his recent Middle East and European tour, Senator Barack Obama stated
his strategic positions on Iraq and Afghanistan, which involves a
timetable for withdrawal of most, if not all, U.S. forces from Iraq,
and redeploying some forces to Afghanistan, which Obama seems to think
is the epicenter of the misnamed “War on Terror.” This would constitute
During the 1968 presidential election,
Republican candidate Richard Nixon promised to end the Vietnam War in
his first term. Meanwhile, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, the
Democratic Party candidate, was stuck with “running for Lyndon
Johnson’s second term.” At the end of October, in a vain effort to
boost Humphrey’s chances, Johnson ended the already limited bombing of
North Vietnam. Nixon won anyway, albeit barely.
Once in office, President Nixon found
restarting the bombing of North Vietnam politically unpalatable.
Nevertheless, saddled with his campaign promise to withdraw U.S. forces
in four years, Nixon used air power to cover the retreat by covertly
bombing enemy strongholds in the Cambodian border region and unleashing
a massive “secret” bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Hanoi’s 200-mile
infiltration corridor through eastern portions of neutral Laos.
Despite dumping three million tons of bombs on
the Trail, Hanoi’s infiltration of troops and supplies continued even
as American force levels plummeted from a high of 569,000 troops in
1969 to little more than 60,000 by March 1972 when Hanoi launched its
14-division invasion from sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia.
Nixon’s response, Operation Linebacker, blunted
the invasion and helped move peace talks forward to the point that his
national security advisor, Dr. Henry Kissinger, claimed “peace is at
hand” just before the 1972 presidential elections. When Saigon balked
at the terms (which would have left the nation vulnerable to a
communist takeover), Hanoi stood firm. Nixon responded with more
bombing: a 12-day campaign known as Linebacker II. The key to that
operation was the destruction of Hanoi’s air defense system, leaving
North Vietnam vulnerable to aerial annihilation. While conceding
nothing, Hanoi agreed to reopen negotiations. The last American forces
pulled out of South Vietnam in early 1973 and Hanoi returned U.S.
prisoners of war. Nixon called it “peace with honor.” To many air-power
enthusiasts it “smelled like victory.” It was neither. Great nations do
not make war so they can withdraw their forces (retreat by another
name) and have their prisoners repatriated.
Nixon’s timetable spelled strategic disaster
for South Vietnam. A premature withdrawal from Iraq risks much more
since Iraq is far more strategically vital to U.S. interests than
Indochina ever was.
The situation in Afghanistan begs the moniker
“quagmire.” In the Vietnam War courses I taught over the last 30 years,
when asked what is the essential lesson of that war, I answered it is
that the United States should never again become involved in a civil
war in a former European colony on the other side of the globe where
the enemy has contiguous borders and sanctuaries in neighboring
countries. Though meant to be facetious since every strategic challenge
has its own dynamics, Afghanistan, in many ways, approximates that
The Taliban and its Al-Qaeda cohorts
evidentially possess an inviolate sanctuary in the wilds of Pakistan,
just as the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese allies enjoyed in Laos
and Cambodia—and this time it is impossible to use air power against
them. Furthermore, because of drastic cuts in the size of U.S. military
forces after 1991, America does not have the staying power for a long
twilight war in Afghanistan.
Finally, there is this: After President John F.
Kennedy backed down the Russians during the Cuban Missile Crisis in
1962, the Soviets engaged in a massive strategic military buildup so
that by 1969 they achieved rough nuclear parity with the West.
Currently, Russia and China are engaged in comprehensive military
modernization programs while the United States slashes weapons
modernization programs to fund maintenance on aging systems acquired
during the Reagan years.
Great nations do not make war so they can
retreat without victory. The current war, unlike any in our history,
has yet to be properly identified as a global struggle, a total war
pitting the Judeo-Christian West against Islamic Jihadists. Until there
is an unambiguous identification of the enemy and a clear statement of
national strategic objectives, a viable military strategy cannot be
devised. And tactical triumphs do not necessarily correlate with
strategic victory. Any strategic vision focused on retreat augers