> On Monday, July 15, 2013 8:58:19 AM UTC+2, Virgil wrote: > > Am Montag, 15. Juli 2013 07:51:47 UTC+2 schrieb Albrecht:
> > > > Modern math ist the only "science" > > Math is not a science at all. > > Nothing is proved or disproved in mathematics by looking at physical > > evidence. > > > You apply the Anglo-Saxon sight of this things and take it as overall truth. > Suitable for your daily demonstrated arrogance. > > Other nations take math as science and with good arguments: there are some > basic principles about the working within the subjects. These principles are > e.g. accuratness, apply of logic, confirmability, etc.
Applied mathematics may take into account ow well the mathematics conforms to the physical world, but pure mathematics does not.
All proofs of all mathematical theorems are based purely on their conforming to purely mathematical assumptions like axiom systems.
The ultimate proof of Fermat's last theorem, for example, does not rely on any sort of physical evidence or conformity with the physical world whatsoever. > > And you are a second time wrong: Parts of math are proveable by physical > evidence.
I know of no theorem of pure mathematics whose proof relies in any way on physical evidence.
If you think otherwise, perhaps you can cite some examples of mathematical theorems whose proofs rely on physical evidence in support of that claim.
> Math is developed that way over tens of thousands of years. Sadly, > todays students are not aware oft this facts.
The earliest evidences of what we would now call mathematics is no more than about 5000 to 6000 years old, from ancient Egypt, and is certainly not several tens of millennia as yo cliam. > > And, yes, Einstein. Math is pure, that means, 1+1=2, and not a little bit > more than 2 or less than 2. That's the great difference between math and > natural science. So what? > > Don't forget: Einstein had poked his tongue out at you. Think about it.
Einstein agrees with me that pure math has nothing to do with the physical world:
"As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality. It seems to me that complete clearness as to this state of things first became common property through that new departure in mathematics which is known by the name of mathematical logic or Axiomatics.¹ The progress achieved by axiomatics consists in its having neatly separated the logical-formal from its objective or intuitive content; according to axiomatics the logical-formal alone forms the subject-matter of mathematics, which is not concerned with the intuitive or other content associated with the logical-formal. . . . [On this view it is clear that] mathematics as such cannot predicate anything about perceptual objects or real objects. In axiomatic geometry the words point,¹ straight line,¹ etc., stand only for empty conceptual schemata."