POLICY BACKGROUND -2- MAY 20, '1969
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The effort for peace in the Middle East has spawned its own
terminology. There are those who employ the same evocative
semantics over and over again, without clarification, as though
their mere incantation generates the peace. Declaratory words
are uttered for cosmetic effect, creating an imagery that is
both fictitious and misleading. The term "political settlement"
is presented to look like peace agreement; the Security Council
resolution is made to sound as though it can implement itself
and become a substitute for agreement; its mere "acceptance" is
demonstrated as "peaceful concession"; and fragile "armistice
lines" are exhibited 'as "secure boundaries".
Listed below is a glossary of terms pertinent. to the Middle
East dispute. They are presented an a clarification of words and
expressions as Israel understands them.
WJhile the term, .:'psace," is not a scientifically precise
concept, it does have a common universal meaning, understood.and
accepted in every-day usage. Applied to the Middle East, peace
means the final and declared liquidation of the Arab-Israel
conflict. It means mutual recognition, reconciliation and open
boundaries, free to the flow of ideas, of information, of people
and goods. Peace means an endto military vulnerability and the
establishment o' secure and recognized boundaries. It connotes
an end to claims of belligerency, blockades, boycotts, interference
with free navigation, and the existence and activity.of organ-
izations engaged in sabotage operations. Peace means a system
of relations based on regional cooperation-for the development
and prosperity of the Middle East.
All these, in their collective, add up to peace and are
the essence of Israel's policy. This is the peace that will
replace the existing cease-fire regime. It can be achieved only
through the normal international practice of negotiation and
contractual agreement between the parties.
2. Political Settlement ..
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A political settlement, within the context of the Middle
East, is an arrangement conceived by outside powers calculated to
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establish a temporary regime of non-violence between the parties
to the conflict. Unlike a.peace settlement, it does not contrive
to remove the actual roots of the conflict and, therefore, cannot
be lasting. Labels evocative of peace might, of,course, be attached
to a political arrangement in an effort to give':it the image of true
peace, but these are misleading appendages. The hallmark of peace
is explicit mutual recognition, mutual reconciliation through nego-
tiated agreement, and borders open to the movement of people and
goods. The hallmark of a political settlement is continuing non-
recognition, intermediaries, negotiations via third parties, outside
guarantees, and the continuing ostracism diplomatic, political,
and commercial of one party towards the other.
By the very fact that a political settlement cannot eradicate
the roots of the conflict, it automatically enshrines the seeds for
further conflict'and war... The political arrangements contained
in the armistice agreements of 1949 set the stage for the war of
1956; the arrangements of 1957 laid the groundwork for the war of
1967. (See below).
Arab' strategy in-pressing now, again, for.a political arrange-
ment as opposed to peace is a two--phase 'one: the .imposition of an
Israeli withdrawal from the cease-fire.lines to the old vulnerable
armistice lines; and then, when the time is believed right, renewed
all-out assault upon a truncated Israel from the retreived strategic
bridgeheads. This design has been repeatedly enunciated by President
Nasser to Cairo cadiences.
1957 was the last 'occasion in which Israel placed-its security
in guarantees from -he outside, and in a political settlement
conceived as a substitute for peace. '
In Marc'-. 1957, the United Nations, the United States, and
most of the major maritime powers, undertook \to guarantee a poli-
tical settlement designed to resolve the conflict that had given
rise to the Sinai Campaign of 1956. Prior to that Campaign, Israel
had been the victim of ceaseless terrorist raids by Egyptian forces.
It had been 'deprived of its right of passage through the Suez Canal
and it had.been deprived of its right of passage through the Gulf
of Aqaba. The powers, 'in consort with the UN, brought into being
the UN Emergency Force, its presence designed to 'demonstrate the
international consensuss affirming Israel's right to freedom from
harassment by Egypt and to freedom of shipping in the region's
international iuaterways. The maritime powers undertook to pre-
serve the international character of the Gulf of Aqaba and the UN
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"If w.e have succeeded in restoring the situation to what
......it was before 1956, then there is no doubt that God will
help us andenable us to restore the situation to what
it was before 1948."
The-international guarantees represented by the UN presence
and the commitment of the maritime powers evaporated. What followed
is now history, reduced to a vague memory in the minds of many, and
twisted and distorted by the propaganda of the Arabs and Soviets.
4. The United Nations
As a member of the United Nations, Israel firmly subscribes
to the principles of its Charter, It believes deeply that the UN
had a vital role-to play in the advancement of world peace, it
being the one existing framework involving the overwhelming majority
of the world community. )
For more than twenty years there has been a continuing UN
physical presence of one form or another in the Middle East. The
UN Truce Supervision Or animation crumbled in-the face of the Arab
repudiation of .the armistice agreement'F The United Nations
Emerooncy Force abruptly departed from the scene when its very
presence was most critically required. The UN cease-'fire observers
carry out their duties with distinction. But the mere' fact of
their presence cannot absolve the Security Council of its duty to
condemn repeated Arab cease-fire violations, whose victims include
UN observers. The UN Relief and Works Aqency, originally conceived
as an instrument of creative rehabilitation, has long been reduced
to a permanent relief body serving a politically self-perpetuating
refugee problem. '
The gap between the UN's capacity for constructive action and
the principles of its Charter is the product of parliamentary
imbalance and the resultant imperfections of' machinery. UWithin
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force had the duty to prevent a reimposition of its blockade.
In return for these commitments, Israel agreed to withdraw
from the Sinai Peninsula, including Sharm-el-Sheikh, and the Gaza
Strip. Egypt wa's not required to undertake any direct commitment
to Israel or to establish peace.
Hardly had Israel withdrawn when President Nasser repositioned
his army in Sina'i and the Gaza Strip, reinstated the Suez blockade
and continued his war against Israel.
By May 1967, what was'left of the 1957 political arrangements
collapsed in shambles ss Nasser mobilized 100,000 troops and 900
tanks against Israel's southern border, coordinated his invasion
with Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, ousted the United Nations Emergency
Force, reimposed his blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba and declared:
the Charter, Israel finds justice and equity; w within the reality,
which is the sum total,of the policies, premises, prejudices and
predilections of the United Nations' membership, Israel has had to
contend with inequality.
In a dispute between parties, one o'f which (Israel) has a single
vote and the other (the Arab States) fifteen, the mere -assertion of
majority power is not of itself moral weight.
Within the present Security Council, more than one third of
its members are States which openly proclaim and maintain either
non-recognition of Israel or outright hostility towards it. Algeria
is in an active state of war with Israel, with troops stationed
along the Suez Canal. China has no relations with Israel.' H-ungary
broke off relations with Israel in 1967 together with all but one
of the' Communist Bloc. Pakistan professes non-recognition of Israel.
Spain has no relations with Israel. The USSR.broke off relations
in 1967; it carries a particularly grave responsibility for the
events that led up to the Six Day-W ar. It has displayed implacable
hostility towards Israel, has for years fed Arab belligerence, and
has lent its veto as an automatic instrument'of that belligerence.
It has become an axiom of contemporary political life that the
Security Council will never adopt a resolution unacceptable to the
Arab States. If Arab armies were to converge on Israel from. every
side, as in 1967, the Security Council will, uith certainty, do and
say nothing. Any resolution .objectionable to the Arab States will
either not obtain the"adequate majority or will be vetoed by the
Diplomatically defenseless within the-Council, Israel is con-
stantly'exposed to the prospect of unjust cen-sure for.,any defensive
action it might take in response to Arab aggression. A resolution
objectively in its favor has no hope of passage. Hundreds'of Israelis
have fallen victim to Arab violations of the former armistice, and
the present cease-fire agreements, but there has yet to be heard
words of regret from -United Nations organs in response to repeated
acts of aggression.
Despite the record of this.experience, Israel holds to the be-
lief that the UN can play a constructive role in promoting a Mlideast
peace. To be effective, however, that role has to be proscribed by
the lessons of its past experience and by the dictates-of its present
*reality. The UN can do much to encourage the parties to negotiate,
and can-assist in establishing the machinery of negotiation,.. as
evinced in the Jarring mission. It cannot, however, serve as a
substitute for the parties in negotiation nor as a meaningful
guarantor of the peace.
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Since a political settlement (-see pages 2-3) cannot eradicate
the cause of the conflict it has, perforce, to be accompanied by
outside guarantees. Such guarantees are meant to ensure the pre-
servation of the arrangements that constitute the political settle-
'In the past Israel placed its security in outside guarantees
designed to bolster attempted political settlements, with disastrous
results. The 1950 tripartite guarantee of the United States, Britain
and France, endorsing the territorial integrity of the States of
the region, failed to prevent the two major wars of 1956 and 1967.
The 1957 commitment of major maritime powers, led by the United
States, likewise failed to grant Israel its rights in the region's
international waterways which was the major intent of that under-
taking. Not onlydid it fail to prevent Nasser from continuing
his blockade of the Suez Canal; it proved impotent when, in 1967,
the Egyptian President reimposed his blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba.
(See pages 3-4).
The Uni-ted Nations likewise has proved it's ineffectiveness as
a potent guarantor. It proved helpless as a keeper of the peace
in 1967. The international guarantee demonstrated in the presence
of the United Nations Emergency Force collapsed overnight when the
Force was summarily removed. The organization's parliamentary im-
balance and the Soviet veto which, in the course of years, has be-
come an automatic instrument of Arab policy, certainly disqualify
the United Nations as a meaningful guarantor now. (See page 4-5).
For the Big Powers to guarantee a political settlement would
be to court new potential dangers. It would mean an intensification,
not a -'eescalation, of their role in the area. The very term
guarantee implies commitment.- Were the Powers to serve as guarantors
it could bring into very real focus the potential threat of super-
power confrontation, with every small border incident (as in Berlin)
constituting the object of world anxiety. Their guarantee, then,
would become either paralyzed, or the source,of possible global
conflict. International guarantees of peace treaties might be
envisaged with the consent of the parties, once they have negotiated
their own agreements. They cannot, however, be' construed as a
substitute for treaties.
6. The Security Council Resolution
On November 22, 1967, the United Nations Security Council
adopted its unanimous resolution postulating the principles of a
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just and lasting .peace in the Middle East, an end to belligerency,
withdrawal from territory, the establishment of agreed and secure
boundaries, freedom of shipping through the region's international
waterways, and a solution to the refugee problem. The resolution
conceived the appointment of a Special Representative of the United
Nations Secretary General, charged with promoting agreement between
the parties. This resolution is the operative international document
that lays down the framueork of principles for a Mideast peace.
Israel accepted the resolution and has expressed its readiness
to negotiate agreements on all the principles mentioned therein.
Arab assertions of Israeli non-acceptance are baseless and deliber-
Arab protestations of their own "acceptance" are equally mis-
leading. Syria rejected the resolution outright and has refused
'any contact with the United Nations Special Representative, Ambassador
Gunnar Jarring. Egypt and Jordan have claimed to "accept" the
resolution but have consistently refused to specify how they propose
to implement it beyond demanding Israel's unconditional withdrawal.
They have refused to cooperate uith the Jarring mission in any
meaningful way, rejecting every negotiation procedure proposed by
the Special Representative on the implementation of the resolution's
In Arab thinking and policy, the United Nations resolution is
superseded by a resolution of their own the Khartoum decision of
September 1967 resolving on "no recognition, no negotiation, and
no peace with. Israel." Khartoum explains why the Jarring mission
could make no progress. That mission and the resolution that brought
it into being are the very antithesis of the Khartoum resolution.
7. Cease Fire
The cease-fire is the existing regime of relationships between
Israel and the Arab States. It replaces the armistice regime which
the Arabs repudiated by their aggression of 1967.
The cease-fire was set up by the Security Council and con-
firmed in a series of resolutions. Israel is determined to preserve
the cease-fire lines until such a time as they are replaced by new,
secure and recognized boundaries within the framework of peace
The, Arab Governments accepted the United Nations cease-fire,
but have consistently violated their agreement. Egypt has even
cast doubts on the continued existence of the cease-fire.
In the period between June 1967 and April 1969, there have
been 1,236 violations by Jordan, 231 by Egypt, 66 by Syria, and
49 by Lebanon.
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Israel has consistently made plain its position that the
cease-fire agreement can be upheld only on the basis of full reci-
procity. So lng as the Arab governments fail to fulfill the coese-
fire, so long as they continue to violate it in any way whatever -
by attack of their forces, military or para-military, by raids per-
petrated by 'irregulars or marauders, by terror or'sabotage -'they
must understand that Israel, like any other state in its position,
will maintain its right and duty to take all pncessary measures for
the security of the terr.i.tory and the population under its
It it. Israel's assessment that the Arab countries cannot, at
present, permit themselves to wage total war and are therefore in-
capable of shattering the ceas--fire Legime. Though serious in
themselves, the violations do not constitute a danger to world peace.
They have been contained and can be contained within a local and
8. Direct Neqotiations
Israel's insistence upon direct negotiations is both a matter
of substance and of principle. The comTplexity of the Israel-Arab
dispute is such that only by means of a vigorous negotiation between
the parties directly involved can their differences be hammered out
and reco.;ci.led. There is no instance in history in which a stubborn
conflict has ever been bIrought to an end withoutprecise agreements
on the issues of which the conflict is composed. Peace cannot be
advanced by declarations accompanied by a refusal to negotiate
viable aoreemen ts.
The r-.iddle Eastern peace, with its'relevant agreements and
provisions for enforcement, can spring only from within the region.
It cannot be imposed or grafted .from the outside... Only the gov-
ornrments of the region can be responsible for negotiating and
.drafting their peace treaties (See page 9 ). The Middle East is
not an international protectorate- It is a region of sovereign
States which bear the responsibility for adjusting their mutual
relations. A refusal to negotiate is inherently identical with
non-recognition. It is tantamount to a refusal to live in peace.
9. Secure and Recoqnized Boundaries
Secure and recognized boundaries are borders that are new,
permanent and drawn up by agreement through direct negotiation
between the Government of. Israel and each of the neighboring Arab
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States. Their security is a function of geography, not of "arrange-
ments". They are, inevitably, different from the old fragile armis-
A boundary settlement compatible with the security of Israel
and with the legitimate interests of the, Arab States can be worked
out by agreement. Israel does net covet territory but seeks security.
The Security Council resolution of November 22, 196.7 recognized
this when it called for the establishment' of securee and recognized
boundaries." Israel has never kIrirtn' borders, either secure or
recognized. For more than twenty years it has lived within temporary
delaarcation lines truce lines (1948-49); armistice lines (1949-67);
and now, since 1967, cease-fire lines..
10. Peace Treaty
The direct contractual principle i.e. peace treaties jointly
signed by the parties is an indispensable component of a Middle
East peace. Doinit signature obligates the parties to a mutually
binding instrument, laying upon them-the full political, ideological
and juridical commitment inherent in the words "peace treaty."
One of the important consequences of peace is ideological, and
the signing of peace treaties has an overriding psychological sig-
nificance. A peace treaty is of itself a symbol of mutual recogni-
tion, enshrining the message that a new phase of relationships has
opened between the parties signatory to it. (See page 8). No ex-
ternal declarations or guarantees, no general affirmations of United
Nn.i.ons Charter principles, no recommendations or statements by
international bodies or po!,'ers, however unexceptionable in them-
selves, can replace the juridical. political and ideological
supremacy of peace treaties solemnly signed by the parties to the
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