Mysticism and Logic In Seng-Chao's Thought
RICHARD H. ROBINSON
Philosophy East and West 8, no. 3/4, October 1958-January 1959.
(c) by The University Press of Hawaii.
ANYONE WHO has followed in the pages of this
journal the serpentine course of the disputes between
Dr. D. T. Suzuki and his opponents will readily
appreciate the confusion that beset Chinese Buddhist
intellectuals around A.D. 400. As Słng-chao
(374--414)(1) likening his times to AAryadeva's,
says, "At that time, the Tiirhikas [non-Buddhists]
ran riot, heterodoxies arose in conflict, and
perverse debates umperilled the truth, so that the
Right Way was nearly lost in confusion."(2) For
Słng-chao and his contemporaries, Naagaarjuna and
AAryadeva were the long-awaited guides to the Right
Way. However, the modern disputants cannot share the
ancients' assumption that there actually is one final
answer. Neither the two Indian bodhisattvas nor their
Chinese disciples can be taken as beacons in our
contemporary debates on the relationship of the
mystical to the rational. Nevertheless, in the
process of analyzing the fifth-century Chinese
analogues, certain aspects of this topical problem
will be clarified.
The muddle of Słng-chao's day arose from
inattention to the offices that terms occupy in
systems, from handling concepts promiscuously apart
from their defining contexts. This was only to be
expected in the intellectual flux of China around
A.D. 400. New philosophical systems were being
introduced from India, contradicting each other, and
all claiming the adherence of Chinese Buddhists.
Native Chinese thought was still in a state of
riotous disequilibrium consequent upon the overthrow
of Han orthodoxies . Thinkers were inventing,
syncretizing, and synthesizing. Fashions in thought
changed decade by decade. In this flux, excited but
intellectually insecure monks alternately glorified
the achievements of their day and lamented the
corruption and instability of their degenerate age.
(1) Tsukamoto Zenryuu, ed., J(-+o) ron kenkyuu
(Cha-lun Studies) Kyoto: H(-+o)z(-+o)kan, 1955),
pp. 120-121, establisheds these dates as more
probable than the traditional ones, 384-314.
(2) Preface to the Twelve Topic Treatise, Taish(-+o)
Shinshuu Daiz(-+o)ky(-+o) (Tokyo: Taish(-+o)
Issaikyo kank(-+o)kai 1924-1934), LV, p. 77b15.
the milieu in which Słng-chao thought out and
recorded his ideas about man's relation to the
Słng-chao was one of the personal disciples and
translating assistants of the great translator
Kumaarajiiva. As a gifted stylist and independent
thinker, he was instrumental in interpreting to his
contemporaries the Maadhyamika teaching that
Kumaarajiiva brought to China for the first time. His
surviving essays, collected in the Chao-lun,(3) his
commentary on the Vimalakiirtinirde'sa-suutra,(4) and
his prefaces to Suutras and 'Saastras, constitute the
largest body of literary remains of any Chinese
Buddhist of that period.(5)
The Chao-lun has been perennially popular among
thinking Chinese Buddhists, but serious modern
scholarship on Słng-chao begins with T'ang
Yung-t'ung, in his History of Pre-Sui Chinese
Buddhism.(6) Waiter Liebenthal's The Book of Chao(7)
incorporates T'ang Yung-t'ung's work on the subject,
presents the first modern and annotated translation
of the text, and breathes a series of problems
concerning Słng-shao's place in the history of
Chinese thought and religion. A study group in the
Univer sity of Kyoto, directed by Tsukamoto Zenryuu,
translated the Chao-lun into modern Japanese, and
produced a series of essays on separate topics. Their
work was published in 1955 as Studies in the
Chao-lun.(8) Thus, the basic stage in Słng-chao
studies has been completed. However, a number of
fundamental questions remain open to further inquiry.
The first outstanding question concerns the
character of Słng-chao's mysticism. Liebenthal's
general view was that Słng-chao was primarily an
ecstatic and that his writings were intended to hint
at the content of an inexpressible ecstatic vision.
"Though put forward as a theory of the Identity
of Illusion and Reality, the Middle Path actually
signified a personal mystical experience; in his
vision, Chao saw the Absolute,-immutable, empty, or
filled with the image of Nature itself, aloof and
gracious."(9) "Without precluding further
investigation, we may say that Chao's religious
experience--his sudden discovery of a changed
world--is similar to that of Ch'an monks."(10)
The second question, whether Słng-chao's
paradoxes signal a rejection
(3) Taish(-+o) XLV.150-161.
(4) Taish(-+o) XXXVIII.327-419.
(5) Walter Liebenthal, The Book of Chao (Peking:
Catholic University of Peking, 1948), p. 9
(6) T'ang Yung-t'ung, Han Wei Liang-chin
Nan-pei-ch'ao Fo-chiao-shib (Shanghai: Commercial
Press, 1938), pp. 328-340.
(7) See note 5, above.
(8) Tsukamoto Zenryuu, op. cit. see reviews by A.
Waley, BSOAS 19 (1957), 195-196 and P.
Demiéville, T'oung-pao, XLV, Nos. 1-3 (1957),
(9) Liebenthal, p. vii.
(10) Ibid., p. 41.
of reason, is concomitant with the first. Liebenthal
says, "Chao's intention is not to elucidate Buddhist
theory, but to force the reader to admit the
impossibility of solving the riddle of Existence by
rational thinking The paradox itself, not its
rational solution, is the priceless find he is
seeking."(11) "He speaks in paradoxes. These do not
make a theory, but are meant to lead the reader
before the Gate of Mystery, to the borders of the
Unknown, so that he may gaze into the unfathomable in
a moment of ecstasy and share Chao's experience.
What this experience contained, Chao does not
The third question concerns Słng-chao's formal
reasoning and its relation to Naagaarjuna's.
Liebenthal says, "Chao's syllogisms are not genuine
prasa^nga [reductions to absurdity]. For Naagaarjuna
merely refutes-mundane entities, but Chao wishes to
establish the existence of supramundane ones."(13)
Kajiyama Yuuichi(14) holds that Słng-chao's logic
is wholly different from Maadhyamika. He also
states(15) that worldly logic and supra-worldly logic
ate different and must not be confused. He concludes
that Słng-chao's understanding of Naagaarjuna was
imprecise. However, neither Liebenthal nor Kajiyama
and his colleagues examined the purely formal
features of Słng-chao's reasoning. They judged it as
to content and intention rather than as to formal
A common factor in these questions is the
relation between mysticism and rationality. On this
important point, previous Słng-chao studies have
presupposed what Rudolph Otto(16) termed "the
peculiar logic of mysticism, which discounts the two
fundamental laws of natural logic: the law of
Contradiction and of the Excluded Third. As
non-Euclidean geometry sea aside the axioms of
parallels, so mystical logic disregards these two
axioms; and thence the 'coincidentia oppositorum,'
the 'identity of opposites' and the 'dialectic
This theory is stated precisely enough that it
can be subjected to verification. It is important to
do so, because the advocates of non-rational
intuition ate continually exhorting us to forsake the
rational, while the enemies of mysticism warn us
against forfeiting our mason. As Suzuki says,
"Paradoxical statements are therefore characteristic
of praj~naa-intuition. As it transcends vij~naana
(logic), it does not mind contradicting itself; it
knows that a contradiction is the outcome of
diffentiation, which is the work of
(11) Ibid., p. 38.
(12) Ibid., p. 44.
(13) Ibid., p. 32.
(14) Chao-lun Studies, p. 216.
(15) Ibid., p. 219.
(16) Rudolph Otto, Mysticism East and West (New York:
Meridian Books, 1957), p. 45.
vij~naana. Praj~naa negates what it asserted before,
and, conversely, it has its own way of dealing with
this world of dualities. The flower is red and
notred; the bridge flows and not the river."(17)
This is the sort of thing that Bertrand Russell
meant when he said, "The logic of mysticism shows, as
is natural, the defects which are inherent in any.
Quite apart from the question of the validity of
mystical experience, we may ask whether this is
actually the logical pattern of mystical discourse.
This can be decided piecemeal by examining individual
mystical texts. As an example, I propose to examine
selected passages from Słng-chao's writings,
particularly those passages that have led other
investigators to believe that he considered the
irrational as the gateway to the transcendental.
Maybe we cannot solve, or even express, the riddle of
Existence. But we need not accept apparent paradoxes
as rationally insoluble, or decide that strange
sayings are illogical, until a proper rational and
logical analysis has been attempted.
II. SÉNG-CHAO'S MYSTICISM
Liebenthal's opinion that S łn g-chao is a mystic
is virtually incontrovertible. I intend merely to
elaborate and define it further. We cannot learn much
about his mystical experience, as he did not write
any accounts of it. Naturally, very little about
personal experience can be inferred from generalized
doctrinal statement. S łn g-chao quotes so
extensively, so few of his words are his own, that
even his ordinary feelings do not show through his
literary mask. Consequently, inquiry is restricted to
his discourse about contemplation, rather than his
contemplative experience. Liebenthal(19) ventures
some conjectures about Chao's inner development. The
conjectures that I will make at the end of this
article are radically different from Liebenthal's,
but are no less speculative.
Suutra: While not arising from the trance of
cessation (nirodha-samaapatti) to display all the
postures [walking, standing, sitting and lying
down)--this is samaadhi [lit. "still-sitting"].
(17) D. T. Suzuki, "Reason end Intuition in Buddhist
Philosophy," in Charles A. Moore, ed, Essays in
East-West Philosophy (Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press, 1951), p. 24.
(18) Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic (London:
Penguin Books, 1953), p. 26 (reprinted from
Hibbert journal, July, 1914).
(19) Op. cit., p. 8.
(20) Vimalakiirti Commentary, Taish(-+o)
XXXVIII.344c14-21; Liebenthal, p. 39.
Chao: When the Hiinayaanists enter the trance of
cessation, then their bodies are like dry wood and
lack the power of moving and functioning. When the
Mahaasattva enters the reality-samaadhi, (21) his
mind-knowledge ceases forever, and his body fills the
eight directions. He acts in compliance with crucial
occasions, and his responding and meeting are
endless. In rising, moving, advancing and halting, he
does not forsake correct deportment. His practice of
samaadhi is also according to the ultimate. When it
says above that he does not manifest body or mind in
the three planes, it means that he displays all the
postures. Now, because he has no displaying, he is
able to have nothing that he does not display.
Nothing not displayed is identical with the essence
of no displaying. I hope that gentlemen who
investigate the metaphysical will have the means to
understand the respects in which the two are the
same, and to make the same the respects in which the
two are different.
This is Słng-chao's doctrine of samaadhi. In his
view, it is not a state of trance which precludes
ordinary activities, but a state of enlightenment in
which the Holy Man is omniscient, omnipotent, and
omnipresent. Słng-chao evidently understood these
powers as the attributes of saints who had reached
the non-relapsing (avaivartika) stage. He probably
did not consider himself to be a bodhisattva of such
august attainments, so this passage is to be taken as
a description of someone else's samaadhi.
Suutra: As for samaadhi, not to manifest body or mind
in the three planes is samaadhi.
Chao: Now, in the samaadhi of the dharmakaaya, body
and spirit have both ceased.
The Way (bodhi) is cut off from ordinary
sense-spheres, and it is something that seeing and
heating cannot reach. How then is it samaadhi when
one manifests a body in the three planes and
cultivates thoughts? 'Saariputra still had worldly
retribution and was born in a body. Because worldly
retribution is the root of thoughts, he considered
human company an annoyance, and "sat still" under a
tree. He was not able to make his body and spirit
devoid of traces, and so he incurred this criticism.
The general intention behind [Vimalakiirti's]
criticism [of 'Saariputra] is to benefit [him]
greatly. It is not that [Vimalakiirti] held onto
other and self and had thoughts in terms of
affirmation and denial.
In the Indian Buddhist epistemology that
underlies Słng-chao's doctrine, vij~naana
corresponds, not to reason, but to sense-perception.
Vij~naana is awareness of an object in a specific
sense-mode, including awareness of the mental event
of the preceding moment.(23) The operation that
abstracts characteristic marks from the percepta is
termed kalpanaa (construction, Imagination), or
vikalpa (imagination). Bodhi is nirvikalpaka-j~naana
(21) bhuutalak.sana-samaadhi. Cf, Étienne Lamotte, Le
traité de la grande vertu de sagesse, tome I
(louvain: Bureaux du Muséon, 1944), p. 325, and
Ta-chih-tu-lun, Taish(-+o) XXV.97a20.
(22) Vimalakiirti Commentary, 344b23-29.
(23) Th. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of
Buddhism, (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1923),
(knowledge free from imagination). This distinction
between cognition that apprehends determinate marks
and cognition that does not figment determinate marks
is the theme of Słng-chao's earliest essay, Praj~naa
Has No Knowing.(24)
It is apparent that the term "intellect" is not
the same as either sensory awareness (vij~naana) or
image-construction (vikalpa). In the classical
Buddhist epistemologies, as in the Neo-Platonic, the
sensible and the imaginable are not the only
knowables. There are intelligibles that ate neither
sensible nor imaginable. The intelligible as a class
includes the imaginable, but is not included in the
imaginable. What the bodhisattva transcends in the
exercise of praj~naa is not the intellect but the
Słng-chao viewed the samaadhi of the dharmakaaya
as a supersensuous mode of illumination. It is devoid
of "traces, " i.e., of discursive symbolisms and
conceptions. It is not a mere trance-state
experienced by a human being sitting still under a
tree. This is not uniquely Słng-chao's notion of
samaadhi, but is the explicit doctrine of the
Vimalakiirti-nirde'sa-suutra, on which the above
passage is an exposition. Vimalakiirti criticized
'Saariputra's samaadhi because contemplation that
depends on the senses or the imagination is not the
dharmakaaya contemplation. This does not constitute a
repudiation of the intellect, though it means that
the content of the highest contemplation cannot be
learned by inference and transcends the sensible and
The Neo-Platonic and Medieval concept of the
"ladder of cognition" offers sufficient analogy to
Słng-chao's epistemology that it may illuminate by
comparison. Thomas Aquinas, summarizing the schema of
Richard of St Victor, says:
These six denote the steps whereby we ascend by means
of creatures to the contemplation of God. For the
first step consists in the mere consideration of
sensible objects; the second step consists in going
forward from sensible to intelligible objects; the
third step is to judge of sensible objects according
to intelligible things; the fourth is the absolute
consideration of the intelligible objects to which
one has attained by means of sense-data; the fifth is
the contemplation of those intelligible objects that
are unattainable by way of sense-data, but which the
reason is able to grasp; the sixth step is the
consideration of such intelligible things as the
reason can neither discover nor grasp, which pertain
to the sublime contemplation of divine truth, wherein
contemplation is ultimately perfected.(25)...The
ultimate perfection of the human intellect is the
(24) Chao-lun, Part III, Taish(-+o) XLV. 153-154;
Liebenthal, pp. 67-85.
(25) Thomas Aquinas, Selected Writings (London: J. M.
Dent, 1939; Everyman's Library No. 953). p.201
(Summa Theologica, Of the Contemplative life,
Fourth Article, Reply Obj. 3).
(26) Ibid., p.202 (Reply Obj. 4).
Here "intellect" is used in its traditional
sense, which embraces the functions that are now
termed "reason" and "intuition." Reason, operating
through analogy, is dependent on what is already
known. The rational is not confined to the sensible
and imaginable, though it can apprehend a certain
class of intelligible objects by way of sense-data
However, certain intelligibles are not to be known
through reason, since they afford no real analogies
with the lower grades of intelligibles. From this
follows t he Thomist counterpart of the Buddhist
doctrine of the Two Truths (satyadvaya), "That
nothing is predicated univocally of God and other
things" and "That not all terms applied to God and
creatures are purely equivocal."(27)
It is plain from the Thomistic example that a
theory of mysticism may postulate a contemplation of
intelligible things that are not accessible to
discursive reason, without repudiating reason or
advocating irrationality. There is a perfectly
rational Thomist explanation of the passages from
Eckhart that Otto cited as examples of "the peculiar
logic of mysticism."(28)
Słng-chao does not seem to have used any term
equivalent to "reason." In his epistemology, the
primary distinction is between cognition that
apprehends marks and cognition that does not. He does
not deal with the distinction between thought that
operates through formal analogy and thought that does
not. Thus, it cannot be said that his writings accept
or reject reason. They simply do not mention it.
However, though the concept of reason is not
mentioned, formal reasoning is very much in evidence
in Słng-chao's works. His theory of knowledge must be
distinguished from his own modes of thought and
Suutra: Maitreya, you should bring these gods' sons
to give up the view which imagines bodhi. For what
reason? Because bodhi cannot be attained with the
body and cannot be attained with the mind.
Chao: Bodhi is true enlightenment, absolute knowledge
of the markless. Its Way is void and metaphysical,
sublimely cut off from ordinary sense-spheres.
Hearers have nothing to insert their hearing in, and
knowers have nothing to exercise their knowledge
on.(30) Dialecticians have nothing on which to fasten
their words. Symbolizers [i.e., I-ching diviners]
have nothing with which to give shape to their
primary dichotomy [between ch'ien (heaven) and k'un
(earth)]. Therefore the character of its Way is that,
being subtle and markless, it cannot be considered
(27) Ibid., pp. 148 and 150 (Contra Gentiles).
(28) Rudolph Otto, op.cit., p.45.
(29) Vimalakiirti Commentary, 362e-3-14.
(30) Tao-tł-ching, chap. 50: "The tiger has no place
on which to fasten its claw; the weapon has no
place in which to insert in blade." Here
Słng-chao likens the inscrutability of bodhi to
the invulnerability of the Taoist "Perfect Man."
and as its function is exceedingly vigorous, it
cannot be considered inexistent. Therefore, though it
is able to mirror the myriad things abstrusely, it
does not radiate.(31) Its metaphysical track "goes
beyond the carriage" yet it does not obliterate
[things]. It is so great that it comprises heaven and
earth, yet it does not rest on any support. It bends
and saves the deluded multitudes, yet it has no
private motives.... So then, it is only bodhi, the
Way of great enlightenment, that though it has no
knowing, has nothing that it does not know,(32) and
though it has no action (wu wei) has nothing that it
does not effect.(33) This nameless dharma is
certainly not anything that names can name. We do not
know how to express it, so we arbitrarily call it
bodhi. This unconditioned (actionless) Way surely
cannot be attained with the body or the mind.
Here Słng-chao defines the Buddhist concept of
enlightenment in Taoist terms. It is both
transcendental and immanent, unimaginable (acintya)
and ineffable (anabhilaapya), yet omnipresent and
omnipotent. This is a description of Divine Wisdom
rather than an account of the experience of human
bodhisattvas such as Słng-chao and his teacher,
Kumaarajiiva. It looks more like a mystical theology
than a mysticism.
The question then arises, how did Słng-chao know
the nature of bodhi? What connection was there
between his own religious experience, and his
doctrine of enlightenment? He did not say how he
knew, but the answer can be inferred from his
writings. The above passage, like many of his others,
is a patchwork of phrases borrowed from Chuang
Tz(-+u), Lao Tz(-+u), the I-ching, and the Maaayaana
Suutras. The Neo-Taoist Classics were recognized as
authoritative by the devotees of "metaphysical
studies" (hsüan-hsüeh)-the gentlemen and gentleman-
monks who appear to have been the public to whom
Słng-chao addressed his essays. The Suutras possessed
scriptural authority, and their truth was taken as
axiomatic because they were the Word of the Buddha.
Thus the truth of Słng-chao's fundamental principles
was posited as a revelation, not based on experience
(pratyak.sa) , and not established by inference
(anumaana) from experience.
Since Słng-chao's language is borrowed, we cannot
say that it reveals his religious experience. Yet,
for all we know, his experience may well have been
profound, and he may have felt that his language
expressed it in so far as language can express such
experience. Borrowed and even trite phraseology often
serves to express a very personal and intense
psychological event Liturgics, for example, are
standard and public, yet they provide vehicles for
personal devotion. We cannot admit, as Joachim Wach
(31) Cf. Tao-tł-ching, chap. 58: "Though it lights,
it does not shine."
(32) Cf. Chao-lun, Part III, Taish(-+o) 153a27;
liebenthal, p. 71; Document 13, below.
(33) Tao-tł-ching, chap. 48: "Though there is nothing
that it does, there is nothing htat it does not
have it, (34) that the intensity of religious
awareness can be discerned through scrutiny of
recorded utterances. Yet, by the use of certain
phrases, Słng-chao signals his adherence to a
tradition on the question of illumination, and so
enables us in some measure to understand his ideas,
though not his inner life.
All-knowledge (sarvaj~nataa) is the ultimate of
knowledge... the manifold figures are mirrored
together. It is only all-knowledge that has no
knowing yet has nothing that it does not know. For
what reason? If there is mentation (citta), then
there is a field.(36) If there are fields, then there
are boundaries. When fields and boundaries have taken
shape, then one's knowledge has limits. When one's
knowledge has limits, then one's cognition is not
all-embracing. The Perfect Man has no mentation.(37)
As he has no mentation, he has no held. As he has no
field, he has no boundaries. Since he has no fields
and boundaries, his knowledge is limitless. Since his
knowledge is limitless, the range of his cognition is
boundless. Therefore he is able to know all the
dharmas in one thought, at one time.
In this theory of knowledge, mentation is
consciousness of determinate objects and specific
attributes. It is directed to the realm of the
sensible and the imaginable. It cannot comprehend the
subtle and markless. Omniscience is possible only
when cognition is not limited by determinate
Now, the existent arises from the mind, and the
mind arises dependent on the existent. False notions
keep to the realm of affirmation and negation, and so
divergent theories about the existent and the
inexistent are disputed pell-mell. As for one who can
make his ideas empty, merge his mind into the sphere
of the absolute, sublimely keep to the center of the
circle,(39) and contemplate existent and inexistent
as a unity, though his knowledge pervades the myriad
things, it is never existent, and though his abstruse
mirroring has no cognition it is never inexistent.
Therefore he can equalize heaven and earth,
considering them as one in significance, without
erring from the actuals. He mirrors the manifold
existents with his metaphysical intelligence, yet
things and self are a unity. Because things and self
are a unity, his
(34) Joachim Wach, The Comparative Study of Religions
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1958),
(35) Vimalakiirti Commentary, 365a8 ff.
(36) Chuang-Tz(-+u), chap.2, Chuang-Tzu-pu-cheng
(shanghai: Commercial press, 1947), P.1B.17b;
also James legge, the Writings of Chuang-tzu,
sacred Books of the East, vol. XXXIX (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1891), p. 185.
(37) Wu-hsin ÁLĄ▀ (no mentation) is a common phrase
in the chuang-Tzu commentary of kuo Hsiang (died
A.D.313) . See Chuang-Tzu-pu-cheng, 1A.12a-b,
1A.16a, 1B.13a, 1B.28b, 2B.1a, 2B.9a, and
2B.24b; also see Fukunaga K(-+o)ji, Chao-lun
Studies (cf. notes 1,8, above), pp. 254-255.
This Neo-Taoist term was taken up by the Ch'an
sect. See D. T. Suzuki, The Zen Doctrine of
No-mind (London: Rider a Co., 1949).
(38) Vimalakiirti Commentary, 372c17; Liebenthal,
(39) Chuang-Tzu, chap. 2, 1B.13b; Legge, S.B.E., vol.
knowledge has no operation of cognition. Because he
does not swerve from the actuals, he is himself
identical with each thing.
In Documents 4 and 5, the function of praj~naa or
bodhi is defined as merging the opposites and knowing
unity. Praj~naa is knowledge free from the
subject-object distinction. The individuality of the
myriad things is not obliterated, yet they are known
as free from plurality. This is the well-known mystic
vision of one in all and all in one.
The Chinese term translated as "cognition" in
passages 4 and 5 is chao ĚË, which concretely means
"shine, illuminate." By the fourth century A.D., it
had become a regular term for "cognition." In
Słng-chao's later writings, it indicates cognition by
praj~naa in particular, a specialization of meaning
that is to be found also in Ch'an literature. In its
later use, it may be translated "intuition." Here,
however, it comes close to "intellect."(40)
"Mirroring," in the above passages, designates the
cognitive aspect of Praj~naa. The mirror occurs
commonly in Chuang Tzu and in the Mahaayaana Suutras
as a figure for perfect, effortless, and
Słng-chao certainly presents a mystical
philosophy, yet he has left not so much as one
sentence of explicit spiritual autobiography. Perhaps
he considered that the recounting of his experiences
would have been prideful and immodest. Certainly the
Buddhist tradition contains numerous warnings against
publicizing one's attainments, and in this tradition
there was no Augustine to show how in writing an
autobiography, a devotee might humble himself and
glorify the Other. The result is that we know only
Słng-chao's doctrines on the subject of samaadhi.
Tsukamoto Zenryuu says:
Though the (Neo-Taoist) metaphysician Słng-chao might
be proud of himself, the monk Słng-chao had nothing
to boast about. Depending on the absolute monarchial
authority of Yao Hsing, the non-Chinese
"Heaven-prince," associating with a teacher who lived
with court women and with the elders of
Kumaarajiiva's school who received official
emoluments and contended for authority and
advancement, the young Słng-chao, overwhelmed by the
stimulus of doctrines from the continual new
translations, let wider thoughts about the suffering
of living beings be concealed and also tended to
forget to examine the basis in actuality of himself
and the people, who were profoundly separated from
the Holy One, and as he was not blazing with ardent
aspiration for the experience of enlightenment, it
was inevitable that he should end up not indicating a
concrete empirical method for realizing the Holy
(40) P. Demiéville, Le Concile de Lhasa (Paris:
presses universitaires de france, 1952),
(41) P. Demiéville, Le miroir spirituel (Basel:
Verlag fur Recht und Gesellschaft, 1947),
Sinologics I. 1, p.112-137.
(42) Chao-lun Studies, p.160.
In this passage and in many others, professor
Tsukamoto has vividly stated the metal dilemma at the
heart of a religious enterprise supported by the
secular power. Yao Hsing was zealous, but
high-handed, and though he was a lavish donor to the
cause of the Dharma, he did nor hesitate to make
monks break the code of the very vinaya (monastic
rule) that was translated under his patronage.
Nevertheless, though Słng-chao was a favorite of Yao
Hsing's, it is not legitimate to say that he forgot
about the sufferings of living beings, or that he
was not fired with zeal for the realization of bodhi.
Słng-chao's moral life was undoubtedly beset by
severe conflict, but probably even his closest
contemporaries were in no position to judge it, and
certainly we nowadays cannot.
As for "a concrete empirical method for realizing
the Holy Mind," by which Tsukamoto says later that he
means a manual of dhyaana (contemplation), it should
be noted that Kumaarajiiva's first translation was
such a text, the Bodhisattva-dhyaana,(43) which was
requested by Słng-jui, one of the elder distinguished
monks, who became Kumaarajiiva's leading disciple and
a favorite of Yao Hsing's. Słng-jui's biography says
that he practiced dhyaana assiduously and became
noted for his sanctity.(44) Słng-chao might well
have practiced the methods of contemplation
prescribed in this text, which is a Hiinayaana manual
with a Mahaayaana appendix attached to it. However,
he would have done so with the full realization that
such practices were imperfect dhyaana and led to
inferior samaadhis. It is more probable that the
study of the Suutras and 'Saastras and the
contemplation of their doctrines were his "concrete
empirical method for realizing the Holy Mind." As
with the later Chinese San-lun School, he most likely
con sidered that the elimination of wrong views
through dialectic was an efficacious method leading
to revelation of the truth.
III. LANGUAGE AND TRUTH.
Słng-chao frequently discusses the relation of
language to fact, and the problem of talking about
the unimaginable. In the Vimalakiirti Commentary, his
statements on the subject are seen in the context of
the Suutra's teachings about language and truth, of
which they are simply elucidations.
The making of words arises from erroneous
apprehension. In the dharmas, there is nothing to be
apprehended, so they are intrinsically devoid of
words and marks.
(43) Taish(-+o) No. 614, XV.269-286.
(44) Taish(-+o) L. 362a22ff. arthur F. Wright, trans.,
Słng-jui Alias Hui-jui, in Leibenthal
Festchrift, Sino-Indian Studies, vol. V, Parts 3
& 4 (Santiniketan: Visvabharati University,
The wise do not cling to false designations.(45)...
He only says that the marks of the dharmas cannot be
expressed. He does not fasten words onto the marks of
the dharmas. This language is the end-point of
language.(46)... [The Tathaagata] cannot be named by
names, and cannot be marked by marks.(47)...To have
words about the wordless is not so good as to have no
words about the wordless.(48)
Some passages in the Chao-lun clarify these
The flourishing of words and traces produces
divergent paths (heterodoxies). But wards have
something that cannot be expressed, and traces have
something that cannot be traced. Therefore the
skillful speaker of words seeks to express what
cannot be expressed, and the skillful tracer of
traces seeks to trace what cannot be traced.
The word rendered "traces" also means
"footprints." It refers to the literary remains of
the ancient sages. The allusion is to a passage in
Chuang Tzu(50) where the footprint is contrasted with
the shoe that made it Słng-chao is stressing that
meaning does not reside in language but is inferred
If you Seek a thing through a name, in the thing
there is no actual that matches the name. If you seek
a name through a thing, the name has no efficacy to
obtain the thing. A thing without an actual to match
its name is not a thing. A name without efficacy to
obtain a thing is not a name. Therefore, names do not
match actuals, and actuals do not match names. Since
them is no matching of names and actuals, where do
the myriad dharmas occur?... Thus we know that the
myriad things are not absolute, but arbitrary
Słng-chao here expresses a position that
'Suunyavaadins and Taoists both held, namely, that
actuality cannot be articulated into a set of
discrete actuals ordered homologously to an ideal
language. He repudiates the notion of a one-to-one
correspondence between entities and words. This is
what he calls "the doctrine of names." It looks like
the doctrine of Late Chou philosophers such as Hsün
Tzu, who maintained that it is possible to define
terms so that they correspond to actuals.(52) The
term "actual" (shih, ╣ŕ ) is the Late Chou logicians'
expression for the existential coun-
(45) Vimalakiirti Commentary, 352c2.
(46) Ibid., 399a27.
(47) Ibid., 411a27.
(48) Ibid., 399b29.
(49) Chao-lun, Letter to Liu I-min, Taish(-+o) XLV.
157a6 ff.; Liebenthal, p. 109.
(50) Chuang-Tzu, chap. 14, 5C.20b; legge, S.B.E.,
vol. 39, p.361.
(51) Chao-lun, part II, Emptiness of the
Non-Absolute, Taish(-+o) XLV. 152c20;
liebenthal, p. 65.
(52) The Works of Hsüntze, H. H. Dubs, trans.
(London: Arthur Probsthain, 1928), chap. XXII.
terpart of a term. The "doctrine of names" is rather
similar to one that Bentrand Russell once put
forward: "The first requisite of an ideal language
would be that there should be one name for every
simple, and never the same name for two different
simples."(53) Russell, unlike Hsün Tzu, was not
optimistic about the possibilities of constructing an
ideal language. Słng-chao seems to have been aware
that even an ideal language would correspond only to
a conventional interpretation of reality, and not to
IV. SENG-CHAO'S PARADOXES.
A pattern that occurs in Document 3 is repeated
time and again in Słng-chao's writings. It is,
"Though bodhi has no knowing, there is nothing that
it does not know; though it has no action, there is
nothing that it does not effect."
The dharmakaaya has no presence yet there is
nowhere that it is not present. Because it has no
presence, it is not present at a [particular] place.
Because there is nowhere that it is not present, it
is not apart from places.
These paradoxes are easily resolved when it is
recognized that "knowing," "action," and "presence"
are used in two different senses each--the mundane
sense (laukika-satya) and the absolute sense
(paramaartha-satya). This is the doctrine of the Two
Truths that underlies the seeming contradictions of
the Praj~naa-paaramitaa Suutras. Bodhi does not know
in the mundane sense, because mundane knowing is
directed towards the sensible and the imaginable.
However, bodhi is all-knowledge (sarvaj~nataa`)
because i t knows the own-being of things, namely,
their lack of own-being.
Liebenthal's opinion that Słng-chao was trying to
establish positive conclusions about the existence of
supramundane entities stems partly from his
translating as "it contains every object"(55) what I
render as "there is nothing that it does not know. It
is to be noted that "there is nothing that it does
not know" is not interchangeable with "there is
something that it does know. The first proposition is
true even when there is nothing at all, while the
second is true only when something exists.
(53) Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1922), "Introduction" by Bertrand
(54) Vimalakiirti Commentary, 411b8.
(55) Liebenthal, p.32.
Some features of this paradoxical pattern must be
explained with reference to Słng-chao's concept of
negation and opposition. This can be worked out
from the following passage.
To say that [praj~naa] is not existent is to say
that it is not affirmed as existent, but does not
mean that it is affirmed as not existent. To say that
it is not inexistent is to say that it is not
affirmed as inexistent, but does not mean that it is
affirmed as not inexistent. It is not existent and it
is not not existent; it is not inexistent, and is
not not inexistent.
This passage obviously concerns the tetralemma
(catu.sko.ti). The formula is stated in the
Muula-madhyamaka-kaarikaas, XVIII. 8:(57) "Everything
is real,. or not real, or both real and not real, or
neither real nor not real--this is the accommodated
teaching of the Buddhas." The commentary on this
verse in the Chinese Chung-lun, translated by
Kumaarajiiva while Słng-chao was studying with him,
is as follows:
As for "everything is real," when you search for
the real-nature of the dharmas, [you find that] they
all enter the absolute truth, are all equal,and have
the mark of oneness, that is, absence of marks. It is
just like the different colors and different tastes
of all streams which become one color and one taste
when they enter the great ocean.
As for "everything is unreal," when the dharmas
have not entered reality (tattva or bhuutalak.sa.na),
they are seen through discrimination one by one and
are all devoid of reality. They only exist because of
the combining of conditions.
As for "everything is both real and unreal, "
there are three classes of living beings-superior,
medium, and inferior. The superior look on the marks
of the dharmas as "not real and not unreal." The
medium look on the marks of the dharmas as "all both
real and weal." The inferior, because their powers of
knowledge are shallow, look on the marks of the
dharmas as "partly real and partly unreal." Because
nirvaa.na and the unconditioned dharmas are
imperishable, they look on then as real Because
sa^msaara and the conditioned dharmas are
counterfeit, they look on them as unreal.
As for "[everything] is not real and not unreal,"
the Buddha declared 'not real and not unreal' in
order to refute "both real and unreal."
Question: In other places, the Buddha declared
"detachment from not-real-and-not-unreal." Why does
it say here that "not existent and not inexistent" is
what the Buddha declared?
(56) Chao-lun, Letter to Liu I-min, Taisho 156b26;
(57) Number refers to chapter and stanza of Louis de
La Vallée Poussin, ed.,
Muula-madhyamakakaarikaas. Bibliotheca Buddhica
(St. Petersburg: Imperial Academy of Sciences,
1903-1913), vol. IV.
(58) Taish(-+o) XXX.25a18-b2.
Answer: In Other places, it was declared in order to
demolish the four kinds of attachment. But here
there is no discursive fancy (prapa~nca) towards the
tetralemma. When one hears the Buddha's declaration,
then one attains bodhi. Therefore he says, "not real
and not unreal."
Candrakiirti in his Prasannapadaa gives a
somewhat different interpretation of the stanza in
question.(59) He considers the tetralemma as an
expedient device (upaaya) that the Buddha uses in
giving progressively higher instruction to the
different grades of beings. First, the Buddha speaks
of phenomena as if they were real, in order to lead
beings to venerate his omniscience. Next, he teaches
that phenomena are unreal, because they undergo
modifications, and what is real does not undergo
modifications. Thirdly, he teaches some hearers that
phenomena are both real and unreal--real from the
point of view of worldlings, but unreal from the
viewpoint of the saints. To those who are practically
free from passions and wrong views, he declares that
phenomena are neither real nor unreal, in the same
way that one denies that the son of a barren woman is
white or that he is black.
These interpretations are concerned with the
content and intention of the formula, and only
incidentally indicate its logical structure. In a
previous article, I suggested a possible logical
interpretation.(60) I postulated a quantification for
the terms of the four propositions, and produced a
correlation with the four Aristotelian forms. The
tetralemma is thus tranformulated into: "'All X is
A', or 'All X is non-A' or 'Some X is A and some X is
non-A' or 'All X is A and all X is non-A'".
The word shih ČO, translated "affirm" in Document
10, behaves in a puzzling way. It will be interesting
to discover what logical meanings it may have. First,
let us assume that Słng-chao understood the terms of
the tetralemma to be quantified as in the preceding
paragraph. Let "P" stand for "Praj~naa," add "E" for
"existent." The key propositions then are: "P is not
E, and P is not non-E," and "P is not non-E, and P is
not non-non-E." These are both in the form of the
fourth lemma. If this lemma is to be interpreted as
"No P is E, and no P is non-E," then fei-shih (it is
not affirmed) equals "no," and shih (affirm) equals
"at least some, any." Taking shih in this way as an
existential quantifier, the logical structure of
Document 10 may be formulated:
(a) "P is not E" means "No P is E."
(b) "P is not E" does not mean "Some P is non-E."
(59) J. W. De Jong, Cinic chapitres de la
Prasannapadaa (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1949). pp.
(60) Richard H. Robinson, Some Logical Aspects of
Naagaarjuna's System, Philosophy East and West,
VI. No. 4 (January, 1957), 301.
(c) "P is not noon-E" means "No P is non-E."
(d) "P is not non-E"does not mean "Some P is
(e) "P is not E, and P is not non-E."
(f) "P is not non-E, and P is not non-non-E."
Substituting according to (a) and (c),
(e) becomes: "No P is E, and no P is non-E,"
(f) becomes: "No P is non-E, and no P is E."
Thus it appears that (e) and (f) are identical.
Since the two constituent propositions of the fourth
lemma are each other's contraries ("No P is E," and
"No P is non-E") the negation of their respective
predicates leaves the whole lemma unchanged; the
operation is infinitely regressive.
It is like the three positions--east, west, and
middle--with regard to each other. When we say that
the middle is not the east, we do not say that it is
identical with the west. On the basis of the
preceding statements, we should say "To say that it
is 'not east' is to say that it is not affirmed as
'east,' but does not mean that it is affirmed as 'not
east' and that 'not east' is determined as 'west.' To
say that it is 'not west' is to say that it is not
affirmed as 'west: but does not mean that it is
affirmed as 'nor west' and that 'not west' is
determined as 'east.'"... Answer: "If 'the not
existent and not inexistent' is affirmed as the
middle why labor to use the term 'middle' separately?
East, west, and middle are like this, coo. Further,
'not east' is not necessarily identical with 'not
east.' [i.e., one "not east" is not necessarily
identical with any other "not east."] 'South' and
'north' are also not 'east.' 'Not west' is not
necessarily identical with 'not west.' 'South' and
'north' are also 'not west.' If you pattern 'not
existent and not inexistent' on 'not east and not
west,' then you can understand it."
The analogy of the directions poses the problem
in terms of the different kinds of opposition. "Not
east" is the contradictory of "east," but "west" is
not the contradictory of "east;" but only its
contrary. Yüan-k'ang seems to be aware of the problem
of extension and of a kind of indeterminacy of
complements. However, his analogy leads him astray,
since "existent and inexistent" is a two-term
pattern, while the directions constitute a five-term
system. The spatial illustration presents the idea of
contr ariety vividly, but obscures the principle of
the quantity of terms on which the distinctions
between different kinds of opposition depend.
Several passages in the Chao-lun support the
supposition that Słng-chao understood the tetralemma
as involving quantification. "In some respects the
myriad things are not existent, " and "In some
respects the myriad
(61) Yuan-k'ang, Chao-lun Shu, Taish(-+o) XLV.188a9.
things are not inexistent." "Since in some respects
they do not exist, they cannot really exist." "Since
in some respects they do not inexist, they cannot
really inexist."(62) Another passage in the same
essay reiterates Słng-chao's acceptance of the fourth
lemma: "'Not existent and not inexistent' is indeed
speech about Absolute Truth."(63)
Given the general rules of interpretation that I
have extracted from Document 10, Słng-chao's
paradoxes do not violate the rule of contradiction.
They are simply oxymora--rhetorical paradoxes.
V. SÉNG-CHAO'S SYLLOGISMS
In form, the essays in the Chao-lun are a
composite of rhetorical exposition and formal
demonstration. Rhetorically, devices from Taoist
literature and from the 'Suunyavaadin Suutras such as
the Praj~naa-paaramitaa and the Vimalakiirti-nirde'sa
are blended together into a thoroughly ambivalent
style. In the formal demonstrations, which are the
particular concern of this article, Słng-chao
imitates Naagaarjuna's formal reasoning, though he
also employs forms that Naagaarjuna did not use. His
attempts to use the hypothetical syllogism are of
special interest, as this was prominent in
Naagaarjuna's reasoning, but relatively unimportant
in both the 'Suunyavaadin Suutras and Taoist
Fallacy of the Antecedent
Consider the structure of this section of
"If there is mentation, then there is a field. If
there are fields, then there are boundaries. When
fields and boundaries have taken shape, then one's
knowledge has limits. When one's knowledge has
limits, then one's cognition is not all-embracing.
The perfect Man has no mentation. As he has no
mentation, he has no field. As he has field, he has
no boundaries. Since he has no fields and boundaries,
his knowledge is limitless. Since his knowledge is
limitless, the range of his cognition is boundless."
The propositional form of this argument is:
This is a remarkable chain of four successive
implications, However, the syllogism is invalid,
because it exemplifies the fallacy of negating the
antecedent four times, once in each stage of the
conclusion. It is evident that, in spite of the
formal complexity of the successive implications,
(62) Chao-lun, Part II, Taish(-+o) 152b18 ff.;
Liebenthal, pp. 62-63.
(63) Ibid., Taish(-+o) 152b28; Liebenthal, p. 63,
last two lines.
chao was not aware of the nature of implication, at
least when he wrote this passage.
A simpler variety of the same construction occurs
in Praj~naa Has No Knowing.(64)
If there are some things that are known, then
there are some things that are not known. In the Holy
Mind there are no things that ate known. Therefore
there are no things in it that are not known.
The propositional form of this invalid syllogism
A further interesting feature of this argument is
the initial implication, which expresses
Naagaarjuna's concept of negation as the complement
of 1 finite extension, universal and null terms being
excluded from consideration.(65) Compare
Madhyamaka-kaarikaas, XIII.7: "If something non-empty
existed, then there might be something termed empty,"
and XXVII.18: "If 'both eternal and non-eternal' were
established, then 'neither eternal nor non-eternal'
might be established"
Probably Słng-chao constructed this argument in
imitation of one of Naagaarjuna's syllogisms which
commit the fallacy of the antecedent, for example,
Madhyamaka-kaarikaas VII.17: "If any non-arisen
entity occurred anywhere, then it might arise; but,
since it does not exist, the entity cannot
Would you say that they inexist? Then annullist
views would not be erroneous. Would you say that
things exist? Then eternalist views would be correct.
Because things are not inexistent, annullist views
are erroneous. Because things are not existent,
eternalist views are not correct.
The form of this argument is:
It consists of two hypothetical syllogisms in
tandem. In both, the antecedent is negated, and the
argument is fallacious.
(64) Chao-lun, Part III, Taish(-+o) 153a27;
(65) Robinson, op.cit., pp. 299-300.
(66) Ibid., p.297.
(67) Chao-lun, part II, Taish(-+o) 152b26 ff.;
There are two valid examples of the affirmation
of the antecedent in Emptiness of the Non-Absolute.
If you would say that they exist, their existence
arises non-absolutely. If you would say that they
inexist, their forms have taken shape. Having
forms and shapes, they are not identical with
the inexistent; being non-absolute, they are not
The logical structure Of this passage is easier
to see if it is reworded as follows:
(1) If things' existence arises non-absolutely,
then the things do not really exist. The existence of
things arises non-absolutely. Therefore, things do
not really exist.
(2) If things have shapes, then they do really
inexist. Things have
Here, as in Document 14, there are two
hypothetical syllogisms in tandem. shapes. Therefore,
they do not really inexist.
However, in this case the syllogisms are valid,
though not rigorously stated.
If the present reached the past, there should be
the present in the past. If the past reached the
present, there should be the past in the present
There is no past in the present, so we know that it
does not come. There is no present in the past, so we
know that it does not depart.
This argument consists of two hypothetical
syllogisms in tandem; In both, the consequent is
negated, and thus both are valid instances of modus
If the myriad things were inexistent, then they
should not arise. If they arise, then they are not
inexistent. Thus we know that because they arise from
conditions, they do not inexist.
The second implication is a valid conversion of
the first, obtainable by negating the consequent of
the first. The conclusion follows validly from either
the first implication (by modus tollens) or the
second implication (by modus ponens).
(68) Chao-lun, part II, Taisho 152c16; Liebenthal,
(69) Chao-lun, Part I, Things Do Not Shift; Taisho
151c14 ff.; Liebenthal, p.53.
(70) Chao-lun, Part II, Taisho 152c6; Liebenthal,
As the dilemma was one of Naagaarjuna's favorite
devices,(71) there is some interest in comparing
Słng-chao's dilemmas with Naagaarjuna's. Contrary to
expectation, I have found only two dilemmas in the
Chao-lun, both in the first essay, Things Do Not
What other people mean by motion is that because
past things do not reach the present, they move and
are not still. What I mean by stillness is that
because past things do not reach the present they are
still and do not move. [According to others] they
move and are not still, because they do not come.
[According to me] they are still and do not move,
because they do not depart.
This dilemma is an inference of contradictory
conclusions from the same reason. Most of
Naagaarjuna's dilemmas, though, draw the same
conclusion from contradictory reasons, for example,
Madhyamaka-kaarikaas XXV. 1--2: "[Opponent:] If all
this [world] is empty, then there is no arising and
perishing, and no one's nirvaa.na through abandonment
or cessation is asserted. [Naagaarjuna:] If all this
[world] is non-empty, then there is no arising and
perishing, and no one's nirvaa.na through abandonment
or cessation is asserted."(73)
Since [other people] know that past things do not
come, they think that present things can pass. [But I
say,] since past things do not come, where do present
things go? What does this mean? If you seek past
things in the past, they are never inexistent in the
past. If you seek past things in the present, they
ate never existent in the present. They are never
existent in the present, so we understand that things
do not come. Because they are never inexistent in the
past, we know that things do not depart. If next we
examine the present, the present likewise does not
Słng-chao contradicts the opponent's conclusion
that present things can pass,while he accepts his
reason--that past things do not come. This is a
dilemma of the same type as that in Document 18.
V. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT SENG-CHAO'S LOGIC
(a) Słng-chao's paradoxes are only apparent, and
ate easily resolved by the doctrine of the Two Truths
and by determining the quantity of his terms.
(71) Robinson, op.cit., pp. 303-304.
(72) Chao-lun, Part I, Taish(-+o) 151a22; Liebenthal,
(73) Robinson, op.cit., p.304.
(74) Chao-lun, Part I, Taish(-+o) 151a28; Liebenthal,
(b) He understood the terralemma, and thus had
some knowledge of the logic of classes.
(C) He employed the hypothetical syllogism but
not as frequently as Naagaarjuna. Like Naagaarjuna,
he sometimes violated and sometimes observed the
rules of conversion. Thus his control of simple
propositional logic was poor.
(d) He constructed very few dilemmas, and those
that he did construct were not of the same type as
Naagaarjuna's commonest dilemmas.
(e) In view of the foregoing, I conclude that
Słng-chao was not antilogical, though his
manipulation of logical forms was imperfect. He tried
to reason formally, and sometimes succeeded.
This inquiry has been concerned chiefly with
features of Słng-chao's reasoning that have
counterparts in early Maadhyamika writings. His
logical forms also owe much to the Chinese tradition.
He uses the so-called "chain syllogism,"(75) and his
preference for carrying two arguments in tandem
obviously belongs to the p'ien-wen (double-harness
literary style) tradition.(76) This, though, is
VI. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
It cannot be established that Słng-chao's
paradoxes themselves, rather than their rational
solution, ate the goal. These paradoxes, like
Naagaarjuna's, serve to demonstrate that reality
cannot be described by means of the concept of
own-being (svabhaava) and with terms that exactly
match actuals. But if one understands the rational
solution to these apparent contradictions, then one
is brought face to face with the mystery of the
relation between symbols and actuals.
Słng-chao's syllogisms do not aim to establish
the existence of supramundane entities any more than
Naagaarjuna's did. The Indian master and his Chinese
follower understood the tetralemma in the same way.
Whenever Słng-chao asserted one of the first three
lemmas, he did so with the explicit sanction of
Madhyamaka-kaarikaas XVIII.8, and the Chung-lun
commentary on that verse. That is, he employed such
expressions as heuristic designations. Further, his
errors in formal reasoning were ones that Naagaarjuna
had committed before him. To the extent that
surviving materials do not indicate that Słng-chao
was aware of the rule of contradiction or the rule of
the excluded middle, his understanding of Naagaarjuna
(75) Derk Bodde, China's First Unifier (Leiden: E. J.
Brill, 1938) pp.228-232.
(76) E. R. Hughes, Chinese Epistemological Methods,
Charles A. Moore ed., Essays in East-West
Philosophy, pp.59 ff.
(77) Robinson, op. cit., p.295.
Nevertheless, his hypothetical syllogisms are genuine
prasa^nga in form.
The ontological objective of Słng-chao's
arguments, as it can be inferred from his writings,
is not to establish any 'positive" entities as
existent, but quite simply to demonstrate that
"existent" and "inexistent" cannot be absolutely and
universally predicated of anything. Reality belongs
to an order that is fundamentally incommensurable
with symbolic systems such as language. Nevertheless,
language performs a function in establishing this
Słng-chao was in agreement with Wittgenstein's
conclusion in the Tractatus: "My propositions are
elucidatory in this way; he who understands me
finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has
climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He
must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has
climbed up on it.) He must surmount these
propositions; then he sees the world right. Whereof
one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."(78)
It seems that in fifth-century China, as in the
modern world, at least one thinker saw an intimate
connection between logical or dialectical forms and
the mystery of reality, that he saw the road to
bodhi, not in the practice of trances, but as a
journey through, on, and over propositions about
existence and inexistence.
(78) Wittgenstein, op. cit., 6.54, pp.188-189.