956 N.E.2d 1157 (2011)
In re the PATERNITY OF M.F.
N.F., Appellant-Respondent,
v.
J.T., Appellee-Petitioner.
No. 10A01-1101-JP-15.
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
November 9, 2011.
*1159 A. David Hutson, Smith Carpenter Thompson Fondrisi Cummins & Lewis, LLC, Jeffersonville, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

OPINION
BROWN, Judge.
N.F. ("Mother") appeals the trial court's order finding her in contempt of court. Mother presents one issue, which we revise and restate as whether the trial court erred in finding her in contempt. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
The relevant facts follow. Mother and J.T. ("Father") have a daughter, M.F., who is fourteen years old. Mother resides in Jeffersonville, Indiana, and Father resides in Miramar, Florida. In April 2010, Father filed a motion for modification of parenting time. After a hearing, the trial court approved an order on July 6, 2010, which provides in part that Father "is to receive Parenting Time where Distance is a factor," that "the parties shall share the cost of travel expenses (50/50)," that "for winter break 2010, [Father] shall have the minor child from the date school lets out for seven days thereafter," and that "the parties shall alternate Christmas day thereafter."[1] Appellant's Appendix at 9.
On September 1, 2010, Father filed a motion to modify support.[2] A hearing on the motion was initially scheduled for November 4, 2010 but, on October 1, 2010, was rescheduled for December 16, 2010.
On Saturday, December 11, 2010, Mother and Father spoke with each other by phone, Father stated that he would like to change his visitation with M.F. to the second week after Christmas, and Mother told Father that she did not have a problem with that but that she had scheduled appointments for M.F. during that time due to M.F.'s school schedule and Mother's *1160 work schedule and that she would check on the following Monday to see if it were possible to change the appointments.
On December 13, 2010, Mother called Father to make him aware that she was unable to change M.F.'s appointments and that she had found a flight from Louisville, Kentucky, to Miami, Florida, for December 18, 2010, and a return flight to Louisville for December 24, 2010. On December 14, 2010, Mother and Father exchanged several text messages related to the dates that M.F. would fly to Florida. In a text message to Mother, Father indicated that he was scheduling M.F. to return to Indiana on either December 24 or 25, 2010, and Mother sent a text message to Father stating that it was not acceptable for M.F. to return on December 25, 2010. Father sent a text message to Mother indicating that he did not have the money for the flight on December 24, 2010. Mother sent a text message to Father stating that she would see Father on Thursday, which was December 16, 2010, the date of the scheduled court hearing on Father's motion to modify support, and Father sent a text message to Mother stating that they would talk in court.
The court held a hearing on Father's motion to modify support on December 16, 2010 as scheduled.[3] An entry for December 16, 2010 in the CCS indicates: "Not Present: Petitioner [Father]; Respondent [Mother]." Id. at 4. The court granted Mother's motion to continue, over Father's objection, and set the matter for March 11, 2011. Also on December 16, 2010, Mother sent a text message to Father asking "I thought we were going to talk in court & u did show ? ?" Id. at 18.
While M.F.'s last day of school prior to Christmas break was originally scheduled to be Friday, December 17, 2010, the school had scheduled two daysDecember 20 and 21, 2010as possible make-up days. Due to a snow day the school scheduled "a snow make-up day on Monday, December 20th." Respondent's Exhibit 1. In addition, a school play was rescheduled for that same day.
On December 17, 2010, Father sent a text message to Mother stating "Ok [M.F.] is flying out of Cincinnati tomorrow morning and she will be back on the 24 I will email you the itinerary in a bit." Appellant's Appendix at 19. Mother sent a text message to Father stating that she had to work on December 18, 2010, because she had taken time off work to go to court on December 16, 2010. After Mother and Father exchanged several text messages regarding their disagreement over the flight arrangements, Father sent a text message to Mother stating: "Just sent you the email. [M.F.] is flying out of Lexington at 6.00 pm due to you [sic] conflict with work tomorrow the 18. Returns the 24 at 5.30 pm into Lexington." Id. at 19. The email Father sent to Mother indicated that M.F. would be leaving from Lexington on Saturday, December 18, 2010, at 5:59 p.m., and returning to Lexington on Friday, December 24, 2010. The email also indicated that the departure time from Lexington was in the evening to avoid issues with Mother's work on Saturday. Mother sent a text message to Father stating that she "got the email however that won't work." Id. Mother did not place M.F. on the flight that Father had arranged.
On or about December 20, 2010, Father filed a Motion for Citation for Contempt of Court and Motion for Emergency Hearing, and the trial court set an emergency hearing for December 21, 2010. On December 21, 2010, Mother, by counsel, filed an "Objection *1161 Motion for Continuance, and Motion to Prevent Telephonic Testimony of [Father]," which stated in part that Mother's counsel was given less than twenty-four hours notice of the hearing and Mother was not given sufficient notice of the hearing and requested the court to reschedule the hearing. Id. at 14.
The trial court held the emergency hearing on December 21, 2010, at which Father appeared by phone. At the hearing, Father's counsel stated that Father had purchased airfare for M.F., that M.F. had not taken the flight which he had arranged, and that he had attempted to contact Mother by phone, email, and text message but received no response. Mother's counsel stated that he had not been able to contact Mother prior to the hearing, that no evidence or testimony had been admitted upon which the court could make a decision, and that he would like additional time to get in touch with Mother. Father testified by phone that, on the morning of Friday, December 17, 2010, he had purchased tickets for M.F. to travel to Florida and that he had been unable to reach either Mother or M.F. since December 17, 2010. Father also testified that his understanding had been that Mother wanted M.F. to be in Indiana no later than December 23, 2010, that the seven days did not begin until Saturday, December 18, 2010, because M.F.'s last day of school was Friday, December 17, 2010, and that seven days after December 18, 2010 actually fell on Christmas Day. Father testified that Mother did not want M.F. to return on Christmas Day and that they had several exchanges indicating that it would be settled on December 16, 2010 in court. Near the end of the hearing, the court continued the hearing to the following day and ordered Mother to appear in court on December 22, 2010, at 9:00 a.m.
At the December 22, 2010 hearing, Mother indicated that her understanding of the court's order regarding visitation was that Father was supposed to have parenting time with M.F. in Florida beginning after school ended for Christmas break. Mother testified that the last day of school for M.F. was originally scheduled to be Friday, December 17, 2010, but due to a snow day, the last day of school was rescheduled for December 20, 1010. Mother also presented an exhibit containing a print-out of the school's website notifying parents of the schedule change. Mother testified that Father and Father's counsel had copies of M.F.'s school calendar which stated there was a possibility of snow make-up days on December 20 and 21, 2010, and that she knew Father was aware of the school website because he previously obtained information from the site. Mother further testified that, during her phone call with Father on Monday, December 13, 2010, she had made Father aware that there could be a snow day but that she did not know at that time.
Mother indicated that M.F. did not board the plane on Saturday, December 18 because she had school on Monday, December 20, and also had a play that "was scheduled originally for Thursday evening and that was also changed to Monday the 20th." Transcript at 36. Mother further indicated that she received Father's email stating that he arranged a flight which was scheduled to leave from Lexington, Kentucky, and that she made Father aware that she would not be able to do that "prior to [Father] purchasing the ticket." Id. Mother testified that she and Father considered having M.F. visit Father the week after rather than the week before Christmas, and that she had been unable to reschedule the appointments she had made for M.F. during the week after Christmas. Mother testified that she had told Father about a Friday flight out of Louisville, Kentucky and that Father said that he would look into it. Mother testified *1162 that the first she heard of the flight departing from Lexington was on Friday, December 17, 2010; that she was a manager at a kitchen; that she had to trade schedules in order to be in court on Thursday, December 16, 2010; and that she had agreed to work from 10:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. on Saturday, December 18, 2010. On cross-examination, Mother acknowledged that she did not expressly inform Father that M.F.'s school had a make-up day on December 20, 2010, and Father testified by phone that he had not been aware that December 20, 2010, would be used to make up a snow day.
Father's counsel asked the court to require Mother to pay the costs of transportation to Florida and Father's attorney fees and to find Mother in contempt. Mother's counsel argued that there was no basis for the court to find Mother in contempt and thus no basis for the court to grant the relief Father's counsel requested. Mother's counsel further argued that the last day of school was the previous day and thus there was no basis to find Mother in contempt and that Mother should pay for half of any flight that was booked for M.F., but that Mother should not be liable for the cost of the flight that was booked as a result of a mistake.
The trial court stated that it was "going to find [Mother] in contempt for what [she did] to frustrate this court order." Transcript at 66. The court stated:
Whether or not it would have been on the 17th or whether or not it would have been yesterday. Really had you bought the ticket based on the 20th being the last school day and coming into court today saying I have the tickets to travel on the 21st, that would have been some sign of good faith. But I don't see any sign of good faith on your part, ma'am.
Id. After some discussion, the court ordered Mother to purchase a round-trip ticket so that M.F. would travel to Florida on December 27, 2010, and return on January 2, 2011. The court also stated: "I'm going to assess you attorney's fees in the sum [of] three hundred dollars, payable to [Father's counsel] in thirty days for your contempt." Id. at 70. On December 27, 2010, the trial court issued a written order, which provided in part:
1. [Mother] is found to be in Contempt of this Courts [sic] previous Order of 6/28/10.
2. [Mother] shall be responsible for the cost of transportation to and from Ft. Lauderdale Florida for the minor child with travel to begin on 12/27/10 with the child to be returned on 1/2/11.
3. [Mother] is further ordered to pay attorney's fees to [Father's] attorney in the amount of $300.00 to be paid within 30 days of 12/22/10.
Appellant's Appendix at 7.[4]
The issue is whether the trial court erred in finding Mother in contempt. Whether a party is in contempt of court is a matter within the trial court's discretion, and its decision will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion. J.M. v. D.A., 935 N.E.2d 1235, 1243 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (citing Norris v. Pethe, 833 N.E.2d 1024, 1029 (Ind.Ct.App.2005)), reh'g denied. A court has abused its discretion when its decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or is contrary to law. Id. (citing Mitchell v. Mitchell, 871 N.E.2d 390, 394 (Ind.Ct.App.2007)).
We initially observe that Father has not filed an appellee's brief. When an *1163 appellee has not filed an answer brief, we need not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the appellee's behalf. Henderson v. Henderson, 919 N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (Ind.Ct.App.2010). Rather, we may reverse the trial court if the appellant presents a case of prima facie error. Id. Prima facie error means at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it. Id. If an appellant does not meet this burden, we will affirm. Id.
Contempt of court "involves disobedience of a court which undermines the court's authority, justice, and dignity." Henderson, 919 N.E.2d at 1210 (citing Srivastava v. Indianapolis Hebrew Congregation, Inc., 779 N.E.2d 52, 60 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002), trans. denied). There are two types of contempt: direct and indirect. Id. Direct contempt involves actions occurring near the court that interfere with the business of the court and of which the judge has personal knowledge. Id. Contempt is indirect if it involves actions outside the trial court's personal knowledge. Id. "Willful disobedience of any lawfully entered court order of which the offender had notice is indirect contempt." Id. (citing Francies v. Francies, 759 N.E.2d 1106, 1118 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), reh'g denied, trans. denied).
The trial court here found Mother to be "in Contempt of this Courts [sic] previous Order of 6/28/10."[5] Appellant's Appendix at 7. Generally, a person who willfully disobeys any order lawfully issued by any court of record or by the proper officer of the court is guilty of indirect contempt. Henderson, 919 N.E.2d at 1210 (citing Ind.Code § 34-47-3-1). As such, this case involves indirect contempt. See id. (citing In re Paternity of J.T.I., 875 N.E.2d 447, 450 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (concluding that the mother's interference with the father's parenting time as provided by a court order is one of indirect civil contempt)).
Indirect contempt "is the willful disobedience of any lawfully entered court order of which the offender has notice." City of Gary v. Major, 822 N.E.2d 165, 169 (Ind.2005) (citation omitted and emphasis omitted).
It lies within the inherent power of the trial court to fashion an appropriate punishment for the disobedience of its order. MacIntosh v. MacIntosh, 749 N.E.2d 626, 631 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied. Unlike criminal indirect contempt, the primary objective of a civil contempt proceeding is not to punish the contemnor but to coerce action for the benefit of the aggrieved party. Thompson v. Thompson, 811 N.E.2d 888, 905 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied. . . . "Nevertheless, a contempt order which neither coerces compliance with a court order or compensates the aggrieved party for loss, and does not offer an opportunity for the recalcitrant party to purge himself, may not be imposed in a civil contempt proceeding." Flash [v. Holtsclaw], 789 N.E.2d [955, 959 (Ind. Ct.App.2003), trans. denied].
In re Paternity of M.P.M.W., 908 N.E.2d 1205, 1209 (Ind.Ct.App.2009). Further, this court has held:
In order to be held in contempt for failing to comply with a court order, a party must have willfully disobeyed the order. The order must have been so clear and certain that there could be no question as to what the party must do, or not do, and so there could be no question regarding whether the order is *1164 violated. A party may not be held in contempt for failing to comply with an ambiguous or indefinite order. . . .
Bandini v. Bandini, 935 N.E.2d 253, 264-265 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Mother argues that the court's order "did not clearly state the circumstances of the Winter Break 2010 visit" and that the court erred by holding her "in contempt of a vague order that did not clearly require her to do the acts that she was held in contempt for failing to do." Appellant's Brief at 5. Mother points to the court's statement that it was "going to find [Mother] in contempt for what [she did] to frustrate this court order" and asserts that the order "did not specifically state the actions or inactions for which [she] was found to be in contempt." Transcript at 66; Appellant's Brief at 6. Mother argues that the court's order "did not specify how travel arrangements would be made for [Father's] 2010 winter break parenting time." Appellant's Brief at 7. Specifically, Mother argues that the court's July 6, 2010 order "did not obligate [her] to put M.F. on the flight of [Father's] choosing on the date that parenting time was to begin," that it "did not require [Mother] to tell [Father] that the reason the December 18, 2010 Lexington flight would not work is that M.F. had school scheduled for the following Monday," and that "there was nothing in the order that required [Mother] to purchase a plane ticket for M.F. after December 20, 2010." Id. at 8-9.
The order entered on July 6, 2010 provided in part: "That for winter break 2010, [Father] shall have the minor child from the date school lets out for seven days thereafter. That the parties shall alternate Christmas day thereafter." Appellant's Appendix at 9. The court's written order found Mother to be in contempt of court but did not set forth express reasons for the finding.
The order entered on July 6, 2010 did not expressly state that Mother was responsible for purchasing a plane ticket or otherwise arranging travel or transportation plans for M.F. to ensure that Father was able to exercise his parenting time. Instead, the order merely set forth the seven-day period during which Father was to have parenting time. Further, the record indicates that the parties were aware that the last day of school for M.F. was originally scheduled to be Friday, December 17, 2010, but that there was a possibility that the last day of school would be on Monday, December 20, 2010 or Tuesday, December 21, 2010 if the school needed to make up one or more days due to any previous snow days. The record reveals that the school's website indicated that the school would have a snow make-up day on Monday, December 20, 2010. In addition, we note that any failure by Mother to inform Father that M.F.'s school had scheduled a make-up day was not a violation of any express provision in the court's July 6, 2010 order. Further, the exchange of text messages between Father and Mother on December 17, 2010 indicates that Mother sent a message to Father that she had to work on Saturday, December 18, 2010 because she had changed her schedule to be in court on Thursday, December 16, 2010, and that Father then scheduled a flight for M.F. to fly out of Lexington, Kentucky, for 6:00 p.m. on Saturday, December 18, 2010.
Further, we note that "[t]o avoid being purely punitive, a contempt order must offer an opportunity for the recalcitrant party to purge himself or herself of the contempt." Henderson, 919 N.E.2d at 1212 n. 3. Here, the court's order entered on December 27, 2010, did not indicate the manner in which Mother could purge herself of the contempt. See id. (noting that one problem with the trial court's contempt *1165 order was that it did not indicate the manner in which the husband could purge himself of the contempt).
Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that Mother has presented a prima facie case that, under the circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion in finding her in contempt. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the order finding Mother in contempt. See id. at 1210-1212 (reversing finding of contempt and noting that the court's order did not indicate how the appellant could purge himself of the contempt); Nicholas v. Nicholas, 482 N.E.2d 770, 771 (Ind.Ct. App.1985) (holding that the husband demonstrated prima facie error in the entry of the contempt judgment, noting that an order or judgment which merely declares the rights of the parties without any express command or prohibition cannot provide the foundation for contempt proceedings, and finding that a provision in the divorce decree that the husband was responsible for college expenses was indefinite and was not an express command, violation of which would give rise to a judgment of contempt). Because the court indicated that its order that Mother pay attorney fees in the amount of $300 was based upon its contempt finding, we also reverse that portion of the court's order related to attorney fees.
Although Mother does not appear to challenge the portion of the order requiring her to purchase a plane ticket for M.F., we reverse the trial court's contempt finding and award of attorney fees, in light of the facts and circumstances, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in fashioning a remedy with respect to M.F.'s travel arrangements to ensure that Father was able to exercise parenting time during the winter break of 2010 in ordering that Mother was responsible for the cost of M.F.'s travel on December 27, 2010 and January 2, 2011.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand with instructions to vacate that portion of the order entered on December 27, 2010 finding Mother in contempt and ordering Mother to pay attorney fees of $300.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
BAKER, J., concurs.
KIRSCH, J., dissents without opinion.
NOTES
[1]  The order is titled "Order of 6/25/10;" however, the order was signed on July 6, 2010 and the chronological case summary (the "CCS") shows an entry on July 6, 2010 stating "Order of 6-25-10 submitted and approved." See Appellant's Appendix at 3, 9-10.
[2]  The record does not contain a copy of this motion.
[3]  A transcript of the December 16, 2010 hearing is not included in the record. The recited facts related to the hearing and Father's motion to modify support are taken from the CCS.
[4]  The order is titled "Order of 12/21/10;" however, the order was signed on December 27, 2010, and the CCS shows an entry on December 30, 2010 stating in part "Order Signed: 12/27/2010 of 12/21/10." See Appellant's Appendix at 5, 7.
[5]  Although Father's motion for citation for contempt stated that the court's order was dated June 28, 2010, the CCS does not show an order entered on June 28, 2010. As previously mentioned, the court's order titled "Order of 6/25/10" was signed on July 6, 2010 and the CCS shows entry of the order on July 6, 2010. See Appellant's Appendix at 3, 9-10.


         11-2086-ag
         Zheng v. Holder
                                                                                BIA
                                                                                Mulligan, IJ
                                                                               A089 198 271
                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                      SUMMARY ORDER
     RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
     FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
     APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
     IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
     ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
     ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1            At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2       for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
 3       United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
 4       New York, on the 6th day of February, two thousand twelve.
 5
 6       PRESENT:
 7                         ROGER J. MINER,
 8                         ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
 9                         BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
10                              Circuit Judges.
11
12       _______________________________________
13
14       JIAN CAN ZHENG,
15                Petitioner,
16
17                         v.                                   11-2086-ag
18                                                              NAC
19       ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
20       ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21                Respondent.
22
23       ______________________________________
24
25       FOR PETITIONER:                Farah Loftus, Law Office of Farah
26                                      Loftus, Century City, CA.
27
28       FOR RESPONDENT:                Tony West, Assistant Attorney
29                                      General; Ada Bosque, Senior
30                                      Litigation Counsel; Jonathan F.
31                                      Potter, Attorney, Office of
 1                          Immigration Litigation, Civil
 2                          Division, United States Department
 3                          of Justice, Washington, D.C.
 4
 5       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 6   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

 7   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

 8   is DENIED.

 9       Petitioner Jian Can Zheng, a native and citizen of

10   China, seeks review of a April 27, 2011, order of the BIA

11   affirming the July 1, 2009, decision of Immigration Judge

12   (“IJ”) Thomas J. Mulligan denying his application for

13   asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the

14   Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).   In re Jian Can Zheng,

15   No. A089 198 271 (B.I.A. Apr. 27, 2011), aff’g No. A089 198

16   271 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y. City July 1, 2009).     We assume the

17   parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and

18   procedural history of this case.

19       Under the circumstances of this case, we review the

20   IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA.     See Yan Chen v.

21   Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005).     The applicable

22   standards of review are well-established.     See 8 U.S.C.

23   § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2006); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510,

24   513 (2d Cir. 2009).

25       Zheng challenges both the agency’s adverse credibility

                                  2
 1   determination and its alternative finding that the harm he

 2   suffered did not rise to the level of persecution.

 3   Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse

 4   credibility determination. See Yanquin Weng, 562 F.3d at

 5   513.    For applications, such as this one, governed by the

 6   REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, considering the

 7   totality of the circumstances, base a credibility finding on

 8   an asylum applicant’s demeanor, the plausibility of his

 9   account, and inconsistencies in his statements, without

10   regard to whether they go “to the heart of the applicant’s

11   claim.”    8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006); see also

12   Matter of J-Y-C-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 260, 265 (B.I.A. 2007).

13          Here, the IJ relied on Zheng’s demeanor to find him not

14   credible, noting that he failed to answer “simple and basic

15   questions,” was “incredibly nervous,” paused for long

16   periods at several points in his testimony, and, overall,

17   gave “an extremely poor impression that he had memorized a

18   script.”    Additionally, the IJ found that Zheng could not

19   provide basic details regarding the event that led to his

20   altercation with Chinese officials and his wife’s alleged

21   forced abortion.    Because the IJ was in the best position to

22   observe Zheng’s manner while testifying, and identified

                                    3
 1   specific examples of problematic testimony, we accord his

 2   demeanor finding particular deference.     See Shu Wen Sun v.

 3   BIA, 510 F.3d 377, 380-81 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Li

 4   Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir.

 5   2006).

 6       Moreover, as the BIA found, even if credible, Zheng did

 7   not demonstrate harm rising to the level of persecution

 8   because he was not eligible for relief based on the harm

 9   suffered by his wife, Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of

10   Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 309 (2d Cir. 2007) (en banc), and the

11   single incident with family planning officials in which he

12   was punched several times in the chest did not rise to the

13   level of persecution, see Jian Qui Liu v. Holder, 632 F.3d

14   820, 822 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (holding that a minor

15   beating by family planning officials who did not have “any

16   intention of arresting or detaining” petitioner did not

17   constitute persecution where no lasting physical injury

18   resulted).     Contrary to Zheng’s assertion, because his past

19   harm did not rise to the level of persecution, he is not

20   entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear of

21   persecution.     See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) (2001).

22   Furthermore, because Zheng was unable to show the objective

                                     4
 1   likelihood of persecution needed to make out an asylum

 2   claim, he was necessarily unable to meet the higher standard

 3   required to succeed on a claim for withholding of removal.

 4   See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006). We

 5   do not reach Zheng’s claim for CAT relief as he did not

 6   exhaust it before the BIA.    See Foster v. INS, 376 F.3d 75,

 7   78 (2d Cir. 2004).

 8       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

 9   DENIED.   As we have completed our review, any stay of

10   removal that the Court previously granted in this petition

11   is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in

12   this petition is DENIED as moot.    Any pending request for

13   oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with

14   Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2) and Second

15   Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).

16                                 FOR THE COURT:
17                                 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
18

                                    5


567 So.2d 1318 (1990)
Alfred E. WRIGHT
v.
ALAN MILLS, INC., and Roberta Goza.
88-1166.
Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 14, 1990.
W.N. Watson of Watson & Watson, Fort Payne, for appellant.
Michael L. Brownfield, Fort Payne, for appellees.
KENNEDY, Justice.
The plaintiffs, Curtis Gene Wright, Sheri Deann Wright, and Alfred E. Wright, sued Alan Mills, Inc. (the "corporation"), and Roberta Goza, alleging that they had failed to pay on certain promissory notes made by the corporation to the plaintiffs. The complaint also alleged that Ms. Goza had breached a contract with Alfred Wright that granted Wright minority ownership status in the corporation.[1] Ms. Goza and the corporation counterclaimed against Alfred Wright, alleging that he had procured the contract by fraud and that he had breached it. The trial court, after hearing ore tenus evidence, found for the plaintiffs and against the corporation on the claim based on the promissory notes. The trial court ruled in favor of Ms. Goza on her counterclaim against Alfred Wright.
Alfred Wright appeals the trial court's refusal to hold Ms. Goza personally liable for the judgments against the corporation on the promissory notes. The only issue is whether the trial court erred in refusing to "pierce the corporate veil" and thereby to impute the liability of the corporation on the notes to Ms. Goza personally.
*1319 At the outset, we note that a corporation is a distinct entity to be considered apart from the individuals who operate it, and that a corporation's obligations and transactions are to be considered separately from those of the corporation's stockholders. East End Memorial Association v. Egerman, 514 So.2d 38, 42 (Ala.1987). However, a "`separate corporate existence will not be recognized where a corporation is so organized and controlled and its business conducted in such a manner as to make it a mere instrumentality of another.'" Woods v. Commercial Contractors, Inc., 384 So.2d 1076, 1079 (Ala.1980), quoting Forest Hill Corp. v. Latter & Blum, Inc., 249 Ala. 23, 28, 29 So.2d 298, 302 (1947).
In the present case, there was evidence before the trial court that Ms. Goza was the owner of 100% of the shares of stock of the corporation at the time the parties entered into the contract. There was also evidence that Ms. Goza was in charge of the day-to-day operations of the corporation and that she wrote checks on the corporation's account to D & H Hosiery, a business owned by her son, as well as to herself.
However, Ms. Goza presented testimony indicating that the payments to D & H Hosiery and to herself were arm's-length transactions made in the ordinary course of business. Although the testimony presented by Ms. Goza showed that she was involved in the day-to-day operations of the corporation, her involvement, coupled with her status as sole owner, does not, without additional facts, allow this Court to conclude that the corporation was the alter ego of Ms. Goza.
"[E]ven though a corporation is controlled by only one person, who is also the sole shareholder, in the absence of fraud or inequity, [s]he will be protected from individual liability by the corporate entity." Washburn v. Rabun, 487 So.2d 1361, 1366 (Ala.1986). There was no evidence before the trial court showing that Ms. Goza was using Alan Mills, Inc., as a device to defraud someone or to circumvent the requirements of Alabama corporation law. Without such a showing, we are not willing to "pierce the corporate veil" and, thereby, hold Ms. Goza personally liable. Id.
It is important to note that when a trial court has heard ore tenus evidence, we will not disturb its ruling unless the ruling is clearly or palpably wrong. McInnis v. Lay, 533 So.2d 581 (Ala.1988).
Reviewing the evidence under the ore tenus rule, we conclude that the trial court is due to be, and it is hereby, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and JONES, SHORES and HOUSTON, JJ., concur.
NOTES
[1]  The contract also granted minority ownership in the corporation to a third party who is not a party to this action.


                                                                                FILED
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit

                             FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          October 18, 2018
                         _________________________________
                                                                          Elisabeth A. Shumaker
                                                                              Clerk of Court
 JANICK WEBB,

       Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.                                                          No. 17-2216
                                                 (D.C. No. 2:16-CV-00777-WJ-GBW)
 COMMISSIONER, Social Security                                (D. N.M.)
 Administration,

       Defendant - Appellee.
                      _________________________________

                             ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                         _________________________________

Before EID, KELLY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

      Janick Webb appeals from the district court’s decision affirming the Social

Security’s Commissioner’s denial of his Title II application for a period of disability

and Social Security disability insurance. Exercising jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

      *
        After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
                                    BACKGROUND

       Mr. Webb worked as an assistant manager at a convenience store. In 2008, he

injured his back when stocking merchandise. And in January 2012, he again was

injured when he was tackled by a drunk customer. He worked until March 28, 2012,

then applied for disability benefits based on both physical and mental impairments.

       At step one of the five-step sequential evaluation process, see Wilson v.

Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2010), the administrative law judge (ALJ)

found that Mr. Webb had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his onset

date. At step two, the ALJ found that he suffered from the following severe

impairments: esophagitis, glossopharyngeal neuralgia, degenerative disc disease,

Baker’s cyst and chondromalacia patella, sinusitis, generalized anxiety disorder,

somatoform disorder, major depressive disorder, and dissociative amnesia.

       At step three, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Webb’s impairments did not meet or

medically equal the severity of a listed impairment. Then he assessed Mr. Webb with

the residual functional capacity (RFC) to do light work with the following

restrictions:

       [Mr. Webb] must be permitted to change position from sitting to standing
       or standing to sitting approximately every 30 minutes at the workstation.
       [He] can never climb ladders, ramps or stairs. He can frequently balance
       and stoop, and can occasionally [climb] ramps and stairs, kneel, crouch,
       and crawl. [Mr. Webb] cannot perform overhead reaching bilaterally, but
       can frequently reach and handle in all other directions bilaterally. [He]
       should avoid even moderate exposure to vibrations and hazards. He is
       limited to a moderate noise level . . . . [He] can perform simple, routine,
       repetitive tasks consistent with unskilled work. He cannot have contact
       with the public, and can have occasional superficial contact with

                                             2
      coworkers. [Mr. Webb] is limited to low stress work, which is defined as
      work requiring few decisions and few changes.
Aplt. App., Vol. I at 21. 1 Based on testimony from a vocational expert (VE), the ALJ

concluded at step four that Mr. Webb could not perform his past relevant work. At

step five, also based on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ found that Mr. Webb could

perform other jobs available in significant numbers in the national economy,

specifically, laundry folder and price marker. The ALJ therefore denied Mr. Webb’s

application. The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the

Commissioner’s final decision, and the district court affirmed.

                                    DISCUSSION

      “We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether the factual

findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the correct

legal standards were applied.” Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir.

2005). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

“We consider whether the ALJ followed the specific rules of law that must be

followed in weighing particular types of evidence in disability cases, but we will not

reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for the Commissioner’s.” Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d

1254, 1257-58 (10th Cir. 2007).

      1
         The RFC assessment states both that Mr. Webb can never climb ramps and
stairs and can occasionally climb them. Mr. Webb does not challenge this
inconsistency, and it is not relevant to the issues before the court.
                                           3
      Mr. Webb raises three challenges to the denial of benefits: (1) the ALJ failed

to provide specific, adequate reasons for rejecting a treating physician’s opinion;

(2) the ALJ erred in considering the opinion of a consulting psychologist; and (3) the

ALJ failed to resolve conflicts between the RFC and the requirements of light work,

given Mr. Webb’s sit/stand restriction.

I.    The ALJ did not err in failing to afford controlling weight to a treating
      physician’s opinion.

      Mr. Webb saw orthopedist Paul Puziss from April 2009 until September 2012.

Dr. Puziss diagnosed Mr. Webb with spinal stenosis, cervical degeneration,

herniated discs, chronic left trapezius and sterncleidomastoid spasm, cubital tunnel

syndrome, and ruptured left Baker cyst. In May 2012, Dr. Puziss opined that

Mr. Webb could lift no more than five pounds, could not bend or stoop, and could not

“stand for more than a few moments in any one position and ha[d] to move about.”

Aplt. App., Vol. III at 615. In June and August 2012, he increased the lifting

restriction to fifteen pounds. The effect of Dr. Puziss’s restrictions would be to limit

Mr. Webb to sedentary work.

      The ALJ gave Dr. Puziss’s opinion very little weight for the following reasons:

      First, it appears that the limitation was based on [Mr. Webb’s] subjective
      report rather than on objective evidence, as Dr. Puziss’s records, and those
      of others, all discussed above, document minimal objective findings and
      none that would warrant a limitation to sedentary work. Furthermore, there
      was no objective change that would support the change from a five to
      15-pound lifting restriction. In addition, the claimant did not see Dr. Puziss
      after September 2012, only six months after the alleged onset date, and
      subsequent records to not document objective findings or any change that
      would support a limitation to sedentary work. Finally, no other physician
      has subsequently assessed similar limitations. Therefore, because

                                            4
      Dr. Puziss’s opinion is not well supported or consistent with the record
      considered as a whole, it is given very little weight.
Id., Vol. I at 30-31. Mr. Webb challenges this explanation on both procedural and

substantive grounds.

      A treating physician’s opinion is entitled to controlling weight if it is

“well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic

techniques” and “not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the

individual’s case record.” Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96–2p, 1996 WL 374188, at

*2 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). But “if the opinion is deficient in

either of these respects, then it is not entitled to controlling weight.” Watkins v.

Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2003). “Under the regulations, the agency

rulings, and our case law, an ALJ must give good reasons in the notice of

determination or decision for the weight assigned to a treating physician’s opinion.”

Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he notice of determination

or decision ‘must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers

the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the

reasons for that weight.’” Id. (quoting SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5).

      Procedurally, Mr. Webb asserts that the ALJ’s reasons were not sufficiently

specific to allow this court to review the decision. We disagree. An ALJ may

discount a treating physician’s opinion because it is inconsistent with the weight of

the evidence or assesses new restrictions without explanation or support. See Allman

v. Colvin, 813 F.3d 1326, 1332 (10th Cir. 2016) (inconsistent with record); Raymond

                                            5
v. Astrue, 621 F.3d 1269, 1272 (10th Cir. 2009) (same); White v. Barnhart, 287 F.3d

903, 907-08 (10th Cir. 2002) (assesses new restrictions without explanation). While

Mr. Webb takes issue with the ALJ’s general reference to medical records “all

discussed above,” Aplt. App., Vol. I at 30, in this case it is not difficult to determine

what inconsistencies the ALJ relied upon. “Where, as here, we can follow the

adjudicator’s reasoning in conducting our review, and can determine that correct

legal standards have been applied, merely technical omissions in the ALJ’s reasoning

do not dictate reversal.” Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1166 (10th Cir.

2012). And contrary to Mr. Webb’s assertion, relying on those other medical

opinions, which are all discussed earlier in the decision (and thus are apparent from

the ALJ’s decision itself), does not constitute an impermissible post hoc justification.

      Substantively, Mr. Webb contends that Dr. Puziss’s opinion is entitled to

controlling weight. As part of this argument, he asserts that the record evidence as a

whole does support Dr. Puziss’s assessment. But substantial evidence supports the

numerous instances of unremarkable findings by other treating physicians that the

ALJ identified. Thus, Mr. Webb essentially invites us to reweigh the evidence,

which we do not do, see Oldham, 509 F.3d at 1257-58; Hackett, 395 F.3d at 1172.

Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the ALJ erred by failing to afford controlling

weight to Dr. Puziss’s opinion. See Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1300.

                                            6
II.   The ALJ did not fail to use the correct legal standard in evaluating a state
      agency consultant’s opinion.

      Mr. Webb’s next argument concerns the opinion of non-examining

psychological consultant Edwin R. Holmes, PsyD. In a Mental Residual Functional

Capacity Assessment form (MRFCA), Dr. Holmes assessed moderate limitations in

nine subcategories (Section I ratings) and then added narrative assessments regarding

those ratings (Section III narrative assessments). 2 The ALJ gave Dr. Holmes’s

opinion significant weight. Mr. Webb asserts that (1) there are differences between

certain of Dr. Holmes’s Section I ratings and his Section III assessments; (2) the RFC

failed to incorporate three of the Section I ratings in his RFC; and (3) the RFC failed

to incorporate certain of Dr. Holmes’s Section III assessments.

      As the district court explained, under agency procedure, it is the Section III

narrative assessments that document the RFC. The MRFCA itself states that “the

actual mental residual functional capacity assessment is recorded in the narrative

discussion(s).” Aplt. App., Vol. I at 114; see also Smith v. Colvin, 821 F.3d 1264,

1268 n.1 (10th Cir. 2016) (highlighting form’s narrative discussion). And the Social

Security Administration’s Program Operations Manual Systems (POMS) provides

that Section III of the MRFCA, not Section I, is for recording a medical consultant’s

formal RFC assessment. POMS DI 24510.060 B.4.a; POMS DI 25020.010 B.1.

Nevertheless, an ALJ cannot ignore moderate Section I limitations. If a consultant’s

      2
        The MRFCA in the record does not formally designate Section I and Section
III. The parties and the district court use the terms, however, and we follow suit.
                                           7
Section III narrative fails to describe the effect of a Section I limitation or contradicts

a Section I limitation, then the MRFCA is not substantial evidence to support an

RFC. But if a Section III narrative adequately encapsulates the Section I limitations,

then the ALJ may rely upon the narrative to formulate the RFC.

       We agree with the district court that Dr. Holmes’s Section III narrations

adequately encapsulated his Section I restrictions, and the ALJ in turn adequately

incorporated the Section III assessments into the RFC. We therefore affirm the

denial of relief on this issue for substantially the reasons explained by the district

court. See Aplt. App., Vol. V at 1185-89.

III.   The ALJ did not err in accounting for the need to alternate sitting and
       standing.

       Finally, Mr. Webb argues that the ALJ erred with regard to Mr. Webb’s need

to alternate sitting and standing. Mr. Webb asserts that the sit/stand restriction,

which provides that he must be able to change position approximately every thirty

minutes, means that the ALJ found that he could stand or walk only four hours in an

eight-hour workday. Pointing out that the full range of light work generally requires

standing or walking for six hours out of an eight-hour workday, see SSR 83-10,

1983 WL 31251, at *6 (1983), he argues there is a conflict that the ALJ failed to

resolve.

       We are not convinced that the sit/stand restriction necessarily means that the

ALJ limited Mr. Webb to four hours of standing in an eight-hour workday. As the

Commissioner points out, “[t]he ALJ did not say that the hypothetical individual had

                                             8
to stand for 30 minutes at a time, or sit for 30 minutes at a time, but instead said that

30 minutes was the maximum amount of time the hypothetical individual could stand

(or sit) at one time.” Aplee. Br. at 38. The ALJ’s sit/stand restriction explicitly

provided that Mr. Webb would change positions while remaining at the workstation,

with the hypothetical question making it clear that the ALJ envisioned “there would

be no associated loss of productivity.” Aplt. App., Vol. I at 79. Such a situation

would allow Mr. Webb to change positions at irregular intervals, meaning that he

might stand more (or less) than four hours in a given workday.

      To the extent that Mr. Webb claims that there is an unresolved conflict

between the VE’s testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), we

disagree. “When there is an apparent unresolved conflict between VE . . . evidence

and the DOT, the adjudicator must elicit a reasonable explanation for the conflict

before relying on the VE . . . evidence to support a determination or decision about

whether the claimant is disabled.” SSR 00-4P, 2000 WL 1898704, at *2 (2000).

“[T]he ALJ must investigate and elicit a reasonable explanation for any conflict

between the [DOT] and expert testimony before the ALJ may rely on the expert’s

testimony as substantial evidence to support a determination of nondisability.”

Haddock v. Apfel, 196 F.3d 1084, 1091 (10th Cir. 1999). But as Mr. Webb admits,

the DOT does not address sit/stand options. Therefore, there is no “apparent

unresolved conflict” between the DOT and the VE’s testimony.

      Further, noting that the DOT does not address position changes, the ALJ asked

the VE what his testimony relied on. The VE answered it was based on his twenty

                                            9
years’ experience as a rehabilitation counselor. The VE’s experience is among the

bases for reasonable explanations for conflicts. SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at

*2. Therefore, even if there were a conflict between the VE’s testimony and the

DOT, the ALJ would have satisfied his obligation to elicit a reasonable explanation.

       Similarly, to the extent that Mr. Webb claims that there is an unresolved

conflict between the RFC and the VE’s testimony, on the one hand, and the

requirements of light work on the other hand, again we disagree. A sit/stand

restriction does not necessarily mean that a claimant cannot do light work. Where a

claimant “can do a little more or less than the exertion specified for a particular range

of work,” “the occupational base is affected and may nor may not represent a

significant number of jobs.” SSR 83-12, 1983 WL 31253, at *1, *2 (1983). “Where

the extent of erosion of the occupational base is not clear, the adjudicator will need to

consult a vocational resource.” Id. at *2. And particularly “[i]n cases of unusual

limitation of ability to sit or stand, a [vocational specialist] should be consulted to

clarify the implications for the occupational base.” Id. at *4. As required by

SSR 83-12, the ALJ consulted the VE about the implications of Mr. Webb’s sit/stand

restriction. The VE opined that notwithstanding the restriction, Mr. Webb could

perform jobs available in the national economy. And as stated, the VE adequately

explained the basis for his opinion. Accordingly, there was no unresolved conflict.

                                            10
                            CONCLUSION

The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                     Entered for the Court

                                     Allison H. Eid
                                     Circuit Judge

                                   11


217 F.2d 956
Application of Albert F. PIO.
Patent Appeal No. 6057.
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
December 21, 1954.

Leonard L. Kalish, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.
E. L. Reynolds, Washington, D. C., (S. W. Cochran, Washington, D. C., of counsel), for Commissioner of Patents.
Before O'CONNELL, Acting Chief Judge, and JOHNSON, WORLEY and COLE, Judges.
COLE, Judge.

1
Albert F. Pio has appealed here from a decision of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office affirming the Primary Examiner's rejection for lack of invention of claims 4, 8, 9, 11 and 13 of his application for a patent on subject matter relating to bottle construction.

2
Appellant's device is a bottle having a plurality of surfaces or bases upon which it may be selectively supported in either of several non-dispensing positions, or in a dispensing position whereby the contents of the bottle may be poured without having to lift the bottle from its supporting means. This construction is designed to facilitate the pouring of liquids from fairly heavy bottles.

3
Structural details of the alleged invention are well illustrated by claims 4 and 11, which are representative of those on appeal, and read as follows:

4
"4. A bottle adapted to rest upon a supporting surface selectively on one of a plurality of support-contacting portions or bases, said bottle including a rectangular support-contacting bottom-portion, a rectangular support-contacting intermediate side-portion disposed at an angle to said bottom-portion and a support-contacting curvilineal-portion extending from said side-portion, a handle whereby to control the movement of said bottle when supported on the said curvilineal-portion said bottle adapted to retain its contents when supported on the bottom-portion or on the side-portion but adapted to dispense its contents when supported on the curvilineal-portion, the line of intersection between said bottom-portion and said side-portion being straight and extending substantially the full thickness of the bottle providing a pivot about which said bottle may be moved on the supporting surface from said bottom-portion to said side-portion and back to said bottom-portion.

5
"11. A bottle adapted to rest upon a supporting surface selectively on one of a plurality of support-contacting portions or bases, said bottle including a rectangular support-contacting flat bottom-portion, a rectangular support-contacting flat intermediate side-portion disposed at an angle to said bottom-portion and a support-contacting curvilineal-portion extending from said flat side-portion, a handle whereby to control the movement of said bottle when supported on the said curvilineal-portion said bottle adapted to retain its contents when supported on the bottom-portion or on the side-portion but adapted to dispense its contents when supported on the curvilineal-portion; — the center of gravity on the filled bottle being within the vertical projection of the flat intermediate support-contacting side-portion when the latter is horizontal."

6
Further description of the nature of the device in question is set forth in appellant's brief as follows:

7
"Appellant's bottle construction comprises a pair of generally parallel broad flat side-walls and a series of interconnecting walls, which collectively may be called `edge walls.' These include a generally rectangular bottom `resting' wall or surface, perpendicular to the axis through the center of the neck of the bottle; a second generally rectangular resting wall or surface adjacent to and disposed at an obtuse angle to the bottom; and a curved rocking surface adjacent to and disposed at an obtuse angle to the second resting surface. The interconnecting-wall extending from the bottom resting wall of the bottle opposite to the interconnecting wall on which the aforementioned second resting surface and rocking surfaces are disposed, may be generally curved outwardly.

8
"A fulcrum-line is formed at the intersection of the bottom resting surface and the second resting surface, and a second fulcrum-line is formed at the intersection of the second resting surface with the curved rocking surface. These two fulcrum-lines extend across the full width of the bottle, as do the bottom resting surface, the second resting surface and the curved rocking surface."

9
As the foregoing demonstrates, appellant's bottle has a pair of relatively flat and broad opposing side walls, a flat and generally rectangular bottom, an intermediate support or resting surface which is also flat and generally rectangular, and curved sides or portions, one of which sides is adjacent to and disposed at an obtuse angle to the intermediate resting surface and acts as a rocking surface. The bottom resting surface, the intermediate resting surface, and the curved rocking surface and aforementioned fulcrum lines are so related to one another, and to the center of gravity of the bottle, either when filled or only partially filled, that the bottle, when positioned on the intermediate support, will not pour, but, upon being tipped over the second fulcrum line, will begin to dispense the liquid, and will continue to do so as it is tipped further and further over the second fulcrum line until, when rocked on the curvilineal rocking surface, the remaining liquid will finally and completely be dispensed.

10
In its rejection of the appealed claims, the Board of Appeals relied upon and applied as an anticipating reference the prior art disclosure of the patent to Fuerst for an ornamental design for a bottle, Des. 87,255, issued June 28, 1932. While recognizing that the bottle of the design reference and appellant's bottle differed in several structural respects, the board believed that such differences in appellant's device were without patentable consequence in function, result, or mechanical improvement.

11
In reviewing the board's action, and considering the appellant's arguments with respect thereto, we think the issue for determination here, reduced to its basic essentials, is simply whether the claimed structure and functional consequences resulting therefrom would have been obvious to the ordinary skilled worker in the art having full knowledge of the disclosure of the Fuerst design.

12
The Fuerst reference clearly reveals a bottle of similar shape to that outlined by appellant in his claims and drawings. The patentee's bottle has flat side walls, a flat bottom, curved sides, and intermediate flat portions between the bottom and curved sides, and, in addition, contains small triangular flat portions at the intersection of the bottom and side wall and intermediate support which results in an octagonal bottom and trapezoidal intermediate supports. It is this distinction in shape that, in our opinion, prevents appellant's claims from being directly readable on Fuerst.

13
It is clear from the drawings of the Fuerst patent that the patentee's bottle will function to dispense liquid in much the same manner as appellant's bottle. As stated by the examiner, and we feel correctly, "the curvilineal side surface is adapted for use as a rolling contact surface, if such use is desirable, when dispensing the container contents." While it appears, as the appellant maintains, that Fuerst's bottle, resting upon one of its trapezoidally shaped resting walls, does not prevent the dispensing of a small amount of liquid from the bottle when it is full, and that such resting wall and the octagonal bottom lack the stability of their rectangular counterparts in appellant's construction, it is our view that to change these support surfaces in Fuerst to rectangular supports of increased area would be entirely obvious if greater stability was desired.

14
In contending that the structure set forth in the appealed claims is inventive, producing a new, unusual, and in-obvious result which would not have occurred to the ordinary worker skilled in the art having the Fuerst design before him, appellant argues that, insofar as the reference discloses any function, such disclosure is wholly accidental and not available to anticipate. In support of this conclusion, appellant has included in the record an affidavit of the reference patentee, Fuerst, which states, in effect, that affiant's bottle was not intended for use as a dispenser by rolling it onto its curved upper portion, and that substantial structural differences exist between the respective bottles which would not have been obvious either to affiant or any other ordinary artisan skilled in the art at the time appellant filed his application. The record abundantly shows that Fuerst is a bottle designer of exceptional talents, having been granted 141 design patents covering designs in the container art, and that he has no interest in the application on appeal.

15
It is easy for us to determine that Fuerst's curved side in relation to the two flat supporting surfaces constitutes a prominent and major part of his ornamental design, and therefore is not an accidental disclosure, as alleged by appellant, but even if such disclosure were accidental, it would nevertheless suggest a structural device which, with mere mechanical alterations, would better serve to accomplish the obvious result achieved by appellant herein. See In re Bager, 47 F.2d 951, 18 C.C.P.A., Patents, 1094, and In re Seid, 161 F.2d 229, 34 C.C.P.A., Patents, 1039. Similarly, Fuerst's affidavit to the effect that he did not intend his bottle for use as a dispenser is immaterial to the issue, as we are concerned only with whether his disclosure sufficiently anticipates the device of the appealed claims. That Fuerst's bottle will, in fact, function in substantially the same manner as appellant's bottle, producing the same end results, is apparent from a comparative analysis of the structure of the two bottles, and Fuerst does not state otherwise in his affidavit, nor has it been developed to our satisfaction that appellant's bottle brings forth any inventively meritorious operating advantage over that of the reference. Fuerst's opinion, as set forth in his affidavit, as to the non-obviousness of appellant's bottle to the skilled worker in the art, including himself, is a conclusion on the ultimate issue for determination by this court and, despite affiant's disinterested position, we have accorded it all the consideration to which it is entitled. See In re Pierce, 35 F.2d 781, 17 C.C.P.A., Patents, 626, and In re Voit, 152 F.2d 987, 33 C.C.P. A., Patents, 737. See also In re McKenna, 203 F.2d 717, 40 C.C.P.A., Patents, 937, for a discussion relating to the office performed by ex parte affidavits in patent cases.

16
It being unnecessary, in the light of the foregoing, to discuss other points raised by the appellant, the decision of the Board of Appeals is affirmed.

17
Affirmed.

18
On account of illness, GARRETT, C. J., did not participate in the hearing or decision of this case.


                                             COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Humphreys and O’Brien
UNPUBLISHED

              CARLOS FRANCISCO CORDON RIVAS, SR.
                                                                               MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.     Record No. 1828-18-4                                          PER CURIAM
                                                                                APRIL 9, 2019
              FAIRFAX COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
               FAMILY SERVICES

                                    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
                                                David Bernhard, Judge

                               (Joseph B. Dailey, on brief), for appellant.

                               (Elizabeth D. Teare; May Shallal; John B. Jacob, Jr., Guardian ad
                               litem for the minor children; Office of the County Attorney, on
                               brief), for appellee.

                     Carlos Francisco Cordon Rivas, Sr. (father) appeals the orders terminating his parental rights

              to his children and approving the goal of adoption. Father argues that the circuit court erred in

              finding that the evidence was sufficient to terminate his parental rights and approve the goal of

              adoption because the Fairfax County Department of Family Services (the Department) did not

              provide “appropriate services designed to remedy the conditions that led to the children’s placement

              or continuation in foster care.” Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude

              that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the circuit

              court. See Rule 5A:27.

                     *
                         Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
                                          BACKGROUND1

       “On appeal from the termination of parental rights, this Court is required to review the

evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing in the circuit court.” Yafi v. Stafford

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 69 Va. App. 539, 550-51 (2018) (quoting Thach v. Arlington Cty. Dep’t of

Human Servs., 63 Va. App. 157, 168 (2014)).

       Father and Nelly Margarita Bonillas de Cordon (mother) are the biological parents to four

children, C., F., A., and R., who are the subject of this appeal. The Department first became

involved with the family in December 2012, when it received a referral alleging mental abuse

and neglect of C. and F.,2 who were six and four years old at the time. The Department received

allegations that mother assaulted father and was arrested. Two days later, mother took C. and F.

and fled to El Salvador. She and the children eventually returned to Virginia.

       In February 2014, the Department received a referral alleging mental abuse and neglect

of C. and F. Another domestic violence incident occurred between mother and father in front of

the children. Neither parent was willing to cooperate with the Department nor participate in

mental health treatment. The Department placed the children in foster care.

       In 2015, A. was born, and the Department returned C. and F. to mother and father’s home

for a trial home visit from October 16, 2015 to November 5, 2015, when it received a referral

alleging physical neglect of C. and F. Mother left the house overnight with the infant, A., and

she did not bring weather-appropriate clothes, extra diapers, or supplies for A. She left C. and

       1
         The record in this case was sealed. Nevertheless, the appeal necessitates unsealing
relevant portions of the record to resolve the issues raised by appellant. Evidence and factual
findings below that are necessary to address the assignments of error are included in this opinion.
Consequently, “[t]o the extent that this opinion mentions facts found in the sealed record, we
unseal only those specific facts, finding them relevant to the decision in this case. The remainder
of the previously sealed record remains sealed.” Levick v. MacDougall, 294 Va. 283, 288 n.1
(2017).
       2
           A. and R. were not born yet.
                                                -2-
F., who were nine and seven years old at the time, home alone. Mother reported various stories

to the Department as to where she had been when she left C. and F. The social worker noticed

that mother did not respond appropriately to all of the questions and occasionally would “stare

off in space.” The Department placed all three children in foster care. Father expressed concern

about mother and her mental health and told the Department that he was not worried about the

children because they were in foster care. The Department tried to discuss placement options

with father, but he refused to make any decisions without mother.

       The Department offered individual therapy for mother, father, C., and F., and it also

provided intensive family preservation services. C. and F. returned home for a trial home visit in

July 2016, while A. returned home for a trial home visit in August 2016. The Fairfax County

Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (the JDR court) returned the children to their

parents’ custody on September 30, 2016.

       In November 2016, the Department received a referral for physical neglect of C., F., and

A. Mother physically assaulted father in front of the children, and she was arrested. Mother was

held without bond for thirty days, placed on probation for twelve months, and ordered to

participate in mental health treatment and anger management services. The Department

encouraged father to obtain a protective order, but father refused to file for a protective order or

create a safety plan for the children. The Department offered ongoing services and a referral for

father and the children to stay at a domestic violence shelter, but he refused all services. The

children initially stayed with their former foster parents for a fourteen-day respite.

       The Department explored relative placements, including father’s sister, but she had a

small home and several of her own children. Mother could not identify any relatives. Father

told the Department that the only possible relative to take the children would be his sister.

                                                -3-
       The Department returned the children to father’s care until mother’s release from

incarceration because he refused to keep mother away from the children. Father expressed that

his primary goal was to take care of mother, not the children. The children were placed back in

foster care in December 2016. On January 26, 2017, the JDR court returned the children’s

custody to their parents.

       On July 31, 2017, the Department received a referral alleging physical neglect of C., F.,

and A. At the time, mother was pregnant with R. and stopped taking her medication for her

mental illness. On at least two occasions, mother left the children home alone for extended

periods of time.

       Father contacted the Department and expressed concern that mother was no longer seeing

her therapist. When the social workers interviewed C. and F., they reported that mother had left

them alone more than once. C. complained that there was no food, other than cookies and ice

cream, in the house. C. and F. described their mother as staring off and not responding to them

when she was home. Neither C. nor F. wanted to be alone or go anywhere with mother for fear

of what she might do. Both recalled the domestic violence incident that occurred in November

2016 and that father was bleeding a lot.

       When the social workers interviewed mother, she admitted that she stopped taking her

medications because she was pregnant. She was unable to provide any details to the social

workers about her days with the children.

       Father reported that mother was having an “emotional problem” because of the

pregnancy. He stated that mother had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and that the doctor

gave her the option of reducing her medication while she was pregnant. Mother, however,

decided to stop taking the medication altogether, which father thought was a “bad decision.”

Father expressed concern about leaving the children home alone with mother while he went to

                                              -4-
work. Father acknowledged that mother left the children home alone for the day while he was at

work. Father stated that there was no one with whom he could leave the children while he

worked. The Department offered to assist with child care, but it would be a few days before it

began. Father stated that he was unable to stay home and watch the children until child care

would be available. Father also declined the Department’s offer for rental assistance.

       Father told the Department that he did not have any other family or friends who could

watch the children. Father refused to allow the children to be placed in a foster care respite

placement unless mother agreed. Eventually, mother and father agreed to a respite placement

with the previous foster care family. The children cheered at the prospect of returning to the

foster parents’ home. When the social workers took the children to the foster care respite

placement, A. was not wearing a diaper or underwear, and his shoes and socks were saturated

with urine. C. and A. were wearing clothes that were too small. Upon arrival at the foster home,

the children immediately went to bed and fell asleep.

       The Department explored placement options for the children, including placing them with

church members, but the Department could not locate any viable placements. Therefore, the

Department decided to remove the children, instead of continuing with a respite placement,

because mother had violated her probation and father was “not prioritizing the needs of the

children.” Mother was arrested for violating her probation and subsequently hospitalized at

Western State Hospital.

       On August 2, 2017, the JDR court entered emergency removal orders and granted

temporary custody of the children to the Department. At the adjudicatory hearing, the JDR court

found that the children were abused or neglected and ordered mother to comply with mental

health treatment. On October 13, 2017, the JDR court entered the dispositional orders.

                                                -5-
       The Department offered numerous services to the parents. The Department had referred

mother and father for psychological evaluations, parent-child evaluations, individual therapy,

couple’s therapy, and parenting classes. The Department also referred mother for a

neuropsychological evaluation and a psychiatric evaluation.

       The Department arranged for supervised visitation for the parents. While mother was

hospitalized, the Department had offered father opportunities to visit with the children twice a

week, but father stopped visiting for a while when he refused to transport himself to the visits,

after the Department learned that he had a car and a driver’s license and offered to reimburse him

for mileage. Father’s visits recommenced later, but he only visited once per week.

       In September 2017, the Department moved the children to a pre-adoptive home, where

the foster parents spoke English and Spanish. The Department offered homebased services to

the children and the foster family to assist with the transition. The Department also referred C.

and F. to therapy, as they had been experiencing anxiety with their situation.

       In January 2018, the Department filed petitions to terminate mother and father’s parental

rights to C., F., and A. On February 20, 2018, the JDR court entered orders terminating mother

and father’s parental rights to C., F., and A. and approved the goal of adoption. Mother and

father appealed the orders to the circuit court.

       Meanwhile, the Department contacted father prior to R.’s birth to determine his plans for

the child, and at first, father refused to speak with the Department. While mother was

hospitalized, she gave birth to R. in December 2017. Once R. was ready to be discharged from

the hospital, the Department placed R. in the same foster home as C., F., and A. The Department

advised father about the upcoming hearing date and family partnership meeting for R., but father

said that he was too busy at work and could not come. Father requested a paternity test, which

revealed that he was R.’s biological father. Father also told the Department that he would be

                                                   -6-
unable to care for R. for six weeks, which was the earliest age that R. could attend day care.

Father attended few visitations with R. The JDR court adjudicated R. to be at risk of abuse and

neglect and entered a dispositional order on February 9, 2018.

        When mother was released from incarceration, mother met with the social worker

regarding the children. The Department arranged for mother to visit with the children twice per

week, and her visits were separate from father’s visits. Mother also had an additional visit with

R. during the week, but that was discontinued after she abruptly left for El Salvador in April

2018.

        On May 18, 2018, the JDR court terminated mother and father’s parental rights to R. and

approved the goal of adoption. Mother and father appealed to the circuit court.

        On May 30, 2018, the parties appeared before the circuit court to be heard on the appeals

regarding C., F., and A. The Department presented evidence that mother participated in a

parenting class, couple’s counseling, individual counseling, and homebased services. Likewise,

father participated in parenting classes, couple’s counseling, and two rounds of individual

therapy.

        The Department provided evidence concerning the parents’ visits with the children.

Throughout the history of this case, mother did not regularly visit with the children, and when

she did, she was “hesitant” with them. In February and March 2018, mother still required

prompts from the supervisor as to how to interact with the children and detect their needs.

Mother never could articulate the children’s needs or why they were in foster care. In May 2018,

father’s visits were still chaotic. He focused too much attention on one child and not enough

attention on the other three children. Father told the social worker that he intended to be with

mother and hoped to have the children come home. His plan continued to be that mother would

care for the children, while he was at work. Neither parent had progressed to having community

                                               -7-
visits or unsupervised visits. Also, neither parent had demonstrated that they had learned how to

apply what they had learned from the various services provided.

       The Department presented evidence about mother’s mental health. Dr. Nesly Hneich,

mother’s psychiatrist, testified that she had treated mother between January and August 2017,

until mother was hospitalized at Western State Hospital. Mother attended six out of thirteen

visits. Mother’s diagnosis was schizoaffective disorder, and Dr. Hneich provided psychiatric

services, as well as medication management. Mother refused to take an injectable medication

that Dr. Hneich originally suggested, but she did initially agree to a low dose of pills. Dr. Hneich

found that mother had poor insight into her mental condition and displayed symptoms of flat

affect and “bizarre behaviors,” including erratic and disorganized behaviors, as well as

responding to internal stimuli. Dr. Hneich was concerned that when mother was pregnant with

R., she did not receive prenatal care and had stopped her psychiatric medications. Dr. Hneich

explained to mother that there was another medication that was safe to use during pregnancy, but

mother refused it. Dr. Hneich also expressed concern that a patient who is violent toward one

member of the family could be violent with other members of the family. Dr. Hneich testified

that she did not know whether mother was ever going to be capable of handling the stressors

involved with parenting one child, much less four children.

       At the end of the day on May 30, 2018, the parties had not presented all of their evidence,

so the matter was continued to August 22, 2018. Between the May 30, 2018 hearing and the

August 22, 2018 hearing, R.’s appeal came to the circuit court. The circuit court consolidated

R.’s case with C., F., and A.’s cases.

       On August 22, 2018, the Department continued to present its evidence. Amy Anderson, a

counselor, testified that she had been working with F. off and on since February 2015, and she

also counseled C. and F. as siblings. Anderson worked with F. in play therapy, where F.

                                               -8-
displayed feelings of instability and fear that eventually improved over time spent in therapy.

Anderson diagnosed F. with reactive attachment disorder and unspecified anxiety disorder.

Anderson determined that C.’s prognosis was not as good as F.’s prognosis and that C. needed “a

stable home with adults who . . . [were] able to provide adequate and consistent care . . . .”

Anderson also opined that all of the children needed “two parents who [were] fully committed to

caring for them” and who had “very good management skills.”

       Next, the Department offered the testimony of Damaris Cullerton, who had supervised

mother and father’s visits with the children since 2017. Cullerton explained that she had to set

guidelines because initially, father brought too many sweets for the children. Cullerton also had

to discipline the children if C. and F. acted inappropriately, because father would not always

intervene. Father did not have any structure or rules for the children, and he had difficulty

handling all of the children at one time. Father was not comfortable with R., and Cullerton often

had to take care of R., including changing his diaper, feeding him, and soothing him. Cullerton

had to remind father that she was there to help him and not be a nanny. Although father was

slow to respond to Cullerton’s teaching, he did cooperate and was receptive to her instructions.

       Mother, on the other hand, was resistant to Cullerton’s instruction and advice. During the

visits with all four children, mother’s primary focus was on R. Cullerton noticed that A. never

showed any affection toward mother or greeted her.

       During the eighteen months that she supervised the visits, Cullerton did not notice much

improvement in the parents’ skills. Cullerton remained uncomfortable with the prospect of the

parents having unsupervised visits.

       The Department then presented evidence from Dr. William Ling, who had conducted

several parent-child assessments with father and mother since 2014, as well as psychological

evaluations of father, C., and F. Dr. Ling found that father “had tremendous struggle being able

                                                -9-
to balance his need to work a large number of hours in order to be able to financially provide for

the family with the demand that would occur when his wife became incapacitated or unavailable

to parent.” Dr. Ling also found that father had “struggled to be able to set appropriate

boundaries with his wife” because of her mental illness and refusal to take medication at times.

He had difficulties “adequately provid[ing] for the safety of the children when she [became]

disorganized.” Dr. Ling saw father several times between 2014 and 2018, and he found father to

be “remarkably stable from a psychological perspective and from a parenting perspective.”

Dr. Ling concluded that while father “has the appropriate capacities, he’s been unable to

implement them to a satisfactory degree.” Father has not shown that he “can assume direct

responsibility for the children as a single parent.” Dr. Ling opined that father had prioritized his

job first and foremost, and then secondarily, his wife, and lastly, his children. Dr. Ling

expressed concern that father could be too permissive and would not be able to guide and

supervise the children as they grew older.

       Dr. Ling found that mother had a “basic set of parenting skills that were appropriate, but

her ability to apply those skills was greatly dependent on what her psychological or psychiatric

status was from moment to moment.” Dr. Ling noted that “[t]here were periods of time where

she was clearly and significantly compromised in her functioning, not just as an individual but

also her ability to parent her children.” Dr. Ling expressed concern about mother’s ability to stay

on her medication and how her mental health had affected the children.

       Dr. Ling recommended that the level of supervision not be reduced until mother and

father demonstrated at least two years of stability and an ability to handle one child.

       At the conclusion of the evidence presented on August 22, 2018, the circuit court

continued the case to September 6, 2018, for the final day of evidence and argument. On

                                               - 10 -
September 6, 2018, father and mother moved to strike the evidence, which the circuit court

denied.

          Father did not present any evidence, but mother testified about her situation and that she

wanted the children to come home. She verified that she regularly had been receiving her

medication via injections since November 2017, but admitted that she was not participating in

counseling. On cross-examination, mother acknowledged that she had missed her injections

when she went to El Salvador.

          Mother testified about the children and her mental health. When asked if the children had

any special needs, mother replied, “They need a lot of love.” Mother testified that she was

capable of taking care of the children and knew that she needed to take her medication. Mother

explained that the medication helped to keep her calm and reduced her urges to leave the house

or be violent. However, when asked, she could not identify her illness. She testified that if the

children returned home and she became stressed, she would talk to father or take a walk “to get

away from the stress.”

          After hearing the parties’ arguments, the circuit court found that it was in the best

interests of the children to terminate mother and father’s parental rights under Code

§ 16.1-283(B) and (C)(2) and approve the goal of adoption. The circuit court entered the final

orders, and mother and father timely noted their appeals.

                                              ANALYSIS

          “On review, ‘[a] trial court is presumed to have thoroughly weighed all the evidence,

considered the statutory requirements, and made its determination based on the child’s best

interests.’” Castillo v. Loudoun Cty. Dep’t of Family Servs., 68 Va. App. 547, 558 (2018)

(quoting Logan v. Fairfax Cty. Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128 (1991)). “Where, as

here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus, its finding is entitled to great weight and will not be

                                                  - 11 -
disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Fauquier Cty. Dep’t

of Soc. Servs. v. Ridgeway, 59 Va. App. 185, 190 (2011) (quoting Martin v. Pittsylvania Cty.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20 (1986)).

       Father argues that the circuit court erred by terminating his parental rights and approving

the goal of adoption because the Department failed to provide father with reasonable and

appropriate services to remedy the conditions that led to, and required continuation of, the

children’s placement in foster care. Father contends that the Department did not provide any

services to father to reunify the family after it removed the children in 2017.

       “‘Reasonable and appropriate’ efforts can only be judged with reference to the

circumstances of a particular case. Thus, a court must determine what constitutes reasonable and

appropriate efforts given the facts before the court.” Harrison v. Tazewell Cty. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 42 Va. App. 149, 163 (2004) (quoting Ferguson v. Stafford Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 14

Va. App. 333, 338 (1992)). The Department “is not required to force its services upon an

unwilling or disinterested parent.” Tackett v. Arlington Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs., 62

Va. App. 296, 323 (2013) (quoting Harris v. Lynchburg Div. of Soc. Servs., 223 Va. 235, 243

(1982)); see also Logan, 13 Va. App. at 130.

       Since 2014, the Department had provided this family numerous services. Over the years,

the Department offered referrals and services for mental health treatment, individual counseling,

couple’s counseling, parenting classes, intensive family prevention services, psychiatric services,

medication management, parent-child assessments, and psychological evaluations. In 2016, the

Department offered ongoing services and a referral for father and the children to go to a domestic

violence shelter, but father refused all services. In 2017, the Department had offered father

assistance with day care and rent, but father refused that assistance.

                                               - 12 -
       The Department also provided supervised visitation opportunities for mother and father.

Father was even offered additional visitation consisting of two days per week, instead of one day

per week, in 2017 and 2018, but he stopped visiting altogether for a while when he refused to

transport himself to visitations. Then, father recommenced visitation but only once per week.

       At the time of the circuit court hearing, the Department had placed C. and F. in foster

care three times, and A. in foster care twice, in the past four years. Furthermore, R. had been in

foster care since his birth. Despite all of the services provided to father over the years, father did

not demonstrate that he could apply what he had learned. He consistently stated that he placed

mother’s needs over the children’s needs. Father never progressed to having unsupervised or

community visits. In 2018, father still relied on mother to do everything during the visits, and he

“scaled back” his role with the children. Dr. Ling concluded that while father “has the

appropriate capacities, he’s been unable to implement them to a satisfactory degree.”

       Father had not substantially corrected the conditions that led to the findings of neglect

and abuse because father and mother continued to live together, mother had a serious mental

illness for which she did not reliably take medication, and father continued to place mother’s

needs above the children’s needs. See Code § 16.1-283(B). Father was unable to remedy those

conditions that led to and required continued foster care. See Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). “It is

clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out

when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his [or her] responsibilities.” Tackett, 62

Va. App. at 322 (quoting Kaywood v. Halifax Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540

(1990)).

       Considering the circumstances of this case, the circuit court did not err in holding that the

Department provided reasonable and appropriate services to the parents to help remedy the

                                                - 13 -
conditions that led to, and required the continuation of, foster care. The circuit court did not err

in terminating father’s parental rights and approving the goal of adoption.

                                          CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s ruling is summarily affirmed. Rule 5A:27.

                                                                                Affirmed.

                                                - 14 -