Seems like there's a lot of problems with Russell's position.
First off, stating that consciousness is the capacity to experience is a very bad definition, because it is so general as to be nearly meaningless. What exactly is "the capacity to experience", anyway? How do we tell if something has an actual capacity to experience things or not?
Second, Russell has foreclosed on any possibility of determining what "the capacity to experience" is, by stating that we cannot measure it and can perform no scientific experiments to determine whether something is conscious or not. These are assumptions, made specifically to prevent any effort to scientifically analyze "the capacity to experience". Furthermore, they commit the fallacy of special pleading, because they attempt to set consciousness out of the realm of science without good reason.
Third, he states that the universe works perfectly well without an explanation of consciousness. Well, the universe works perfectly well without an explanation of gravity, or of electromagnetism, or any number of other things. Is that a good reason not to try to explain how those things work? No, it's simply an excuse to keep from having to deal with pesky attempts to explain it via science.
Fourth, he states that remote viewing, reincarnation, and healing (I assume he means faith healing or some equivalent) are problems for materialism. Leaving aside the fact that none of these things have been demonstrated to actually happen, something being a problem for materialism does not mean that materialism is no longer valid. Quantum physics was unquestionably a problem for materialism, and yet materialism is still considered perfectly valid.
Fifth, he states that consciousness is as fundamental, if not more so, than space/time/matter. However, this is an assumption, because according to him we cannot measure consciousness and can perform no scientific experiments to determine whether something is conscious. If we cannot measure consciousness, how do we know that it is at least as fundamental as space, time, and matter, all of which we can measure, even if only imperfectly?
Sixth, he states that consciousness is in everything. This is also an assumption, because according to him we cannot measure consciousness and cannot scientifically determine whether something is conscious. This is also a package assumption, meaning it contains innumerable other assumptions - such as that subatomic particles, electrons, protons, neutrons, atoms, molecules, and so on up the line, are all conscious, which we cannot determine for the same reason as before. In short, he violates the principle of Occam's razor so badly here that his argument is not really worth considering unless and until he reformulates it; he has sliced his own argument to ribbons by ignoring Occam's razor.