ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Eric K. Koselke Karen M. Freeman-Wilson
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Deputy Attorney General
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
GERALD MICKENS, ) ) Appellant (Defendant Below ), ) ) v. ) Cause No. 49S00-0005-CR-325 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee (Plaintiff Below ). )
February 27, 2001
The jury in appellant Gerald Mickens trial reported back a unanimous verdict of
guilty on both counts, murder and carrying a handgun without a license.
As counsel polled the jury, however, one juror said she had been intimidated
by another and was unsure about voting to convict. The trial judge
took extensive measures, described below, to deal with this development. We are
satisfied that these measures were adequate and thus affirm the convictions.
The same juror later informed the bailiff that a juror was threatening her
and calling her names. The trial court conducted an inquiry of Juror
#12. Juror #12 told the court: The other black female in
the jury has been very angry at me because Im not deciding what
their side is deciding and shes been calling me names. Shes been
saying Im immature. And basically, putting me under a lot of duress.
(R. at 334.) Upon questioning by the court, the juror indicated that
she understood that how one decides to vote on a verdict is an
individual decision and said she was taking it very seriously. (R. at
Then, at Juror #12s request, the court replayed some testimony from the trial
and instructed the jury to maintain civility during deliberations. (R. at 336,
338-39.) After the testimony was replayed, another juror sent a note to
the court stating that Juror #12 was not logical and not following the
request of the Court. (R. at 344.) The bailiff told the
court that Juror #12 had said that she wished to be taken off
the Jury. (Id.)
The court conducted another inquiry of Juror #12. Juror #12 indicated that
it was actually other jurors who wanted her off the panel, but that
the jurys deliberations were now being conducted in a reasoned way and that
she wished to continue serving. The judge instructed her to rejoin the
other jurors and continue deliberations.
After further deliberations, the jury again found Mickens guilty on both the murder
and handgun charges. The court polled the jurors individually, and each juror
confirmed agreement with the verdict.
Mickens asserts that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury when the trial court denied his request for a mistrial based on juror misconduct during deliberations. On appeal, a trial judges discretion in determining whether to grant a mistrial is afforded great deference, because the trial judge is in the best position to gauge the surrounding circumstances of an event and its impact on the jury. Gregory v. State, 540 N.E.2d 585, 589 (Ind. 1989). We therefore review the trial courts decision solely for abuse of discretion. Rodriguez v. State, 270 Ind. 613, 388 N.E.2d 493 (1979). After all, a mistrial is an extreme remedy that is only justified when other remedial measures are insufficient to rectify the situation. Szpyrka v. State, 550 N.E.2d 316, 318 (Ind. 1990)(citing Lee v. State, 531 N.E.2d 1165 (Ind. 1988)).
To prevail on appeal from the denial of a motion for mistrial, the appellant must establish that the questioned conduct was so prejudicial and inflammatory that he was placed in a position of grave peril to which he should not have been subjected. Gregory, 540 N.E.2d at 589. The gravity of the peril is determined by considering the misconducts probable persuasive effect on the jury's decision, not the impropriety of the conduct. Id.
The trial judge in this case proceeded in a thorough and thoughtful way,
confronting an unusual set of circumstances. He conducted two separate inquiries of
the beleaguered juror to confirm the importance of the verdict being an individual
decision, admonished the jury to maintain civility during their deliberations, and polled the
jurors independently after the verdicts were announced to verify that the result was
truly an individual decision. The affected juror assured the trial court that
she understood how she voted was an individual decision, (R. at 335, 345-46),
and she agreed with the jurys verdict, (R. at 349-50). Because the
juror did not indicate any hesitation or unwillingness to continue deliberating in this
matter, and certainly, she knows that she doesnt have to go the route
that the other Jurors do, the court denied Mickens motion for mistrial.
(R. at 340, 342.)
This approach focused on the right questions, similar to those at issue in
a case in which two jurors received mysterious and possibly intimidating phone calls.
Rodriguez, 270 Ind. at 616, 388 N.E.2d at 495. The jurors
assured the court that the phone calls would not affect their decision in
the case, and the court specifically admonished the jurors to not allow the
calls to influence them during deliberations. We concluded that any prejudicial effect
these calls might have had on the jury was cured by the courts
inquiries and admonishments. Id., 270 Ind. at 617, 388 N.E.2d at 496.
We reach the same conclusion in the case before us today. The
road here was a little bumpy, but the trial judge was satisfied that
the verdict represented the impartial and separate judgment of all the jurors.
The court justifiably denied Mickens motion for mistrial.
As the parties approached one another, no words were exchanged. Whitlow punched
Mickens in the face once and Lewis struck him. Mickens then stepped
back and drew a gun. Lewis had seen Mickens hand in his
pocket earlier, but did not think anything of it until Mickens drew the
gun. Lewis ran from Mickens when he saw the gun; Whitlow
remained motionless. After hearing a shot, Lewis turned around in time to
see Mickens fire a second shot in the vicinity of where Whitlow lay.
Whitlow died from gunshot wounds to the head and abdomen.
The State charged Mickens with knowingly killing another human being by shooting a deadly weapon. Mickens does not contest the adequacy of the proof on these elements, arguing instead that the State unsuccessfully rebutted his claim of self-defense.
In a homicide prosecution, a self-defense claim can prevail only if
the defendant had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm.
Brooks v. State, 683 N.E.2d 574, 577 (Ind. 1997). A defendant may
use deadly force to repel an attack only if such force is reasonable
and believed to be necessary. Crisler v. State, 509 N.E.2d 822 (Ind.
1987). Indeed, [t]he trier of fact is not precluded from finding that
a defendant used unreasonable force simply because the victim was the initial aggressor.
Birdsong v. State, 685 N.E.2d 42, 45 (Ind. 1997)(citations omitted).
When a defendant asserts self-defense, the burden shifts to the State to disprove
one of the elements of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
The State may carry its burden by rebutting the defense directly, by affirmatively
showing the defendant did not act in self-defense, or by simply relying upon
the sufficiency of its evidence in chief. Lilly v. State, 506 N.E.2d
23, 24 (Ind. 1987).
Here, the evidence favorable to the verdict suggests that Whitlow and Lewis each
punched Mickens once after approaching him and his girlfriend. Neither of Mickens
assailants possessed guns at the time of the confrontation. Nevertheless,
after being hit twice, Mickens backed away from the aggressors, drew a gun,
and shot Whitlow two times. According to Lewis testimony, Mickens
shot Whitlow again after his first shot knocked the victim to the ground.
(R. at 187.)
This was ample evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mickens used excessive force and could not have entertained a good faith belief that he was in danger of death or great bodily harm. Accordingly, we will not disturb the jurys decision.
Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 49 (Ind. 1999).
Mickens concedes that the two convictions do not violate
the statutory elements test. (Appellants Br. at 11.) He contends instead that the same evidence was used to convict him of both charges, thereby contravening the actual evidence test. Under this test, the actual evidence presented at trial is examined to determine whether each challenged offense was established by separate and distinct facts. Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 53. The defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable, not speculative or remote, possibility that the fact-finder used the same evidentiary facts to establish the essential elements of both offenses. Griffin v. State, 717 N.E.2d 73, 89 (Ind. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 2697 (2000). Mickens has failed to meet this burden.
To prove the murder, the State demonstrated that Mickens caused Whitlows death by
shooting him two times with a handgun. It also showed that
Mickens carried the gun as he approached Whitlow and Lewis. (R. at
185, 196, 201). Once the State proved that Mickens carried a handgun,
the burden shifted to Mickens to provide proof that he possessed a valid
license. Washington v. State, 517 N.E.2d 77 (Ind. 1987). See also
Ind. Code Ann. § 35-47-2-1 (West 1998). Mickens did not.
This claim resembles the one addressed in Ho v. State, 725
N.E.2d 988 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). There, the Court of Appeals confronted a double jeopardy claim arising from a defendants convictions for robbery and carrying a handgun without a license. Id. at 992. Like Mickens, Ho did not present evidence that he had a license for the handgun that he used to commit robbery. The court concluded that distinct evidentiary facts were used to prove that Ho committed robbery while armed with a handgun, while a lack of evidentiary facts was used to prove that Ho did not have a license to carry that handgun. Ho, 725 N.E.2d at 993. Consequently, the court held that Ho unsuccessfully demonstrated a reasonable possibility that the same evidentiary facts may have been used to establish the essential elements of each challenged offense. Id.
This seems about right. Carrying the gun along the street
was one crime and using it was another. The Richardson actual evidence test is not met, and we reject Mickens double jeopardy claim.
Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.