David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (2005)
How the Body Shapes the Mind is an interdisciplinary work that addresses philosophical questions by appealing to evidence found in experimental psychology, neuroscience, studies of pathologies, and developmental psychology. There is a growing consensus across these disciplines that the contribution of embodiment to cognition is inescapable. Because this insight has been developed across a variety of disciplines, however, there is still a need to develop a common vocabulary that is capable of integrating discussions of brain mechanisms in neuroscience, behavioral expressions in psychology, design concerns in artificial intelligence and robotics, and debates about embodied experience in the phenomenology and philosophy of mind. Shaun Gallagher's book aims to contribute to the formulation of that common vocabulary and to develop a conceptual framework that will avoid both the overly reductionistic approaches that explain everything in terms of bottom-up neuronal mechanisms, and inflationistic approaches that explain everything in terms of Cartesian, top-down cognitive states.
|Keywords||Body schema body image neonate imitation phantom limb intersubjectivity social cognition schizophrenia autism deafferentation gestures|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$34.95 used (71% off) $96.81 new (20% off) $120.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||BF161.G35 2005|
|ISBN(s)||0191622575 9780191622571 0199271941|
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Citations of this work BETA
Kim Sterelny (2010). Minds: Extended or Scaffolded? [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):465-481.
Dan Zahavi (2011). Empathy and Direct Social Perception: A Phenomenological Proposal. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):541-558.
Shannon Spaulding (2010). Embodied Cognition and Mindreading. Mind and Language 25 (1):119-140.
Joel Krueger (2012). Seeing Mind in Action. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):149-173.
Jane Suilin Lavelle (2012). Theory-Theory and the Direct Perception of Mental States. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2):213-230.
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