April was a big month for ballistic missile launches in Asia. The unusual series of tests began with North Korea’s failed attempt to place a small satellite into orbit in a thinly-disguised test of its longest-range missile. Later in the month India successfully tested a new ballistic missile with sufficient range to hit any city in China, and Pakistan soon responded with a test of its own new missile. Meanwhile, Iran’s leaders issued a steady stream of threats about how they might use their own missiles to close the strategic Strait of Hormuz.
If you aren’t paying close attention, the increased missile activity might seem like reason for concern. Ballistic missiles are the most efficient method of delivering nuclear weapons against distant targets, and the longer-range ones move so fast that even technologically advanced countries have great difficulty shooting them down (the challenge is often described as trying to “hit a bullet with a bullet”). But a closer look at how various countries are faring in their missile programs suggests there is little reason for concern about an attack against the U.S. anytime in this decade.
For starters, the foreign nations with the most fearsome arsenals of long-range ballistic missiles are either our friends (Britain and France) or have been working with Washington for a long time to reduce military tensions (China and Russia). In the case of Russia, great progress has been made in shrinking the size of both the Russian and American arsenals to a small fraction of their peak numbers during the Cold War, and a succession of Russian leaders have collaborated with U.S. leaders in assuring the security of the former Soviet arsenal. In the case of China, Beijing continues to show great restraint in modernizing its own nuclear forces, fielding only the minimal number of long-range weapons it deems necessary to deter a U.S. attack.
So barring a complete breakdown in the current international order, most of the cause for concern resides with non-traditional nuclear power or aspirants to that status, and it is those countries that have been conducting the recent missile tests. Not surprisingly, the most capable system was tested by India when it successfully launched its Agni-V missile on April 19. The Agni-V doesn’t quite meet the performance spec used by U.S. experts to distinguish intercontinental ballistic missiles from those with lesser range, but it doesn’t need to: it was designed to deter a Chinese nuclear attack on India, and can hit both Beijing and Shanghai.
That range, combined with road mobility and multiple warheads on each missile, will make Agni-V a potent deterrent system when it is fielded in a few years. It may be an unsettling prospect for Chinese leaders to realize their biggest cities are vulnerable to Indian attack, but the problem New Delhi faced was that it lacked reliable defenses against a Chinese nuclear attack, and it therefore needed a credible retaliatory capability to dissuade Beijing from ever contemplating such aggression. The mobility of the missiles means the Chinese wouldn’t be able to target them preemptively in a crisis, so in the peculiar logic of nuclear strategy they are not deemed “destabilizing” — meaning they present aggressors with no incentive to strike first.
Pakistan’s test of a new ballistic missile the following week was the latest evidence that Islamabad intends to maintain the credibility of its own modest nuclear deterrent as Indian capabilities expand. This follows a pattern that began in 1998, when Pakistan conducted its first detonations of nuclear devices two weeks after India carried out the second test of its own nuclear arsenal. Having fought three wars since they achieved independence in 1947, neither country is inclined to trust the other and Pakistani leaders feel they must maintain a minimal retaliatory force — about 100 warheads — to dissuade New Delhi from nuclear aggression.
Pakistan’s new ballistic missile has less range than its Indian counterpart, but it does possess the capability of hitting major cities in India — which is what matters most in deterring Indian aggression. It is not necessary for Pakistan to match Indian missiles capable of hitting China to have a credible deterrent, just as it is not necessary for India to match Chinese missiles capable of hitting America. However, having the ability to move the missiles around so they cannot be targeted is potentially very important, so the Pakistanis are working on that as they are on equipping each missile with multiple warheads that each can hit a separate target.
A key difference between Indian and Pakistani ballistic missile programs is the degree to which technology is imported from abroad. India has focused its own efforts on indigenous development, whereas Pakistan seems to have secured much of its missile technology from North Korea and some of its nuclear warhead technology from China. Islamabad is not particularly forthcoming about its efforts, but the performance characteristics of its most capable ballistic missiles mimic those of North Korea and neighboring Iran — suggesting a common design. Unlike the other two countries, though, Pakistan shows little inclination to develop intercontinental-range missiles capable of targeting Western Europe or America.
Iran apparently does have that goal, although at present it lacks the crucial item that would change everything: a nuclear warhead to place on its missiles. Despite the ongoing sanctions battle aimed at stopping Iran’s nuclear enrichment and missile efforts, U.S. intelligence agencies do not believe Iran is currently trying to assemble nuclear weapons. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta confirmed that assessment in January, sharing the view first expressed in a 2007 national intelligence estimate that Iran suspended weaponization efforts in 2003. That doesn’t mean anybody in foreign capitals trusts the future intentions of the Teheran regime, but without nuclear warheads its ballistic missiles don’t pose much of a threat.
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