758 F.2d 1535
Waylon Rex VAUGHN, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.Mary Lee SHANNON, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 84-7421.
United States Court of Appeals,Eleventh Circuit.
April 29, 1985.

1
Julian McPhillips, Jr., Montgomery, Ala., for plaintiff-appellant.

2
G.R. Trawick, Randall B. James, Montgomery, Ala., for defendants-appellees.

3
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.

4
Before HENDERSON and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges, and ALLGOOD*, District Judge.

ALLGOOD, District Judge:

5
Appellant Vaughn complains of the grant of summary judgment by the district court in favor of the appellees Mary Lee Shannon, et al.  In the district court, Vaughn sought relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for violation of civil and constitutional rights and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985 for conspiracy to abridge plaintiff's civil rights.  Our review of the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and our study of the applicable law convinces us that the district court's decision was correct and we affirm.

6
Appellant raises two issues on appeal.  Vaughn claims that he has a property interest in his job with the Alabama Department of Mental Health, which entitles him to due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.  He further claims that he is entitled to such due process by virtue of a liberty interest in his good name and reputation.

7
Plaintiff began his employment with the Department of Mental Health in August 1974.  He rose through the ranks from a position in the Administrative Transitional Services, to Mental Health Consultant, and ultimately to Chief, Evaluation of Community Programs.

8
On May 3, 1983, plaintiff was informed that he was being reassigned from the position of Chief, Evaluation of Community Programs, to the position of Mental Health Consultant II.  The reasons given were inadequate supervision of and communication with the staff, failure to take responsibility for decision making, minimal participation in on-site reviews of community programs, and poor analysis of deficiencies in community programs.

9
Following the proposed reassignment, plaintiff requested and was granted the right to a hearing on his reassignment before a duly-appointed, independent hearing officer, Mr. Frank Caskey.  The hearing was conducted on July 1 and July 5, 1983.  On August 1, 1983, Mr. Caskey, after thoroughly reviewing the evidence submitted to him at the hearing, entered his findings that the evidence was not sufficient to warrant plaintiff's reassignment and recommended that plaintiff be reinstated to his former position.

10
Mr. Caskey's recommendation was then given to Ken Wallis, the Acting Commissioner of the Department of Mental Health, for his decision.  Commissioner Wallis, who had maintained the final authority to decide the matter, reviewed the transcript of the hearing and the findings and recommendation of Mr. Caskey, and ordered that plaintiff be reassigned to the position of Mental Health Consultant II.  The grounds stated for this reassignment were management needs and plaintiff's use of racial slurs when referring to a particular employee, a practice which Commissioner Wallis found offensive and an obstacle to effective supervision and job performance.

11
Appellant claims a property interest in his job with the Alabama Department of Mental Health, entitling him to due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.  According to the Alabama Merit System Act, Alabama Code, Sec. 36-26-1 et seq. there are three classifications for state employees.  The officers for "exempt" service, and the positions for "unclassified" service are specifically defined.  Section 36-26-2 states that "classified" positions are all those officers and employees who have not been placed in the unclassified or exempt service.  Because Vaughn's position of Chief, Evaluation of Community Programs was not specifically placed in the unclassified or exempt categories, he claims that this position is a classified one, giving him the required property interest to entitle him to due process.  He relies upon Wyatt v. Bronner, 500 F.Supp. 817 (1980), which involved former employees of the State Building Commission who claimed they had a property interest, sufficient for due process protection, in their jobs with the Commission.  In that case, the court stated that "[d]efendants can point to no place in this article or elsewhere where plaintiffs are 'placed in the unclassified service or exempt service.'    Not having been so placed, the statute compels this court to conclude that the plaintiffs are classified employees and are entitled to the type of hearing required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution."Appellant's reliance on these Code sections and Wyatt v. Bronner, supra, without consideration of later enacted Code sections is faulty.  Alabama Code Sec. 22-50-1 et seq. is determinative of this issue.  According to Sec. 22-50-40, the Alabama Mental Health Board is authorized to establish personnel policies and salary schedules for its employees.  Sec.   22-50-41 states that the "[p]ersonnel policies may be established so as to include under the state merit system certain positions in the department of mental health and so as to exclude other positions ..."  Therefore, the Director of the Mental Health Department has the authority to determine which positions would be included in the Merit System and which would be excluded.

12
Ken Wallis, Commissioner of the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation;  Henry Ervin, Personnel Director of the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation;  and Halycon Vance Ballard, State Personnel Director, submitted affidavits to the effect that plaintiff's position was within the exempt service.  The District Court cited Veal v. James, No. CA 81-124-N (M.D.Ala., filed October 20, 1981).  In that case, the plaintiff was terminated from a position with the Department of Mental Health and filed a suit under Section 1983 alleging a deprivation of property without due process.  The court considered the affidavits of the defendants, which stated that plaintiff was an exempt employee, and Alabama Code Secs. 22-50-41 and 22-50-16, and concluded that plaintiff was exempt.  The same result is due here.  The Alabama Mental Health Board has the authority to establish personnel policies and the authority to include or exclude certain positions from the Merit System in so setting the policy.  Vaughn's position as Chief, Evaluation of Community Programs, was therefore exempt from the Merit System, which deprived him of the property interest that would entitle him to due process.

13
A second issue on appeal is raised by Appellant's claim that he is entitled to the protection of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment based on a liberty interest in his good name and reputation.  Whether a liberty interest has been violated so as to trigger Fourteenth Amendment due process rights can be determined by looking at the tests set forth in Wells v. Doland, 711 F.2d 670 (5th Cir.1983).  According to that case, the employee must show "not only that he has been stigmatized, but that he was stigmatized in or as a result of the discharge process.   Dennis v. S & S Consolidated Rural High School District, 577 F.2d 338, 341 (5th Cir.1978);  that the charges were made public, Ortwein v. Mackey, 511 F.2d 696, 699 (5th Cir.1975);  and that he was denied a meaningful hearing to clear his name.   In re Selcraig [705 F.2d 789], at 795-796."    A footnote in the Wells case cites Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 628, 97 S.Ct. 882, 884, 51 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977), as requiring "a finding that the charges not only seriously damaged the employee's standing and association in the community or foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities, but that the charges are false."

14
In the instant case, the reasons given by Mr. Wallis for plaintiff's reassignment were management needs and plaintiff's use of racial slurs toward a subordinate which the Commissioner felt created permanent barriers to effective supervision and efficient job performance.  The District Court held that he was not deprived of his liberty interests when initially charged with inadequate supervision and communication with his staff, minimal participation in on-site reviews of community programs, and poor analysis of deficiencies in community programs, because the Hearing Examiner resolved each of these charges in favor of the plaintiff.  There is no indication that the reasons set forth for Mr. Vaughn's new job assignment--management needs and plaintiff's use of racial slurs toward a subordinate--seriously damaged his standing in the community or foreclosed his opportunities for other employment.  Further, plaintiff admits having made racial slurs toward an employee in referring to Howard Blalock as "Blacklock".  The Wells tests were clearly not met.  Therefore, plaintiff cannot be said to have been deprived of a liberty interest in his good name and reputation, giving rise to due process protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.

15
We affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

16
AFFIRMED.

*
 Honorable Clarence W. Allgood, U.S. District Judge, Northern District of Alabama, sitting by designation


626 So.2d 1273 (1993)
CENTURY 21-REEVES REALTY, INC., and Iris Reeves,
v.
McCONNELL CADILLAC, INC., and General Motors Corporation.
1920534.
Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 23, 1993.
Rehearing Denied August 27, 1993.
*1274 John W. Parker, Mobile, for appellants.
M. Lloyd Roebuck, Mobile, for McConnell Cadillac, Inc.
Richard T. Dorman and Patricia J. Ponder of McRight, Jackson, Dorman, Myrick & Moore, Mobile, for General Motors Corp.
HOUSTON, Justice.
The plaintiffs, Century 21-Reeves Realty, Inc., and its president, Iris Reeves ("Century 21"), appeal from separate summary judgments for the defendants, General Motors Corporation ("GM") and McConnell Cadillac, Inc. ("McConnell"), in this action seeking damages for breach of warranty, fraud, and negligence. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
The following material facts in this case are undisputed: Century 21 leased a Cadillac DeVille automobile from General Motors Acceptance Corporation ("GMAC") in 1985. GM had built the automobile and sold it to GMAC. The automobile was equipped with an "HT-4100" engine. GM had had a problem with this kind of engine in that it would leak coolant slowly around a gasket into the engine's crank-case, thereby reducing the lubricating capabilities of the engine's oil and causing damage. However, GM automobiles equipped with this kind of engine that were built midway through 1985, such as the one purchased by Century 21, were serviced at the factory before shipment, to correct this problem. GM adopted a program whereby notices were to be mailed to owners and dealers detailing the potential problem with the HT-4100 engines. Owners whose automobiles had not been serviced at the factory were to be mailed notices stating that dealer services were available to correct the problem and informing them that GM was providing *1275 an extended limited warranty on the engine. That warranty covered, for 48 months or 50,000 miles, whichever occurred first from the date the automobile was placed in service, repairs or adjustments to the covered components of the engine that were needed because of defects in material or workmanship. It also provided:
"General Motors does not authorize any person to create for it any other obligation or liability in connection with these cars. Any implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose applicable to the engine components covered by this limited warranty is limited in duration to the duration of the written warranty."
(Emphasis in the warranty document.) Owners whose automobiles had been serviced at the factory were to be mailed similar notices and were also to receive the extended engine warranty.
When Century 21 leased the automobile from GMAC, it was covered by the extended limited warranty on the engine as well as by a 12-month, 12,000 mile, general GM limited warranty. Century 21 also purchased a five-year, unlimited mileage, extended service contract covering the automobile. Although not a warranty, that contract covered the cost of certain repairs that might be made to the automobile. Upon expiration of its lease in 1990, Century 21 purchased the automobile from GMAC. Neither GM nor McConnell was involved with the negotiations leading up to Century 21's purchase of the automobile. Shortly after Century 21 had purchased the automobile, the engine overheated and was damaged as a result. Although the GM limited warranties, as well as the extended service contract, had expired by the time the automobile's engine failed, GM and McConnell offered to replace the engine at no cost to Century 21. Century 21 rejected this offer.
Century 21 sued, claiming against GM breach of warranty and fraud, alleging that GM had breached both express and implied warranties covering the automobile and that GM had suppressed material information concerning the problem that it had had with the HT-4100 engine. Against McConnell, Century 21 claimed fraud and negligence, alleging that McConnell had also suppressed material information concerning the automobile's engine and that McConnell had negligently failed to repair the automobile.
Our standard of review in this case is well settled. The summary judgments were proper if there was no genuine issue of material fact and each defendant was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, A.R.Civ.P. The burden was on the defendants to make a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact existed and that they were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. If they made that showing, then the burden shifted to Century 21 to rebut that showing by presenting evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact. In determining whether there was a genuine issue of material fact, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Century 21 and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the defendants. Knight v. Alabama Power Co., 580 So.2d 576 (Ala. 1991).
After carefully reviewing the briefs of the parties and the applicable portions of the record, we conclude that the summary judgment for GM was proper as to Century 21's breach of warranty claims. The undisputed evidence shows that the express GM limited warranties covering the automobile had expired by the time the engine failed. Furthermore, pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 7-2-316 ("Exclusion or modification of warranties"), GM had expressly limited the duration of any implied warranties of merchantability (§ 7-2-314) and fitness for a particular purpose (§ 7-2-315) to the duration of the extended limited warranty on the engine.
We also conclude that the summary judgment for GM was proper as to Century 21's fraud claim. The undisputed evidence shows that Century 21 purchased the automobile from GMAC, not from GM. GM was not involved with the negotiations leading up to Century 21's purchase of the automobile from GMAC. GM, which had no confidential relationship with Century 21 (in fact, GM had no contacts with Century 21 at all), had serviced Century 21's automobile at the factory *1276 to correct the problem with the engine. Although GM may have misjudged the effectiveness of its efforts to rectify the problem with the engine's gasket, we can find no basis under the circumstances of this case upon which to impose a duty on GM's part to disclose information concerning the automobile directly to Century 21. See Cobb v. Southeast Toyota Distributors, Inc., 569 So.2d 395 (Ala.1990).[1]
Century 21's fraud claim against McConnell was based on allegations that McConnell had failed to inform Century 21 of the problem that GM had had with the HT-4100 engine. The evidence shows that Iris Reeves's husband, A.C. Reeves, took the automobile to McConnell on August 16, 1990, shortly before Century 21 purchased it from GMAC. Reeves testified that he told a McConnell service representative that the air conditioner and radio antenna were not working properly. He further testified that he told the representative that the automobile's "coolant light" had come on and that he asked that the automobile be "checked out" before Century 21 purchased it. The repair order prepared by the service representative contained no reference to a complaint concerning the "coolant light"; it did state that the "A/C light [had come] on." Mr. Reeves testified that when he picked up the automobile he was told that it was "ready." Mr. Reeves made no specific inquiries as to the mechanical work that had been performed on the automobile. The air conditioner and the radio antenna were repaired. Subsequently, the engine on the automobile overheated and was damaged as a result.
After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the summary judgment for McConnell was proper as to Century 21's fraud claim. The undisputed evidence shows that the engine in Century 21's automobile had been serviced by GM at the factory to correct the problem caused by the leaking gasket. McConnell, which had been notified of that fact by GM, was never informed by Century 21, before August 16, 1990, of any problem with the automobile's engine that could be associated with the engine's coolant leaking into the crankcase. McConnell adamantly disputed Mr. Reeves's testimony that he told its service representative about the "coolant light." Mr. Reeves testified that he never said anything to the representative about the "A/C light." Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorably to Century 21, we must conclude for purposes of this appeal that Mr. Reeves told the service representative that the "coolant light" had come on and that the representative misstated on the repair order that the "A/C light" had come on. The obvious result of this "failure to communicate" would have been that McConnell would not check, or would not adequately check, the automobile's cooling system. However, we can see no evidentiary support for Century 21's allegations that McConnell had specific information concerning the automobile's engine that would have given rise to a duty on its part to inform Century 21 about the problem that GM had had with the HT-4100 engine.
We disagree, however, with the trial court's entry of the summary judgment as to Century 21's negligence claim against McConnell. As previously noted, the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Century 21, indicates that Mr. Reeves informed McConnell, through its service representative, that the automobile's "coolant light" had come on. Although McConnell disputes Mr. Reeves's testimony, a fact question was presented as to whether McConnell's service representative exercised reasonable care under the circumstances in transcribing Mr. Reeves's complaint onto the repair order so that the engine's cooling system could be thoroughly inspected.
We note McConnell's argument that, because the engine was never "broken down" for an examination as to the exact cause of the engine's failure, the summary judgment should be affirmed on the ground that Century 21 failed to present any expert testimony as to the proximate cause of the damage (i.e., *1277 evidence showing that the engine was damaged as a result of the engine's coolant leaking around the gasket and into the crankcase). Initially, we point out that McConnell apparently presented no evidence tending to show that its alleged negligence was not the proximate cause of the engine's damage. Therefore, the burden never shifted to Century 21 to present any evidence concerning the proximate cause of the damage. In any event, the record contains the following testimony of Edwin McConnell:
"A.... At which time I turned to my service manager, Bill, I said `Bill, is that correct?' And Bill said, `That's correct, approximately; Cadillac has agreed to pay for half of the repairs on Mrs. Reeves's engine.' And I immediately said to Mrs. Reeves at that time, `Well, Mrs. Reeves, don't worry about it, McConnell Cadillac will pay for the rest of the engine repair, whatever that happens to be.'
"Q. Let me stop you there. Was the fifteen hundred dollarswas that going to be her part or was that the total amount that would be split between GM and
"A. You have to keep in mind at this time we had not gone into Mrs. Reeves's engine.
"Q. Okay.
"A. We strictly knew that we had a water and oil condition. So that maximum amount of the repair to the engine alone, if you replace the engine and put a new engine in that has a three-year, fifty-thousand-mile warranty, is three thousand dollars."
In addition, Harvey Totsch, an employee of McConnell, testified as follows:
"Q. Anything else you recall about that conversation [with Iris Reeves]?
"A. Well, other than we gave her an estimated price of what the repairs could amount to, approximately $3,000.
"Q. Okay. Do you remember if that was to repair the engine or replace the engine?
"A. Well, it could run either way. Sometimes when you get involved in the repair of the engine it could run more than the replacement, you know, cost. Sometimes it's easier to replacecheaper to replace the engine.
"But we wouldn't know anything on this particular repair unless we tore the engine down and inspected it to see how much internal damage was done
"Q. Okay.
"A. from the coolant getting into the oil."
This testimony, which was properly before the trial court when it considered the summary judgment motion, was sufficient to present a fact question as to the proximate cause of the damage to the engine.
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment for GM was proper and, therefore, it is due to be affirmed. The summary judgment for McConnell was proper as to the fraud claim and, therefore, it is due to be affirmed as to that claim; however, the summary judgment for McConnell was improper as to the negligence claim and it is due to be reversed as to that claim.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX and SHORES, JJ., concur.
KENNEDY, J., concurs in the result.
NOTES
[1]  The record shows that GM adopted a plan to notify owners of record of automobiles equipped with the HT-4100 engine of the problem that it had had with the gaskets. The record is unclear; however, as to whether GMAC or Century 21 actually received specific notice of the engine's problematic history.


356 F.Supp. 1048 (1972)
William Donovan RUNDLE, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
Frank I. MADIGAN et al., Defendants.
Nos. C-70-334, C-70-333.
United States District Court, N. D. California.
November 20, 1972.
*1049 Richards, Watson & Hemmerling, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiffs.
Richard J. Moore, County Counsel, Crosby, Heafey, Roach & May, Professional *1050 Corp., Oakland, Cal., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM
PECKHAM, District Judge.
Defendants have moved to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment on counts 1 and 5 of plaintiffs' amended complaint. These counts allege causes of action based on violations of plaintiffs' civil rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3). Plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment on count 1. In addition to their other contentions, defendants interpose the defense of sovereign immunity against all the acts complained of. The complaint alleges the shooting of plaintiffs by the defendant Riche and asserts claims against the other defendants based on their improper supervision of Riche.

1. Sovereign Immunity.

It is important to note at the outset that the Sheriff may not be held vicariously liable for the acts of his subordinates. This rule was set down by the Ninth Circuit in Hesselgesser v. Reilly, 440 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1971). Thus, if the Sheriff is to be held liable for any injuries sustained by the plaintiffs, there must be a showing that the Sheriff by his own acts violated one of the Civil Rights Acts in question.
Plaintiffs allege that Sheriff Madigan committed several acts for which he should be held liable:
"a. Failing to adequately plan to deal with the events that occurred in Berkeley on May 15, 1969 in spite of his having been informed by his own intelligence network well in advance of May 15, 1969, that a riot could be expected if any efforts were made to clear People's Park;
b. Failing to utilize any meaningful criteria or standards in selecting which members of the Alameda County Sheriff's Department would be used in Berkeley on May 15, 1969 in spite of such warning;
c. Selecting deputy sheriffs who were essentially untrained in riot control work, and in some instances, still on a probationary status, to work in Berkeley on May 15, 1969;
d. Issuing riot guns and double-aught buckshot to these essentially untrained and probationary deputies; and
e. Failing to provide any leadership or control of these deputies once the guns and ammunition had been issued."
The defendant Madigan argues that these acts are discretionary and should be protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Court disagrees. "Discretionary acts" are narrow in scope; for example, "discretionary acts" for the purpose of applying the doctrine are narrower in breadth than acts within the scope of authority. Courts have been extremely reluctant to invoke the immunity doctrine in § 1983 cases. See, e. g., Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1972); Carter v. Carlson, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 388, 447 F.2d 358 (1971).
The defendant's own authority likewise seems to go against him. Boreta v. Kirby, 328 F.Supp. 670, 673 (N.D.Cal. 1971), asks: "[I]s the act complained of the result of a judgment or decision which it is necessary that the Government official be free to make without fear or threat of vexatious or fictitious suits and alleged personal liability?" In the instant case, the answer to this query is no.

2. The Section 1985(3) Claim.

Several elements constitute a § 1985 conspiracy claim. One is that the plaintiffs have been deprived of "equal protection of the law" or of "equal privileges and immunities under the law." Due process violations alone do not suffice. Defendants argue that plaintiffs cannot show such a deprivation of equal *1051 treatment, citing Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 661, 71 S.Ct. 937, 95 L.Ed. 1253 (1950). See also Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 L. Ed. 497 (1944); Egan v. City of Aurora, 291 F.2d 706 (1961).
Plaintiffs argue in response that either 1) § 1985 covers due process violations as well; or 2) they have made a sufficient showing of discriminatory treatment to withstand defendants' motion for summary judgment. The only case they cite to support their position is Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971), which reverses Collins to the extent that § 1985 now applies to private individuals. Thus, under Collins, the plaintiffs must still show some denial of equal protection to make out a § 1983 claim. This they have failed to do. Summary judgment is therefore granted as to all defendants on all claims based on § 1985(3).

3. Section 1983 Conspiracy Claim.

There are two questions here. First, can one validly make a conspiracy claim under § 1983? Second, if so, are there sufficient issues of fact to defeat either side's motion for summary judgment on this issue?
The Ninth Circuit has ruled that a plaintiff can state a civil cause of action for conspiracy under § 1983. Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962); Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959). The former case involved a mental patient in a state hospital who was allegedly improperly held in the hospital; the latter case involved a suit against city police officers for unreasonable searches and seizures. The appellate courts in both cases held that it was unnecessary to allege a conspiracy to deny the plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws; a conspiracy to deprive them of their civil rights without due process was sufficient to state a claim under § 1983. See also Mizell v. North Broward Hospital District, 427 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1970).
Clearly, conspiracy must still involve an allegation and proof of purpose. Plaintiffs argue that the language of Cohen v. Norris eliminates the purpose requirement. This Court disagrees. However, although plaintiffs' allegations and facts concerning purpose are skimpy, the requisite purpose may be inferred therefrom. Defendants' motions for dismissal or summary judgment on the § 1983 claim are denied.

4. Section 1983 Tort Claim.

In claim 5 of their amended complaint, plaintiffs allege that "These acts [of misfeasance by the Sheriff, noted above] were the result of a conscious indifference or disregard of the possible consequences to the plaintiff . . . ." The immediate result of the actions of the sheriff and deputies was the shooting of plaintiffs by officer Riche. Plaintiffs allege that that shooting deprived plaintiffs of their rights to life and liberty without due process of law, in violation of the 14th Amendment. The actual deprivation of a constitutional right is therefore pleaded, without regard to the actions of Riche's superiors.
Having established that the superiors acted under color of state law, and that the plaintiffs were deprived of a constitutional right, the question becomes, did the actions of the supervisors directly cause that deprivation? Again, the answer seems clear; Riche fired on plaintiffs and inflicted their injury only because, according to plaintiffs, he was placed on duty and given the weapons and instructions to use them by his superiors. In the language of § 1983, the superiors "cause[d] [plaintiffs] to be subjected . . . to the deprivation of . . . rights . . . secured by the Constitution and laws . . . ."
Since Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), § 1983 has been read "against the background of tort liability mak[ing] a man responsible for the natural consequences of his acts." 365 U.S. at 187, 81 S.Ct. *1052 at 484.[1] Courts have put to rest former notions that relief under § 1983 depended upon proof that the deprivation complained of was the result of the intentional act of the defendant. See, e. g., Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 787-789 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. den. 396 U.S. 901, 90 S.Ct. 210, 24 L.Ed.2d 177. Defendants in the instant case argue, however, that at least a "quasi-intent" on the part of the Sheriff and his deputies is required to hold them liable for plaintiffs' injuries under § 1983.
The current of recent decisions in all circuits is against this contention. The Ninth Circuit has not settled the question what degree of culpability is required to state a cause of action under § 1983. In Williams v. Field, 416 F.2d 483, 485 (9th Cir. 1969), the court affirmed the dismissal of a complaint from a San Quentin inmate who alleged that the prison authorities failed to protect him from the attack of another prisoner after they had been put on notice that such an attack would take place. In so holding, the court said:
"Since Monroe v. Pape, . . . some courts, like the district court in the instant case, have held that unintentional conduct does not state a claim under section 1983. . . . . Another court has indicated that negligent conduct in the appropriate circumstances may support a claim under section 1983. . . . The `natural consequences' test formulated by Mr. Justice Douglas apparently leaves open the question of the degree of culpability required by section 1983. It may be that negligent conduct, in the appropriate circumstances, will support an action under section 1983 . . . Mere negligent failure to act, standing alone, however, would seem insufficient.
In addition to an allegation of the requisite degree of culpability, plaintiffs in section 1983 actions must show a violation of federally secured rights."
The Ninth Circuit has not spoken on the question of the requisite degree of culpability since this opinion.
In the Fourth and Fifth circuits, courts have held that negligence alone is sufficient to state a cause of action. However, the facts of the cases decided differentiate, and to some degree belie, these holdings. The outstanding case is Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970). There, the court (Sobeloff, J.) specifically found the reckless use of excessive force by a police officer seeking to arrest plaintiff. The court held that plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action under § 1983, and specifically distinguished the "raw abuse of power" present in the case before it from cases of simple negligence. The court held that the requirements of § 1983 were satisfied by "gross and culpable negligence." Id. at 1231-1232. Simple negligence was not the basis of the decision.
In a very recent Fourth Circuit opinion, the court (Sobeloff, J.) holds that simple negligence alone may satisfy § 1983. McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 4-5 (4th Cir. 1972). The district court dismissed a civil rights complaint alleging that plaintiff's constitutional right to access to the courts had been denied by a clerk of the state court who had negligently failed to file plaintiff's writ of habeas corpus. The circuit court reversed and ordered the district court to hear the case. The only authority cited for this holding was the decision in Jenkins v. Averett.
In the Fifth Circuit, the courts have granted relief in cases involving the equivalent of "gross negligence." Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. den. 404 U.S. 866, 92 S.Ct. 83, 30 L.Ed.2d 110, is a case quite similar factually to that before this court. The superintendent of a prison farm was held liable for injuries to a prisoner shot by a `trusty' who was overseeing *1053 work on a public road. The trusty's rifle discharged as a result of his negligence. The superintendent was held liable because of his failure properly to train the trusty in the use of firearms and for the specific job he entrusted to him. The precise facts of the failures to train, related to the district judge and noted in the circuit court's opinion, are extremely similar to the allegations directed at the sheriff and his deputies in this case. See id. at 822-23. See also Anderson v. Nosser, 456 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1972).
Many courts have read the Fourth Circuit decision in Jenkins for the proposition that negligencewhether simple or grossis sufficient culpability to state a cause of action under § 1983. See Puckett v. Cox, 456 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1972); Carter v. Carlson, 144 U.S. App.D.C. 388, 447 F.2d 358, 365 & n. 20 (1971); Build of Buffalo, Inc. v. Sedita, et al., 441 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1971). Other courts as well have been imprecise in finding allegations of negligence sufficient under § 1983. See Joseph v. Rowlan, 402 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1968); Daniels v. Van De Venter, 382 F.2d 29, 31 (10th Cir. 1967); Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536, 540-541 (10th Cir. 1963).
Fortunately, some courts have been clearer about the distinction drawn in Jenkins between simple and gross negligence. The court in Mullins v. City of River Rouge, 338 F.Supp. 26 (E.D. Mich.1972), dismissed the complaint of a plaintiff who was arrested on a city street in winter and taken to the station as a drunk. In fact, he was not drunk and was suffering from severe frostbite. As a result of the neglect of his captors, all his fingers and parts of this thumbs were amputated. He charged the arresting officers with negligence in failing to perceive the frostbite and not rendering him medical attention. The court found that the officers were not in fact negligent, but that even assuming negligence, they could not be held liable under § 1983. The court cited Jenkins and drew the distinction between mere negligence and gross negligence. See also Richardson v. Snow, 340 F.Supp. 1261 (D.Md. 1972).
This Court's decision whether plaintiffs' allegations state a cause of action under § 1983 should consider the policy behind allowing recovery under the civil rights acts. If the purpose of the acts is to deter individuals acting under color of state law from abusing the rights of others, then the distinction between gross and simple negligence is sensible. There is deterrent value in charging a sheriff, or even a court clerk, with the responsibility for organizing and supervising the affairs of his office so as to insure against even the chance that someone's constitutional rights will suffer as a result of his or one of his subordinate's actions. In every case refusing to dismiss a complaint where only negligence is alleged, we have a situation, as we do here, where reasonable precautions could easily avoid catastrophic consequences; delegating authority to wield and discharge a firearm in the presence of people is a very serious matter demanding a high degree of care. Failure to exercise such care would seem to be gross negligence, which is the same as conscious disregard for the rights of others. The case of the court clerk's mistake, however, does not involve gross negligence, and it can only be explained if the deterrent policy of the statute encompasses patterns or systems of behaviour dangerous to civil rights. The actions alleged in the instant case would fall within this rationale as well.
However, it is likewise possible to view § 1983 as giving a straightforward tort remedy for any deprivation of civil rights caused by one acting under color of law, no matter how such deprivation came about. At least one court has taken this view:
"[U]ntil the legislature provides a substitute scheme for compensating the victims of police torts, common law principles and the federal Civil Rights Act guarantee to people like *1054 [plaintiff] at least a day in court." Carter v. Carlson, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 388, 447 F.2d 358, 370 (1971).
If all deprivations that can be proved are to be compensated, then simple negligence should be the rule, leaving to the actors, of course, their defenses as they would have them at common law. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967).
This Court need not decide the question whether simple negligence suffices under § 1983 since the complaint in this action alleges circumstances bringing the case within the gross negligence rule of Jenkins. Hence, count 5 of the amended complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Nor should either side's motions for summary judgment be grantedthe facts need developing. Motions to dismiss and for summary judgment denied.
NOTES
[1]  The statute predating § 1983 [18 U.S.C. § 242] in terms required intentional deprivation; § 1983 omits any "intent".


48 F.3d 1217NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Timothy COFIELD, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 94-7088.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Submitted Jan. 19, 1995.Decided Feb. 16, 1995.

Timothy Cofield, Appellant Pro Se.
Mark Joseph Hulkower, Office of the United States Attorney, Alexandria, VA, for Appellee.
Before WILKINS and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and SPROUSE, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:

1
Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying Appellant's Motion for the Production and Conveyance of Trial Transcripts and Related Documents.  Our review of the record and the district court's opinion discloses that this appeal is without merit.  Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court.  United States v. Cofield, No. CR-92-167-A (E.D. Va.  Sept. 9, 1994).  We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED


56 B.R. 68 (1985)
In the Matter of Maurice Dean LIPPLY and Janet Elaine Lipply, Debtors.
Bankruptcy No. 83-30984.
United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division.
December 10, 1985.
*69 Michael D. Rush, Columbia City, Ind., for creditor.
David A. Rosenthal, Lafayette, Ind., for debtors.

ORDER
ROBERT K. RODIBAUGH, Chief Judge.
The Citizens National Bank of Whitley County has made an application for the abandonment of the debtors' 1981 Jayco 5th-wheel camper-trailer on the basis that it is of no value to the estate. A separate proceeding is pending regarding the debtors' pick-up truck. The debtors have objected to the abandonment on the basis of an alleged defect in the perfection of Citizens' lien; this matter was taken under advisement September 20, 1985.
The only issue raised by the debtors requires the court "to determine the validity, priority, or extent of a lien or other interest in property." Bankruptcy Rule 7001 requires an adversary proceeding, with its formalities and notice requirements, to determine such an issue. Where, however, as in the case at bar, the undisputed facts and the relevant law require the objection to be overruled on the merits there is no harm due to the lack of notice to other parties. In re Holywell Corp., 48 B.R. 69 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fl.1985).
The stipulated facts and documentation show that Citizens provided the purchase money financing for the debtors' acquisition of the 1981 Jayco 5th-wheel camper-trailer. The trailer is approximately 30 feet long and equipped exclusively as living quarters for persons traveling upon the highways. It is not self-propelled; the debtors pull it with a pick-up truck. Citizens' lien was duly noted upon the Certificate of Title by a public official. The parties entered into a security agreement; however, no financing statement was filed with the Secretary of State or with the Recorder in the county of the debtors' residence.[1]
This case presents a question of first impression in Indiana. The statutory provisions involved, the Indiana Uniform Commercial Code and Indiana Motor Vehicle Code, are substantially similar to many other jurisdictions; therefore, it is appropriate to draw upon the analysis of other courts. *70 The debtors, in the case at bar, are debtors-in-possession equipped with the avoiding powers of a trustee. § 1107(a). The debtors may avoid Citizens' interest in the camper-trailer unless that interest is properly perfected. § 544. The debtors contend that no financing statement was filed in the location(s) specified by I.C. XX-X-X-XXX and that Citizens is therefore unperfected.
The filing requirements for the perfection of a security interest are set out in I.C. XX-X-X-XXX, which provides in pertinent part:
(1) A financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests except the following:
(d) A purchase money security interest in consumer goods; but filing is required ... for a motor vehicle required to be licensed;[2]
.   .   .   .   .
(3) The filing provisions of this article [chapter] do not apply to a security interest in property subject to a statute
(b) of this state which provides for central filing of security interests in such property, or in a motor vehicle which is not inventory held for sale for which a certificate of title is required under the statutes of this state if a notation of such a security interest can be indicated by a public official on a certificate or a duplicate thereof.[3]
Understanding the exceptions from filing as they relate to the case at bar requires a brief examination of the motor vehicle code.
I.C. 9-1-1-2 defines, "for the purposes of chapter 1 through 4 of [the motor vehicle code]":
(b) Motor Vehicle.Every vehicle, as herein defined, which is self-propelled ...
.   .   .   .   .
(t) Recreational Vehicle.Every vehicle with or without motive power equipped exclusively for living quarters for persons traveling upon the highways.
I.C. 9-1-2-1 subjects both motor vehicles and recreational vehicles to the certificate of title requirements administered by the Bureau of Motor Vehicles. These definitions clearly overlap to some extent; both are included within the broader definition of "Vehicle." I.C. 9-1-1-2(a).
The UCC does not recognize filing as a valid method for the perfection of a security interest in a motor vehicle subject to a certificate of title requirement.[4] The 1962 version of the Model UCC, as adopted by Indiana in I.C. XX-X-X-XXX(3)(b), was drafted to account for the problem that non-mandatory certificate of title laws posed. Maine and Massachusetts both still present such a problem.[5]In re Crowley, 39 UCC Rep. 671, 42 B.R. 603 (Bkrtcy.D.Me.1984). The certificate of title requirement in Indiana is mandatory and has recently been extended to include all camping trailers except very lightweight campers manufactured prior to 1986. I.C. 9-1-2-4. The 1981 Jayco 5th-wheel camper-trailer was subject to a certificate of title requirement at the time Citizens took their security interest.
The 1972 version of the Model UCC which was adopted by Indiana to become effective January 1, 1986, changed the wording of I.C. XX-X-X-XXX(3)(b). The modification modernizes the language and removes any confusion which might result from the language dealing with, "obsolete non-mandatory certificate of title laws." *71 Uniform Commercial Code (U.L.A.) § 9-302, Official Reasons for 1972 Change.
The term "motor vehicle" is not defined in the UCC but has been broadly construed to mean those vehicles subject to a certificate of title requirement. Mobile homes, although clearly not motorized, have been found to be motor vehicles for the purposes of determining whether a vehicular certificate of title was the proper location to note a lien. In re Brown, 40 UCC Rep. 684, 45 B.R. 766 (Bkrtcy.N.D.N.Y.1985). This broad interpretation is supported by the 1972 official comment which states:
"In addition to such central filing statutes many states have enacted certificate of title laws covering motor vehicles and the like. Subsection (3) exempts transactions covered by such laws from the filing requirements of the Article." (emphasis added)
Security interests in trailers in states where they are subject to a certificate of title requirement must be shown on the certificate of title to be properly perfected. In re Ramco Well Service, Inc., 32 B.R. 525, 530 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Ok.1983); In re ASW III Builder-Contractor, Inc., 12 B.R. 29, B.L.D. ¶ 68,086 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Va.1981). Citizens' lien was properly noted in the case at bar.
The debtors contend that the term "motor vehicle" is specifically limited by the Motor Vehicle Code to only those vehicles which are self-propelled. They argue that this narrow definition should be used in the Indiana Uniform Commercial Code. Since a camper-trailer is not self-propelled, the debtors contend, perfection upon the certificate of title should be ineffective. This interpretation would, according to the debtors, promote the policy of interpreting the UCC to have the broadest possible scope.
The court declines to incorporate the "self-propelled" requirement into the UCC. While the two codes are inter-related and must be considered together, any interpretation must not hinge on an isolated clause and should promote the implementation of the policies and objectives behind the statute. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 95 S.Ct. 1893, 44 L.Ed.2d 525 (1975). To incorporate the "isolated clause" narrowly defining motor vehicles in the Motor Vehicle Code into the provision of the UCC which deals with certificate of title requirements would frustrate the purpose of the exception. No additional public forum is needed where a lien has been noted on the certificate of title by a public official. Vehicles are highly mobile; a UCC filing in Indiana would be of little assistance to a recreational vehicle dealer in Oklahoma offered a trade-in with an apparently clear Indiana certificate of title. An underlying policy of the UCC is the promotion, not hindrance, of modern business practices.
Even were the debtors to prevail in the interpretation of "motor vehicle," Citizens would still be properly perfected. Where a camper-trailer, as in the case at bar, is purchased by the debtor for his personal or family recreation it is a consumer good. In re Ten Brock, 4 UCC Rep. 712 (W.D.Mi.1966). If a camper-trailer is not a motor vehicle, then no filing is required to perfect a purchase money security interest such as that held by Citizens. I.C. XX-X-X-XXX(1)(d). Citizens therefore prevails under either interpretation.
Wherefore, the court holds that the 1981 Jayco 5th-wheel camper-trailer is a motor vehicle subject to a certificate of title requirement for the purposes of the exception from the filing requirements of the Indiana Uniform Commercial Code. Citizens' lien was properly perfected by notation by a public official on the certificate of title. The debtors have no equity in the camper-trailer, and it is not needed for a successful reorganization. Citizens' application for abandonment is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
NOTES
[1]  The debtors reside in Fulton County; a financing statement was filed in Kosciusko County.
[2]  The revision effective January 1, 1986 reads, "(d) ... for a motor vehicle required to be registered;"
[3]  The revision effective January 1, 1986 exempts property subject to, "I.C. 9-1-2-1 concerning motor vehicles" [other than inventory].
[4]  The filing requirement for motor vehicles held as inventory is not applicable in the case at bar.
[5]  In both states automobiles which are ten or more years old are exempt from the certificate of title requirements.


                            Fourth Court of Appeals
                                   San Antonio, Texas
                                          March 4, 2014

                                       No. 04-13-00847-CV

                                IN THE INTEREST OF B.A.E.,

                   From the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
                                Trial Court No. 2013-PA-00095
                            Honorable Dick Alcala, Judge Presiding

                                          ORDER
        This is an accelerated appeal from the trial court’s final order terminating appellant’s
parental rights. Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief and motion to
withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which he asserts there are no
meritorious issues to raise on appeal. See In re RR, No. 04-03-00096-CV, 2003 WL 21157944
(Tex. App.—San Antonio, May 21, 2003, order) (holding that Anders procedures apply to
appeals from orders terminating parental rights), disp. on merits, 2003 WL 22080522 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio, Sept. 10, 2003, no pet.)(mem. op.). Counsel states he has provided copies of
the brief and motion to withdraw to appellant and informed appellant of his right to review the
record and file his own brief. See id.; Nichols v. State, 954 S.W.2d 83, 85-86 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio, July 23, 1997, no pet.); Bruns v. State, 924 S.W.2d 176, 177 n.1 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 1996, no pet.).

        If appellant desires to file a pro se brief, we order that he do so by March 24, 2014. If
appellant files a timely pro se brief, appellee may file a responsive brief no later than twenty days
after appellant’s pro se brief is filed in this court. Alternatively, if appellant does not file a
timely pro se brief, appellee may file a brief in response to counsel’s brief no later than April 14,
2014. We further order the motion to withdraw filed by appellant’s counsel is held in abeyance
pending further order of the court.

                                                      _________________________________
                                                      Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

       IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
court on this 4th day of March, 2014.

                                                      ___________________________________
                                                      Keith E. Hottle
                                                      Clerk of Court