David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 139 (3):307 - 327 (2008)
A number of philosophers defend naturalistic moral realism by appeal to an externalist semantics for moral predicates. The application of semantic externalism to moral predicates has been attacked by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons in a series of papers that make use of their “Moral Twin Earth” thought experiment. In response, several defenders of naturalistic moral realism have claimed that the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment is misleading and yields distorted and inaccurate semantic intuitions. If they are right, the intuitions generated by Moral Twin Earth cannot be appealed to in arguments against externalist moral semantics. The most developed case against the Moral Twin Earth argument that follows this strategy is found in a paper by Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis and Angus Dawson. Here I argue that their attack on the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment fails. Laurence, Margolis and Dawson have not shown that we have reason to distrust the semantic intuitions it generates.
|Keywords||Moral Twin Earth Intuitions Ethical Naturalism Moral Realism Cornell Realism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Richard Boyd (1988). How to Be a Moral Realist. In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press. 181-228.
David O. Brink (1984). Moral Realism and the Sceptical Arguments From Disagreement and Queerness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):111 – 125.
David O. Brink (2001). Realism, Naturalism, and Moral Semantics. Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (02):154-.
David Copp (1990). Explanation and Justification in Ethics. Ethics 100 (2):237-258.
David Copp (2000). Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth. Synthese 124 (1-2):113-137.
Citations of this work BETA
Jorn Sonderholm (2013). Unreliable Intuitions: A New Reply to the Moral Twin-Earth Argument. Theoria 79 (1):76-88.
Similar books and articles
Joshua Gert (2006). Problems for Moral Twin Earth Arguments. Synthese 150 (2):171 - 183.
Andrea Viggiano (2008). Ethical Naturalism and Moral Twin Earth. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (2):213 - 224.
Neil Levy (2011). Moore on Twin Earth. Erkenntnis 75 (1):137-146.
Heimir Geirsson (2005). Moral Twin-Earth and Semantic Moral Realism. Erkenntnis 62 (3):353 - 378.
Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2009). Analytical Moral Functionalism Meets Moral Twin Earth. In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press.
Katalin Farkas (2003). Does Twin Earth Rest on a Mistake? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (8):155-169.
Robert Stalnaker (1993). Twin Earth Revisited. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63:297-311.
Eric Russert Kraemer (1991). On The Moral Twin-Earth Challenge to New-Wave Moral Realism. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:467-472.
Max Seeger (2010). Experimental Philosophy and the Twin Earth Intuition. Grazer Philosophische Studien 80:237-244.
Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis & Angus Dawson (1999). Moral Realism and Twin Earth. Facta Philosophica 1:135-165.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads127 ( #8,999 of 1,413,434 )
Recent downloads (6 months)14 ( #15,332 of 1,413,434 )
How can I increase my downloads?