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Sun-tzu’s writings, especially the simple, familiar aphorisms of The Art of War—so frequently cited in Western literature on war and strategy—obscure complex patterns of thought with deep roots in Chinese culture.
Katagiri’s analysis confirms the lesson that Mao Zedong learned during the civil war in China: a small group of insurgents relying on primitive strategy and mostly military means is likely to lose in a straightforward fight against a state.
What people think they know about war is as likely to come from watching war movies as from listening to the news or reading history—and in Hollywood, dramatic license often trumps historical accuracy.
Three books tell the story of the Battle of the Bulge, Adolf Hitler's last-ditch offensive in late 1944 that aimed to catch the complacent Allies unaware and force them to agree to a negotiated solution to the war, but instead left the German army exhausted, outnumbered, and outgunned.
The term "coward" was once reserved for those who turned away from physical danger. Walsh explores how the concept has evolved as a result of changes in the way societies understand morality, human nature, and the nature of war.
Baer explains that assassination requires dedication, self-discipline, and a degree of intimacy with one’s target—all reasons why he thinks the United States is unlikely to ever do it very well.
Stoker’s biography focuses on Clausewitz’s military record and draws on his sharp observations to illuminate key military engagements of the Napoleonic Wars.
Conventional wisdom holds that new information technologies have favored insurgents and revolutionaries. Tucker argues that they have likely benefited states even more.
Smith explores how the intense sights, sounds, and smells of battle affect the conduct of war. He gets into these gritty details by narrating some of the most important encounters of the American Civil War.
In 2004, as an operations officer in a tank battalion in Iraq, Nagl witnessed U.S. forces commit critical errors. This engaging book exhibits droll humor and a sharp grasp of the limits and possibilities of the U.S. Army as a learning organization.
Echevarria and Strachan are intrigued by the relationship between national policy and military strategy. Both are wary of cultural explanations for a nation’s conduct of war, and both challenge the view that their respective countries have unique “ways of war” that shape their responses to conflict.
During international crises, political leaders must make judgments about the likely attitudes and behavior of both prospective allies and enemies. Shore is skeptical of models that assume that actors will behave rationally and instead explores the idea of empathy as an aid to decision-making.
A hundred years after World War I, new accounts of the drama help readers navigate the intricacies of European politics and the political and diplomatic maneuverings that kicked off the war. Yet there is still no consensus on its origins or lessons.
This is the autobiography of a delinquent young Danish man, Storm, who gave up on a boxing career and turned to Islam to give his life some meaning. His tale illuminates the methods that intelligence agencies use to keep track of terrorists and how terrorists seek to evade them.
Lawrence Freedman’s massive, ambitious new book, Strategy, offers a personal take on an important term, one so overused that it has become almost meaningless.
The stability of the atomic age has bred complacency and reduced policymakers’ fluency with the nuances and practicalities of nuclear strategy. It is therefore important for fresh eyes to look at the dilemmas created by nuclear weapons.
Wars evoke powerful emotions: grief and pride, humiliation and honor, outrage and exultation. As this volume reveals, such feelings form essential parts of national mythologies, especially in the case of World War II.
For a country, such as the United States, that believes in decisive conclusions to military operations, allowing Osama bin Laden to escape from his redoubt in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan in December 2001 was an extraordinary lapse. Barzilai blames a combination of political inattention and sloppy tactics.
Sander has produced something better than a battlefield memoir: an accomplished history of Operation Lam Son 719 -- a little-known battle of the Vietnam War -- that explains why it failed.
Coker sees war not as a vicious, dysfunctional throwback to more primitive, pre-rational times but as an essential feature of human societies.
Without ever denying MacArthur’s flaws and mistakes, Perry revives the general’s reputation by carefully and positively appraising his role in some of the war’s key moments.
Matthews, a professor of engineering psychology at West Point, believes that a better grasp of how humans understand and adapt to their environments would improve the selection and preparation of fighters in armed forces.
Coffey, a historian of science, traces the origins of some of the most important weapons of the past century.
Epstein's book will set the standard for further research on the military-industrial complex.
In his thorough exploration of why and how foreign fighters get involved in wars far away from their homes, Malet focuses on the importance of transnational identity.
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