517 U.S. 654 (1996)
HENDERSON
v.
UNITED STATES
No. 95-232.
United States Supreme Court.
Argued March 19, 1996.
Decided May 20, 1996.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
*655 Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Kennedy, J., joined, post, p. 672. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, J., joined, post, p. 673.
Richard A. Sheehy argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Kenneth R. Breitbeil and Lauren L. Beck.
Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Bender, Michael E. Robinson, and Timothy R. Lord.
*656 Justice Ginsburg, delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the period allowed for service of process in a civil action commenced by a seaman injured aboard a vessel owned by the United States. Recovery in such cases is governed by the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 741 et seq. , which broadly waives the Government's sovereign immunity. See § 742 (money judgments); § 743 (costs and interest). Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows 120 days to effect service of the summons and timely filed complaint, a period extendable by the court. The Suits in Admiralty Act, however, instructs that service shall be made "forthwith." § 742. The question presented is whether the Act's "forthwith" instruction for service of process has been superseded by the Federal Rule.
In the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2071 et seq. , Congress ordered that, in matters of "practice and procedure," § 2072(a), the Federal Rules shall govern, and "[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect," § 2072(b). We hold that, in actions arising under federal law, commenced in compliance with the governing statute of limitations, the manner and timing of serving process are generally nonjurisdictional matters of "procedure" controlled by the Federal Rules.

I
On August 27, 1991, petitioner Lloyd Henderson, a merchant mariner, was injured while working aboard a vessel owned and operated by the United States. On April 8, 1993, after exhausting administrative remedies, Henderson filed a seaman's personal injury action against the United States, pursuant to the Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 Stat. 525, as amended, 46 U. S. C. App. § 741 et seq.[1] Under that Act, *657 suits of the kind Henderson commenced "may be brought . . . within two years after the cause of action arises." § 745. Henderson brought his action well within that time period. He commenced suit, as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 instructs, simply "by filing a complaint with the court."[2]
Having timely filed his complaint, Henderson attempted to follow the Federal Rules on service. It is undisputed that the following Rules, and nothing in the Suits in Admiralty Act, furnished the immediately relevant instructions. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(a) (1988) provided: "Upon the filing of the complaint the clerk shall forthwith issue a summons and deliver the summons to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney, who shall be responsible for prompt service of the summons and a copy of the complaint." Rule 4(b) provided: "The summons shall be signed by the clerk, [and] be under the seal of the court." Rule 4(d) stated: "The summons and complaint shall be served together."[3]
A series of slips occurred in obtaining the summons required by Rule 4. Henderson's counsel requested the appropriate summons forms and file-stamped copies of the complaint on April 8, 1993, the day he filed Henderson's *658 complaint. But the court clerk did not respond immediately. Counsel eventually obtained the forms on April 21, 1993, and completed and returned them to the clerk. On May 4, counsel received the summons mailed to him from the clerk's office, and on May 19, counsel sent the summons and complaint, by certified mail, to the Attorney General,[4] who received them on May 25.
Service on the local United States Attorney took longer. On May 25, Henderson's counsel forwarded the summons and complaint, as received from the clerk, to a "constable" with a request to effect service. On June 1, the constable's office returned the documents, informing Henderson's counsel that the summons was not in proper form, because it lacked the court's seal. Counsel thereupon wrote to the court clerk requesting new summons forms with the appropriate court seal. Counsel repeated this request on August 19; ultimately, on August 25, Henderson's counsel received the properly sealed summons.
Once again, Henderson's counsel requested the constable's service and, on August 30, moved for an extension of time to serve the United States Attorney.[5] The court granted the motion, extending the time for service until September 15. The United States Attorney received personal service of the summons and complaint, in proper form, on September 3, 1993.
*659 Thus, the Attorney General received the complaint 47 days after Henderson filed suit, and the United States Attorney was personally served 148 days after Henderson commenced the action by filing his complaint with the court. On November 17, 1993, the United States moved to dismiss the action. The grounds for, and disposition of, that motion led to Henderson's petition for certiorari.
The United States has never maintained that it lacked notice of Henderson's complaint within the 2-year limitation period prescribed for Suits in Admiralty Act claims. See 46 U. S. C. App. § 745; Tr. of Oral Arg. 38-39 (counsel for United States acknowledged that service on Attorney General gave Government actual notice three months before 2-year limitation period ended).[6] Nor has the Government asserted any prejudice to the presentation of its defense stemming from the delayed service of the summons and complaint. And the manner and timing of service, it appears beyond debate, satisfied the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 (titled "Summons" and detailing prescriptions on service of process).
In support of its motion to dismiss, the United States relied exclusively on § 2 of the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 742, which provides in part:
"The libelant [plaintiff] shall forthwith serve a copy of his libel [complaint] on the United States attorney for [the] district [where suit is brought] and mail a copy thereof by registered mail to the Attorney General of the United States."
This provision has remained unchanged since its enactment in 1920, 18 years before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective, and 46 years before admiralty cases were brought within the realm of the Civil Rules. The Government argued that Henderson's failure to serve process *660 "forthwith," as required by § 742, deprived the District Court of subject-matter jurisdiction because § 742 describes the conditions of the United States' waiver of sovereign immunity.
The District Court initially denied the Government's motion, but reconsidered the matter based on an intervening Fifth Circuit decision, United States v. Holmberg, 19 F. 3d 1062, cert. denied, 513 U. S. 986 (1994). The court in Holmberg, agreeing with the United States, held that the § 742 service "forthwith" requirement "is a condition of the Government's waiver of sovereign immunity and, thus, a jurisdictional prerequisite." 19 F. 3d, at 1064. In so ruling, the Holmberg court rejected the argument that service of process under the Suits in Admiralty Act, as in the generality of cases arising and timely filed under federal law, is a matter of procedure, now governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Bound by Holmberg, the District Court dismissed Henderson's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals, adhering to Holmberg, affirmed. 51 F. 3d 574 (CA5 1995).[7] We granted certiorari to resolve disagreement among lower courts on the question whether Federal Rule 4, which authorizes an extendable 120-day period for service of process, supersedes the Suits in Admiralty Act provision that service on the United States be made "forthwith."[8]

*661 II
The United States first suggests that Rule 4's extendable 120-day time prescription, and the Suits in Admiralty Act's service "forthwith" instruction, can and should be read harmoniously. The Rule 4 time limit for service, Rule 4(j) at the time Henderson's action commenced,[9] provided:
"(j) Summons: Time Limit for Service. If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf such service was required cannot show good cause why such service was not made within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant . . . ." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 4(j) (1988).
Section 2 of the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 742, prescribes service "forthwith," see supra, at 659, a word not precisely defined in the Act or in case law, but indicative of a time far shorter than 120 days. The apparent conflict dissolves, the Government urges, if one reads Rule 4 as establishing not "an affirmative right to serve [a] complaint" within 120 days, but only an outer boundary for timely service. See Brief for United States 14, 18, 26; Tr. of Oral Arg. 28, 30.
We reject the Government's view of the time the Federal Rules authorize for service. Reading Rule 4 in its historical context, we conclude that the 120-day provision operates not as an outer limit subject to reduction, but as an irreducible allowance. Prior to 1983, Rule 4 contained no time limit for service. Until the changes installed that year, *662 United States marshals attended to service. The relevant Rule 4 provisions read:
"(a) Summons: issuance. Upon the filing of the complaint the clerk shall forthwith issue a summons and deliver it for service to the marshal or to any other person authorized by Rule 4(c) to serve it. . . .
. . . . .
"(c) By whom served. Service of process shall be made by a United States marshal, by his deputy, or by some person specially appointed by the court for that purpose . . . ." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 4(a), (c) (1980).
Marshals were expected to effect service expeditiously, and Rule 41(b), providing for dismissal "[f]or failure of the plaintiff to prosecute," could be invoked as a check against unreasonable delay. See 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2370, pp. 374-376 (2d ed. 1995); 2 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 4.18, p. 436 (2d ed. 1995).
Rule 4 changes made operative in 1983 completed a shift in responsibility for service from the United States marshals to the plaintiff. See Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N. C. L. Rev. 795, 845 (1991). With marshals no longer available as routine process servers, the Judicial Conference considered a time control necessary; the Conference proposed, and this Court approved, 120 days from the filing of the complaint as the appropriate limit. Congress relaxed the rule change by authorizing an extension of the 120-day period if the party responsible for service showed "good cause." See supra, at 661; 128 Cong. Rec. 30931-30932 (1982), reprinted in 28 U. S. C. App., p. 647.
Most recently, in 1993 amendments to the Rules, courts have been accorded discretion to enlarge the 120-day period "even if there is no good cause shown." See Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 4, 28 U. S. C. App., *663 p. 654.[10] And tellingly, the text of Rule 4 sets out, as "[a] specific instance of good cause," ibid., allowance of "a reasonable time" to "cur[e] the failure to serve multiple officers . . . of the United States if the plaintiff has effected service on either the United States attorney or the Attorney General" within the prescribed 120 days. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 4(i)(3).
The Federal Rules thus convey a clear message: Complaints are not to be dismissed if served within 120 days, or within such additional time as the court may allow. Furthermore, the United States acknowledges that, § 2 of the Suits in Admiralty Act aside, Rule 4's extendable 120-day time prescription applies to the full range of civil litigation, including cases brought against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2675, and the Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (current version 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346, 1491 and other scattered sections of 28 U. S. C.). See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. We are therefore satisfied that Rule 4's regime conflicts irreconcilably with Suits in Admiralty Act § 2's service "forthwith" instruction, and we turn to the dispositive question: Does the Rule supersede the inconsistent statutory direction?

III
The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2071 et seq., authorizes the Supreme Court "to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure . . . for cases in the United States district courts . . . and courts of appeals," § 2072(a), and directs:

*664 "Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect." § 2072(b).
Correspondingly, and in confirmation of the understanding and practice under the former Federal Equity Rules, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 82 provides: "[The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts or the venue of actions therein." See 1937 Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 82, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 821 (Rule 82 confirms that the Rules' broad allowance of claim joinder "does not extend federal jurisdiction."); see also 12 Wright & Miller, supra, § 3141, at 210-214.
According to the United States, Rule 4 cannot supersede § 2 of the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 742, for the latter is "jurisdictional" and affects "substantive rights" by setting the terms on which the United States waives its sovereign immunity. Henderson, in contrast, characterizes the Suits in Admiralty Act's service "forthwith" instruction as a nonjurisdictional processing rule. Service "forthwith," he urges, forms no part of the immunity waiver or § 745's statute of limitations, but is simply a direction for the conduct of litigation once the case is timely launched in court a characteristically "how to" direction in conflict with, and therefore superseded by, Rule 4.
Before examining the text of § 742 to determine the character of the service "forthwith" provision, we note that the conflict with Rule 4 is of relatively recent vintage. The Suits in Admiralty Act, which allows in personam suits against the United States for maritime torts, was enacted in 1920, 18 years before the advent of the Federal Rules. Furthermore, admiralty cases were processed, from 1845 until 1966, under discrete Admiralty Rules. Even after 1966, the year admiralty cases were brought under the governance of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4 and *665 the Suits in Admiralty Act service "forthwith" provision could coexist. Rule 4, as just recounted, originally contained no time prescription, only the direction that, "[u]pon the filing of the complaint the clerk shall forthwith issue a summons and deliver it for service," generally to a United States marshal. See supra, at 662. It was only in 1983, when plaintiffs were made responsible for service without the aid of the marshal, that the 120-day provision came into force, a provision that rendered Rule 4's time frame irreconcilable with § 742's service "forthwith" instruction.
Section 2 of the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 742, captioned "Libel in personam," contains a broad waiver of sovereign immunity in its first sentence:
"In cases where if [a vessel owned or operated by the United States] were privately owned or operated . . . a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained, any appropriate nonjury proceeding in personam may be brought against the United States . . . ."
Section 3 of the Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 743, although captioned "Procedure in cases of libel in personam," completes the immunity waiver by providing for costs and interest on money judgments against the United States.[11] See United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U. S. 202, 203-204, n. 3 (1979); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(d)(1) (absent an authorizing statute, United States is not liable for costs); Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U. S. 310, 314 (1986) (absent an authorizing statute, United States is not liable for interest).
The United States asserts that not just the first sentence of § 742, but that section in its entirety is "jurisdictional," spelling out the terms and conditions of the Government's *666 waiver of sovereign immunity, in contrast to the next section of the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 743, which governs "procedure," specifying in its first sentence: "Such suits shall proceed and shall be heard and determined according to the principles of law and to the rules of practice obtaining in like cases between private parties." See Brief for United States 26-27; see also Holmberg, 19 F. 3d, at 1064; Libby v. United States, 840 F. 2d 818, 820 (CA11 1988) ("The fact that the waiver of sovereign immunity is declared in section 742, while the procedures governing admiralty suits against the United States are specified in section 743, indicates that the requirements contained in section 742 are more than procedural."). The dissent adopts this argument hook, line, and sinker. See post, at 674-675 (finding key to text and structure of the Suits in Admiralty Act in Congress' placement of service requirement in § 2 (46 U. S. C. App. § 742) rather than § 3 (46 U. S. C. App. § 743)). But just as § 743 is not "purely procedural," for it waives the Sovereign's immunity as to costs and interest, so § 742 is not pervasively "jurisdictional."
The sentence immediately following § 742's broad waiver, and immediately preceding the sentence on service, reads:
"Such suits shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the district in which the parties so suing, or any of them, reside or have their principal place of business in the United States, or in which the vessel . . . charged with liability is found."
This notably generous-to-plaintiffs provision will be recognized instantly as one describing venue choices, not subject-matter jurisdiction. Cf. 28 U. S. C. § 1391 ("Venue generally").
Section 742's final sentence provides:
"Upon application of either party the cause may, in the discretion of the court, be transferred to any other district court of the United States." *667 Cf. 28 U. S. C. § 1404 (change of venue to more convenient forum); § 1406 (authorizing transfer, rather than dismissal, when venue is improperly laid). Congress simultaneously added to the Suits in Admiralty Act, the Public Vessels Act, and the Federal Tort Claims Act the transfer provision just set out so that "jurisdictional" dismissals could be avoided when plaintiffs commenced suit under the wrong statute. See S. Rep. No. 1894, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 2-5 (1960); cf. 28 U. S. C. § 1631 (authorizing transfer, inter alia, when review of agency action is sought in the wrong federal court). In short, far from reining in "jurisdiction," § 742's venue and transfer provisions afford plaintiffs multiple forum choices and spare plaintiffs from dismissal for suing in the wrong place or under the wrong Act.[12]
Section 742's critical sentence on service reads:
"The libelant [plaintiff] shall forthwith serve a copy of his libel [complaint] on the United States attorney for such district and mail a copy thereof by registered mail to the Attorney General . . . ."
Rule 4, as observed at oral argument, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-28, provides for dispatch of the summons and complaint to the Attorney General "by registered or certified mail." See supra, at 658, and n. 4. The Government's sovereignimmunity waiver, counsel for the United States agreed, did not depend on registered mail service, the sole form of mailing § 742 authorizes; "in this day and age," counsel said, "certified mail would be acceptable." Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29. But see post, at 678, n. 4 ("jurisdiction in [a Suits in Admiralty Act] suit may turn upon the plaintiff's use of registered mail"). It thus appears that several of § 742's provisions are not sensibly typed "substantive" or "jurisdictional." Instead, they have a distinctly facilitative, "procedural" cast. *668 They deal with case processing, not substantive rights or consent to suit.[13]
If the service "forthwith" prescription is not made "substantive" or "jurisdictional" by its inclusionalong with broad venue choicesin § 742, is it a rule of procedure superseded by Rule 4? Before we address that dispositive question, we note a preliminary issue. Rule 4(j), which contained the 120-day prescription at the time Henderson filed suit, was not simply prescribed by this Court pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act. See 28 U. S. C. § 2074 (rules transmitted by Court to Congress "not later than May 1" become effective "no earlier than December 1" of the same year unless Congress otherwise provides). Instead, the Rule was enacted into law by Congress as part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, § 2, 96 Stat. 2527. See supra, at 662. As the United States acknowledges, however, a Rule made law by Congress supersedes conflicting laws no less than a Rule this Court prescribes. See Brief for United States 16, n. 14 ("We agree with petitioner . . . that Section 2072(b) provides the best evidence of *669 congressional intent regarding the proper construction of Rule 4(j) and its interaction with other laws.").
Returning to the dispositive question, we need not linger over the answer. What we have so far said, and the further elaboration below, lead securely to this response: Rule 4 governs summons and service in this case in whole and not in part.
A plaintiff like Henderson, on commencement of an action under the Suits in Admiralty Act, must immediately resort to Rule 4 for instructions on service of process. See supra,  at 657, and nn. 3, 4. In that Rule, one finds instructions governing, inter alia, form and issuance of the summons, service of the summons together with the complaint, who may serve process, and proof of service.[14] The Rule also describes how service shall or may be effected on various categories of defendants,[15] including, in detail, "the United States, and Its Agencies, Corporations, or Officers."[16] All these prescriptions, it is uncontested, apply in Suits in Admiralty Act cases, just as they apply in other federal cases. We see no reason why the prescription governing time for service[17] is not, as *670 is the whole of Rule 4, a nonjurisdictional rule governing "practice and procedure" in federal cases, see 28 U. S. C. § 2072(a), consistent with the Rules Enabling Act and Federal Rule 82, and rendering provisions like the Suits in Admiralty Act's service "forthwith" requirement "of no further force or effect," § 2072(b). See Jones & Laughlin Steel, Inc.  v. Mon River Towing, Inc., 772 F. 2d 62, 66 (CA3 1985) (just as Rule 4 "now governs the method of service of process in admiralty actions, as well as service of process on the United States in all civil cases to which it is a party," so the "congressional enactment of a uniform 120-day period for accomplishing service of process" supersedes inconsistent prior law, in particular, "the Suits in Admiralty Act's requirement of forthwith service"); Kenyon v. United States, 676 F. 2d 1229, 1232 (CA9 1981) (Boochever, J., concurring) ("I can see no logical reason why there should be a different method of service in this one instance [Suits in Admiralty Act cases] in which the United States is a defendant.").[18]
*671 Service of process, we have come to understand, is properly regarded as a matter discrete from a court's jurisdiction to adjudicate a controversy of a particular kind,[19] or against a particular individual or entity.[20] Its essential purpose is auxiliary, a purpose distinct from the substantive matters aired in the precedent on which the dissent, wrenching cases from context, extensively relieswho may sue,[21] on what claims,[22] for what relief,[23] within what limitations period.[24]*672 Instead, the core function of service is to supply notice of the pendency of a legal action, in a manner and at a time that affords the defendant a fair opportunity to answer the complaint and present defenses and objections.[25] Seeing service in this light, and in view of the uniform system Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, we are satisfied that the service "forthwith" provision of Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 742, has been displaced by Rule 4, and therefore has no current force or effect.

* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the dismissal of Henderson's complaint is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Kennedy joins, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court. I write separately to make clear that it is not my view, and I do not understand the Court to hold, that no procedural provision can be jurisdictional. It assuredly is within the power of Congress to condition its waiver of sovereign immunity upon strict compliance with procedural provisions attached to the waiver, with the result that failure to comply will deprive a court of *673 jurisdiction. For the reasons stated by the Court, I do not think that the legislative scheme here makes the "forthwith" service requirement such a condition.
Justice Thomas, with whom The Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor join, dissenting.
The Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA or Act) entitles the United States to be served with process "forthwith" in all admiralty proceedings brought under the Act. As a statutory condition on the Government's waiver of its immunity, this time restriction on service demands strict compliance and delimits the district court's jurisdiction to entertain suits in admiralty against the United States. The majority's conclusion that this requirement is supplanted by former Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j) (now Rule 4(m)) rests on a misreading of the SAA and is irreconcilable with our sovereign immunity jurisprudence. Because I believe that Congress intended to restrict admiralty suits against the United States to those cases in which the United States receives service of process forthwith, I respectfully dissent.
As a sovereign, the United States "is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued." United States v. Sherwood,  312 U. S. 584, 586 (1941). "A necessary corollary of this rule is that when Congress attaches conditions to legislation waiving the sovereign immunity of the United States, those conditions must be strictly observed, and exceptions thereto are not to be lightly implied." Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S. 273, 287 (1983). See also Lehman v.Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156, 160 161 (1981) ("Like a waiver of [sovereign] immunity itself, which must be `unequivocally expressed,' `this Court has long decided that limitations and conditions upon which the Government consents to be sued must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied' " (citations omitted)). The fact that the condition involves a matter of procedure does not affect the analysis, for "in many cases *674 this Court has read procedural rules embodied in statutes waiving immunity strictly, with an eye to effectuating a restrictive legislative purpose when Congress relinquishes sovereign immunity." Honda v. Clark, 386 U. S. 484, 501 (1967).
As always, the starting point in interpreting the extent of a waiver of sovereign immunity is the text of the statute. Section 2 of the Act contains the actual waiver. It provides that "[i]n cases where if [a] vessel [of the United States] were privately owned or operated, or if . . . cargo [of the United States] were privately owned or possessed, or if a private person or property were involved, a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained, any appropriate nonjury proceeding in person am may be brought against the United States." 46 U. S. C. App. § 742. Section 2 also contains the service provision at issue in this case, which states that a plaintiff suing the United States in admiralty "shall forthwith serve a copy of his libel on the United States attorney for such district and mail a copy thereof by registered mail to the Attorney General of the United States, and shall file a sworn return of such service and mailing. Such service and mailing shall constitute valid service on the United States." Ibid. Section 3 of the Act, aptly titled "Procedure in cases of libel in personam," provides that suits under the SAA "shall proceed and shall be heard and determined according to the principles of law and to the rules of practice obtaining in like cases between private parties." § 743.
The text and structure of the SAA lead me to conclude that Congress intended to allow admiralty suits to proceed against the United States only in cases in which process is served "forthwith." The key to understanding the scheme enacted by Congress lies not so much in Congress' decision to place this service requirement in § 2 as in its decision not  to address service of process in § 3; for this reason, the majority's sentence-by-sentence analysis of § 2, see ante, at 665 668, is largely beside the point. Section 3 provides that the *675 ordinary rules of procedure governing private parties in admiralty also govern suits under the SAA. But Congress excepted from this provision the service-of-process requirement and placed it in a separate section altogether. This suggests not only that Congress attached greater significance to the requirement that process be served forthwith than to other procedural rules, but, more importantly, that Congress expected process to be served forthwith in SAA cases regardless of the "principles of law and . . . rules of practice obtaining in like cases between private parties." 46 U. S. C. App. § 743.
Even were I not convinced that the SAA's requirement of prompt service is a condition on the Government's waiver of sovereign immunity, I still could not agree with the majority that it clearly is not a condition on the waiver. At best, the SAA is ambiguous on this point, and when interpreting the breadth of a waiver of sovereign immunity, ambiguity must always be resolved in favor of the Government. See United States v. Williams, 514 U. S. 527, 531 (1995). We have consistently reaffirmed "the traditional principle that the Government's consent to be sued must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign, and not enlarge[d] . . . beyond what the language requires." United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 34 (1992) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U. S. 310, 318 (1986). It is at least plausible to interpret the SAA's service provision as a condition on the waiver, and that is enough to justify construing the statute in the Government's favor. Cf. Nordic Village, supra, at 37.
Because the SAA's service requirement is best read as a condition on the Government's waiver of sovereign immunity, it necessarily follows that this requirement cannot be superseded by a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. Sovereign immunity is by nature jurisdictional, FDIC v. Meyer,  510 U. S. 471, 475 (1994), and the terms of the United States' "`consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction *676 to entertain the suit.' " Ibid. (quoting Sherwood, 312 U. S., at 586). Though the Rules Enabling Act provides that all previously enacted laws that are "in conflict with" the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall be of no further force or effect," 28 U. S. C. § 2072(b), it also expressly provides that the Federal Rules "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right," ibid. Allowing SAA claims in which process is not served forthwith to proceed against the United States infringes upon the Government's immunity and thereby alters a substantive right in direct contravention of the Rules Enabling Act. Moreover, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 82 makes clear that the Rules of Procedure "shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts." Given the jurisdictional nature of a waiver of sovereign immunity, allowing this suit to proceed also violates Rule 82.
I do not mean to imply that ordinary procedural rules automatically become jurisdictional prerequisites in civil cases simply because the United States is a defendant; they do not. But Congress certainly has the power to impose a procedural requirement as a condition on a waiver of sovereign immunity and to require strict compliance with that condition as a prerequisite to invoking or maintaining the court's jurisdiction. The text and structure of the SAA demonstrate that Congress exercised this power when it enacted the SAA, and "nothing in the . . . rules of civil practice so far as they may be applicable in suits brought in district courts [against the Government] authorizes the maintenance of any suit against the United States to which it has not otherwise consented." Sherwood, supra, at 589.[1]
*677 The majority rejects the proposition, accepted by four of the five Courts of Appeals that have addressed this issue, that a service requirement can serve as a condition on a waiver of sovereign immunity.[2] This cannot be, the majority concludes, because service is "not sensibly typed `substantive' or `jurisdictional,' " and instead has a "`procedural' cast" and "deal[s] with case processing." Ante, at 667-668. But the proper inquiry is not whether the condition is in nature "procedural" or "substantive," for we have long maintained that even procedural rules can condition a waiver of sovereign immunity. See Honda, 386 U. S., at 501. The fact that Congress has determined to limit the scope of its consent to suit is sufficient to restrict federal-court jurisdiction over the United States, regardless of the nature of the condition Congress has attached. For instance, though no one would claim that failure to satisfy a statute of limitations in a case between private parties would serve as a jurisdictional bar to the plaintiff's suit, we have long held that a statute of limitations attached to a waiver of sovereign immunity functions as a condition on the waiver and defines the limits of the district court's jurisdiction to hear a claim against the United States. See Williams, 514 U. S., at 534, n. 7; Block, 461 U. S., at 287; United States v. Kubrick, 444 7; 111, U. S. 117-118 (1979); Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270, 271, 273 (1957). See generally 14 C. Wright, *678 A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3654, pp. 194-199 (1985).[3] The same is true of the SAA's service requirement. While service of process in a case between private parties may generally be understood to be "a matter discrete from a court's jurisdiction to adjudicate a controversy of a particular kind," ante, at 671, a waiver of sovereign immunity conditioned upon a particular method of service would transform what is ordinarily a nonjurisdictional rule into a jurisdictional one.[4]
Once the majority concludes that Congress attached no particular significance to the SAA's requirement that process be served forthwith, the conclusion that Rule 4(j), by operation of the Rules Enabling Act, displaces § 2's service requirement would appear to flow naturally. But that is not the case. As the Government concedes, the Rules Enabling *679 Act is "technically inapplicable" in this case, Brief for United States 16, n. 14, because Rule 4(j) was not promulgated by this Court but rather was enacted by Congress, see Pub. L. 97-462, 96 Stat. 2528, and the Rules Enabling Act by its terms nullifies only statutory rules of procedure that conflict with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.
The majority acknowledges the inapplicability of the Rules Enabling Act, ante, at 668, but appears to apply the Act nonetheless, ante, at 669-670 (citing 28 U. S. C. § 2072(b)). The majority is not entirely clear on this point, however, and it appears that the majority may instead find that Rule 4(j) effected an implied repeal of § 2's service requirement independent of the Rules Enabling Act. See ante, at 668 ("[A] Rule made law by Congress supersedes conflicting laws no less than a Rule this Court prescribes"). The majority may mean by this statement only that the Rules Enabling Act pertains equally to Rules of Procedure promulgated by this Court and by Congress, but I am reluctant to assume, absent clearer indication, the Court's reliance on a method of statutory construction that allows us to rewrite a statute when the text does not address the specific situation before us or when it does not generate an outcome that we desire. Regardless of the rubric under which this case is actually decided, the Court, in my opinion, reaches the wrong conclusion. In contrast to the rest of the procedures that apply in SAA cases, the Act requires a specific method of service even though the procedures that govern similar cases may differ. This, in combination with the critical fact that this case involves a waiver of sovereign immunity, leads me to conclude that Rule 4(j) does not displace the service requirement of § 2 either under the Rules Enabling Act or as an implied repeal.
The only question remaining is whether Henderson served his complaint on the United States "forthwith." There is no reasonable argument that he did. Henderson served his complaint on the United States Attorney 148 days after he *680 filed it in the District Court. Although we have never undertaken to define "forthwith" as it is used in the SAA, it is clear that the term "connotes action which is immediate, without delay, prompt, and with reasonable dispatch." Amella v. United States, 732 F. 2d 711, 713 (CA9 1984) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 588 (5th ed. 1979)). See also Dickerman v. Northern Trust Co., 176 U. S. 181, 192-193 (1900). Whatever problems Henderson may have had in serving his complaint upon the United States, the 148-day delay can hardly be described as process served forthwith under even the most generous definition of the term. I respectfully dissent.
NOTES
[1]  Henderson's complaint also invoked the Public Vessels Act, 43 Stat. 1112, as amended, 46 U. S. C. App. § 781 et seq. The Government maintains, however, that Henderson's suit falls under the exclusive governance of the Suits in Admiralty Act, because his claim arose from employment aboard a Maritime Administration vessel. See Brief for United States 8, n. 9 (citing 57 Stat. 45, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 1291(a) (1988 ed.)). Henderson apparently does not contest this assertion. In any case, claims under both Acts proceed the same way. See 46 U. S. C. App. § 782 (suits under the Public Vessels Act "shall be subject to and proceed in accordance with the provisions" of the Suits in Admiralty Act).
[2]  In a suit on a right created by federal law, filing a complaint suffices to satisfy the statute of limitations. See West v. Conrail, 481 U. S. 35, 39 (1987). In a federal-court suit on a state-created right, however, a plaintiff must serve process before the statute of limitations has run, if state law so requires for a similar state-court suit. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U. S. 740, 752-753 (1980) (reaffirming Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U. S. 530 (1949)). But cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U. S. 460 (1965) (method of service, as distinguished from time period for commencement of civil action, is governed by Federal Rules in all actions, including suits based on state-created rights).
[3]  The substance of these provisions is retained in current Rules 4(a), (b), and (c)(1).
[4]  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(4), effective at that time, instructed that "a copy of the summons and of the complaint [be sent] by registered or certified mail to the Attorney General of the United States at Washington, District of Columbia." The same instruction currently appears in Rule 4(i)(1)(B).
[5]  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j), then in force, provided for service of the summons and complaint within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, a time limit subject to extension for good cause.The substance of this provision is retained in current Rule 4(m), which permits a district court to enlarge the time for service "even if there is no good cause shown." Advisory Committee's Notes on 1993 Amendments to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 4, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 654.
[6]  Inany event, the filing of the complaint within the limitation period rendered the action timely. See supra, at 657, n. 2.
[7]  The Holmberg court "agree[d] that there has been no uniform definition of forthwith," as that term is used in § 742, 19 F. 3d, at 1065, and the Court of Appeals in the instant case took no position on whether service on the Attorney General 47 days after commencement of the action could count as "forthwith." 51 F. 3d, at 577. The court held, however, that the "forthwith" requirement applies to service on both officersthe United States Attorney and the Attorney Generaland stated that "completing service in 148 days [through service on the United States Attorney] is not forthwith." Id., at 576.
[8]  Compare, e. g., Libby v. United States, 840 F.2d 818, 819-821 (CA11 1988); Kenyon v. United States, 676 F. 2d 1229, 1231 (CA9 1981); Battaglia  v. United States, 303 F. 2d 683, 685-686 (CA2), cert. dism'd, 371 U. S. 907 (1962), with Jones & Laughlin Steel, Inc. v. Mon River Towing, Inc., 772 F. 2d 62, 66 (CA3 1985). See also Kenyon, 676 F. 2d, at 1231-1232 (Boochever, J., concurring); Battaglia, 303 F. 2d, at 686-687 (Friendly, J., concurring).
[9]  Currently, Rule 4(m) states the time limit for service. See supra, at 658, n. 5.
[10]  Rule 4(m), captioned "Time Limit for Service," currently provides:

"If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, the court, upon motion or on its own initiative after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant or direct that service be effected within a specified time; provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court shall extend the time for service for an appropriate period. . . ."(Emphasis added.)
[11]  Specifically, the second sentence of § 743 reads: "A decree against the United States . . . may include costs of suit, and when the decree is for a money judgment, interest at the rate of 4 per centum per annum until satisfied, or at any higher rate which shall be stipulated in any contract upon which such decree shall be based."
[12]  While striving for fidelity to what Congress wrote, see post, at 674, 679, the dissent inexplicably writes off many of § 742's words as "largely beside the point," post, at 674.
[13]  Even before admiralty proceedings were placed under the governance of the Federal Rules, Judge Henry Friendly trenchantly observed:

"I cannot believe Congress meant [to render `jurisdictional' every failure by a libelant to comply with a procedural step outlined in the Suits in Admiralty Act]; I should have supposed that, once Congress gave the basic consent to sue the United States, as it did in the first sentence of [§ 742], it was content to have the courts decide the effect of various procedural lapses in the same manner as `if such vessel were privately owned or operated.'" Battaglia v. United States, 303 F. 2d, at 686 (concurring opinion).
Circuit precedent was otherwise, however, and therefore Judge Friendly reluctantly concurred in the "Draconian conclusion" that a 4month delay in mailing the pleadings to the Attorney General called for dismissal of the case, despite "forthwith" service on the United States Attorney. Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 4(i)(3) ("court shall allow a reasonable time" to "cur[e] the failure to serve multiple officers . . . of the United States if the plaintiff has effected service on either the United States attorney or the Attorney General").
[14]  Currently, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 4(a), (b), (c), and (l).
[15]  Currently, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 4(e)(j).
[16]  Currently, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 4(i); formerly, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 4(d)(4). See supra, at 658, n. 4; Kenyon, 676 F. 2d, at 1232 (Boochever, J., concurring) (noting that § 2 of the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 742, specifies mailing "by registered mail to the Attorney General of the United States," and commenting that the Federal Rule, then Rule 4(d)(4), supersedes, allowing "registered or certified mail"). The current Rule 4(i)further facilitates service when the United States is a party by permitting the United States Attorney to designate clerical employees to receive process and allowing service on the United States Attorney by mail. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 4(i)(A).
[17]  The Government acknowledges the aim of the rulemakers, from the start, to provide "`a uniform and comprehensive method of service for all actions against the United States,' " Brief for United States 19-20, n. 18 (quoting Advisory Committee's Notes on 1937 Adoption of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 4, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 641), but tenders a distinction between "method" and "timing" of service, Brief for United States 19-20, n. 18. Current Rule 4(i)(3) shows why the suggested separation of "time" from "method" or "manner" in this context is not credible. That provision, addressing "time" in relation to "manner," instructs:

"The court shall allow a reasonable time for service of process . . . for the purpose of curing the failure to serve multiple officers . . . of the United States if the plaintiff has effected service on either the United States attorney or the Attorney General of the United States."
[18]  Judge Boochever, like Judge Friendly, see supra, at 668, n. 13, reluctantly concurred in Circuit precedent, which ranked service "forthwith" "a condition precedent to the congressional waiver of the Government's sovereign immunity," Kenyon, 676 F. 2d, at 1231. But he stated cogently the view he would take "if freed from the bounds of stare decisis ":  "Section 742 does not constitute an integral part of the substantive waiver of sovereign immunity, but is a mere procedural provision necessary at the time of the statute's enactment, to effectuate that waiver. As such it was superseded by the Federal Rules." Id., at 1232 (concurring opinion).

Curiously, although the Ninth Circuit, in Kenyon and other cases, has typed the Suits in Admiralty Act service "forthwith" provision "jurisdictional," that Court of Appeals has pointed to a remedy for litigants in Henderson's situation: Amend the complaint, even after the 2-year statute of limitations (46 U. S. C. App. § 745) has run, serve the United States Attorney and the Attorney General "forthwith," and by those steps, gain the benefit of the original complaint filing date through the application of the "relation back" provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). See Ashland v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 711 F. 2d 1431, 1435-1437 (CA9 1983) (allowing such relation back when plaintiff amended a complaint, brought four years earlier under the Federal Tort Claims Act, to assert instead a claim under the Suits in Admiralty Act); cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 38 (counsel for United States acknowledged that Henderson, who filed his complaint April 8, 1993, could have filed a fresh complaint anytime before August 27 of that year (the date the 2-year statute of limitations expired), and served it "forthwith," thereby avoiding the loss of his claim).
[19]  I. e., subject-matter jurisdiction. See 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3522, p. 78 (2d ed. 1984); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 11, p. 108 (1982) (defining "subject matter jurisdiction" as the "authority [of the court] to adjudicate the type of controversy involved in the action").
[20]  On relationships sufficient to support "jurisdiction over persons," see generally Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 27-32, 35-44, 47-52 (1971 and Supp. 1989). See also 4 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1064.
[21]  See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584 (1941) (Tucker Act, allowing contract claims against United States, does not authorize joinder of claims between private parties).
[22]  See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 39 (1992) (Bankruptcy Code § 106(c) does not waive the Government's sovereign immunity from bankruptcy trustee's monetary relief claims).
[23]  See Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U. S. 310, 323 (1986) (Government's waiver of immunity from suit for damages does not waive immunity with respect to interest).
[24]  See, e. g., United States v. Williams, 514 U. S. 527, 534, n. 7 (1995); Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S. 273, 287 (1983).But cf. Honda v. Clark, 386 U. S. 484 (1967) (Trading with Enemy Act § 34(f) provided a 60-day claim-filing limitation; Court applied traditional equitable tolling principles to preserve petitioners' cause of action where similar suit was filed within 60-day limitation).
[25]  See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314 (1950) (to qualify as adequate, notice generally must "apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections").See also Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis,79 Harv. L.Rev. 1121, 1134 (1966) (recognizing notice as a matter separate from bases of adjudicatory jurisdiction); 4 Wright & Miller, supra, § 1063, at 225 (same).
[1]  For instance, in United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584 (1941), we held that the possibility of joinder under the liberal joinder provisions of the Federal Rules does not authorize a district court to hear a claim brought against the Government for breach of contract by a party not specifically authorized to bring suit against the United States under the Tucker Act. Notwithstanding the possibility of joinder in a similar case between private parties, we explained that "[t]he matter [was] not one of procedure but of jurisdiction whose limits are marked by the Government's consent to be sued," and held that the Government's consent to suit "may be conditioned . . . on the restriction of the issues to be adjudicated in the suit, to those between the claimant and the Government." Id.,  at 591.
[2]  See United States v. Holmberg, 19 F. 3d 1062 (CA5), cert. denied, 513 U. S. 986 (1994); Libby v. United States, 840 F. 2d 818 (CA11 1988); Amella  v. United States, 732 F. 2d 711 (CA9 1984); Battaglia v. United States, 303 F. 2d 683 (CA2), cert. dism'd, 371 U. S. 907 (1962). Only one Circuit has gone the other way. See Jones & Laughlin Steel, Inc. v. Mon River Towing, Inc., 772 F. 2d 62 (CA3 1985).
[3]  Although we held in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95-96 (1990), that statutes of limitations in cases brought against the Government are presumptively subject to equitable tolling, we also reaffirmed in that case that a time restriction on suit against the United States "is a condition to the waiver of sovereign immunity and thus must be strictly construed." Id., at 94. Irwin did mark a departure from our earlier, and stricter, treatment of statutes of limitations in the sovereign immunity context, but our decision in United States v. Williams, 514 U. S. 527 (1995), makes clear that statutes of limitations in suits brought against the United States are no less jurisdictional prerequisites than they were before Irwin. Williams confirmed that a statute of limitations "narrow[s] the waiver of sovereign immunity," 514 U. S., at 534, n. 7,and cited for this proposition United States v. Dalm, 494 U. S. 596 (1990), which held that failure to file a claim against the Government for a federal tax refund within the statute of limitations operates as a jurisdictional bar to suit.
[4]  I recognize that, under my reading of the Act, jurisdiction in an SAA suit may turn upon the plaintiff s use of registered mail, which is also specified in the sentence of § 2 that requires process to be served forthwith. 46 U. S. C. App. § 742. Though this may seem like an odd requirement from our modern perspective, the most sensible textual reading of the Act is still that Congress sought to impose a specific method of service in SAA cases without regard to the rules governing service generally. Congress is free to amend the statute if it determines that the SAA has fallen out of date with modern mailing practices.


140 N.J. Super. 510 (1976)
357 A.2d 6
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v.
JOHN MITCH INMAN, JR., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.
Submitted March 23, 1976.
Decided April 7, 1976.
*512 Before Judges KOLOVSKY, BISCHOFF and BOTTER.
Mr. Stanley C. Van Ness, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Mr. James R. Kinarney, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Mr. William F. Hyland, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney for respondent (Mr. Michael R. Ascher, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by BISCHOFF, J.A.D.
Defendant appeals his conviction by a jury of the larceny of property valued at more than $200 but less than $500, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2A:119-2(a).
On April 13, 1973 David DeCicco, an employee of Triangle Plumbing, observed a colored male close the trunk of a 1964 Chevrolet, license #YCV 473, get in the car and drive away. DeCicco, who was about 25 feet away, observed boxes in the back seat of the car which he described as approximately three feet square, one inch thick and of the same type used by Triangle Plumbing to package copper tubing coils. Each of these boxes (when full of coils) weighs approximately 30 pounds. He could not see how many boxes were in the car but felt that there were more than two. The car had been parked in the driveway leading to the rear of the warehouse and was three or four feet from it. DeCicco was unable to identify defendant as the driver of the car but testified that defendant fit the general description of the man he saw driving away.
Thomas Crowell, another warehouseman of Triangle Plumbing, testified that on the same day he saw a car of the same make, model and license number as that described *513 by DeCicco going out the driveway with two boxes of copper coils in the back seat. He described the boxes in a manner similar to the description given by DeCicco. He could not identify defendant.
When interrogated by the police defendant explained his presence at the Triangle Plumbing warehouse by stating that his vehicle had sustained a flat tire and he had changed it at that location.
Following a voir dire Norman Starr, an employee of Community Plumbing Supply Company, was permitted to testify over objection that in the middle of April 1973 he walked into the garage of Community Plumbing and noticed defendant walking out with boxes of copper tubing. He approached defendant and saw a car parked adjacent to the garage with the trunk open. When Starr informed defendant that the establishment was not a self-service store, defendant returned the merchandise to the garage. The license number on the vehicle was observed by Starr and it was the same as that on the vehicle noticed by DeCicco and Crowell. He identified defendant in court as the man he saw at the Community Plumbing garage.
A shop supervisor of Triangle Plumbing testified that an inventory taken on April 13, 1973 disclosed that five coils of copper tubing were missing and the invoice value of the missing coils was $260.40 or $264.40.
Defendant argues on appeal that "the court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury that they could find the value of the property to be under $200 if they found that defendant in fact did steal the property." The judge instructed the jury that defendant was charged "with the crime commonly known as larceny of property of a value of more than $200 but less than $500 belonging to Triangle Plumbing on April 13, 1973." This was followed by a reading from the statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:119-2(a), and defining larceny. Later in the charge the judge said:
As you noted from my reading the statute, value must be alleged in the indictment to distinguish between the degree of crime proscribed *514 by our law. The distinction exists merely for the purpose of punishment, a high misdemeanor carrying a higher penalty than a misdemeanor. But the offenses are otherwise the same. Accordingly, proof of value must be introduced at the trial. If you determine that the State has established the guilt of the defendant of the crime charged to him beyond a reasonable doubt it is important that you determine the value of the articles taken and state that value in returning your verdict.
No objection was taken to the charge. After approximately one hour of deliberation the jury returned with the following question:
Does the value of the merchandise have to be stated with a verdict? Can we decide that he stole five rolls or do we assume that if he is guilty he stole all that the inventory shows is missing?
The judge answered the question by instructing the jury again on the necessity for the State to prove the crime of larceny beyond a reasonable doubt and that the jury must state in its verdict the value of the property which it found to have been stolen.
While defense counsel did not object to the court's supplemental charge, he did say:
I don't have an objection, your Honor, but I think in view of the question it may be appropriate to charge the jury as to less than $200 which I believe would be categorized as shoplifting. I understand that is not indictable. It would only be a disorderly persons offense. In view of the question that certainly is a lesser included offense than what the State has charged.
The judge refused to supplement the charge since there had been "no request to charge the larceny of property having a value of less than $200."
The jury returned a verdict of guilty, finding that defendant had stolen property "worth more than $200 but less than $500."
It is now well recognized that a defendant may be found guilty of a lesser offense necessarily included in the greater offense charged in the indictment, State v. Saulnier, *515 63 N.J. 199, 205 (1973), and this is so even if the lesser included offense is not indictable. Id. at 208. However, a charge on a lesser-included offense is only required where there is a request to so charge and where there is a rational basis in the evidence for a finding "that the defendant was not guilty of the higher offense charged but guilty of the lesser included offense." Id. at 206-207.
We are of the opinion that it was error under the facts of this case for the trial judge to fail to instruct as to the lesser-included offense of a disorderly person. N.J.S.A. 2A:170-30.1. Here, the question asked by the jury and the statement of defense counsel should have alerted the trial judge to this issue. The only evidence of the value of the coils of copper was that the invoice cost of five coils was $260.40. The sole evidence establishing that five coils were stolen was in the inventory discrepancy. The evidence of the number of coils in defendant's car was that there were two (total value of approximately $100) or more. The jury was left with the alternative of finding defendant guilty of larceny of goods worth over $200, or not guilty. The doubt in the jury's mind was evidenced by the verdict where, contrary to the instructions given to them, they did not find the specific value of property stolen but instead returned what was in effect a verdict of "guilty as charged." This was clearly erroneous and the verdict should not have been accepted in that form. State v. Romero, 95 N.J. Super. 482, 488 (App. Div. 1967); State v. Shelbrich, 33 N.J. Super. 7 (App. Div. 1954).
We are of the opinion that the failure of the trial judge to submit to the jury for their consideration the lesser-included offense was prejudicial error and requires that the judgment of conviction be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
One other issue requires comment. Defendant alleges that the judge erred in admitting into evidence, over objection, the testimony of Starr as it related to defendant's alleged prior criminal conduct at another company's warehouse in *516 walking out of the garage with merchandise for which he had not paid. Such testimony was offered by the State under Evid. R. 55 "to show the intent or motive of defendant at the time the incident in question did occur." The State argues on this appeal that the testimony of Starr was admissible "to establish defendant's method of operation in the instant theft," to establish his identity and to indicate his state of mind.
The judge, in instructing the jury on the limited use they could make of this testimony, restricted their consideration to "the issues of intent or plan, or absence of mistake, or accident on the part of defendant."
Realistically viewed, the only tenable basis for the admission of Starr's testimony concerning defendant's prior conduct would be to establish his identity. State v. Gibson, 92 N.J. Super. 397, 401 (App. Div. 1966); State v. Leonard, 126 N.J. Super. 308 (Law Div. 1974). It would, of necessity, be predicated on the theory that the prior activity of defendant was so nearly identical in method as to earmark the crime with which he was charged as defendant's handiwork. Admission of evidence of prior conduct on this theory requires more than testimony of repeated crimes of the same class, such as burglaries, thefts, or attempts at theft. The conduct in question or the criminal scheme or device used "must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature." McCormick on Evidence (2 ed. 1972), § 190 at 449.[1]
*517 The admissibility of such evidence is generally limited to those situations where "a crime has been committed by some novel or extraordinary means or in a peculiar or unusual manner," and there is proof of recent similar acts or crimes by the accused committed by the same means or in the same manner. 22A C.J.S., Criminal Law § 684 at 759 (1961); 1 Underhill's Criminal Evidence (6 ed. 1973), § 210 at 637; cf. State v. Harris, 105 N.J. Super. 319, 322 (App. Div. 1969); State v. Hector, 19 Ohio St.2d 167, 249 N.E.2d 912, 918 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
Since this case must be retried for the reason stated above, we express no opinion as to whether or not on this record the testimony of Starr was properly admitted. On the retrial the admissibility of such testimony, if offered, will depend upon the record then existing and a consideration of whether the proof of the prior conduct of defendant contains sufficient distinctive or unusual elements as to be probative on the issue of identity of defendant as being a participant in both incidents.
For the reason first above stated, the judgment of conviction is reversed and the matter is remanded for a retrial.
NOTES
[1]  The admissibility of evidence of the commission of prior similar criminal acts as relevant on the issue of identity has been most frequently raised in cases involving rape or sexual offenses. The courts generally require proof of sufficient facts to establish an unusual pattern or modus operandi as a condition precedent to admission. For examples see Nester v. State, 75 Nev. 41, 334 P.2d 524 (Sup. Ct. 1959); State v. Francis, 91 Ariz. 219, 371 P.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Mosley v. State, 211 Ga. 611, 87 S.E.2d 314 (Sup. Ct. 1955), and Harris v. State, 189 Tenn. 635, 227 S.W.2d 8 (Sup. Ct. 1950); cf. State v. Smith, 84 N.J. Super. 452 (App. Div.), certif. den. 43 N.J. 270 (1964).


917 F.2d 570
Moore (Mary M.)v.Comfed Savings Bank
NO. 89-8414
United States Court of Appeals,Eleventh Circuit.
OCT 04, 1990
S.D.Ga., 908
F.2d 834

1
DENIALS OF REHEARING EN BANC.


            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In the Matter of: Tax Sale 2018-Upset :
                                      :           No. 238 C.D. 2019
Appeal of:                            :
B. Monte Kemmler and Orpha G.         :           Argued: December 10, 2019
Kemmler                               :

BEFORE:       HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
              HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
              HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

OPINION BY
JUDGE McCULLOUGH                                                 FILED: February 28, 2020

              B. Monte Kemmler and Orpha G. Kemmler (collectively, Taxpayers)
appeal from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County (trial court),
dated February 4, 2019, that dismissed Taxpayers’ objections and exceptions, and
concluded that their due process rights were not violated with regard to the upset tax
sale of their property that occurred on September 10, 2018. Upon review, we affirm.

                                         Background
              Taxpayers were the owners of property located at 1002 Front Street,
Newton Hamilton, Mifflin County, Pennsylvania, and bearing the map number “11
,02-0062” (Property). (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 68a, Notes of Testimony (N.T.)
at 27.)1 Taxpayers failed to pay real estate taxes. (R.R. at 28a.) As a result, on May

       1
         Taxpayers have failed to comply with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure (Pa.
R.A.P.) 2173, which requires pages of the reproduced record to be numbered in Arabic figures,
followed by a small “a.” Thus, we treat the first page of the reproduced record as page “1a,” and
(Footnote continued on next page…)
2, 2017, a notice of return and claim was sent to Taxpayers regarding unpaid 2016
real estate taxes. Id. The notice included the following warning:

              IF YOU FAIL TO PAY THIS TAX CLAIM OR FAIL
              TO TAKE LEGAL ACTION TO CHALLENGE THIS
              TAX CLAIM, YOUR PROPERTY WILL BE SOLD
              WITHOUT YOUR CONSENT AS PAYMENT FOR
              THESE TAXES. YOUR PROPERTY MAY BE SOLD
              FOR A SMALL FRACTION OF ITS FAIR MARKET
              VALUE. IF YOU PAY THIS TAX CLAIM BEFORE
              JULY 1, 2018, YOUR PROPERTY WILL NOT BE
              SOLD. IF YOU PAY THIS CLAIM AFTER JULY 1,
              2018[,] BUT BEFORE THE ACTUAL SALE, YOUR
              PROPERTY WILL NOT BE SOLD BUT WILL BE
              LISTED ON ADVERTISEMENTS FOR SUCH SALE.
              IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, PLEASE CALL
              YOUR ATTORNEY, THE TAX CLAIM BUREAU
              [(BUREAU)] AT THE FOLLOWING TELEPHONE
              NUMBER (717) 248-6571, OR THE COUNTY
              LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICE.
Id. (Emphasis in original.) By notice dated June 4, 2018, Taxpayers were informed
that their property bearing map number “11 ,02-0062,” would be sold at a tax sale on
September 10, 2018 at 7:00 p.m. (R.R. at 29a.) The notice included the following
warning:

              WARNING ‘YOUR PROPERTY IS ABOUT TO BE
              SOLD   WITHOUT    YOUR   CONSENT  FOR
              DELINQUENT TAXES. YOUR PROPERTY MAY BE
              SOLD FOR A SMALL FRACTION OF ITS FAIR
              MARKET VALUE.      IF YOU HAVE ANY
              QUESTIONS AS TO WHAT YOU MUST DO IN

(continued…)

given our numerical re-designation, we number and cite to other pages in the reproduced record
accordingly.

                                              2
               ORDER TO SAVE YOUR PROPERTY, PLEASE
               CALL YOUR ATTORNEY, THE TAX CLAIM
               BUREAU AT THE FOLLOWING TELEPHONE
               NUMBER (717) 248-6571 OR THE COUNTY
               LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICE.’
Id. (Emphasis in original.) The notice further stated that

               the sale of this [P]roperty may, at the OPTION of the
               BUREAU, be stayed if the Owner thereof or any lien
               creditor of the Owner, on or before the date of sale,
               enters into an agreement with the BUREAU to pay
               taxes[,] claims[,] and costs in installments in the manner
               provided by [the Real Estate Tax Sale Law, Act of July 7,
               1947, P.L. 1368, as amended, 72 P.S. §§5860.101 -
               5860.803 (RETSL)], and the agreement to be entered
               into.
Id. (emphasis in original).          A second notice, dated July 5, 2018, was sent to
Taxpayers bearing the same warnings as the notice dated June 4, 2018. (R.R. at 21a.)
On August 13, 2018, the Property was posted for sale by the Sheriff. (R.R. at 22a.)
               On September 10, 2018, the Property was exposed and sold at the upset
tax sale.     (R.R. at 32a-39a.)       On September 27, 2018, the trial court issued a
Confirmation Nisi upon the Bureau’s consolidated return of the 2018 upset tax sale.
(R.R. at 3a.) On October 26, 2018, Taxpayers filed objections and exceptions to the
Confirmation Nisi. (R.R. at 4a.) Taxpayers argued that the Bureau’s sale of the
property was impermissible and unconstitutional. (R.R. at 5a.) Taxpayers argued
that the sale should not have been conducted under RETSL, but should have been
conducted under what is commonly known as the Municipal Claims and Tax Liens
Act.2, 3 In the alternative, Taxpayers argued that notice of sale was not properly given

      2
          Act of May 16, 1923, P.L. 207, as amended, 53 P.S. §§7101-7505.

      3
          Taxpayers have abandoned this argument in their brief to this Court.
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                  3
and did not advise them of their rights under section 603 of RETSL (Section 603), 72
P.S. §5860.603.4 Specifically, Taxpayers argued that under Section 603 they were

(continued…)

      4
          Section 603 provides in full:

                Any owner or lien creditor of the owner may, at the option of the
                bureau, prior to the actual sale, (1) cause the property to be
                removed from the sale by payment in full of taxes which have
                become absolute and of all charges and interest due on these taxes
                to the time of payment, or (2) enter into an agreement, in writing,
                with the bureau to stay the sale of the property upon the payment
                of twenty-five per centum (25%) of the amount due on all tax
                claims and tax judgments filed or entered against such property
                and the interest and costs on the taxes returned to date, as provided
                by this act, and agreeing therein to pay the balance of said claims
                and judgments and the interest and costs thereon in not more than
                three (3) instalments all within one (1) year of the date of said
                agreement, the agreement to specify the dates on or before which
                each instalment shall be paid, and the amount of each instalment.
                So long as said agreement is being fully complied with by the
                taxpayer, the sale of the property covered by the agreement shall
                be stayed. But in case of default in such agreement by the owner
                or lien creditor, the bureau, after written notice of such default
                given by United States mail, postage prepaid, to the owner or lien
                creditor at the address stated in the agreement, shall apply all
                payments made against the oldest delinquent taxes and costs, then
                against the more recent. If sufficient payment has been made to
                discharge all the taxes and claims which would have caused the
                property to be put up for sale, the property may not be sold. If
                sufficient payment has not been received to discharge these taxes
                and claims, the bureau shall proceed with the scheduled upset sale
                or at a special upset sale, either of which is to be held at least
                ninety (90) days after such default. If a party to an instalment
                agreement defaults on the agreement, the bureau shall not enter
                into a new instalment agreement with that person within three (3)
                years of the default.

(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                   4
entitled to notice that they had a right to enter into an installment agreement with the
Bureau to pay their delinquent taxes.
              A hearing was convened on December 5, 2018, where the trial court
received evidence and heard argument on the objections and exceptions. (R.R. at
43a.) Orpha Kemmler (Mrs. Kemmler) testified at the hearing. (R.R at 68a, N.T. at
27.) Mrs. Kemmler explained that in the past she had attempted to pay her delinquent
taxes by way of an installment agreement, but did not attempt to with respect to the
sale at issue. (R.R. at 68a-69a.) Mrs. Kemmler testified that when she received the
present notice and saw the provision about the option to enter into installment
agreements, she did not understand it. (R.R. at 69a.) She explained that when she
read the notice she did not understand it meant that if she paid 25% of the amount
due, she would be entitled to enter into an installment agreement for the balance of
her delinquent taxes owed prior to the sale of the Property. Id. However, she
explained that she had been denied such an option in the past. Id. Mrs. Kemmler
testified that she did not recall if the Bureau told her that if she paid 25% of the
unpaid taxes, she would be given the option to make payments and possibly stay the
sale of the property. (R.R. at 71a-72a.)
              The trial court dismissed Taxpayers’ objections and exceptions on
February 4, 2019. (Trial court op. at 1, R.R. at 87a.) Relying on Moore v. Keller, 98
A.3d 1, 5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014), and In re Consolidated Return of Tax Claim Bureau of
County of Beaver from August 16, 2011 Upset Sale for Delinquent Taxes, 105 A.3d
76, 83 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014), appeal denied, 121 A.3d 497 (Pa. 2015), it concluded that

(continued…)

72 P.S. §5860.603.

                                           5
after a property owner has paid at least 25% of the delinquent taxes due, a taxing
authority is required to inform the property owner of the option to enter into an
installment agreement to pay the rest of the delinquent taxes, and the failure to do so
is a due process violation. Id. The trial court stated that Taxpayers did not make the
25% payment and, therefore, Section 603 was not applicable and Taxpayers were
not entitled to explicit notice of the installment agreement option. Id. Nevertheless,
the trial court determined that even if Taxpayers were entitled to notice that they had
a potential right under Section 603, the court could not find that due process rights
were violated. (Trial court op. at 2, R.R. at 88a.) The trial court determined that the
notice of public sale clearly stated that the Bureau had the option to enter into an
installment agreement, Taxpayers had entered into a similar agreement under Section
603 in the past and, therefore, their due process rights were not violated.                       Id.
Taxpayers subsequently appealed to this Court.
               On appeal,5 Taxpayers raise the single issue of whether the trial court
erred in dismissing their objections and exceptions to the September 10, 2018 tax
sale.6 In support of their argument, Taxpayers assert that under Section 603 they
were permitted to enter into an installment agreement if 25% of their tax debt had
been paid. Taxpayers further argue that, after the 25% payment threshold has been

       5
         “Our review in tax sale cases is ‘limited to determining whether the trial court abused its
discretion, clearly erred as a matter of law[,] or rendered a decision with a lack of supporting
evidence.’” In re Consolidated Reports and Return by the Tax Claims Bureau of Northumberland
County of Properties, 132 A.3d 637, 643 n.12 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016).

       6
           In their statement of errors complained of on appeal, Taxpayers raised issues under the
United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. However, counsel for Taxpayers did not pursue
these issues in their brief. At oral argument held on December 10, 2019, counsel for Taxpayers
clarified that these two issues were abandoned because our Supreme Court had issued an allowance
of appeal on these issues in a separate action docketed at Fred Lohr v. Saratoga Partners, L.P., (Pa.,
No. 67 MAP 2019, filed September 4, 2019).

                                                  6
met, any taxpayer is unequivocally entitled to notice of his right to enter into an
installment agreement. Taxpayers point to our decision in Darden v. Montgomery
County Tax Claim Bureau, 629 A.2d 321, 323-24 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993), for the
proposition that even if notice has previously been given of the option to enter into an
installment agreement once the 25% threshold was met, a taxpayer is entitled to
notice of the potential to enter into an installment agreement. Taxpayers also point to
our decision in Jenkins v. Fayette County Tax Claim Bureau, 176 A.3d 1038 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2018), for the proposition that a taxpayer is entitled to notice of the
installment agreement option when he attempted to pay 25% of his delinquent tax
liability. Taxpayers argue that they were entitled to notice of their potential right to
enter into an installment agreement before they paid 25% of their outstanding tax
liability.
             Additionally, Taxpayers argue that the trial court erred when it found
that “[Taxpayers] were aware of the installment plan, as they had previously been on
the plan with the [] Bureau.” (R.R. at 88a.) Taxpayers argue that this conclusion is
erroneous because Mrs. Kemmler testified that Taxpayers never entered into an
installment agreement under Section 603.
             The Bureau argues that the law clearly states that where an owner pays
at least 25% of the amount of delinquent taxes that are due, a taxing authority is
required to inform him of the option to enter into an installment agreement. The
Bureau argues that because Taxpayers did not make a qualifying payment of 25%,
they were not entitled to notice of the option to enter into an installment agreement.

                                      Discussion

                                           7
      The question before this Court is whether Taxpayers were entitled to notice of
the option to enter into an installment agreement before paying 25% of the
outstanding tax delinquency. Section 603, in pertinent part, provides that

            [a]ny owner or lien creditor of the owner may, at the
            option of the bureau, prior to the actual sale . . . (2) enter
            into an agreement, in writing, with the bureau to stay the
            sale of the property upon the payment of twenty-five per
            centum (25%) of the amount due on all tax claims and
            tax judgments filed or entered against such property and
            the interest and costs on the taxes returned to date, as
            provided by this act, and agreeing therein to pay the
            balance of said claims and judgments and the interest and
            costs thereon in not more than three (3) instalments all
            within one (1) year of the date of said agreement, the
            agreement to specify the dates on or before which each
            instalment shall be paid, and the amount of each
            instalment.
72 P.S. §5860.603.
            In interpreting this provision, this Court has consistently held that if an
owner has paid at least 25% of his delinquent taxes, then a taxing authority is
required to inform the owner of the option to entire into an installment agreement,
and the failure to do so is a violation of the taxpayer’s due process. Moore, 98 A.3d
at 5. Specifically, “the tax claim bureau must notify a taxpayer of [his or] her
rights under Section 603 after the receipt in excess of twenty-five percent of the
outstanding delinquency.” In re Sale by Tax Claim Bureau of Bedford County of
Tax Parcel G.14-0.00-007, 112 A.3d 685, 689 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (bold emphasis
added; italicized emphasis in original) (citing In re Consolidated Return of Tax Claim
Bureau of County of Beaver, 105 A.3d at 83).

                                           8
            Here, Taxpayers do not dispute that they did not pay the 25% threshold
amount necessary to trigger the notice of the option under Section 603 to enter into an
installment agreement with the Bureau. Thus, under our precedent, the Bureau was
under no duty to provide any notice that an installment agreement was available
under Section 603. See, e.g., Barker v. Chester County Tax Claim Bureau, 143 A.3d
1069, 1075 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (concluding that a taxpayer who paid over 25% of
her delinquent tax debt should have been notified of the option to enter into an
installment agreement), and In re Upset Sale of Properties Against Which Delinquent
1981 Taxes Were Returned to Tax Claim Unit on or About the First Monday of May,
1982, 559 A.2d 600, 601 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989) (same).
            Nevertheless, Taxpayers argue that they were unaware of the potential to
enter into an installment agreement because the notice sent by the Bureau did not
inform them of this option. Taxpayers argue that the duty of the Bureau to inform a
taxpayer of the installment agreement option arises prior to the payment of 25% of
the delinquent tax liability. However, our cases above are clear on this issue; this
burden is not placed on the Bureau until after 25% of the delinquent tax liability is
paid.
            Nonetheless, Taxpayers cite to this Court’s decisions in Darden and
Jenkins in an attempt to bolster their argument. In Darden, the taxpayer owned
property that was sold at tax sale. 629 A.2d at 323. Prior to the sale, the taxpayer
made payments toward the outstanding tax liability. Id. This Court found that
because the taxpayer had paid 25% of the tax debt, due process required that the
Bureau inquire whether the taxpayer wished to enter into a written installment
agreement. Id. at 324. We also concluded that the notice contained elsewhere in the
record indicating the possibility of entering into an installment agreement was

                                          9
insufficient to effectuate the appropriate notice after a qualifying payment was
received. Id. (Emphasis added.) Thus, Darden is in accord with our precedent that a
taxpayer is entitled to affirmative notice that an installment agreement may be entered
into only after payment of 25% of the delinquent tax liability,
             Contrary to Taxpayers’ argument, Jenkins actually supports our
conclusion. In Jenkins, the taxpayer was delinquent on her tax payments. 176 A.3d
at 1040.    The taxpayer made a significant payment toward her outstanding tax
liability and entered into an agreement with the tax claim bureau to make payments.
Id. Subsequently, the taxpayer went to the tax claim bureau to make payments
toward the taxes that she owed but was told that she could not make a payment
because the property was already sold. Id. The tax sale was subsequently set aside.
Id. We concluded that where a taxpayer made a payment toward a delinquent tax
liability and the tax claim bureau did not determine whether the taxpayer paid 25% of
the delinquent liability, the tax claim bureau violated its duty under Section 603. Id.
at 1044. Thus, Jenkins establishes that the bureau must determine if a payment meets
the 25% threshold, and if so, the taxpayer must be notified of the possibility to enter
into an installment agreement. Neither of these cases establish, as Taxpayers argue,
that notice of a potential installment agreement must be given before 25% of any
delinquent tax liability is paid.
             Relatedly, Taxpayers assert that the language in the notice advising
Taxpayers that “the sale of this property may, at the OPTION of the BUREAU, be
stayed if the Owner thereof . . . enters into an agreement with the BUREAU to pay
taxes . . . in installments in the manner provided by said Act, and the agreement to be

                                          10
entered into,”7 (R.R. at 29a), erroneously states the law because Darden requires the
Bureau to offer a payment plan.            However, in Darden, we again explained the
affirmative duty of a tax claim unit to “inquire whether the property owner desired to
enter into an installment agreement.” 629 A.2d at 323. Moreover, in In re Tax Sale
Pursuant to Real Estate Tax Sale Law of 1947, 8 A.3d 358, 365 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010),
we unequivocally explained:

              Section 603 of the Law provides that “[a]ny owner or
              lien creditor of the owner may, at the option of the
              bureau, prior to sale . . . enter into an agreement, in
              writing, with the bureau to stay the sale of the property
              upon the payment of twenty-five per centum (25%) of the
              amount due on all tax claims . . . and . . . to pay the
              balance . . . in not more than three (3) installments all
              within one (1) year of the date of said agreement. . . .” 72
              P.S. §5860.603 [(emphasis in original)].

              As such, it is not a statutory right of the taxpayer to pay
              delinquent taxes in installments, but rather an option
              which is determined by the Tax Bureau.

       7
       This particular language must be included in the notice pursuant to section 602(f) of
RETSL, which provides in full as follows:

              (f) The published notice, the mail notice and the posted notice shall
              each state that the sale of any property may, at the option of the
              bureau, be stayed if the owner thereof or any lien creditor of the
              owner on or before the actual sale enters into an agreement with
              the bureau to pay the taxes in instalments, in the manner provided
              by this act.

72 P.S. §5860.602(f).

                                                11
(Emphasis added.) Thus, contrary to Taxpayers’ assertion, the Bureau is not under
any affirmative duty to enter into an installment agreement, but is only required to
notify Taxpayers of the possibility after 25% of the delinquent tax liability is paid.
             Before concluding, we address Taxpayers’ contention that the trial court
erroneously decided that, “[Taxpayers] were aware of the installment plan as they had
previously been on the plan with the [Bureau].” (R.R. at 88a.) Taxpayers’ contention
that this finding is unsupported by the record is correct. Contrary to the trial court’s
conclusion, Mrs. Kemmler testified that Taxpayers were denied the option of a
payment plan in the past, not that they had participated in a payment plan. (R.R. at
68a-69a, N.T. at 27-28.) However, because we have concluded that the trial court
was correct in deciding that Taxpayers were not entitled to notice of the installment
agreement option, the trial court’s error finding that Taxpayers were previously on an
installment plan does not change our analysis.
             Based on our precedent and the language of Section 603, we cannot
conclude that Taxpayers were entitled to notice of the option to enter into an
installment agreement before payment of 25% of the outstanding tax liability was
made. Section 603 grants Taxpayers with no vested right or entitlement to enter into
an installment agreement. Rather, the Bureau has discretion (“at the option”) to enter
into such an agreement. 72 P.S. §5860.603. Therefore, the taxpayers were not
entitled to notice as a matter of constitutional due process. See Miller v. Workers’
Compensation Appeal Board (Pavex, Inc.), 918 A.2d 809, 812-13 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007)
(concluding that where a statute does not grant an individual “an actual entitlement”
or “an unqualified right to receive the benefit,” the individual has nothing “more than
a mere expectation” of the benefit and, therefore, is not entitled to protection under

                                           12
the due process clause). Based on the foregoing, Taxpayers would have only been
entitled to such notice if they had made a qualifying payment, which they did not.
            Accordingly, the order of the trial court is affirmed.

                                           ________________________________
                                           PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

                                          13
            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In the Matter of: Tax Sale 2018-Upset :
                                      :    No. 238 C.D. 2019
Appeal of:                            :
B. Monte Kemmler and Orpha G.         :
Kemmler                               :

                                  ORDER

           AND NOW, this 28th day of February, 2020, the February 4, 2019,
order of the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County is AFFIRMED.

                                          ________________________________
                                          PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge


950 F.2d 725
Vaseur (Larry A.)v.Lockhart (A.L.)
NO. 90-2029
United States Court of Appeals,Eighth Circuit.
JUL 08, 1991

1
Appeal From:  E.D.Ark.

2
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.