CHATTISGARH RURAL AGRICULTURE EXTENSION OFFICERS ASSON Vs. STATE OF M.P. AND ORS.
V.N. KHARE, CJ , S.B. SINHA , S.H. KAPADIA
2004 AIR 2020, 2004(3 )SCR821 , 2004(4 )SCC646 , 2004(4 )SCALE260 , 2004(4 )JT446
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. It is trite that the Pay Commission in the years 1982 and in 1999
desired and recommended that the same scale of pay be given to the
Extension Officers irrespective of their educational qualification, but it
is not in dispute that the recommendations of the Pay Commission were not
accepted by the State. Although the Pay Commission is considered to be an
expert body, the State in its wisdom and in furtherance of a valid policy
decision may or may not accept its recommendation. The State in exercise of
its jurisdiction conferred upon it by the proviso appended to Article 309
of the Constitution of India can unilaterally make or amend the conditions
of service of its employees by framing appropriate rules. The State in
terms of the said provision is also entitled to give a retrospective effect
thereto. A policy decision had been adopted by the State that the post of
Extension Officer shall be filled up only by graduates. Such a policy
decision ex facie cannot be termed to be arbitrary or irrational attracting
the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. A dying scale was
provided by the State for the non-graduates. Fresh recruitments were to be
made only from amongst the persons who held he requisite educational
qualification. With a view to avoid any discrimination between the new
recruits and the serving employees who possessed the same qualification,
the State cannot be said to have acted illegally in granting a higher scale
of pay also for the existing degree holders. It may be that when
recommendations are made by a Pay Commission, evaluation of job must be
held to have been made but the same by itself may not be a ground to
enforce the recommendations by issuing a writ of or in the nature of
mandamus although the State did not accept the same in toto and made rules
to the contrary by evolving a policy decision which cannot be said to be
arbitrary or discriminatory.
[827-C; 828-D-F; 832-G-H; 833-A]
2. Article 14 forbids class legislation but permits reasonable
classification subject to the conditions that it is based on an
intelligible differentia and that the differentia must have a rational
relation to the object sought to be achieved. [828-G-H]
Saurabh Chaudri and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (2003) 9 SCALE 272,
Lachhman Dass v. State of Punjab and Ors., AIR (1963) SC 222, referred to.
3. Despite the fact that the employees have been performing similar duties
and functions and their posts are interchangeable, a valid classification
can be made on the basis of their educational qualification.
State of Mysore v. P. Narasinga Rao, AIR (1968) SC 349, followed.
Mewa Ram Kanojia v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences and Ors.,
 2 SCC 235; Shyam Babu Verma and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(1994) 2 SCC 521; V. Markendeya and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and
Ors.,  3 SCC 191 and Government of West Bengal v. Tarun K. Roy and
Ors., JT (2003) 9 SC 130, relied on.
Col. A.S. Iyer and Ors. v. V. Balasubramanyam and Ors.,  1 SCC 634;
State of Mysore v. B. Basavalingappa,  Supp. SCC 661; State of Madhya
Pradesh and Anr. v. Pramod Bhartiya and Ors.,  1 SCC 539,
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3134 of 1999.
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.4.98 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
in M.P. No. 1550 of 1998.
Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Prakash Shrivastava, A.P. Dhamija and P.P. Singh for the
Ms. Geetanjali Mohan for State of Chhatisgarhi. Sakesh Kumar and S.K.
Agnihotri for the Respondent.
Constitution of India, 1950-Article 14-Doctrine of equal pay for equal
work-Sanction of different pay scales to employees belonging to the same
cadre on the basis of educational qualification-Pay Commission recommended
equal pay scale as the nature of their work was similar-Recommendation not
accepted by State and two scales of pay granted- Order challenged as
discriminatory-Relief to the aggrieved employees denied by Court below- On
appeal, held: A valid classification can be made on the basis of
educational qualification despite the fact that employees have been
performing similar duties-The policy decision of the State ex facie cannot
be termed to be arbitrary or irrational.
Employees-members of the appellant Association, whose educational
qualification was matriculation were initially appointed as Village Level
Workers. Their services being subsequently transferred to Agriculture
Department of State, their designation was changed to Rural Agriculture
Extension Officer. State Government decided to fill up the post only by
graduates and by reason of provisions of Madhya Pradesh Revision of Pay
Rules, 1983 prescribed two different pay scales for non-graduates (Dying
scale) and higher scale for fresh recruits and existing graduates.
Appellants challenging the decision of the State, filed Writ Petition
before High Court, which was transferred to State Administrative Tribunal
after its constitution. Tribunal despite holding that it was a case of
hostile discrimination, did not grant any relief to the appellants holding
that the same had to be dealt with by Pay Commission. Writ petition against
the order of the Tribunal was dismissed by High Court.
In appeal to this Court appellant contended that sanction of different pay
scale to the employees of same cadre, on the basis of educational
qualification was impermissible as their posts were interchangeable, were
carrying out same work and had undergone same training; that State should
have accepted the recommendations of Pay Commission made in 1982 and 1999
for grant of scale of pay to all the officers irrespective of their
educational qualification; that doctrine of classification should not be
stretched too far and the same cannot be a basis for justifying an
arbitrary action of State; and that Tribunal wrongly refused to grant any
relief despite holding that State committed hostile discrimination.
Appeal (civil) 3134 of 1999
CHATTISGARH RURAL AGRICULTURE EXTENSION OFFICERS ASSON
STATE OF M.P. AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/04/2004
V.N. KHARE, CJ & S.B. SINHA & S.H. KAPADIA
2004(3) SCR 821
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J. Applicability of doctrine of 'equal pay for equal work' is
involved in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated
13.4.1998 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Writ
Petition No. 1550 of 1998.
The appellant herein is an Association of Rural Agriculture Extension
Officers (hereinafter referred to as 'the Extension Officers'). They were
originally appointed as Village Level Workers. They are matriculates. The
services of the Village Level Workers were transferred to the agriculture
department of the State. It framed rules in the year 1972. On or about
9.4.1981, the designation of the Village Level Workers was changed to the
Rural Agriculture Extension Officer by the State Government. The State of
Madhya Pradesh in exercise of the power conferred upon it under the Proviso
appended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India made rules known as
'Madhya Pradesh Revision of Pay Rules, 1983'. Rule 3 of the said Rules
reads as under :
"3. Revised Scale of Pay.- The revised scale of pay applicable to any post
carrying existing scale shown in columns 2 and 3 of Annexures Iand II
respectively shall be the corresponding pay-scale shown in column 4 thereof
in respect of that post."
By reason of the provisions of the said Rules, two different scales of pay
were prescribed, namely, Rs. 575-880 for non-graduates (Dying scale) and
Rs. 635-950 for fresh recruitment and for existing B.Sc./B.Sc. Agriculture.
By reason of an executive instruction dated 2/5.3.1984, the decision of the
State Government was communicated to the Director, Agriculture, the
relevant portion whereof is to the following effect:
"Essential educational qualification for the post of Rural Agricultural
Extension Officer being graduation (for all departments) be fixed and all
the graduates so employed be paid by the pay-scale of Rs.635-950. All those
graduate employees who were working to the posts in all departments prior
to 1.4.81 should be paid given a salary at the rate of Rs. 635-950.
2 ******* 2 *******
This sanction endorsement vide notification No.5/385/84/Dept.I/ Four dated
3.3.84 had been endorsed in the records of the Accountant General's
Yet again by an amendment to the rule by a notification dated 5.9.1984 in
sub-clause (2) in Part B of the said Rules the words "for new recruitments
and for the qualification B.Sc./B.Sc. (Agri.) pass" were replaced by the
words "for new recruitments and for graduates holding the degree". The
appellant herein filed a writ petition before the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh at Jabalpur praying, inter alia, for the following reliefs
"(b) That the pay scale of Rural Agriculture Extension Officers be given in
accordance with the ratio given in AIR 1984 Supreme Court 1221 and it
should be enhanced with the cadres stated in the above paras by giving them
maximum pay scale, as has been given to any one of those cadres."
On constitution of the Madhya Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal in the
year 1988, however, the said writ petition was transferred thereto. The
Tribunal gave several opportunities to the respondents herein to file a
return but despite its failure to do so and despite holding that a clear
case of hostile discrimination has been made out in view of the decision of
this Court in Union of India and Anr v. P. V. Hariharan and Anr.,  3
SCC 568] = JT (1997) SC 569 held that the grievances of the applicant
regarding pay scale had to be dealt with by the Pay Commission. A writ
petition filed thereagainst before the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh
High Court by the appellant was also dismissed in view of the judgment of
this Court in Hariharan (supra) observing :
"...Moreso, there can always be a classification on the basis of graduation
and non-graduation in the pay scale. Thus, we are satisfied that there is
no ground to interfere with the order. Hence, this petition is dismissed."
Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant, would submit that the Tribunal as also the High Court went wrong
in passing the impugned judgments and orders insofar as they failed to take
into consideration that as by reason of the impugned rule no new post or
cadre was created, sanction of different pay scale to the employees
belonging to the same cadre was impermissible. The purported classification
between the two sets of employees whose posts are interchangeable and who
are carrying out the same work and have undergone the same training could
not have been placed in two different classes only on the basis of
educational qualification, the learned Counsel submitted. Dr. Dhavan would
contend that as despite having been given several opportunities, the
respondents herein failed to file return, they must be deemed to have
admitted the contentions raised by the appellant herein before the Tribunal
as correct and, thus, the Tribunal misdirected itself in refusing to grant
any relief to the appellant despite arriving at a finding that the State
has committed a hostile discrimination against the appellant. Educational
qualification, Dr. Dhavan would urge, can be a valid criteria only where
new cadre is created and where no minimum qualification was fixed at the
time of initial appointment, but in a situation where the employees
irrespective of their qualification had been performing the same functions
in the same grade, the doctrine of equal pay for equal work would be
Drawing our attention to the report of the Pay Revision Commissions made on
or about 13.10.1982 as also in the year 1999, the learned counsel would
submit that the State should have accepted the recommendations contained
therein for grant of scale of pay to all Extension Officers irrespective of
their educational qualification. The learned counsel in support of his
aforementioned contention has placed strong reliance on State of Mysore v.
B. Basavalingappa,  Supp. SCC 661, State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr.
v. Pramod Bhartiya and Ors.,  1 SCC 539 and Shyam Babu Verma and Ors.
v. Union of India and Ors.,  2 SCC 521.
The learned counsel would contend that the doctrine of classification
should not be stretched too far and the same cannot be a basis for
justifying an arbitrary action on the part of the State. In support of the
said contention, reliance has been placed on Col. A.S. Iyer and Other v. V.
Balasubramanyam and Ors.,  1 SCC 634.
Ms. Geetanjali Mohan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State of
Chhattisgarh, on the other hand, would urge that the possession of a higher
educational qualification has all along been held by this Court to be a
valid classification for the purpose of fixing the scale of pay. Although
the concerned employees had been performing similar duties and functions,
the same would not mean, it was urged, that the employees cannot be granted
different scale of pay on the basis of their educational qualification.
Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Ms. Mohan would argue, will have
application only when a discrimination is made between the persons who are
absolutely similarly situated and not otherwise. Strong reliance in this
behalf has been placed on The State of Mysore and Anr. v. P. Narasinga Rao,
AIR (1968) SC 349 = [ 1968] 1 SCR 467, Mewa Ram Kanojia v. All India
Institute of Medical Sciences and Ors.,  2 SCC 235, V. Markendeya and
Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.,  3 SCC 191 and a recent
decision of this Court in Government of West Bengal v. Tarun K. Roy and
Ors., JT (2003) 9 SC 130.
Applicability of doctrine of equal pay for equal work
on the touchstone of Article 39(d) read with Article 14 of the Constitution
of India will have to be considered for the purpose of the present case on
the premise that save and except disparity in educational qualification,
the nature of work performed by Extension Officers is identical and they
had undergone a similar training. It is trite that the Pay Commission on or
about 13.10.1982 and in the year 1999 desired and recommended that the same
scale of pay be given to the Extension Officers irrespective of their
educational qualification, but it is not in dispute that the
recommendations of the Pay Commission were not accepted by the State. The
relevant portion of the recommendations of the Pay Commission and the Order
of the State Government thereupon respectively are as under :
"SI. Report of Pay No. Commission Chapter/Para
Recommendations of Pay Commission
Order of the State Government
Twelve 17 & 18
(One) The present pay scale of Gram Sewak Rs. 169-300 the said pay scale
was recommended to be revised at S. No. five and this suggestion was
proposed that all the Gram Sewak who passed the 6th months training course
should be upgraded to pay scale of Rs.195-330 as being revised grade.
According to the amendment in the recruitment rules of this department the
minimum qualification being graduation with Science or
Agriculture and in future the Gram Sewak be placed on pay scale Rs.635-950.
This pay scale will be given to Gram Sewaks who were only Agriculture
graduate or Science graduate but other gram sewaks will be given the
revised pay scale Rs. 575-880 as accepted pay scale. We have noticed
hereinbefore that the State issued an executive instruction directing that
not only the fresh recruits shall be entitled to the pay scale of Rs.
635-950, but also the graduate officers working even prior to 1.4.1981
would be eligible therefor. We have furthermore noticed that by reason of
an amendment in the rules made in terms of notification dated 5.9.1984, the
employees holding a degree as also the new recruits were to be placed in
the said scale of pay.
The primal question which arises for consideration is whether the
aforementioned order of the State Government is discriminatory in nature.
The Pay Commissions are constituted for evaluating the duties and functions
of the employees and the nature thereof vis-a-vis the educational
qualifications required therefor. Although the Pay Commission is considered
to be an expert body, the State in its wisdom and in furtherance of a valid
policy decision may or may not accept its recommendations. The State in
exercise of its jurisdiction conferred upon it by the proviso appended to
Article 309 of the Constitution of India can unilaterally make or amend the
conditions of service of its employees by framing appropriate rules. The
State in terms of the said provision is also entitled to give a
retrospective effect thereto. A policy decision had been adopted by the
State that the post of Extension Officers shall be filled up only by
graduates. Such a policy decision ex facie cannot be termed to be arbitrary
or irrational attracting the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India. A dying scale was provided by the State for the non-graduates. Fresh
recruitments were to be made only from amongst the persons who held the
requisite educational qualification. With a view to avoid any
discrimination between the new recruits and the serving employees who
possessed the same qualification, the State cannot be said to have acted
illegally in granting a higher scale of pay also for the existing degree
Article 14, it is trite, does not forbid a reasonable classification.
Article 14 forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification
subject to the conditions that it is based on an intelligible differentia
and that the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought
to be achieved.
[See Saurabh Chaudri and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (2003) 9 SCALE
Constitutional interpretation is a difficult task. Its concept varies from
statute to statute, fact to fact, situation to situation and subject matter
to subject matter. A classification based on educational qualification has
been applied by a Constitution Bench of this Court as far back as in 1968
in P. Narasinga Rao (supra), wherein it was observed:
"It is well settled that though Article 14 forbids class legislation, it
does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation.
When any impugned rule or statutory provision is assailed on the ground
that it contravenes Article 14, its validity can be sustained if two tests
are satisfied. The first test is that the classification on which it is
founded must be based on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes
persons or things grouped together from others left out of the group, and
the second test is that the differentia in question must have a reasonable
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the rule or statutory
provision in question. In other words, there must be some rational nexus
between the basis of classification and the object intended to be achieved
by the statute or the rule. As we have already stated. Articles 14 and 16
form part of the same constitutional code of guarantees and supplement each
other. In other words, Art. 16 is only an instance of the application of
the general rule of equality laid down in Art. 14 and it should be
construed as such. Hence there is no denial of equality of opportunity
unless the person who complains of discrimination is equally situated with
the person or persons who are alleged to have been favoured. Article 16 (1)
does not bar a reasonable classification of employees or reasonable tests
for their selection."
The said dicta was applied by this Court in Mewa Ram Kanojia (supra),
"5. While considering the question of application of principle of 'Equal
pay for equal work' it has to be borne in mind that it is open to the State
to classify employees on the basis of qualifications, duties and
responsibilities of the posts concerned. If the classification has
reasonable nexus with the objective sought to be achieved, efficiency in
the administration, the State would be justified in prescribing different
pay scale but if the classification does not stand the test of reasonable
nexus and the classification is founded on unreal, and unreasonable basis
it would be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Equality
must be among the equals. Unequal cannot claim equality."
The principle was reiterated in V. Markendeya (supra), observing :
"13. In view of the above discussion we are of the opinion that where two
classes of employees perform identical or similar duties and carrying out
the same functions with the same measure of responsibility having same
academic qualification, they would be entitled to equal pay. If the State
denies them equality in pay, its action would be violative of Articles 14
and 16 of the Constitution, and the court will strike down the
discrimination and grant relief to the aggrieved employees. But before such
relief is granted the court must consider and analyse the rationale behind
the State action in prescribing two different scale of pay. If on an
analysis of the relevant rules, orders, nature of duties, functions,
measure of responsibility, and educational qualifications required for the
relevant posts, the court finds that the classification made by the State
in giving different treatment to the two classes of employees is founded on
rational basis having nexus with the objects sought to be achieved, the
classification must be upheld. Principle of equal pay for equal work is
applicable among equals, it cannot be applied to unequals. Relief to an
aggrieved person seeking to enforce the principles of equal pay for equal
work can be granted only after it is demonstrated before the court that
invidious discrimination is practised by the State in prescribing two
different scales for the two classes of employees without there being any
reasonable classification for the same. If the aggrieved employees fail to
demonstrate discrimination, the principle of equal pay for equal work
cannot be enforced by court in abstract. The question what scale should be
provided to a particular class of service must be left to the executive and
only when discrimination is practised amongst the equals, the court should
intervene to undo the wrong, and to ensure equality among the similarly
placed employees. The court however cannot prescribe equal scales of pay
for different class of employees."
A Bench of three Judges in which two of us were parties reiterated the same
principle in Tarun K. Roy and Ors. (supra). The aforementioned decisions
are authorities for the proposition that despite the fact that the
employees have been performing similar duties and functions and their posts
are interchangeable, a valid classification can be made on the basis of
their educational qualification. The observation of Krishna Iyer, J. in V.
Balasubramanyam (supra) although is interesting but it appears that the
fact of the matter involved therein did not warrant application of the said
The view of Subba Rao, J. in Lachhman Dass v. State of Punjab and Ors., AIR
(1963) SC 222 was a minority view. Venkatarama Aiyar, J. therein speaking
for the majority held :
"...The law is now well settled that while Art. 14 prohibits discriminatory
legislation directed against one individual or class of individuals, it
does not forbid reasonable classification, and that for this purpose even
one person or group of persons can be a class. Professor Willis says in his
Constitutional Law p.580 "a law applying to one person or one class of
persons is constitutional if there is sufficient basis or reason for it".
This statement of the law was approved by this Court in Chiranjit Lal
Chowdhury v. Union of India,  SCR 869 : AIR (1951) SC 41. There the
question was whether a law providing for the management and control by the
Government, of a named company, the Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Company
Ltd. was bad as offending Art. 14. It was held that even a single Company
might, having regard to its features, be a category in itself and that
unless it was shown that there were other Companies similarly
circumstanced, the legislation must be presumed to be constitutional and
the attack under Art. 14 must fail. In Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S.R.
Tendolkar,  SCR 279 at p. 297 : AIR (1958) SC 538 at p. 547 this
Court again examined in great detail the scope of Art. 14, and in
enunciating the principles applicable in deciding whether a law is in
contravention of that Article observed :
"that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single
individual if on account of some special circumstances or reasons
applicable to him and not applicable to others that single individual may
be treated as a class by himself."
Furthermore, as noticed hereinbefore, a valid classification based on
educational qualification for the purpose of grant of pay has been upheld
by the Constitution Bench of this Court in P. Narasinga Rao (supra).
In B. Basavalingappa (supra), a two-Judge Bench of this Court did not
notice the earlier binding precedents of this Court. In fact one of them,
K.N. Singh, J., as the learned Chief Justice then was, was a party to the
subsequent decision in Mewa Ram Kanojia (supra). In that case no material
was brought on records on the basis of which it could be contended that
there was any substantial difference at that time between the two
classifications although they were described differently. It was in that
situation observed :
"...It was argued that a diploma is a higher qualification than a
certificate. But neither there is any curriculum on record nor any other
material to draw that inference. On the contrary this circumstance that at
the time when respondent was recruited a diploma holder or a certificate
holder both were entitled to be recruited as an Instructor on the same pay
scale indicates that in those days the two were considered to be alike."
In Pramod Bhartiya (supra), Jeevan Reddy, J. categorically held that burden
to prove that a discrimination has been committed is upon the petitioners.
In that case petitioners failed to discharge their burden.
Yet again in Shyam Babu Verma (supra), N.P. Singh, J. speaking for a three-
Judge Bench observed :
"...The nature of work may be more or less the same but scale of pay may
vary based on academic qualification or experience which justifies
classification. The principle of 'equal pay for equal work'should not be
applied in a mechanical or casual manner. Classification made by a body of
experts after full study and analysis of the work should not be disturbed
except for strong reasons which indicate the classification made to be
unreasonable. Inequality of the men in different groups excludes
applicability of the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' to them..."
True it may be that when recommendations are made by a Pay Commission,
evaluation of job must be held to have been made but the same by itself may
not be a ground to enforce the recommendations by issuing a writ of or in
the nature of mandamus although the State did not accept the same in toto
and made rules to the contrary by evolving a policy decision which cannot
be said to be arbitrary or discriminatory.
For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that no case has been
made for our interference with the impugned judgment. The appeal is
dismissed accordingly. No costs.