BERKELEY, Calif. (MarketWatch) -- As more research is done into the recall of certain vehicles made by Toyota Motor Corp., the more likely it is that the sudden-acceleration phenomenon due to supposedly faulty gas pedals may actually be a software glitch.
In other words, an electromagnetic pulse outside the vehicle or a unusual series of commands to the onboard computer may trigger the hazardous condition.
When the concept of "fly-by-wire" cars (known in the auto industry as drive-by-wire, or DBW) became public, I was under the impression that some mechanical systems would remain in place, and that networks within the vehicle would be used for lights, instrumentation and engine fine-tuning.
Most people remember the 1988 incident at the Paris Air Show, where a fly-by-wire Airbus crashed into the trees during a demonstration. Although there is still a debate over the exact causes, some tech pundits are convinced that the computer, not liking the pilot input since it made no sense to the software, crashed the plane.
This very public accident is one of hundreds, if not thousands of software-related incidents, many grisly. Now we have the Toyota TM, +0.90% "sticking" accelerator.
In a Prius, as well as many computer-controlled Toyotas, the accelerator pedal is more like a volume-control knob than anything else. In the olden days when you stepped on the pedal, it would be directly connected to, say, a carburetor, and open a valve mechanically as you pushed down.
This is now passé, as this activity is done electronically on the most modern cars by network signaling.
The original concept behind computer-networked cars began with engine-control units (referred to as car computers) in the 1980s, which handled the complicated fuel injection and other aspects of the modern engine. But car makers knew that the real benefit to them would to find some way to run a computer network throughout the car to get rid of the repair bugaboo and nightmarish cable harness/wiring assembly built into automobiles.
The cable harness had wires for everything electric within the car. A dedicated set of wires would go from the light switch, for example, to the headlamps and taillights. This was an expensive proposition when compared with a computer network with one wire looping around the entire car, telling every device what to do based on what switches (sensors) were turned on and off.
Because computer networks are easier to troubleshoot than a harness with a bunch of wires in it, cars got more reliable. So companies took the next money-saving step, which was to think seriously about a complete drive-by-wire car.
I can assure you that in the 1980s when this was first being discussed, this drive-by-wire idea was verboten. But hey, it works on airplanes, why not cars?
Of course, the software, if it is going to be used in the first place, should be coded to recognize a panic situation and shut down the engine or reset the gas pedal, or do something proper. Perhaps something as simple as a panic button or kill switch would suffice.
Unlike mechanical systems, software is nothing more than a lengthy series of instructions that require an inordinate amount of intense logical thought and second-guessing on the part of the software writer(s).
At the end of the day, you always get a bug. Apparently, at least for Toyota, the bug can be lethal.
This sort of problem can never be fully resolved or eliminated in complex systems. If we are going to continue to trust software and computers to run everything, disaster will forever occur. So get ready for this sort of problem to reemerge over and over in the decades to come.
The next step for the auto industry is drive-by-wire steering. I think we can already imagine how this is going to turn out.