1 Thursday, 17 July 2008
2 [Appeals Judgement]
3 [Open session]
4 [The appellant entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.33 a.m.
6 JUDGE VAZ: [Interpretation] Good morning to everyone.
7 Is it Mr. or Madam Registrar? Madam Registrar.
8 Madam Registrar, could you kindly call the case before us today?
9 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is the case
10 number IT-01-42-A, the Prosecutor versus Pavle Strugar.
11 JUDGE VAZ: [Interpretation] Thank you, Madam Registrar.
12 I would like to know if Mr. Strugar is able to hear the
13 proceedings and follow them in a language which he understands?
14 THE APPELLANT: [Interpretation] I'm not receiving interpretation.
15 JUDGE VAZ: [Interpretation] Could you repeat what you just said,
16 Mr. Strugar?
17 THE APPELLANT: [Microphone not activated]
18 THE INTERPRETER: The Appellant's microphone was off.
19 JUDGE VAZ: [Interpretation] Well, I know that Mr. Strugar is able
20 to hear and follow the proceedings in a language which he understands.
21 THE APPELLANT: [Interpretation] Yes. I can follow the
22 proceedings now.
23 JUDGE VAZ: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Strugar.
24 I will now ask the parties to introduce themselves, beginning,
25 please with the Defence for Mr. Strugar.
1 MR. RODIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.
2 Mr. Strugar's Defence is represented by Mr. Goran Rodic from Podgorica
3 and Mr. Vladimir Petrovic from Belgrade
4 JUDGE VAZ: [Interpretation] Thank you, Counsel. I will now turn
5 my attention to the Office of the Prosecutor.
6 MS. BRADY: Good morning, Your Honours. Helen Brady, appearing
7 on behalf of the Prosecution, together with Michelle Jarvis, Laurel Baig
8 and our case manager, Sebastian van Hooydonk.
9 JUDGE VAZ: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 Today's hearing concerns the case of the Prosecutor versus Pavle
11 Strugar. As indicated in the scheduling order of 18 June 2008, the
12 Appeals Chamber is sitting today to pronounce its judgement in this case,
13 in accordance with Article 15 bis of the Statute and Rule 117(D) of the
14 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal.
15 In accordance with the Tribunal practice, I will not read out the
16 text of the judgement with the exception of its disposition. After
17 recalling the principal issues raised in the context of these
18 proceedings, I will present the conclusions of the Appeals Chamber. I
19 should like to point out that the following summary is not an integral
20 part of the judgement. The only authoritative account of the Appeals
21 Chamber's findings, and of its reasons for those findings, is to be found
22 in the written judgement, copies of which shall be made available to the
23 parties at the end of this hearing.
24 The events giving rise to these appeals took place during the
25 military campaign conducted by the troops of the former Yugoslav People's
1 Army, the JNA, in the region of Dubrovnik, Croatia
2 and December 1991. According to the judgement rendered on 31 January
3 2005 by Trial Chamber II, in the context of an attack on Srd ordered by
4 Strugar, the 3rd Battalion of the 472nd Motorised Brigade shelled the Old
5 Town of Dubrovnik
6 subordinated to the 2nd Operational Group, the 2nd OG, of which General
7 Strugar assumed command on 12 October 1991
8 this shelling was deliberate; that it was not a response at Croatian or
9 other military positions, actual or believed; and that it had caused
10 considerable damage to the Old Town
11 of the Old Town
12 were actively taking part in the hostilities. On that basis, the Trial
13 Chamber convicted Strugar to a single sentence of eight years
14 imprisonment for the following counts: Count 3, attack on civilians
15 under Articles 3 and 7(3) of the Statute; Count 6, destruction or wilful
16 damage done to cultural property under Articles 3(D) and 7(3) of the
18 Both parties appealed the trial judgement. At the request of the
19 parties, the Appeals Chamber accepted the withdrawal of these appeals on
20 20 September 2006
21 7 June 2007
22 all counts against him or, in the alternative, to order a new trial, or
23 substantially reduce the sentence imposed upon him. He also requests the
24 Appeals Chamber to stay the judicial proceedings concerning him as a
25 result of the fact that he was and remains unfit to stand trial. The
1 Prosecution requests the dismissal of all grounds of appeal put forth by
2 Strugar and raises three grounds of appeal in which it alleges errors of
3 law and of fact concerning the scope of Strugar's duty to prevent the
4 illegal shelling of the Old Town
5 convictions and to sentencing.
6 Before reviewing the grounds of appeal, it is appropriate to
7 recall briefly the standards for appellate review. Appeals against
8 judgements are of a corrective nature and are not trials de novo.
9 Accordingly, Article 25 of the Statute provides that the role of the
10 Appeals Chamber is limited to correcting errors of law invalidating a
11 decision and errors of fact which have occasioned a miscarriage of
13 As regards errors of fact, it is established jurisprudence that
14 the Appeals Chamber will not lightly overturn findings of fact made by a
15 Trial Chamber. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber will overturn these
16 findings only where no reasonable trier of fact could have reached the
17 same finding or where the finding is wholly erroneous. As for the
18 determination of the sentence, the Appeals Chamber will not revise a
19 sentence unless the Trial Chamber has committed a discernable error in
20 the exercise of its broad discretion or has failed to follow the
21 applicable law.
22 The Appeals Chamber may immediately dismiss the arguments of a
23 party which do not have the potential to cause the impugned decision to
24 be reversed or revised and need not consider them on the merits.
25 Finally, it is appropriate to recall that the Appeals Chamber has the
1 inherent discretionary power to determine which arguments merit a
2 reasoned opinion in writing and will thus dismiss without detailed
3 consideration the arguments which are evidently unfounded.
4 I will now move to the review of the grounds of appeal raised by
5 the parties.
6 The Appeals Chamber first decided to review Strugar's fifth
7 ground of appeal in which he alleges that he is unfit to stand trial,
8 since allowing that ground could render the other grounds of appeal moot.
9 In its decision of 26 May 2004
10 issue of fitness to stand trial is one which, although undoubtedly
11 connected with the physical and mental condition of the accused, was not
12 confined to establishing whether a given disorder was present, but was
13 better approached by determining whether the accused was able to exercise
14 his rights effectively in the proceedings against him.
15 After analysing the arguments of the parties in this respect, and
16 the numerous relevant legal authorities, the Appeals Chamber finds that
17 the Trial Chamber did not err by defining the standard applicable to the
18 determination of fitness to stand trial. In fact, the test for such a
19 determination must be that of rational participation which allows the
20 accused to exercise his right to a fair trial such that he is able to
21 participate effectively in his trial and have an understanding of the
22 basic procedural matters.
23 Next, the Appeals Chamber also agrees with the Trial Chamber's
24 application of the legal standard to the facts in the present case. More
25 specifically, and in light of the conclusions above, the Appeals Chamber
1 shares the view of the Trial Chamber that the report prepared by the
2 Defence expert wrongly set the level of understanding too high for
3 assessing fitness to stand trial by arguing, in particular, that the
4 accused must have the capacity to understand fully the conduct of the
5 Court proceedings and the evidence in order to mount a genuine defence.
6 The Appeals Chamber notes that a distinction must be made between
7 the fitness to stand trial and the capacity to conduct one's own defence.
8 Regarding Strugar's claims to the Trial Chamber that his overall
9 health condition was not taken into account, the Appeals Chamber
10 considers that the Trial Chamber correctly noted that a diagnosis was not
11 sufficient in itself to determine whether or not a person was fit to
12 stand trial. Consequently, rather than examine each suspected or
13 asserted illness afflicting the accused at the time, it correctly focused
14 its analysis on the conclusions and remarks concerning the accused's
15 capacity in connection with the effective exercise of his rights.
16 In light of the evidence of the case, as a whole, the Appeals
17 Chamber upholds the findings of the Trial Chamber that Strugar understood
18 the nature of the charges against him, the conduct of the Court
19 proceedings and the evidence in detail, and could testify and give
20 instructions to his counsel.
21 Consequently, the Appeals Chamber finds that Strugar, admittedly
22 suffering from a certain number of mental and somatic disorders, was fit
23 to stand trial since he was assisted by qualified counsel. As a result,
24 the fifth ground of appeal raised by Strugar is dismissed in its
1 We will now examine the first and third grounds of appeal, in
2 which Strugar argues that the Trial Chamber committed a certain number of
3 factual errors.
4 Firstly, the Appeals Chamber dismisses without detailed
5 consideration several of Strugar's arguments concerning the details of
6 combat operations conducted by the JNA in the region of Dubrovnik in
7 October and November 1991, because they are evidently unfounded. As
8 regards the argument according to which the Trial Chamber erred in
9 finding that the mens rea needed to establish his responsibility as a
10 superior under Article 7(3) of the Statute was satisfied, the Appeals
11 Chamber is of the opinion that it was reasonable for the Trial Chamber to
12 find that Admiral Jokic had conducted an investigation into the events of
13 November 1991 and that Strugar was aware of the shelling of the Old Town
14 of Dubrovnik
16 Secondly, as regards the alleged errors in connection with the
17 events of 3 and 5 December 1991, the Appeals Chamber dismisses, without
18 providing detailed reasons, Strugar's arguments concerning the conduct of
19 negotiations with the Croatian ministers, the role played by Admiral
20 Jokic in the events of 5 December 1991
21 JNA, and the testimony of Lieutenant-Colonel Jovanovic, because they are
22 evidently unfounded.
23 As regards the order to attack Srd, the Appeals Chamber finds
24 that Strugar failed to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber's findings were
25 unreasonable. In particular, he failed to demonstrate how the Trial
1 Chamber's failure to clarify the content of the order to attack Srd
2 affected his conviction or sentence. The exact content of this order
3 does not affect the Trial Chamber's findings that Strugar ordered this
4 attack, had the material ability to prevent and put an end to the
5 shelling of the Old Town
6 subordinates during the attack.
7 The Appeals Chamber also finds that Strugar has failed to
8 demonstrate that the Trial Chamber's appreciation of the testimonies of
9 Colm Doyle and Colonel Svicevic was unreasonable. Consequently this
10 claim is rejected.
11 Thirdly, considering the alleged errors with respect to the
12 events of 6 December 1991
13 detailed consideration, Strugar's arguments concerning the testimony of
14 Frigate Captain Handzijev and the owners of the buildings damaged in the
15 Old Town
16 The Appeals Chamber further considers that Strugar has failed to
17 demonstrate that the Trial Chamber's findings concerning the reports
18 prepared by Admiral Jokic and Captain Nesic, the Croatian firing
19 positions or the presence of Croatian heavy weapons in the Old Town
20 6 December 1991
22 As regards Strugar's conversation with General Kadijevic, the
23 Appeals Chamber finds that Strugar has failed to demonstrate that no
24 reasonable trier of fact could have reached the same findings as the
25 Trial Chamber, in particular, that he was aware of the clear and strong
1 risk that the artillery was repeating its previous conduct and committing
2 similar offences. As regards the Trial Chamber's finding that it is
3 highly unlikely that he did not receive reports on the attack on the Old
4 Town, the Appeals Chamber is of the opinion that the Trial Chamber
5 reasonably established that the 2nd OG had the fundamental organisational
6 structure needed to control combat operations and that it received combat
7 reports from the units directly subordinated to it.
8 Moreover, the Trial Chamber established, with reason and support,
9 the numerous ways in which Strugar could have obtained information about
10 the attack on Srd. Finally, as regards the status of Mato Valjalo and
11 Ivo Vlasica, the Appeals Chamber considers that a reasonable trier of
12 fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that in his capacity as
13 a driver for the Dubrovnik
14 actively taking part in the hostilities when he was injured.
15 Furthermore, although it would have been preferable for the Trial Chamber
16 to have done so more explicitly, the Appeals Chamber is of the opinion
17 that the Trial Chamber has established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
18 at that time Mato Valjalo and Ivo Vlasica were civilians. Consequently,
19 this claim is rejected.
20 Fourthly, with respect to the allegations of errors concerning
21 Strugar's failure in his duty to prevent the crimes, the Appeals Chamber
22 dismisses, without detailed consideration, the arguments related to the
23 command structure of the 2nd OG, because they are evidently unfounded.
24 As regards the material ability to prevent the crimes, contrary to
25 Strugar's assertion, the Trial Chamber did not identify it with the
1 position he held within the command structure.
2 For each of the findings it made concerning the de jure authority
3 that Strugar exercised over the forces that participated in the shelling
4 of the Old Town
5 de jure authority he exercised within the 2nd OG command structure also
6 materialised in his de facto position of authority.
7 Moreover, in the light of its other findings, in particular those
8 related to the 2nd OG structure and the means that Strugar had at his
9 disposal to obtain additional information about the attack on Srd, the
10 Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber's findings that Strugar
11 failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to ensure at least
12 that the unlawful shelling of the Old Town
13 Consequently, this claim is rejected.
14 Fifthly, regarding the alleged errors in respect of the events of
15 6 December 1991
16 consideration Strugar's arguments with respect to his material ability to
17 punish the crimes and to the promotions and decorations of persons
18 involved in the shelling of the Old Town
20 As regards his failure in his duty to take measures following the
21 events of 6 December 1991
22 was reasonable for the Trial Chamber to find that General Kadijevic
23 accepted Admiral Jokic's suggestion to conduct an investigation into the
24 events of 6 December 1991
25 turned out to be a sham. A majority of the Appeals Chamber, with
1 Judges Meron and Kwon dissenting, is also of the opinion that Strugar
2 knew that this investigation was a sham and that he was not, in fact,
3 excluded from the process of investigation conducted by Admiral Jokic.
4 Accordingly, this majority finds that it was reasonable for the
5 Trial Chamber to find that Strugar was at the least prepared to accept a
6 situation in which he would not become directly involved, leaving all
7 effective investigation to his immediate subordinate, Admiral Jokic,
8 leaving actions and decisions concerning disciplinary or other actions to
9 him. Therefore, this claim is rejected.
10 In view of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber dismisses by a
11 majority Strugar's first and third grounds of appeal.
12 In his second ground of appeal, Strugar first submits that the
13 Trial Chamber wrongly found that a superior-subordinate relationship
14 existed. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the power of a superior to
15 give orders does not automatically establish that this superior exercised
16 effective control over his subordinates, but it is a relevant element to
17 establish effective control.
18 As the Appeals Chamber held in Halilovic, the orders in question
19 must be considered carefully, while taking into account the evidence as a
20 whole, in order to determine the degree of effective control wielded over
21 the perpetrators of the crimes. The nature of the orders that the
22 superior may issue, the nature of his position of power, and whether or
23 not his orders are followed are elements to be taken into account when
24 determining whether he had the material ability to prevent the crimes or
25 punish the perpetrators thereof.
1 In this regard, considering the nature of the orders that Strugar
2 had the power to issue, the nature of the negotiations in which he was
3 authorised to represent the JNA, those of his functions as commander of
4 the 2nd OG, the fact that his orders were effectively followed, and that
5 the military justice system was still functioning at the material time,
6 the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber reasonably held that
7 Strugar had the material ability to prevent the illegal shelling of the
8 Old Town
9 Consequently, the Trial Chamber correctly applied the requirement
10 of the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship to the facts of
11 the case. This claim is therefore dismissed.
12 In the second prong of this ground of appeal, Strugar submits
13 that the Trial Chamber made erroneous findings, with respect to the mens
14 rea of the crime of attacks on civilians and destruction or wilful damage
15 to cultural property, in particular as regards the findings on direct
17 The Appeals Chamber recalls that to be held criminally
18 responsible, the perpetrator of an attack on civilians must have acted
19 intentionally. In other words, the mens rea requisite of this crime is
20 established when the acts of violence constituting the crime were
21 perpetrated intentionally on civilians, that the civilians were targeted
22 deliberately, or that the perpetrator of the acts was entirely
23 indifferent to their consequences. As a result, this definition
24 encompasses the concepts of direct intent and indirect intent referred to
25 by the Trial Chamber and Strugar.
1 As regard the mens rea for the crime of destruction or wilful
2 damage to cultural property, it is established, if the destruction or
3 damage targeted cultural property intentionally; that is to say, either
4 deliberately or recklessly. In this case, in light of the evidence as a
5 whole, the Trial Chamber was convinced that the perpetrators of the
6 attack of 6 December 1991
7 consequences of their acts and wishing those consequences to occur.
8 Strugar has failed to show how these findings were not
9 reasonable. Accordingly, this claim is dismissed. In view of the
10 foregoing, the Appeals Chamber dismisses Strugar's second ground of
11 appeal in its entirety.
12 As regards the Prosecution's first ground of appeal, the Appeals
13 Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber erred in law by not applying the
14 correct test for the requisite mens rea under Article 7(3) of the
15 Statute, by finding that prior to the attacks on Srd launched in the
16 early hours of 6 December 1991
17 know that his subordinates were about to commit a crime.
18 More specifically, the Trial Chamber erred in considering that
19 the fact that Strugar knew that there was a risk that his forces would
20 illegally shell the Old Town
21 possessed the requisite mens rea under Article 7(3) of the Statute, and
22 that for this he had to know that there was a substantial likelihood or a
23 clear and strong risk that his forces would shell the Old Town
24 The Trial Chamber wrongly considered that the requisite mens rea,
25 under Article 7(3), required proof that the superior knew that his
1 subordinates would very likely commit crimes. In this connection, the
2 Appeals Chamber recalls that in order to hold a superior responsible
3 under Article 7(3) of the Statute, it is sufficient to prove that he knew
4 that his subordinates could commit crimes.
5 Having found that the Trial Chamber erred in law by applying the
6 wrong legal test, the Appeals Chamber must apply the test that is
7 appropriate to the facts found by the Trial Chamber and determine whether
8 it is itself convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that Strugar had,
9 prior to the beginning of the attack on Srd, a sufficiently alarming body
10 of information within the meaning understood by the standard of "had
11 reason to know."
12 According to the Appeals Chamber, the only reasonable conclusion,
13 in light of the Trial Chamber's findings, is that having been put on
14 notice of the risk of an attack and alerted to the need to open an
15 investigation, Strugar had reason to know within the meaning of
16 Article 7(3) of the Statute that his subordinates were about to commit
17 crimes but did nothing to prevent them.
18 In view of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber allows the
19 Prosecution's first ground of appeal.
20 In its second ground of appeal, the Prosecution submits that the
21 Trial Chamber erred in refusing to enter cumulative convictions in
22 respect of Count 4, devastation not justified by military necessity;
23 Count 5, unlawful attacks on civilian objects; and Count 6, destruction
24 or wilful damage of cultural property.
25 The Appeals Chamber notes that after finding that each of the
1 offences theoretically contained materially distinct elements from each
2 other, the Trial Chamber held that Counts 4 and 5 really added no
3 materially distinct element, given the circumstances in which these
4 crimes were committed.
5 The Appeals Chamber considers that by applying the Celebici test
6 to the particular circumstances of the case, the Trial Chamber thus
7 committed an error in law. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber revises the
8 judgement accordingly and enters a finding of guilt for Counts 4 and 5.
9 In view of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber allows the
10 Prosecution's second ground of appeal.
11 Finally, let us turn to the grounds of appeal on sentence as
12 raised by both parties: Strugar's fourth ground of appeal and the
13 Prosecution's third ground of appeal.
14 Strugar claims that the Trial Chamber erred in comparing his
15 conviction with that of Miodrag Jokic in failing to give the due weight
16 to his apologies and in failing to attach sufficient weight to certain
17 mitigating factors. The Prosecution submits that the Trial Chamber erred
18 in comparing Mr. Strugar's conviction with that of Miodrag Jokic's and in
19 considering that the apologies presented by Mr. Strugar were a mitigating
21 As regards the comparison of Strugar's sentence with that imposed
22 on Miodrag Jokic, the Appeals Chamber notes that further to his -- to its
23 established jurisprudence, the comparison between the Strugar case and
24 the Jokic case is only one of the elements the Trial Chamber took into
25 account in determining the sentence. The Appeals Chamber considers that
1 the Trial Chamber was correct to attach limited weight to the sentence
2 imposed on Jokic. Indeed, for the Appeals Chamber, there are significant
3 differences between the Strugar case and the Jokic case.
4 The Appeals Chamber thus finds that the parties have failed to
5 show that the Trial Chamber committed a discernable error in referring
6 briefly to the Jokic case.
7 As regards Strugar's statement at the end of his trial, the
8 Appeals Chamber understands that the Trial Chamber considered that, in
9 his statement, Strugar had expressed the pain that he felt for the
10 victims and not the remorse he experienced. The Trial Chamber simply
11 stated that it was convinced that the accused was sincere, expressly
12 noting that it did not accept what was said by him in his last sentence.
13 The Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber's finding on this
14 point was entirely reasonable, on the understanding that at no time did
15 Strugar acknowledge the moral blameworthiness of his acts.
16 Finally, the Appeals Chamber considers that Strugar failed to
17 demonstrate that the Trial Chamber did not take into account all the
18 evidence before it when weighing these mitigating factors or that it
19 erred in its discretion with respect to the weight to give to mitigating
21 In light of the foregoing the Appeals Chamber dismisses Strugar's
22 fourth ground of appeal and the Prosecution's third ground of appeal.
23 This concludes the Appeals Chamber's examination of the grounds
24 of appeal raised by the parties.
25 I will now move to the analysis of how the Appeals Chamber's
1 findings affect the sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber.
2 Firstly, the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber had
3 erred with regard to the scope of Strugar's criminal responsibility in
4 failing to prevent the shelling of the Old Town of Dubrovnik. Although
5 the Appeals Chamber in effect extended this responsibility from 7.00 in
6 the morning to midnight
7 set out in its judgement, that the Trial Chamber took into account the
8 damage caused during this additional period. The Appeals Chamber,
9 therefore, considers that this error has no impact on Strugar's sentence.
10 Secondly, as regards the convictions entered for Counts 4 and 5,
11 the Appeals Chamber agrees, as the Prosecution submits, that these
12 convictions are based on the same criminal conduct and add nothing to the
13 gravity of the crimes committed by Strugar.
14 Finally, the Appeals Chamber notes that during the appeal
15 hearing, the Defence submitted that Strugar's health had deteriorated
16 considerably since the trial judgement was rendered. The Appeals Chamber
17 considers that it is competent to factor in evidence in this regard,
18 given the fact that it must determine the sentence in connection with the
19 errors found in the trial judgement.
20 After examining the relevant evidence, the Appeals Chamber
21 considers that Strugar's deteriorating health since the trial judgement
22 was rendered must be considered as a mitigating factor. Consequently,
23 the Appeals Chamber believes that it is good to impose a new sentence on
25 I shall now read the disposition of the appeals judgement.
1 Mr. Strugar, please stand up.
2 Mr. Strugar, I shall read the disposition. For the foregoing
3 reasons, the Appeals Chamber; pursuant to Article 25 of the Statute and
4 rules 117 and 118 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence; noting the
5 respective filings of the parties and the arguments they presented at the
6 hearing on the 23rd of April 2008; sitting in open session; dismisses all
7 the grounds of appeal submitted by Mr. Strugar, Judges Meron and Kwon
8 dissenting, with regard to the third ground of appeal concerning the
9 failure to take measures for the events of 6 December 1991; allows the
10 Prosecution's first ground of appeal regarding the scope of Strugar's
11 duty to prevent the shelling of the Old Town
12 second ground of appeal, and, pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute,
13 enters convictions under Count 4, devastation not justified by military
14 necessity, a violation of the laws or customs of war, under Article 3 of
15 the Statute, and Count 5, unlawful attacks on civilian objects, a
16 violation of the laws or customs of war, under Article 3 of the Statute;
17 dismisses the Prosecution's third ground of appeal; replaces the sentence
18 of eight years of imprisonment imposed by the Trial Chamber by a sentence
19 of seven and a half years, subject to credit being given for the period
20 already spent in detention under Rule 101 of the Rules; orders that
21 pursuant to Rules 103(C) and 107 of the Rules, Strugar is to remain in
22 the custody of the International Criminal Tribunal pending the
23 finalisation of arrangements for his transfer to the state in which his
24 sentence will be served.
25 Judge Shahabuddeen appends a separate opinion; Judges Meron and
1 Kwon append a joint dissenting opinion.
2 Mr. Strugar, please be seated.
3 Mr. Registrar, please distribute copies of the appeals judgement
4 to the parties.
5 Before concluding, I would take this brief opportunity to thank
6 all of those who have contributed to the efficient conduct of this case,
7 and thank them for their constructive efforts.
8 Thank you. These proceedings are adjourned.
9 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 10.22 a.m.