A young Rabin
Today marks the tenth anniversary of Yitzchak Rabin’s assassination. It is hard to put into words what the man means to me. Courageous, pragmatic, idealistic and visionary would be only a few worthy adjectives. As a member of the labour movement I consider him to be one of the very best labour leaders that any country has produced.
One of the nation’s saviours on the battlefield, and a man who led his compatriots along the first steps to final salvation in peace. A man willing to sacrifice his life for the hope of such peace, joining the high company of Anwar Sadat and Michael Collins on ground that Arafat and others feared to tread. If only more in the Middle East were brave enough to follow their path.
To mark the occasion I’ve included an essay I wrote last year, for a question that asked whether the Israeli right was to blame for the failure of Oslo. The more I wrote, the more it turned into praise for Rabin and the great strides he and his allies made during those remarkable days. I felt that it would be appropriate to post it here with some photos from Rabin’s life and others I took when visiting his memorials in Israel. I always visit his grave when I am there, and place a stone on it according to Jewish custom.
Rest in peace, Yitzchak Rabin.
---------------------------------------------------------------------(Those interested in particular citations for the essay, please ask for the bits you want in the comments section and I will post the footnote. It was too much trouble to refootnote the entire thing for blog format.)
The ‘Oslo peace process’ was a process of rapprochement and mutual recognition between Palestinians and Israelis. It was always going to require more from both sides than they had ever given before, if its faint chances of permanent status resolution were to be realised. The process would only ever take hold if both leaderships made a comprehensive, active and risk-laden effort to reconcile the national aspirations of their societies to a pragmatic position. Neither side universally achieved such a goal, but differing levels of success are discernible. On the Israeli side, the Labour movement showed that it was intent on changing the national psyche. Even at the risk of an Israeli civil war and increased threat from Palestinian groups, it did not resile from the task.
(From right) Generals Rabin,
Dayan and Narkis enter
the Old City of Jerusalem
after its capture in 1967
On the Palestinian side, the PA proved itself unable and unwilling to fundamentally reshape Palestinian nationalism into a form that was compatible with Oslo, or improve the social conditions that would necessitate such a change. They too faced internal pressures from many groups and external ones from the Israeli right, but it is clear that the failure of Oslo cannot be solely blamed on the Israeli right’s inability to accept it from the start. As with any other aspect of Israeli-Arab relations, a deeper analysis is necessary to identify the driving forces behind developments.
To realise the Oslo concept of an eventual Palestinian entity in the West Bank and Gaza, a profound seachange needed to take place in Israeli political discourse and society. Since the capture of the territories in 1967, segments of both the Israeli left and right rejected the concept of territorial compromise. The ‘Rafi’ faction of the Labour Party, led by Defence Minister Moshe Dayan and an eminent leader in the Achdut Ha’avoda movement began agitating for gradual de facto establishment of Israeli rule through settlements. When joined by the other Labour-right movements of Rafael Eitam and Rehavam Ze-evi, along with the ultra-orthodox and secular right movements of the Gush Emunim, Kach Kahane, the NDP and Likud, the pro-annexationist camp formed a formidable bloc. Threat of violence by these groups was real. In the lead up to the Oslo accords from 1988 onwards, national civil war was a serious possibility if any government were to attempt withdrawal.
After inheriting such a landscape from the Shamir government in 1992, Yitzchak Rabin had to move carefully through his agenda of preparing the population for peace. Whilst doves within his government such as Shimon Peres were pushing for an immediate turn to permanent-status agreements with the Palestinians, Rabin opted for an incremental, interim approach to the negotiations. This was in order to acclimatise the population bit by bit to the prospect of a Palestinian state, which would be the ‘ “amputation” of the homeland’ for many annexationists. However, this objective was not impossible. The Yom Kippur War had proven the ability of the Israeli public to adapt their nationalism towards the territories, for what they perceived to be the best shot at peace. Indeed, some commentators contend that many Likudniks do not support the Greater Israel policy, but base their annexationist tendencies on a grim outlook for peace with the Arabs. Rabin could reshape the Israeli landscape in favour of Oslo, if he was brave enough.
Politically, Rabin did not flinch. Whenever the process threatened to be derailed by the acts of Israeli extremists, he reacted strongly. After the massacre perpetrated by Dr Baruch Goldstein in 1994, the religious extremist parties Kach and Kahane Chai were outlawed. The precarious nature of the anti-annexationist coalition and the need to maintain the country’s trust meant that a show of force was still necessary whenever attempts were made to derail the process by Palestinian groups like Hamas. Such occasions included the deportation of four hundred Hamas activists after a spate of attacks on Israeli civilians and the Peres-authorised assassination of Yahya Ayyash, a Hamas terrorist who had masterminded the suicide bombings.
The famous handshake:
Rabin puts his trust in Arafat,
Although the peace process was slowed by these actions and appeasement of the Israeli right was a significant reason for them, the societal changes that the anti-annexationists introduced were critical for the long-term success of the Oslo process. The state educational curriculum and government broadcasting agenda were changed in line with the Oslo requirements of preparing the population for peace. Efforts to eliminate Arab stereotypes, respectful portrayals of Islam and the representation of the Palestinian Authority on schoolbook maps were all implemented in order to change the national mindset. The results were clear, with polling suggesting a huge shift in public acceptance of a Palestinian state, despite the terror attacks and much to the chagrin of the right. Such a paradigm shift was absolutely necessary before any of the permanent status issues of Oslo could be approached.
This is why Israel insisted on the formula of interim agreements in a gradual process that would eventually lead to final status negotiations. However, the approach produced a clash with Palestinian objectives. Many Palestinians felt it was critical that some of the final status issues, such as refugees, were put immediately on the table, to prevent those groups from feeling betrayed. On the other hand, the argument that Rabin used to justify the deliberate ambiguities in the agreements could well have applied to the Palestinians. If a two-state solution were to be achieved under a final settlement of the Oslo process, elements of Palestinian national identity would have to undergo profound paradigm shifts. This process would also take time and the first, incremental steps would need to be put in place immediately.
It is important to examine Palestinian societal dynamics over the Oslo period, to determine whether their population was being prepared for the permanent status negotiations upon which the success of Oslo rested. Leading into Oslo, Palestinian society was equally as complex as its Israeli counterpart. A large proportion of the Palestinian population remained in the same situation that they had upon fleeing their homes in 1948 and 1967. The surrounding Arab nations and UNRWA had maintained the structure of refugee camps and strongly supported the refugee identity amongst such Palestinians, imbuing them with an unshakeable belief that they would one day return to their original places of residence. It naturally came at the expense of exploring other solutions.
The pragmatic leadership of the Palestinian Authority maintained a precarious grip on power, in much the same predicament as the anti-annexationist group within Israel. Rival Palestinian groups were actively fighting for influence as the PA continued to centralise its control, ranging from the Islamist Hamas to the Communist PFLP. Refugee return to ‘all of Palestine’ and other entrenched national mythologies were used to criticise the PA in precisely the areas that it needed to reform. However, as in Israel, there were some justifications for optimism. Even amongst the Palestinian refugee population in Arab countries, some surveys found that Palestinians who enjoyed better socio-economic conditions were more likely to accept a peace agreement with Israel. If the PA could perform on improving the lives of Palestinians and take a stand on the definition of national identity, perhaps the Oslo process could succeed.
Rabin sings Shir L’Shalom
(Song for Peace) at the peace rally
minutes before his death
Ideologically, the PA differentiated itself from the other dominant Palestinian groups by pursuing the Oslo process. For example, although Hamas consisted of wings that originally emphasised strengthening the internal Palestininan Muslim community instead of fighting Israel, all of its components were fundamentally opposed to Israel’s existence on any part of ‘Muslim land’. The establishment of the PA left the PLO with better funding, resources, propaganda opportunities and support than any of its rival groups. Indeed, Yasser Arafat was prepared to exercise some tactical muscle when outbreaks of violence amongst Palestinians were not sanctioned by his authority. However, even at the beginning of the process when the PA enjoyed wider support than Hamas and others, it not only refrained from attempting to change the ideological nationalist agenda but in fact reinforced it.
Within weeks of the signing of the Cairo agreement, Arafat had twice publicly declared that the Oslo process was similar to the temporary hudna declared by Muhammad in his eventual war of annihilation against rival tribes. He clearly encouraged a ‘holy war’ to liberate Jerusalem. The PA-appointed religious clerics spread messages of conquest in PA media, perpetuating the idea that all of the land will be ‘returned to’.
The PA also began work on a new series of schoolbooks throughout the mid- to late nineties, over which it had complete control from 1997. These books describe Israel, the West Bank and Gaza as ‘our country Palestine’, incite the waging of violent jihad to liberate the whole of the land and specifically target it against Jews. Quite apart from that, PA leaders repeatedly expressed their opinion that the peace accords entailed the return of all refugees inside the 1967 borders and reaffirmed such a result as the ultimate goal of negotiations. The direct correlation between this continued reassurance and the inability of the PA to commit to a final-status agreement on refugees at Camp David II was therefore not surprising. There was no reason for the Palestinian population, particularly the refugees, to expect anything other than full repatriation and the Palestinian Authority knew that it could not bring them back anything less.
Aside from ideological problems, the PA also proved itself unable to facilitate a softening of societal attitudes through marshalling its resources for socio-economic improvement. Yasser Arafat, rather than developing solid economic institutions to deal with the influx of aid, instead opted to encourage a neo-patrimonial system of corruption and kickbacks in order to solidify the post-revolutionary order. Only recently has the IMF begun to uncover the level of corruption throughout the Authority, large parts of which have been directly attributable to Arafat. The economic conditions were always going to be difficult for the Authority, due to its war-damaged constituency and the challenges of setting up a state. However, the PA’s short-sighted and irresponsible approach contributed to its problems and exacerbated them, rather than doing all in their power to create a more suitable environment for the Oslo process to develop.
A photo I took at Rabin Square. The big
Hebrew graffiti simply reads ‘sorry’
None of these criticisms in any way detract from the difficulties placed in front of the process by the Israeli side. For example, a member of the extremist Israeli right carried out the assassination of Yitzchak Rabin, the leader most capable of taking Israel through the process. A member of the extremist Israeli right perpetrated the Hebron massacre, allowing Hamas to legitimate their already-extant policy of violent response to the process and tying PA hands in responding to them. More importantly, it was a rightwing government under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that actively attempted to subvert the peace process and impede the further transfer of land to the PA. His reversal and re-negotiation on the previous Oslo promise of handing over Hebron and his overall attempted replacement of Oslo with a unilateral ‘Allon Plus’ plan of radically narrower scope were both destructive moves.
All of these obstacles made the PA task harder in preparing its populace for the eventual re-evaluation of its national goals that would be necessary to facilitate Oslo. However, as has been shown earlier, there were spheres of influence that the PA bore sole responsibility for, such as its own economic structure, education curriculum and media service. Those institutions bore the potential to prepare the landscape for a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Palestinian Authority, partly through attempts to consolidate its ruling oligarchy and partly through a lack of determination to adapt the Palestinian national psyche for Oslo, were just as guilty as the Israeli right for not accepting it.
Overall, the Oslo process required an underlying shift in the societies of both Israelis and Palestinians, if it was to bring about a permanent status agreement. In Israel, the anti-annexationist movement made use of their periods in government to begin the process of affecting this societal change, through reforms in the education system and public advocacy of their policies despite the threat of civil war. Under the Palestinian Authority, even the opportunities that Israel and anti-Oslo Palestinians left in tact were not utilised by the PA pragmatists to begin reshaping the national self-image. It is true that the Israeli right never accepted the Oslo process and actively worked against it, just as it is true of Hamas and other Palestinian organisations. However, culpability lies not with them alone. It lies with all pragmatists who possessed any power to change the political landscape during the days of Oslo, yet refrained from doing so.A photo of Leah and Yitzchak Rabin’s
grave I took at sunset, Har HerzlIn life: Yitzchak and Leah RabinRabin’s legacy: a peace rally
at Rabin Square, 2004rabinLyrics to Shir L’Shalom (Hebrew and English)