Probability Inequalities for a Gladiator Game
Based on a model introduced by Kaminsky, Luks, and Nelson (1984), we consider a zero-sum allocation game called the Gladiator Game, where two teams of gladiators engage in a sequence of one-to-one fights in which the probability of winning is a function of the gladiators' strengths. Each team's strategy consist the allocation of its total strength among its gladiators. We find the Nash equilibria of the game and compute its value. To do this, we study interesting majorization-type probability inequalities concerning linear combinations of Gamma random variables.
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