David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):760-761 (2002)
This commentary questions the authors’claim that cognitive neuropsychology is defined by modularity and that other theoretical frames, that is, connectionism, are a priori rejected. It also points to the fact that whereas in genetic disorders there are developmental delay and asynchrony, there are few reports of deviant developmental trajectories that are never seen in typical development. It is suggested that the possibility that structure does not equal function in the developing brain, may be a viable option.
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