In 2003, there were 8098 SARS cases in 29 countries with 774 deaths. Places worst affected by SARS were unprepared to deal with the scale of the local epidemic. As described by Sue Lim and colleagues (University Health Network, Toronto, Ontario, Canada,), when SARS arrived in Toronto in March 2003, there was no centralised public health system in Ontario, and the province's 37 public health units operated quite independently of each other. Hospital staff were particularly vulnerable to infection, but with 211 hospitals in Ontario alone requiring supplies of protection and isolation equipment, these quickly ran out. Among the unpredictable effects of SARS were a reduction in income for some hospital workers, because those staff that normally worked shifts at several institutions were forced to choose one institution at which to work during the outbreak. Through tracing the contacts of SARS patient, the Toronto authorities identified 23103 people who required quarantine, which represented almost 1% of the population of the city.
In Taiwan, as described by Mei-Shang Ho and Ih-Jen Su, 211945 people were quarantined for 1014 days because of suspected contact with SARS cases, which, similar to Toronto, is almost 1% of the population of Taiwan. However, quarantine was subsequently replaced as a control strategy in Taiwan because only 133 (0.06%) of those quarantined developed probable or suspected SARS, and most confirmed cases became infected in a hospital setting. The problems and solutions encountered during the SARS epidemic have had a beneficial consequence for Taiwanese authorities in that they have helped planning for an influenza pandemic. Should such a pandem
Contact: Joe Santangelo