Lewis, Peter J. (2005) Probability in Everettian quantum mechanics. [Preprint]
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The main difficulty facing no-collapse theories of quantum mechanics in the Everettian tradition concerns the role of probability within a theory in which every possible outcome of a measurement actually occurs. The problem is two-fold: First, what do probability claims mean within such a theory? Second, what ensures that the probabilities attached to measurement outcomes match those of standard quantum mechanics? Deutsch has recently proposed a decision-theoretic solution to the second problem, according to which agents are rationally required to weight the outcomes of measurements according to the standard quantum-mechanical probability measure. I show that this argument admits counterexamples, and hence fails to establish the standard probability weighting as a rational requirement.
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|Keywords:||Many worlds, Everett, probability.|
|Subjects:||Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics|
|Depositing User:||Peter J. Lewis|
|Date Deposited:||23 Apr 2006|
|Last Modified:||07 Oct 2010 11:14|
Available Versions of this Item
- Deutsch on quantum decision theory. (deposited 20 Aug 2003)
- Probability in Everettian quantum mechanics. (deposited 23 Apr 2006)[Currently Displayed]
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