Why do bureaucrats enforce rules in cases where their application is universally regarded as stupid?
A zoning board in Fairfax County, Va., is standing firm in its decision to order a war veteran to destroy a tree house he built for his two young sons.
Apparently it needs some kind of variance for purely technical reasons.
Here’s a question for the economists out there.
Why do zoning board personnel do their jobs here? Let’s assume that they don’t personally have a preference for chopping down treehouses. (Seems straightforward.) A zoning board employee has the choice to work or shirk on any given case — shouldn’t s/he work only on those cases where s/he’s likely to get punished for shirking, i.e., where anyone else in the would would give a damn?
- they actually do have a preference for chopping down harmless treehouses
- they have preferences for enforcement of the rules in general (hmm… rule of law rears its head again?)
- they’re uncertain about others’ preferences, and are enforcing it due to risk-aversion?
My guess is the third, but, more?