Speakers:Francoise Forges, Vince Crawford, Michalis Drouvelis, Eran Shmaya, Nick Vriend, Joel Sobel
Location:Room EAS.E171 (New Theatre, East Building, LSE)
Refreshments and lunch in room EAS.E304 below the lecture hall.
Maps of the LSE campus can be found here: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/mapsAndDirections/findingYourWayAroundLSE.aspx
Everybody is welcome and participation is free - contacts for the event:Professor Bernhard von Stengel firstname.lastname@example.org, Loraine Evans email@example.com
10:30 Francoise Forges(Paris-Dauphine)
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium
of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly infinitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely finite), direct, cheap talk.
11:25 Vince Crawford(Oxford)
The paper revisits Myerson and Satterthwaite's (1983 JET) classic analysis of mechanism design for bilateral bargaining with independent private values, relaxing
their assumption of Bayesian equilibrium in favor of a structural nonequilibrium model based on "level-k" thinking.
12:20 lunch(sandwiches, provided)
13:50 Michalis Drouvelis(Birmingham)
We consider a parametric version of Chicken and Battle of the Sexes to test whether or not players are able to coordinate on pure Nash equilibria using correlation devices. We use two different correlation devices, public and private to send recommendations in different sessions with different payoffs for these games and test whether the players follow the recommended strategies to avoid coordination-failure in the respective games. We find that the players overall do achieve coordination by following the recommended strategies; however, "following the recommendation" varies significantly with the treatment (game), period, recommended strategy and Markov (last period) effects.
14:30 Eran Shmaya(Northwestern)
In a game with incomplete information each player receives a stochastic signal that depends on the actual state of nature. The signals received are determined by the information structure, which in turn determines the equilibria of the game. Two information structures are equivalent if they induce the same set of equilibrium
outcomes. We characterize situations in which two information structures are equivalent in terms of "garblings", which are natural transformations from one structure to another. We study the notion of "being equivalent to" with respect to three equilibrium concepts: Nash equilibrium, agent normal-form correlated equilibrium, and the belief-invariant Bayesian equilibrium.
15:25 coffee break
15:55 Nick Vriend(Queen Mary)
Considering a pure coordination game with a large number of equivalent equilibria, we argue that a focal point that is itself not a Nash equilibrium, and is Pareto dominated by all Nash equilibria, may enhance coordination substantially. Besides attracting the
players' choices to itself, such a non-equilibrium focal point may act as an equilibrium selection device that the players use to coordinate on a small subset of Nash equilibria. We present experimental support for these two roles of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devices, and suggest a theoretical explanation for this.
16:35 Joel Sobel(San Diego)
This paper studies cheap talk games by imposing a monotonicity condition on Sender strategies and then applies iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies. This procedure selects among Crawford and Sobel (1982) equilibria, typically selecting the outcome with the maximal number of induced actions. Other refinements, such as NITS, select the same outcome. It also predicts that Senders will inflate their communication using only the highest messages in equilibrium.
19:30 Dinner at Pu's Brasserie (self-paid)
Workshop contacts: firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com
This workshop is part of an ESRC sponsored series of one-day workshops organised by Andres Carvajal (Warwick), Martin Cripps (UCL) and Olivier Gossner and Bernhard von Stengel (LSE).