|George Kennan: The
Flip Side of Containment
by Bruce L. Brager
In March 1946, American diplomat George Kennan, serving in Moscow, received a
telegram from the State Department asking why the Soviet Union refused to join
the World Bank and the International Monetary fund. Keenan's 8,000-word
response, so long it was broken up and sent as five telegrams, laid the
groundwork for what became known as "containment."
Containment, simplified, stated that the Soviets were actively trying to expand
their influence around the world, but that they did not work to set time tables
and did not like to take unnecessary risks. Appropriate resistance, and counter
pressure, as long as it did not seem to endanger basic Soviet security, would
cause them to back off. Eventually the system would collapse due to internal
problems. The history of the next 45 years made it clear that Kennan has been
In 1947, Kennan wrote, in an article based on his telegram,
||"It would be an exaggeration to say that
American behavior unassisted and alone could. . . bring out the early fall of
Soviet power in Russia. But the United States has it in its power to increase
enormously the strains under which the Soviet policy must operate, to force
upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it
has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which
must eventually find their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual
mellowing of Soviet Power."
The policy Kennan conceived was not just peaceful resistance to Soviet
expansion. It included subtle efforts to turn the tide away from Communism.
Urging American involvement in the 1948 elections in Italy, Kennan, now heading
the Department of State Policy Planning Committee, stated that if the
"Communists were to win [the] election there our whole position in [the]
Mediterranean, and possibly in Western Europe as well, would probably be
Funds were secretly given to the non-Communist parties in Italy, particularly
the Christian Democrats. Much of this money was spent for similar activities to
those of American elections, such as printing pamphlets and posters and paying
people to get out the vote. Money was also apparently used to bribe election
officials, but details remain sketchy.
A few days before the election a major newspaper in Rome, Tempo, published
a story on the so-called Zorin Plan, outlining Soviet Foreign Minister Valerian
A. Zorin's program for Italy after a Communist victory. The key portion of the
speech called for,
||"The immediate conclusion of a military
alliance with Russia and Yugoslavia; strict dependence of Italy on Yugoslavia,
which would become a pattern for Italian social life, economy, and foreign
policy; strict control over the press, radio and movies; and elimination of all
priests who do not swear devotion to the Communist state and Communist
Zorin had a reputation for supporting active Soviet efforts to help Communist
parties gain power in Western Europe. The "Zorin plan" fit into his pattern,
and the pattern of Soviet takeover in Eastern European nations. However, the
newspaper never offered details on where it got the information. Its
publication, which hurt Communist chances in the election, may have been the
direct or indirect result of CIA efforts.
Also in 1948, Kennan proposed that his Policy Planning Committee of the State
Department also begin a program of covert action against the Soviets. A less
well known part of Kennan's 1947 "X" article called for "counter-force" at
shifting points. This was a call for specific action, but, since Kennan did not
want to provoke a full-scale war, covert action.
Kennan stated later that it was not "our primary aim to time of peace to set
the stage for a war regarded as inevitable [but] admittedly we are aiming at
the creation of circumstances and situations which would be difficult for the
present Soviet leaders to stomach, and which they would not like. It is
possible. . . that they would not be able to retain their power in Russia."
Joseph Stalin began another series of purges around this time, concentrating on
the leadership in Eastern Europe rather than on that of the Soviet Union. These
purges, which included leadership of the various Eastern European security
services, may have at least partly resulted from this active American, and
British, covert action. The purges are usually credited to Stalin's paranoid
reaction to Yugoslavia's break with the Soviet bloc in 1948 and its pursuit of
an independent foreign policy. Soviet failure to chase the West out of West
Berlin is considered a secondary cause. The desire to find scapegoats for
economic problems is also credit with playing a role.
British and American efforts at infiltration of active saboteurs behind the
Iron Curtain were not well done, and were betrayed by Soviet moles within
American and British intelligence. The Soviets were quickly able to round up
all they knew about. However, it would have been consistent with Stalin's
personality for him to have considered that perhaps Soviet moles in the West
did not know about all the Western agents in the Soviet bloc. Individuals
arrested during the purges were usually denounced in the Communist press as
being in league with the West. The United States and its allies, including
Britain, were directly denounced. One press article accused the West of using
former German intelligence officers and their spy network in Eastern Europe –
accurately, as it turned out.
The Western intelligence services were delighted by the purges and the damage
they were doing to Soviet bloc leadership. If they did not cause the purges
they certainly tried to contribute. September 1949 National Security Council
policy papers included the statement that "The propensity of the revolution to
devour its own, the suspicions of the Kremlin regarding its agents and the
institutions of denunciation, purge and liquidation are grave defects in the
Soviet system which have never been adequately exploited."
A recent analysis of the history of American and British anti-Soviet
intelligence puts things well in writing that "Stalin's fantastic paranoia was
the central factor in the extraordinary wave of arrests and executions that
swept over the Eastern block between 1948 and 1953. But the purges had more
than one cause and Western intelligence played its part – after 1949 quite
intentionally. . ." The purges were targets of opportunity for the Western
nations, and they seem to have taken advantage.
George Kennan's major contributions to American foreign policy, making him on
of the most important people of the 20th century, were to contribute a range of
specific policy recommendations, calling for different ways of responding to
the very real Soviet threat. He also contributed a realistic approach to
looking at the United States's situation and the world and how best to react to
the situation. Neither ideologue nor realpolitic cynic, Kennan's way of
thinking is something still worth emulating. After all, it worked.
Show Footnotes and
. "X" (George Kennan) "The Sources of Soviet Power," Foreign Affairs,
July 1947, found www.historyguide.org.
. G. J. A. O'Toole, Honorable Treachery, New York: The Atlantic
Monthly Press, A Morgan Entrekin Book, 1991, page 435.
. O'Toole, 437.
. Richard J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, Woodstock and New York: The
Overlook Press, 2001, page 148.
. Thomas H. Etzold and John Louis Gaddis, editors, Containment: Documents on
American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950, New York: Columbia University
Press, 1978, pages 220-221.
. Aldrich, 179.
Copyright © 2008 Bruce L. Brager.
Written by Bruce L. Brager. If you have questions or comments on this
article, please contact Bruce L. Brager at:
About the author:
Bruce Brager is a writer specializing in military history, defense and foreign
policy. He is the author of ten published books and over fifty
Published online: 04/26/2008.
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those of MHO.