Miracles and Modern Scientific Thought
Professor Norman Geisler
Since the "Enlightenment" it is widely accepted that the belief in
miracles and a commitment to modern scientific methodology are
incompatible. This study will examine the arguments of important
anti-supernatural thinkers from Spinoza to the present with a view to
finding any common threads. Next, we will analyze the nature of miracles
in the light of scientific methodology to see if they are irresolvably
incompatible. Finally, we will see if a way can be found to retain the
integrity of science without denying the credibility of the
I. The Arguments Against Miracles.
A. Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677).
We will begin our study with the Jewish philosopher, Benedict Spinoza.
Arguing from a Newtonian concept of nature, Spinoza insisted that
"nothing then, comes to pass in nature in contravention to her universal
laws, nay, nothing does not agree with them and follow from them, for .
. . she keeps a fixed and immutable order." In fact "a miracle, whether
in contravention to, or beyond, nature, is a mere absurdity." Spinoza
was dogmatic about the impossibility of miracles when he proclaimed, "We
may, then, be absolutely certain that every event which is truly
described in Scripture necessarily happened, like everything else,
according to natural laws."
In support of his crucial premise Spinoza insisted that Nature "keeps a
fixed and immutable Order." That is to say, everything
"necessarily happened . . . according to natural laws." And
"nothing comes to pass in nature in contravention to her
universal laws . . . "
Spinoza's argument can be summarized as follows:
Put in this form it is clear that the second premise is crucial: natural
laws are universal or immutable. Just how does one know this? Laying
aside for the moment Spinoza's deductive rationalism, from a strictly
empirical point of view Spinoza's answer is: we know this by
universal observation. That is, we always observe
physical objects fall in accordance with Newton's law of gravitation.
There are no known exceptions. But a miracle would be an
exception. Hence, miracles are contrary to universal scientific
- Miracles are violations of natural laws.
- Natural laws are immutable.
- It is impossible for immutable laws to be violated.
- Therefore, miracles are impossible.
B. David Hume (1711-1776).
Next, let us consider briefly Hume's argument against miracles. David
Hume said of his argument: "I flatter myself that I have discovered an
argument . . . which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an
everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and
consequently will be useful as long as the world endures."
Just what is this "final" argument against the miraculous? In Hume's own
In this form the crucial premise is the second one which Hume explains
as follows: "There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against
every miraculous event. Otherwise the event would not merit that
appellation." So "nothing is esteemed a miracle if it ever happened in
the common course of nature."
- "A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature."
- "Firm and unalterable experience has established these laws."
- "A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence."
- Therefore, "the proof against miracles . . . is as entire as any
argument from experience can possibly be imagined."
Here again the essence of the argument depends on man's repeated
observation. For the common course of nature provides us with uniform
experience of natural regularities. However, there is a difference
between Hume and Spinoza. For Spinoza a scientific law was
universal and immutable; hence, miracles were absolutely
impossible. For Hume human experience is uniform and,
thus, miracles may be possible but they are incredible. So
between Spinoza and Hume there was a softening of the basis for
naturalism which corresponds to the later softening of the understanding
of a scientific law. A scientific law is not necessarily universal (with
no possible exception); it is simply uniform (with no
credible exception). But even in this weaker form, Hume's argument rests
upon the regularity of nature as opposed to the claim for
highly irregular events (such as miracles).
C. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).
There is a widely neglected argument against miracles tucked away in
Kant's famous book, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone.
In his own words, Kant reasons this way:
Those whose judgment in these matters is so
inclined that they suppose themselves to be helpless without
miracles, believe that they soften the blow which reason
suffers from them by holding that they happen but
seldom. [but we can ask] How seldom? Once
in a hundred years? . . . Here we can determine nothing on
the basis of knowledge of the object . . . but only on the
basis of the maxims which are necessary to the use of our
reason. Thus, miracles must be admitted as [occurring]
daily (though indeed hidden under the guise of
natural events) or else never . . . Since the
former alternative [that they occur daily] is not at all
compatible with reason, nothing remains but to adopt the
later maxim-for this principle remains ever a mere maxim for
making judgments, not a theoretical assertion. [For example,
with regard to the] admirable conservation of the species in
the plant and animal kingdoms, . . . no one, indeed, can
claim to comprehend whether or not the direct influence of
the Creator is required on each occasion. [Kant insists]
they are for us, . . . nothing but natural effects
and ought never to be adjudged otherwise . . . To
venture beyond these limits is rashness and immodesty . . .
Stated this way the critical premise is the second one which claims that
practical reason operates according to universal laws. In support of
this premise Kant wrote, "In the affairs of life, therefore, it is
impossible for us to count on miracles or to take them into
consideration at all in our use of reason (and reason must be used in
every incident of life)."
- The heart of Kant's argument can be summarized as follows:
- Everything in our experience (the world to us) is
determined by practical reason.
- Practical reason operates according to universal laws.
- Miracles occur either (1) daily, (2) seldom, or (3) never.
- But what occurs daily is not a miracle since it occurs regularly
according to natural laws.
- And what occurs seldom is not determined by any law.
- But all scientific knowledge must be determined by practical
reason which operates on universal laws.
- Therefore, it is rationally necessary for us to conclude that
miracles never occur.
In brief, miracles are theoretically possible but they are
practically impossible. We must live as if they never
occur. If we lived any other way it would overthrow the dictates of
practical reason and erode the basis for both science and morality. For
both science and morality are based on universal principles. Once more
we can see that the key element in the anti-supernatural argument is the
regularity of the operational laws of the universe. Kant believed these
regular events to be universal. To deny them by admitting miracles, Kant
thought, would be to deny the very basis of a rational and moral
D. Antony Flew (1923- ).
In his article on "Miracles" in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Flew notes that "Hume was primarily concerned, not with the question of
fact, but with that of evidence. The problem was how the occurrence of a
miracle could be proved, rather than whether any such events had ever
occurred." However, adds Flew, "our sole ground for characterizing the
reported occurrence as miraculous is at the same time a sufficient
reason for calling it physically impossible." Why is this so? Because
"the critical historian, confronted with some story of a miracle, will
usually dismiss it out of hand . . . ." On what grounds? Flew answers,
"To justify his procedure he will have to appeal to precisely the
principle which Hume advanced: the 'absolute impossibility or miraculous
nature' of the events attested must, 'in the eyes of all reasonable
people . . . alone be regarded as a sufficient refutation.'" In short,
even though miracles are not logically impossible, they are
scientifically impossible. "For it is only and precisely by
presuming that the laws that hold today held in the past . . . that we
can rationally interpret the detritus [fragments] of the past
as evidence and from it construct our account of what actually
Flew's argument against miracles can be summarized this way:
Like the arguments of Spinoza, Hume, and Kant, the key to Flew's
argument is premise number 3 which counts as greater evidence events
which are regular or repeatable. For science by its very nature is not
based on the exceptional or the odd but on the normal and the usual.
- Miracles are by nature particular and unrepeatable.
- Natural events are by nature general and repeatable.
- Now, in practice, the evidence for the general and repeatable is
always greater than that for the particular and unrepeatable.
- Therefore, in practice, the evidence will always be greater
against miracles than for them.
E. Alastair McKinnon.
Other contemporary philosophers have offered arguments with similar
premises against supernatural acts. Alastair McKinnon's argument is an
example. It can be summarized as follows:
Here the critical premise is the second one. It is admitted by all that
a scientific law is a generalization based on observation. But not all
would insist that a single exception would invalidate a law. Even some
anti-supernaturalists admit that "This a priori argument can be refuted
by noting that a supernaturally caused exception to a scientific law
would not invalidate it, because scientific laws are designed
to express natural regularities." But in the case of a
miracle we have "a special and non-repeatable" exception.
- A scientific law is a generalization based on observation.
- Any exception to a scientific law invalidates that law as such and
calls for a revision of it.
- A miracle is an exception to a scientific law.
- Therefore, a "miracle" would call for a revision of a law and the
recognition of a broader law (which thereby explains the "miracle" as a
From a strictly scientific perspective a non-repeatable exception is an
anomaly. And scientists do not overthrow established laws on the basis
of singular, unrepeated anomalies. In fact, they are more likely to
attribute the anomaly to faulty observation. At any rate, scientists do
not revise laws based on unrepeated exceptions, since scientifically the
irregular never outweighs the regular.
F. The Common Thread.
Even in this admittedly unsuccessful anti-supernatural argument is
hidden the premise of an apparently successful one, namely the evidence
for the regular and repeatable is always greater than that for the
irregular and singular. Science is based on uniform experience, not
anomalies. Regularity is the basis of a scientific understanding.
Therefore, science as such can never accept the miraculous. Thus the
principle of regularity seems to be the common thread of the anti-
II. The Nature of Science
A. Two Fundamental Principles of Science.
It seems beyond question that science involves at least two things:
observation and repetition. No scientific law emerges
unless there has been some observation of natural phenomena. This
observation need not be strictly empirical. Microscopes and telescopes
are legitimate extensions of man's empirical senses. Nor need one
observe the actual event directly, as long as there are observed
phenomena associated with the event. But there must be observation of
some recurring pattern or else there is no scientific basis for drawing
The events of the past, such as are indicated by the rock and fossil
record, are not an exception to the need for observation. There were no
human scientific observers of the origin of the universe or the origin
of living things. However, our scientific understanding of these events
is dependent, nonetheless, on observations. It is not dependent on past
observation of these events but on present observation of similar
events. That is, all understanding of the past is based on the principle
of uniformity, to wit, "the present is the key to the past." This
principle of uniformity means that processes observed in the present are
the basis for a scientific approach to unobserved processes in the past.
So even in the case of unavailable past events science is based on
observation of similar events which repeatedly happen in the present.
B. Repetition and the Odd.
Science is so firmly based in regular repeatable events in the present
that even when an odd event occurs scientists do not consider it part of
a scientific explanation. Thus experiments that cannot be repeated are
given little or no validity. At least unrepeatable events are never made
the basis for an operational law of science.
In a thought provoking article on miracles one contemporary philosopher
The crux of the argument is what he called the "repeatability
requirement." Unless an event can be repeated over and over again we
have no right to claim we know who (or what) caused it. For example, one
should not make a causal connection between the golfer's type of swing
and a once-in-a-life-time-hole-in-one he shot. Rather than drawing a
direct causal connection between them, we would consider it a lucky
shot. And scientific analysis is not based on fluke relations but on
repeated relations. This is why scientists use the principle of
concomitant variation. For unless there is a direct correlation between
the presence and absence of the cause and the presence and absence of
the effect, then there is here no scientific basis for believing it is
- No event can be attributed to a rational agent unless its
occurrence is regular and repeatable.
- Miracles are by nature not regular or repeatable.
- Therefore, no miracle can be attributed to any rational agent
(e.g., to God).
This same point applies whether the cause is a natural force or an
intelligent being. With regard to an intelligent cause, certainly no one
would believe that there is a scientifically established causal
connection between one's intellectual ability to pick a winning horse
and a one-time win at the racetrack. For unless the intelligent being
can do it over and over we would believe the result was a matter of
luck, not a matter of scientific intelligence. Likewise, with regard to
non-intelligent causes, there is no scientific basis for belief in a
causal connection between spilt letters of alphabet cereal and a fan
which blew them into the word "careful." Unless the fan does this
repeatedly with randomly dropped letters we would consider this one-time
event an anomaly. In such a case no scientific causal connection will be
drawn between the apparent message and the fan.
So whether we are dealing with non-intelligent or intelligent causes,
there must be a relationship repeatedly observed before one can consider
the connection scientifically based. But this repeated relation is
precisely what we do not-indeed, cannot-have with miracles because they
are one-time events. Hence, by nature, singularities such as
miracles would seem to be ruled out of the realm of science.
III. Science and the Supernatural.
If all scientific understanding of the universe is based on observed
repetitions and if miracles are by nature singularities, then are not
miracles automatically ruled out on scientific grounds? For miracles are
by nature singular (unusual) events which are caused by an intelligent
being (namely, God) beyond the realm of natural law.
A. Are Miracles a Matter of Faith?
For the supernaturalist there seem to be two basic avenues of escape
from this argument. First, he could simply admit there is no scientific
basis for belief in miracles. Simply because miracles are not subject to
repetition does not mean they do not occur. After all, a hole-in-one has
happened; desperation shots have gone through the hoop, and some have
won at the lottery on the first ticket. So all the theist needs to admit
is that singular events (such as miracles) are not subject to scientific
analysis. That is, there may be no way to have a scientific
understanding of them; they might be understood only by "faith." In this
sense, what the non-supernaturalist would call a "fluke" the
supernaturalist may choose (by faith) to see as the "hand of God." Thus
the theist could admit that there is no scientific way to
differentiate between a natural statistical improbability and a miracle.
Both would have the same empirical data associated with them and neither
would be based in the scientific principle of repeatability.
Of course, if the theist admits this then the naturalist has won a major
victory. For the theist has admitted that there is no
scientific basis for a belief in either the creation of the
universe or of life, to say nothing of the resurrection of Christ.
Further, the anti-supernaturalist could press his argument that there is
no rational or evidential grounds for belief in
miracles either. For all rational connections seem to be based on
previously observed causal connections. And all empirical evidence is
likewise dependent on empirical observations of regular events. In
brief, if the supernaturalist admits there is no regularly observed
phenomena as a basis for miracles, then he has given up any basis for
knowing they have happened. It has become simply a matter of
unjustifiable faith in believing they have happened. If this is
so then his faith is empirically unfalsifiable. This would not differ in
principle from someone who claims his watch works because a little
invisible green gremlin changes the time each second.
B. A Scientific Basis for the Miraculous.
However, before all is given up to fideism let us suggest another
possibility which offers a scientific basis for belief in
miracles. This approach is grounded on the most fundamental principle of
science-the very principle of regularity used to argue against miracles.
In order to understand this approach let us first try to pinpoint the
basic problem in the arguments against miracles. The essence of the
argument goes like this:
1. Antisupernaturalism Proves too Much.
- Only what is observed to occur over and over again can be the
basis for a scientific understanding of what caused the event.
- Singular events like miracles are not repeated over and over
- Therefore, there is no scientific basis for an understanding of
what caused a singularity such as a miracle.
The first and most obvious problem with this argument is
that it seems to prove too much. For if the argument is valid, then it
would prove that there is no scientific basis for some events considered
to be scientific by non-supernaturalistic scientists. For example, the
Big Bang theory is considered by most astronomers to be a viable
scientific explanation of the origin of the universe, but so far as
the scientific evidence goes the Big Bang occurred only once. It has not
been repeated. It is a singularity. Hence, if the repeatability
requirement is pressed it would eliminate one of the most widely held
scientific views on the origin of the universe.
Further, most non-supernaturalist scientists believe in the spontaneous
generation of first life on earth. And even naturalists who believe
life began in outer space, must acknowledge that it began by spontaneous
generation somewhere out there. But to bring the problem back down to
earth, most scientists believe that life began here only once. At the
very least the spontaneous generation of life has not happened over and
over again. What is more, we do not observe it happening spontaneously
over and over again in the present. But if repeatability in the present
is essential to a scientific understanding of an event, then the belief
in spontaneous generation is not scientific either.
The same logic applies to the naturalistic theory of macro-evolution.
According to this belief, the evolutionary development of life occurred
only once. Each new forward development occurred only once. For example
fish evolved into reptiles only once, and reptiles evolved into birds
only once. and so on. These events have never happened again. Yet
naturalistic scientists believe it is scientific to speak of
macro-evolution. Some even call evolution a "fact," not merely a
theory. But if it is unscientific to believe in singularities, then
it would also be unscientific to believe in macro-evolution. In short,
the naturalist's argument against singularities proves too much; it
proves that even some of his naturalistic explanations are not science
2. Naturalism Neglects Uniformity.
In one of the strangest ironies in the history of thought,
naturalism has destroyed its own argument by its own basic premise. For
we have seen that from Spinoza to the present the repeatability or
regularity requirement has been part of the anti-supernaturalists'
argument against miracles. Scientific laws are based on repetition of
events. Miracles are not repeated over and over. Therefore, miracles are
Not only do naturalists hold to the need for regularities but they also
believe there are scientific explanations for singular events (such as
the origin of life). But how do they know this? The answer seems to be
the principle of uniformity. That is, they insist that we can understand
past singularities in terms of present regularities.
For we observe over and over in the present that when certain chemicals
(gases) are put together under certain circumstances that amino acids,
which are the basic elements of life, are the result. Hence, we can
assume that the same thing would occur under similar circumstances in
The same is true of macro-evolution. Scientists have observed over and
over in the present that small changes occur in animals. Hence, they
assume that given long periods of time in the past these small changes
could add up to the large changes needed to explain a common ancestry of
all life. So here too the principle of uniformity is the key. That is,
even though the past event is a singularity which the
naturalist did not observe, nevertheless, there are present
regularities (which are observed to occur over and over again)
which are used as the scientific basis for understanding these past
singularities. In this way what is repeated in the present is the key to
understanding what happened only once in the past. Thus, the naturalist
can avoid the charge that his view about past singularities is
unscientific. It is scientific, they can insist, because their
understanding of a singular event is based on similar regular events
which happen all the time.
What is true of past singularities is also true of present ones. For
example, one need only see one Mount Rushmore to know that some
intelligence carved these faces on the mountain. For repeated
experiences of similar situations are a sufficient basis for knowing
that what caused this singular event must have been
intelligent. There is an analogous situation here to the astronomical
search for extra-terrestrial intelligence. Carl Sagan believes that even
a single message from outer space would prove the existence of
highly intelligent beings there. How does he know this? Because he
has repeated experiences of similar messages caused by
intelligent beings. So the general principle can be stated as follows:
all singularities must be understood in terms of similar
This being the case, the objection of the supernaturalist about their
belief in singularities without a scientific basis in repetition seems
to have collapsed. For if one can know there is an intelligent cause of
a single message (or event), based on repeated experience of similar
situations, then why cannot one know there was an intelligent cause for
the origin of life? In short, the answer of the naturalist opens the
door wide for a scientific explanation for a supernatural origin of
life. For if repetition is the key to understanding singularities, then
a supernaturalist can argue that there was a supernatural cause for the
origin of first life. For this reasoning is also based on repeated
observation. The argument has two sides, both of which are based in
First, all observational evidence indicates that the non-living never
produces the living. Pasteur's experiments disproved spontaneous
generation long ago. There is a uniform and universally
available experience as a basis for this conclusion, and there are no
verified exceptions. Hence, the argument against spontaneous generation
is as firmly scientific as any such argument can be.
There appears to be one exception to this principle that life only
produces life. Are not scientists able to produce life? That is, cannot
life be created by intelligent beings? In response to this two things
should be noted. First of all, scientists have not yet created life from
non-living chemicals. They have only succeeded in producing some
biologically interesting chemicals, such as amino acids. Furthermore,
even in these experiments the role of the experimenters plays a crucial
role in the success of the experiment. Thus intelligent intervention
is necessary in the production of these results. Hence, even if
scientists could produce life, it would show that it took an intelligent
form of life to produce a less than intelligent form of life. And the
production of an intelligent robot would also show that only
intelligence produces intelligence. So in any event, the creation of
life (whether non-intelligent or intelligent life) always takes an
intelligent source of life to accomplish it. But if this is so, then
here again scientific observation would lead us to believe that the
first living thing must have had an intelligent cause.
Second, this leads us to the other side to this scientific argument for
an intelligent origin of life.
In short, repetition in the present does give us a firm scientific basis
for believing in an intelligent intervention into the natural world. To
borrow Hume's term, we have "uniform experience" on which to base our
belief in the miraculous origin of life. For we never observe an
encyclopedia resulting from an explosion in a printing shop. We never
observe a fan blowing on alphabet cereal produce a scientific research
paper. No one would conclude Mount Rushmore resulted from wind or rain
erosion. Why? Our uniform experience teaches us that the kind of
information conveyed on Mount Rushmore never results from natural laws
but only from intelligent intervention.
- The only cause repeatedly observed to be adequate to produce
information is intelligence.
- Now the information in the first single cell which emerged on
earth would fill a whole volume of an encyclopedia.
- But observation of regularities are the scientific basis for
- Hence, there is a scientific basis (in repeated observation) for
believing that first life was caused by some intelligence beyond the
- But since this kind of singularity produced by a supernatural
intelligent being would be a miracle by definition, then we have a firm
scientific basis for believing in miracles.
Summary and Conclusion
Since the rise of modern science anti-supernatural arguments have
stressed the principle of uniformity. They have argued that:
Two things should be noted about this argument. First, this form of the
argument does not deny that unusual events like miracles may occur, any
more than it denies a hole-in-one may occur. It simply says that
scientific law is based on regularities. And until one can establish a
constant conjunction between antecedent and consequent factors there is
no scientific basis for assuming a causal connection between them.
- Scientific understanding is always based on constant repetition of
- Miracles are not constantly repeated.
- Therefore, there is no scientific way to understand miracles.
Second, neither does this argument deny that there is any scientific way
to analyze singularities, such as the origin of the universe, or the
origin of life, or receiving one message from outer space. It simply
says that observed regularities must be the basis for analyzing
singularities. For example, if we observe over and over again
that a certain kind of effect regularly results from a certain kind of
cause then when we discover even a singular case of this kind
of effect (whether from the past or present), we have a scientific basis
for assuming it had the same kind of cause too. This same assumption is
behind the naturalists' search for a chemical basis for the origins of
life and an evolutionary basis for the origin of species. In both cases
repeatable observations in the present are used as a basis for
understanding the singularity of origin in the past. Without this
principle of uniformity there would be no way of getting at
singularities in either the past or the present.
Certainly we must grant that this is a legitimate procedure to base all
scientific understanding in the principle of regularity. However, the
question is this: Does such a procedure eliminate a scientific
understanding of miracles? In order to better understand our answer to
this question let us reformulate the naturalist argument in the light of
the two qualifications noted above.
1) Scientific understanding is always based on constant repetition of
la) This repetition need not be a repetition of the event we are
analyzing but only of other similar events.
2) Miracles are not constantly repeated events.
3b) Therefore, miracles need not be eliminated from the realm of
Once the argument is put in this form we can see that all one needs to
do to establish a basis for singularities such as miracles is to find
some constantly repeated process as a basis for understanding them. This
we believe can be done by adding these premises:
4) Constant repetition informs us that wherever complex information is
conveyed there was an intelligent cause.
5) There are some scientific singularities (such as the origin of first
life) where complex information is conveyed.
6) Therefore, there is a scientific basis for positing an intelligent
non-natural cause for the origin of first life.
Certainly no one can reasonably deny the information comes from an
informer. This is a uniform experience. The only apparent exceptions are
flukes which cannot be repeated constantly. So firmly established is our
uniform experience that only intelligence causes information that we
would consider it highly unscientific for a geology teacher to insist
that his students continue to study the faces on Mount Rushmore until
they can find some natural law of erosion which can explain them.
Furthermore, one does not have to see more than one Mount Rushmore to
know that it was formed by intelligence, not by natural processes of
erosion. For uniform experience of similar situations indicates that
these kinds of forms on rocks always result from intelligent
intervention. Likewise, if a single sentence or paragraph is repeatedly
observed to result from intelligence, then the encyclopedia full of
information contained in the first simple form of life surely must have
had an intelligent cause too.
Should someone protest that there is still a chance-remote as it may be-
that life arose naturally, we need only remind them that science is not
based on flukes or anomalies. It is based on regularities and
repetition. And we have no observed regularly repeated conjunctions that
would provide a scientific basis for us to believe in such an unrepeated
singularity. In brief, the principle of repeatability which naturalists
use to attack miracles actually boomerangs to support the miraculous.
Naturalism is defeated at its own game of science on its own
- Benedict De Spinoza, Tractatus Theologica-Pliticus, in
The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, trans. R. H. M. Elwes (London:
George Bell and Sons, 1883), 1:83, 87, 92.
- Ibid., p. 83.
- David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding,
ed. C. W. Hendel (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955), 10.1.118.
- Ibid., pp. 118-123.
- Ibid., pp. 10.1.122-123.
- Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason
Alone, 2nd ed., trans. T. M. Green and H. H. Hudon (New York:
Harper Torchbook, 1960), pp. 83-84.
- Ibid., p. 82.
- Anthony Flew, "Miracles" in The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: The Macmillan Company and
The Free Press, 1967), 5.346-353.
- Alastair McKinnon, "Miracle' and 'Paradox'" in American
Philosophical Quarterly 4 (Oct. 1967): 308-14.
- Malcolm L. Diamond, "Miracles," Religious Studies 9
(Sept., 1973), 316-317.
- Charles Lyell (1797-1876), the father of modern uniformitarianism,
wrote: It may be necessary in the present state of science to supply
some part of the assumed course of nature hypothetically; but if so,
this must be done without any violation of probability, and always
consistently with the analogy of what is known both of the past and
present economy of our system." See his Principles of Geology
(New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1887), p. 229.
- George D. Chryssides, "Miracles and Agents," Religious
Studies 11 (Sept., 1975), 319-27.
- Ibid., p. 322.
- This point was made by Paley in his famous watchmaker argument,
but it seems to have been largely lost in the subsequent arguments
against God. For example, Paley used phrases like "we observe," "our
observer," "each observation," "Our observation" over and over again. He
even used the phrase "uniform experience" as the basis for his belief in
an intelligent Designer of nature. (See William Paley, A View of the
Evidences of Christianity (Cambridge: J. Hall & Sons, 1875), 6th
ed., pp. 10, 11, 20, 29 and especially 37-38.
- See Robert Jastrow, God and the Astronomers (New York: W.
W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1978), especially pp. 14, 111, 116 and 120f.
- George Wald wrote, "We tell this story [about Pasteur's
experiments] to beginning students of biology as though it represents a
triumph of reason over mysticism. In fact it is very nearly the
opposite. The reasonable view was to believe in spontaneous generation;
the only alternative, to believe in a single, primary act of
supernatural creation. There is no third position." See "The Origin of
Life" in Scientific American (Aug., 1954), p. 48; reprinted in
Life: Origin and Evolution, ed. C. E. Folsome (San Francisco:
W. H. Freeman and Company, 1979).
- Many scientists recognize this point. J. W. N. Sullivan wrote: "So
far as actual evidence goes, this is still the only possible conclusion.
But since it is a conclusion that seems to lead back to some
supernatural creative act, it is a conclusion that scientific men find
very difficult of acceptance" (The Limitations of Science, New
York: Mentor Book, 1963, p . 94). Speaking of spontaneous generation,
Robert Jastrow said, the "theory is also an act of faith. The act of
faith consists in assuming that the scientific view of the origin of
life is correct, without having concrete evidence to support that
belief" (Until the Sun Dies, New York: W. W. Norton and
Company, 1977, p. 63).
- Isaac Asimov said, "Scientists who deal with evolution as their
field of specialization may argue over the mechanism behind evolutionary
development, but none questions the fact of evolution itself"
(Science Digest, October, 1981, p. 86).
- Sagan wrote: "There are others who believe that our problems are
soluble, that humanity is still in its childhood, that one day soon we
will grow up. The receipt of a single message from space would
show that it is possible to live through such technological adolescence:
the transmitting civilization, after all, has survived. Such knowledge,
it seems to me, might be worth a great price" (Broca's Brain,
New York: Random House, 1979, p. 275, emphasis added).
- See Note 17 above.
- See the excellent new book by some creative scientists on this
point: Charles Thaxton, Walter Bradley, and Roger Olsen, The Mystery
of Life's Origin: Reassessing Current Theories (New York:
Philosophical Library, 1984).
- The information in a complex form of life is much greater. Carl
Sagan pointed out that "If written out in English, say, that information
[in the human brain] would fill some twenty million volumes, as many as
in the world's largest libraries" (Cosmos, New York: Random
House, 1980, p. 278).