A rhetorical history of the North Korean nuclear crisis: How three presidents talked about the bomb
This research attempted to analyze the North Korean nuclear crisis using a rhetorical history that evaluated the discursive framings of the George H.W. Bush, William J. Clinton, and George W. Bush administrations. I used an inductive format to use rhetorical criticism to create interpretive lenses for each presidential administration. Studying each presidential administration’s rhetoric provided for a number of thematic elements that informed the context of the crisis. I found the George H.W. Bush administration deployed a rhetoric of compliance. This rhetorical frame failed to meet the needs of the North Koreans to be seen as legitimate. The William J. Clinton administration used a rhetoric of negotiation. Clinton’s rhetorical posture was unable to account for the suspicions of the Republican Congress elected in 1996 that derailed the Agreed Framework of 1994. The George W. Bush administration utilized a rhetoric of verification. George W. Bush’s rhetorical choices produced the six-party accord, but ultimately may not be able to satisfy the need for complete transparency. This is especially true in light of the events surrounding North Korea and Syria’s nuclear program. It was concluded that each presidential administration failed to satisfy the exigency of the situation due to a number of constraints. By studying these rhetorical constraints, scholars can better understand the role that presidential rhetoric and history play in how events unfold.
Thesis [M.A.] - Wichita State University, College of Liberal Arts and Science, Elliot School of Communication