203 Cal.App.2d 591 (1962)
HEAVY, HIGHWAY BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION TEAMSTERS COMMITTEE FOR NORTHERN CALIFORNIA et al., Petitioners,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent; CALIFORNIA DUMP TRUCK OWNERS ASSOCIATION et al., Real Parties in Interest.
Civ. No. 20483.
California Court of Appeals. First Dist., Div. Two.
May 16, 1962.
 LeProhn & LeProhn, Robert LeProhn, Brundage, Hackler & Flaum, Albert Brundage, McCarthy, O'Hara & Johnson, P. H. McCarthy, Jr., Neyhart & Grodin and Duane B. Beeson for Petitioners.
 No appearance for Respondents.
 Scott Elder, Pembroke Gochnauer, Samuel L. Holmes and Angell, Adams Gochnauer, Elder & Holmes for Real Parties in Interest.
 KAUFMAN, P. J.
 Petitioners, the Heavy, Highway Building & Construction Teamsters Committee for Northern California, and the Western Conference of Teamsters, on behalf of their affiliated local unions, seek a writ of prohibition to restrain the respondent court from hearing action No. 507496, instituted by California Dump Truck Owners Association, an association of owner-operators, the real parties in interest, to enjoin the enforcement of certain provisions of a 1959 collective bargaining agreement between the union and the A.G.C., an association of contractors in the highway and construction industry in northern California. All members of *593 the A.G.C. are employers engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act. (61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C.A.  141 et seq.)
 The specific provision relating to owner-operators, adopted on July 27, 1961, pursuant to the modification clause of the collective bargaining agreement, prescribed the terms and conditions which regulated the terms under which an owner-operator drove his equipment for an individual employer in the performance of work covered by the collective bargaining agreement.
 The complaint of the real parties in interest alleged that the owner- operators were not parties to the collective bargaining agreement but were individuals and an association of individuals who owned dump trucks and drove themselves for the performance of transportation services, under a permit and regulation by the California Public Utilities Commission; that the owner- operator clause unlawfully interfered with their freedom to carry on business and constituted a violation of the Cartwright Act. Petitioners demurred to the complaint on the ground that the respondent court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter as the provision of the contract relates to a right protected by the National Labor Relations Act. Petitioners' demurrer was overruled without opinion on October 20, 1961, and the petition for the writ ensued.
 The question is whether the fact that the contract provision relating to owner-operators was contained in an agreement which was the fruit of the exercise of collective bargaining rights under the National Labor Relations Act precludes the respondent superior court from applying the Cartwright Act to prohibit application of the owner-operator provision to the real parties in interest.
 [1] It is well settled that where the trial court has determined that it had jurisdiction, prohibition will lie to prevent exercise thereof when jurisdiction is challenged in that court by demurrer, motion, plea or other objection of some kind (Harden v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.2d 630-634 [284 P.2d 9]). The writ is a necessary and proper method of obtaining relief under the circumstances (Tide Water Assoc. Oil. Co. v. Superior Court, 43 Cal.2d 815-820 [279 P.2d 35]).
 The question here presented was recently decided by the United States Supreme Court in an almost identical fact situation in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 [79 S.Ct. 297, 3 L.Ed.2d 312], and International *594 Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Oliver, 362 U.S. 605 [80 S.Ct. 923, 4 L.Ed.2d 987]. In the Oliver cases, an owner-operator who leased and drove his vehicle in the service of an interstate carrier, challenged the validity of a substantially identical contract provision under the Ohio Antitrust Law. The court determined that the purpose of the owner-operator provision was not price fixing but wages and that (at pp. 294-297): "The regulations embody not the 'remote and indirect approach to the subject of wages' perceived by the Court of Common Pleas but a direct frontal attack upon a problem thought to threaten the maintenance of the basic wage structure established by the collective bargaining contract. The inadequacy of a rental which means that the owner makes up his excess costs from his driver's wages not only clearly bears a close relation to labor's efforts to improve working conditions but is in fact of vital concern to the carrier's employed drivers; an inadequate rental might mean the progressive curtailment of jobs through withdrawal of more and more carrier-owned vehicles from service. Cf. Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 771 [62 S.Ct. 816, 86 L.Ed. 1178]."
 "* * *"
 "The goal of federal labor policy, as expressed in the Wagner and Taft- Hartley Acts, is the promotion of collective bargaining; to encourage the employer and the representative of the employees to establish, through collective negotiation, their own charter for the ordering of industrial relations, and thereby to minimize industrial strife. See Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 [57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893, 108 A.L.R. 1352]; Labor Board v. American National Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-402 [72 S.Ct. 824, 96 L.Ed. 1027]. Within the area in which collective bargaining was required, Congress was not concerned with the substantive terms upon which the parties agreed. Cf. Terminal Railroad Assn. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6 [63 S.Ct. 420, 87 L.Ed. 571]. The purposes of the Acts are served by bringing the parties together and establishing conditions under which they are to work out their agreements themselves. To allow the application of the Ohio antitrust law here would wholly defeat the full realization of the congressional purpose. The application would frustrate the parties' solution of a problem which Congress has required them to negotiate in good faith toward solving, and in the solution of which it imposed no limitations relevant here. Federal law here created the duty upon the *595 parties to bargain collectively; Congress has provided for a system of federal law applicable to the agreement the parties made in response to that duty, Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 [77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972]; and federal law sets some outside limits (not contended to be exceeded here) on what their agreement may provide, see Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union, 325 U.S. 797 [65 S.Ct. 1533, 89 L.Ed. 1939]; cf. United States v. Employing Plasterers Assn., 347 U.S. 186, 190 [74 S.Ct. 452, 98 L.Ed. 618]. We believe that there is no room in this scheme for the application here of this state policy limiting the solutions that the parties' agreement can provide to the problems of wages and working conditions. Cf. California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 566-567 [77 S.Ct. 1037, 1 L.Ed.2d 1034]. Since the federal law operates here, in an area where its authority is paramount, to leave the parties free, the inconsistent application of state law is necessarily outside the power of the State. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 542-544 [65 S.Ct. 1373, 89 L.Ed. 1782]. Cf. International Union v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 457 [70 S.Ct. 781, 94 L.Ed. 978]; Amalgamated Assn. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U.S. 383 [71 S.Ct. 359, 95 L.Ed. 364, 22 A.L.R.2d 874]; Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 338 U.S. 953 [70 S.Ct. 491, 94 L.Ed. 588]. The solution worked out by the parties was not one of a sort which Congress has indicated may be left to prohibition by the several States. Cf. Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 301, 307-312 [69 S.Ct. 584, 93 L.Ed. 691]. Of course, the paramount force of the federal law remains even though it is expressed in the details of a contract federal law empowers the parties to make, rather than in terms in an enactment of Congress. See Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 [76 S.Ct. 714, 100 L.Ed. 1112]. Clearly it is immaterial that the conflict is between federal labor law and the application of what the State characterizes as an antitrust law. '... Congress has sufficiently expressed its purpose to ... exclude state prohibition, even though that with which the federal law is concerned as a matter of labor relations be related by the State to the more inclusive area of restraint of trade.' Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 481 [75 S.Ct. 480, 99 L.Ed. 546]. We have not here a case of a collective bargaining agreement in conflict with a local health or safety regulation; the conflict here is *596 between the federally sanctioned agreement and state policy which seeks specifically to adjust relationships in the world of commerce. If there is to be this sort of limitation on the arrangements that unions and employers may make with regard to these subjects, pursuant to the collective bargaining provisions of the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, it is for Congress, not the States, to provide it." (Emphasis supplied.)
 The owner-operators in the instant case, of course, contend that their case is distinguishable from the Oliver case because the subject matter of the contract affects their status as individual businessmen as it compels them to become employees of the contractors when they drive trucks for them and that as individual contractors, they are exempt from the act and that they cannot be made a party to a collective bargaining agreement. However, the identical argument was raised by the plaintiff Oliver in the Ohio case, supra. As indicated, the Oliver case necessarily implies that Oliver's status was immaterial and that the real issue was the subject matter of the collective bargaining agreement.
 Furthermore, in the subsequent decision in the Oliver case at 362 U.S. 605, the Supreme Court commented that on remand the Ohio court set aside the prior order as applied to Oliver as a lessor-driver but continued the provision order in full force and effect as it applied to Oliver as lessor- owner and employer of drivers of his equipment, the Ohio court holding that the Supreme Court decision did not preclude an injunction against enforcement of the clause insofar as it required the carriers to use their own equipment and employees before hiring extra equipment. The Supreme Court held in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Oliver, 362 U.S. 605 [80 S.Ct. 923, 4 L.Ed.2d 987] that the applicable provisions are "... at least as intimately bound up with the subject of wages as the minimum rental provisions we passed on then. Accordingly, as in the previous case, we hold that Ohio's antitrust law here may not 'be applied to prevent the contracting parties from carrying out their agreement upon a subject matter as to which federal law directs them to bargain.' " (At p. 606.)
 [2] The owner-operator clause in the present case cannot be distinguished from that in the Oliver case. Thus, as the subject matter of the contract concerns wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment upon which federal law directs the parties to bargain, the respondent court has no *597 jurisdiction to consider the cause. (San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 [79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775]; Calise v. Superior Court, 159 Cal.App.2d 126, 132 [323 P.2d 859].) The subject matter of the controversy is one which the United States Supreme Court has determined is in the area of exclusive federal jurisdiction.
 [3] While the record indicates that the collective bargaining agreement was to expire on April 30, 1962, we are satisfied we should not treat the question as moot. The question presented is one of continuing importance to the parties in their negotiations of future contracts. This is not a situation in which the parties are no longer interested in the legal issue involved. No purpose but delay would be served by treating the question as moot and the public interest in the orderly process of collective bargaining negotiations and in the orderly administration of justice compels a determination now (DiGiorgio Fruit Corp. v. Department of Employment, 56 Cal.2d 54 at 58-59 [13 Cal.Rptr. 663, 362 P.2d 487]). As a practical matter, this judgment has a direct bearing on the owner-operator provision in any new contract.
 In view of the foregoing, it is ordered that a peremptory writ of prohibition issue forthwith, restraining the respondent court from hearing or taking any proceedings in superior court action No. 507496.
 Shoemaker, J., and Agee, J., concurred.


                 cc: Jessie Matthew Diaz
                       Fry & Berning, LLC
                       Washoe District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT
        OF
     NEVADA

(0) 1947A    e


                   NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
                              File Name: 13a0880n.06

                                            No. 12-6589

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
                                                                                FILED
                                                                                Oct 08, 2013
                                                                                DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
JOSHUA DYLAN HORNBACK,                                )
                                                      )
       Plaintiff    Appellant,                        )
                                                      )       ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v.                                                    )       STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
                                                      )       EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN                               )
COUNTY, GOVERNMENT, a Municipal                       )
Corporation, et al.,                                  )
                                                      )
       Defendants - Appellees.                        )

Before: MOORE and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges; HELMICK, District Judge.*

       JEFFREY J. HELMICK, District Judge. Appellant Joshua Dylan Hornback appeals the district

court’s dismissal of his complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Hornback asserts the district court

erred when it applied the Supreme Court’s ruling in Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007), to

Hornback’s § 1983 illegal search claim and dismissed Hornback’s claim as barred by the Kentucky

statute of limitations for personal injury claims. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the district

court’s ruling.

                                          I. BACKGROUND

       On August 31, 2010, Kentucky Probation and Parole Officers Alizabeth Graham and Abigail

Dillingham arrived at Hornback’s residence in Lexington, Kentucky to conduct a home visit on

*
 The Honorable Jeffrey J. Helmick, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio,
sitting by designation.
Brandon Bell, one of Hornback’s roommates. On that date, Bell was under the supervision of the

Probation and Parole Division of the Kentucky Department of Corrections, though Hornback was

not. Upon their arrival, Graham and Dillingham smelled burning marijuana. They requested

assistance from Kentucky Probation and Parole Officers Monte Corbett and Paul Fulcher, as well

as Lexington, Kentucky Police Officers Ray Samuel Wilson and Katie Rhea. These defendants

conducted a warrantless search of the residence including Hornback’s private bedroom, where they

discovered and seized marijuana. As a result, Hornback was arrested later that day. He was charged

with four felonies but ultimately indicted on three misdemeanor charges, including possession of

marijuana and drug paraphernalia.

        On February 17, 2011, Hornback filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his

bedroom, arguing the state lacked probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of his bedroom.

The trial court agreed, and granted Hornback’s motion to suppress on May 9, 2011. On the same

day, the trial court also granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss all charges against Hornback.

        On May 8, 2012, Hornback filed a six-count complaint, alleging, in part, Appellees violated

his constitutional protections against illegal searches and seizures in conducting the warrantless

search. The district court concluded Hornback’s claims were barred by the expiration of the statute

of limitations and dismissed those claims with prejudice as to all Appellees.

                                     II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        We review a district court’s dismissal of a case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Bloch

v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 1998). To defeat a defendant’s motion to dismiss, the plaintiff

must allege sufficient facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” City of Columbus

v. Hotels.com, L.P., 693 F.3d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)). Courts must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint

                                                   2
when ruling on a motion to dismiss. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Thurman v. Pfizer,

Inc., 484 F.3d 855, 859 (6th Cir. 2007). A determination that a claim is barred by the applicable

statute of limitations is a legal conclusion we also review de novo. Tolbert v. State of Ohio Dep’t

of Transp., 172 F.3d 934, 938 (6th Cir. 1999).

                                           III. ANALYSIS

       Hornback claims the district court erred in applying Wallace to the facts of his case because,

he contends, the Wallace Court issued a narrow ruling that applies only to claims of false arrest or

false imprisonment. Hornback argues his cause of action did not accrue until the trial court ruled

the warrantless search of his bedroom illegal. Defendants urge us to affirm the district court’s

dismissal. They argue Hornback’s cause of action accrued on the date of the search, as Hornback

knew or should have known of his injury at that time.

       State law determines the appropriate statute of limitations for a cause of action arising under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Roberson v. Tennessee, 399 F.3d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2005). Under Kentucky law,

the limitations period is one year. See Collard v. Ky. Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 182 (6th Cir.

1990); K.R.S. 413.140(1)(a). In contrast, “federal law governs the question of when that limitations

period begins to run.” Wolfe v. Perry, 412 F.3d 707, 714 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Sevier v. Turner,

742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984)). The statute of limitations “ordinarily does not begin to run until

the plaintiff has a ‘complete and present cause of action.’” Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning

Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 195 (1997); see also Roberson, 399 F.3d

at 794 (quoting Sevier, 742 F.2d at 273) (“The statute of limitations commences to run when the

plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action. A plaintiff has

reason to know of his injury when he should have discovered it through the exercise of reasonable

diligence.”).

                                                  3
       The district court correctly concluded Hornback knew or had reason to know of the unlawful

search of his bedroom on the day of the search. On August 31, 2010, Hornback knew he was not

under the supervision of the Division of Probation and Parole, Appellees did not have a warrant or

his consent to search his bedroom, and that Appellees nonetheless had searched his bedroom. On

that date, Hornback had a “complete and present cause of action” and could have sued for relief.

Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388.

       Hornback fails to identify any case law in support of his contention that the Supreme Court’s

ruling in Wallace is applicable only to claims of false arrest. While the Wallace Court issued a case-

specific ruling, the driving principle behind that ruling   that the deferred accrual rule of Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), does not apply to actions “which would impugn an anticipated

future conviction” is generally applicable, including to claims such as Hornback’s. Wallace, 549

U.S. at 393 (emphasis removed); see also Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 233 (6th Cir. 2007) (“In no

uncertain terms . . . the Court in Wallace clarified that the Heck bar has no application in the pre-

conviction context.”).

       Hornback correctly notes Wallace distinguishes between causes of action for malicious

prosecution and those for false arrest. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 394. The Court drew this distinction

based on the nature of the claims, however; unlike malicious prosecution, some torts redressable

under § 1983 (like false arrest) “accrue before the setting aside of indeed even before the existence

of the related criminal conviction.” Id. Claims of illegal search are analogous to claims of false

arrest, as a potential plaintiff very often has a complete cause of action even before criminal

proceedings commence. While Hornback argues he could not know his rights had been violated

until the trial judge granted his motion to suppress, he fails to identify any authority in support of

                                                  4
his contention. Hornback had a colorable claim for the violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights on the day of the search, and the statute of limitations began to run on that date.

       Hornback also asserts that if this court declines to apply the Wallace holding to § 1983 illegal

search claims, “orderly adjudication of illegal search claims would take place, the risk of

inconsistent legal determinations would be minimized, and the clogging of courts with unnecessary

filings would be avoided.” The Wallace Court, however, announced a procedure for lower courts

to follow when confronted with scenarios such as the one Hornback faced:

       If a plaintiff files a false-arrest claim before he has been convicted (or files any other
       claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal
       trial), it is within the power of the district court, and in accord with common practice,
       to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is
       ended.

Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393-94 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Hornback’s arguments

concerning judicial efficiency are unpersuasive and ultimately irrelevant to the question of when his

legal injury arose.

                                          IV. CONCLUSION

       For the reasons stated above, we conclude Hornback filed his claims after the limitations

period had expired and affirm the district court’s dismissal of his complaint.

                                                   5


375 Pa. 296 (1953)
Mitchell, Admr.,
v.
Stolze, Appellant.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued October 2, 1953.
November 17, 1953.
*297 Before STERN, C.J., STEARNE, JONES, BELL, CHIDSEY, MUSMANNO and ARNOLD, JJ.
Palmer J. McCloskey, Jr., with him McCloskey, Patrono & McCloskey, for appellant.
John J. Moschetta, with him Howard F. Carson, for appellee.
OPINION BY MR. JUSTICE MUSMANNO, November 17, 1953:
On November 1, 1951, at about 5 p.m., two automobiles travelling on Pennsylvania State Highway Route No. 71 in Washington County, collided with each other so violently as to inflict death on the operator of one car (Helen C. Mitchell) and injuries on the operator of the other (Hildred Knight Stolze). No one, except the two operators themselves, witnessed the actual impact so that, when the administrator of the estate of Mrs. Helen C. Mitchell sued Hildred Knight Stolze for damages in both a wrongful death *298 and survival action, the defendant maintained there could be no recovery since ocular evidence to describe, visualize and reconstruct the details of the accident, was missing.[*]
This defense, however, is not valid. Circumstantial evidence when it is planted squarely on the bedrock of natural laws, inevitable sequence and undeviating effect can be and is as convincing as the story of an eye witness. If circumstantial evidence can and often does persuade juries in criminal cases to render verdicts which deprive defendants of liberty and sometimes life, as indeed it can and does equally as effectively exonerate defendants accused of crime, why should it be regarded as any less reliable in civil cases? The worth of circumstantial evidence in civil cases is no longer a matter of academic debate or forensic argument. In Tucker v. Pittsburg, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 227 Pa. 66, we said: "Accidents in which life is lost not infrequently occur unwitnessed. Such fact in itself does not operate to protect one whose negligence can be shown from the general situation and circumstances to have been the operative cause. When these are such as to satisfy reasonable and well-balanced minds that the accident resulted from the negligence of the party charged, liability attaches."
Five minutes after the crash between the Mitchell and the Stolze cars, a Shelby V. Ghrist arrived at the scene of the accident. He testified at the trial that he found both cars on the southern side of the highway with only the rear left fender of the Stolze car partly projecting over the center of the highway. Since the geographical physics of the accident indisputably establish that the Mitchell car was travelling eastwardly *299 and the Stolze car was travelling westwardly, the fact that both cars came to rest on that portion of the road assigned to eastwardly-moving traffic proclaims prima faciedly that the Stolze car was violating the law of the road at the time of the impact. As stated by Mr. Justice ALLEN M. STEARNE in Buchanan et al. v. Belusko, 361 Pa. 465, 467, "We are not required. . . to determine whether negligence may be inferred from attending circumstances. Driving on the wrong side of the streets in violation of section 1004 of The Vehicle Code of May 1, 1929, P.L. 905, as amended, 75 PS 521, is a prima facie case of negligence."
Ghrist testified further that the front ends of the cars were nosed together at the guard rail on the southern side of the highway, while the rear sections, stretching laterally to the center of the highway, spread apart, forming a V-pattern. On the left front door of the Mitchell car Mr. Ghrist found an indentation of the size and shape of the Stolze right headlight, the latter being only three feet away from its imprint.
Mrs. Mitchell's body protruded through this left front door, her head on the pavement, her feet still within the interior of the car. This would indicate that the mortal blow must have occurred just before the cars stopped, for otherwise Mrs. Mitchell would most likely have fallen out of the vehicle while it was traversing the distance suggested by the defendant's theory as to how the accident occurred.
Defendant's counsel argued at the trial, as well as before us on appeal, that Mrs. Mitchell had driven her car into a road, which, from her left, intersected with Route No. 71, that it came into contact with the Stolze car travelling westwardly on Route 71, that the two vehicles became entangled with each other and that then in some unexplained manner crossed over from the westwardly to the eastwardly-moving side of *300 the highway and ceased movement at the guard rail on the southern side of Route 71. This theory, woven out of conjecture and interlaced with surmise, has not a strand of fact to give it strength and therefore cannot possibly support the weight of a factual defense.
Several persons who arrived some 30 minutes after the accident testified to having seen skid and tread marks on the highway and the defendant seeks to draw from these marks inferences that the Mitchell car had gotten over to the northern side of the road. But these markings can have no probative effect whatsoever in view of the positive and undenied testimony that from the time of the accident until these witnesses arrived, traffic continued practically unimpeded on the highway, each car leaving its own tire marks with a story entirely unrelated to the Mitchell-Stolze tragedy.
No one can with retrospective omniscience reproduce all the movements of these two automobiles as they headed toward each other for a rendezvous with disaster. But there are sufficient physical facts here to prove to the satisfaction of any reasoning mind intent on fair-handed justice that Mrs. Mitchell came to her untimely end because of Hildred Knight Stolze's negligence. The imprint in the left front door of Mrs. Mitchell's car, fitting exactly into the contour of the Stolze headlamp, is evidence as convincing of the aggression of the Stolze car as a coin is the result of the imprint of its parent die.
The Mitchell car was painted blue, the Stolze car black. As the cars lay together on the highway after the accident it was noted that the front of the Stolze car carried stains of blue paint while streaks of black paint extended from the center of the grille of the Mitchell car, thence along its left front and left side to the center of the left door. These paint markings, added to the indentation above described, spelled out *301 even more conclusively the movement of the Stolze car toward and against the left front of the Mitchell car travelling on its own side of the highway.
These writings in steel on the Mitchell car, added to the position of Mrs. Mitchell's body and the location of the cars on the highway, narrate clearly the manner in which the accident occurred: while Mrs. Mitchell was driving eastwardly in her proper lane on the highway, Mrs. Stolze, probably in an attempt to countereffect the centrifugal force of her car moving on the outer tangent of the curve in the highway, swung sharply to the left. But whatever the cause for Mrs. Stolze's swinging to her wrong side of the road, Mrs. Mitchell, attempting to avoid a collision, swerved to the right, immediately decelerating speed and applying brakes, and she was struck on the left front by the Stolze vehicle. It is apparent that the Mitchell car was practically stopped when the mortal blow landed. Otherwise, as heretofore stated, Mrs. Mitchell's body would have fallen completely out of the car.
The case was well tried by able lawyers before an able judge who properly instructed the jury on the law applicable to the issues involved. We find no reversible error in the record.
Nor do we see any reason for disturbing the verdicts as recorded below. In the Survival action the jury returned a verdict in the sum of $21,045.50. In the Wrongful Death action the jury's verdict amounted to $15,711.62. The learned Trial Judge struck off $20,000 from the Survival Action verdict and allowed the amount of the Death Action verdict to remain intact. We find nothing to indicate that the Trial Judge abused his discretion in either instance. The judgment of the lower court is, therefore, affirmed.
NOTES
[*]  The defendant herself was disqualified from testifying under the Act of 1887.


                             UNPUBLISHED

                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                      FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                             No. 12-4869

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                Plaintiff - Appellee,

          v.

KELVIN JAMILLE REEVES, a/k/a Knowledge,

                Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville.    G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (6:11-cr-02026-GRA-9)

Submitted:   June 19, 2013                 Decided:   July 18, 2013

Before WILKINSON, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Richard W. Vieth, Spartanburg, South Carolina, for Appellant.
William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, E. Jean Howard,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina,
for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

            Kelvin Jamille Reeves appeals his conviction and 121-

month sentence imposed following his guilty plea to conspiracy

to possess with intent to distribute and distribute 280 grams or

more of crack, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006).                                 On

appeal,    counsel     has     filed     a       brief    pursuant     to     Anders    v.

California,      386   U.S.    738    (1967),       stating    that    there     are    no

meritorious      issues      for     appeal       but    questioning        whether    the

district court committed sentencing error.                    Reeves was notified

of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but has not

done so.        Following a review of the record, we directed the

parties    to   submit    supplemental           briefs   addressing        whether    the

district court committed plain error by concluding that Reeves’

plea was supported by an independent factual basis.                          Finding no

reversible error, we affirm.

            Because Reeves did not seek to withdraw his plea in

the district court or timely object to any alleged violation of

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, we review his plea colloquy for plain

error.    United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342 (4th Cir.

2009).    To establish plain error, Reeves must show that (1) the

district court erred, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error

affects his substantial rights.                    United States v. Olano, 507

U.S. 725, 732 (1993).              In the guilty plea context, an error

affects a defendant’s substantial rights if he demonstrates a

                                             2
reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty but

for the error.           Massenburg, 564 F.3d at 343.                       Even if these

requirements are met, we will correct such error only if it

“seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation

of   judicial     proceedings.”             Olano,     507    U.S.     at     732     (internal

quotation marks and alteration omitted).

            When accepting a guilty plea, the district court must

find that the plea is supported by an independent factual basis.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3).                 The court possesses wide discretion

in   determining        the   factual         basis    and    may      rely      on    anything

appearing in the record.                   United States v. Ketchum, 550 F.3d

363,    366-67     (4th       Cir.      2008).          The     court       need      only     be

“subjectively satisfied” that the factual basis is sufficient to

establish each element of the offense.                       Id. at 366.         In reaching

this determination, the court is not required to find that a

jury would convict the defendant, “or even that the defendant is

guilty by a preponderance of the evidence.                           The district court

must    assure     itself         simply      that    the     conduct       to      which     the

defendant     admits     is       in   fact    an     offense    under      the       statutory

provision under which he is pleading guilty.”                           United States v.

Carr,   271      F.3d    172,      178-79      n.6     (4th     Cir.    2001)         (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

            To     prove      a    crack      conspiracy,        the    government           must

establish that “an agreement to distribute and possess [crack]

                                               3
with intent to distribute existed between two or more persons”

and that the defendant knew of and knowingly and voluntarily

became part of the conspiracy.                  United States v. Yearwood, 518

F.3d   220,    225-26     (4th    Cir.     2008)          (internal      quotation     marks

omitted).          “The   gravamen    of    the       crime       is     an    agreement    to

effectuate     a    criminal     act.”      Id.       at    226    (internal       quotation

marks omitted); see United States v. Edmonds, 679 F.3d 169, 173-

74   (4th    Cir.)    (discussing       distinction          between          conspiracy   and

underlying drug offense), vacated and remanded on other grounds,

133 S. Ct. 376, reissued in part, 700 F.3d 146, 147 (4th Cir.

2012).

              In proffering evidence to support Reeves’ plea, the

Government     recounted       that   the       indictment         against       Reeves    and

eleven      co-defendants        charged        a     broad       drug        conspiracy    in

Greenville County, South Carolina.                    The Government stated that a

confidential informant had made a small purchase of crack from

Reeves and that other individuals admitted to supplying Reeves

with crack cocaine.          When asked to confirm these facts, Reeves

readily admitted that he had sold crack, but he adamantly denied

involvement in a conspiracy.               Of the numerous individuals named

in the indictment as co-conspirators, Reeves acknowledged that

he   knew    his     brothers,    but    he         did    not    provide       any   further

testimony to indicate his knowing or voluntary participation in

the charged conspiracy.

                                            4
              While it is true that, “[o]nce the Government proves a

conspiracy, the evidence need only establish a slight connection

between a defendant and the conspiracy to support conviction,”

United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 367 (4th Cir. 2010), we

question whether the evidence proffered by the Government was

sufficient to prove the requisite nexus between Reeves and the

charged conspiracy.        Neither the confidential informant, nor the

individuals     who     purportedly      provided        drugs     to    Reeves,    were

identified     as     co-conspirators.             The   Government       provided       no

indication of the quantity, frequency, or type of transactions

in which Reeves allegedly engaged, as necessary to use these

transactions     as    evidence    of    a       tacit   agreement       to   distribute

further.      See Edmonds, 679 F.3d at 174; United States v. Reid,

523 F.3d 310, 317 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Banks, 10

F.3d 1044, 1054 (4th Cir. 1993).                   Reeves’ receipt and sale of

drugs, standing alone, does not establish that he entered into

an agreement with his alleged co-conspirators.                           Moreover, the

mere   fact    that    Reeves     knew    or      was    related    to    certain    co-

conspirators does not demonstrate either his knowledge of the

conspiracy     or   his   knowing       and      voluntary   participation          in   a

conspiracy with these individuals.

              In reviewing a district court’s acceptance of a guilty

plea, “we will not find an abuse of discretion so long as the

district court could reasonably have determined that there was a

                                             5
sufficient          factual        basis       based        on    the     record      before     it.”

Ketchum, 550 F.3d at 367 (emphasis added) (internal quotation

marks       omitted).           However,            Reeves        pled    guilty       before      his

presentence report was prepared, and the court did not defer

accepting the plea until sentencing.                              Moreover, while the court

may     have       been     aware         of        other        facts    supporting          Reeves’

involvement based on the pleas and presentence reports of his

co-defendants, information about these defendants’ proceedings

is    not    available        in    the    record          on     appeal,      and    we   can    only

speculate as to the content of these materials and the extent to

which       the    district        court       may    have       relied       upon    them.       When

coupled       with       Reeves’     adamant             denial     of    participation          in    a

conspiracy, these facts may indeed be inadequate to establish an

independent factual basis for the plea.

                  Ultimately,        however,             we      need    not        resolve     this

question.          Reeves bears the burden to demonstrate each element

of plain error.             Importantly, Reeves does not assert that, had

the court been more exacting in ensuring factual support for the

plea, he would have chosen not to plead guilty and would have

insisted on proceeding to trial.                               In light of the additional

facts detailed in the presentence report, to which Reeves does

not object, we conclude that Reeves has not met his burden to

establish         that    any      error       in    accepting          the   plea    affects         his

substantial         rights.          Moreover,            these     facts      provide     adequate

                                                     6
support      for     Reeves’       plea    such     that    any      error        would    not

“seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity or public reputation

of    judicial      proceedings.”          Olano,    507    U.S.      at    732    (internal

quotation marks and alteration omitted).

              In his Anders brief, counsel also questions whether

the    district      court    committed        sentencing    error.          We     review    a

sentence imposed by the district court for reasonableness under

a    deferential      abuse-of-discretion           standard.          Gall       v.   United

States,      552    U.S.     38,   46,    51   (2007).      We       first       examine    the

sentence for “significant procedural error,” including improper

calculation of the Guidelines range, insufficient consideration

of    the    18     U.S.C.    § 3553(a)        (2006)    factors,          and    inadequate

explanation of the sentence imposed.                    Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.                If

we    find    the    sentence      procedurally         reasonable,         we    also     must

examine the substantive reasonableness of the sentence under the

totality      of     the     circumstances.          Id.         A    within-Guidelines

sentence is presumed reasonable on appeal, and the defendant

bears the burden to “rebut the presumption by demonstrating that

the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a)

factors.”          United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379

(4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

              Unpreserved arguments regarding sentencing error are

reviewed for plain error.                 See United States v. Streiper, 666

F.3d 288, 292 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d

                                               7
572, 577 (4th Cir. 2010).                   A defendant preserves a claim that

the district court failed to properly consider the § 3553(a)

factors    and    to   adequately           explain       the    chosen   sentence     “[b]y

drawing arguments from § 3553 for a sentence different than the

one ultimately imposed.”               Lynn, 592 F.3d at 578.              Because Reeves

did not object to the presentence report, request any specific

sentence,    or    raise       any    arguments       drawing      from    the     § 3553(a)

factors, we review these issues for plain error.                            See Streiper,

666 F.3d at 292; Lynn, 592 F.3d at 577-78.

            We have thoroughly reviewed the record and discern no

reversible       sentencing          error.         The    district       court     properly

calculated Reeves’ Guidelines range, conducted an individualized

assessment of his case, and announced a justification for its

sentence grounded in the relevant § 3553(a) factors.                                 To the

extent    the    court    may    have        erred    in    not    considering       Reeves’

history and characteristics more explicitly or in not permitting

the   Government          an     opportunity          to        present     arguments     at

sentencing,       we   conclude        such     error       did    not    affect     Reeves’

substantial rights; counsel did not request a below-Guidelines

sentence, and the court imposed a sentence at the bottom of the

Guidelines       range     and       only     one     month       above    the     statutory

mandatory    minimum.           Neither       Reeves       nor    the    available    record

provides     a    basis    to        rebut    the     presumption         of     substantive

                                               8
reasonableness      accorded      his     within-Guidelines               sentence.        See

Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d at 379.

            In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.                               This court

requires that counsel inform Reeves, in writing, of the right to

petition    the    Supreme      Court   of       the    United      States      for   further

review.     If     Reeves      requests      that       a   petition       be    filed,    but

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then

counsel    may    move    in    this    court      for      leave    to    withdraw       from

representation.      Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof

was served on Reeves.

            We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal    contentions      are    adequately            presented     in    the    materials

before    this    court   and    argument         would     not     aid    the   decisional

process.

                                                                                AFFIRMED

                                             9


11 Ill. App.3d 780 (1973)
298 N.E.2d 353
MASTER BARBERS' AND BEAUTY CULTURISTS' ASSOCIATION OF CHICAGO, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
ALFRED GRAJEK et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 55663.
Illinois Appellate Court  First District (3rd Division).
May 3, 1973.
Robert J. Egan, of Chicago, for appellants.
Robert J. Gorman, of Chicago, for appellees.
Order affirmed.
Mr. JUSTICE McNAMARA delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiffs filed a complaint under the Illinois Anti-Trust Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 60-1 et seq.), charging defendants with conspiring to fix the price of haircuts and seeking both a temporary and permanent injunction and treble damages. Defendant, Alfred Grajek, was the owner of the Veterans Barber Shop located at 33 East 111th Place in the City of Chicago. The other defendants were barbers in the same *781 shop. Before defendants filed their answer, plaintiffs made a motion for a temporary injunction. The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for temporary relief after a hearing. Plaintiffs prosecute this interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of their motion, and contend that the trial court's order was improper.
The facts, as developed at the hearing, show that Grajek leased 20 chairs in the shop to independent barbers who work their own hours and collect their own fees. The shop had no cashier. In return for the lease arrangement Grajek operated as a central purchasing agent for the purpose of purchasing linens, barber supplies and arranging for advertising.
Grajek and several other defendant barbers testified that the basic price of a haircut at the shop was $1.25 for adults and $1.00 for children. They testified that the adult price was raised from $1.00 to $1.25 about six years previously and that this price increase was the result of individual action by each barber. They also stated that there were additional charges for special services which were determined by the individual barber at the time the services were rendered. At the time of the filing of this suit, the prevailing price for adult haircuts in all other barber shops throughout the area was $3.
Grajek testified that the basic price of $1.25 for haircuts at the Veterans Barber Shop was the advertised price. Plaintiffs introduced several advertisements from local newspapers and handbills confirming Grajeks' testimony.
Plaintiffs' complaint sought an injunction to restrain the defendant barbers from publishing, communicating or combining to fix their prices or hours at the shop in question. At the hearing, plaintiffs' main contention appeared to be that defendants should be restrained by means of temporary injunction from advertising the price of haircuts at their barber shop on the grounds that such advertising is violative of the Illinois Anti-Trust Act. Plaintiffs contend in this court that the evidence adduced at the hearing clearly established their right to such a temporary injunction. We do not agree.
 1, 2 Initially, it should be noted that the granting or refusal to grant a temporary injunction rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and, unless there is an abuse of this discretion, a reviewing court will not set aside the determination of the trial court. (Weingart v. Weingart, 23 Ill. App.2d 154, 161 N.E.2d 714.) In order to obtain a temporary injunction the moving party must establish an immediate need for the injunction in order to preserve the status quo and to prevent irreparable injury to its rights, as well as show the probability of ultimate success on the merits of the case. (Schlicksup Drug Co., Inc. v. *782 Schlicksup, 129 Ill. App.2d 181, 262 N.E.2d 713.) Plaintiffs have failed to meet this burden.
Under the facts as presented to the trial court it is apparent that the temporary injunction which plaintiffs were seeking was not necessary to preserve the status quo as it existed between the parties at the time the complaint was filed. In fact, the injunction would have altered the status quo in that it would have prevented defendants from advertising the price of haircuts at the Veterans Barber Shop, an already established practice.
 3 The record has also failed to show that an injunction was necessary to prevent irreparable injury to plaintiffs' rights. There are no facts in the record to establish that plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if they were not granted immediate relief. And, a temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which is generally employed only in matters of great urgency. (Hoffman v. City of Evanston, 101 Ill. App.2d 440, 243 N.E.2d 478.) The effect of haircut prices in one shop would appear to be minimal.
 4 Pending the joinder of issues and a final determination of the litigation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary injunction.
Accordingly, the order of the circuit court of Cook County denying the request for a temporary injunction is affirmed.
DEMPSEY, P.J., and McGLOON, J., concur.


                                                    129 Nev., Advance Opinion    66
                       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF                        No. 57960
                RONALD N. SEROTA, BAR NO. 7904.

                IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF                        No 59551
                RONALD N. SEROTA, BAR NO. 7904.

                IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF                        No. 60719
                RONALD N. SEROTA, BAR NO. 7904.
                                                                          IUD
                                                                        OCT 0 j3 2013

                            Automatic review of a Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board
                hearing panel's recommendation that attorney be disbarred from the
                practice of law in Nevada (Docket No. 57960); original petition by bar
                counsel to report attorney convicted of crime (Docket No. 59551); original
                petition by attorney for dissolution of order temporarily suspending him
                from the practice of law (Docket No. 60719).
                            Recommendation approved (Docket No. 57960); petitions
                denied as moot (Docket Nos. 59551160719).

                Ronald N. Serota, Las Vegas,
                in Proper Person.

                David Clark, Bar Counsel, and Glenn Machado, Assistant Bar Counsel,
                Las Vegas,
                for the State Bar of Nevada.

SUPREME COURT
     OF
   NEVADA

                                                                                15-079V.4:02
BEFORE PICKERING, C.J., GIBBONS, HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE,
DOUGLAS, CHERRY and SAITTA, JJ.

                                 OPINION
PER CURIAM:
             These bar matters, though separately docketed, all involve the
same attorney, Ronald N. Serota, Bar No. 7904. They are not
consolidated; however, we have elected to resolve them in a single
disposition. 1
             Docket No. 57960 is an automatic review of a Southern
Nevada Disciplinary Board hearing panel's recommendation that Serota
be disbarred from the practice of law in Nevada.        See SCR 105(3)(b).
Serota misappropriated $319,000 in client funds that were to be used to
satisfy a judgment in a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) action
against the client. He asks us to impose a lesser sanction, contending that
because of mitigating factors, we should merely suspend him from the
practice of law and/or refer him to a diversion program. On de novo
review, we conclude that disbarment is the proper sanction and therefore
approve the panel's recommendation.
             Docket No. 59551 is an original petition by bar counsel
advising us that Serota has been convicted of a felony for the same conduct
underlying the disciplinary matter. See SCR 111(4). Docket No. 60719 is

      'We originally decided these matters in an unpublished order filed
May 24, 2013. Bar counsel subsequently filed a motion pursuant to NRAP
36(f) to reissue our order as an opinion. We grant the motion and
therefore issue this opinion in place of our prior order.

                                      2
an original petition by Serota seeking dissolution of our prior order
temporarily suspending him from the practice of law. 2 See SCR 102(4)(d).
We conclude that the petitions in Docket Nos. 59551 and 60719 have been
rendered moot as a result of our decision in Docket No. 57960 that Serota
be disbarred from the practice of law.
                   FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Docket No. 57960
              Serota represented a client in an action by the SEC. The SEC
alleged that the client engaged in accounting practices that were violative
of federal law. On August 3, 2009, Serota's client signed a consent to
entry of judgment, which was filed with the federal court on August 27,
2009.
              In anticipation of this negotiated outcome, the client paid
Serota all of the monies necessary to satisfy the judgment in advance, by
way of 14 checks totaling $319,901.59 written between July 2 and July 24,
2009. The checks were deposited into Serota's client trust account. Each
check contained a notation indicating that it was for some aspect of the
SEC action.
              Meanwhile, on July 16, 2009, a check from Serota's client
trust account was written to Beverage Plus, a company in which Serota
had an ownership interest, for $225,000. Despite this misappropriation,
Serota continued to accept additional checks from the client until the

       We previously temporarily suspended Serota from the practice of
        2

law pending the outcome of the instant disciplinary proceedings. In re
Discipline of Serota, Docket No. 54856 (Order of Temporary Suspension,
November 18, 2009).

                                         3
client had paid him the entire amount of the anticipated judgment in the
SEC action. On July 28, 2009, a check from Serota's trust account was
written to Clean Path Resources, another company in which Serota had an
interest, for $94,000. Thus, Serota had misappropriated virtually the
entire amount of the judgment prior to having his client sign the consent
to entry of judgment on August 3, 2009.
            Pursuant to the signed consent, final judgment was entered
against Serota's client in the SEC action on September 25, 2009; The final
judgment ordered the client to, among other things, pay a total judgment
of $319,901.59 within 10 business days. On October 7, 2009, just two days
before the judgment was to be paid, Serota admitted his
misappropriations to the state bar.
            Consequently, the state bar filed a complaint against Serota
alleging that his conduct violated RPC 1.15 (safekeeping property), RPC
3.4 (fairness to opposing party and counsel), and RPC 8.4 (misconduct).
Thereafter, a formal disciplinary hearing was held, at which the state bar
put on evidence of Serota's misappropriations and of aggravating
circumstances it alleged were present in this matter; the defense focused
primarily on mitigating circumstances that it alleged were present.
            The disciplinary panel found unanimously that Serota had
violated RPC 1.15 and RPC 8.4. It recommended, by a 4-1 vote, that
Serota be disbarred and ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings.
Consequently, Serota's disciplinary matter was forwarded to us for
automatic review pursuant to SCR 105(3)(b).
Docket Nos. 59551 and 60719
            Bar counsel subsequently filed an original petition pursuant to
SCR 111(4), Docket No. 59551, informing this court that Serota was

                                      4
convicted in the Eighth Judicial District Court of one count of theft, a
category B felony pursuant to NRS 205.0832 and NRS 205.0835, for the
same conduct underlying the disciplinary proceeding. Thereafter, Serota
filed an original petition pursuant to SCR 102(4)(d), Docket No. 60719,
seeking dissolution of our November 18, 2009, order of temporary
suspension entered in Docket No. 54856.
                              DISCUSSION
            We review a decision of a hearing panel recommending
disbarment automatically. SCR 105(3)(b). The panel's findings must be
supported by clear and convincing evidence. SCR 105(2)(e);            In re
Discipline of Drakulich, 111 Nev. 1556, 1566, 908 P.2d 709, 715 (1995).
Although persuasive, the panel's findings and recommendations are not
binding on us. In re Discipline of Droz, 123 Nev. 163, 168, 160 P.3d 881,
884 (2007). Our review is conducted de novo, requiring us to exercise
independent judgment to determine whether and what type of discipline is
warranted. SCR 105(3)(b); In re Discipline of Stuhff, 108 Nev. 629, 633,
837 P.2d 853, 855 (1992). The paramount objective of attorney
disciplinary proceedings is "to protect the public from persons unfit to
serve as attorneys and to maintain public confidence in the bar as a
whole." State Bar of Nev. v. Claiborne, 104 Nev. 115, 129, 756 P.2d 464,
473 (1988). In determining the proper disciplinary sanction, we consider
four factors: (1) the duty violated, (2) the lawyer's mental state, (3) the
potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and (4) the
existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances.    In re Discipline of
Lerner, 124 Nev. 1232, 1246, 197 P.3d 1067, 1077 (2008).

                                     5
The panel's findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence
            We conclude that the panel's findings are supported by clear
and convincing evidence. Serota concedes that he violated RPC 1.15,
which requires a lawyer, among other things, to safekeep clients' property
in the lawyer's possession. Serota's client turned over money to him that
was to be paid to the SEC to satisfy a judgment against the client, but
instead of safeguarding those funds, Serota misappropriated them for his
own purposes. He therefore failed in his duties to safekeep his client's
property. Serota also concedes that he violated RPC 8.4(c), which states
that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. In addition to
misappropriating the client's funds for his own purposes, Serota allowed
the client to sign the consent to entry of judgment despite knowing that he
had already misappropriated the money intended to satisfy the judgment.
He therefore engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation. We conclude that clear and convincing evidence
supports the panel's findings that Serota violated RPC 1.15 and 8.4. 3
Disbarment is the appropriate discipline
            We further conclude that, considering the four Lerner factors,
disbarment is the appropriate disciplinary sanction in this case. Serota's
conduct in this matter violated duties to his client, the profession, and the

      3 Because clear and convincing evidence supports the panel's findings
regarding these rules of professional conduct, we need not consider the
parties' remaining arguments regarding RPC 3.4 (fairness to opposing
party and counsel) or subsection (d) of RPC 8.4 (conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice).

                                      6
public. We conclude that his conduct was intentional and caused actual
injury to his client. The egregiousness of his actions alone justifies
disbarment.     See generally American Bar Association Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Compendium of Professional Responsibility
Rules and Standards, at 455 (2013 ed.) (disbarment is generally
appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts client property causing
injury or potential injury).
              The presence of aggravating circumstances further supports
this conclusion.     See SCR 102.5(1) (listing examples illustrative of
aggravating circumstances). One such circumstance is that Serota has a
prior disciplinary offense. 4 SCR 102.5(1)(a). In addition, we agree with
the state bar that his conduct evinces a dishonest or selfish motive. SCR
102.5(1)(b). Furthermore, there was a pattern of misconduct where, prior
to each misappropriation, Serota accepted several payments from the
client beforehand, and hid his misconduct afterwards until its discovery
was imminent. SCR 102.5(1)(c). Finally, Serota concedes that he
committed multiple offenses. SCR 102.5(1)(d). Even assuming arguendo
that Serota's conduct did not by itself warrant disbarment, the presence of
these aggravating circumstances would justify an increase in the degree of
discipline to be imposed. See SCR 102.5(1) (aggravating circumstances are
"any considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of
discipline to be imposed").

      4 0nAugust 18, 2008, Serota received a letter of reprimand for
violating RPC 1.1 (competence), RPC 3.1 (meritorious claims and
contentions), and RPC 5.5 (unauthorized practice of law).

                                     7
            We further conclude that, although there are some mitigating
circumstances present in this case, they do not justify a reduction in the
degree of discipline to be imposed.       See SCR 102.5(2) (listing examples
illustrative of mitigating circumstances). To begin, Serota's contention
that there is an absence of a dishonest or selfish motive is belied by his
conduct. SCR 102.5(2)(b). In addition, though his medical condition may
have contributed to personal or emotional problems, we conclude that
these mitigating circumstances are insufficient to warrant a reduction in
discipline in light of the egregiousness of his misconduct. SCR 102.5(2)(c),
(h). We further conclude that his claimed mental disabilities are largely
uncorroborated and, in any event, he failed to establish a causal
connection between them and his misconduct. SCR 102.5(2)(0(2).
Although he was cooperative and self-reported, SCR 102.5(2)(e), discovery
of his misconduct was imminent, and thus this does not warrant a
reduction in discipline. We conclude that Serota's claimed rehabilitation
is not supported by the record. SCR 102.5(2)(k). We further conclude that
he failed to demonstrate genuine remorse; instead, on appeal he attempts
to blame the victim. SCR 102.5(2)(m). Finally, his claims of having done
pro bono and other work to benefit the profession and the community are
largely unsubstantiated, and even if established would not warrant a
reduction in discipline in light of the seriousness of his misconduct. SCR
102.5(2). Under the circumstances presented here, we conclude that
disbarment is the only viable option. We agree with the panel's
recommendation in Docket No. 57960 that Serota be disbarred from the
practice of law in Nevada.

                                      8
             In light of this disposition, we conclude that the other bar
matters pending before us regarding Serota have been rendered moot.
Personhood Nev. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. , , 245 P.3d 572, 574 (2010)
(court's duty is not to render advisory opinions but to resolve actual
controversies by an enforceable judgment); NCAA v. Univ. of Nev.,    97 Nev.
56, 57, 624 P.2d 10, 10 (1981) (duty of judicial tribunal is to decide actual
controversies by a judgment that can be carried into effect, not to give
opinions on moot questions or abstract propositions or to declare principles
of law that cannot affect the matter at issue). We therefore deny as moot
the State Bar's petition in Docket No. 59551 regarding Serota's felony
conviction. Likewise, we deny as moot Serota's petition in Docket No.
60719 for dissolution of our order temporarily suspending him from the
practice of law.
                              CONCLUSION
             We conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the
panel's findings that Serota failed to safekeep his client's property, a
violation of RPC 1.15, and that he engaged in misconduct, a violation of
RPC 8.4. Moreover, the egregiousness of misappropriating $319,000 in
client funds warrants disbarment. The presence of aggravating
circumstances provides further support for the conclusion that disbarment
is the only appropriate discipline in this case. In light of our conclusion
that disbarment is the appropriate disciplinary sanction, bar counsel's
petition regarding Serota's felony conviction, and Serota's petition for
dissolution of our order temporarily suspending him from the practice of
law, are denied as moot.

                                      9
            Accordingly, Serota is hereby disbarred from the practice of
law in Nevada. 5 If he has not already done so, Serota shall pay the costs
of the disciplinary proceedings in the amount of $2,142.75 within 30 days

      5 Serota's motion to set aside the recommendation of disbarment by
the board, filed July 7, 2011, in Docket No. 57960 is denied. The State
Bar's motion to strike or, in the alternative, opposition to Serota's motion
to set aside the recommendation of disbarment by the board, filed July 20,
2011, in Docket No. 57960 is therefore denied as moot.

       Serota has communicated to this court by way of several letters
addressed to the clerk of the court. He is admonished that any request for
relief from this court must be presented by way of a formal, written
motion, not by way of a letter addressed to the clerk of the court. Weddell
v. Stewart, 127 Nev. , n.8, 261 P.3d 1080, 1085 n.8 (2011). In
addition, Serota's briefs in Docket No. 57960 contain numerous factual
assertions not supported by references to the record and references to facts
that are outside the record altogether. This is improper, and we disregard
such references. See NRAP 28(e)(1); SCR 105(3)(b); Carson Ready Mix,
Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Nev., 97 Nev. 474, 476, 635 P.2d 276, 277 (1981).
In addition, Serota has improperly attempted to supplement the record in
Docket No. 57960 with exhibits not before the disciplinary panel, which we
cannot consider. See NRAP 10; NRAP 30(b); SCR 105(3)(b); State; Dep't of
Taxation v. Kelly-Ryan, Inc., 110 Nev. 276, 282, 871 P.2d 331, 336 (1994).
We direct the clerk of this court to return, unfiled, the document entitled
"Appellant's Exhibit Supplement to Reply Brief," provisionally received on
October 19, 2011, in Docket No. 57960; we further direct the clerk of this
court to strike Exhibits 1-6 from "Appellant's Reply Brief' filed October 21,
2011, in Docket No. 57960.

      Finally, on August 4, 2011, Serota filed an opposition to the State
Bar's motion to extend the time in which to file the answering brief in
Docket No. 57960. At the time the opposition was filed, the extension of
time had already been granted; however, it would appear that the
documents may have crossed in the mail. Under these unique
circumstances, we elect to treat Serota's opposition as a motion for
reconsideration of our order granting the requested extension of time, and
we deny it. See NRAP 31(b)(3)(B); SCR 105(3)(b).

                                     10
from the date of this order. If they have not already done so, Serota and
the state bar shall comply with SCR 115 and SCR 121.1.

                                                              , C.J.

                                  Gibbons

                                  Hardesty

                                  liarraguirre

                                                              ,   J.

                                  Saitta

                                   11


57 B.R. 635 (1986)
In re Robert JOHNSON, Debtor.
Robert JOHNSON, Plaintiff,
v.
FORD MOTOR CREDIT CO., Defendant.
Bankruptcy No. 85 B 6575, Adv. No. 85 A 606.
United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.
February 6, 1986.
*636 Zalutsky & Pinski, Ltd., Chicago, Ill., for Johnson.
Law Offices of Lawrence Friedman, Steven J. Sensibar, Chicago, Ill., for Ford Motor Credit Co.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROBERT E. GINSBERG, Bankruptcy Judge.
The adversary defendant, Ford Motor Credit Co. ("FMC"), has filed a motion requesting the Court to reconsider its Memorandum and Order of October 18, 1985, In re Johnson, 53 B.R. 919 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. 1985). This dispute centers around the debtor's attempt to recover $203.68 in wages held by his employer pursuant to a wage garnishment in favor of FMC by using 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(f)(1) and 522(g). In the earlier decision, this Court denied FMC's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that FMC failed to prove that the debtor lacked an interest in the garnished wages as required by §§ 522(f)(1), (g), and (h). FMC now asks the Court to reconsider that conclusion.[1]
*637 The motion for reconsideration focuses strictly on § 522(f)(1).[2] FMC questions whether the Court properly interpreted Illinois law in concluding that the debtor might be able to recover the garnished wages under § 522(f)(1). Section 522(f)(1) permits a debtor to avoid a lien if four requirements are met: (1) the lien the debtor seeks to avoid is a judicial lien; (2) the debtor claims an exemption in the property to which the debtor is entitled under § 522(b); (3) the creditor's lien impairs the debtor's exemption; and (4) the debtor has an interest in the property. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1). See also In re Webb, 49 B.R. 646, 650 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1984).
In its prior decision, the Court found that the debtor satisfied the first three elements and that genuine issues of fact regarding the fourth element, the debtor's interest in the property, precluded summary judgment for either party. In its motion to reconsider, FMC does not challenge the Court's findings as to the first, third, and fourth requirements of § 522(f)(1). FMC argues only that this Court erroneously held that the debtor satisfied the second requirement, the debtor's right to assert an exemption in the property in question, and FMC's summary judgment motion should thus have been granted. Simply stated, FMC contends that a debtor may not assert an exemption in garnished wages under Illinois law.
In the earlier decision, the Court, after analyzing the relevant Illinois statutes and case law, held that the debtor could assert an exemption in garnished wages, at least until such wages had actually been turned over to the garnishing creditor.[3] Specifically, the Court held that the debtor could claim the garnished wages in the hands of his employer as exempt by using the Illinois personal property "wild card" exemption, § 12-1001(b),[4] under which a debtor can claim as exempt "[t]he debtor's equity interest, not to exceed $2,000 in value, in any other property." (Emphasis added). The Court interpreted the language "any other property" as allowing a debtor to claim garnished wages as exempt. In re Johnson, 53 B.R. at 923. The Court found support for this conclusion in In re Barker, 768 F.2d 191 (7th Cir.1985). In Barker, the Seventh Circuit held that the phrase "any other property" in § 12-1001(b) must be interpreted broadly to favor debtors. Id. at 196. Consequently, the Barker court allowed a debtor to stack his exemptions, i.e. to use the $2,000 wild card exemption to exempt the equity remaining in his car after he had used the $1,200 automobile exemption set out in § 12-1001(c). Id.
FMC now contends that this Court misinterpreted the wild card exemption and Barker. A debtor, according to FMC, may only use § 12-1001(b) to exempt up to $2,000 of the debtor's equity interest in any other property specifically allowed to be claimed as exempt under the Illinois exemption statute alone.[5] In FMC's view, *638 because wages are not specifically exempt under § 12-1001, but rather can be claimed as exempt under § 12-803[6] of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, in the portion of that Code dealing with wage deductions rather than the portion dealing with exemptions, the debtor cannot use the wild card exemption for garnished wages. The argument continues that since § 12-803 exempts only 85% of a debtor's gross wages (in most cases), that percentage is the most the Illinois legislature intended a debtor to be able to shield from a garnishing creditor like FMC. FMC argues that to allow a debtor like Johnson to use the $2,000 wild card exemption to exempt the 15% of wages not exempt under § 12-803 effectively wipes out FMC's ability to ever garnish any of a debtor's wages.
As support for its position, FMC refers to the fact that Barker permitted the debtor to stack the wild card exemption on top of the automobile exemption provided for in § 12-1001(c). FMC argues that Barker should not be extended to allow a debtor to stack the wild card exemption on top of an exemption provided for in another statutory section, like § 12-803 of the wage deduction statute.
The problem with accepting FMC's argument is that it runs contrary to the plain meaning of the statute. The only reasonable interpretation of the phrase "any other property" is that it means just that, any other property, i.e., that a debtor may claim the wild card exemption in any other property without limitation.[7] If the legislature had intended to limit the wild card exemption to operate only within § 12-1001, it could have stated so simply enough by providing that the debtor could exempt up to $2,000 in "any other such property." The Illinois wild card, exemption contains no such restriction, and this Court refuses to read one into the statute, particularly in light of Barker's directive to interpret § 12-1001 in a broad fashion to favor debtors. It is true Barker adjudicated the stacking of a wild card exemption upon an exemption listed in § 12-1001. However, the Barker court gave no weight to that fact. The Seventh Circuit did not limit its holding to such a situation, as FMC suggests. To the contrary, Barker mandates our conclusion that § 12-1001(b) may be used to claim any nonbusiness personal property as exempt, whether or not that property appears in the list of specific personalty exempted in § 12-1001 or in any other Illinois exemption provision.[8]
Barker's interpretation of Illinois exemption law is nothing new. The Seventh Circuit in In re Feilchenfeld, 99 F.2d 710 *639 (7th Cir.1938) broadly interpreted ch. 52, § 13 of the Illinois exemption statute, the predecessor of § 12-1001, and refused to restrict the wild card exemption to tangible property in the absence of specific statutory language. The Court's reasoning in that case is particularly relevant here:
The legislature could easily have restricted the [wild card exemption] to tangible property by so stating. The fact that it did not so limit the selection of exempt property is significant and impels us to the conclusion that it did not mean to restrict the selection. The terminology "other property" is very broad and must be held by us to include intangible as well as tangible property, where not specifically excluded by statute.
Id. at 712.
Moreover, the result the Court reaches seems to be mandated by Matter of Smith, 640 F.2d 888 (7th Cir.1981). In that case, the Seventh Circuit was asked virtually the same question the Court is asked in this case, i.e. whether the phrase "any property" in the § 522(d)(5) Bankruptcy Code wild card exemption should be read to be limited to the § 522(d) specific property list, or whether it should be given its literal meaning and applied to any property regardless of whether or not otherwise exempt. The Smith court concluded that the legislative purpose behind § 522 mandated the broader reading. Smith, 640 F.2d at 891. The fact that Illinois has since opted out of § 522(d) does not alter the congressional purpose behind § 522. The purpose of § 522 remains to foster a debtor's fresh start. Therefore, the language of the Illinois wild card provision, which is virtually identical to that of § 522(d)(5), should be given a similar broad and logical interpretation to advance the purposes underlying both Illinois and Bankruptcy Code exemption law.[9]
As previously noted, FMC alleges that our conclusion "will have effectively done away with wage deduction in Illinois." FMC's Motion to Reconsider at 4. Its argument is that debtors will be allowed to exempt up to 85% of their wages under § 12-803 and then use § 12-1001(b) to exempt the remainder that is subject to wage deduction. There is no question the decision in this case will allow some debtors to exempt 100% of their wages and thus avoid garnishment by stacking these two exemptions. However, there are several observations worth making in that regard. First, this result not only is warranted by the clear statutory language and Seventh Circuit case law, such as Barker and Smith, but in fact is mandated by those authorities. Second, the overall statutory pattern supports this result. Section 12-803 states that the "maximum wages . . . subject to collection under a deduction order" shall not exceed 15% of the debtor's gross weekly pay. This language clearly does not prohibit debtors from exempting more than 85% of their wages. It only prevents an employer from deducting more than 15% of their wages. This statute is an exemption statute. It protects debtors and their families, not creditors, as FMC claims. Bliss v. Smith, 78 Ill. 359, 361 (1875); General Finance Corp. v. Rainer, 20 Ill. App.2d 192, 195, 155 N.E.2d 833, 835 (1st Dist.1958); Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Cowles, 127 Ill.App. 456, 461-62 (1906). As a result, it is wholly consistent with § 12-803 for this Court to permit debtors to exempt more than 85% of their wages by additionally claiming the wild card exemption.
Third, it is the clear intent of § 12-1001 to allow a debtor to retain an estate of up to $2,000 in personal property over and above the specific list of personal property contained in that provision. Personal property exceeding the specific personal property exemptions plus $2,000 in any other personal property the debtor chooses should be made available to creditors. In other words, the debtor should be allowed to save *640 $2,000 and no more under the wild card exemption. The Court's interpretation of § 12-1001 reaches exactly that result. The debtor in this case will be able to keep up to $2,000 in personal property, including the garnished wages, as exempt and no more. If his equity interest in his personal property other than that which is otherwise exempt exceeds $2,000 in value, FMC and his other creditors will be able to realize on their claims from those assets. If the debtor's equity interest in all of his personal property other than that which is otherwise exempt does not exceed $2,000, the debtor will get to keep all of it, including the garnished wages, to the exclusion of his creditors. That is the precise result that both Congress in § 522 and the Illinois legislature in § 12-1001 intended.
FMC argues that this result effectively wipes out wage garnishments in Illinois. That is simply not true. It only affects wage garnishments where the debtor's interest in nonexempt personal property does not exceed $2,000. Where the debtor's nonexempt personal property exceeds $2,000, the debtor will have to choose between saving wages and saving other property. See § 12-1002. In effect, the poor and destitute, i.e. those without significant additional assets, are protected as are their families. Those with significant additional assets are not protected. This appears to be a rational legislative scheme, and the Court sees no reason not to implement it.
Finally, the Court cannot accept FMC's contention that a debtor may not stack the wild card exemption on top of the wage deduction exemption because § 12-803 lacks language specifically allowing a debtor to do so. FMC's restrictive reading is inappropriate. Section 12-803, like § 12-1001, must be construed broadly to favor debtors. See Bliss v. Smith, 78 Ill. 359, 361 (1875); Davis v. Siegel, Cooper & Co., 80 Ill.App. 278, 279 (1899). See also State Bank of Antioch v. Nelson, 132 Ill.App.3d 120, 122, 87 Ill.Dec. 476, 478, 477 N.E.2d 77, 79 (2d Dist.1985). The Court finds much more persuasive the lack of language in § 12-803 prohibiting the stacking of exemptions.
The statutory history of both §§ 12-903 and 12-1001 supports the holding that the debtor may claim the wild card exemption in garnished wages. Section 12-803 was enacted as part of the new Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, effective July 1, 1982. Prior to that time, wage deductions were governed by Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 62, § 71 et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1981). Section 73 was the counterpart of § 12-803. Prior to October 1, 1977, § 73 provided in part that "[a]ll compensation above the exempt amount is subject to collection under a wage deduction order." That statutory language, which supports FMC's position, was deleted by the Illinois legislature with the passage of P.A. 80-724, § 1. Neither the former provision nor similar language has been inserted into the statute since that time. This strongly suggests that the legislature intends to allow a debtor to claim a wage exemption above the statutorily exempt amount of 85% of gross wages.
Section 12-1001 also was enacted about the same time as the new Illinois Code of Civil Procedure.[10] Previously, a debtor claimed exemptions under Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 52, § 13 (Smith-Hurd 1981). Prior to January 1, 1970, § 13 provided in part that the debtor could claim a wild card exemption of up to $300 worth of property "[p]rovided, that such selection and exemption shall not be made by the debtor, or allowed to him or her from any other money, salary or wages due him or her from any person or persons or corporation whatever." That statutory language, which would support FMC's position, was deleted by the Illinois legislature. From January 1, 1970 to January 1, 1982, former § 13 provided that a debtor may *641 exempt up to $300 worth of property, "including money, and salary or wages due him." See P.A. 76-1060, § 1; P.A. 81-241, § 1. That language was replaced by the enactment of a new Illinois exemption law, P.A. 82-685, § 2. Section 13(1)(b) of that law contained the same language as that in current § 12-1001(b), allowing a debtor to exempt up to $2,000 of an equity interest in "any other property." This Court believes that the history of § 12-1001 shows an affirmative legislative intent to allow a debtor to use the wild card provision to exempt wages. In 1970, the Illinois legislature repealed the language in § 13 prohibiting a wild card exemption in wages. Section 13 specifically permitted such an exemption for the next 12 years. While from 1982 on the wild card exemption statute has been silent regarding the availability of its use to exempt wages, it does allow a wild card exemption in "any other property" with no reinstatement of the prior prohibition on its use for wages. This Court must interpret the current statute's silence regarding wages in a manner consistent with Smith and Barker. Therefore, the conclusion is inevitable that rather than intending to return to pre-1970 exemption law with the 1982 omission, the legislature did not deem it necessary to continue the explicit authority allowing a debtor to use the wild card exemption for wages because the unlimited language "any other property" obviously included wages.[11]

CONCLUSION
FMC asks this Court to read §§ 12-803 and 12-1001 in a restrictive fashion. The law is clear and to the contrary. Exemption laws are to be read broadly in favor of debtors and their families. If FMC does not like the result which flows from such a reading, this Court is not the proper forum to restrict a debtor's clear statutory exemption rights. Only the Illinois legislature can add language to those statutes to effect the result sought by FMC. This Court cannot ignore the statutes' language, rules of statutory construction, and the Feilchenfeld, Smith, and Barker directives. Therefore, the Court adheres to its ruling that the debtor may claim his garnished wages as exempt under § 12-1001(b) and denies FMC's motion for reconsideration.[12]
NOTES
[1]  While it might appear that this Court has devoted an inordinate amount of time and effort to a dispute involving only $203.68, in fact, this case is representative of a chronic problem. My brethern in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois and I have repeatedly been asked to rule on whether a debtor can use §§ 522(f)(1), 522(g), and (h) to recover garnished wages as exempt. The Court commends the parties in this case for their spirited advocacy despite the small dollar amount in issue.
[2]  In its prior decision, the Court held that the debtor could not use §§ 522(g) and (h) on the facts of this case because the $600 limit of § 547(c)(7) would prevent a trustee from avoiding this $203.68 garnishment as a preference. FMC, of course, does not ask the Court to reconsider that conclusion.
[3]  In re Johnson, 53 B.R. at 923. Because Illinois has opted out of the Bankruptcy Code substantive exemption provision, § 522(d), Illinois debtors are confined to those exemptions available to them under Illinois law. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b); Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 110, § 12-1201 (Smith-Hurd 1985).
[4]  Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 110, § 12-1001(b) (Smith-Hurd 1985).
[5]  Under § 12-1001, which is the primary Illinois personal property exemption provision, an individual debtor may claim the following specifically identified types of personal property as exempt, subject to some restrictions: necessary wearing apparel; bible; school books; family pictures of the debtor and the debtor's dependents; automobile; implements, professional books or tools of the debtor's trade; professionally prescribed health aids; life insurance annuities; various financial benefits; alimony support payments; pension plan payments; crime victim reparation law awards; wrongful death payments; life insurance payments; and personal injury payments. In addition, as previously noted, this same statutory provision contains a "wild card" provision allowing each individual debtor to claim up to $2,000 in "any other property" as exempt. Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 110, § 12-1001(b) (Smith-Hurd 1985).
[6]  Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 110, § 12-803 (Smith-Hurd 1985).
[7]  The only specific restriction on the wild card exemption set out in § 12-1001 is that "[t]he personal property exemptions set forth in this Section shall apply only to individuals and only to personal property which is used for personal rather than business purposes." It has not been alleged that the debtor will use the wages subject to the wage deduction order for business rather than personal purposes. Furthermore, it is clear from the introductory sentence to § 12-1001 that the wild card exemption is limited to personal property of a debtor. Illinois law contains another provision providing a $7,500 exemption for real property of a debtor used as a residence. See Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 110, § 12-901 (Smith-Hurd 1985). The question of whether the wild card exemption could be used to increase the exemption for personal property used as a residence, e.g., the beneficial interest in a land trust, from $7,500 to $9,500 is not now before the Court.
[8]  Thus, it is clear that a debtor can use the $2,000 wild card to exempt things that nowhere appear on the § 12-1001 list at all or in any other Illinois exemption provisions, such as cash in a bank account or the right to receive an income tax refund. See In re Cusanno, 17 B.R. 879, 881 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1982); In re Barnes, 14 B.R. 788, 790 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1981); In re Schuler, 13 B.R. 478, 480 (Bankr.D.Mont.1981).
[9]  In fact, the only difference between the two for purposes of this case is that § 522(d)(5) refers to "any property" while the Illinois wild card refers to "any other property." The word "other" seems to clearly allow a debtor to go outside of the exemption law itself to find personal property to claim as exempt.
[10]  A new Illinois exemption law, with similar provisions to the current § 12-1001, was enacted effective January 1, 1982. See P.A. 82-685, § 2. However, a legislative gaffe reinstated the former exemption provisions when the new Illinois Code of Civil Procedure was adopted effective July 1, 1982. This error was corrected with the repeal of the former exemption law and replacement with the newer, more generous version of § 12-1001 effective July 13, 1982. See P.A. 82-280, § 12-1001; P.A. 82-783, Art. III, § 43.
[11]  The Court is aware of the fact that § 12-803 and all of its predecessors provide that "[t]his provision (and no other) applies irrespective of the place where the compensation was earned or payable and the State where the employee resides." The phrase "and no other" does not prohibit a debtor's use of the wild card exemption in addition to § 12-803 to exempt wages. This is true for several reasons. First, as stated supra, Illinois law specifically allowed a debtor to use the wild card exemption for wages from 1970 to 1982. See former Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 52, § 13 (Smith-Hurd 1981). Arguably, until October 1, 1977, this exemption could not be used to exempt garnished wages in excess of the statutory amount prescribed by former § 73 because that section provided that wages above the exempt amount were subject to wage deduction orders. Once that language was deleted, however, there was no impediment to a debtor using both §§ 13 and 73 to exempt wages. Thus, the legislature in continuing the use of the phrase "and no other" in § 12-803 and its predecessors could not have intended to preclude a debtor from claiming an exemption under the wild card provision. Cf. Deschauer v. Hilt, 105 Ill. App.3d 657, 660, 61 Ill.Dec. 399, 402, 434 N.E.2d 552, 555 (2d Dist.1982) ("[w]e find no suggestion in any other part of the exemption statutes, or in the garnishment statutes (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 62, par. 33 et seq.) that the exemptions of section 13 should not apply in garnishment proceedings.") Second, it is much more logical to read the above-quoted sentence as a whole and interpret it to mean that the provisions of § 12-803 (and its predecessors), as opposed to similar laws of other states, apply to set maximum wage deductions even though the debtor earned or was paid the wages outside of Illinois or resides in another state. See Taylor v. Taylor, 44 Ill.2d 139, 141-42, 254 N.E.2d 445, 446 (1969).
[12]  As a necessary corollary, the Court adheres to its ruling that FMC failed to show that the debtor lacks a sufficient interest in the garnished wages to seek a turnover order pursuant to §§ 522(g) or (h). See In re Johnson, 53 B.R. at 925. FMC's motion for reconsideration in that regard also is denied.


544 U.S. 1057
DAMESv.UNITED STATES.
No. 04-6006.
Supreme Court of United States.
May 23, 2005.

1
Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


480 F.2d 922
*Connerv.Henderson
73-1555
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Fifth Circuit
July 20, 1973

1
N.D.Ga.

2
---------------

* Summary Calendar cases; Rule 18, 5 Cir.; see Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of


               IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                       FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

                           No. 99-40936
                        Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                         Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ONE PIECE OF REAL PROPERTY
LOCATED IN HIDALGO COUNTY, TEXAS,

                                         Defendant,

TERESA MENDIOLA,

                                         Claimant-Appellant,

                       - - - - - - - - - -
          Appeal from the United States District Court
               for the Southern District of Texas
                      USDC No. M-97-CV-283
                       - - - - - - - - - -
                         August 22, 2000

Before KING, Chief Judge, and POLITZ and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

     Teresa Mendiola appeals from a jury’s finding that she knew

of and consented to drug trafficking activity on her property.

In accordance with the jury’s finding on this subject, the

district court ordered the forfeiture of Mendiola’s property

pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7).   Mendiola argues that the

district court abused its discretion when it did not include the

     *
        Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
                           No. 99-40936
                                -2-

requirement of actual knowledge in the jury verdict form as

requested by her.   In her notice of appeal, Mendiola indicated

that she was seeking review from the district court’s denial of

her motion for a new trial, but she did not designate the

underlying judgment for appeal.   Nevertheless, the Government

addressed the underlying judgment in its brief and was not

prejudiced by Mendiola’s failure to comply strictly with Fed. R.

App. P. 3(c).   See Turnbull v. United States, 929 F.2d 173, 176-

77 (5th Cir. 1991).

     Although not included in the written verdict form, the

district court orally instructed the jury that it must find

actual as opposed to constructive knowledge.   See United States

v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232, 245 (5th Cir. 1998).   Likewise,

Mendiola’s attorney emphasized to the jury during closing

argument that the knowledge must be actual rather than

constructive.   See Bernard v. IBP, Inc. of Nebraska, 154 F.3d

259, 265 (5th Cir. 1998); Consolidated Cigar Co. v. Texas

Commerce Bank, 749 F.2d 1169, 1173 (5th Cir. 1985).   The district

court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Mendiola’s

request that the term “actual knowledge” be included in the

verdict form.   See McCoy v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 371, 375 (5th

Cir. 2000).   Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.