This chapter discusses Patriot's offensive and defensive support operations. The role of Patriot battalions and batteries in both offensive and defensive operations is to shape the third dimension battle throughout the depth of the battlefield. This means not just protecting assets and maneuver forces, but disrupting enemy TBM and air operations from the rear areas to beyond the forward line of own troops (FLOT). Patriot offensive and defensive operations are driven by mission, commander's intent, METT-T, system considerations, and most specifically by the threat.
During offensive operations, Patriot's missions are to destroy incoming enemy TBMs and defeat enemy ABTs. To support an offensive ground operation, EAC Patriot may be deployed to augment the corps ADA brigade by protecting corps rear area assets. This allows corps ADA units to concentrate their efforts forward providing weighted protection to the corps' main effort. This may involve fighting Patriot as units or forming a HIMAD task force, depending on METT-T. In addition, forward-deployed Patriot units, belonging either to the corps or to EAC, influence the corps deep battle by augmenting corps and division ADA units with greater firepower and range. Patriot's ability to simultaneously engage large numbers of attacking aircraft, TBMs, standoff jammers, and specific aircraft at relatively long ranges, allows the ground commander freedom to execute the deep battle.
Patriot commanders should consider and plan for long-range engagements against enemy aircraft attack packages. While the Patriot system's probability of kill (Pk ) may be comparatively low for such targets, the disruptive effect may be worth the expenditure of missiles, especially against a poorly trained or motivated enemy. Such engagements must be sanctioned by the JFACC and coordinated through the air tasking order.
Patriot units should attempt to identify enemy aircraft packages, recognize the flight leaders, and selectively engage them, either before or during attack by friendly AD fighters. This type of engagement requires extensive coordination whenever possible, but such synchronization of effort will yield better protection of friendly units and assets.
Patriot units in the forward area should make the most of the system's capability against the jamming threat. Specific batteries should be designated for the mission of engaging standoff jammers, as this type of engagement reduces the system's ability to simultaneously engage aircraft and TBMs. For more details on SOJC engagements, see FM 44-85-1 (TBP).
Corps Patriot battalions and batteries providing air defense to offensive operations must thicken air defense over the corps' main effort to preserve the initiative. Top priorities are providing protection to the maneuver units that form the main effort and to their support facilities such as critical operational and tactical assets, C3, logistics operations, and reserve forces. The Patriot battalion participates in the integrated theater air defense, which gives it access to early warning and intelligence information critical to the offensive effort and to the effectiveness of corps and divisional ADA units.
Threat doctrine shows that the main objective of enemy air operations against our offensive operation is to destroy our ability to synchronize. The main threats to offensive operations that Patriot must counter are: the TBM threat that targets critical corps and theater assets as well as Patriot units themselves; the FW threat that attempts to target the same critical assets; and RW jammers and attack helicopters that penetrate short-range air defense (SHORAD) and Hawk units.
The supported commander's intent is the driving force for Patriot employment during offensive operations. Offensive operations during force-projection operations may be extremely fluid. Patriot units can expect rapid transition from defensive to offensive or to exploitation operations. Deep operations and rear area battles are likely to be conducted simultaneously. To support such fluid operations, Patriot must move quickly and efficiently to provide air defense of friendly attacking forces and their support base. When risk must be taken, battalion commanders may influence the battle by pushing the flow of missiles and fuel to batteries most likely to have a positive effect on the battle, while restricting the flow of those assets to batteries which are malpositioned or facing less opposition. Launching stations may be directed from one unit to another to allow heavily engaged units to continue the fight. Repair parts and float equipment may also be used for the same effect.
An attacking force is most vulnerable to air attack during a movement to contact. Because Patriot units cannot shoot on the move, and move more slowly than other corps maneuver units, positioning must be planned in detail before the operation begins. Patriot coverage of highly mobile movements to contact can be maintained by several methods.
Forward coverage. Patriot batteries may be placed close to the line of departure (LD) for two reasons. This ensures that initial coverage can be maintained for at least several hours, and it places batteries in the forward area where they must beat the onset if they expect to be able to cover a mobile force when it contacts the enemy force. Once the force has crossed the LD, Patriot units must have priority for movement to ensure movement in a timely manner in order to provide coverage.
Detailed planning. Before the operation begins, the battalion S3 should identify, by map reconnaissance or other resources, as many suitable positions for Patriot batteries as possible along the axis of advance. Each battery should know in advance which sites it will most likely occupy, and when they should be operational. Actual use of these sites is dependent upon reconnaissance by the battery's reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of position (RSOP) team. For this reason, battery RSOP teams and battalion survey crews should be considered for placement with lead elements as a means to speed reconnaissance and selection of sites. Prospective locations for Patriot batteries should be coordinated through the ADA brigade S3, if possible, so that use of the land may be deconflicted with other corps units.
Leapfrog. Using the leapfrog method to move units forward ensures that Patriot coverage moves forward with the force. Initial coverage is provided by batteries located near the LD (see Figure 5-1). Designated batteries move forward behind attacking forces to preplanned positions along the axis of advance. When they become operational, the batteries at the LD move to forward positions, and so on, to the conclusion of the operation. This is a very difficult operation for Patriot units. Keep in mind these considerations:
Patriot units must stay focused on the threat. When the primary threat is missiles, batteries must be placed near or with the assets being protected. However, when the primary threat is aircraft, this is not the case.
Planners should keep in mind the most likely AAOAs, as well as the locations of enemy airfields, when determining where to place batteries. Figure 5-2 shows a possible placement of batteries to protect the flank of a corps movement to contact from air attack.
FM 100-5 states that successful offensive operations include the tenets of depth, synchronization, and agility. Patriot's contribution to offensive synchronization is to provide air defense to forces and assets at the critical time and place. This means that Patriot commanders and leaders must realize that agility is more often a state of mind rather than a simple matter of tactical mobility. Patriot's ability to look deep into the enemy's AO, simultaneously engage numerous threats at all altitudes, and react quickly to changing situations is the key to shaping the third dimension of the offensive battle.
The ultimate objective of any defensive operation is to seize the initiative from the enemy so that offensive operations may be mounted. Commanders must see Patriot's contribution to defensive operations as offensive in nature. Patriot units must aggressively attempt to disrupt the enemy's air campaign to the point that synchronization between air and ground offensive operations is not possible. Patriot battalions and batteries accomplish this by locating TBMs and ABTs, providing TBM and ABT protection to theater and corps critical assets, and by massing firepower forward against the ABT avenues of approach to those assets.
Long-range engagements, discussed earlier in this chapter, should be considered during defensive operations to help disrupt the enemy's offensive air campaign. However, this mission must be closely considered due to the low Pk , projected numbers of enemy aircraft and TBMs, and the number and types of available missiles.
Every effort must be made to synchronize Patriot fires with the Air Force or other service air defense aircraft. The threat of surface-to-air fratricide is greatly magnified during defensive operations, especially if the enemy has enjoyed any success in targeting friendly C2 structures.
There are four major threats that Patriot battalions and batteries must counter during defensive operations to degrade the enemy's ability to synchronize. TBMs will target the lodgment area, C3I nodes, and AD sites including air bases. FW aircraft will be programmed against the same targets. The ECM threat that targets not only ADA radars, but also C3I nodes and communications in general, must be disrupted. Finally, Patriot must help corps and divisional ADA units counter the enemy's close air support (CAS) and battlefield air interdiction (BAI) operation that directly supports his ground operation.
Use of Patriot in defensive operations will differ depending on where the battalion is employed. The demands for rear areas differ significantly from those of forward areas.
Patriot forces in the corps area kill TBMs and aircraft directed against maneuver units and their sustainment facilities. These units also kill enemy aircraft attempting to penetrate to rear areas. Thus, Patriot units in forward areas must counter all the threats noted above. Forward Patriot battalions must also provide early warning for corps, division, and higher echelons, as well as integrate with Hawk and SHORAD fires.
Patriot, in areas controlled by EAC, must protect critical assets from TBMs and aircraft. Because Patriot's limited TBM capability forces prioritization of assets for TBM protection, not all assets may receive the same degree of protection. Again, early warning must be exchanged with adjacent and higher echelon AD forces.
The challenge for Patriot units involved in defensive operations is twofold: first, to provide air defense to friendly forces facing air and missile attack, and second, to use their immense firepower and range offensively to help the air forces wrest the initiative from the enemy's air operation. If synchronization of the enemy's air and ground force is disrupted, the defensive battle can more easily be won.
At the ADA brigade level, designing defenses is largely a matter of determining force allocation, task-organizing when appropriate, defining the zones and areas of responsibility within which subordinate battalions or task forces will operate, and constructing the C3 architecture to support the AD operation. At the battalion or task force level, defense design is the detailed process of maximizing Patriot system potential against the threat. It includes planning initial and follow-on positions, determining PTLs, allocating special missions to specific batteries, defining assets to be protected, and planning the necessary communications routing. The technical and system details of defense design are discussed at length in FM 44-85-1(TBP) and in (S)FM 44-100A(U) (TBP).
At all levels, defense design is a continuous, iterative process. The battalion commander normally starts the process for his battalion by giving his guidance as a statement of intent and a concept of operations. Defense design is based on the following four possible missions for Patriot battalions:
Once guidance for concept of operation and intent have been specified, the battalion S3 begins the detailed work of defense design. Batteries' locations, PTL designations, system initialization, and communications must be worked out. If the decision has been made to task-organize with Hawk, the S3 must also include allocated Hawk assault fire platoons (AFPs) into his defense design.
Because Patriot is a sectored system, the PTL is more significant than it was in the past with other systems. Conceptually, the fire units can be oriented so that their PTLs are convergent, divergent, or parallel.
Patriot fires are more effective against the ABT when convergent PTLs are used. As shown in Figure 5-3, each Patriot battery's PTL converges on the PTL of at least two other batteries in the defense. Ideally, the PTL of each unit will converge on that of all other units in the battalion. Convergent PTLs are most effective when applied to known avenues of approach (AAs). Convergent PTLs are also effective against FW aircraft attempting to establish air corridors in forward areas. The exact orientation of battery PTLs depends upon the mission, IPB, and terrain. PTLs should be proposed by the brigade as part of the defense design process, but final PTLs have to be determined by the battalion as it deploys its batteries.
Convergent PTLs provide mutual support and defense in depth. They concentrate firepower to one area while sacrificing some of the additional area that could be gained by parallel or divergent PTL orientation. However, the protection provided by employing convergent PTLs can be sustained longer because it is less sensitive to loss of units than a deployment that uses parallel or divergent PTLs. More important, convergent PTLs make the Patriot system more effective against raids using escort or self-screening jammers by allowing the system to triangulate to provide range.
Against the ABT, divergent and parallel PTLs allow the battalion S3 to provide Patriot coverage to larger areas than when using convergent PTLs. This occurs at the expense of concentration of firepower and it reduces system electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) capability. However, in many circumstances, the considerations of METT-T will not allow the use of convergent PTLs. For example, if the battalion area of responsibility is too large to allow batteries to be positioned using convergent PTLs, or if too few batteries have been allocated to the defense, then divergent PTLs may be required. When threat AAs require acquisition and firepower in different directions, the S3 may not be able to use convergent PTLs (see Figures 5-4 and 5-5).
Secondary target lines (STLs) need to be carefully planned to sustain the AD protection of the supported unit or asset. They should also be planned for contingencies and to cover possible catastrophic failures. Launcher positioning must support the use of STLs. See FM 44-85-1 (TBP) for guidance on the positioning of launchers.
When designing a defense against TBMs, convergent PTLs are not important to the overall design. Each battery's PTL should be oriented toward suspected TBM launch sites. It is important to remember that Patriot antitactical missile (ATM) capability is limited. (S)FM 44-100A(U)(TBP) addresses the technical details of a TBM defense, and FM 44-85-1(TBP) addresses tactical software issues, but the S3 should follow these general guidelines:
The HIMAD task force (TF) is a mix of Patriot batteries and Hawk AFPs (the exact mix being dependent on IPB and METT-T) under the control of a Patriot ICC. Hawk AFPs normally operate centralized to the ICC in the same manner as Patriot FUs. The ICC is capable of controlling Patriot batteries and Hawk AFPs in a separate configuration, or of controlling subordinate battalions (Hawk and or Patriot through the BTOC or ICC, respectively). The size of the TF is a function of METT-T and system capability (see Figure 5-6).
Patriot software limits the number of fire units that the ICC may control to no more than 12. Any combination of Patriot and Hawk batteries may be assigned to an ICC, as long as no more than 6 Patriot FUs are assigned. In the master ICC configuration, the ICC may also control up to 5 subordinate battalions, though a task force that large would likely be beyond the ability of most ICC crews to control, regardless of the level of training. Such a large operation would also likely stress the communications capability of the organizations involved. Figure 5-7 shows the connectivity with higher echelon, auxiliary, lateral, and subordinate units, including the German Hawk Operations Center (GEHOC).
There are several general situations that require consideration for the use of a HIMAD TF:
In a task force configuration, the capabilities of the Hawk and Patriot systems complement one another and increase the effectiveness and survivability of both systems. To fully integrate operations, the Hawk system must be aligned with the Patriot survey crew equipment during the RSOP. Without precise integrated Hawk-Patriot alignment, target resolution will be ineffective, and accurate air battle management will be impossible. Differences in communications data languages complicate task force formation and make it imperative that Hawk and Patriot units conduct frequent interoperability training. Patriot uses PADIL for ICC and FU communications while Hawk uses ATDL-1. The ICC uses either ATDL-1 or TADIL-B for Hawk interoperability. Differences in track processing computers and data flow rate require modems in the ICC and CRGs to be used to integrate Hawk and Patriot systems. Tactical directors (TDs) and tactical control officers (TCOs) must train together often to understand requirements unique to the other system and be able to conduct operations smoothly. The system specific languages and system capabilities are divergent enough to cause confusion during the pressure of battle.
The Phase III Hawk system makes integration with the Patriot ICC much easier because the data displays, mapping, and internal software are modeled after Patriot's. Figure 5-8 shows a HIMAD task force defense with Hawk augmenting Patriot coverage by providing rear and side coverage for the Patriot dead zones. Two AFPs also provide early engagement and defense in depth to counter ABTs and conserve Patriot missiles for more threatening targets such as TBMs.
To fully implement the concept of the HIMAD TF, the task force S3 must not only understand both the Patriot and the Hawk systems, but must also have a good working knowledge of the software of both systems and its impact on the planning and execution of the mission. The TF commander must also have a thorough understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and requirements of both systems. Planners should refer to (S)FM44-100A(U) (TBP) and FM 44-85-1(TBP) for technical details and specifics on both systems.
The formation of a HIMAD TF can afford the commander several advantages.
By combining the two systems under the ICC, the limitations inherent in each system are to some extent mitigated. For Hawk, track correlation is improved, identification conflicts quickly resolved, and the Pk and survivability are enhanced. For Patriot, existing sector coverage is augmented and dead zones are filled. When Hawk AFPs are placed forward of Patriot batteries, they may provide early warning to the TF and may also be able to drive attacking aircraft up into Patriot fires. In any case, enemy pilots are forced to fly against two systems that use two very different methods of acquisition and guidance that share a single C2 node. Hawk survivability is enhanced, and if the defense is properly designed and operators are properly trained, both systems will be engaged fully.
Better use of available missiles is more easily accomplished under TF C2. A coordinated effort allows for a more judicious use of Patriot missiles which are more expensive and less plentiful than Hawk missiles and might better be conserved for use in the TBM role. Placement of Hawk AFPs to support early engagement by Hawk and training Patriot TDs to favor use of Hawk over Patriot are fundamental to making the HIMAD TF function efficiently (see FM 44-85-1[TBP]).
The HIMAD TF provides the force commander with a means of tailoring the AD organization to fit the combat situation and the mission. The TF is a multifaceted organization that can counter the entire spectrum of potential threats facing the corps and EAC (for example, FW and RW aircraft, TBMs, and jammers). Use of Hawk with Patriot frees up Patriot for the ATM role and for missions against standoff jammers. Patriot's communications capabilities provide the TF with robust, reliable communications. Patriot can increase Hawk survivability by providing high-quality early warning via data link as well as by providing incidental TBM coverage. Hawk's greater mobility can allow the TF to provide good coverage during highly mobile operations. When fire units are available, the TF organization lends itself easily to change. As the brigade commander alters the TF structure, units may be added or taken away to meet fluid situations.
The coordination of effort that the HIMAD task force allows provides unprecedented synchronization, and, therefore, greater effectiveness and lethality on the battlefield. During the planning for contingency operations, the TF may also provide planners with flexible means for providing ground forces with adequate TBM and AD protection. Limited airlift assets require planners to put together force packages that provide a maximum of firepower while costing as little as possible in weight or numbers of aircraft sorties. Pure Patriot or pure Hawk configurations may meet the requirements of METT-T in some circumstances, but many potential contingency operations may need the flexibility that the TF provides in terms of firepower against both the TBM threat and the ABT.
The disadvantages of the HIMAD task force revolve mainly around training and support issues. The effects of both may be mitigated by ensuring that mission-essential task lists (METLs) for both types of units include the task force mission and by ensuring that unit tactical SOPs address the formation and composition of task forces. The ADA brigade is primarily responsible for ensuring that SOPs of assigned Hawk and Patriot units are compatible and that they support task organization. Training objectives which emphasize the formation and proper support of task forces will result in units that can fight together.
Training issues for the HIMAD task force include tactics and communications training. Patriot tactical directors and assistants must be thoroughly familiar with the Hawk weapon system. They must understand how Patriot system software functions with regard to Hawk.
On the Hawk side, tactical control officers and radar operators must understand the differences in C3 when linked to the ICC (see FM 44-73). In many cases, these are no more than differences in terminology, but unless they are identified and understood, they can severely affect the synchronization that is the strength of the HIMAD TF. Hawk TCOs at the battery level will need more than brief familiarization with the Patriot system to fully integrate operations and deconflict engagements at the battery level. During task force operations, it is particularly important that the operators and planners in both systems fully understand the capabilities, requirements, and limitations of the other system to synchronize AD operations.
Training for both Hawk and Patriot communicators is critical. Compatible communications SOPs which stress channelization for UHF systems will reduce unnecessary training. Patriot communicators should be familiar with the communications equipment used by their counterparts in the Hawk units. Many of the differences amount to no more than terminology. Training together frequently will increase understanding and ease integration of the TF.
Providing the right slice of system-specific support to the HIMAD TF is a difficult problem. Unit SOPs that address this subject should be based upon solid evidence gathered during TF training. Training should be structured to stress the logistical system. SOPs should address how support is to be accomplished; how repair parts are to be divided, and how maintenance personnel, tools, and test equipment are to be allocated. While the emphasis here is on system support, variations in conventional and communications equipment between Hawk and Patriot units must be considered as well.
During TF defense design planning, Patriot deployment should be considered first to lay the framework for the defense. Hawk AFPs should then be factored into the design. Normally, Hawk AFPs should be emplaced within the Patriot sector 10 to 20 kilometers forward of FUs in valleys, along low-altitude AAs, or areas not sufficiently covered by Patriot. This will ensure that the Patriot air picture provided to Hawk will be of use, and that Hawk can detect low flyers in Patriot dead zones. Hawk detection will force aircraft up into Patriot coverage.
When a TF is organized, it should consist of no less than three Patriot batteries. This will help ensure that the TF will retain good ECCM capability through triangulation. Although METT-T will help determine the exact size of the TF, a mix of four Patriot batteries and four Hawk AFPs is a good baseline. This facilitates excellent area coverage and is well within the workload capacity of well-trained ICC operators. It also facilitates assignment of remaining Hawk units, eases system-specific support problems, and maintains Hawk battery administrative and logistics integrity.
When necessary, Hawk can be employed on the flanks and rear of the Patriot defense, preferably within Patriot coverage because of the reasons stated above. When this is not possible, the S3 should ensure that Hawk AFPs do fall within Patriot sectors after reorientation to Patriot STLs.
Table 5-1 is a mission-to-task force organization matrix. This is a general template for planning or brainstorming purposes; it is not intended to be prescriptive in nature. In this matrix, 1 is the first choice and 4 is the least desirable option. The numbers may be altered to fit any situation.
Separate battalions (pure Hawk or Patriot).
Patriot-heavy task force (more Patriot batteries than Hawk AFPs).
Hawk-heavy task force (more Hawk AFPs than Patriot batteries).
Hawk alignment in the pure configuration normally uses map spotting or resection with the M2 aiming circle to orient the AFP. This provides sufficiently accurate data for the correlation needs of the Hawk BTOC. However, when operating with Patriot, these alignment procedures are not precise enough to ensure track correlation and rapid lock with the Hawk high-powered illuminator (HPI). In a TF, survey crews assigned to Patriot must be sent to subordinate Hawk AFPs as they move about the battlefield to provide location, altitude, and alignment data. This may create a management and coordination problem for the TF S3 because of the limited numbers of survey crews assigned. However, the Patriot quick response program (QRP) with the global positioning system (GPS)/precision lightweight GPS receiver (PLGR) helps to alleviate some of the management and coordination problems for the TF S3. Unit moves must be coordinated so that survey crews can be available to RSOP teams before the main body closes.
Defense design begins with the commander's guidance. The following figures show several possible designs for pure Patriot and or TF. These are only examples to be used as a start. Each unit must, of course, tailor these designs to its own structure and specific mission.
Figure 5-9 shows a possible defense design for a TBM pure defense. The specific priorities for a pure TBM defense must be articulated and well-defined because of the limited nature of Patriot's TBM capability. EMCON must be addressed. PTLs will be oriented on the source of the TBM threat. ABTs are engaged only as directed by higher authority and if it does not detract from the primary mission of killing TBMs. Batteries should be placed no farther than 20 kilometers apart when the mission allows. Defended assets should normally be as close as possible but no farther than 20 kilometers from the battery.
Figure 5-10 shows a possible defense design for a pure ABT mission. In a pure ABT defense, Patriot batteries should be arrayed to provide air defense to assets and forces as dictated by the mission analysis and prioritization process. Mission permitting, PTLs should converge whenever possible. This defense lends itself well to task organization with Hawk. Batteries should be placed no farther than 20 to 30 kilometers apart. Defended assets should be no farther than 30 kilometers from the battery. Dependent on METT-T, the Patriot ICC may initialize Hawk AFPs as defended assets.
Figure 5-11 shows a possible defense design for a TBM-heavy mission. When arrayed in a TBM-heavy defense, Patriot batteries should focus on providing effective fires against TBMs, but they must consider the ABT as well. PTLs should be oriented on the TBM threat, STLs on ABT avenues, and planners should keep in mind the shorter acquisition range of the Patriot radar against the ABT when in the TBM search mode. This defense should be considered when deploying Patriot as a TF, and it is especially useful for contingency operations when the threat of both TBMs and ABTs exists. Batteries should be placed no farther than 20 kilometers apart. Defended assets should be no farther than 20 kilometers from the battery. Dependent on METT-T, Hawk AFPs may be designated defended assets.
Figure 5-12 shows a possible defense design for an ABT-heavy mission. The priority for an ABT-heavy defense is to kill enemy aircraft. This defense would be used when the threat of TBM attack exists, but the major threat is by ABTs. The defense design should be oriented on the ABT, PTLs should converge whenever possible, and assets designated for TBM protection must be clearly defined so that one or two batteries may be allocated to the antitactical ballistic missile (ATBM) mission. Batteries should be no farther than 20 kilometers apart for TBM and 30 kilometers for ABT.
The HIMAD TF defense design is determined by the unit's mission rather than location. The TF defense design relates to three of the Patriot system's four missions. To reiterate, those missions are--
The exact task force configuration and deployment should depend on the mission of the entire force, supported force goals and objectives, and threat capabilities. Brigades should design and train for TF operations that support their mission(s).
The following designs are examples of proposed task force missions. A TBM as well as an ABT is assumed. A standard task force of four Patriot batteries and four Hawk AFPs is used.
The ADA TF commander's intent is to identify and destroy enemy jammers, counter TBMs, and provide the maneuver force with protection from FW and RW attacks (see Figure 5-13). Tactical surprise and mobility are the keys to success. Hawk AFPs are positioned forward of Patriot units to cover dead space. Hawk is EMCON silent until required to radiate. Patriot provides an air picture to Hawk. Patriot is positioned to the rear of the corps sector to defend designated assets. Patriot PTLs for the two rear batteries are directed toward the TBM threat. The forward batteries cover the main ABT approach and provide acquisition and fires for the standoff jammer (SOJ) threat.
In Figure 5-14, the TF commander's intent is to provide a lodgment with protection from TBM and air attack. Clear definition of assets for TBM protection and area coverage by Hawk are the keys to success. Hawk AFPs are positioned to the flanks and rear of Patriot units to cover the out-of-sector area. Hawk is EMCON silent until directed to radiate. Patriot provides air picture to Hawk. Patriot is positioned behind the lodgment with respect to the TBM threat. PTLs for rear batteries are directed toward the TBM threat. Forward batteries provide protection against the main ABT avenues of approach.
In Figure 5-15, the TF commander's intent is to identify and destroy enemy jammers and provide the maneuver force with protection from air attacks. Mutual support and overlapping fires are key to success. Hawk AFPs are positioned forward of Patriot to counter the helicopter threat and to the flanks and rear to cover dead space. Hawk is EMCON silent until required to radiate. Patriot provides the air picture to Hawk. Patriot is positioned to the rear of the corps sector to defend designated assets. Patriot PTLs converge for maximum firepower over the defended area and to assist system capability against jammers.
The ability of a Patriot unit to function effectively on the battlefield depends on effective C3I. The following are definitions of each element.
Command is the authority that a commander exercises over his subordinates. It includes the authority and responsibility to use available resources to accomplish the assigned mission as well as to plan the employment and organization of the unit. It also includes the responsibility for the health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned soldiers.
Control is the authority, which may be less than full command, exercised by a commander over the tactical activities of a subordinate unit. Patriot's control chain sometimes functions separately from the command chain. For example, in USAREUR, theater HIMAD is controlled by the Air Force's central region rather than the brigade and Army AD command chain.
Communications are the key to effective C2. The two basic types of communications are voice and data. Communications are covered in detail in Appendix G of this manual, and also in FM 44-85-1(TBP).
Intelligence, in the context of C3I, involves the gathering and processing of target information and early warning. Some of this information is available via Patriot's data links, while some is passed by voice. This type of information directly affects engagement operations in that most of it is information about the identity and proximity of airborne targets. It allows Patriot units to identify friendly aircraft, helps identify hostile aircraft, provides early warning for enemy missile attacks, and aids in target selection and prioritization.
There are three types of Patriot C3I facilities: command post (CP), fire direction center (FDC), and tactical operations center (TOC).
The CP is the command and control center of the unit. The unit commander is normally located at or near the CP. CPs are maintained at both battery and battalion levels. The CP controls the unit ground defense control cell, battery Stinger teams, logistics functions, the administrative communications networks, and other unit operations activities.
The FDC is the air battle control facility for the Patriot battalion. It consists of the Patriot ICC and support equipment. FDC operations are controlled at the tactical level by tactical directors and their assistants who operate the ICC. The unit tactical communications nets are routed through the ICC for air battle control.
TOCs are located at all echelons which are authorized a staff. The battalion TOC is the operational control and planning center for the battalion. The TOC provides guidance to the subordinate unit commanders on employment, organization, and intelligence. In some situations, the TOC may be split into operations and logistics cells located in different areas. Normally, the S3 is in charge of the operations, planning, and intelligence cell. This cell also normally handles most Patriot system specific logistics requirements. The administrative and logistics cell, under the direction of the battalion executive officer, handles administrative and personnel matters, and most logistics functions and coordination (see Chapter 6).
The three cornerstones that form the basis for AD C2 are discussed in the next paragraphs. For a more complete discussion of C2, see FM 44-100.
Because of the complexity of force projection, air battle management must be centralized at the highest possible level to ensure synchronization of effort and combat power. However, the sheer volume of operations precludes an efficient response at the highest air battle management level. Execution at the lowest possible level ensures rapid and flexible response within the guidelines set by higher levels. Whenever friendly air forces maintain air superiority, Patriot units can expect the JFACC/AADC to exercise tight centralized control of Patriot firepower to preclude fratricide.
This is the control and coordination of both tactical air-to-air and surface-to-air defense resources. Close coordination is vital to the integrated AD activity due to the many systems and components of the defense. Mutual interference and fratricide must be prevented. There are two basic methods for air battle management. They are positive control and procedural control. Some combination of both methods is the most effective solution. The specific mix is determined by a number of factors. The nature and magnitude of enemy operations, and terrain and weather conditions will affect the balance of management. The availability, capability, reliability, and vulnerability of the management facilities, and the number, deployment, and characteristics of friendly airborne weapon systems impact on the management method choice. The electronic identification capabilities will determine the amount of positive management procedures used. The challenge for leaders of Patriot units is to understand how procedural control is implemented in their weapon system, and to be able to convert that understanding into permission to engage using procedural controls. As noted above, loss of air superiority, or failure to gain air superiority, will stress our ability to use positive control. Use of procedural control by Patriot units must not make bad situations worse by causing fratricide.
This is the case-by-case management of engagements. Rather than try to direct every engagement, air battle controllers will prevent prohibited engagements. This reduces the detail down to a manageable level at each level of control.
Remote launch (RL) use in defense design is a battalion-level decision due to the increases in logistics and security support. The battalion may now task-organize its FUs or design its defense to give one or more batteries additional remote launchers for TBM protection of remote assets.
Hardware and software improvements provide additional flexibility in defense design by allowing a TBM defense to protect more assets with a higher Pk.
An FU does not have to deploy on an asset (as in post deployment build [PDB 3]) to afford the greatest protection to the asset. Assets can be protected by an RL section or platoon.
Automatic emplacement enhancement (AEE) makes the emplacement of the Patriot system an automatic procedure, reducing the requirement to schedule use of survey crew equipment. It provides an all-weather, day and night emplacement capability. However, the survey crew, the M1 gunner's quadrant, and the M2 aiming circle must be retained by Patriot for the following circumstances: