Majority Rule the Basic Republican Principle (July 5, 13, 14)
- MR. MADISON
- ... conceived that the Conventian was reduced
to the alternative of either departing from justice in order to
conciliate the smaller States, and the minority of the people of
the United States or of displeasing these by justly gratifying the
larger States and the majority of the people. He could not
himself hesitate as to the aption he ought to make. The Convention with justice and the majority of the people on their side, had
nothing to fear. With injustice and the minority on their side they
had every thing to fear. It was in vain to purchase concord in the
Convention on terms which would perpetuate discord among
their Constituents. The Convention ought to pursue a plan which,
would bear the test of examination, which would be espoused
and supported by the enlightened and impartial part of Arnerica,
and which they could themselves vindicate and urge. It should be
considered that although at first many may judge of the system
recommended, by their opinion of the Convention, yet finally all
will judge of the Convention by the System. The merits of the
System alone can finally and effectually obtain the public suffrage. He was not apprehensive that the people of the small
States would obstinately refuse to accede to a Government founded
on just principles, and promising them substantial protection. He
could not suspect that Delaware would brave the consequences
of seeking her fortunes apart from the other States, rather than
submit to such a Government much less could he suspect that she
would pursue the rash policy of courting foreign support, which
the warmth of one of her representatives (Mr. Bedford) had
suggested, or if she should that any foreign nation would be so
rash as to hearken to the overture. As little could he suspect that
the people of New Jersey notwithstanding the decided tone of the
gentlemen from that State, would choose rather to stand on their
own legs, and bid defiance to events, than to acquiesce under an
establishment founded on principles the justice of which they
could not dispute, and absolutely necessary to redeem them from
the exactions levied on them by the commerce of the neighbouring
States. A review of other States would prove that there was as
little reason to apprehend an inflexible opposition elsewhere.
Harmony in the Convention was no doubt much to be desired.
Satisfaction to all the States, in the first instance still more so.
But if the principal States comprehending a majority of the
people of the USA should concur in a just and judicious plan, he
had the finest hopes, that all the other States would by degrees
accede to it...
- MR. WILSON
- If a general declaration would satisfy any gentleman he had no indisposition to declare his sentiments. Conceiving that all men wherever placed have equal dghts and are
equally entitled to confidence, he viewed without apprehension
the period when a few States should contain the superior number
of people. The majority of people wherever found ought in all
questions to govern the minority. If the interior Country should
acquire this majority, it will not only have the right, but will
avail themselves of it whether we will or no. This jealousy
misled the policy of Great Britain with regard to America. The
fatal maxims espoused by her were that the Colonies were
growing too fast, and that their growth rnust be stinted in time.
What were the consequences? first, enty on our part, then
actual separation. Like consequences will result on the part of
the interior settlements, if like jealousy and policy be pursued on
ours. Further, if numbers be not a proper rule, why is not some
better rule pointed out. No one has yet ,entured to attempt it.
Congress have never been able to discover a better. No State as
far as he has heard, has suggested any other. In l783, after
elaborate discussion of a measure of wealth all were satisfied
then as they are now that the rule of numbers, does not differ
much from the combined rule of numbers and wealth. Again he
could not agree that property was the sole or the primary object
of Government and society. The cultivation and improvement of
the human mind was the most noble object. With respect to this
object, as well as to other personal rights, numbers were surely
the natural and precise measure of Representatiom And with
respect to property, they could not vary much from the precise
measure. In no point of view however could the establishment of
numbers as the rule of representation in the first branch vary his
opinion as to the impropriety of letting a vicious principle into
the second branch...
- MR. MADISON
- expressed his apprehensions that if the proper
foundation of Government was destroyed, by substituting an
equality in place of a proportional Representation, no proper
superstructure would be raised. lf the small States really wish for
a Government armed with the powers necessary to secure their
liberties, and to enforce obedience on the larger members as well
as on themselves he could not help thinking them extremely
mistaken in their means. He reminded them of the consequences
of laying the existing confederation on improper principles. All
the principal parties to its compilation. Joined immediately in
mutilating and fettering the Government in such a manner that it
has disappointed every hope placed on it. He appealed to the
doctrine and arguments used by themselves on a former occasion. It had been very properly observed by (Mr. Paterson) that
Representation was an expedient by which the meeting of the
people themselves was rendered unnecessary; and that the representatives ought therefore to bear a proportion to the votes which
their constituents if convened, would respectively have. Was not
this remark as applicable to one branch of the Representation as
to the other? But it had been said that the Government would in
its operation be partly federal, partly national, that although in
the latter respect the Representatives of the people ought to be in
proportion to the people, yet in the, former it ought to be according to the number of States. If there was any solidity in this
distinction he was ready to abide by it, if there was none it ought
to be abandoned. In all cases where the General Government is
to act on the people, let the people be represented and the votes
be proportional. In all cases where the Government is to act on
the States as such, in like manner as Congress now act on them,
let the States be represented and the votes be equal. This was the
true ground of compromise if there was any ground at all. But he
denied that there was any ground. He called for a single instance
in which the General Government was not to operate on the
people individually. The practicability of making laws, with
coercive sanctions, for the States as Political bodies, had been
exploded on all hands. He observed that the people of the large
States would in some way or other secure to themselves a weight
proportioned to the importance accruing from their superior numbers. If they could not effect it by a proportional representation
in the Government they would probably accede to no Government which did not in great measure depend for its efficacy on
their voluntary cooperation, in which case they would indirectly
secure their object. The existing confederacy proved that where
the Acts of the General Government were to be executed by the
particular Government the latter had a weight in proportion to
their importance. No one would say that either in Congress or
out of Congress Delaware had equal weight with Pennsylvania.
If the latter was to supply ten times as much money as the
former, and no compulsion could be used, it was of ten times
more importance, that she should voluntarly furnish the supply.
In the Dutch confederacy the votes of the Provinces were equal.
But Holland which supplies about half the money, governs the
whole republic. He enumerated the objections against an equality
of votes in the second branch, notwithstanding the proportional
representation in the first.
- The minority could negative the will of the majority of the people.
- They could extort measures by
making them a condition of their assent to other necessary
- They could obtrude measures on the majority by virtue of the peculiar powers which would be vested in the Senate.
- The evil instead of being cured by time, would increase with every new State that should be admitted, as they must all be admitted on the principle of equality.
- The perpetuity it would give to the preponderance of the Northern against the
Southern Scale was a serious consideratiom.
- MR. WILSON
- would add a few words only. If equality in the second branch was an error that time would correct, he should be less anxious to exclude it being sensible that perfection was unattainable in any plan, but being a fundamental and a perpetual error, it ought by all means to be avoided. A vice in the Representation, like an error in the first concoction, must be followed by disease, convulsions, and finally death itself. The justice of the general principle of proportional representation has not in argument at least been yet contradicted. But it is said that a departure from it so far as to give the States an equal vote in one branch of the Legislature is essential to their preservatiom He had considered this position maturely, but could not see its application. That the States ought to be preserved he admitted. But does it follow that an equality of votes is necessary for the purpose? Is there any reason to suppose that if their preservation should depend more on the large than on the small States the security of the States against the General Government would be diminished? Are the large States less attached to their existence, more likely to commit suicide, than the small? An equal vote then is not necessary as far as he can conceive: and is liable among other objections to this insuperable one: The great fault of the existing confederacy is its inactivity. It has never been a complaint against Congress that they governed overmuch. The complaint has been that they have governed too little. To remedy this defect we were sent here. Shall we effect the cure by establishing an equality of votes as is proposed? no: this very equality carries us directly to Congress, to the system which it is our duty to rectify. The small States cannot indeed act, by virtue of this equality, but they may control the Government as they have done in Congress. This very measure is here prosecuted by a minority of the people of America. Is then the object of the Convention likely to be accomplished in this way? Will not our Constituents say? we sent you to form an efficient Government and you have given us one more complex indeed, but having all the weakness of the former Government. He was anxious for uniting all the States under one Government. He knew there were some respectable men who preferred three confederacies, united by offensive and defensive alliances. Many things may be plausibly said, some things may be justly said, in favor of such a project. He could not however concur in it himself, but he thought nothing so pernicious as bad first principles.