Congressional Research Service: Report for Congress, 94-581 S July 20, 1994 -ti- The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War World: Toward Self-Deterrence? By Stanley R. Sloan, Senior Specialist in International Security Policy Office of Senior Specialists THE UNITED STATES AND USE OF FORCE IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD: TOWARD SELF-DETERRENCE? SUMMARY Early in the post-Cold War era, the willingness of the United States to use military force was tested by Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. U.S. actions and those of allied nations suggested that the international community had the will and ability to respond to serious aggressions and some other threats to international order. The United States appeared to be showing the way toward a post-Cold War international system whose demonstrated ability to respond to such threats was expected to deter at least some of them. Toward the end of the Bush Administration, however, and into the Clinton Administration, the United States became much less certain about its willingness to use force as part of its role in international affairs. This report concludes that, since mid-1991, the United States has become increasingly self- deterred, or self-restrained, reticent to use and consequently unable to threaten credibly the use of military force to support its foreign policy objectives. Several factors appear to have contributed to this trend, including: * limited threats to vital U.S. interests (survival of the nation); * national uncertainty regarding the interests or values for which the United States should be willing to fight in the post-Cold War era; * the apparent belief of many Americans that the United States should not use force unless vital interests are threatened; * the U.S. military's contention that, if force is to be used, sufficient forces should be committed and supported to ensure success; * the failed expectation of the Clinton Administration that international organizations and other nations would be able to provide substantial relief for U.S. global military burdens; * reluctance of Members of Congress to support multilateral military responses to global security problems either by providing U.S. forces or helping to fund the use of non-U.S. military resources. These considerations undoubtedly reflect a contemporary appreciation of U.S. interests, and this report does not argue that the United States should or should not have used force in any of the cases analyzed. But if the U.S. tendency toward self- deterrence persists, it could be difficult if not impossible for the international community, and instruments of that community like NATO and the United Nations, to deter or respond effectively to threats to international order. Incentives for disorder would likely grow stronger and weapons proliferation would accelerate. In the near term, vital U.S. interests might not be threatened. But, in the longer term, a more unstable world with regional arms races and growing numbers of states deploying weapons of mass destruction could create a more threatening environment for U.S. interests. ---------- NOTE Jean Haguet, an American Political Science Association Congressional Fellow, provided research assistance for the preparation of this report. The author appreciates the many constructive comments and suggestions offered by CRS colleagues, including Richard Best, Ed Bruner, Ellen Collier, John Collins, Ray Copson, Steve Daggett, Karen Donfried, Lou Fisher, Bob Goldich, Julie Kim, Mark Lowenthal, Gary Pagliano, Nina Serafino, Bob Shuey, Bob Sutter and Jim Wootten --------- TABLE OF CONTENTS PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS 1 IS THE UNITED STATES BECOMING SELF-DETERRED? 5 The Gulf War Against Iraq and a "New World Order" 6 Bosnia 7 Enlargement of NATO 10 Somalia 10 Haiti 12 Korea 14 PDD-25 16 Rwanda 17 WHAT FACTORS LEAD TOWARD A SELF-DETERRENCE PHENOMENON? 20 No Threats to Vital U.S. Interests 20 Cold War Leadership Fatigue 21 Domestic Preoccupations 22 President Clinton's Approach 23 Limited Tolerance for Casualties 24 Diminished Expectations for the United Nations 26 Cautious U.S. Military Leadership 27 Congressional Qualms 27 The Bottom Line 28 WHAT ARE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. SELF DETERRENCE? 29 In the Short-term, Vital U.S. Interests Should Remain Secure 29 International Cooperation Becomes Less Effective 30 Longer-term: Tendencies Toward Disorder and Proliferation 31 U.S. Values Challenged 31 Net Assessment 32 WHAT ARE POTENTIAL REMEDIES TO SELF-DETERRENCE? CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE CONGRESS 35 Muddling Through 35 Lead Toward a New Consensus 36 --------- page 1 PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS The post-Cold War international system has opened with two very prominent realities. The first is that the United States has an unmatched potential to provide global political leadership and to deploy and use military power. The second is that the United States has become increasingly unwilling to use its military potential on behalf of international policy goals other than the protection of vital or directly-threatened U.S. interests. As a consequence, the world's only remaining superpower could also be described in many respects as a self-deterred power -- a country whose contemporary priorities, requirements and goals place severe constraints on its willingness to use coercive force to resolve problems abroad, to put its forces in harm's way, or, often, to pay for international responses to global security challenges. During the Cold War, U.S. Presidents were able to argue with some force to the Congress and to the public that the vital U.S. interest of national survival was threatened by the potential spread of Communist ideology and the power of the Soviet Union, the main Communist state. Only one aspect of this threat, the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear forces, posed an imminent threat to national survival. But many other threats and sources of instability were seen as extensions of the global competition of systems and alliances. As a consequence, in response to such derivative threats, the United States fought wars in Korea and Vietnam, deployed large military forces armed with nuclear weapons to Europe, and intervened or supported military interventions in Middle Eastern, African and Latin American countries, all in the name of defending against the Soviet- Communist threat. Today, aggressions and sources of instability that in the Cold War might have been seen as bearing on the Soviet-Communist threat and therefore as warranting a U.S. military response, appear much less dangerous for U.S. interests and certainly not threats to "vital" U.S. interests. The nation has not yet identified clearly threats and opportunities that it views as extensions of the vital interest in national survival in the post-Cold War world. In this setting, a number of factors, taken together, appear to weave a strong web of constraints around U.S. use of force. They include: * limited threats to vital U.S. interests; * post-Cold War uncertainty concerning the rationale, directions, and costs of world leadership and the belief of many that the United States should not use force unless its vital interests are threatened; --------- page 2 * renewed dominance of domestic priorities, more stringent limits on resources available for global leadership, and the desire to cash in the "peace dividend"; * very low tolerance for casualties when they can no longer be justified in terms of resistance to communism or Soviet power; * the Clinton Administration's reluctance to use force in view of the potential political and financial costs and indications that this reluctance is shared by many Members of Congress; * unfulfilled U.S. expectations for the United Nations; * the professional military's insistence on broad political support and resources sufficient to ensure success of assigned missions despite declining force levels; * Congressional mistrust of multilateral frameworks for the use of force; and, * Congressional unwillingness for the United States to bear heavy burdens in policing the world. These reasons reflect a contemporary appreciation of U.S. interests, and this report does not argue that the United States should have or should not have used force in any of the cases analyzed below. Each of the challenges to the peace since the end of the Cold War has posed unique questions about whether or not there were militarily feasible responses that would have promoted U.S. policy goals. The nature of the U.S. response to date may represent a natural process of re-balancing the U.S. role in the world to reflect a much-diminished threat environment for vital U.S. interests. Nevertheless, continuation or hardening of the current U.S. unwillingness to use force could well affect U.S. interests. The potential consequences of self-deterrence can be summarized as follows: * In the near term, U.S. vital interests will not likely be threatened by the U.S. reluctance to use military force on behalf of foreign policy objectives. U.S. lives and money may be saved as use of force is avoided. * U.S. self-deterrence, however, appears to have begun to erode the ability of the international system to respond effectively to threats to the peace that might usefully be controlled or reversed early by the threat to use, or actual use of, military force. If the United States is unwilling or unable to back its professed international goals with the potential use of force, the international system will lack the means and the leadership to deal effectively with many legitimate threats to the peace. Most regions of the world do not have the political consensus --------- page 3 and organizational structure to maintain order on a regional basis without broader international backing. * In the longer term, the absence of effective force to maintain world order would likely lead to a progressively more chaotic international system because countries seeking to accomplish self-serving political objectives through the use of military force would face fewer disincentives, or deterrents, to do so. * The absence of effective international policing mechanisms appears likely to increase the incentives for regional arms races and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, for at least two reasons: * Some countries, perhaps including Iraq, Iran and North Korea, seeking to achieve political goals through the use or threat of military force, might be encouraged to believe that they could develop local military superiority, including weapons of mass destruction, and not face an international military response. * Other countries, perhaps including Israel, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Japan and some European states, that had believed their security was ensured or at least enhanced by alliance with the United States or the likelihood of international military protection, might become more inclined to build up defensive military capabilities and consider developing their own weapons of mass destruction to deter threats to their security. * In some regions, the absence of effective international policing mechanisms might lead to the emergence of regional hegemons, with a commitment only to maintain an order that conforms to their interests rather than to international norms or, for that matter, U.S. interests. * Once diminished substantially, the credibility of the U.S. threat to use force on behalf of values it held throughout the Cold War would be difficult to re- establish. Other nations would be less responsive to U.S. diplomatic initiatives and proposals, and the United States would have relinquished at least a part of its claim to a value-based foreign policy that had been responsible for establishing the United Nations, NATO, and other forms of international cooperation that were seen as advancing a U.S. vision of world order. * A diminished U.S. leadership role and consequent increase in international disorder could, in theory, stimulate other nations such as the members of the European Union to attempt to fill the gap, but this is by no means certain. --------- page 4 A potentially costly consequence of the current phase of self- deterrence would be for the Administration to decide that it should demonstrate its ability to use force and to do so in a circumstance that was otherwise ill-advised. But whatever the current challenges, President Clinton and his advisors apparently remain more wary of the political costs of the use of force than worried about the longer-term potential penalties of self- deterrence. To avoid the longer term negative consequences of continued self- deterrence, however, it appears that the United States would have to re-build a consensus concerning the values and interests the United States wishes to advance and is prepared to defend before it would be able to resume a role as a reliable, predictable force in international politics. If it wished, the Clinton Administration could seek to develop a new statement of U.S. values, interests, goals and policy instruments for the post-Cold War world. Such a process of formal re-evaluation would be difficult and conflicted. If it failed to develop consensus the process could contribute to an image of presidential uncertainty. The deliberations could not be contained within the government bureaucracy and the debate inevitably would spill into the press and public discussion. Indeed, the Administration might encourage such a public debate as a contribution to its internal considerations. Those in and outside the Administration who have argued that the United States should focus its foreign policy on U.S. economic interests and pull back from global commitments would be pitted against others who favor an assertive multilateralist approach. In the end, however, the process might yield a new compromise foundation for the role of the United States in the world reflecting a balance between the domestic and international interests and responsibilities of the world's only superpower. And it could be argued that, in one form or another, some such national decision- making process is inevitable sooner or later. The Congress probably cannot substitute for executive leadership on this issue. If the United States is eventually to move away from its current reticence on the world stage, it will most likely have to be led in that direction by the President. Nevertheless, the Congress can, if it wishes, play an important role in the process of constructing a new consensus on U.S. interests, values and the use of force on their behalf in the post-Cold War world. In the long run, the United States needs to answer the question of how a semblance of international order can be maintained if the United States is not willing to commit its military forces and some financial resources to play a leading role in such a task. --------- page 5 IS THE UNITED STATES BECOMING SELF-DETERRED? Since the end of the Cold War, the world has experienced a wide range of localized wars, aggressions, and gross violations of internationally accepted human rights and humanitarian standards. In a number of these circumstances, the use of force by outside powers or the international community en bloc was a theoretical option in response to the challenge posed. 1. For a review of perspectives on deterrence in the post- Cold War world see Allan, Charles T. "Extended Conventional Deterrence: In from the Cold and Out of the Nuclear Fire?" The Washington Quarterly. Summer 1994, p. 203-233. The response of the international community -- no longer influenced by Cold War divisions, and theoretically freer to organize collective responses to specific security challenges -- has been uneven and unpredictable. One of the most important reasons for this mixed record has been the international community's continued reliance on U.S. leadership and on U.S. military forces to help shape and lead responses to international crises even as the United States has been questioning its own willingness to play such a role. Such reliance reveals habits developed during the Cold War, particularly among Western allies of the United States. It also reflects the U.S. position as the sole surviving superpower at the end of the Cold War. As the post-Cold War international world began to emerge, no other country had potential for leadership matching that of the United States. No country had military resources or a global military presence equal to those of the United States. No other country (or group of countries, such as the members of the European Union or the United Nations collectively) appeared to have the near-term potential to challenge or substitute for the U.S. role, particularly when it came to the projection of political leadership and military force beyond national borders. The suggestion variously advanced that the United States is becoming a self-deterred power, despite its post-Cold War status as the only remaining superpower, arises from the experiences of the past 3-4 years. Over that time, a number of international crises and conflicts have raised the issue of the use of U.S. military forces. The U.S. responses help illustrate trends in U.S. approaches to the use of force on behalf of its foreign policy. Each case examined in the following pages is treated only to the extent necessary to illustrate its relevance to the self- deterrence thesis. 2. This thesis was originally outlined in Sloan, Stanley R. "From US Deterrence To Self-Deterrence." The Christian Science Monitor. May 3, 1994, p. 19. --------- page 6 The purpose of this survey is not to suggest that the United States should have used its military forces more boldly than it has, but rather to illustrate the factors that have combined to produce a reluctance to use military force -- a reluctance that some might regard as simply prudent responses to given circumstances and others as a dangerous reticence leading to abdication of international responsibilities. The Gulf War Against Iraq and a "New World Order" In August 1990, Saddam Hussein provided the first test of the ability of the international community to respond to a clear case of aggression in the post-Cold War era when his forces overwhelmed neighboring Kuwait. Following U.S. leadership and relying heavily on U.S. forces, the international community reversed Iraq's aggression, restored Kuwaiti independence and imposed sanctions and constraints on a defeated Iraq designed both to punish the Iraqis for their aggression and to make a resurgence of aggressive capabilities more dangerous and costly. Many observers saw the conduct and outcome of U.S.-led response to the Iraqi aggression as a hopeful sign for the post-Cold War world. The experience suggested that the United Nations Security Council might be able to begin working as it had been intended before the East-West conflict made it difficult for the Council to carry out its peace maintenance responsibilities whenever U.S. and Soviet interests clashed. Most observers hoped that non- military instruments such as diplomacy, economic assistance and the threat or use of economic sanctions would be the instruments of first resort to discourage aggression and other violations of internationally-accepted norms of behavior. But very few believed that the post-Cold War world could be a peaceful one unless the international community held a stick even while it spoke softly. To help justify and build support for the response to the Iraqi aggression, President Bush said that his actions were part of an emerging "New World Order" in which the United States would play a leading role. This new order, according to President Bush's approach, would feature increased U.S.-Soviet cooperation, a more effective United Nations and multilateral responses to threats to that order. 3. For a detailed examination of President Bush's "New World Order" see Sloan, Stanley R. The US Role in a New World Order: Prospects for George Bush's Global Vision. Washington: Congressional Research Service. CRS Report No. 91-924 RCO. March 28, 1991. But once Desert Storm operations had driven Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, President Bush retreated from his new world order policy. The approach had been questioned from a wide variety of perspectives. Many observers criticized the approach as relying too heavily on the use of force, a strong leadership role for the United States, and involvement of international organizations. In the context of growing emphasis on domestic priorities and the forthcoming election --------- page 7 campaign, the "new world order" concept became the first foreign policy orphan of the post-Cold War era. 4. The demise of the "New World Order" concept and the opening of a debate on U.S. international priorities and roles is analyzed in Sloan, Stanley R. The U.S. Role in the Post-Cold War World: Issues for a New Great Debate. Washington: The Congressional Research Service. CRS Report No. 92-308 S. March 24, 1992. President Bush's "New World Order" policy represented an attempt to apply U.S. leadership and power to the requirements for order in a world that would succeed the politically frozen Cold War international system. The subsequent retreat from that attempt to establish a framework for the U.S. role in a post-Cold War world could be viewed as the first step along a path toward self- deterrence. President Clinton has supported a policy of responding to Iraqi bad behavior, authorizing a cruise missile strike on Iraqi intelligence headquarters in Baghdad which was carried out on July 27, 1993 in retaliation for an Iraqi plot to assassinate former President Bush. This strike proved to be very popular with the American public, producing an 11 point jump in Clinton's approval rating. The reaction illustrated that a low risk attack on a certified villain can attract popular support. Had the action against Iraq put American lives in jeopardy, however, both the President's decision and the public reaction might have been somewhat different. 5. Berke, R. "Raid on Baghdad: Poll Shows Raid Buoyed Clinton's Popularity," The New York Times, June 29, 1993, p. A7. Bosnia Within a year of the victory in the Gulf, the deterrent value of the international response to Iraqi aggression was called into question by the increasingly introverted nature of U.S. policy as the nation became immersed in its first national election of the post-Cold War era. George Bush decided not to lead or even participate actively in attempts to prevent or control the growing conflict in former Yugoslavia when fighting erupted in June 1991. The Bush Administration largely relied on efforts by the West Europeans to negotiate a peaceful settlement. The Bush Administration's hands-off approach to Yugoslavia undoubtedly was influenced by a variety of factors, including the inherent difficulty of the Balkan situation, unlikelihood of an early resolution and strong opposition by U.S. military officials to any commitment of U.S. forces to deal with the conflict. Professional military caution about involvement in --------- page 8 the conflict and the approach of the 1992 presidential election campaign made a potentially costly intervention in former Yugoslavia unattractive. 6. For a review illustrating how unattractive military options appeared in mid-1992, see Collins, John M. Balkan Battlegrounds, U.S. Military Alternatives. Washington: Congressional Research Service. CRS Report No. 92-679 S. September 2, 1992. 7. For background and updated information on U.S. policy toward the conflict in former Yugoslavia see Woehrel, Steven and Kim, Julie. Yugoslavia Crisis and U.S. Policy. Washington: Congressional Research Service. CRS Issue Brief 91089. [updated regularly]. A former Bush Administration National Security Council staffer has provided another perspective on the Administration's reluctance to become involved. David Gompert, writing in Foreign Affairs, observes that Following the Gulf War, a leading role in Yugoslavia would have implied that the United States could and would act as international policeman, even in an area of more immediate importance to America's rich European partners.... Only massive Western intervention would have stopped and reversed Serbian aggression, not some smart bomb down the right Serbian chimney. The United States faced by far the largest risks because it had (and has) the only real intervention capability. And the larger the task, the greater the American burden and casualties. Desert Storm taught the American people, wrongly, that vital interests could be defended with a handful of casualties in a videogame war. [emphasis added] 8. Gompert, David. "How to Defeat Serbia." Foreign Affairs. July/August 1994, p. 41-42. During the 1992 election campaign, candidate Bill Clinton criticized President Bush for failure to respond to the crisis in former Yugoslavia. After taking office, the Clinton Administration backed away from the more involved approach implied by campaign rhetoric and adopted a policy of willingness to contribute U.S. peacekeeping forces following a peace settlement agreed to by the warring parties, but not to send forces under other circumstances. The administration sought support among the NATO allies for a lifting of the arms embargo to provide additional arms to the Bosnian government forces accompanied by air strikes against Bosnian Serb forces. When the Administration encountered European opposition to the "lift and strike" approach, it backed away. Since the failed attempt to promote a "lift and strike" approach, the United States has supported enforcement of a "no-fly" zone over former Yugoslavia, participated in threats by NATO to carry out air strikes against Bosnian Serb forces attacking Sarajevo and five other Bosnian safe areas (actually mounting some limited air strikes on Bosnian-Serb forces), contributed ships to the international fleet implementing the embargo against Serbia, played an active role in support of relief shipments to Bosnia and, in 1994, diplomatic efforts in a "contact group" along with Russia, France and the United Kingdom to arrange a political settlement. In addition, the administration sent a small peacekeeping unit to support a Nordic military presence in Macedonia. --------- page 9 The Clinton Administration has continued to affirm that it would like to see the U.N. arms embargo lifted to allow arms shipments to the Bosnian Muslim forces. But it has resisted doing so unilaterally, arguing that it would harm peace efforts and relations with allied nations, in spite of pressure from the Congress to do something to allow the Bosnians to defend themselves against the Bosnian Serbs. The United States has held the line against the commitment of any U.S. ground troops to Bosnia, despite pressure from U.N. officials and U.S. allies with forces in Bosnia, unless and until there is a peace settlement to enforce. And, even in the case of contributions to a future peacekeeping force, the United States has required that a number of conditions be met including NATO (not United Nations) command of any enforcement operations, clear political and military strategies, including an exit strategy, plans for financing the operation and support from the Congress for the commitment. 9. Woehrel and Kim, on. cit., p. 14. Even though the Clinton Administration has pursued what could arguably be called an "activist" strategy toward the Bosnia issue, the bottom line has been that neither the Administration, the Congress, nor the American people have been eager to commit the United States in Bosnia in circumstances that could produce heavy casualties among U.S. forces. Even the most impassioned arguments in the congressional debate over lifting the arms embargo to "do something' for the Bosnians have assumed that it would be politically impossible to commit U.S. ground forces until there is a peace settlement. In the Bosnia case, therefore, the United States appears to have been looking for an approach that would not retreat from traditional U.S. policies of opposing aggression and genocide and responding to gross violations of human rights and humanitarian disasters, while, at the same time, not risking American lives. Because U.S. vital interests have not been threatened, neither the Clinton Administration, the Congress, nor the American people have been willing to pay the price that could be involved in the commitment of U.S. ground forces to force a peace in Bosnia. In spite of the economic embargo against Serbia, the enforcement of a no-fly zone, and limited air strikes against Serbian forces, the Bosnian Serb military and political leadership appeared not to be deterred from using military force to wrest control of Bosnian territory from the Bosnian government as long as the international presence in Bosnia was limited to protection of humanitarian relief operations and selected safe areas. The threats of military action against the Serbian forces lacked credibility as long as neither the United States nor NATO allies were willing to use ground forces to back up such threats. When air strikes were mounted, they were so limited as to undermine their credibility as a military threat to Serbian forces. It is not known whether a more forceful U.S. and international approach would have produced an earlier end to the conflict. But the U.S. unwillingness to put its military forces in harm's way in Bosnia produced questioning in Europe and around the world about the future --------- page 10 U.S. ability to lead the international community in responses to localized civil strife or regional aggression. Enlargement of NATO Throughout 1993, the question of whether or not to expand NATO's membership to take in new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe was a major issue on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. A variety of arguments were made for and against such expansion, and the United States finally proposed a compromise that would open the door to eventual expansion of the alliance while, in the near term, offering participation in a "Partnership for Peace" program to all former Warsaw Pact members, former Soviet republics and formerly"neutral" European states. 10. See Gallis, Paul E. Partnership For Peace. Washington: Congressional Research Service. CRS Report No. 94-351 F. April 22, 1994. One of the arguments made against inviting the leading candidates (usually assumed to be Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Republics) to join was that the U.S. Congress would not be willing to expand the area covered by the NATO founding Treaty of Washington's Article 5. Article 5 says that "[t]he Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them... shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them... will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith... such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."[emphasis added] Whether or not the Senate would approve accession of these potential candidates to the Treaty remains to be seen. But many Washington observers and commentators, including some Administration officials when speaking off the record, assume that the Congress would resist such new commitments. If this is an accurate assumption, it tends to reinforce the view that the United States is reluctant to use force against aggression or even to make such a pledge in order to reinforce the chances for success of democracy in these countries. Somalia U.S. involvement in Somalia produced some particularly notable developments in sentiment toward the use of U.S. military forces. Following defeat in his bid for re-election, President Bush took on one more international commitment for the United States before he left office. On November 25, 1992, the lame-duck president offered U.S. troops to participate in a multinational force to help create sufficiently secure conditions in Somalia to allow relief efforts to reach needy Somalians. According to the Bush plan, the mission of the U.S.-led force would be to create security conditions that would permit the feeding of the starving Somali people and then allow transfer of the security function to a U.N. peacekeeping force. The United Nations approved a U.S.-led military force to guarantee --------- page 11 distribution of food (U.N. Security Council Resolution 794) on December 3, 1992. President Bush observed that "America alone cannot right the world's wrongs, but we know that some crises in the world cannot be resolved without American involvement.... Only the U.S. has the global reach to place a large security force on the ground in such a distant place quickly and efficiently and thus, save thousands of innocents from death." 11. As quoted by Clough, Michael. "A President Bedeviled by a Lack of Vision," The Los Angeles Times, October 17, 1993, p. M-1. U.S. troops began landing in Somalia on December 9, taking over responsibility for security of relief operations from the small U.N. force that had been in Somalia since 500 Pakistani soldiers arrived there under U.N. auspices in October 1992. The expeditionary force helped create sufficiently peaceful conditions to allow relief efforts to deal effectively with the famine. U.S. forces suffered their first casualty on January 19, 1993, the day before President Clinton's inauguration. But the new Administration supported continuation of the effort and both the Senate and the House supported the use of force on behalf of the U.N. mission in the spring of 1993. In June 1993, forces loyal to one of the Somalia warlords, Ahmed Farah Aidid, ambushed Pakistani peacekeepers, killing 24 and wounding 54. The U.N., in response, authorized the arrest of Aidid, and a bounty was put out for Aidid a week later. By the summer of 1993, some Members of Congress were growing concerned about the "mission creep" for U.S. forces in Somalia -- from giving protection to relief efforts to joining in the Somali civil war against Aidid. On September 25, three U.S. soldiers were killed in the downing of a Blackhawk helicopter, increasing domestic concern about the costs of U.S. involvement. Those concerns escalated dramatically when, on October 3, 18 U.S. soldiers were killed and another 78 wounded on an attempt to capture Aidid's top lieutenants. U.S. television broadcast pictures of U.S. casualties, including the remains of one U.S. soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by Aidid's supporters. In reaction, some Members of Congress urged an immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia. Critics of the Administration charged that the United States had allowed itself to be dragged into a nation-building exercise much different from the original humanitarian relief effort. Other critics complained that U.S. forces in Somalia had become instruments of a United Nations mission, command structure and combat organization that placed U.S. forces in jeopardy. 12. For discussion of the mission shift from the perspective of a former Bush Administration official see Bolton, John R. "Wrong Turn in Somalia." Foreign Affairs. January/February 1994, p. 56-66. President Clinton reacted by sending additional U.S. forces to Somalia to protect against further casualties while promising to withdraw U.S. forces by March 31, 1994. On October 15, the Senate approved an amendment to the --------- page 12 FY94 defense appropriations bill endorsing Clinton's plan for a March 31 pullout after Senators had rejected an amendment that called for a "prompt" withdrawal. On January 28, 1994, U.N. Under Secretary General in charge of peacekeeping, Kofi Annan, observed, "the impression has been created that the easiest way to disrupt a peacekeeping operation is to kill Americans." By March 31, all U.S. forces had been withdrawn. 13. Lewis, Paul. "U.N. Official Reproves U.S. Over Plan to Pull Out of Somalia," The New York Times, January 30, 1994, Sect. 1, p. 10. The Somalia case appears to have provided confirmation for many Americans that the United States should not take serious risks or pay significant prices in blood or money to restore order in parts of the world that have little near-term relevance to vital U.S. interests. The American public had generally been sympathetic to the original mission of the U.S. presence in Somalia, which was to create sufficiently stable conditions to permit humanitarian assistance to reach the population. When the mission was expanded to include more active involvement in Somalia's civil conflict, Members of Congress began to question the commitment. The domestic reaction to the deaths of U.S. soldiers questioned the objectives, wisdom and importance of their mission and the arrangements under which they had been deployed. The Clinton Administration had been laboring for almost nine months to produce a policy on international peace operations that sought to share U.S. international burdens through greater reliance on international organizations, particularly the United Nations. The October 3 ambush apparently confirmed the Administration officials' emerging judgment that they would have to produce a much more circumspect set of objectives and guidelines for U.S. peacekeeping policy. 14. Lowenthal, Mark M. The Clinton Foreign Policy: Emerging Themes. Washington: Congressional Research Service. CRS Report 93-951 S. November 1, 1993, p. 10-11. Haiti Whether or not the United States will ultimately decide to use force to restore an elected government to Haiti remains to be seen, but the Clinton Administration has suggested for some time that it has not ruled out the use of force. Haiti is a special case in U.S. foreign policy because Haiti's geographic proximity to the United States and the impact of Haitian refugees on Florida make it an important domestic issue as well as a foreign policy problem. If Haiti were several thousand miles across the ocean, given the current U.S. foreign policy climate, the return of democracy to this small nation would likely be a very low priority among U.S. foreign policy goals. 15. For detailed discussion of and background on U.S. policy toward Haiti, see Taft-Morales, Maureen. Haitz: The Struggle for Democracy and Congressional Concerns in 1994. Washington: Congressional Research Service. CRS Issue Brief 93036. [updated regularly]. --------- page 13 Since a military coup overthrew the democratically elected government of Haiti in September 1991, the United States has sought to encourage the restoration of that government and a return to democracy, largely through imposition of economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure on the junta leaders. A number of factors have influenced the Clinton Administration to intensify pressure on the junta, including the problems created for the key electoral state of Florida by the flow of refugees out of Haiti, humanitarian concerns for the refugees and a hunger strike on their behalf by a leading American black advocate, the Administration's advocacy of enlarging the area of democracy in the world and significant pressure from black Members of Congress to restore democracy and acceptable human rights conditions in Haiti. For a variety of reasons, implied U.S. threats to use force in Haiti may not appear particularly credible to the Haitian junta. The U.S. position was seriously undermined in October 1993, shortly after the losses suffered by U.S. forces in Somalia, when a U.S. ship that was attempting to deliver U.S. and Canadian members of a U.N. military and police observing and training team was unable to dock in Haiti. The Haitian military leadership had agreed to allow the troops and police to land, but an angry mob at the dock (presumably organized by the junta) appeared to threaten a peaceful disembarkment. The ship, the U.S.S. Harlan County, turned back. U.S. officials subsequently acknowledged that the experience in Somalia had influenced the decision not to risk taking casualties by landing the troops in a confrontational setting. The sequence of events was widely interpreted as a confrontation in which the United States blinked first -- a major victory for the junta. 16. Holmes, Steven A. "Effort to Restore Haiti's Leader Is Halted." The New York Times. October 13. 1993. p. A1. It is not a foregone conclusion that the Congress would favor the commitment of forces to Haiti. Even though some Members of Congress who are particularly concerned about gross violations of human rights in Haiti under its current dictatorship have urged the use of force to accomplish this objective, the actions of Congress to date suggest an inconclusive perspective on the use of force. On October 21, 1993, the U.S. Senate defeated (by a vote of 81-19) an amendment offered by Senator Helms to the Department of Defense appropriations bill, H.R. 3116, that would have blocked deployment of U.S. troops to Haiti without prior congressional authorization except to protect or evacuate U.S. citizens. The Senate did approve (by a vote of 98-2) a "sense of the Congress" amendment offered by Senator Mitchell that urged President Clinton to seek congressional authorization before committing U.S. troops in Haiti. On May 24, 1994, the House passed a non-binding resolution opposing an invasion of Haiti. On June 9, it voted on the amendment again and reversed itself. On June 29, 1994, the Senate rejected another Republican-led effort to require that President Clinton seek congressional authorization before ordering military intervention in Haiti. In lieu of such authorization, according to the proposed amendment to the foreign operations appropriation bill, the President could have submitted a written report to Congress on the objectives of such a --------- page 14 mission. This amendment, proposed by Senator Gregg, was defeated by a vote of 66-34. The Senate then voted 93-4 to approve a non-binding amendment urging the President to seek congressional approval before sending troops to Haiti. These votes suggest that a majority of Senators is reluctant to tie the President's hands in his role as commander-in-chief, and, in spite of various reservations concerning Administration policy toward Haiti, most Senators prefer that the President bear leadership responsibility for any decision to use force to remove the junta. The Clinton Administration reportedly has held extensive discussions with other nations in an attempt to attract offers of troop contributions to a United Nations peacekeeping force for Haiti, and has received a large number of troop offerings. Such a force would not be designed to remove the junta, but rather to help maintain a secure internal environment in which democratic practices could be re-established. Suggestions in June 1994 that the Administration was considering removing the junta by force may have been undermined by reports that the Administration hoped to "buy" them out of power by offering to set them up in comfortable retirement out of Haiti. The Administration stepped up preparations in July 1994 that could be a prelude to armed invasion in an attempt to increase pressure on the military leaders to leave peacefully. 17. Sciolino, Elaine. "Large Haiti Force is Weighed by U.S." The New York Times. June 25, 1994, p. 1. The overall impression left so far by Administration and Congressional handling of the Haitian situation is that the United States would much prefer not to use force as a means of ousting the military junta and restoring the democratic government to power. The pressure to do so results largely from the humanitarian and financial problems created by the exodus of Haitians from the island. The arguments against using force include the absence of a vital U.S. security interest in Haiti, the fact that the international community would be far less supportive of follow-on measures if the Haitian government is removed by a U.S. military action, and the danger that the United States could end up with a commitment to keep military forces in Haiti for many years into the future. The concern of many observers is that the Administration might be painting itself into a corner from which it can escape only by a military intervention. 18. Devroy, Ann and Graham, Bradley. "U.S. Units Ready to Invade but Clinton Is Said to Be Weeks From Decision." The Washington Post. July 17, 1994, p. A21. Korea The question of use of force in Korea brings together the requirements of U.S. non-proliferation goals and the long- standing commitment to defend South --------- page 15 Korea against possible aggression from the north. The current crisis was touched off by North Korea's decision in March 1993 to suspend international inspections of its nuclear facilities and withdraw from the Non-proliferation Treaty, which it had just signed in 1992. The actions came after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) found evidence that North Korea had produced more weapons-grade plutonium than it had claimed, suggesting intent to divert the material for nuclear weapons production. 19. For more detailed information on the background to the Korean crisis and U.S. policy see Cronin, Richard, Coordinator. North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program: U.S. Policy Options. Washington: Congressional Research Service. CRS Report No. 94-470 F. June 12, 1994. and Collins, John M. Korean Crisis, 1994: Military Geography, Military Balance, Military Options. Washington: Congressional Research Service. CRS Report No. 94-311 S. April 11, 1994. In the maneuvering between the United States and North Korea since March 1993, the Clinton Administration has shifted back and forth between hard line positions and more conciliatory approaches. For example, in March 1994 Secretary of Defense Perry said that the United States intended to stop North Korea from developing a substantial arsenal of nuclear weapons, even at the risk of war. Then, in June 1994, the Administration, apparently at the urging of former-President Jimmy Carter, gave its tacit sanction to a mediating mission by Carter to North Korea. Carter announced that North Korea's leader, the late-Kim Il Sung, intended to pursue "good faith efforts" to resolve the crisis and, contrary to Perry's ominous warnings, that the U.S. push to impose stricter international sanctions against the North could be relaxed. The Carter visit stimulated planning for a North-South Korean summit meeting and, at least temporarily, stood down from the Administration's harder line stance. 20. See the analysis in Gordon, Michael R. "U.S. Shift On Korea, Clinton Retreating From a Showdown." The New York Times. June 8, 1994, p. 1. All experts appear to agree that war on the Korean peninsula would be devastating for all concerned. Although the United States and South Korea would presumably succeed in repulsing a North Korean attack, the conflict could well result in the destruction of Seoul, South Korea's capital and economic and population center, and substantial casualties to U.S. and South Korean forces. Thirty-eight thousand U.S. troops currently stand astride the likely invasion routes. 21. Gellman, Barton. "Trepidation at Root of U.S. Korean Policy." The Washington Post. December 12, 1993, p. A-1, 49. It is likely that U.S. counterproliferation strikes against North Korean nuclear facilities would be viewed by the North as an act of war, possibly setting off a wider war. In the current U.S. domestic context, U.S. attempts to threaten the use of force in the absence of an unprovoked North Korean attack on the south may lack credibility. In spite of tough-talking by some Administration officials, the long-standing defense commitment to South Korea, and the obvious priority that the Administration gives to its non-proliferation policy, the threat --------- page 16 to resort to the use of force probably looks more like a bluff to North Korea than a real threat. The question raised is whether it is possible to affect Korean behavior through the threat of military sanctions if U.S. approaches to the use of force elsewhere suggest a dominant disinclination to follow through on such threats. The Administration may not be able to derive much value from threats to resort to force as long as it, the Congress and the American people appear unwilling to pay the price that following through on the threat would require. PDD-25 22. An examination of the development of U.S. policy toward peace operations in the Clinton Administration can be found in Lowenthal, Mark M. Peacekeeping in Future U.S. Foreign Policy. Washington: Congressional Research Service. CRS Report 94-260S. May 10, 1994. When Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) was issued in May 1994, it reflected the experiences and debate of the previous year. As a consequence, it incorporated a substantial modification of the Clinton Administration's original concepts for U.S. participation in and increased reliance on United Nations peace operations. PDD-25 incorporated many of the limitations on U.S. commitments suggested as desirable by congressional reactions to the casualties in Somalia. The Administration had gone from U.N. Ambassador Madeleine Albright's advocacy of a U.S. policy of "assertive multilateralism" in June 1993 to PDD-25's policy of "stringent conditionality." 23. Albright, Madeleine. "The Myths About U.N. Peacekeeping." Statement to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights, June 24, 1993. The text can be found in Foreign Policy Bulletin, September/October 1993, pp. 35-38. 24. Lowenthal, op. cit., p. 14. PDD-25 lays out a long list of factors that this Government would consider when called on to vote on peace operations in the U.N. Security Council. These conditions include whether: U.N. involvement advances U.S. interests; there is a threat to the peace; there are clear objectives and means to accomplish the mission; the consequences of inaction have been weighed and considered unacceptable; and the operation's duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the operation. PDD-25 lays out even more demanding additional factors to consider for operations that involve U.S. participation. Those factors, many of which were prominently mentioned in the October 1993 congressional debate on U.S. involvement in peace operations include whether or not: * risks to American personnel are considered acceptable; * personnel, funds and other resources are available; * U.S. participation is necessary for an operation's success; --------- page 17 * the role of U.S. forces is tied to clear objectives and an endpoint for U.S. participation can be identified; * domestic and congressional support exists or can be marshalled; and * command and control arrangements are acceptable. If it is anticipated that U.S. involvement will include combat, PDD-25 goes on to list factors that reflect the U.S. military establishment's legitimate concern that, if they are asked to perform a dangerous mission, they are provided sufficient support and flexibility to accomplish that mission. These factors, which appear to be drawn directly from the military's institutional reaction to the Vietnam war, include whether or not there is: * a determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined objectives; * a plan to achieve those objectives decisively; * a commitment to reassess and adjust, as necessary, the size, composition and disposition of our forces to achieve our objectives. It is possible to look at these lists of considerations and reach a variety of conclusions. Most of them, taken individually, appear reasonable considerations under most circumstances. Taken collectively, however, against the backdrop of the experiences with use of force in the post-Cold War world and of the current priorities of the Administration and Congress, these factors appear so constraining as to be prohibitive of action. In effect, PDD-25 could be described as a very effective set of guidelines in a self-deterrence foreign policy regime. Rwanda The civil war in Rwanda presented the first opportunity for application of the Clinton Administration's more modest (PDD-25) approach to peace operations. The current crisis was precipitated when Rwanda's President, Juvenal Habyarimana, and the president of Burundi died when the plane returning them from a conference in Tanzania crashed on approach to Kigali, Rwanda's capital. The plane was rumored to have been hit by rocket fire, but the cause of the crash was never independently verified. Some sources claim that the forces of the Tutsi ethnic minority were responsible (Habyarimana was a Hutu, Rwanda's ethnic majority). But subsequent reports suggested that Hutus carried out the attack to undermine a plan for settlement of the Tutsi-Hutu ethnic conflict that they regarded as unfavorable. 26. For detailed discussion of and background on U.S. policy toward the Rwanda crisis, see Copson, Raymond W. Rwanda and Burundi: Background and U.S. Policy Options. Washington: Congressional Research Service. CRS Issue Brief 94027. [updated regularly] The fighting immediately following the crash took the lives of from 250,000 to 500,000 Rwandans, mostly Tutsi who were slaughtered by Hutu extremist militia and militant Hutu in the armed forces. An estimated 1.5 million were made homeless within Rwanda, and similar numbers fled to neighboring --------- page 18 countries as refugees. Subsequently, Tutsi rebel forces steadily reversed the initial Hutu gains and ultimately seized the entire country. Prior to this conflict, the United Nations had a 2,500-member U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) to help implement a Hutu-Tutsi peace accord that had been reached in August 1993. The force consisted of some 940 soldiers from Ghana, 840 from Bangladesh and 440 from Belgium. After losing 10 soldiers in the fighting, Belgium withdrew its contingent and the U.N. Security Council decided to reduce the remaining force to 270 military and civilian personnel. In June 1994, France sent more than 2,500 troops into Rwanda as what the French government described as a temporary humanitarian operation to protect innocent civilians until the international community can produce a longer-term solution. From the outset of the current crisis, it was clear that the United States would not volunteer to send troops to Rwanda. In addition, the United States raised questions about sending any new troops to reinforce UNAMIR and urged a go-slow approach, attempting to block or at least delay U.N. Security Council Resolution 918 to authorize a 5,500 person force for Rwanda, arguing that more time was needed to plan such a force. The United States did offer to lease 50 M-113 armored personnel carriers to the United Nations for use in Rwanda. But, consistent with PDD-25's cautionary approach to U.S. financial contributions to U.N. peacekeeping and with Congressional sentiments that costs of U.S. contributions to peacekeeping be limited, the Administration engaged in protracted negotiations over how much the U.N. would pay the United States for the use of the APCs. Another indication of the Administration's circumspect tack centered on the question of whether or not genocide was taking place in Rwanda. The 1948 Genocide Convention, to which the United States is a party, implies obligations for nations to respond to cases of genocide. The Administration, on June 9, instructed its spokesmen to say only that "Acts of genocide may have occurred", apparently seeking to diminish or defer the responsibility for the United States to act. Following protests by Members of Congress and human rights groups, the Administration revised its approach and began describing the killings as genocide without making fundamental changes in its approach to the crisis. 26. Jehl, Douglas. "Officials Told to Avoid Calling Rwanda Killings 'Genocide.'" The New York Times. June 9, 1994, p. 11. Critics have charged that the Administration's approach contributed to the deaths of thousands of Rwandan civilians. Administration supporters reject the charge and argue that the United States has only humanitarian concerns but no economic or security interests at stake in Rwanda, and should not become militarily involved. 27. Ibid., p. 12. Whether or not the United States should have taken a more interventionist approach to the Rwandan crisis can and will be debated. But the response of --------- page 19 the Clinton Administration was consistent with a more circumspect recent approach to peace operations, and tends to support the perception that the United States is increasingly reluctant to use or support the use of military force in circumstances where U.S. interests are not directly threatened. --------- page 20 WHAT FACTORS LEAD TOWARD A SELF-DETERRENCE PHENOMENON? The foregoing review of events suggests that the recent U.S. reticence to use military force arises from a combination of circumstances and policy choices. The circumstances include the changes in the international context at the end of the Cold War. The choices are those that have been made by the Bush and Clinton Administrations and by the U.S. Congress. No Threats to Vital U.S. Interests The most important circumstantial influence on the U.S. willingness to use force is the fact that, once the Cold War ended, the Warsaw Pact closed shop and the Soviet Union dissolved, the United States faced few real and present dangers to its national security. During the Cold War, U.S. Presidents were able to argue convincingly to the Congress and to the public that the vital U.S. interest of national survival in a free community of nations was ultimately threatened by the potential spread of Communist ideology and the power of the Soviet Union, the main Communist state. Only one aspect of this threat, the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear forces, posed an imminent threat to national survival. But with alliance systems and proxy arrangements, many other threats and sources of instability were seen as extensions of the main threat. In response to such derivative threats, the United States fought wars in Korea and Vietnam, deployed large military forces armed with nuclear weapons to Europe, and intervened or supported military interventions in Middle Eastern, African and Latin American countries, all in the name of defending against the Soviet-Communist threat. Today, aggressions and sources of instability that in the Cold War might have been, or been seen as, extensions of the Soviet- Communist threat and as warranting a U.S. military response, appear much less dangerous for U.S. interests and certainly not threats to important U.S. interests. This development, and the fact that it left the United States without a comparable sense of foreign policy purpose to replace the policy of containing Communist expansion and Soviet power, has been well-documented and --------- page 21 analyzed, including treatment in several CRS studies. One of these reports predicted early in 1992 that, ..... until there is a clearly articulated Administration approach -- a vision, if you will -- to the U.S. role in the world that has been debated and supported by the Congress and by the American people, U.S. foreign and defense policy will appear to be adrift, with limited sense of purpose, debatable international relevance and, presumably uncertain domestic support. 28. See, for example, Sloan, Stanley R. The U.S. Role in a New World Order.... Op. cit.; The U.S. Role in the Post-Cold War World.... op. cit.; Global Burdensharing in the Post-Cold War World. Washington: Congressional Research Service. CRS Report 93-892S. October 8, 1993; and Lowenthal, Mark M. "National Security" as a Concept: Does It Need to be Redefined ? Washington: Congressional Research Service. CRS Report 93-12S. January 7, 1993; The Clinton Foreign Policy.... op cit.; and Peacekeeping in Future U.S. Foreign Police. op. cit. 29. Sloan, The U.S. role in the Post-Cold War World..., op. cit., p. 28. And, as a recent report in this series has noted, "...the continuing inability of the United States to define both the extent and limits of its self-perceived international role" underlies the contemporary debate on U.S. foreign policy. 30. Lowenthal, Peacekeeping.., op. cit., p. 22. Cold War Leadership Fatigue With the notable exception of George Bush, who continued to savor foreign policy involvement to the end of his term, most Americans in the early 1990s appeared to be suffering from what might be called Cold War leadership fatigue. The perception of the American people and of most Members of Congress was that the United States had carried the lion's share of defense responsibilities and burdens throughout the Cold War. Although public opinion recognized that the United States could not adopt an "isolationist" posture, most Americans apparently wished to escape from the extensive global leadership role that the United States had performed for over four decades. They did not want the United States in the post-Cold War world to be the "world's policeman," even if no other cop appeared on the block. One review of public opinion in March 1992 concluded that "most Americans don't want their country to be the policeman, banker, or social worker for the world, but they aren't isolationist, either. A sensible citizenry accepts that the US needs to assume a strong and constructive -- but realistic - global role." According to another study of the public's response to the use of force, "...the public approves of protecting Americans, is fairly supportive of --------- page 22 defending allies, is a bit skeptical about punishing nations into changing their policies, and the public is quite negative towards restoring order in countries when American lives are not at stake." 31. Cattani, Richard J. "America and the World," Christian Science Monitor. March 4, 1992, p. 18-19. 32. Burbach, David T. "Presidential Approval and the Use of Force," DACS Working Paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Defense and Arms Control Studies Program, May 1994, p. 44. The popular preference for attention to domestic issues suggested by the 1992 election did not, however, necessarily mean that the public wanted the United States to retreat from an international leadership role. After the bad experience in Somalia, for example, one poll in the spring of 1994 found the public wary of "repeating Somalia mistakes" in Bosnia and of getting bogged down in "another Vietnam." The same poll nonetheless discovered that "strong majorities found convincing the arguments that the US should intervene to stop the bloodshed [in Bosnia] for moral reasons, that it would show poor leadership for the US to not contribute troops when it has been a major proponent of a peace agreement, and that ethnic cleansing is a form of genocide that must be stopped." 33. "Poll Finds US Public Strongly Supports Deeper Engagement in Bosnia" Program on International Policy Attitudes, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland. News Release. April 11, 1994. It is by no means clear, however, that popular majorities could be sustained if intervention in Bosnia or elsewhere were to produce U.S. casualties and require the transfer of significant funds from domestic programs and deficit reduction to military spending. Domestic Preoccupations U.S. post-Cold War behavior has also been influenced by the belief that the nation had deferred action on a variety of domestic problems when the arguments for Cold War levels of defense spending remained compelling for a majority of Americans and their representatives in Congress. The process of adjustment actually began in the mid-1980s, as the Cold War eased, when the Congress passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction act. The priority in that act was to gain control over the federal budget deficit, and it placed limits on both domestic and defense spending. Before the Cold War came to an end, experts and officials had debated whether or not the United States could afford to maintain the global role that it had sustained throughout the Cold War. Professor Paul Kennedy led the school of thought arguing that the United States would have to cut back on its commitments or face inevitable economic decline. In the late 1980s, this debate remained somewhat academic, and as long as a Soviet threat existed most officials judged that the United States could not give up its global leadership --------- page 23 role and focused their attention on getting allies to pick up more of the financial burdens on behalf of international stability. Only when it became conventional wisdom in the early 1990s that the Soviet threat was gone did the national consensus begin to accept that major budget funding could be re-allocated to the domestic agenda. 34. Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York: Random House, 1987. 35. For a discussion of this complex of issues, see Daggett, Stephen. "The American Economy, the Defense Budget, and National Security," in Sarkesian, Sam C. and Flanagin, John Mead, Editors. U.S. Domestic and National Security Agendas into the Twenty-First Century. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1994, p. 62-81. Candidate Bill Clinton's presidential campaign recognized and greatly benefitted from this shift in popular perceptions and priorities. "It's the economy, stupid" became the rallying cry and the concern for domestic problems was a hallmark of the campaign. George Bush's campaign managers, recognizing that their candidate was perceived as a competent foreign policy manager but uninterested in domestic issues, attempted to change the President's image, but to no avail. President Clinton's Approach President Clinton apparently followed what he saw as the electoral message supplemented by public opinion polling. If the new Administration were to devote its greatest efforts to domestic issues, it could not maintain the global burdens that had characterized the U.S. role during the Cold War and, more recently in the response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. But, also consistent with campaign positions and public opinion, President Clinton did not reject an internationalist role for the United States, and so looked for ways to pursue such a role at reduced cost. The first answer for the President and his advisors was to rely more heavily on international cooperation, and particularly on the United Nations, to deal with security challenges that did not directly threaten vital U.S. interests. Under the post-Soviet circumstances, this would include most of the likely disruptions of the peace. As noted above, President Clinton initiated a study of U.S. peacekeeping policy (then-called Presidential Review Document 13) to lay out a multilateral strategy for global security challenges. When it appeared that the approach of"assertive multilateralism" could not be sustained in the Congress and in U.S. public opinion, the Administration adjusted its approach to accommodate the existing level of consensus. The President's style appears to attempt to accommodate limits on his possibilities for action in order to reach consensus. For example, in PDD-25 the Administration generally accepted the constraints on the use of U.S. forces suggested in congressional debate. With regard to Bosnia policy, President Clinton has of late tended to view international organizations such as NATO and the United Nations as constraining environments rather than as possible vehicles for U.S. leadership. For example, when caught between Congressional advocacy of lifting the Bosnia arms embargo unilaterally and international --------- page 24 opposition to such a move, the President explained that his hands were tied by the need to sustain international cooperation. This approach could be described as a response to reality, and an effective strategy for finding consensus. On the other hand, the approach tends to limit policy options to the extent that it forgoes the possibility of overcoming resistance and widening the area for action. It is also possible to see President Clinton and his key advisors as wishing to avoid the fate that befell President Lyndon Johnson whose goal of a "Great Society" domestic presidency was done in by the political and resource costs of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. This perception is reinforced by the fact that President Clinton has not made strong efforts to build consensus in Congress or in public opinion for an interventionist U.S. approach to global security problems, and has accepted a shrinking U.S. role in lieu of risking political capital on behalf of international objectives. 36. Christian Science Monitor political cartoonist Danziger captured this perspective in a drawing entitled "Clinton View of the World" in a map of the world portrays the United States surrounded by a world in which all nations are labeled "Vietnam." Danziger, "Clinton View of the World." The Christian Science Monitor. May 11, 1994, p. 24. Although public opinion polls in the first half of 1994 showed declining public confidence in President Clinton's ability to lead U.S. foreign policy, influential political advisors to the President apparently continue to believe that the costs of using military force in virtually all cases to date outweigh the potential benefits. One commentator, Paul Gigot, has noted that the President is consistently advised by his pollster, Stan Greenberg, to continue to "speak the traditional presidential language of 'enlargement,' 'engagement' and 'leadership'" while avoiding the commitments such language implies." 37. See, for example, Morin, Richard. "Support for Sending GIs to Haiti May Be Increasing, Poll Shows," The Washington Post. June 29, 1994, p. 8. 38. Gigot, Paul A. "Clinton Abroad: All Politics Is Local." The Wall Street Journal. April 22, 1994, p. A12. Limited Tolerance for Casualties Whether or not the United States is willing to risk the lives of its young soldiers for international causes is both an emotional question and a critical factor in the ability of the United States to use force on behalf of its foreign policy objectives. Examination of this issue therefore stimulates a variety of perspectives. One analyst has argued that a major factor influencing the reluctance of the United States and other post-industrial societies to use force in their foreign relations is the reduced tolerance to casualties of war in post-industrial --------- page 25 societies. Edward Luttwak argues that in the Great Powers of history large families ("multiple live births") and high rates of infant mortality were the rule. Under these circumstances, according to Luttwak, "To lose a young family member for any reason was always tragic no doubt, yet his death in combat was not the extraordinary and fundamentally unacceptable event that it has now become." 39. Luttwak, Edward N. "Twilight of The Great Powers, Why We No Longer Will Die for a Cause," The Washington Post. June 26, 1994, p. C1. 40. Ibid., p. 2. According to this analysis, only "exceptionally determined leaders" are capable of overcoming the societal resistance to casualties in post-industrial societies -- Luttwak cites President Bush in the Gulf and Margaret Thatcher in the Falklands. Without unusually effective leadership, the resistance to casualties is so high that post-industrial societies generally elect to use their military forces only for the defense of narrowly defined vital interests or when casualties can be anticipated to be minimal. 41. A "joke" recently making the rounds on the diplomatic circuit suggests that, at the end of the Cold War, some nations, including France and the U.K., are still prepared to see their soldiers kill and be killed, others, for example the United States, are prepared to kill but not be killed, and some, such as Italy, are neither prepared to kill or be killed. (Depending on who is telling the joke, Germany or Japan could be substituted for Italy.) Harry Summers, a former military officer who now writes on military affairs, takes issue with what he views as Luttwak's "admiration" for the imperialist Great Powers. According to Summers, "The value of military intervention in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti and North Korea has not been established. Therefore, at face value, the cost in terms of casualties is prohibitive." 42. Summers, Harry. "Great Power envy: Nothing to be jealous of." Army Times. July 11, 1994, p. 54. Another analyst simply attributes the low U.S. tolerance to casualties to a particularly American approach to death, Harvey M. Sapolsky writes that "Americans do not want to die." Acknowledging that this is not so unusual, Sapolsky goes on to observe that ...Americans are both rich enough and arrogant enough to try to do a lot about this very common desire. In attempting to avoid death by disease, war, and accident, Americans spend vastly more on medical care, the military, and risk reduction than do most other people.... We are becoming --------- page 26 even more peculiar. Increasingly, we want our wars to be without killing of any sort." 43. Sapolsky, Harvey M. "War without Killing," in Sarkesian and Flanagin, op. cit., p. 27. It is not necessary to accept Luttwak's historical analysis to conclude that current tolerance in the United States for military casualties is low. We do not know whether or not the U.S. public or other Western electorates would be willing to accept heavy casualties in a case where vital national interests were directly threatened. We have not had such a case in recent history, and may not face one for some time to come. (For comparison, both Korea and Vietnam cost 50,000 dead apiece and in both cases public support fell away when victory was not achieved.) Nonetheless, it is clear that the American people are clearly reluctant to accept casualties without a sense of purpose or mission for which their soldiers may be asked to risk their lives. Diminished Expectations for the United Nations President Clinton originally hoped to be able to shift some of the burdens of enforcing international peace and stability onto the shoulders of the international community, particularly the United Nations. But this expectation did not sufficiently take into account the UN's lack of experience in managing military operations more demanding than keeping the peace in relatively benign military circumstances. The experiences in Somalia and in Bosnia seriously undermined the credibility of the United Nations in the United States as an effective manager of military operations. Michael Mandelbaum, a foreign policy advisor to Bill Clinton's election campaign, observed, "Since the end of the Cold War, the U.N. Security Council has become a font of resolutions authorizing international action. But the United Nations lacks the means to carry out its resolutions, and its member states lack the will to do so." 44. Mandelbaum, Michael. "The Reluctance to Intervene." Foreign Policy. Summer 1994. p. 17. It is quite unlikely that Members of Congress would react favorably to U.S. forces serving in a combat operation under a United Nations command structure under current circumstances. Such a decision is within the prerogatives of the Commander-in- Chief and his authority in this regard has never been challenged successfully by the Congress. PDD-25 nonetheless accepts such a limitation as a given, and so the United States is unlikely to initiate or support proposals in the near term that would give the United Nations much greater responsibility for managing military operations. Without thoroughgoing U.S. support for a stronger U.N. role, it will be difficult if not impossible for the United Nations to develop the competence for managing peace operations that require the --------- page 27 coordinated use of military capabilities to restore or enforce the peace rather than to keep an existing peace. Cautious U.S. Military Leadership The "bad" and "good" experiences for U.S. armed forces in recent decades have left strong "lessons" among professional military leaders. The leading "bad" experience -- the war in Vietnam -- underscored their long-held view that they should not take on missions that could not, or would not, be supported over the long haul by political leadership and public opinion. The leading "good" experience -- the Gulf War -- confirmed the professional military's preference for forces to accomplish assigned missions as quickly as possible with the fewest possible U.S. casualties. The tandem requirements for political support and resource sufficiency have made the Pentagon leadership increasingly wary about taking on missions that might be marginal to U.S. vital interests and consequently lacking the necessary support from the political elite and public opinion. The requirement for resource sufficiency also creates disincentives to use force. First, the larger the force deemed sufficient for the mission the greater the cost and the less likely the congressional support for the mission. Second, the extent to which U.S. military capabilities have been reduced in the post-Cold War period has made the military more cautious about forces that are available beyond those required to protect vital national interests. If the margins are smaller, can the United States afford to make substantial contributions, for example, to U.N. peace operations and still retain sufficient capabilities to use if vital U.S. interests are threatened? In sum, the U.S. professional military establishment seems no longer imbued with the traditional "can do" philosophy, but rather with a "will do if..." approach that contributes to the tendency of the United States to avoid the use of force on behalf of anything other than critical international objectives. It is noteworthy in this context that some of the situations examined in this study did not appear easily susceptible to solutions employing U.S. combat forces. Professional officers and expert observers have raised questions, for example, about the military feasibility of peace enforcement in Bosnia, support for nation building in Somalia, counter-proliferation in Korea, and for other scenarios where a more decisive use of force was a theoretical option. Serious doubts among military professionals about whether or not specific foreign policy goals can be accomplished through the use of military force inspires policymaker caution. Even if this is seen as prudent, it tends to reinforce other tendencies toward self-deterrence. Congressional Qualms The Congress has demonstrated with regard to virtually all potential uses of military force in the post-Cold War period its skepticism about the need for the United States to put its forces in harm's way in a world that currently poses few direct threats to U.S. vital interests. The congressional reaction to --------- page 28 American casualties in Somalia played a direct role in the U.S. decision to withdraw from the international peace operation there. With regard to Bosnia, even many of those Members who have argued strongly that the United States must do something in reaction to the aggression of Serbian Bosnians and human rights abuses, have not been willing to support deployment of U.S. ground forces there until a peace settlement has been reached. Members of the Congressional Black Caucus have argued for U.S. military intervention in Haiti, but other Members have cautioned against such a move. 45. See: Bruner, Edward F. U.S. Forces and Multinational Commands: Precedents and Criteria. Washington: Congressional Research Service. CRS Report 93-436 F. April 21, 1993. 46. Dewar, Helen and Cooper, Kenneth J. "Many Lawmakers Criticize Haiti Policy but Few Propose Alternative." The Washington Post. July 16, 1994, p. A9. The authors of this article note that "If there is any unifying force on foreign policy on Capitol Hill, it is an almost visceral reluctance to leave fingerprints on any policy that involves political risk, especially responsibility for putting American forces in harm's way." The Congress therefore expresses the same appreciation of political costs and benefits that is seen in the Administration's actions. Members of Congress, for the most part, are not willing to advocate the use of U.S. military force in potentially dangerous circumstances at a time when there is no consensus on what international goals are worth paying a price for and when the Administration assesses the domestic political costs of international leadership as greater than the potential benefits. The Bottom Line As long as all these factors persist, it appears that the United States will remain reluctant to intervene militarily in cases where U.S. vital interests are not threatened and U.S. troops could suffer casualties or where the financial costs of involvement would be substantial. (An intervention in Haiti, should it come, might be an exception because it would largely have been stimulated by U.S. domestic ramifications of the Haitian situation.) The general feeling of freedom from direct threats, continuing domestic priorities, reluctance to accept casualties without a clear definition of purpose or mission, the Clinton Administration's apparent reluctance to use force given the prospective political and financial costs, the professional military's requirement for political leadership and sufficient resources, congressional mistrust of multilateral frameworks for the use of force and unwillingness for the United States to bear excessive burdens and other factors discussed above, taken together, appear to weave a strong web of constraints around the United States' use of force. During the Cold War, the caution induced by the Vietnam experience was at least partially offset by the continuing pressure of the U.S.Soviet competition. With no such rationale today, it appears that the Administration could choose to use force only with determined leadership and a rationale defined in terms of both U.S. interests and values. Even under these circumstances, a decision to use force in all cases other than defense of U.S. vital interests might carry high political risks for the President and his supporters. --------- page 29 WHAT ARE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. SELF-DETERRENCE? In the Short-term, Vital U.S. Interests Should Remain Secure A principal reason why the United States has been able to drift toward self-deterrence is the fact that neither the President, the Congress nor the American people have perceived vital U.S. interests as being threatened by any international development since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. This perception appears warranted, particularly if "vital interests" is defined narrowly, for example, to mean the survival of the United States, its political system, and the essential well-being of the American people. It may also be true even if "vital interests" are defined more broadly to encompass the security of major allies, preservation of the flow of commerce, and access to important natural resources. In the post-Soviet, post-Warsaw Pact world, there is no military force that could, with non-nuclear capabilities, overwhelm the United States militarily. Several countries (particularly Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom) deploy nuclear weapons capabilities that could cause catastrophic damage to the United States, but two of these countries have been and remain U.S. friends and allies. The other two currently have no apparent reason to threaten or be seen as threatening U.S. interests with their nuclear weapons. The United States retains sufficient nuclear weapons to deter present or future nuclear weapons states from rationally threatening their use against U.S. territory or forces. There are countries that have the capacity to challenge U.S. vital interests defined more broadly. Perhaps the most tangible example is the ability of a number of countries to restrict access to important natural resources. Several countries (Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia) have the potential to threaten access to oil, a commodity whose price and availability have profound effects on global economic health. One of these countries, Saudi Arabia, is a U.S. ally. Iraq has recently been defeated by a U.S.-led force in its attempt to take over Kuwait's oil fields. Iran, at least for the moment, does not appear inclined to take the requisite risks to threaten U.S. interests in this area. One major U.S. ally, South Korea, does face a dangerous opponent in the north, and the U.S. commitment to South Korea and to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime is being tested. Under some circumstances, threats to broadly defined U.S. vital interests could emerge from this situation. Viewed broadly, the world has become a relatively benign place for "vital" U.S. interests, and the United States has sufficient nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to deter most foreseeable threats to such interests. --------- page 30 International Cooperation Becomes Less Effective Although U.S. vital interests may not be at risk in the near term, even the early stages of what can be seen as self- deterrence have brought with them consequences that run counter to professed U.S. foreign policy goals. U.S. reluctance to commit troops to Bosnia, the rapid disengagement from Somalia after taking casualties and the retreat from a dockside confrontation in Haiti in 1993 all have been interpreted abroad as indicators of changed U.S. intentions and commitments. The dynamic affecting current U.S. attitudes toward the use of force are affecting the policies of other countries as well. Most of our most reliable burdensharers, the West European nations, are reducing their defense spending and military capacities at least as rapidly as is the United States. They, perhaps with the exception of France, are acting on the same perception of diminishing military risks to their interests that has been motivating U.S. reductions. The shrinking military potential of allied countries means that it will become even more difficult to build effective international military coalitions to respond to future security challenges. Further complicating this picture, if the United States does not appear prepared to take the lead in coalition responses to localized aggression or violations of human rights, then very few other countries will be willing or able to act on their own on behalf of accepted international norms of behavior. Thus, not only is the world's last former policeman reducing its will and capacity to lead effective posses, but potential members of the posse are less and less capable of contributing to such efforts. The struggle within the Clinton Administration to articulate a policy toward multilateral military operations and the final product of that struggle -- PDD-25 -- offered confirming evidence that the Administration had grown much more circumspect about supporting multilateral military operations once it discovered the implicit costs and risks. But it is commonly felt that the United States has to be part of, support, or at least help pay for every such operation to ensure its going forward. From the perspective of some foreign officials, the United States can no longer be counted on to follow through on its commitments, particularly if U.S. action would cost money or cause U.S. casualties. This implies that, even in the short term, it will be very difficult for the international community to organize multilateral responses to breaches of the peace, aggressive behavior, or other acts against international comity if the response requires the threat or use of military force. The key organizational frameworks for such responses, the United Nations, NATO, and the OAS, all depend on active U.S. participation and support for any military operations that are more demanding or dangerous than traditional peacekeeping operations. For the present, should the United States decide that it might be necessary to use or threaten the use of military force, for example in dealing with the crises in Haiti or North Korea, other countries might be wary of following what they currently regard as an uncertain lead on problems that they do not consider threats to their vital interests. --------- page 31 The net effect of the drift toward U.S. self-deterrence on the international community appears already to have weakened its ability to deter or respond to acts of aggression or other contraventions of normal international standards. If the United States remains unable to use or threaten the use of force to deal with threats to international peace that do not threaten vital U.S. interests, then the international community's ability to respond to such threats could be seriously diminished, unless alternatives to U.S. leadership and resources somehow appear. Longer-term: Tendencies Toward Disorder and Proliferation The costs for the United States of a self-deterred posture might be relatively small in the near term. But the longer term might be a different story. Let's assume the United States, for several years, remains unwilling to use or threaten the use of force except in the case of direct threats to its vital interests. As a consequence, there is the danger that the international community would be unable to respond to a series of challenges to the peace arising from local or regional aggression. It then would become clear to political leaders who have the military capacity to achieve political goals or settle grievances against a neighboring state or a national minority that there would not likely be an international response to such use of force if vital U.S. interests are not threatened. Over time, the result could be an increasingly chaotic international system in which countries have little or no faith in the will of the United States to honor its international commitments (for example in the NATO Treaty or the U.N. Charter). In such a setting, countries with aggressive designs would be encouraged to arm themselves to ensure success, setting off new regional arms competitions or fueling old ones. Some additional countries might decide to develop nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction to try to achieve such objectives through blackmail. Others might decide to proliferate as a substitute for security once ensured by international commitments backed by the United States. Such risks may sound distant today, but the might well emerge in an international community where the rules of the system are not enforced. The economic and political well-being of the United States relies in many ways on an international system that works roughly according to rules of the game that the United States played a major role in drafting. At some point in the deterioration of the current system, the United States would likely decide that a generally chaotic evolution of the international system was on the verge of threatening vital U.S. interests, but efforts to reverse the trend at that point by changing the perception of the U.S. and international ability to police the system might be much more costly than they would have been earlier. U.S. Values Challenged If vital U.S. interests appear secure today, a value-based U.S. foreign policy may be more seriously challenged. U.S. foreign policy throughout the Cold War --------- page 32 period was premised on a number of values that the United States sought to protect against Soviet power and communism, such as self-determination, democracy, individual freedoms and human rights, territorial integrity, expansion of open markets. Those values became associated with a wide array of national interests and incorporated in formal treaty commitments. It was generally understood that the United States would consider fighting to defend these value-linked interests. There were times when the United States decided that the challenge to those value-linked interests did not require a military response. But in circumstances too frequent to dismiss, the United States decided to put lives on the line and to pay significant financial costs, for example, to deter attacks against our European and Asian allies, to promote peace in the Middle East, and to block Communist advances in Asia and Latin America. The Clinton Administration has said that a key goal of its foreign policy is to replace Cold War containment of communism with post-Cold War promotion of democracy -- the policy described as "enlargement" by President Clinton's National Security Advisor Tony Lake in September 1993. Pursuing enlargement of the area of democracy in the world clearly implies reliance on a wide variety of non-military policy tools. But, in some cases, democracy may still require defending against military attack, and such cases could test the degree and conditions of U.S. commitments to a value-based policy such as enlargement. Over time, an unwillingness to pay a price for a value-based policy would likely erode popular belief among Americans that their country brings a moral perspective to its place in the world. 47. Lake, Anthony. "From Containment to Enlargement." Speech at Johns Hopkins University, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. September 21, 1993. The text of the speech is reprinted in The Congressional Record, Extension of Remarks. September 29, 1993, p. E2293-2296. Diminished reliance on a value-influenced foreign policy might be viewed favorably by those who espouse the virtues of policies based primarily on manipulation of power balances. But it would be a break with the strongly held beliefs of many Americans that the United States has an international responsibility to promote and defend human rights and the rule of law in its national security policy. In addition, if a future President should decide that important U.S. interests require the use of U.S. military forces in a setting in which casualties could be anticipated, he might find it much more difficult to develop a consensus in the Congress and among the American people for such an action once the value base of U.S. foreign policy had seriously eroded. Net Assessment The consequences of sustained or deepened self-deterrence can be summarized as follows: * In the near term, U.S. vital interests will not likely be threatened by reluctance to use military force on behalf of foreign policy objectives. --------- page 33 * U.S. self-deterrence, however, appears to have begun to erode the ability of the international system to respond effectively to threats to the peace that might usefully be controlled or reversed by the threat to use, or actual use of, military force. For the present, if the United States is unwilling or unable to back up its professed international goals with the potential use of force, the international system will lack the leadership and means to deal effectively with many threats to the peace. Most regions of the world do not have the political consensus and organizational structure to maintain order on a regional basis without broader international backing. * In the longer term, the absence of effective force to maintain world order could lead to a progressively more chaotic international system because countries seeking to accomplish self-serving political objectives through the use of military force would face fewer disincentives, or deterrents, to do so. * The absence of effective international policing mechanisms appears likely to increase the incentives for regional arms races and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, for at least two reasons: * Some countries, perhaps including Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, seeking to achieve political goals through the use or threat of military force, might be encouraged to believe that they could develop local military superiority, including weapons of mass destruction, and not face an international military response. * Other countries, perhaps including Israel, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Japan, and some European states, that had believed their security was ensured or at least enhanced by alliance with the United States or the likelihood of international military protection, might become more inclined to build up defensive military capabilities and consider developing their own weapons of mass destruction to deter threats to their security. * In some regions, the absence of effective international policing mechanisms might lead to the emergence of regional hegemons, with a commitment only to maintain an order that conforms to their interests rather than to international norms or, for that matter, U.S. interests. * Once diminished substantially, the credibility of the U.S. threat to use force on behalf of values it held throughout the Cold War would be difficult to re- establish. Other nations would be less responsive to U.S. diplomatic initiatives and proposals, and the United States would have relinquished at least a part of its claim to a value-based foreign policy that had been responsible for establishing the United Nations, NATO, and other forms of international cooperation that were seen as advancing a U.S. vision of world order. --------- page 34 [THIS PAGE CONTAINS NO TEXT] --------- page 35 WHAT ARE POTENTIAL REMEDIES TO SELF-DETERRENCE? CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE CONGRESS Muddling Through It has been argued that a decline of U.S. power, and therefore the willingness and ability of the United States to use or threaten the use of force, will occur due to structural changes in the international system that are not readily subject to manipulation by policy. According to Professor Aaron L. Friedberg, ...the end of the cold war will accelerate the relative decline in American national power. Changes in the distribution of power will lead to ...a protracted period of international instability. This turmoil is likely to give rise to a set of separate, competing subsystems, not to a new, unified world order. 48. Friedberg, Aaron L. "The Future of American Power." Political Science Quarterly. Vol. 109, Number 1, Spring 1994, p. 1. Professor Friedberg argues that trends in economic, political and military power will make it very difficult for the United States to reverse the decline, and suggests that the consequences for the international system (fewer effective global approaches to issues, less order, more conflict, increased weapons proliferation and added nuclear powers) are virtually inevitable. He concludes, "While the current mood of introversion could change, absent some catastrophe it seems likely that the American recessional is closer to its beginning than to its end." 49. Ibid., p. 19. If one follows this analysis through to its logical policy conclusion, there is no real "remedy" to what could be seen as rational self-deterrence. The antidote is a coping strategy, muddling through, maintaining sufficient U.S. retaliatory capacity to deter threats to a narrowly defined set of vital interests. Under such a strategy, the United States would likely downgrade the importance of international cooperation represented by the United Nations and other organizations with global goals and purposes because of the implied commitments on which the United States would be reluctant to deliver. Another consequence would be to minimize the U.S. goal of gaining international acceptance of U.S. values, given the limited will to pay any significant price to promote such acceptance. As serious as the consequences of self-deterrence may appear, perhaps the worst possible remedy to self-deterrence would be for the Administration to --------- page 36 decide that it should demonstrate its ability to use force and to do so in a circumstance that was otherwise ill-advised. Currently, President Clinton and his advisors apparently remain more wary of the political costs of the use of force than worried about the longer-term potential penalties of self-deterrence. Lead Toward a New Consensus To avoid the longer term risks of self-deterrence, and to create alternatives to a "muddling through" strategy, it appears that the United States would have to re-build a consensus concerning the values and interests the United States wishes to advance and is prepared to defend before it would be able to resume a role as a reliable, predictable force in international politics. That process is more difficult without a mobilizing threat. Still, a case can be made than an early stage of the process may be at hand. The Clinton Administration designed a foreign policy that initially evolved around promoting U.S. economic interests and, as a natural consequence, reducing costly U.S. military commitments abroad. When the concept of enlargement of democracy was prominently added to the Administration's policy mix in September 1993, it had a foreign policy based on widely-shared values, economic self-interest and a proclaimed political objective. What the Administration lacked, however, and still appears to lack, is a national consensus on priorities and policy instruments. If promoting democracy requires that the United States spend money on such things as foreign aid, alliance commitments and military intervention, how should the country choose between its pocketbook and its principles? If ensuring a degree of international order is important to longterm U.S. interests, what criteria should determine when U.S. soldiers should be asked to put their lives on the line? An Administration option might be to develop a new statement of U.S. values, interests, goals and policy instruments for the post-Cold War world. The model could be a contemporary NSC-68 (NSC-68, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," was the product of a review and redefinition of U.S. Cold War policies initiated in the aftermath of the first Soviet nuclear test). The results of such a study could, in theory, range anywhere from a neo-isolationist posture on one extreme to an active interventionist, "pax Americana" posture on another. 50. Lowenthal, "'National Security' as a Concept..." op. cit., p. 4. Such a process of formal re-evaluation would be difficult and perhaps initially divisive. The deliberations could not be contained within the government bureaucracy and the debate inevitably would spill into the press and public discussion. Indeed, the Administration might encourage such a public debate as a contribution to it internal considerations. Those in and outside the Administration who have argued that the United States should focus its foreign policy on U.S. economic interests and pull back from global commitments would be pitted against others who favor a robust multilateralist approach. --------- page 37 In the end, however, the process might yield a new compromise foundation for the role of the United States in the world reflecting a balance between the domestic and international interests and responsibilities of the world's only superpower. Such a foundation presumably would include a list of "vital self interests" better reflecting post-Cold War realities and restoring flexibility to U.S. policy options. The Congress probably cannot substitute for executive leadership on this issue. If the United States is eventually to move away from its current reticence on the world stage, it will most likely have to be led in that direction by the President. Nevertheless, the Congress can, if it wishes, play an important role in the process of constructing a new consensus on U.S. interests, values and the use of force on their behalf in the post-Cold War world. In the long run, the United States needs to answer the question of how a semblance of international order can be maintained if the United States is not willing to commit its military forces and some financial resources to play a leading role in such a task.