Yale University >
Economic Growth Center (EGC), Yale University >
Center Discussion Papers, Economic Growth Center (EGC), Yale University >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
| || |
|Title:||Commitment contracts |
Karlan, Dean S.
|Issue Date:||2009 |
|Series/Report no.:||Center Discussion Paper, Economic Growth Center 980|
|Abstract:||We review the theoretical and empirical literature on commitment devices. A commitment device is any arrangement, entered into by an individual, with the aim of making it easier to fulfill his or her own future plans. We argue that there is growing empirical evidence supporting the proposition that people demand commitment devices and that these devices can change behavior. We highlight the importance of further research exploring soft commitments those involving only psychological costs and the welfare consequences of hard commitments those involving actual costs especially in the presence of bounded rationality.|
institutional and behavioral economics
|Document Type:||Working Paper|
|Appears in Collections:||Center Discussion Papers, Economic Growth Center (EGC), Yale University|
Download bibliographical data as:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.