This chapter presents the Departmentís detailed assessment of U.S., NATO and Pacific alliesí and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countriesí contributions in a broad range of responsibility sharing indicators. The purpose and utility of each indicator is explained, and important caveats and limitations are noted. Relevant statistics are summarized in the accompanying charts. The Annex provides further information on each of these indicators, as well as other related data.
Since allied nations differ widely in population, standards of living, and levels of economic development, it is not equitable to measure alliesí responsibility sharing efforts in purely absolute terms. The concept of equity is fundamental to assessing allied responsibility sharing because equitable distribution of effort among allies is essential to ensure continued support from allied governments and their publics. Domestic support, in turn, is necessary to sustain cohesive security relationships and defense alliances among nations.
Accordingly, any attempt to assess responsibility sharing must address a wide range of relevant indicators and factors, and should consider nationsí contributions to the common defense in terms of their ability to contribute and general trends in overall effort. The assessments presented in this chapter are therefore based upon the concept of fair shares. In most cases, they are calculated by measuring each nationís share of total allied contributions in a particular indicator relative to its share of either total allied Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or labor force (depending upon the indicator in question). Charts III-1A and III-1B provide a summary portrayal of nationsí responsibility sharing efforts based on a comparison of contributions vis-à-vis ability to contribute for selected key indicators.
The following assessments are based on the most recent, complete, and reliable data available. Notes on uses and sources of these figures, and a country-by-country summary of selected responsibility sharing statistics, can be found in the Annex, along with a compendium of supporting data.
Countries are also assessed according to the criteria originally specified by the FY 1997 Defense Authorization Act to provide continuity with last yearís Report. These assessments are provided in Annex F.
Responsibility Sharing Indicators
This chapter assesses alliesí contributions in responsibility sharing indicators that are grouped together in eight major categories, which are described briefly below. (Note that these are not listed in order of priority).
Defense spending is the most important single indicator of allied responsibility sharing efforts, since it offers the clearest evidence of allied nationsí willingness to commit resources to the common defense. Assessing defense spending relative to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) allows individual nationsí contributions to be judged in relation to their ability to contribute.
Chart III-2 depicts the wide variations in 2001 per capita GDP (a widely accepted indicator of prosperity and standard of living) among the nations addressed in this Report from slightly above $2,000 in Turkey to over $40,000 in Luxembourg. Given such great disparities in standards of living, "equitable" defense spending among nations may not necessarily mean that each nation should devote the same proportion of its national wealth to defense. That is, it may be fairer for nations with the strongest economies and wealthiest populations to carry a proportionately larger share of the burden of providing for the common defense.
Chart III-2 reveals that half of the countries addressed in this Report that spend above-average percentages of GDP on defense, have below-average per capita GDP: Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, Greece, and the Republic of Korea. In contrast, over half of those that have above-average standards of living spend below-average percentages of their GDP on defense: Luxembourg, Norway, Japan, and Denmark.
Chart III-3 depicts 1990-2001 defense spending trends for the United States, our NATO and Pacific allies, and our GCC partners. The chart shows that the United States experienced the steepest decline in defense spending over this period, while our NATO alliesí overall defense spending fell considerably, but much less sharply. From 2000 to 2001, United States and non-U.S. NATO defense spending all fell slightly while Pacific alliesí defense spending grew slightly. Except for the UAE, the GCC countriesí defense spending grew noting, however, that many of these countries experienced a significant decrease in 2000 from 1999. Refer to Table E-4 in the Annex for further information on defense spending trends.
Excluding the GCC countries, whose defense spending in 1990-1991 was seriously distorted by the Gulf War, combined real defense spending for all other nations addressed in this Report dropped by about 19 percent between 1990 and 2001, reflecting adjustments in the post-Cold War security environment. The largest declines in percentage terms during this period were experienced by Germany (-29 percent), Belgium (-29 percent), the UK (-28 percent), the U.S. (-25 percent), and Canada (-25 percent). In contrast, several nations achieved real increases in their defense budgets over this period Luxembourg (60 percent), the Republic of Korea (37 percent), Greece (36 percent), Turkey (28 percent), Japan (20 percent), and Portugal (6 percent).
A comparison of defense spending between 2000 and 2001 shows that fifteen countries achieved real defense spending growth. The biggest gains were posted by Saudi Arabia (51 percent), Oman (40 percent), Luxembourg (15 percent), Hungary (7 percent), Bahrain (6 percent), Qatar (5 percent), the Republic of Korea (4 percent), the Netherlands (4 percent), and Kuwait (4 percent). However, it should be noted that many of these countries experienced large declines in 2000 compared with 1999.Certain expenditures outside of defense budgets also promote shared security interests, and should be recognized such as Germanyís investments in the infrastructure of eastern Germany, and its financial support for economic and political reform in the new democracies of Central Europe. Nonetheless, it is essential that our allies maintain their defense budgets at appropriate levels, in order to ensure that they remain able to field effective military forces. In our discussions with allies and partners, the Department continues to urge sustained efforts in this area.
Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP
Defense spending relative to GDP combines the most comprehensive indicator of defense effort (defense spending) with the most comprehensive indicator of ability to contribute (GDP). As a result, it is the most widely used indicator of burdensharing efforts. However, this indicator should not be viewed in isolation from other national contributions to shared security objectives. Also, this measure does not take into account efforts that are not directly reflected in defense budgets, nor does it give credit to those countries that are able to make more effective use of their defense resources.Chart III-4 shows the percentage of GDP spent on defense by the United States and its allies in 2001. (Trend data since 1990 are found in the Annex in Table E-5). For 2001 and throughout the 1990s, the pattern has remained relatively constant: the GCC nations, along with Greece and Turkey, spent the highest percentages of GDP on defense, while Japan, and several of our NATO allies (Luxembourg, Canada, Spain, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway) spent the smallest proportions of GDP on defense.
The six GCC nations had the highest 2001 defense spending/GDP percentages of all the nations in this Report: Saudi Arabia (16.1 percent), Oman (12 percent), Qatar (8.8 percent), Kuwait (8.8 percent), Bahrain (5.8 percent) and the UAE (5.2 percent). All but Qatar and the UAE increased the percentage of GDP dedicated to defense in 2001. Two of them, Saudi Arabia, and Oman registered the greatest increases in this indicator (49 percent, and 34 percent, respectively) of all of the nations covered in this Report. However, we note that these countries also experienced large declines in 2000 compared with 1999.
Assessment of Defense Spending Contributions
The dashed vertical line on Chart III-4 depicts the average level of defense spending as a percentage of GDP for all the nations in this Report (2.4 percent). It therefore provides insight into the issue of equity among countriesí defense efforts, by allowing contributions to be compared with the average. The United Kingdom and those countries shown above it on the chart (i.e., France, the Republic of Korea, the United States, Greece, Turkey and the GCC countries) are doing above average in defense spending as a percentage of GDP. Conversely, the Czech Republic and those countries listed below it on this chart spent below average percentages of their GDP on defense. See Section C of the Annex for additional statistics relating countriesí contributions relative to their ability to contribute.
Nine nations were substantially (at least 20 percent) above average in this indicator. The United States was about 25 percent above average, while Greece, Turkey, and all of the GCC nations spent percentages of their GDP on defense that were at least twice the average. Ten nations were substantially (more than 20 percent) below average in this indicator, namely Hungary, Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Canada, Japan and Luxembourg (which spent less than one-third of the average). These assessments are summarized in Charts III-1A and III-1B.
Contributions to multinational peace operations are among the most significant indicators of allied responsibility sharing, particularly when these require the deployment of troops for extended periods. Such contributions have become increasingly important as peace operations have proliferated over the past decade. Within the past two years, U.S. or allied personnel have served in East Timor, Kosovo, Bosnia, Croatia, Cyprus, Lebanon, the Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula, Tajikistan, on the India-Pakistan and Iraq-Kuwait borders, and in Western Sahara, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Our assessment of personnel contributions includes participation in both UN and major non-UN multinational peace operations during the past year. However, since it has proven impractical to assemble complete and comparable data on funding for non-UN peace operations, financial contributions are assessed for UN operations only.
Allied funding contributions to UN peacekeeping missions increased dramatically in 2000 with the advent of new operations in East Timor and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and expansion of the operations in Sierra Leone and Kosovo. With the exceptions of Japan, Poland, Portugal and Qatar, every nation covered in this Report increased its contributions compared to 1999 in many cases by considerable proportions. The UAE increased its contributions by over 400 percent, Omanís rose by over 300 percent, and Germany, Luxembourg, Bahrain, France, and Denmark all registered increases in excess of 200 percent.
Chart III-5 shows that the United States contributed the largest single share of UN peace operations funding in 2000, over a third of the total. Adding Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, France, and Italy raises the figure to 87 percent of total contributions. However, it must be noted that these countries are all members of the ĎGroup of Sevení industrial nations that have the largest (and, in most cases, wealthiest) economies in the world.
There has been dramatic growth in allied personnel contributions to peace operations in recent years particularly for NATO-led operations. When NATOís Bosnia operation began in late 1995, all of the nations covered in this Report combined had over 7,000 peacekeepers serving worldwide. By the end of 2001, this figure had risen to nearly 60,000.
Chart III-6 reveals that the peace operations personnel burden is distributed far more widely than the burden of funding UN peace operations. The U.S. and the "Big Four" NATO countries (France, Italy, Germany, and the UK) combined account for about two-thirds of total personnel. However, it is particularly noteworthy that major contributions are made by less wealthy nations such as Greece, Turkey and Poland. The United States contributed about one-sixth of the whole.
Assessment of Contributions to Multinational Peace Operations
Chart III-7 compares each nationís share of total funding contributed to UN peace operations to its share of total GDP for 2000. On this basis, ten nations, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Denmark, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada, Norway, and Luxembourg contributed substantially (at least 20 percent) more than their fair share of peace operations funding. However, fifteen nations contributed substantially (at least 20 percent) less than their fair share: the Czech Republic, Spain, Greece, Japan, Poland, Turkey, the Republic of Korea, Hungary, Portugal, and all of the GCC nations.
Chart III-8 presents nationsí shares of total multinational peace operations personnel contributions relative to their shares of total labor force. Our NATO allies ranked highly in peace operations personnel contributions. Twelve nations (nearly half the total) contributed personnel shares that were substantially (at least 20 percent) greater than their labor force shares: Norway, Greece, Denmark, Italy, France, Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Hungary. Ten countries contributed substantially less than their fair share, including the U.S., the Czech Republic, the UAE, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the remaining five GCC nations. The UAE was the only GCC nation that contributed peace operations personnel in 2001. However, the Republic of Korea's peacekeeping contribution is expected to increase in 2002. These assessments are summarized in Charts III-1A and III-1B.
Maintaining and improving our capability, and that of our allies, to respond rapidly and multilaterally, both to conventional military aggression and to lesser threats that endanger common interests is a key element of U.S. security strategy. High readiness military units, suitable for deployment in multinational operations remote from national territory, are the practical manifestation of that capability.
NATO Reaction Forces
Of all the countries addressed in this Report, only our European allies maintain large contingents of deployable high readiness military units in the form of NATO Reaction Forces. In accordance with NATOís post-Cold War strategic concept, members continue to develop forces that can be rapidly transported to remote theaters of operation; function in an environment where there are limited or no established lines of communication and host nation support; and fight effectively in multinational formations at division and even corps level.
NATOís ground Reaction Forces are organized into the Immediate Reaction Force Land (IRF(L)) and Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). The IRF(L) is a brigade-sized unit of about 5,000 troops, but is to be expanded into a division-sized force that will be known as the Immediate Reaction Task Force Land (IRTF(L)). The ARRC can deploy a force of up to four divisions from a pool of ten national and multinational divisions. The United Kingdom provides the bulk of the ARRCís headquarters and corps troops, and contributes two divisions. Germany, Greece, Italy, Turkey, and the United States each provide a division, while the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, and Spain each contribute a brigade. Finally, the ARRC includes Multinational Division Central, which has Belgian, Dutch, German, and British brigades, and Multinational Division Southern, which includes Greek, Italian, and Turkish brigades.
NATO has four multinational naval Immediate Reaction Forces. Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) comprises six to ten destroyers and frigates. Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and the U.S. contribute one ship each on a full-time basis. Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, and Spain participate part-time. Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) is organized on similar lines, with ships from Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, the UK, and the United States. Mine Countermeasures Force Mediterranean (MCMFORMED) has four to six mine countermeasures vessels and a mine countermeasures command and support ship. Italy, Germany, Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom are full-time participants, and Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and the U.S. are part-time. Mine Countermeasures Force Northern (MCMFORNORTH) has a similar makeup, with Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK as permanent contributors, and Denmark, Norway, and Poland providing ships on a part-time basis.
NATO also maintains the Immediate and Rapid Reaction Forces (Air). The former comprise the air component of the ACE Mobile Force, whose land component is the IRF(L). Relatively little unclassified information is available on the composition of national contributions to NATOís Reaction Forces (Air).
Chart III-9 shows that the U.S. contributes the largest single share of NATO Reaction Forces - over a quarter of the total. The UK and Italy collectively provide roughly a quarter of total NATO Reaction Forces, while Germany, Spain, and Turkey also make notable contributions.
Other High Readiness Forces
Although France does not participate in NATOís integrated military command structure, it possesses large, modern high-readiness forces, and has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to contribute them to operations under NATO command. The naval component is represented by the Force díAction Navale (FAN), comprising an aircraft carrier, nine surface combatants, three amphibious ships, several nuclear attack submarines and replenishment auxiliaries. Until 1996, the all-professional Force díAction Rapide (FAR) formed theground component of the deployable forces, while the rest of the French Army was limited to homeland defense by political strictures against deploying conscripts abroad. However, in February 1996, President Jacques Chirac announced an end to conscription as part of a major restructuring of all three services. When this restructuring is complete, the French Army will have been transformed into a much more deployable, all-professional force. The new 136,000-strong force structure will be able to deploy 50,000 troops, whereas the former 238,000-strong force could deploy only 10,000.
Japan and the Republic of Korea have no counterparts to the deployable, high-readiness forces provided by NATO. This reflects the very different security situation in Northeast Asia, the bilateral character of our security relationships with the two countries, and the fact that U.S. responsibility sharing policy in this region places greater emphasis on cost sharing than on global military roles and missions. Nevertheless, Japan is assuming a larger role in regional affairs under the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, and the Republic of Korea has started to lay the foundation for a modernization program that will focus increasingly on capabilities with regional applications.
The United States encourages its GCC security partners to strengthen their provisions for collective defense of the Gulf region. At the end of December 2001, the six GCC nations signed a mutual defense agreement at a summit meeting in Manama, Bahrain, and announced their intention to expand the GCCís multinational Peninsula Shield Force (which is deployed in northeastern Saudi Arabia, near the Iraqi border) from its current strength of about 5,000 to at least 25,000 personnel. In late February 2001, the GCC states inaugurated the Cooperative Belt aircraft identification and tracking system, which comprises an interoperable regional air defense early warning and secure communications network.
Finally, it must be noted that the United States maintains substantial high readiness forces above and beyond its NATO Reaction Forces. Examples include the Ready Brigade of the Armyís 82nd Airborne Division, the Air Forceís Air Expeditionary Wings, the Navy task forces operating in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and the forward deployed, battalion-sized Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs). These forces are retained strictly under national command to meet our worldwide security commitments, and therefore do not count as NATO Reaction Forces. Furthermore, the United States has greater capabilities to deploy and sustain military forces than perhaps all the other nations in this Report combined, and has frequently been called upon to lend these capabilities in support of allied forces in contingency operations.
Assessment of NATO Reaction Forces Contributions Relative to GDP
Ground: Thirteen allied nations contributed shares of NATO ground Reaction Forces that were substantially larger than their shares of total NATO GDP: Greece, Hungary, Turkey, Poland, Portugal, Denmark, the Czech Republic, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Italy, and the Netherlands. Germany and Canada were the only allies that contributed Reaction Forces shares that were substantially smaller than their GDP shares, and the United States ranked last in this indicator. Greeceís and Hungaryís Reaction Forces shares were proportionally more than a dozen times larger than their GDP shares, and Turkeyís was over nine times greater.
Naval: Over half the nations assessed had naval Reaction Forces shares that were substantially larger than their shares of total Alliance GDP: Turkey, Greece, Denmark, Norway, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK, Spain and Italy. Germany and Portugal had naval Reaction Forces shares that were substantially smaller than their GDP shares. The landlocked NATO members (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Luxembourg) do not have naval Forces. The U.S. ranked last among all of the nations that maintain naval forces. Turkey and Greeceís Reaction Forces shares were proportionally more than eight times larger than their GDP shares.
Air: Eight allied nations contributed shares of NATO Reaction Forces aircraft that were substantially larger than their shares of total NATO GDP: Hungary, Turkey, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Belgium, the UK and Italy. Five allies contributed Reaction Forces aircraft shares that were substantially smaller than their shares of total Alliance GDP: Norway, Denmark, the Czech Republic, Germany, and Canada. Luxembourg has no Air Force. The United Statesí air Reaction Forces contribution was roughly in balance with its share of total GDP. Hungaryís Reaction Forces shares were proportionally more than three times larger than its GDP shares.
Assessment of NATO Reaction Forces Contributions Relative to NATO-Committed Forces
In many cases, NATO alliesí Reaction Forces are the only readily deployable formations in force structures that include large numbers of non-deployable, low-readiness units suitable only for operations in close proximity to home territory. Given the importance of the ability to deploy troops and equipment rapidly, NATO is encouraging its member nations to increase the deployable proportion of their force structures. Chart III-10D offers insight into the proportion of allied force structures that are currently deployable by depicting each nationís share of NATO Reaction Forces relative to its share of total NATO-committed forces.
Eight allied nations contributed Reaction Forces shares that were substantially larger than their shares of total NATO-committed forces: Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Belgium, Hungary and Luxembourg. Conversely, seven nationsí Reaction Forces shares were substantially smaller than their shares of total NATO-committed Forces: Denmark, Greece, Germany, Turkey, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Norway. However, it should be noted that while most NATO members commit nearly their entire armed forces to the Alliance, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the United States all retain significant military forces under national command. These nations accordingly rank higher, in comparison to others, than they would if the formations under national command were committed to NATO.
Unlike the preceding section, which addressed the critical subset of allied military forces that is specifically intended for employment in multinational military operations, this section and the next focus on nationsí total active-duty military personnel and forces. A nationís total contributions of active-duty military personnel and forces can provide an indication of its commitment to collective security, and should be assessed for reasons of completeness. A nationís ability to contribute is determined by the size of its labor force. It should be noted that the active-duty military personnel assessment does not address qualitative factors (e.g., training, doctrine, leadership) that influence military capability.
Chart III-11 shows active-duty military personnel as a percentage of labor force from 1990 to 2001. During this period, the U.S. percentage has experienced a slow but steady decline that was somewhat steeper than the decrease among our NATO allies. Following the Gulf War, the GCC countries as a group achieved a notable increase in this indicator through 1995. And, although it recently dropped somewhat from the 1995 peak, the percentage grew again in 2000 before falling slightly in 2001. Japan and the Republic of Korea combined have roughly the same percentage of their labor force on active-duty (one percent) as the U.S., but the combined Japanese and Korean level has remained fairly constant over the course of the past decade while the U.S. percentage has declined.
Assessment of Active-Duty Military Personnel Contributions
Chart III-12 depicts the percentage of its labor force that each nation had in active-duty military service during 2001. Twelve countries had above average percentages: Qatar, Oman, Greece, the UAE, Turkey, Bahrain, the Republic of Korea, Italy, Saudi Arabia, France, Portugal and Norway. However, eight allies had substantially below average percentages, including Denmark, Spain, the United Kingdom, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Canada and Japan ranked even lower, with percentages of labor force in active military service less than half the average. These assessments are summarized in Charts III-1A and III-1B.
Standing military forces represent an important contribution to shared security objectives, but there is no single, comprehensive indicator that reflects all of the factors that determine military capability. Accordingly, this section is intended to provide an overview of each countryís force contributions using a few widely accepted measures. Country efforts in this area are summarized in Charts III-1A and III-1B.
Ground Combat Capability
Nationsí ground combat capabilities are measured according to the quantity and quality of their major weapon systems, drawing on static indicators that are widely used within the DoD and NATO. This approach provides more insight into combat potential than do simple tallies of combat units and weapons, although it does not consider factors such as manning, ammunition stocks, logistical support, communications, training, leadership, and morale. At this time, there is no generally accepted static measure of ground combat capability that incorporates these factors.
The largest contributors to aggregate ground capability are shown in Chart III-13. The United States provides by far the largest share of ground combat capability of any nation in this Report, followed by the Republic of Korea, Germany, Turkey, Greece, and Poland. However, it should be noted that this assessment credits allies for their entire inventories of attack helicopters, artillery, and tanks, although many of these are in reserve formations that could take as long as a year to achieve full combat readiness.
Chart III-14 compares nationsí ground combat capability contributions with their ability to contribute. In 2001, thirteen countries contributed substantially (at least 20 percent) more than their fair shares, including all the GCC countries, Turkey, Greece, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Korea, Poland, Hungary, and Denmark. There are also eight nations that contributed ground combat capability shares that were substantially less than their fair shares: Spain, France, the UK, Belgium, Italy, Japan, Canada and Luxembourg. The United Statesí contribution was roughly in balance with its share of total GDP.
Naval Force Tonnage
Tonnage is a static measure of aggregate fleet size that provides a more meaningful basis for comparison than do simple tallies of ships. The use of tonnage alone, however, does not give an indication of the number, effectiveness, or reliability of the weapons aboard the ships. It also does not assess the less tangible ingredients of combat effectiveness, such as training and morale. Consequently, tonnage data should be taken as only a rough indicator of naval potential.
Chart III-15 shows the nations with the largest shares of aggregate fleet tonnage (excluding strategic missile submarines) for 2001. The United States has by far the single largest share of fleet tonnage with 61 percent of the total tonnage of all countries in this Report combined. The next largest tonnage shares are those of the United Kingdom, Japan, France, Spain, and Italy.
Chart III-16 depicts national shares of total fleet tonnage relative to GDP shares. In 2001, eight countries contributed shares of naval force tonnage that were substantially (at least 20 percent) greater than their GDP shares, including Turkey, Greece, Bahrain, the UK, the United States, Portugal, Oman and the Republic of Korea. Conversely, eleven nations contributed naval tonnage shares that were substantially smaller than their GDP shares, including Denmark, Saudi Arabia, Norway, Canada, Italy, Qatar, the UAE, Germany, Japan, Belgium, and Kuwait. The three landlocked allies Luxembourg, Hungary, and the Czech Republic of course contributed none at all. These assessments are summarized in Charts III-1A and III-1B.
Combat Aircraft Capability
Nationsí combat aircraft capabilities are measured according to the quantity and quality of their major weapon systems, drawing on static indicators that are widely used within the DoD and NATO. This approach provides more insight into combat potential than do simple tallies of combat aircraft, although it does not consider such factors as manning, ammunition stocks, logistical support, communications, training, leadership, and morale. At this time, there is no generally accepted static measure of combat aircraft capability that incorporates these factors.
Chart III-17 depicts the distribution of tactical combat aircraft capability among nations addressed in this Report (including air force, naval, and marine assets). The United States possesses approximately 50 percent of all combat aircraft capability, followed by Turkey, France, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, and Germany.
Chart III-18 depicts national shares of the total combat aircraft capability in relation to GDP shares. In 2001, half of the countries in this Report contributed shares of combat aircraft capability that were substantially (at least 20 percent) greater than their GDP shares. Turkey and Bahrain both made contributions that were, respectively, more than nine and ten times greater than their GDP shares. The contributions made by Saudi Arabia and Greece were over four and seven times greater. Other nations that made substantial contributions were Kuwait, the Republic of Korea, the Czech Republic, Poland, the UAE, Oman, Qatar, Belgium, and Hungary. In contrast, six nations (Spain, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, Canada, and Japan) had combat aircraft capability shares that were substantially less than their GDP shares. Luxembourg made no contributions, as it does not have an Air Force, although it does have pilots serving in the Belgian Air Force. The United Statesí contribution was roughly in balance with its share of total GDP. These assessments are summarized in Charts III-1A and III-1B.
Military Transport Aircraft Capacity
Military transport aircraft capacity (i.e., total maximum payload computed in short tons) is an effective measure of the deployability of nationsí military forces. As with the other force indicators previously discussed, transport aircraft capacity does not consider qualitative factors that can greatly impact transport effectiveness, such as the ability to carry outsize cargo and provide inter-theater (strategic) airlift. For example only the United States and the United Kingdom possess military transport aircraft capable of transporting outsize cargo.
Chart III-19 depicts the distribution of transport aircraft capacity among nations addressed in this Report (including air force, army, naval, and marine assets). The United States possesses 77 percent of total military transport aircraft capacity, followed by the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Turkey, and Italy.
Chart III-20 depicts national shares of the total military transport aircraft capacity in relation to GDP shares. In 2001, only six of the countries in this Report (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Oman, the United States, Greece, and the UAE) contributed shares of transport aircraft capacity that were equal to or greater than their GDP shares. Of the six, four (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the United States) contributed military transport aircraft shares that were substantially greater than their GDP Shares. Turkeyís military transport aircraft share was the largest at more than three times greater than its GDP share. In contrast, sixteen nations (the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Belgium, Portugal, Italy, Spain, the Republic of Korea, Germany, Norway, Poland, the Netherlands, Hungary, Denmark, and Japan) had transport aircraft shares that were substantially less than their GDP shares. Qatar and Bahrain have no military transport aircraft (though they do have government-owned airliners that operate in civilian markings). These assessments are summarized in Charts III-1A and III-1B.
Tanker aircraft tallies are another effective indicator of the deployability of nationsí military forces. As with the other force indicators previously discussed, tanker aircraft tallies do not consider qualitative factors. Such factors include fuel offload capacity and types of refueling equipment (i.e., boom or drogue), which impact the types of aircraft that can be refueled.
Chart III-21 depicts the distribution of tanker aircraft among nations addressed in this Report (including air force, army, naval, and marine assets). The United States possesses approximately 88 percent of tanker aircraft, followed by the United Kingdom, France, Saudi Arabia, and Italy.
Chart III-22 depicts national shares of the total tanker aircraft inventory in relation to GDP shares. In 2001, only nine countries contributed tanker aircraft. Only three (Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Turkey) contributed shares of tanker aircraft that were greater than their GDP shares. All three countries contributed shares that were substantially greater than their GDP shares, with Saudi Arabia contributing almost three times more than its GDP share. The remaining six countries with tanker aircraft (United Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy, Canada, and the Netherlands) had shares that were substantially less than their GDP shares. These assessments are summarized in Charts III-1A and III-1B.
The events of the past decade, from the 1991 Gulf War to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, have demonstrated that new and enhanced military capabilities are needed to meet current and future challenges. The highest priority capability requirements include precision attack, C3I (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), strategic mobility and sustainability, theater missile defense, NBC force protection, and SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses). These requirements are particularly pressing for our NATO allies, who as the 1999 Kosovo air campaign revealed currently depend upon the United States to provide the lionís share of total Alliance capability in these areas. The Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), which was launched in 1999, is intended primarily to close the gaps that exist between the United States and the rest of NATO in five categories of military capability: deployability and mobility; sustainability and logistics; consultation, command and control (C3); effective engagement; and survivability of forces and infrastructure.
Due to the scarcity of reliable data, and limitations on the length of this Report, it proved impractical to track progress in each of these categories separately. Instead, this section presents a more general assessment of countriesí defense modernization performance by analyzing the percentage of national defense spending that is devoted to major equipment procurement and research and development. Furthermore, since complete and fully comparable defense budget data was readily available only for the NATO nations, the defense modernization efforts of our Pacific allies and the GCC nations were not assessed.
Assessment of NATO Defense Modernization Spending
Chart III-23 depicts the percentage of 2001 defense spending that each NATO ally devoted to major equipment procurement and research and development. Four NATO nations spent above-average percentages of their defense budgets on modernization. Turkey, which has by far the lowest per-capita GDP in the Alliance (just $2,106 in 2001), ranked first, followed by the United Kingdom, the U.S. and Norway. The Czech Republic, which has the third smallest GDP and the fourth smallest per-capita GDP in the Alliance, fell slightly below the NATO average but ranked fifth at 21 percent.
In addition to the Czech Republic, thirteen other nationsí percentages were below the NATO average. These included less wealthy members, such as Portugal, Poland, Hungary, and Greece. Wealthier allies like Italy, Germany, Spain, Denmark, Canada, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and France also ranked below-average. Belgium, which has the ninth highest per capita GDP in NATO, ranked last with a defense modernization spending percentage that was less than a quarter of the 22.9 percent NATO average.
Nine of our NATO allies increased their modernization spending percentages in 2001, and as a group, the average non-U.S. NATO percentage of defense spending devoted to modernization increased by 2.8 percent compared to 2000. Four allies registered particularly significant increases: Luxembourg (250 percent), Turkey (30 percent), Norway (19 percent) and Canada (10 percent). Despite this positive trend, it is clear that NATO must intensify its defense modernization efforts. Some gains can be achieved through reductions in force structure and operations and maintenance (O&M) costs, but most allies will have to increase their levels of defense spending in order to field effective and interoperable forces. In our discussions with allies and partners, the Department continues to urge sustained efforts in this area.
The most familiar form of cost sharing is bilateral cost sharing between the United States and an ally or partner nation that either hosts U.S. troops and/or prepositioned equipment, or plans to do so in time of crisis. The Department of Defense distinguishes between two different types of bilateral cost sharing: the direct payment of certain U.S. stationing costs by the host nation (i.e., on-budget host country expenditures), and indirect cost deferrals or waivers of taxes, fees, rents, and other charges (i.e., off-budget, forgone revenues).
Cost Sharing Contributions
As shown in Chart III-24, in 2000 (the most recent year for which data are available) the United States received direct and indirect cost sharing assistance from our NATO, Pacific, and GCC allies estimated at about $8.1 billion.
Cost sharing has been a particularly prominent aspect of our bilateral defense relationships with Japan and the Republic of Korea. As Chart III-24 shows, Japan provides a greater level of direct cost sharing ($3.9 billion) than we receive from any other ally. Japanís emphasis on direct cost sharing reflects constitutional provisions and other factors that limit the scope of activities of Japanís own armed forces. Refer to Chapter II for additional details on Japanese cost sharing.
The Republic of Korea first agreed to contribute the Combined Defense Improvement Projects (CDIP) construction program in 1979 which marked the beginning of our present cost sharing relationship. In 1988, it agreed to a CDIP program funded at $40 million a year. Since that time, annual cost sharing negotiations have brought a gradual increase in ROK contributions. During 2000, it provided nearly $433 million in direct cost sharing and over $363 million in additional indirect cost sharing. Further information on U.S.-ROK cost sharing is presented in Chapter II.
Bilateral cost sharing by our GCC security partners during 2000 included over $372 million paid or pledged by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, the UAE, and Qatar to offset U.S. incremental costs in the Persian Gulf region. Kuwait and Qatar both host a prepositioned U.S. Army heavy brigade equipment set, and share the land use, maintenance, and operating costs for U.S. forces stationed or exercising on their territory.
NATO countries have long provided substantial indirect support for U.S. forces stationed on their territory. Our allies provide bases and facilities rent-free, various tax exemptions, and reduced-cost services. NATO allies with the largest cost sharing contributions to the United States in 2000 were Germany ($1.2 billion) and Italy ($364 million).
In addition to bilateral cost sharing, our NATO allies also provide multilateral cost sharing, through common- and jointly-funded budgets. These include the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP); the NATO Military Budget for the operations and maintenance (O&M) of NATO Military Headquarters, agencies, and common-use facilities; and the NATO Civil Budget for the O&M of NATO Headquarters and several non-military programs including civil preparedness. See Chart III-26 at the conclusion of this section for additional detail.
Assessment of Cost Sharing Contributions
In assessing cost sharing contributions, consideration needs to be given to the differences in the nature of our security relationships with various allies and partners. For instance, our European allies have no tradition of providing the kind of direct cash and in-kind support provided by Japan and the Republic of Korea, since NATO has for many years concentrated on strengthening participation in the military roles and missions of the Alliance. In contrast, due to the different security situation in the Pacific, and the unique defense capabilities of Japan and the Republic of Korea, our responsibility sharing policy in this region has emphasized cost sharing rather than global military roles and missions.
Chart III-25 shows the nations with the greatest U.S. cost offset percentages for 2000. Saudi Arabia leads all nations in covering 80 percent of costs associated with the stationing of U.S. forces, with Japan close behind at 79 percent. Kuwait, Qatar, the Republic of Korea, Oman, Italy, and Germany all offset over 20 percent of U.S. stationing costs. The Republic of Korea recently concluded a multi-year cost sharing agreement, which puts it on track to paying approximately 50% of non-personnel stationing costs by 2004. Nine other NATO allies collectively offset 22 percent of U.S. stationing costs. A cost offset percentage cannot be given for the UAE due to the lack of complete information regarding U.S. stationing costs there.
Foreign assistance plays a prominent role in nationsí overall responsibility sharing efforts. Although economic aid does not directly increase U.S. and allied defense capabilities, it makes an important contribution to global peace and stability. For many years, most industrialized NATO countries and Japan have extended various types of assistance to developing countries. In addition, and of special significance in the post-Cold War era, NATO nations, Japan, and the Republic of Korea also provide assistance to the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, and the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Developmentís (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) encourages commitments of international aid, coordinated aid policies, and consistent aid reporting. The DACís definition of Official Development Assistance (ODA) is recognized as the international standard for reporting aid provided to developing countries and multilateral institutions. Aid to 12 of the 22 emerging economies of Central Europe (including the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) and the NIS does not qualify as Official Development Assistance for OECD purposes, but instead is categorized as Official Aid (OA). Both categories, ODA and OA, cover identical types of assistance, with the only difference being the recipient nations. Total foreign assistance evaluated in this Report is the sum of all ODA and OA.
Foreign assistance is comprised of both bilateral aid, assistance given by one nation directly to another, and multilateral aid, assistance given by a nation to an international development bank (e.g., the World Bank) or other multinational agency (e.g., the European Commission) that is pooled with other contributions and then disbursed. Multilateral assistance traditionally focuses on projects and programs with longer term objectives beyond providing immediate liquidity (e.g., human resources development, technical assistance, financial infrastructure improvement, and poverty reduction).
Foreign Assistance Contributions
As shown in Chart III-27, disbursements of foreign assistance by the nations included in this Report exceeded $57 billion in 2000 (the latest year for which reliable data are available). Our allies and partners provided over $44 billion while the United States provided nearly $13 billion. This aid reflects a commitment to promote democratization, government accountability and transparency, economic stabilization and development, defense economic conversion, respect for the rule of law and internationally recognized human rights, and to provide humanitarian relief. Total foreign aid in 2000 represented nearly one quarter (0.24 percent) of the combined GDPs of all the nations in this Report a minor decrease over the 0.25 percent of total GDP reported for 1999.
Chart III-27 also shows that, as in the recent past, the four nations with the largest foreign assistance contributions (in absolute terms) in 2000 were Japan, the United States, France, and Germany. At the other end of the spectrum are those nations that contribute modest amounts of foreign aid, although this may be justified in the case of countries with relatively low standards of living (e.g., Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Poland, and the Czech Republic).
National and aggregated foreign assistance data is presented in the Annex, Table E-13.
Assessment of Foreign Assistance Contributions
Chart III-28 depicts each nationís average foreign assistance contributions as a percentage of its average GDP for the period 1998-2000. In an effort to better reflect real trends in foreign assistance, the Department assessed these contributions based on a three-year average. The use of a multi-year average lessens the effects of excessive year-to-year volatility in the size and timing of aid contributions. For example, the United Kingdomís foreign assistance as a percentage of GDP rose from 0.26 percent in 1999 to 0.36 percent in 2000. This was the result of multilateral contributions being delayed sufficiently that they were included in the 2000 aid totals instead of the 1999 totals.
Over the period 1998-2000, the average percentage of GDP spent on foreign assistance by all nations in this Report was 0.25 percent. Judged on this basis, twelve of the countries addressed in this Report contributed above average percentages of their GDP as foreign assistance. The highest donors were Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Kuwait, and Luxembourg (the only nations that met or came close to the UN assistance target of 0.7 percent of GDP). The United States ranks fifth from last among all the nations in this Report that are net donors of foreign assistance, ahead of Turkey, the Republic of Korea, the Czech Republic, and Poland. Qatar, Oman, Hungary, and Bahrain are net recipients of foreign assistance. These assessments are summarized in Charts III-1A and III-1B.
As stated in previous yearsí Reports, the Department believes that our alliesí and key security partnersí efforts present a mixed, but generally positive picture in terms of shouldering responsibility for protecting shared security interests. As noted throughout this Report, there is no one set formula or strategy for increasing allied contributions to collective security that is appropriate for all allied nations. The United States will continue to encourage our allies and partners to assume a greater share of the burden of providing for the common defense using approaches tailored to the circumstances of particular nations or groups of nations.
The NATO allies demonstrated their commitment to collective security by invoking Article V of the Washington Treaty within a day of the September 11th terror attacks, and speedily implementing all eight measures sought by the United States to support the War on Terrorism. Several Alliance members also contributed substantial military forces to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM on a bilateral basis, and are now assuming most of the burden of peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan. Our European allies are pursuing various efforts to develop capabilities that will enable them to take on a larger share of the burden of defending common interests. NATOís Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) aims to transform the Allianceís military forces by enhancing deployability and mobility; sustainability and logistics; consultation, command and control (C3); effective engagement; and survivability of forces and infrastructure. The United States also encourages the EUís ongoing development of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), and its 2003 "Headline Goal" of being able to deploy a force of 50-60,000 troops within 60 days, and be able to sustain it for up to one year.
The responsibility sharing efforts of our non-NATO allies and security partners also present a generally positive picture. The members of the GCC continue to provide noteworthy host nation support, and maintain unusually high levels of defense spending particularly considering their relatively low average per-capita GDP.
As a front line ally that lives under constant threat of invasion and infiltration, the Republic of Korea contributes to shared security objectives primarily by maintaining large, capable armed forces against the North Korean threat. The ROK Army, for example, accounts for about a tenth of the total ground combat capability contributed by all the nations covered in this Report. The ROK has also supplied the bulk of the funding for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), and thereby made a vital contribution to holding North Koreaís nuclear program in check. Japan provides the second highest level of cost sharing for forward-based U.S. forces, and contributed more funding than any other country (including the United States) to foreign assistance in 2000 (the latest year for which complete data is available).
The War on Terrorism, contingency operations arising from regional conflicts, ethnic strife, and humanitarian disasters will continue to challenge U.S. and allied budgets and armed forces. The Department believes that the nations addressed in this Report have developed a heightened awareness of these challenges, and thus recognize the importance of continuing to increase their efforts to share the roles, risks, and responsibilities of defending shared security interests. The Department is committed to continuing its efforts to convince allied and partner nations to maintain and increase their responsibility sharing contributions.
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