Calvo, Emilio and Urbano, Amparo (2009): The Value for Actions-Set Games.
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Action-Set games are transferable utility games where the set of players is finite, every player has a finite set of actions, and the worth of the game is a function of the actions taken by the players. In this setting a rule has to determine individual payoffs at each combinations of actions. Following an axiomatic approach, we define the set of Consistent Bargaining Equilibria.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||The Value for Actions-Set Games|
|Keywords:||Action-set games, Shapley value, Prekernel, Consistent Bargaining Equilibria|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games|
|Depositing User:||Emilio Calvo|
|Date Deposited:||01. Apr 2009 04:16|
|Last Modified:||22. Feb 2013 08:07|
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