[Noisebridge-discuss] Access control & Safety, both personal and general space.
c1 at caseyc.net
Wed Feb 8 16:40:18 PST 2012
Right - we're not trying to prevent brute-forcing of the system, but to
prevent exposing the cell phone numbers of members in the event the DB
is compromised. I like the idea of hashing to a space smaller than 32
bits (the complexity of currently-allocated US phone numbers).
On 2/8/2012 4:16 PM, Jonathan Lassoff wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 8, 2012 at 4:14 PM, Jonathan Lassoff<jof at thejof.com> wrote:
>> On Wed, Feb 8, 2012 at 3:49 PM, Daniel Pitts<coloraura.com at gmail.com> wrote:
>>> There isn't much point in encrypting a phone number, the number of bits
>>> of entropy is so low that a brute-force attack would be *extremely* easy
>>> to execute.
>> True! And this is why I suggest using bcrypt. Brute-force generation
>> of bcrypt hashes for *every* phone number is variably-hard (by tuning
>> the "cost" of bcrypt).
> Now that I'm thinking about it. If you're in the position that you can
> brute-force every phone number to enumerate the database, you can
> already get into the space pretty easily :p
> That said, the risk is that you could get the phone numbers of the
> users of the system, and called ID is really easy to spoof.
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