If Folk Intuitions Vary, Then What?
Version of Record online: 5 JAN 2012
© 2011 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume 86, Issue 3, pages 618–635, May 2013
How to Cite
Machery, E., Mallon, R., Nichols, S. and Stich, S. P. (2013), If Folk Intuitions Vary, Then What?. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 86: 618–635. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00555.x
- Issue online: 3 MAY 2013
- Version of Record online: 5 JAN 2012
We have recently presented evidence for cross-cultural variation in semantic intuitions and explored the implications of such variation for philosophical arguments that appeal to some theory of reference as a premise. Devitt (2011) and Ichikawa and colleagues (forthcoming) offer critical discussions of the experiment and the conclusions that can be drawn from it. In this response, we reiterate and clarify what we are really arguing for, and we show that most of Devitt’s and Ichikawa and colleagues’ criticisms fail to address our concerns.