19 November 1941
I know that it is beyond our powers to imagine the anxiety felt by the Cabinet leaders who bear the heavy responsibility of saving the nation and succoring the people at this time when relations between Japan and the United States have now at last reached the point of cruciality. There are now three ways which the Empire might take-
(1) Maintain the status quo.
(2) Break the present deadlock by an advance under force of arms.
(3) Devise some means for bringing about a mutual non-aggression arrangement.
No. 1 would mean that both sides would continue to increase war preparations and send out larger fleets of war vessels bringing about a state where only a contact would be needed to start a conflagration. In other words this would finally result in an armed clash and it differs from No. 2 only in the matter of the longer or shorter time involved.
No. 3 would mean finding some provisional arrangement by which the present deadlock might be broken, and at the same time attaining our objectives under the peace for which we have been striving. My #1134* of yesterday was sent with this purpose in mind. The displeasure felt by the government is beyond my power of comprehension, but as I view it, the present, after exhausting our strength by four years of the China incident following right upon the Manchuria incident, is hardly an opportune time for venturing upon another long drawn out warfare on a large scale. I think that it would be better to fix up a temporary "truce" now in the spirit of "give and take" and make this the prelude to greater achievements to come later.
I am thus frankly setting before you my humble opinion as supplementary to my message of yesterday.**
JD-1: 6769 (F) Navy Trans. 11-25-41 (2)
**Wash-Tok #1138 (JD-1: 6771) says: "At the end of my message #1136 (S.I.S. #25250) please add 'please convey the above to the (Prime ?)Minister' ".
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)