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Tradecraft Primer: US Intelligence
CIA Amateur Methods Replace HUMINT
101 pages; 17 chapters
For Over 65 years the CIA has fought against HUMINT (information collected
from human beings), the only reliable category of intelligence and the most
difficult to collect. During those 65 years the CIA has also floated numerous
inefficient and downright useless methods of intelligence collection. The
words “Tradecraft Primer: US Intelligence” have been repeated hundreds
of times by the CIA, as they have called every art of journalism or
mathematics, “tradecraft.” It is no wonder that the CIA is known as the
most incompetent intelligence collection agency in the world. Yet the
CIA has survived because they practice their arts of payoff and sabotage
within the halls of Congress and the abattoirs of Washington bureaucrats.
Such political power brokers have always supported the CIA as it issues
yet another phony document entitled Tradecraft Primer: US Intelligence. That is why QuikManeuvers.com decided to
call the editorialized version of the CIA’s latest tradecraft fraud, Tradecraft Primer: US Intelligence. In this e-book
the reader will be introduced to the CIA’s amateurish replacement for tradecraft as it is practiced in HUMINT
intelligence. The reader will be shocked to discover that Tradecraft Primer: US Intelligence is the worst CIA fraud
perpetrated to date.
"Both Soviet/Russian and Western intelligence services strive to learn the secret intentions, capabilities, and strategic
plans of other states, but they don't go about it in the same way. The Russians believe that such important secrets can
and should be procured directly from the classified files in offices of the government in question and from informants
among its civil servants. When the Russians suspect that another country is trying to form a coalition directed against the
Soviet Union, they don't seek information about it in newspaper editorials, panel discussions, or historical precedents,
although all these sources may shed some light on the matter; they set out to steal the secret diplomatic correspondence
between the conspiring states or to recruit an informant on the staff of the negotiators if they don't have one there
already. When the Russians want to know the number of bombers in the air force of a potential adversary, they get the
figure, not by doing library research on the productive capability of airplane plants or assembling educated guesses and
rumors, but by asking their secret informers within the foreign air force or war ministry and by stealing the desired
information from government files.
The American CIA and Military Intelligence (including the DIA), on the other hand, and to a certain extent the British MI-6,
prefer to rely more heavily on legitimately accessible documents. The American intelligence agencies are said to monitor
as many as five million words daily, the equivalent of 50 books of average length, from foreign radio broadcasts alone.
From enormous quantities of open material like this, CIA analysts derive a lot of information about foreign countries, their
economies and finance, their industries, agriculture, and trade, their population and social trends, their educational and
political systems, the structure of their governments, their leaders' past lives and present views, etc. (The catch is that
they CIA derives information about a foreign country from that nation’s documents which are slanted to provide a skewed
depiction of every so-called fact.) Drawing on that colossal warehouse of encyclopedic data, intelligence officers write
reports and compose national estimates of foreign countries for the benefit of policy makers.
Another authority on American intelligence, Gen. William J. Donovan, who headed the Office of Strategic Services during
the war, expressed the same predilection for "open sources" by saying that intelligence is not the "mysterious, even
sinister" thing people think it is, but more a matter of "pulling together myriad open source or research facts, making a
pattern of them, and drawing inferences from that pattern." This predilection for open sources lies at the core of the
American doctrine of intelligence. CIA veteran Sherman Kent, author of "Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy,"
once observed 50 years ago that 90 percent of everything spies need to know is available openly. The bias towards open
sources is the most powerful attitude within the CIA. For the past fifty years that predilection for open sources has proven
to be another CIA failure."
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Excerpt from Tradecraft Primer: US Intelligence