F. Eichhorn, Jr., Eichhorn, Eichhorn & Link, Hammond, Ind., John E. Hubbard, Jeff A. Anderson, Kutak, Rock & Campbell, Omaha, Neb., for plaintiff-appellee.
Saul I. Ruman, David M. Hamacher, William H. Tobin, Ruman, Clements & Tobin, Hammond, Ind., Stephen R. Snyder, Beckman, Lawson, Sandler, Snyder & Bederoff, Syracuse, Ind., for defendant-appellant.
Before WOOD, Jr., POSNER, and COFFEY, Circuit Judges.
WOOD, Jr., Circuit Judge.

1
Defendant-Appellant Jeffrey C. Brown, like the archetypal salesman Willie Loman, rode on a smile and a shoeshine.1   Brown, however, was so successful in selling his employer's products that it named him "rookie of the year" and implored him to reveal the secrets of his success to its entire sales force.  Brown's employer, Princeton Corporation, produced or purchased items and services that nonprofit organizations such as schools, parent-teacher associations, and booster clubs offer when conducting door-to-door sales campaigns to raise money.  Brown was humbled, however, when his employer was acquired by a competitor, Henco, Inc.  ("Henco"), that purportedly began providing him with inferior products that drew complaints from his customers.  Brown's plaintive customers assailed him with allegations that his once irreproachable line of goods had been supplanted with soapy fudge, stale cookies, and cheap and broken gimcracks.  The customers began demanding assurances from Brown that his company would refrain from delivering shoddy merchandise and providing unreliable service.  After communicating this sea of troubles to his supervisors and allegedly failing to receive any guarantee that they would remedy the problems, Brown resigned on January 25, 1989, and became a salesman for Jerry Daniels, d/b/a Custom Services ("Custom Services").  Custom Services, like Henco, supplied various products and programs to schools and other nonprofit organizations for their fund-raising activities.

2
When Henco learned of Brown's employment with Custom Services, it filed a complaint seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief and compensatory damages based on allegations that Brown and Custom Services breached or induced a breach of a restrictive covenant not to compete that was contained in Brown's employment contract with Henco.  The restrictive covenant provided as follows:

3
For a period of one (1) year following the termination of this Agreement, the Salesperson will not, within the territory outlined in paragraph (5) or as amended, directly or indirectly own, manage, operate, control, be employed by, participate in, or be connected in any manner with the ownership, management, operation, or control of any business similar to the type of business conducted by the Company at the time of the termination of this Agreement.  Further, the Salesperson covenants that within the said territory he will not sell or deal in any programs, systems, products, goods, supplies or services similar to those dealt in by the Company at the time of the termination of the Agreement.  In addition to the foregoing, the Salesperson agrees that this restrictive covenant shall include acting in concert with others in a manner whereby the Salesperson shall supervise the activity or sale of another in the territory set out in paragraph (5) above, or as amended.

4
The district court held a hearing on the application for a preliminary injunction and issued an order on September 13, 1989, enjoining Brown from engaging in the acts listed in the restrictive covenant until January 24, 1990, which was one year from the date Brown resigned from his job with Henco.  Brown filed a timely notice of appeal and this court heard oral argument on this matter on April 18, 1990.  No party requested an expedited appeal.

5
The only issue argued before and ruled on by the district court was Henco's motion for a preliminary injunction to expire January 24, 1990.  Because this appeal was heard more than eleven weeks after the end-date of the injunction, we raised the threshold issue of mootness.  Article III of the Constitution requires that federal courts only decide disputes that present a "Case or Controversy."    Because the preliminary injunction Brown appealed from expired under its own terms, the issues decided by the trial court pertaining to the propriety of a preliminary injunction have "lost ... [their] character as a present, live controversy of the kind that must exist if we are to avoid advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law."    Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48, 90 S.Ct. 200, 201, 24 L.Ed.2d 214 (1969).  Brown's counsel did not allege, and could not allege, that this case falls within the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception.  See Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 349, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975);  Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 283, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911).  The merits of the claims in Henco's complaint and Brown's counterclaim need not "evade review" because the trial court will resolve them when it tries this case.  At oral argument, however, Brown's attorney did allege that the injunction bond kept the appeal of the preliminary injunction alive.

6
In University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 396, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 1834, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981), the Supreme Court noted that "when the injunctive aspects of a case become moot on appeal of a preliminary injunction, any issue preserved by an injunction bond can generally not be resolved on appeal, but must be resolved on a trial on the merits."    See also Certified Grocers of Ill. v. Produce, Etc.  Union, Local 703, 816 F.2d 329, 331 (7th Cir.1987).  The "injunction bond exception" to the nonappealability of moot preliminary injunctions arises in cases where the district court reaches a final decision on the merits of the plaintiff's case after earlier granting a preliminary injunction, the defendant moves the district court for damages on the injunction bond under FED.R.CIV.P. 65(c),2 and the defendant appeals the district court's denial or partial award of damages incurred as a result of the issuance of the preliminary injunction.  See id. 451 U.S. at 396-98, 101 S.Ct. at 1834-35;  see also Klein v. Califano, 586 F.2d 250, 256 (3d Cir.1978).  If Brown eventually moves the district court for damages on the injunction bond and is dissatisfied with the district court's ruling, we can review the correctness of the trial judge's decision after the district court has had an opportunity to fully deliberate on the merits of the parties' claims.

7
In summary, the issue of whether the district court should have issued the preliminary injunction is moot because the injunction has dissolved on its own terms well before this appeal was heard.  It would be inappropriate for this court to intimate any view on the merits of the parties' competing claims, and we therefore decline appellant's request that we do so.  Accordingly, we DISMISS Brown's interlocutory appeal as MOOT.

1
 A salesman is "a man way out there in the blue, riding on a smile and a shoeshine.  And when they start not smiling back--that's an earthquake."    A. Miller, Death of a Salesman, 138 (1949)

2
 Rule 65(c) provides in part:
No restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper, for the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.
FED.R.CIV.P. 65(c).  Any award of damages on an injunction bond rests in the sound discretion of the district court's equity jurisdiction.  Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S.  [15 Otto] 433, 441-42, 445, 26 L.Ed. 1060 (1882);  H & R Block, Inc. v. McCaslin, 541 F.2d 1098, 1099 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946, 97 S.Ct. 1582, 51 L.Ed.2d 793 (1977).


98 F.3d 1346
NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.James LUDLOW, Petitioner-Appellant,v.Teresa ROCHA, Warden;  Attorney General of the State ofCalifornia, Respondents-Appellees.
No. 95-17307.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Oct. 7, 1996.*Decided Oct. 11, 1996.

Before:  BEEZER, KOZINSKI and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges.

1
MEMORANDUM**

2
We affirm for the reasons stated in the magistrate judge's Findings and Recommendation, filed on August 11, 1995, which was adopted in full by the district court's Order filed on October 18, 1995.1

3
AFFIRMED.

*
 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument.  Fed.R.App.P. 34(a);  9th Cir.R. 34-4.  Accordingly, Ludlow's request for appointment of counsel for oral argument is denied

**
 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3

1
 Because of our disposition of this appeal, we do not consider the applicability, if any, of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), to this appeal


Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
05/08/2020 12:14 AM CDT

                                                        - 615 -
                               Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                                        305 Nebraska Reports
                                                  JONES v. JONES
                                                 Cite as 305 Neb. 615

                                        Mary A. Jones, appellant, v.
                                         Curtis L. Jones, appellee.
                                                   ___ N.W.2d ___

                                         Filed April 23, 2020.    No. S-18-093.

                 1. Modification of Decree: Appeal and Error. Modification of a dis-
                    solution decree is a matter entrusted to the discretion of the trial court,
                    whose order is reviewed de novo on the record, and will be affirmed
                    absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
                 2. Judges: Words and Phrases. A judicial abuse of discretion exists if the
                    reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriv-
                    ing a litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in matters
                    submitted for disposition.
                 3. Modification of Decree: Child Custody: Proof. Ordinarily, custody
                    of a minor child will not be modified unless there has been a material
                    change in circumstances showing either that the custodial parent is unfit
                    or that the best interests of the child require such action.
                 4. ____: ____: ____. The showing required to modify custody is a two-
                    step process: First, the party seeking modification must show a material
                    change in circumstances, occurring after the entry of the previous cus-
                    tody order and affecting the best interests of the child. Next, the party
                    seeking modification must prove that changing the child’s custody is in
                    the child’s best interests.
                 5. Modification of Decree: Words and Phrases. A material change in
                    circumstances is the occurrence of something which, had it been known
                    to the dissolution court at the time of the initial decree, would have per-
                    suaded the court to decree differently.
                 6. Modification of Decree: Child Custody. If a change in custody is to be
                    made, it should appear to the court that the material change in circum-
                    stances is more or less permanent or continuous and not merely transi-
                    tory or temporary.
                 7. Modification of Decree: Child Custody: Evidence: Appeal and
                    Error. Even when a finding of a material change in circumstances is
                                      - 616 -
             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      305 Nebraska Reports
                                JONES v. JONES
                               Cite as 305 Neb. 615

      not expressly made by the trial court, an appellate court, in its de novo
      review, may make such a finding if the evidence supports it.
 8.   Modification of Decree: Child Custody: Evidence: Time. As a general
      rule, when determining whether the custody of a minor child should
      be changed, the evidence of the custodial parent’s behavior during the
      year or so before the hearing on the complaint to modify is considered
      most significant.
 9.   Child Custody. When determining the best interests of the child in the
      context of custody, a court must consider, at a minimum, (1) the rela-
      tionship of the minor child to each parent prior to the commencement
      of the action; (2) the desires and wishes of a sufficiently mature child,
      if based on sound reasoning; (3) the general health, welfare, and social
      behavior of the child; (4) credible evidence of abuse inflicted on any
      family or household member; and (5) credible evidence of child abuse
      or neglect or domestic intimate partner abuse. Other relevant consider-
      ations include stability in the child’s routine, minimalization of contact
      and conflict between the parents, and the general nature and health of
      the individual child. No single factor is determinative, and different fac-
      tors may weigh more heavily in the court’s analysis, depending on the
      evidence presented in each case.
10.   Child Support. All orders concerning child support, including modifi-
      cations, should include the appropriate child support worksheets.
11.   ____. Attaching a child support worksheet to the child support order
      allows the trial court to show the parties, and the appellate courts, that it
      has “done the math” required by the child support guidelines.
12.   ____. The purpose of setting nominal support is to maintain information
      on the obligor in the child support system and, hopefully, encourage
      such person to understand the necessity, duty, and importance of sup-
      porting his or her children.
13.   Child Support: Rules of the Supreme Court. The absence of a child
      support worksheet requires the parties and appellate courts to speculate
      about the trial court’s conclusions and calculations in awarding support;
      therefore, even in very low income cases, courts awarding nominal sup-
      port under Neb. Ct. R. § 4-209 (rev. 2020) should attach a child support
      worksheet, and the reason for any deviation from the minimum support
      amounts required by § 4-209 should be contained either in the court’s
      decree or order or on worksheet 5.

  Petition for further review from the Court of Appeals,
Moore, Chief Judge, and Riedmann and Welch, Judges, on
appeal thereto from the District Court for Lancaster County,
                                  - 617 -
            Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                     305 Nebraska Reports
                             JONES v. JONES
                            Cite as 305 Neb. 615

Andrew R. Jacobsen, Judge. Judgment of Court of Appeals
affirmed in part, and in part reversed and remanded with
directions.
  David V. Chipman, of Monzón, Guerra & Associates, for
appellant.
   Mark J. Krieger and Terri M. Weeks, of Bowman & Krieger,
for appellee.
  Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
   Stacy, J.
   In this appeal from an order modifying custody, the primary
question is whether there was sufficient evidence of a mate-
rial change in circumstances affecting the best interests of the
minor child. The Nebraska Court of Appeals found sufficient
evidence to support modifying legal custody, but not physical
custody. 1 It also found the evidence did not support the need
for a safety plan addressing parental substance use. On further
review, we reverse only that portion of the Court of Appeals’
opinion pertaining to the modification of physical custody. In
all other respects, we affirm.
                       I. BACKGROUND
   Mary A. Jones and Curtis L. Jones were married in 2003
and had one son, Kasey Jones, born in December 2004. Mary
filed for divorce in 2005. The parties eventually entered into
a property settlement and custody agreement that resolved
all disputes. At the final hearing in 2006, the court approved
the parties’ property settlement and custody agreement in its
entirety and entered a consent decree that awarded Mary legal
and physical custody of Kasey, subject to Curtis’ reasonable
parenting time. The parties did not agree to a set parenting time
1
    Jones v. Jones, No. A-18-093, 2019 WL 446636 (Neb. App. Feb. 5, 2019)
    (selected for posting to court website).
                              - 618 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  305 Nebraska Reports
                         JONES v. JONES
                        Cite as 305 Neb. 615

schedule, and the original decree did not establish one. Curtis
was ordered to pay monthly child support of $550.
                 1. Stipulated Modification
                           of Custody
   In 2011, Curtis filed a complaint to modify custody. He
alleged there had been a material change in circumstances,
in that Mary was no longer able to provide a stable and con-
sistent environment for Kasey and the lifestyle in her home
was no longer in Kasey’s best interests. Eventually, Mary
and Curtis entered into a written stipulation agreeing there
had been “a material change in circumstances necessitating
a change in the custody and support obligations” without
elaborating on the nature of the changed circumstances. In
November 2011, the court approved the parties’ stipulation
and entered a modified decree awarding them joint legal and
physical custody pursuant to a week-on-week-off parent-
ing schedule. Curtis’ monthly child support obligation was
reduced to $500. One year later, pursuant to another joint
stipulation of the parties, Curtis’ child support obligation was
reduced to $257.
                 2. 2016 Complaint to Modify
   Curtis filed the instant complaint to modify in April 2016,
alleging there had been a material change in circumstances
warranting a change in the joint custody arrangement. His
complaint generally alleged that residing with Mary 50 percent
of the time was no longer in Kasey’s best interests because,
since the last modification, Mary had failed to provide a
stable and structured home for Kasey or properly care for his
mental, physical, and educational well-being. Mary’s answer
denied these allegations and included a counterclaim seeking to
increase Curtis’ monthly child support payments.
                          3. Trial
   In August 2017, the court held a 2-day trial on Curtis’ com-
plaint to modify custody and Mary’s counterclaim to increase
                              - 619 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  305 Nebraska Reports
                         JONES v. JONES
                        Cite as 305 Neb. 615

child support. As pertinent to the issues before this court on
further review, the following evidence was adduced.
                     (a) Parties’ Employment
   When the parties divorced in 2006, Mary was working at
a law firm. She resigned that position in 2007 to return to
school, and in 2011, she earned a degree in paralegal studies. In
November 2011, when the stipulated order modifying custody
was entered, Mary was working part time as a paralegal and
office manager. In 2012, she began working as a paralegal for
a different attorney, earning $18 an hour, and it was during that
period that the parties stipulated to a reduction in Curtis’ child
support obligation. Mary continued working in that position
until 2014, when the attorney was suspended.
   For the next 3 years, Mary was basically unemployed, and
the testimony at trial provided no clear explanation for why
she was unable to obtain employment. In the months leading
up to trial, Mary applied for approximately 25 different jobs,
and in May 2017, she began working 10 hours per week as a
caregiver, earning $9 per hour. Two weeks before trial, Mary
started a second temporary job, working part time for an attor-
ney, entering client data into a legal software program.
   Curtis has worked as a drywaller for the past 25 years. He
currently owns his own drywall business and has a steady
income. Curtis remarried in 2014, and his current wife has
worked for the same employer for the past 23 years. Curtis has
a flexible work schedule that allows him to take time off work
when necessary.
                  (b) Parties’ Substance Use
   Both Mary and Curtis have a history of substance use.
Mary denied any current substance use, but she admitted using
controlled substances in the past. Mary testified that in 2011,
she was being routinely drug tested and someone from the
Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services lived in
her home “[t]wenty-four hours a day for one year” to make
sure she “stayed on the straight and narrow.” It was during
                              - 620 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  305 Nebraska Reports
                         JONES v. JONES
                        Cite as 305 Neb. 615

this time period that the parties agreed to change Mary’s pri-
mary physical custody of Kasey, and move to a joint legal and
physical custody arrangement with week-on-week-off parent-
ing time.
   Curtis also admitted to abusing alcohol and using con-
trolled substances during the parties’ marriage. He testified
that he stopped consuming alcohol when Kasey was about
2 years old and stopped using controlled substances shortly
thereafter.
   At trial, there was no evidence that either party is currently
abusing alcohol or controlled substances. Both parties submit-
ted to court-ordered testing for illicit drugs and alcohol, and
the tests were negative.
                       (c) Mary’s Health
   Mary testified that she has been diagnosed with “ADD/
ADHD,” bipolar disorder, and Lyme disease. She also suf-
fers from chronic back pain. In addition to taking prescribed
medication for these conditions, Mary is prescribed an antide-
pressant and regularly treats with a mental health practitioner.
There was no evidence that any of Mary’s health issues have
directly impacted her ability to parent, nor did Mary testify that
her health issues have interfered with her ability to obtain or
keep stable employment.
                      (d) Parties’ Housing
   At the time of the stipulated modification in 2011, Mary
lived in her own residence. At some point, her boyfriend
moved in and helped pay the rent, but Mary admitted that he
was not a good influence on Kasey. Her boyfriend used mari-
juana and was verbally, mentally, and physically abusive to
Mary. Following an assault in 2014, Mary obtained a domes-
tic abuse protection order against her boyfriend and he was
removed from the residence.
   In 2015, Mary was evicted from her residence. She lived
with friends for a month or two after the eviction, then moved
in with her adult daughter and lived there for another couple of
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                         JONES v. JONES
                        Cite as 305 Neb. 615

months. Mary then moved again, living in a friend’s basement
for about a month.
   In the fall of 2015, Mary moved in with her adult son, Kash
Wolff (Kash). She testified that because she had lost her job
and lost her car, she “needed to rely on him for a while.” Kash
had a job and usually paid their rent and all of their monthly
household expenses. Mary admitted that Kash had anger con-
trol issues and caused physical damage to their residence and
to property within the residence, but Mary fixed what she could
and did not believe Kasey noticed the damage. Mary described
Kash as an alcoholic, admitted he used drugs, and testified that
he frequently allowed his friends to live with them for weeks
at a time. Mary admitted that some of Kash’s friends were not
a good influence on Kasey and that she asked them to leave,
but she testified that it was “hard” since Kash was “trying to
be nice and give them a place to stay.”
   Mary described one time when she discovered Kash’s friend
was storing stolen property, including a shotgun, in their
garage. She called the police and reported the stolen property,
and shortly thereafter, a bullet was shot into their residence
and lodged in Mary’s headboard. Initially, Mary testified that
Kash’s friend “shot at me because I turned him in,” but later,
she testified that “[i]t could have been somebody shooting a
BB — or a gun back there at animals.”
   Mary lived with Kash for nearly 2 years, but about 2
months before the modification trial, they were evicted for
nonpayment of rent. At the time of trial, Mary had moved back
in with her adult daughter and her daughter’s boyfriend and
minor child. Mary described her daughter’s home as a stable
and structured environment, but admitted the living arrange-
ment was temporary. It is undisputed that during Mary’s par-
enting time, Kasey lived wherever, and with whomever, Mary
was living.
   At the time of the custody modification in 2011, Curtis was
still living in the same residence where he and Mary had lived
during their marriage. In 2014, Curtis remarried and built a
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                         JONES v. JONES
                        Cite as 305 Neb. 615

new home, where he currently lives with his wife, her two
daughters, and Kasey.
                      (e) Child’s Testimony
   Kasey was 12 years old at the time of trial. He testified in
chambers with his parents’ counsel present. The district court
assured Kasey that his testimony would not be shared with his
parents, and the parents’ attorneys were similarly admonished.
We have considered Kasey’s testimony as part of our de novo
review, but we will not summarize it here other than to say it
is clear that he loves both his parents and wants to spend time
with both of them.
                (f) Child’s Health and Welfare
   The evidence at trial was undisputed that Kasey is a healthy,
well-adjusted teenager who is involved in appropriate activi-
ties, has meaningful friendships, and is doing well academi-
cally. He spends quality time with both his parents and has a
strong and loving relationship with both. He also has a positive
relationship with Curtis’ new wife and her two daughters and
with Mary’s adult daughter and that daughter’s child.
                  (g) Parental Communication
   The evidence at trial showed that since their divorce, Mary
and Curtis have generally been cordial with one another and
able to communicate effectively about most parenting issues.
Curtis testified they struggle with some joint decisions, and
he recounted a time when Mary needed money and demanded
that Curtis pay her nearly $1,000 before she would agree to
have Kasey attend a different elementary school. Curtis also
testified that he and Mary had difficulty agreeing on holiday
parenting time, because it was not addressed in the 2011 par-
enting plan.
                      (h) Requested Relief
   Curtis asked the court to award him primary legal and physi-
cal custody of Kasey, subject to Mary’s parenting time on a
“10/4” schedule during the school year and a week-on-week-off
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                         JONES v. JONES
                        Cite as 305 Neb. 615

schedule during the summer. Curtis believed Mary’s housing
situation had become chronically unstable and unsafe, and he
felt it would be best if Kasey spent fewer overnights in that
environment during the school year. Curtis asked that he be
ordered to pay all of Kasey’s expenses and that Mary not be
required to pay any child support. Finally, Curtis asked that his
existing child support obligation be terminated prospectively,
but not retroactively.
   Curtis submitted a proposed parenting plan reflecting this
requested relief. His parenting plan also included a safety plan
that prohibited Mary from consuming alcohol or narcotics dur-
ing her parenting time, except as prescribed by a physician.
The safety plan also provided that if Curtis believed Mary was
under the influence of alcohol or drugs during her parenting
time, he could “suspend or terminate” her parenting time until
her sobriety could be confirmed.
   Mary asked the court to continue the joint custody arrange-
ment and the equal parenting time schedule. She also asked
that Curtis’ child support obligation be increased to $1,437 per
month, based on his increased earnings since the last child sup-
port modification.
                 4. District Court Order
                     (a) Factual Findings
   The district court made express factual findings about
changes in Mary’s housing, employment, and finances since
the custody modification in 2011. We summarize those find-
ings below.
                          (i) Housing
   The court found that since 2011, Mary had experienced dif-
ficulty maintaining a stable residence in which to raise Kasey.
It found she had moved five times, been evicted multiple
times, and was generally dependent on others to pay her rent
and living expenses. She had lived with 13 different people
since 2011, some of whom were physically violent and many
of whom were not a good influence on Kasey. The court was
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particularly troubled with the environment in which Mary
lived for most of the 2-year period leading up to the modifica-
tion trial:
      It is clear to the Court that [Mary] recognized that while
      living with Kash, having his friends stay for a week or
      two at a time in and out of the house was not a good sit
      uation for [K]asey, but because she had no other place to
      go, no employment, no other source of income, she was
      reliant on her 24-year-old son to provide her and [K]asey
      a roof over their head. Her objections to the people liv-
      ing there apparently were unsuccessful as the parade
      of people continued until they were eventually evicted.
      During this period of time, [Mary] testified that Kash
      was making bad decisions, was an alcoholic, was hanging
      out with bad people, making poor choices of friends and
      these were the very people that were residing with her
      and [K]asey . . . .
                       (ii) Employment
   The court found that after the modification in 2011, Mary
had difficulty maintaining stable employment. She had seven
different employers during that time period, and for several
of those years—from the summer of 2014 through May 30,
2017—she was almost continuously unemployed.
                         (iii) Finances
   The court found that since 2011, Mary had incurred sig-
nificant debt and had been sued multiple times by collection
agencies, landlords, and businesses. It also found that because
of her financial struggles, she had “left the financial care of
the minor child to [Curtis] since the entry of the modification
in November of 2011.” The court found that a partial itemiza-
tion of such expenses totaled more than $5,000, but that Curtis
“ha[d] taken no action against [Mary] in an attempt to get her
to pay her share of those expenses because he recognize[d] the
precarious financial position that [she] has been in for the last
several years.”
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                         JONES v. JONES
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                     (b) Modification Order
   The court modified the parties’ joint physical custody and
gave Curtis physical custody, subject to Mary’s parenting
time on a 10/4 schedule during the school year and a week-
on-week-off schedule during summer break. The court also
established a specific holiday parenting time schedule. The
court found it was unnecessary to modify the parties’ joint
legal custody, but it did give Curtis final say in the event the
parties reached an impasse and were unable to make a joint
decision. Finally, the court terminated Curtis’ child support
obligation and ordered Mary to pay nominal child support of
$10 per month.
   The court attached, and incorporated into its modification
order, the proposed parenting plan submitted by Curtis. It
expressly found the modified parenting plan was in Kasey’s
best interests except for the proposed changes to legal cus-
tody. The modification order, which was prepared by counsel,
did not include an express finding that a material change
in circumstances justified modification of Kasey’s physi-
cal custody.
                      5. Court of Appeals
   Mary appealed. As relevant to the issues on further review,
she assigned it was error for the district court to (1) modify
physical custody, (2) modify joint legal custody by giving
Curtis final say in the event of an impasse, (3) include a safety
plan in the modified parenting plan, and (4) deny Mary’s coun-
terclaim seeking an increase in child support.
   In its de novo review, the Court of Appeals examined the
record for evidence of a material change in circumstances
affecting the best interests of the child since the 2011 cus-
tody modification. It found insufficient evidence to warrant
modifying physical custody, but sufficient evidence to modify
legal custody.
   The Court of Appeals thus reversed the district court’s order
to the extent it modified Kasey’s physical custody, affirmed
the order to the extent it modified joint legal custody to give
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                              JONES v. JONES
                             Cite as 305 Neb. 615

Curtis final decisionmaking authority, eliminated the safety
plan, and remanded the cause for further consideration of
Mary’s counterclaim seeking to increase Curtis’ child sup-
port obligation.
   We granted Curtis’ petition for further review.
               II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
   On further review, Curtis assigns only that the Court of
Appeals erred in finding there was insufficient evidence of a
material change in circumstances to support modifying physi-
cal custody.
                 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
   [1] Modification of a dissolution decree is a matter entrusted
to the discretion of the trial court, whose order is reviewed de
novo on the record, and will be affirmed absent an abuse of
discretion by the trial court. 2
   [2] A judicial abuse of discretion exists if the reasons or
rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriv-
ing a litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in
matters submitted for disposition. 3
                         IV. ANALYSIS
                   1. Custody Modification
   [3,4] Ordinarily, custody of a minor child will not be modi-
fied unless there has been a material change in circumstances
showing either that the custodial parent is unfit or that the best
interests of the child require such action. 4 We have described
this showing as a two-step process: First, the party seeking
modification must show a material change in circumstances,
occurring after the entry of the previous custody order and
2
    VanSkiver v. VanSkiver, 303 Neb. 664, 930 N.W.2d 569 (2019).
3
    State on behalf of Kaaden S. v. Jeffery T., 303 Neb. 933, 932 N.W.2d 692
    (2019).
4
    Whilde v. Whilde, 298 Neb. 473, 904 N.W.2d 695 (2017); Hopkins v.
    Hopkins, 294 Neb. 417, 883 N.W.2d 363 (2016).
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                               JONES v. JONES
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affecting the best interests of the child. 5 Next, the party seek-
ing modification must prove that changing the child’s custody
is in the child’s best interests. 6
   Here, neither parent claimed the other was unfit.
Consequently, we focus our review on whether Curtis has
shown a material change in circumstances occurring after the
2011 modification and affecting Kasey’s best interests, and
whether Curtis proved that changing the custody arrangement
was in Kasey’s best interests.

             (a) Material Change in Circumstances
   [5,6] We have long described a material change in circum-
stances as the occurrence of something which, had it been
known to the dissolution court at the time of the initial decree,
would have persuaded the court to decree differently. 7 We have
also explained that if a change in custody is to be made, it
should appear to the court that the material change in circum-
stances is more or less permanent or continuous and not merely
transitory or temporary. 8
   [7] We begin by noting, as did the Court of Appeals, that
the district court made express factual findings concerning
changes in Mary’s employment and housing since the 2011
custody modification, but its order made no express find-
ing that those changes were material and affected Kasey’s
best interests. The absence of this express finding is not
dispositive, however, because we have recognized that even
when a finding of a material change in circumstances is not
expressly made by the trial court, an appellate court, in its de
5
    Id.
6
    Id.
7
    VanSkiver, supra note 2; State on behalf of Jakai C. v. Tiffany M., 292 Neb.
    68, 871 N.W.2d 230 (2015); Schrag v. Spear, 290 Neb. 98, 858 N.W.2d
    865 (2015); Heistand v. Heistand, 267 Neb. 300, 673 N.W.2d 541 (2004);
    Swenson v. Swenson, 254 Neb. 242, 575 N.W.2d 612 (1998).
8
    Hoschar v. Hoschar, 220 Neb. 913, 374 N.W.2d 64 (1985), disapproved on
    other grounds, Parker v. Parker, 234 Neb. 167, 449 N.W.2d 553 (1989).
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                               JONES v. JONES
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novo review, may make such a finding if the evidence sup-
ports it. 9
   Having reviewed the record de novo, we find ample evi-
dence that Mary’s continuous unemployment and housing
instability combined to present a material change in cir-
cumstances after the 2011 modification that affected Kasey’s
best interests.
                 (i) Continuous Unemployment
   The Court of Appeals concluded that Mary’s unemploy-
ment after the 2011 modification did not amount to a mate-
rial change in circumstances, reasoning that she experienced
periods of unemployment before the 2011 modification too. It
is true that Mary experienced periods of unemployment before
2011, but the evidence generally showed those periods were
sporadic and included several years when Mary intentionally
left the workforce to further her education. When the stipulated
modification was entered in 2011, Mary had completed her
degree in paralegal studies and was gainfully employed as a
paralegal. She changed employers several times thereafter, but
generally held a steady job in the legal field until 2014, when
her employment situation changed significantly.
   [8] From 2014 until shortly before trial in 2017, Mary
was almost continuously unemployed and her only source of
income was child support. This lengthy period of unemploy-
ment differed from the past, in that Mary was not unemployed
because she was changing jobs or furthering her education.
Mary did start working shortly before trial in this case, but
the jobs were part time and temporary and did not suggest a
commitment to returning to stable employment. And as a gen-
eral rule, when determining whether the custody of a minor
child should be changed, the evidence of the custodial parent’s
behavior during the year or so before the hearing on the com-
plaint to modify is considered most significant. 10
 9
     Parker, supra note 8.
10
     See Heistand, supra note 7.
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                                   JONES v. JONES
                                  Cite as 305 Neb. 615

   Despite Mary’s history of sporadic and temporary unem-
ployment before the custody modification in 2011, we agree
with the district court that the continuous unemployment she
experienced after 2014 amounted to a material change in cir-
cumstances. And it was a change in circumstances that nega-
tively impacted her ability to provide safe and stable housing
for Kasey, a concern we discuss next.
                           (ii) Housing
   The Court of Appeals expressed concern over Mary’s hous-
ing instability and the questionable character of some of the
individuals with whom she resided after the 2011 modifica-
tion. But it ultimately concluded this evidence did not support
a material change in circumstances, reasoning there was no
evidence that the frequent moves or the presence of ques-
tionable individuals in the home “had any actual negative
impact on Kasey.” 11 Our de novo review leads us to a differ-
ent conclusion.
   We find it significant that at the time of the stipulated cus-
tody modification in 2011, Mary lived in her own residence
and appeared to be providing a safe and stable living envi-
ronment for Kasey. Someone from the Nebraska Department
of Health and Human Services was living with her around
the clock to make sure she “stayed on the straight and nar-
row,” and there was no evidence of crime or violence in the
home. Since that time, Mary’s housing situation has changed
significantly.
   She has been evicted twice for nonpayment of rent. Her
chronic unemployment left her unable to afford safe and stable
housing, and she became dependent on the generosity of fam-
ily and friends for a place to live. Mary moved residences four
times in 2015 alone, and since 2011, she has lived with approx-
imately 13 different people. Mary admits some of the people
with whom she lived were not a good influence on Kasey, and
the evidence bears that out.
11
     Jones, supra note 1 at *7.
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                               JONES v. JONES
                              Cite as 305 Neb. 615

   For several years after the 2011 custody modification, Mary
lived with a man who used illegal substances and who was
verbally, mentally, and physically abusive to her. And from
2015 until a few months before trial in 2017, Mary lived with
her adult son, who had a violent temper, was an alcoholic, used
illegal drugs, and allowed his friends to live with them for
weeks at a time. At the time of trial, Mary was living with her
adult daughter, and while the environment in that home was
considerably safer than Mary’s prior residence, she admitted
the arrangement was temporary. Mary was hopeful her cir-
cumstances would improve in the future, but she described no
concrete plans for more permanent housing.
   Mary’s post-2011 living conditions were unstable and regu-
larly exposed Kasey to living alongside people who were
verbally and physically abusive to Mary, used illegal drugs,
engaged in criminal activity, and had violent tempers. Mary did
not believe that Kasey was affected by living in this environ-
ment, because he was still doing well in school, had positive
relationships with his parents and peers, and regularly attended
church with her. But we have rejected the suggestion that a
parent must show that actual harm has befallen a child in order
to establish that a modification of custody due to a material
change in circumstances would be in the child’s best inter-
ests. 12 And there is little doubt that if this unsafe and unstable
living environment had existed and been brought to the atten-
tion of the court at the time of the 2011 custody modification,
it would have persuaded the court to decree differently.
   On this record, we find that Curtis met his burden of prov-
ing that Mary’s continuous unemployment and chronic housing
instability after the 2011 modification was a material change
in circumstances that affected Kasey’s best interests. We next
consider whether the modified custody arrangement ordered by
the district court was in Kasey’s best interests. 13
12
     See Schrag, supra note 7.
13
     See Hopkins, supra note 4.
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                                JONES v. JONES
                               Cite as 305 Neb. 615

                    (b) Best Interests of Child
   [9] When determining the best interests of the child in the
context of custody, a court must consider, at a minimum, (1)
the relationship of the minor child to each parent prior to the
commencement of the action; (2) the desires and wishes of a
sufficiently mature child, if based on sound reasoning; (3) the
general health, welfare, and social behavior of the child; (4)
credible evidence of abuse inflicted on any family or household
member; and (5) credible evidence of child abuse or neglect
or domestic intimate partner abuse. 14 Other relevant consider-
ations include stability in the child’s routine, minimalization
of contact and conflict between the parents, and the general
nature and health of the individual child. 15 No single factor is
determinative, and different factors may weigh more heavily
in the court’s analysis, depending on the evidence presented in
each case. The one constant is that the child’s best interests are
always the standard by which any custody or parenting time
determination is made. 16
   Here, the district court found it was in Kasey’s best interests
for Curtis to have primary physical custody, subject to Mary’s
liberal parenting time on a 10/4 schedule during the school
year and a week-on-week-off schedule during summer break.
After our de novo review, we cannot find this was an abuse
of discretion.
   Since the 2011 modification, Curtis has had stable employ-
ment and a consistently safe and stable living environment
for raising children; Mary has not. The district court left joint
legal custody in place with additional provisions for resolving
disputes, but placed primary physical custody with Curtis. It
also changed the parenting time schedule to reduce the number
of overnights with Mary during the school year, while still
14
     Jeffery T., supra note 3. See, also, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2923(6) (Reissue
     2016).
15
     See Jeffery T., supra note 3.
16
     See id.
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                         JONES v. JONES
                        Cite as 305 Neb. 615

affording liberal parenting time and allowing Kasey to spend
equal time with both his parents over the summer months.
We agree such a custody and parenting time arrangement is in
Kasey’s best interests.
                          (c) Disposition
   We thus reverse the Court of Appeals’ finding that Curtis
did not prove a material change in circumstances justifying
modification of physical custody, and we remand the cause
with directions to affirm the district court’s modification of
physical custody. We also direct the Court of Appeals to affirm
the modified parenting plan approved by the district court, with
two caveats.
   First, for the sake of clarity, we direct the parenting plan be
corrected to reflect that the parties maintain joint legal custody
of Kasey, but that in the event they reach impasse and are
unable to make a joint decision, Curtis shall have final say.
Second, because we agree with the Court of Appeals that the
record in this case does not support the need for a safety plan,
we direct the safety plan provisions be stricken from the par-
enting plan.
                   2. Child Support Order
   The district court terminated Curtis’ monthly child support
obligation and ordered Mary to pay nominal child support
of $10 per month. No party takes issue with the amount of
support ordered, but when the case was before the Court of
Appeals, Mary assigned that it was error not to attach a child
support worksheet to the order of modification showing how
the support was calculated. Given the Court of Appeals’ dis-
position, it did not reach this assignment of error. We exercise
our discretion to consider it now, rather than directing consid-
eration on remand.
   [10,11] Neb. Ct. R. § 4-203(E) (rev. 2020) of the child sup-
port guidelines provides that “[a]ll orders for child support,
including modifications, must include a basic income and sup-
port calculation worksheet 1, and if used, worksheet 2 or 3.”
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                               JONES v. JONES
                              Cite as 305 Neb. 615

We have been clear that “[a]ll orders concerning child support,
including modifications, should include the appropriate child
support worksheets.” 17 The appellate courts have repeatedly
emphasized the importance of adhering to this requirement, 18
explaining that attaching the worksheet allows the trial court to
show the parties, and the appellate courts, that it has “‘done the
math’” required by the child support guidelines. 19
   [12] In this case, the court ordered nominal support pursuant
to the earlier version of Neb. Ct. R. § 4-209 (rev. 2020) of the
child support guidelines, which provides that “[e]ven in very
low income cases, except in cases of disability or incarceration
where a lower amount may be justified, a minimum monthly
support of $50, or 10 percent of the obligor’s net income,
whichever is greater, per month should be set.” The purpose
of setting nominal support is to maintain information on the
obligor in the child support system and, “hopefully, encourage
such person to understand the necessity, duty, and importance
of supporting his or her children.” 20
   We have not previously addressed whether a child support
worksheet is required even when ordering nominal support
under § 4-209, but we see no principled reason to depart from
the settled rule, even in very low income cases. Admittedly,
when nominal support is ordered in the recommended amount
of $50, there is very little math to show. But in this case, it is
not clear whether the $10 support figure was calculated based
on a finding regarding Mary’s net income or whether the court
concluded that an amount lower than the recommended mini-
mum was justified in this case. And of course, whenever there
is a deviation from the child support guidelines, either the
17
     Rutherford v. Rutherford, 277 Neb. 301, 305, 761 N.W.2d 922, 926 (2009).
18
     Id.
19
     See Stewart v. Stewart, 9 Neb. App. 431, 434, 613 N.W.2d 486, 489
     (2000). See, also, Fetherkile v. Fetherkile, 299 Neb. 76, 907 N.W.2d 275
     (2018); Molina v. Salgado-Bustamante, 21 Neb. App. 75, 837 N.W.2d 553
     (2013).
20
     § 4-209.
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reason for the deviation must “be contained in the findings por-
tion of the decree or order, or worksheet 5 should be completed
by the court and filed in the court file.” 21
   [13] Because the absence of a child support worksheet
requires the parties and appellate courts to speculate about the
trial court’s conclusions and calculations in awarding support,
we hold that even in very low income cases, courts awarding
nominal support under § 4-209 should attach a child support
worksheet. And the reason for any deviation from the mini-
mum support amounts required by § 4-209 should be contained
either in the court’s decree or order or on worksheet 5.
   On remand, we direct the Court of Appeals to remand the
matter to the district court with directions to prepare and
attach an appropriate child support worksheet to the order of
modification.
                       V. CONCLUSION
   For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Court of Appeals’
decision in part and remand the cause with directions to affirm
the district court’s modification of physical custody, child
support, and the parenting plan, subject to the caveats set out
above. In all other respects, we affirm.
                   Affirmed in part, and in part reversed
                   and remanded with directions.
21
     § 4-203.


841 F.2d 1117
U.S.v.Gallo
NO. 88-1019
United States Court of Appeals,Second Circuit.
JAN 22, 1988

1
Appeal From:  E.D.N.Y.

2
AFFIRMED.


503 F.Supp. 179 (1980)
The TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, a corporation, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
Walter BOLES, Defendant.
No. C-80-0270 SW.
United States District Court, N. D. California.
December 9, 1980.
*180 Stanley L. Gibson, Richard C. Wootton, Derby, Cook, Quinby & Tweedt, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiffs Travelers Indemnity Co. and Insurance Company of North America.
David C. Phillips, Samuel D. Davis, Goldstein & Phillips, A Professional Corp., San Francisco, Cal., for Walter Boles.
James E. Martin, San Francisco, Cal., for defendant Brookings Harbor Insurance.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE ORDER OF DISMISSAL AND ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE
SPENCER WILLIAMS, District Judge.
This case presents troubling procedural and jurisdictional questions which the court resolved following a hearing on April 22, 1980 by granting defendant Boles's motion to dismiss. The purpose of this brief memorandum is to set forth in writing the reasons why dismissal was deemed appropriate.
Plaintiffs, two insurance companies ("the companies"), issued Boles a policy of insurance covering his fishing vessel, the LORA BEE. On December 5, 1979, the LORA BEE was lost on rocks at Pt. Reyes, California. Boles filed a claim with the companies alleging their policy covered his vessel at the time of its loss, but they refused to pay the claim charging that Boles had breached the warranty contained in the insurance policy. On February 4, 1980 the companies filed the instant action seeking a declaration that they are not liable to Boles under their policy. The action was denominated an admiralty-maritime claim under Rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.[1]
On February 7, 1980, prior to service of the complaint in the present case, Boles filed his own action in state court against the companies and another party alleging breach of the insurance contract, fraud and negligence in connection with the salvage of the LORA BEE, conversion of the vessel, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of California Insurance Code § 790.03(h), deceit, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The state court action was removed to this court by the companies on the ground of diversity of citizenship, but at the April 22, 1980 hearing this court ordered the case remanded for failure of the third defendant named in the state action to join in the petition for removal.
Boles's motion to stay or to dismiss was based on the existence of the state court action concerning the same issues. He argued this court has discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction under the circumstances of this case. The companies contended the court had no discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction over their admiralty action.
Ordinarily, the granting of declaratory judgment relief rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.[2] Considerations *181 generally bearing on the court's decision to exercise that discretion include: whether the judgment sought would settle the controversy between the parties; whether piecemeal litigation is the likely product of permitting the action for the declaratory judgment to go forward; the availability of another, more adequate remedy; the pendency of another action posing some or all the questions raised in the declaratory action; and whether there is an indication that entertaining the declaratory action would encourage a "race to the courthouse" style of litigation. Making federal declaratory relief available was not intended to enable one party to obtain a change of forum from a state to a federal court, nor to permit the use of a declaratory judgment action in federal court merely as a means of asserting what otherwise would be defenses to a claim brought in state court by the defendant in the federal declaratory action.[3]
The doctrines governing stays or dismissals of parallel state and federal actions are best developed in the context of diversity cases. Thus, the general rule accepted in this district is that the federal court should decline to exercise diversity jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action when the same question of state law will be determined in a suit pending in state court.[4] The rule is based in part on considerations of judicial administration, since the declaratory judgment action often could not resolve the entire controversy between the parties, in part on a desire not to interfere with state court processes unnecessarily, and in part on fear that, in the context of insurance cases, the out-of-state insurance carrier may be using the declaratory judgment device to haul the parties to a tort action into federal court to try only a part of the entire controversy between them. There is also, however, an implied recognition that declaratory judgment actions are a special breed of lawsuit, intended to fill a gap in the remedies otherwise available but not to be substituted for the "real" thing when a coercive suit can be brought.
Though the doctrines are best developed in connection with diversity cases, the reasoning of the leading diversity cases[5] has been applied in situations where substantive federal law is involved.[6] Furthermore, although authorities dealing with declaratory judgments in the admiralty context are sparse in general, the court has discovered there is at least one reported case in which an admiralty action for declaratory relief was dismissed because the court found no useful purpose would be served in rendering a decision which could not afford complete relief among the parties when another action in a state forum was available which could do so.[7]
In light of the factors traditionally applied to determine whether a dismissal or a stay is appropriate, it is evident that proceeding with the instant declaratory judgment action at this time would serve no useful purpose. First, the present action probably would not settle the entire controversy between the parties. For example, Boles's state law claims for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress probably will not depend on the insurance contract's warranty provision. Second, the state court remedy is available and is adequate. There has been much discussion in the papers concerning the law which will apply to the insurance contract, with Boles *182 arguing that state law would govern anyway under relevant admiralty principles[8] and the companies contending state law would not necessarily apply, but there has been no indication of any conflicts between state law and the admiralty law the companies assert might control the issue. In fact, the most significant practical difference, aside from the location of the trial, which declining to exercise jurisdiction here would have is that Boles will be able to litigate before a jury. This brings up the third relevant consideration, the "race to the courthouse." The danger of encouraging a race to the courthouse as a means of depriving one or the other side of its ability to present its case to a jury especially concerns the court in these circumstances. The situation would be very different if the relief sought in admiralty were something more than a mere defensive declaratory judgment, or if the defendant in the declaratory action were not prepared to litigate a coercive action in state court. But the facts of this case appear to harbor tremendous potential for abuse of the availability of declaratory relief in federal admiralty courts. For this reason, the pendency of another action wherein the same questions of law are raised carries particular weight.
The companies have argued nevertheless that dismissal will deprive them of their historical right to proceed in admiralty. This plea must be considered in light of the fact that at least as recently as 1968 it has been held unequivocally that an admiralty court cannot grant declaratory relief.[9] Boles has not contended this court sitting in admiralty would be prohibited from granting declaratory relief, and the court is not presently persuaded it would lack the power to do so,[10] but it surely cannot be argued that declaratory relief has any deep historical roots in admiralty. Yet, in the absence of this remedy, the present action could never have been filed in the first place, and the companies would have been forced to await their being named defendants in a state court coercive suit. In short, the court is unable to discern any special considerations in admiralty which would prevent it from exercising the discretion regarding declaratory relief available in other situations, and the companies have cited no authority to that effect. As noted above, there is authority supporting the power of an admiralty court to dismiss a declaratory action due to the pendency of a parallel state action. Additionally, it is worth noting that this action, being one brought under Rule 9(h), is not one which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the admiralty court.
The court is, therefore, persuaded that the circumstances presented here  including the combination of (1) a defensive declaratory judgment action, (2) brought in admiralty pursuant to Rule 9(h) concerning an insurance contract, (3) which threatens the jury right the insured would otherwise enjoy, (4) would resolve only part of the dispute and (5) is duplicated in a comprehensive state court action  warrant its declining to exercise jurisdiction. This is a case in which dismissal without prejudice, as opposed to a stay of proceedings, is appropriate because all the claims raised in the complaint in this court are the subject of an adequate proceeding in the state court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
NOTES
[1]  Rule 9(h) is applicable to claims which may be brought in admiralty but which also fall within this court's jurisdiction on some other ground, and it permits the plaintiff to select at the outset whether his claim will be considered an admiralty claim by expressly identifying it as such.
[2]  New York Guardian Mortgagee Corp. v. Cleland, 473 F.Supp. 409, 418 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (and cases cited therein); 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2759 (1973).
[3]  See generally Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 494-95, 62 S.Ct. 1173, 1175, 86 L.Ed. 1620 (1942).
[4]  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Harris, 445 F.Supp. 847, 850-51 (N.D.Cal.1978).
[5]  E. g., Brillhart, 316 U.S. 491, 62 S.Ct. 1173, 86 L.Ed.2d 1620.
[6]  See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 664, 98 S.Ct. 2552, 2558, 57 L.Ed.2d 504 (1978) (plurality opinion); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1246, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976).
[7]  Cia Aeolia De Naveg. S.A. Panama v. John T. Clark and Son of Boston, Inc., 250 F.Supp. 808, 809 (D.Mass.1964).
[8]  Boles principally relies on the sometimes controversial case of Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 316, 75 S.Ct. 368, 371, 99 L.Ed. 337 (1955).
[9]  Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Manor Inv. Co., 286 F.Supp. 1007, 1009 (S.D.N.Y.1968). Cf. States Maine Lines, Inc. v. United States, 196 F.Supp. 562 (N.D.Cal.1960).
[10]  See Ins. Co. of N. America v. Langan Constr. Co., 327 F.Supp. 567, 567-68 (S.D.Ala.1971).


6 So.3d 68 (2009)
WOODS
v.
STATE.
No. 3D08-1433.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
March 16, 2009.
Decision without published opinion. Mand.denied.