Nathan Cullen's plan for a pre-election accord between the NDP, Libs and Greens is certainly receiving loads of attention. Leadnow and Avaaz are encouraging members to join the NDP to support it (raising for me the question of how a large number of instant NDP members would allocate their down-ballot support if Cullen drops off the ballot). And Catch 22 is trying to make the case for pre-election cooperation as compared to other options in toppling the Harper Cons, while Malcolm calculates the remote odds of a such a strategy making a difference in actual electoral outcomes based on 2011 voting patterns.
But then, I'm not sure hindsight is the best way to evaluate what a cooperation plan would actually do. Instead, let's consider what would happen in the lead up to 2015 if Cullen were to win the NDP's leadership based on his plan.
To start with, as I've pointed out before, the goal of cooperation is mostly moot if the other main party needed to make the scheme work isn't committed to participating. And that means for a year after the NDP's leadership campaign, the most important question as to the primary plan of the leader of the Official Opposition would be based on the impending result of another party's leadership race - encouraging the media to keep focusing on the Libs for that year, while leaving the NDP's grassroots in limbo out of uncertainty as to how to allocate its resources.
So what would happen based on the results of the Libs' leadership race? Well, if they chose a candidate who supported Cullen's plan, then the next step would be for riding associations on both sides to plan their strategies for a co-operation scheme. Each would have a choice between not participating and planning for a campaign as usual, or participating and having to ramp up for a nomination contest. And both parties would have to work internally and coordinate with each other at all times to set up an agreeable nomination schedule and ground rules - diverting plenty of resources which might otherwise be used setting up a winning message against the Cons.
The co-operation plan would then apply only in the ridings where both parties' grassroots membership preferred cooperation - which would be far from assured based on some of the backlash against Cullen's plan from both sides of the party divide. And then a nomination meeting would only serve to divide the parties once more before the final effort to put their vote shares together.
In other words, if Cullen's proposal works as planned, the result will be a wasted year for the NDP in building itself up in contrast against both the Cons and Libs. And that would be followed by a huge diversion of energy and effort from traditional or innovative political engagement, toward instead setting up and then trying to gain the greatest possible advantage within a one-time ad hoc structure.
So what if a Lib leader were to reject Cullen's plan? On the one hand, any failure is bound to take some wind out of the sails of a party, particularly to the extent the Libs would be seen as dictating what happens within the opposition despite their third-party status.
But at the same time, Cullen and the NDP would be able to make another pitch to voters that their efforts to cooperate have been rebuffed by a party which puts its own self-interest ahead of the goal of replacing the Harper government. And if the same groups which are supporting cooperation now recognized the Libs' refusal to participate as a fundamental barrier to replace the Cons and threw their support behind the NDP, then there's at least some chance that the end result could be a best-case scenario in ensuring that progressive Canadians coalesce within the NDP.
Which is to say that Cullen's proposal isn't without some upside. But the best-case scenario may well be the one in which the Libs reject it and allow Cullen to claim the moral high ground for the NDP. And if the Libs see that possibility too, then it's not out of the question that both parties would end up getting trapped in the plan without any particular grassroots enthusiasm for it.