August 25, 2005 | 41 Comments
Julia Sweeney, on her transition from agnosticism to atheism:
I just became a stronger agnostic, and then I started to realize that everyone who was saying they were agnostic really hadn’t thought about it that much. Still, I went with agnosticism for a long, long time because I just hated to say I was an atheist — being an atheist seemed so rigid. But the more I became comfortable with the word, and the more I read, it started to stick.
Undeservedly, agnosticism is frequently viewed as a “safe” or even unassailable philosophical position. It appears to be a reasonable, half-way compromise between the outrageous claim of the theist (who proposes the existence of fantastic being that is everywhere, yet surprisingly undetectable), and the seemingly equally preposterous claim of the atheist (who, in purporting to “prove a negative,” implies that he or she knows, or has examined, everything in the universe). But the agnostic, having said “I do not know,” can calmly sit back and reserve judgment until proof, one way or the other, comes along.
Agnosticism is, in fact, the least tenable theological position, completely inferior to atheism* and in some instances less defensible than theism. Sweeney is correct that agnosticism for the most part constitutes a failure – and commonly a studied refusal – to think about the God question that much. I will first deal with theological agnosticism–the view that nature and/or existence of God cannot be known or disproven—and demonstrate why it so miserably fails. I will then briefly criticize a form of nontheological agnosticism — really a type of generalized skepticism or even solipsism– which is frequently invoked as a last resort whenever it appears that the argument for theological agnosticism is not going well.
Theological Agnosticism. The threshold, but often overlooked or ignored, question in any theological debate is what is meant by the word “god.” There are thousands of definitions of the term, and the arguments for atheism, theism and agnosticism will necessarily vary with the precise god under discussion. However, in general the gods may be placed into two categories: 1) gods whose nature and attributes are undefined or underdefined, unknown or unknowable and 2) gods whose nature and attributes are defined.
In connection with the first category, a common agnostic (as well as modern theistic) argument is that god’s existence cannot be disproven because god’s very definition, nature and attributes are beyond the comprehension of mere humans. Analogies involving ants are for some reason popular in making this point. Thus, it will usually be noted that although an ant lacks the cognitive ability to understand anything about the nature or powers of human beings, it would be unreasonable (and plainly false) to conclude that humans don’t exist simply because ants can’t comprehend them. Thus, it is argued, it is similarly unreasonable to conclude that god doesn’t exist simply because our puny, ant-like (compared to god’s) brains cannot comprehend the definition or nature of god.
The problem with this argument is that despite appearances, it is not really talking about god at all. In fact, it is talking about nothing at all. It reduces the word “god” to a mere sound devoid of any meaning, indistinguishable from utterances such as “poy” or “blark” or “unie, or, for that matter, the sounds made in barking or coughing. Most people, confronted with the question “does X exist” would not answer “yes,” “no,” or “I don’t know,” but would rather demand to know what is signified by “X.” It is simply impossible to commit to the belief in, the disbelief in, or even the unknowability of a concept which lacks any definition whatsoever. The next time you hear an avowed agnostic that a theist’s faith in god is as justified as any other position because god is unknowable, ask whether faith in [mumble mumble cough cough] is excusable on the same grounds.
This is not to say that there are not things in the universe beyond the comprehension of humans, or things within our comprehension that we simply have not yet discovered or cannot discover. Science is discovering new, previously-unknown objects every day, and I am willing to concede that there may be things that are not even theoretically detectable by any means that humans may someday devise. My point here is that one cannot attach (or refuse to attach) the term “god” to any of those things unless that word is assigned some sort of definition.
One agnostic response has been to simply define god as the set of all presently unknown, or unknowable, things. However, this argument again fails to provide a satisfying or usuable definition. Horses were once unknown, at least in North America; did this fact make horses gods? Quarks and atoms were once unknown–should the “god” label be applied to them? Suppose tomorrow astronomers discover some new, far-away orb with properties unlike any other previously-discovered celestial object, brighter and denser than any star, and composed of elements not found on the periodic table. God? Or finally, let us hypothesize that there are millions of green, cube-shaped objects so small, distant, or otherwise elusive than no human instrument can ever detect them. Does their mere unknowability make them gods? What criteria could one possibly apply to make that assessment, if the word “god” lacks any definition?
Plainly, no one would attach the word “god” to horses, quarks, atoms, orbs or undetectable green cubes. We exclude those things from godhood precisely because we do have some (albeit vague) definition of god in the back of our minds which excludes horses, etc. from its scope. While it is also possible to refuse to exclude anything from the definition of god, to say that god is anything or everything, that god is the universe, that approach results in a sort of pantheism which is indistinguishable from atheism. It simply substitutes the word “god” for the word “universe,” without positing the existence of any being outside the universe.
Another agnostic variant on the argument is to assert the possibility of the existence of some undetectable or unknowable “higher power” or otherwise superior form of intelligence in the universe. Since this theory supplies at least some substance or definition to the concept of god, implying that it is possessed of some kind of power or intelligence, the discussion of it belongs primarily in the next section of this essay. However, insofar as the definition stops with nothing more than a reference to a superior “power” or “consciousness,” it does not supply a meaningful definition of god. There may be stars with far more power or energy than the ones currently discovered, or planets with aliens whose stupidest member is as intelligent as Steven Hawking, but again, stars or aliens do not fit the definition of god. And in any event, Steven Hawking is an atheist.
In short, an agnosticism based upon the notion of the incomprehensibility or undefinability of god simply avoids the question. And the fact that ants find humans incomprehensible, does not strip humans of definite powers and attributes, or, more importantly, make humans gods.
Most theological debate, however, centers around the existence of gods with specifically defined powers and attributes. On the low end of the spectrum are the highly anthropomorphic gods such as Zeus and Wotan with limited powers which are not really gods but little more than glorified humans, somewhat akin to fairies, leprechauns, goblins, witches, and ghosts. On the high end, and really the prime focus of the god debate, are the “gods of the philosophers” including the modern monotheistic Judeo-Christian-Islamic God, having (in various permutations) the attributes of being conscious, all-powerful (omnipotent), all-knowing (omniscient), all good (omnibenevolent), immutable, immortal, infinite, omnipresent, immaterial transcendent, disembodied and eternal. (Sometimes the attributes of incomprehensibility, ineffability and invisibility are thrown in, which converts god into the undefined or unknowable type previously discussed).
The atheist attack on the modern god is generally two-fold. The first prong again generally centers on the definition given and demonstrates that the god proposed is logically impossible due to contradictions among its various attributes; some of the standard arguments are set forth in my Basic Assumptions and elsewhere. These arguments demonstrate that the term “god” is akin to a “square circle” or “married bachelor.”
The agnostic has no adequate response to these arguments. They are purely analytical, “arm-chair” refutations of god which allow no resort to empirical inquiry or speculation. The agnostic cannot suggest that maybe, in some far corner of the universe (or perhaps invisibly in the room) the god in question exists, any more than he can suggest the same of a square circle or married bachelor. The only real avenue open is to address the arguments, to demonstrate whether they are valid or invalid. But in doing so, the agnostic will be forced to commit to either theism or atheism.
The agnostic can, of course, simply back away, refuse to address or focus on the arguments. But in doing so, the agnostic fails to make any assertion at all. He remains an agnostic only in the way that a baby or a cat are agnostics, undecided or neutral on the issue merely because they have never given consideration to the question.
The second most common atheistic attack on god is “negative atheism,” which focuses on refuting the theistic arguments in favor of god, including the ontological, teleological, cosmological and moral proofs. Without discussing the arguments and their refutations, two points may be made with respect to agnosticism regarding them. First, none of the arguments purport to establish well-defined god with particular powers and attributes, so they all succumb to either the arguments against the undefined/underdefined gods discussed above, or to the analytic attacks regarding the logical impossibility of god set forth in this section. Second, and to the point, the agnostic is once again placed in the position of either converting to atheism (or theism) by addressing the arguments, or of ignoring the arguments altogether.
Non-Theological Agnosticism. Another form of agnosticism which occasionally surfaces in the course of theological debates is actually an extreme form of skepticism with no special relevance to the god question. It is simply the denial of reality, the denial of certainty regarding the existence of anything, coupled with the assertion that if nothing is certain, there cannot be certainty regarding the existence or non-existence of god. For all we know, it is argued, we may merely be brains in vats in the laboratory of a mad scientist; the universe may be an illusion, or may have been created five minutes ago; or the universe and everything in it may be doubling in size every second without our perceiving it, because everything, including our bodies, is growing in proportion.
I agree that there is no strictly logical refutation to the brains-in-vats hypothesis, or to the illusory, five-minute-old or size-doubling universes theories. But all of those scenarios are perfectly conceivable (if seemingly improbable), and thus do not imply any contradiction. However, the question of god’s existence (or square circles) is largely a logical, definitional one, fully subject to refutation by the demonstration of a contradiction. However “magical” the brains-in-vats situation might seem, it would not prove that the mad scientist, or anything else, was God. Your vatted brain would still be required to provide a definition and demonstrate that it was beyond refutation.
One final agnostic “argument” I frequently is really nothing more than an objection to certainty and the supposed “arrogance” that accompanies it. Sometimes this is joined with the concern that if either side is “too sure” of its position it will attempt to “force” it upon the other. But there are arrogant physicians and an arrogant faith healers, and modest specimens of each profession. The agnostic seeking to choose between them for treatment would do better considering their claims on the merits rather than disregarding them or using personality as the sole criterion. And the argument based on the impossibility or undesirability of certainty collapses under its own weight insofar as it lays a claim to being the Truth in a way the alternatives are not.
* As used here, the term “atheism” refers to what is know as “strong” or “positive” atheism”, i.e., the claim that the existence of god can be affirmatively disproven and that all statements regarding god are false, self-contradictory, incoherent or meaningless. It is to be distinguished from “weak atheism,” which is simply a disbelief, or lack of belief, in god, without the assertion that god’s existence can be disproven. The distinction is important in the context of this discussion because most agnostics are also weak atheists–people who believe that god’s existence cannot be proven or disproven but feel that it is highly improbable Some agnostics are also theists, believing in god although they do not believe that god’s existence can ever be proven.