Congressional Record: October 27, 1999 (Senate)
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS By Mr. MOYNIHAN: S. 1801. A bill to provide for the identification, collection, and review for declassification of records and materials that are of extraordinary public interest to the people of the United States, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs. [[Page S13262]] public interest declassification act of 1999 Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, today I rise to introduce the Public Information Disclosure Act, a bill that seeks to add to our citizens' knowledge of how and why our country made many of its key national security decisions since the end of World War II. This bill creates a mechanism for comprehensively reviewing and declassifying, whenever possible, records of extraordinary public interest that demonstrate and record this country's most significant and important national security policies, actions, and decisions. As James Madison once wrote, "A people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives." Acquiring this knowledge has become increasingly difficult since World War II's end, when we witnessed the rise of a vast national security apparatus that encompasses thousands of employees and over 1.5 billion classified documents that are 25 years or older. Secrecy, in the end, is a form of regulation. And I concede that regulation of state secrets is often necessary to protect national security. But how much needs to be regulated after having aged 25 years or more? The warehousing and withholding of these documents and materials not only impoverish our country's historical record but retard our collective understanding of how and why the United States acted as it did. This means that we have less chance to learn from what has gone before; both mistakes and triumphs fall through the cracks of our collective history, making it much harder to resolve key questions about our past and to chart our future actions. On the other hand, greater openness makes it more possible for the government to explain itself and to defend its actions, a not so unimportant thing when one recalls Richard Hofstader's warning in his classic 1964 essay The Paranoid Style in American Politics: "The distinguishing thing about the paranoid style is not that its exponents see conspiracies here and there in history, but they regard a 'vast' or 'gigantic' conspiracy, set in motion by demonic forces of almost transcendent power as the motive force in historical events." A poll taken in 1993 found that three-quarters of those surveyed believed that President Kennedy was assassinated by a conspiracy involving the CIA, renegade elements of our military, and organized crime. The Grassy Knoll continues to cut a wide path across our national consciousness. The classified materials withheld from the Warren Commission, several of our actions in Vietnam, and Watergate have only added to the American people's distrust of the Federal government. Occasionally, though, the government has drawn back its cloak of secrecy and made substantial contributions to our national understanding. In 1995, the CIA and the NSA agreed to declassify the Venona intercepts, our highly secretive effort that ranged over four decades to decode the Soviet Union's diplomatic traffic. Much of this traffic centered on identifying Soviet spies, one of the cardinal preoccupations of that hateful era we call "McCarthyism." These releases made at least one thing crystal clear: Their timely release decades ago would have dimmed the klieg lights on many who were innocent and shown them more brightly on those who truly were guilty. It would have been an important contribution during a time when the innocent and the guilty were ensnared in the same net. Today, Congress plays a pivotal role in declassification through so- called "special searches." Generally, these involve a member of Congress or the White House asking the intelligence community to search its records on specific subjects. These have ranged from Pinochet to murdered American church women to President Kennedy's assassination. However, these good intentions often produce neither good results nor good history. Sadly, most of these searches have been done poorly, costing millions of dollars and consuming untold hours of labor. Several have been performed repeatedly. Special searches on murdered American church women, for example, have been done nine separate times. Yet there are still several important questions that have yet to be answered. The CIA alone has been asked to do 33 "special searches" since 1998. Part of the problem is that Congress lacks a centralized, rational way of addressing these requests. This bill establishes a nine-member board composed of outside experts who can filter and steer these searches, all the while seeking maximum efficiency and disclosure. The other part of the problem lies in how the intelligence community has conducted these searches. It is imperative that searches are carried out in a comprehensive manner. This is not only cheaper in the long run but produces a much more accurate record of our history. One cannot do Pinochet, for example, and not do Chile under his rule at the same time. To do otherwise skews history too much and creates too many blind spots, all leading to more questions and more searches. This does a disservice not only to those asking for these searches but to the American people who have to pay for ad hoc, poorly done declassification. If we do it right the first time, then we can forgo much inefficiency. Many of these special searches ask vital questions about this nation's role in many disturbing events. We must see, therefore, that they are done correctly and responsibly. This legislation, if passed, would improve Congress' role in declassification, making it an instrumental arm in the de-cloaking and re-democratization of our national history. Indeed, anything less would cheat our citizens, undermine their trust in our institutions, and erode our democratic values.