| There is, however, some suggestion from India that rural private schools could help to raise low educational standards. Private-school teachers are only slightly less likely to be absent than public-school teachers in general, but are 8 percentage points less likely to be absent than public-school teachers in the same village. |
Challenges faced by policymakers – and possible solutions
Faced with high absence rates, policymakers have two challenges. (i) How can education and health policy be adapted to minimize the cost of absence? (ii) How can provider absence be reduced?
Policies in education and health should be designed to take into account high absence rates. For instance, to conserve on the permanently posted rural workers who are absent at such high rates, health policy might shift budgets toward activities that do not require doctors to be posted to remote areas. This could include immunization campaigns, pest control to limit infectious disease, health education, providing safe water, and providing periodic doctor visits rather than continuous service 3, 4.
The research results provide only tentative guidance on how to reduce absence. Conceptually, there seem to be three broad strategies for moving forward. The first would be to increase local control, for example by giving local institutions like school committees new powers to hire and fire teachers. However, the high absence rates among contract teachers and among teachers in community-controlled Indian schools suggest that this may not be enough.
The second approach would be to improve the existing civil service system. Some interventions, such as upgrading school and clinic infrastructure, would involve extra budget outlays. Others, such as increasing the frequency and bite of inspections, could be implemented using existing rules already on the books.
More politically difficult may be changes in incentive structures7, perhaps complemented with technical approaches allowing objective monitoring of attendance8.
The final approach would be to experiment more with systems in which parents choose among schools and public money follows the pupils.This choice could either be within the public system or could encompass private schools. A similar approach could be employed in health with money following patients as opposed to facilities.
But will there be pressure for any of these reforms? There is some evidence that surveys that monitor and publicize absence levels can focus policymakers' attention on the issue – even if the problem of absence is already well known to students and clinic patients.
In Bangladesh, for example, the Ministry of Health cracked down on absent doctors after newspaper reports highlighted the results of the health survey described in The Daily Star 9. Whether or not this type of one-time crackdown is effective, the problem of provider absence warrants further attention.
"Failures in “street-level” institutions and governance have received much less notice from development thinkers and policymakers than have weaknesses in macro institutions like democracy and high-level governance," said Rogers. "Yet for many people, one of the most important indicators of their country’s level of economic and social development is the quality of their day-to-day transactions with those delivering public services."
Nazmul Chaudhury is an Education Economist with the World Bank's South Asia Human Development Sector.
Jeffrey Hammer is a Lead Economist with the World Bank's South Asia Environment and Social Unit.
Michael Kremer is a Professor at Harvard University's Economics Department. His research interests include economic growth, education and development, and research incentives.
Karthik Muralidharan is a PhD student in economics at Harvard University.
Halsey Rogers is a Senior Economist in the Development Research Group. His current research focuses on understanding the quality and determinants of service delivery, particularly through exploration of the incentives for and behavior of teachers, doctors, and other service providers.
1 This methodology was similar to the one used in Jeffrey S. Hammer and Nazmul Chaudhury. 2004. "Ghost Doctors: Absenteeism in Bangladeshi Health Facilities." World Bank Economic Review 18: 423-441. Working paper version
Other recent work by World Bank researchers that measures teacher absence using similar approaches includes:
2 Chaudhury, Nazmul, Jeffrey S. Hammer, Michael Kremer, Karthik Muralidharan, and F. Halsey Rogers. "Missing in Action: Teacher and Health Worker Absence in Developing Countries." Journal of Economic Perspectives (forthcoming).
3 Filmer, Deon, Jeffrey S. Hammer, and Lant H. Pritchett. 2000. "Weak Links in the Chain: A Diagnosis of Health Policy in Poor Countries." World Bank Research Observer 15(2): 199-224.
4 Filmer, Deon, Jeffrey S. Hammer, and Lant H. Pritchett. 2002. "Weak Links in the Chain II: A Prescription for Health Policy in Poor Countries." World Bank Research Observer 17(1): 47-66.
5 Kremer, Michael, Karthik Muralidharan, Nazmul Chaudhury, Jeffrey S. Hammer, and F. Halsey Rogers. 2004. "Teacher Absence in India: A Snapshot." Journal of the European Economic Association 3:2-3.
6 Alcázar, Lorena, Chaudhury, Nazmul, Hammer, Jeffrey, Kremer, Michael, Muralidharan, Karthik, Rogers, Halsey. March, 2006 "Why are Teachers Absent? Probing Service Delivery in Peruvian Primary Schools".
7 Banerjee, Abhijit, and Esther Duflo. "Addressing Absence." Journal of Economic Perspectives (forthcoming).
8 Duflo, Esther and Rema Hanna. 2005. "Monitoring Works: Getting Children to Come to School." Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.
9 The Daily Star. 2003. "24 of 28 Docs Shunted Out for Absence: DG Health Surprised at Surprise Visit to NICVD." The Daily Star: Bangladesh.
Article by Halsey Rogers: More detailed version of this feature
More related papers: World Bank research project on absenteeism website.