Update: Instead of writing new posts to move the debate forward, Justin has massively revised his original posts. My post below still responds to his original posts, not the revised ones.
Justin Martyr has written ‘A Quick Refutation of Desire Utilitarianism [aka desirism]‘ in two parts: Part I, Part II. Like most criticisms of desirism, his criticisms fail to understand what desirism actually claims.
Justin begins with a summary of desirism. First:
A desire is a reason for action. This is true by definition – we have simply defined the word ‘desire’ to mean a reason for action.
This is almost true. It is part of our definition of the word ‘desire’ that it is a reason for action. But desire does not just mean ‘a reason for action.’ There are other possible reasons for action: for example, intrinsic values. It just happens to be the case that intrinsic values do not exist.
Second, the objects of desire are usually states of affairs, not psychological states:
The proposition P is ‘the poor in Calcutta, India are fed’. Mother Theresa desires that P is true. That desire can only be fulfilled if the poor in Calcutta are actually fed.
This is true, though psychological states can also be the objects of desire. For example, I may desire that P where P is “I am happy.”
Third, on malleable desires:
Desire utilitarianism only focuses on malleable desires – desires for things that can be changed. The desire to turn the moon into green cheese is not a malleable desire; the desire to feed the poor is.
Justin’s example is confused. The desire to turn the moon into green cheese is a malleable desire. For example, I may ridicule your desire, or bring you to a cheese factory where you learn that the smell of green cheese disgusts you, and then you will no longer desire to turn the moon into green cheese.
What is not so malleable here is the molecular structure of the moon, not the desire in question.
Fourth, on good and bad:
The definition of ‘good’ is that which fulfills desires and ‘bad’ is that which thwarts desires.
This is true only due to the conjunction of three facts:
- By definition, “good” means “such as to realize that for which there are reasons for action to realize.”
- Empirically, desires are the only reasons for action that exist.
- Empirically, states of affairs are the usual objects of desires. (And for the exceptions, where psychological states are the objects of desires, we can consider psychological states as one category of states of affairs.)
Fifth, Justin notes the role of praise and condemnation, reward and punishment in affecting malleable desires. We can discourage bad desires (desires that tend to thwart other desires) and encourage good desires (desires that tend to fulfill other desires).
Next, Justin claims:
Desire Utilitarianism is the pursuit of self interest.
This is misleading. To claim this, Justin must redefine “self interest” to mean “one’s desires.” But let us consider someone who desires to campaign against acts of state terror by the United States military, even at cost of losing his job, family, and freedom. Using normal definitions, we would say that such a man desires what is contrary to his self interest, or that he sacrifices self interest to help others.
However, even if we accept Justin’s redefinition of “self interest,” Justin’s statement is simply false. Desirism does not advocate the pursuit of one’s own desires. Rather, it describes that this is what people do. People act such as to fulfill the strongest of their desires, given their beliefs. This is merely the central thesis in the most successful theory of intentional action, Belief Desire Intention theory.
Desirism does not say you should pursue your own desires. Instead, it says you should work to mold your own desires and the desires of others into good desires – desires that tend to fulfill other desires – and that you should act on those good desires.
Near the end of Part I, Justin claims that:
Because desire utilitarianism is basically the same as social contract theory it suffers from the same weaknesses. There is a reason why even liberal egalitarian (read: secular) philosophers have generally rejected social contract theory. That will be the subject of the second post in the series…
Secular philosophers have not generally rejected social contract theory. In fact, social contract theory has been one of the most popular normative theories among philosophers since Rawls‘ A Theory of Justice (1971).
Now, social contract theory says that morality is in accord with a hypothetical social contract we would all agree to under certain conditions. Desirism says that morality is about promoting desires that tend to fulfill other desires, and discouraging desires that tend to thwart other desires. If these are “basically the same,” Justin will need to explain how. Later, he tries:
What is justice as impartiality? Basically it is a way of doing bargaining but forcing everyone to have equal negotiating power. John Rawls does this with the Veil of Ignorance. Behind the figurative Veil people do not know if they are white or black. It is in this position that they make the laws about whether or not to allow slavery. But of course, this requires magical reasoning about the existence of intrinsic moral principles. Alternately, it could be the case that a loving God exists.
But what does desirism have to do with justice as impartiality? What is the similarity? In fact, Justin pulls out one of the major differences between desirism and other moral theories: desirism requires no magical thinking about gods or intrinsic moral principles.
So how does Justin ‘refute’ desirism? He presents the 900 Racists Problem, which is identical to the 1000 Sadists Problem (which Justin constantly references), and has the same solution given desirism. Here is Justin’s 900 Racists Problem:
Suppose we lived in a society with 900 racist whites and 100 blacks. The racist whites have the desire that blacks be enslaved and treated as inferiors. In this case the racist oppressors are the ones with the numbers on their side. They are the ones who have the ability to praise, punish, and condemn in order to have their racist desires fulfilled.
Now this might present a problem for act utilitarianism, which argues that the right act is one that causes the most pleasure or satisfies the most preferences. In this situation, acts that maintain slavery are morally right because there are more racist whites than blacks.
But according to desirism, the primary objects of moral evaluation are not acts but desires. So we ask, does a desire to maintain slavery tend to fulfill or thwart desires? One way consider the question is to imagine that we can control the desire with a knob. If we turn the knob to the left, the desire to enforce slavery on others decreases. If we turn the knob to the right, this desire increases. Now, given that the desire to enforce slavery on others is malleable, which way should we turn the knob?
If we turn the knob all the way to the left, then neither the desires of the racists nor the desires of the blacks are thwarted. Everyone is happy. If we turn the knob to the right, then the racists’ desires may be fulfilled by the system of slavery but the blacks’ desires are not. The best place to turn this knob is all the way to the left.
Why does Justin not accept this solution?
The point is that the only use for the [knob-turning thought experiment] is to help us disinterested bystanders figure out which desires to praise and which to punish. If you already have a strong desire then it will have little or no impact.
This is false. Let us imagine a world where there is nobody except the 900 white racists and 100 blacks. People still generally have reason to use moral tools like praise and condemnation to “turn the knob down” on the desire to enforce slavery on others? Why? Because if we turn the knob down then everyone can have their desires fulfilled (or rather, not thwarted).
Perhaps what Justin means to say is that in such a universe, the desire to enforce slavery on others would not be malleable, so there would be no point trying to change it. But if this hypothetical world is just like ours except that it has only 1000 people in it, then the desire to enforce slavery on others would be malleable in it, because it is highly malleable in our universe. In fact, this desire was changed in billions of minds in a single century. Now that is a malleable desire!
Justin’s post misunderstands desirism at almost every step, but that’s understandable. I just need to keep clarifying things with posts like this. I made the exact same mistakes when I first found the theory of desirism.
Another critique of Justin Martyr’s posts is available here.
There are many people who do understand desirism and have mounted serious objections to the theory, and I look forward to answering them, here.