Each student is required to make a 25-minute presentation on a paper chosen by the student or suggested by the professor (own relevant papers are allowed). In case two or more related papers are presented by several students, one report from the group will suffice.
Style: 25-minute conference presentation.
Your presentation must include:
Also required is a written short report briefly outlining contribution of the paper and of related papers.
Topics and References (PDF)
Presentations were made on the following papers this term:
Tirole, Jean. "Inefficient Foreign Borrowing: A Dual- and Common-Agency Perspective." American Economic Review 93, no. 5 (December 2003): 1678-1702.
Kocherlakota, Narayana. "Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment." Review of Economic Studies 63 (1996): 595-609.
Che, Yeon-Koo, and Seung-Weon Yoo. "Optimal Incentives for Teams." American Economic Review 91, no. 3 (June 2001): 525-541.
Levin, Jonathan. "Relational Incentive Contracts." American Economic Review 93, no. 3 (June 2003): 835-857.
Holmström, Bengt. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective." Review of Economic Studies 66, no. 1, Special Issue: Contracts (January 1999): 169-182. Also available as National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 6875, January 1999.
Hart, Oliver, and John Moore. "Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 10397, March 2004.
Maskin, Eric, and Jean Tirole. "Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts." Review of Economic Studies 66 (1999): 83-114.