U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS WASHINGTON, D.C. 20401 In the Matter of ) ) the Appeal of ) ) ST IVES, INC. ) Docket No. GPOBCA 12-93 Jacket No. 331-461 ) Purchase Order 88271 ) For the Appellant: St. Ives, Inc, 2025 McKinley Street, Hollywood, Florida , by William L. Dickey, Attorney at Law, Washington, DC. For the Government: Kerry L. Miller, Esq., Associate General Counsel, U.S. Government Printing Office. Before BERGER, Ad Hoc Chairman. DECISION AND ORDER By Notice of Appeal filed on June 3, 1993, St. Ives, Inc. (Appellant or Contractor), 2025 McKinley Street, Hollywood, Florida 33020, timely appealed the April 6, 1993, final decision of Contracting Officer John W. Adams of the U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO or Respondent) denying the Contractor's post-award request for relief based on an assertion of a mistake in its bid under a contract identified as Jacket 331-461, Purchase Order 88271. See Rule 4 File, Tab M.1 For the reasons which follow, the Contracting Officer's decision is AFFIRMED and the appeal is DENIED.2 I. BACKGROUND On October 9, 1992, GPO issued an invitation for bid (Jacket 331-461) for 250,000 copies and a set of film negatives for a 28-page publication entitled "Air National Guard Planning Guide 1993" (Planning Guide). In response, it received 14 responsive bids on the extended bid opening date of October 22, 1992, ranging from the Appellant's low bid of $163,865 to a high bid of $290,000. Rule 4 File, Tab B. On October 27, upon noticing that the Appellant's bid was $30,000 lower than the next lowest bid, the Respondent contacted the Appellant, pointed out the $30,000 difference, and requested the Appellant to review its bid. Specifically, the Appellant was told to review its worksheets to ensure that the bid was "all inclusive" and to check the stock and inks to make sure that nothing was left out. Rule 4 File, Tabs C and M. The Appellant responded by facsimile transmission on that same date, confirming its bid. The contract was awarded to the Appellant on October 28, 1992. On October 29, 1992, the Appellant claimed a mistake in its bid, asserting that the bid was based on the wrong paper stock, JCP (Joint Committee on Printing) L60 instead of JCP L61 (hereinafter L60 or L61), the stock required by the specifications. The Appellant, in a November 2, 1992, letter to the Respondent, explained that it first requested a price quote on L61 stock, but that its paper supplier was not familiar with L61, which led both parties to believe that L61 was a typographical error and that L60 was the intended paper stock. The Contracting Officer concluded that Appellant's claimed error did not entitle it to a remedy and denied the claim for relief. The Appellant, by this time aware that it could not perform the contract using either paper because of a compatibility problem between the paper and the Appellant's presses, subcontracted the job, with the Respondent's approval, to Gateway Press, Inc., the third lowest bidder, at that company's bid price of $193,284. Rule 4 File, Tab H; Harris Affidavit; Adams Declaration; SMRCR. The Appellant seeks rescission or reformation of its contract with reimbursement for the difference between its contract price of $163,865 and the higher subcontract price. II. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES A. The Appellant The Appellant argues that it made a unilateral mistake in its bid, that mistake being the assumption that the IFB's requirement for L61 paper was a typographical error and that L60 paper was the actual requirement. The Appellant asserts that this was a reasonable mistake for it to make because L60 stock was the paper stock previously used for the Planning Guide and because the IFB did not highlight the fact that L61 paper had been substituted for L60 paper. Appellant argues that the Government had "actual notice" that Appellant had misread the IFB because the Contracting Officer knew or should have known that Appellant's sophisticated web presses could not use L61 paper stock. The Appellant further argues that the Respondent's request that it review its bid was insufficient to alert it to its misreading of the IFB's paper requirement. The Appellant further asserts that a mutual mistake was made in this case, that mistake being the belief of both parties, the Appellant and GPO, that paper stock L61 could run on Appellant's presses to meet the requirements of this contract when in fact it could not. (At oral argument Counsel for the Appellant stated that the mutual mistake involved the assumption that either paper stock, L60 or L61, could run on Appellant's presses but, as was subsequently discovered, neither could.) The Appellant believes this mutual mistake entitles it to relief. The Appellant further asserts that GPO erred in finding Appellant to be a responsible bidder because Appellant did not possess the equipment necessary to perform the contract using L61 paper. Based on the foregoing arguments, Appellant, as stated above, requests contract rescission or reformation or other appropriate relief including reimbursement of the difference between its contract price and the price of its subcontract with Gateway Press. B. The Respondent The Respondent asserts that Appellant is not entitled to relief because the errors it made were errors of judgment rather than the type of errors, e.g., arithmetical error, misreading specifications, for which mistake-in-bid relief is available. Respondent further asserts that the Contracting Officer properly discharged his bid verification duty, and that once Appellant verified its bid the Contracting Officer had no choice but to accept the bid, thereby giving rise to a binding contract. The Respondent further argues that the incompatibility of Appellant's web presses with L61 paper is not a legitimate basis for a claim of mutual mistake. III. ISSUES PRESENTED 1. Did the Appellant make a unilateral mistake in its bid for which relief is available? If so, did the Contracting Officer know or should he have known of the mistake prior to accepting the bid? If so, did the Contracting Officer adequately discharge his bid verification duty? 2. Did the parties make a mutual mistake that requires the rescission or reformation of the contract? 3. Did the Respondent improperly determine Appellant to be a responsible bidder? IV. DISCUSSION A. Unilateral Mistake The rules governing unilateral mistakes are straightforward. One party to a contract who knows or should know that the other party has made a mistake in its offer may not sit quietly by and take advantage of the other party's error; to do so is considered to be improper "overreaching." Ruggiero v. United States, 190 Ct. Cl. 327, 420 F.2d 709 (1970). To prevent this overreaching, federal procurement regulations have imposed on contracting officers a bid verification duty, so that whenever a contracting officer suspects that a bidder has made a mistake in its bid, the contracting officer must point out that suspicion and the basis for it. See, e.g., Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) §§ 14.407-1, 14.407-3(g) (1). The Respondent's mistake in bid rules, which are nearly identical to the FAR provisions, require a contracting officer who suspects a mistake to advise the bidder of that fact and point out, "as appropriate," that the bid is considerably lower than other bids received or the Government's estimate, that there are "important or unusual characteristics of the specifications," that there are "changes in requirements from previous purchases of a similar item," or "other data proper for disclosure that will put the bidder on notice of the suspected mistake." Printing Procurement Regulations, GPO Pub. 305.3 (Rev. 10-90)(hereinafter PPR), Chap. XI, Sec. 6, ¶ 3.(g) . If the bidder responds by alleging a mistake, the bidder is given an opportunity to establish by appropriate evidence that a mistake was made and to either withdraw or correct the bid. PPR Chap. XI, Sec. 6, ¶ 3. On the other hand, if the bidder verifies that the bid is correct as submitted, in most cases the bid may be accepted for award and the award will result in a binding contract. PPR Chap. XI, Sec. 6, ¶ 3.(g)(2) ("[i] f the bid is verified, the Contracting Officer shall consider the bid as originally submitted"); Peterman, Windham & Yaughn, Inc., 56 Comp. Gen. 239 (1977), 77-1 CPD ¶ 20. When a contractor first asserts a mistake-in-bid claim after award of the contract, what must be determined is whether the contracting officer, before award, knew or should have known of the possibility of an error in the bid. PPR Chap. XI, Sec. 6, ¶ 4.c. (relief is available if ". . . the . . . mistake made by the contractor was so apparent as to have charged the Contracting Officer with notice of probability of mistake"); Chernick v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 498, 372 F.2d 492 (1967); The Kato Corp., ASBCA 47601, 97-2 BCA ¶ 29,130. If the circumstances were such so as to put the contracting officer on notice of a possible mistake in a bid, the question becomes whether the contracting officer adequately discharged the required bid verification duty. United States v. Hamilton Enters., Inc., 711 F.2d 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1983). If he/she did not, a contract award to the bidder submitting the erroneous bid will not give rise to a binding contract notwithstanding that the bidder, in response to a verification request, verified the bid as correct. BDF Tesa Corp., GSBCA 8307, 89-3 BCA ¶ 21,925. In such circumstances, the contractor generally will be entitled to rescission or reformation, as appropriate, of the contract. It is the contractor's burden, however, to establish this entitlement to relief by clear and convincing evidence. PPR Chap. XI, Sec. 6, ¶ 4.c.; Olympic Graphic Sys., GPOBCA 01-92 (September 13, 1996), slip op., 1996 WL 812957. At the outset, it is important to note that relief is not available for every mistake that a bidder might make. Arithmetical and mathematical errors and misunderstanding or misinterpreting the specifications typically provide a basis for relief under the mistake rules; relief is not available, however, for mistakes in judgment. Ruggiero v. United States, supra; Aydin Corp. v. United States, 229 Ct. Cl. 309, 669 F.2d 681 (1982); Handy Tool & Mfg. Co., Inc., 60 Comp. Gen. 189 (1981), 81-1 CPD ¶ 27; R.P. Richards Constr. Co.; PW Constr., Inc., B-274859.2; B-274859.3, Jan. 22, 1997, 97-1 CPD ¶ 39; Olympic Graphic Sys., supra. Thus, a contractor will not be entitled to mistake-in-bid relief in all cases involving an inadequate verification request; the mistake made must be one cognizable under the mistake rules. Therefore, the Board first must consider the Respondent's argument that the only error the Appellant made was essentially an error in business judgment, the type of error for which mistake-in-bid relief is not available. According to the Respondent, the Appellant's error was three- fold: (1) Appellant assumed, without seeking clarification from the Contracting Officer, that because L60 paper had been used in the past, L61 paper specified in the IFB was a typographical error; (2) Appellant did not subscribe to the relevant publication that describes all JCP paper stocks, including L61, even though the information provided by the publication is essential to Appellant's business; and (3) Appellant submitted its bid without first determining if the specified paper would run on its presses. The Respondent considers these matters as involving business judgment rather than misunderstanding specifications. The Board does not agree with the Respondent on this issue. While Appellant clearly exercised some judgment based on its experience and knowledge as to what the paper stock specification provision actually meant, that does not make the error one of business judgment rather than one of specification misinterpretation. Experienced Government contractors do not read specifications in a vacuum, but can be expected to bring to that exercise their knowledge and general understanding of Government requirements and make judgments about what the specifications require in light of that knowledge and understanding. See generally Centre Mfg. Co., Inc., ASBCA 10854, 66-1 BCA ¶ 5613; Grand Central Aircraft Co., ASBCA 5128, 59-2 BCA ¶ 2352. The exercise of that judgment in the interpretation of a specification cannot, when the judgment is erroneous, simply be labeled as business judgment when a contractor seeks mistake-in-bid relief. To hold otherwise obviously would eliminate the misunderstanding/misinterpretation of specifications basis for mistake-in-bid relief. Moreover, Appellant's failure to seek clarification from the Contracting Officer and to obtain an available publication describing the different paper stocks available does not, in the Board's view, establish the nature of the mistake as either one of business judgment or one of misreading a specification-it simply bears on the avoidability of the mistake. A useful distinction suggested by the cases in this area is whether the mistake involves: (1) the quantity or nature of the work; or (2) the effort required to perform the work. See John Cibinic, Jr. & Ralph C. Nash, Jr., Administration of Government Contracts 3d ed. 332 (The George Washington University, 1995) (hereinafter Nash & Cibinic, Administration). A mistake involving the former is regarded as a misinterpretation of specifications, while a mistake concerning the latter is viewed as a matter of business judgment. Thus, an experienced contractor's failure to read more than four of the 98 pages of specifications before submitting a bid, leading to a misjudgment of what would be required to meet the specifications (Liebherr Crane Corp. v. United States, 810 F.2d 1153 (Fed. Cir. 1987)), a company's error in determining the nature and cost of materials necessary to perform (Aydin Corp. v. United States, supra), and a company's failure to obtain supplier quotes before computing its bid price (Handy Tool & Mfg. Co., Inc., supra) were held to involve business judgment, while interpretations of specifications as calling for less work than they actually did (Walter Straga, ASBCA 26134, 83-2 BCA ¶ 16,611; BCM Corp. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 602 (1983)) were held to involve the kind of mistake for which relief could be granted. In light of this distinction, it seems clear that the Appellant's asserted error involves the nature of the work, not the effort to perform it. What is at issue is not, for example, the Contractor's judgment as to the amount or type of labor or equipment needed to properly perform the job, but the nature of the final product, that is, the particular kind of paper stock on which the publication was to be printed. Errors in understanding or interpreting what the contract specifications require as a deliverable end product are exactly what is encompassed by the mistake-in-bid rules. BCM Corp. v. United States, supra; Wico, Inc., EBCA 125-6-80, 80-2 BCA ¶ 14,790. The Board concludes that the Appellant's error is not one of business judgment, but one that is cognizable under the mistake-in-bid rules. Resolution of Appellant's unilateral mistake in bid claim depends, therefore, on whether the Contracting Officer adequately discharged his bid verification duty. It is not disputed that the Contracting Officer was on notice of a possible mistake in Appellant's bid. That notice resulted from the $30,000 price disparity between Appellant's bid and the next lowest bid, and led to the Respondent's request to the Contractor that it review its bid. In making that request, the Respondent pointed out to the Appellant the precise basis-the $30,000 bid price differential-for its suspicion of error in the bid. Rule 4 File, Tabs C and M. The Appellant reviewed its bid and verified it, and the contract award followed. The Appellant asserts that the verification process was fatally flawed because the Respondent did not place Appellant on notice of Appellant's actual error-misunderstanding what paper was required in performing the contract. There is no requirement, however, that the Respondent have done so. As set forth above, a contracting officer's duty is to alert a bidder to a possible bid mistake when one is suspected and to the basis for the contracting officer's belief that a mistake might have been made; there is no duty to divine exactly what error a bidder might have made and to point out that precise error in the verification request. Thus, the verification request cannot be considered faulty because it did not highlight for Appellant the actual basis for Appellant's error; it is faulty only if the contracting officer knew or should have known of that basis or any other particular basis for the possible error in Appellant's bid apart from what was brought to the Appellant's attention-the dollar differential between Appellant's bid and the next lowest bid, along with the request to check stock and inks, etc., to ensure that nothing was left out. The Board finds no flaw in the verification request. First, there is no factual basis in the record for a conclusion that the Contracting Officer knew or should have known of any particular reason for the possible error in Appellant's bid. While Appellant asserts that the Contracting Officer knew or should have known that the specified paper stock could not be run on Appellant's presses, the Contracting Officer denies this, R.R. Brf., Adams Declaration (see infra p. 16), and in any event it is not apparent why such knowledge, if it did exist, should have led to further knowledge or suspicion that the Appellant had decided to ignore the specifications and base its bid on using paper other than that called for by the specifications. In fact, Appellant itself concedes that the Contracting Officer was not aware of the actual error made. Complaint, ¶ 23 ("The true nature of the mistake . . . was not readily apparent to . . . the Contracting Officer . . ."); Rule 4 File, Tab H (". . . the Contracting Officer was no more aware than the Contractor that this particular mistake had been made"). Second, the Board does not agree that the verification request should have included specific reference to the paper stock requirement. Appellant, relying on Chap. XI, Sec. 6, ¶ 3.(g) of the PPR (quoted above), asserts that the specifications had an "unusual characteristic" and represented a "change from previous similar purchases," Complaint, ¶ 14, because L61 was a new paper stock with specifications not widely circulated to the public and because L60 stock had been previously specified for similar jobs, thereby requiring Respondent to direct Appellant to the L61 specification requirement when requesting verification. The regulations require information about unusual or changed specifications to be provided to "assure that the bidder will be put on notice of a mistake suspected by the Contracting Officer. . . ." PPR, Chap. XI, Sec. 6, ¶ 3.(g)(1). Since the contracting officer's duty is to place bidders on notice of a suspected mistake and, when a particular mistake is suspected, of that particular mistake, Structural Finishing, Inc., ASBCA 26647, 84-2 BCA ¶ 17303; Ames Color-File Corp., B-185873, Mar. 26, 1976, 76-1 CPD ¶ 199 (denying relief in another GPO procurement to a bidder whose bid was some 33 percent lower than the next lowest bid but who confirmed the bid after being informed of the discrepancy and requested to review the specifications and who then after award asserted a mistake based on using less expensive paper than required by the specifications); Andy Elec. Co., B-194610.2, Aug. 10, 1981, 81-2 CPD ¶ 111; Atlas Builders, Inc., B-186959, Aug. 30, 1976, 76-2 CPD ¶ 204; Porta-Kamp Mfg. Co., Inc., 54 Comp. Gen. 545 (1974), 74-2 CPD ¶ 393, in the Board's view the regulatory language does not require unusual or changed specification information to be provided as part of every verification request when such a specification exists, but means simply that the information should be provided when the contracting officer suspects or should suspect that the possible mistake arose from a failure to understand or appreciate the requirements of the unusual or changed specification provision. The Appellant has not explained exactly what the "unusual characteristic" of the L61 paper stock is that should have led the Contracting Officer to suspect a mistake in connection with the L61 requirement. The record also establishes that while the L61 specification was relatively new, it was not scarce or unavailable. It was included in Amendment No. 2 to No. 9 of the Government Paper Specification Standards issued by the JCP (R. R. Brf., Atch. 1); the Amendment was issued on June 1, 1992, and was distributed by the Respondent to subscribers by August 14, 1992, and was available to the public by subscription until April 29, 1993. R. R.Brf., Cameron Declaration. It is also apparent from the record that the Appellant is an experienced GPO contractor with a satisfactory performance record, R.R. Brf., Adams Declaration (St. Ives . . . has been successfully performing large GPO contracts for many years"), and therefore one about whom the Contracting Officer had no reason to suspect would not be familiar with, or at least aware of, the most recent specifications. Thus, although there is no dispute in the record concerning the actual unfamiliarity of the Appellant and its paper buyer with the specification, the record does not establish that the Contracting Officer knew or should have known of this unfamiliarity such that he should have tied the suspected error in the Appellant's bid to the paper specification even if, as the Appellant asserts, this was the first time the Respondent specified L61 paper3 for the type of publication involved in this procurement.4 Accordingly, the Board concludes that the Contracting Officer did not suspect and should not have suspected that the Appellant's bid was based on the use of an incorrect paper stock, and that the verification request was legally adequate. This conclusion does not quite end our inquiry into the unilateral mistake issue. Although Respondent asserts that once bid verification is received the Contracting Officer need make no further inquiries and that generally the only appropriate course of action is to make award, R.Brf. at. 9, that is not precisely the rule. The Comptroller General has held that a contracting officer who suspects that a mistake has been made notwithstanding receipt of verification from the bidder has a duty to pursue the matter further with the bidder before accepting the bid5, William M. Young & Co., B- 188374, Apr. 18, 1977, 77-1 CPD ¶ 271, and ultimately should reject the bid if it is clear that a mistake has been made. See, e.g., American Independent Corp., B-258126; B-258126.2, Jan. 18, 1995 (unpub.); Tratoros Constr., Inc., B-254600, Jan. 4, 1994, 94-1 CPD ¶ 1; TLC Financial Group, B-237384, Jan. 26, 1990, 90-1 CPD ¶ 116 (a contracting officer may not accept an obviously erroneous bid). In this regard, both the FAR (§14.407-3(g)(5)) and the PPR (Chapt. XI, Sec. 6, ¶ 3(g)(4)) provide that where a bidder fails to furnish evidence in support of a suspected mistake, the contracting officer shall reject, rather than accept, the bid where the amount of the bid is so far out of line with other bids or there are other clear indications of error such that acceptance of the bid would be unfair to the bidder or to other bona fide bidders. See, e.g., R.P. Richards Constr. Co., B- 260543, June 21, 1995, 95-1 CPD ¶ 280, recon. denied, B-260543.2, Aug. 23, 1995, 95-2 CPD ¶ 80. Clearly erroneous bids subject to rejection under these provisions include those based on misinterpretations of solicitation requirements. Orbas & Assocs., B-255276, Feb. 23, 1994, 94-1 CPD ¶ 139; Martin Contracting, B-241229.2, Feb. 6, 1991, 91-1 CPD ¶ 121. Appellant cannot prevail here, however, because the record does not establish that the Contracting Officer had any reason to believe, upon receipt of the Appellant's verification, that there was a mistake in the Appellant's bid. While the Appellant's bid was $30,000 lower than the next lowest bid and no other bid was that much below the next lowest responsive bid, this procurement produced a wide swing in bid prices with a difference between the eighth and ninth lowest bid exceeding $26,000. Rule 4 File, Tab B. Moreover, while the Appellant's price ($655.58/m) was below the 1991 contract price ($770/m), Rule 4 File, Tab D, the 1992 contract called for a 25 percent greater quantity and the Appellant itself notes that it has "price advantages inherent in use of [its] sophisticated web-fed versus competitors sheet feed presses." Rule 4 File, Tab H. In addition, the Contracting Officer knew St. Ives to be an experienced, well-established GPO printing contractor. R.R. Brf., Adams Declaration. Under the circumstances, the Board does not view the Appellant's bid as so out of line with the other bids or the $30,000 difference between the Appellant's bid and the next lowest bid as so clearly indicative of error despite the verification such that the Contracting Officer should not have accepted the Appellant's bid. B. Mutual Mistake The rules governing mutual mistake are also simple. As relevant here, a contractor will be entitled to relief if both the contractor and the government, at the time of the contract award, made a mistake as to a basic assumption upon which the contract is based, the assumption had a material effect upon contract performance, and the contractor did not assume the risk of the mistake. Dairyland Power Co-op. v. United States, 16 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1994); National Presto Ind., Inc. v. United States, 338 F.2d 99 (Ct. Cl. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965); Morris v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 733 (1995); Bath Iron Works Corp., ASBCA 44617, 45232, 97-2 BCA ¶ 29,073. It is not enough that both parties make a mistake; both parties must make the same mistake. Natus Corp. v. United States, 371 F.2d 450 (Ct. Cl. 1967). If there is clear and convincing evidence that a mutual mistake was made, the contract may be rescinded or reformed. PPR, Chap. XI, Sec. 6, ¶ 4.c. Appellant argues that a mutual mistake was made here in that both it and the Respondent incorrectly believed that the specified paper stock, L61, could run on Appellant's presses. According to the Appellant, the L61 paper is manufactured for sheet-fed presses and cannot be used on its web-fed presses. Appellant "submits that neither the Contracting Officer nor St Ives at the time of award . . . knew in fact that JCP L61 paper would not run on St Ives' web fed presses. This was a mutual mistake of fact . . . ." App. Brf. at 7. The Respondent's position is that the Contracting Officer had no knowledge that St. Ives lacked sheet-fed presses or that the L61 paper was not available for web presses. The Board is not persuaded that there was a mutual mistake here. Preliminarily, the Board notes that the Appellant's factual assertions in support of its mutual mistake theory-to the effect that the Contracting Officer did not know that L61 (or even L60) paper would not work on Appellant's web-fed presses-are inconsistent with its other factual assertions that the Contracting Officer knew or should have known that Appellant had web-fed pressses and that L61 paper would not work on those presses. Complaint at 2-3; App. Brf. at 6; Report of Oral Argument at 3. More importantly, the record does not establish that the Respondent made a mistake that is encompassed by the mutual mistake concept. First, there is no persuasive evidence that the Contracting Officer made the mistake alleged by the Appellant. The Contracting Officer states that he did not know that L61 paper was a sheet-fed paper and did not know that the Appellant did not have sheet-fed presses. He explains: It is not a standard practice for Contracting Officers to inquire of large, well-established printing contractors whether they have web or sheet-fed presses. If a Contracting Officer receives a bid from a contractor, like St. Ives, that has been successfully performing large GPO contracts for many years, there is no need to conduct an inquiry to determine whether they have a certain type of press. It is the contractor's obligation to ascertain their equipment needs and to decide whether their equipment can produce the product. . . . I did not know at the time of contract award that St. Ives lacked sheet-fed presses. . . . Similarly, at the time of award, I did not have any knowledge that L61 paper was only available in sheet-fed form. Since all paper is manufactured on rolls at the factory, and the paper is then cut down into sheets, there is no such thing as a paper which cannot be manufactured in a form usable by web presses. The paper specifications do not limit the use of L61 to sheet-fed presses. R.R.Brf., Adams Declaration. The Board ascertains from this statement that the Contracting Officer did not make it his business to know about the particular types of presses used by GPO contractors, including St. Ives, and did not know or have any reason to know whether there would be a compatibility problem between St. Ives' equipment and any particular paper stock. There is no evidence in the record that rebuts this declaration. Although Appellant asserts that GPO's "on-file information on St Ives reflected it only had web presses that would not run the sheet fed only L61 paper," no evidence that this information exists, or that if it exists the Contracting Officer knew about it, has been introduced. Moreover, even if the Contracting Officer knew from such on-file information that St. Ives had only web-fed presses, that would not establish, in light of the Contracting Officer's declaration, that the Contracting Officer had assumed anything with respect to the compatibility of those presses with the specified paper stock. In addition, while a preaward survey on Appellant found satisfactory such things as Appellant's plant facilities and equipment and ability to meet the schedule, Rule 4 File, Tab E, it appears that this was a limited survey rather than the more detailed "full" survey utilized when a bidder's responsibility cannot be readily determined from available information. PPR, Chap. 1, Sec. 5, ¶ 5. Nothing in the record establishes that this limited preaward survey led the Contracting Officer to make any assumptions about what equipment the Appellant had, how the equipment operated, or whether any particular paper would or would not work with the equipment. In short, the Board finds nothing in the record that establishes the validity of the Appellant's assertion that the Contracting Officer knew of the Appellant's particular presses and assumed that the specified L61 paper could be run on those presses. Second, even if Appellant's factual assertions were borne out by the record, as a legal matter the Board could not find that a mutual mistake was made that would provide a basis for relief. As set forth above, for a contractor to get relief there must be a mutual mistake of a basic assumption. As explained in Nash & Cibinic, Administration at 323, that basic assumption must be "a significant part of the bargaining process." For example, in the leading case in this area, a mutual mistake was found to exist when it was discovered that a certain production method which was the subject of preaward discussion and which the contractor had agreed to use would not work. The court held that the parties had "reasonably labored . . . under a mutual mistake as to a most material set of facts." National Presto Indus., Inc., v. United States, supra, at 108. The basic assumption about which the parties were mistaken was that the agreed upon production method was feasible. See also Air Compressor Prods., Inc., ASBCA 40015, 91-2 BCA ¶ 23,957 (where both parties mistakenly believed a particular compressor model would satisfy requirements) and Management & Training Corp. v. General Servs. Admin., GSBCA 11182, 93-2 BCA ¶ 25,814 (where the parties were unaware of the true cost of utilities in government buildings). As the Federal Circuit stated in reviewing cases in this area: . . . where courts have reformed a contract, the parties recognize the existence of a fact about which they could negotiate, they mutually form a belief concerning that fact, but their belief is erroneous. In those cases the court may reform the contract to bring the parties' agreement in accord with the true state of the facts. . . . . . Other cases in which courts have permitted reformation . . . similarly show that the parties had an erroneous belief concerning a fact whose existence the parties recognized and about which they could reach agreement. See, e.g., Southwest Welding & Mfg. Co. v. United States, 373 F.2d 982, 179 Ct. Cl. 39 (1967) (the parties mistakenly believed the price of steel was lower than it actually was); Walsh v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 589, 121 Ct. Cl. 546 (1952) (the parties erroneously believed the minimum wage rate was a certain amount, even though it had increased earlier); Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D.Pa. 1980) (the parties erroneously believed that the Wholesale Price Index would accurately represent on labor production costs for the purpose of a contractual escalation clause). . . . . . Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895 F.2d 745, 750-1 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811 (1990). Here, there was no mutual error concerning anything that was part of the bargaining process or about which the parties could reach agreement. Stated another way, the alleged mistake, unlike in the cases cited above, does not directly involve a specific performance requirement or another contract term or condition. There is no mistake here about what is to be produced or the terms and conditions under which production, delivery, and contractor compensation are to occur. Rather, the mistake involves Appellant's initial misunderstanding of the specifications and its ultimate judgment about its ability to meet the specifications with its own equipment. Clearly, the Respondent did not know of the misinterpretation and, as set forth above, had no common understanding with Appellant that Appellant could meet specification requirements by using any specific type of equipment. These circumstances do not permit the conclusion that a mutual mistake was made here that would entitle the Appellant to relief. See Natus Corp. v. United States, supra, where the court held that a contractor, who sought mutual mistake relief when the production method it chose did not work, was not entitled to such relief because there was nothing "mutual" about the mistake-the contractor had unilaterally chosen the production approach, with the Government "at no time expressing any views as to how production should proceed." 371 F.2d at 14. C. Responsibility The Appellant's assertion that the Respondent erroneously found it to be a responsible bidder is not a matter for resolution by this Board. Bidder responsibility is a preaward matter and as such is not within the Board's jurisdiction. Rose Printing, Inc., GPO BCA 32-95 (December 16, 1996), slip op., 1996 WL 812880; Big Red Enters., GPO BCA 07-93 (August 30, 1996), slip op., 1996 WL 812960. ORDER Considering the record as a whole, the Board finds and concludes that: (1) Appellant has not established by clear and convincing evidence that it is entitled to unilateral mistake- in-bid relief; (2) Appellant and the Respondent did not make a mutual mistake entitling the Appellant to any relief; and (3) the Board is without jurisdiction to consider the Appellant's challenge to the Respondent's determination that Appellant was a responsible bidder. Therefore, the Contracting Officer's final decision denying relief is AFFIRMED and the appeal is DENIED. It is so Ordered. January 5, 1998 RONALD BERGER Ad Hoc Chairman GPO Board of Contract Appeals _______________ 1 The Contracting Officer's appeal file, assembled pursuant to Rule 4 of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure, dated September 17, 1984, was delivered to the Board on July 2, 1993. It will be referred to hereafter as the Rule 4 File, with an appropriate Tab letter also indicated. The Rule 4 File consists of 13 documents identified as Tab A through Tab M. 2 The Board's decision is based on: ( a) the Appellant's Notice of Appeal dated April 27, 1993; (b) the Rule 4 File; (c) the Appellant's Complaint dated July 2, 1993; (d) the Respondent's Answer dated August 5, 1993; (e) Appellant's Submission of Materials Requested in Order to Close the Record dated October 8, 1993 (hereinafter SMRCR); ( f) the Respondent's Notice of Filing dated October 15, 1997; (g) the Respondent's Brief dated November 8, 1993 (hereinafter R. Brf.); (h) the Brief of Appellant, St Ives Inc dated November 8, 1993 (hereinafter App. Brf.); (i) Report of Presubmission Telephone Conference dated November 29, 1993; (j) the Appellant's Reply Brief and Completion of the Record dated January 14, 1994 (hereinafter App. R. Brf.), and accompanying Affidavits of Jeffrey R. Harris and Ernest E. Engle; (k) the Respondent's Reply Brief dated January 14, 1994 (hereinafter R. R. Brf.), and accompanying Declarations of Phyllis J. Kent, James Cameron, John Adams, and Sylvia S. Subt; and (l) Report of Oral Argument dated July 7, 1994. (Oral argument was heard on May 24, 1994, and was not transcribed. A hearing was not held in this case, the appellant having waived a hearing pursuant to Board Rules 8 and 11.) 3 The prior solicitation for the Planning Guide, Jacket No. 300-761, issued on September 9, 1991, did not identify a specific JCP code for the required paper, but Appellant states that "JCP L60 had traditionally be[en] used." App. Brf. at 5. 4 Indeed, the amount of the disparity between Appellant's bid and the next lowest bid would suggest that the suspected error was not tied to the intended use of L60 paper instead of L61. According to Appellant, the cost of L60 paper needed for performing this contract was $78,386, while the cost for L60 paper would have been $124,740, a difference of $46,354. SMRCR. It seems reasonable that a bid based on L60 instead of L61 paper therefore likely would be understated by considerably more than the $30,000 that alerted the Contracting Officer to the mistake possibility here. 5 See L. Washington & Assocs., Inc., B-276556 et al., June 26, 1997, 97-1 CPD ¶ 229, for an example of multiple verification requests preceding agency decisions as to whether to accept a bid.