for Degrees of Belief
. (penultimate draft
We often evaluate belief-forming
processes, agents, or entire belief states for reliability.
This is normally done with the assumption that beliefs are
all-or-nothing. How does such evaluation go when we're
considering beliefs that come in degrees? I argue that a
natural answer to this question is incorrect, and propose in
its place an alternative answer that is based on the notion of
Defence of Epistemic Consequentialism
", Philosophical Quarterly,
Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij). (penultimate
maintain that the epistemically right (e.g. the justified) is to be
understood in terms of conduciveness to the epistemic good (e.g. true belief).
In a recent paper, Selim Berker has provided arguments that
allegedly lead to a ‘rejection’ of epistemic consequentialism.
In the present paper we show that reliabilism—the most
prominent form of epistemic consequentialism, and one of
Berker's main targets—survives Berker’s arguments unscathed.
51 (3): 203-213. (penultimate draft
Can a proposition that you infer
be evidence for you? Williamson's E=K thesis says that it can.
However, I show that the standard Bayesian framework is
inconsistent with such inferential evidence. Since Williamson
adopts this framework, this reveals an inconsistency in his
view. I conclude by considering the wider ramifications of
this inconsistency and note two ways one might respond.
Worlds and Moral Evaluation
", Ethics & Information Technology,
255-265. (penultimate draft
Consider the multi-user virtual
worlds of online games such as EVE and World
of Warcraft, or the multi-user virtual world of Second Life. Suppose a
player performs an action in one of these worlds, via his or
her virtual character, which would be wrong, if the virtual
world were real. What is the moral status of this virtual
action? In this paper I consider this question.
Holistic or Simple
9: 225-233. (penultimate draft
In "What Is Justified Belief?"
Alvin Goldman proposed a simple form of reliabilism about
justification. In Epistemology
and Cognition, Goldman offered a more complicated
version of reliabilism, which he has endorsed as superior to
the simple version. In this paper I clarify both versions of
reliabilism, and argue that the simpler model is preferable.