Endnotes for Chapter
1 U.S. planning for Cambodia was also very secret; units were informed
only twenty-four hours before the attack. However, the positioning of many
artillery units and the sudden demand for Cambodian maps produced
unfortunate security leaks. As in any big operation, the support units in
the rear were informed first. The enemy definitely knew of the attack.
2 To bring the 11th Armored Cavalry together, the 3d Squadron moved more
than 300 kilometers in two days and arrived with every vehicle
operational, just in time to join the attacking column.
3 The 2d Battalion, 34th Armor, was withdrawn from Cambodia after only
five days because of excessive tank breakdowns due to inadequate
maintenance. The piecemeal employment of this unit in the entire war,
together with its accompanying logistical problems, had contributed to
4 On 2 May in IV Corps Tactical Zone, 250 ACAV's from five cavalry
regiments lined up abreast at 25-meter intervals and, with infantry
support, attacked on a 6kilometer front. The breadth of the attack
overwhelmed all resistance.
5 While the 11th Armored Cavalry attacked north, Troop B, 1st Squadron,
9th Cavalry (Air), found an enemy logistics complex in the Fishhook that
was so extensive it was named "the city" It yielded more than
1,500 weapons, millions of rounds of ammunition, and tons of supplies.
This cache, the largest of the war, took several weeks to search and
6 Corps tactical zones were designated military regions on 1 July 1970.
7 Air cavalry support was provided by the largest grouping of air
cavalry ever assembled under one commander. The 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry
(Air), 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry (Air) , an aerial rocket artillery
battalion, and some separate air cavalry troops were formed into the 1st
Brigade, 9th Cavalry (Air) . This was the first air cavalry combat brigade
ever formed and used in combat.
8 In April 1970 the first battalion-size tank, cavalry, and mechanized
units left Vietnam: the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor; 1st Squadron, 4th
Cavalry; 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry (Mechanized) ; and 1st Battalion, 16th
Infantry (Mechanized) . These last three units were the armored strength
of the 1st Infantry Division.
9 Many commanders felt that a periodic standdown for maintenance was
necessary. Others felt that this policy resulted in the delay of daily
maintenance tasks until the scheduled standdown. The latter group, which
favored preventive maintenance, recommended constant unit maintenance in
the field with the help of teams from maintenance support units.
10 The transition after Cambodia was difficult for armored units since
they had been used to responding to enemy action with massive firepower.
In Vietnam, the population density away from the jungles prevented this
and fire control had to be again closely supervised.
11 Brigadier General John G. Hill, Jr., 1st Brigade commander, had
reorganized the mechanized infantry and equipped each platoon with six
APC's, each manned by a six-man squad. This organization increased the
firepower of each platoon and decreased the load on each vehicle.
12 Originally, an M551 Sheridan had started to lead the column with its
infrared light, but the Sheridan and an accompanying mortar carrier were
unable to negotiate the rugged terrain and turned back.
13 During the advance Troop C, 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry (Air),
discovered a modern enemy oil pipeline west of Aloui and destroyed several
sections by Cobra fire. Eventually, this pipeline was rebuilt by the enemy
and extended many miles south into Military Region 3.
14 The South Vietnamese enemy identification books pictured only the
Soviet PT76 and T34 tanks. Thus, all tanks not PT76's were identified as
T34's. In this case the T54 was correctly identified by a photograph of
the T54 tank.
15 Realizing the safety factors involved in the use of supporting fire,
the enemy employed "hugging" tactics to avoid the fire. They
often stayed as close as 20-30 meters to friendly units. The only aerial
support accurate enough that close was the helicopter gunship.
16 The 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry (Air) with the Hac Bao Company
conducted a series of deep, successful raids in Cambodia and Vietnam over
a five month period using this information. The techniques developed in
these raids are worthy of study for future application.
17 U.S. aviation units in Military Region 4 provided gunship support from
bases in the region and from the deck of the USS Cleveland which was
cruising in the bay near Kampong Som.
page created 17 January 2002
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