Two views of submit to one another, in the words of Wayne Grudem,
- Everyone agrees that allēlōn has a "reciprocal" meaning. The question is what specific kind of "reciprocal" meaning the term implies. Of course when a writer says that a group of people "love one another" or "care for one another" or, conversely, that a group of people "were killing one another" or that they "were trampling on one another," the meaning is always in some sense reciprocal, because in every case some in the group do something to others in the group. In that sense the meaning of "one another" is reciprocal - the group acts upon itself, in contrast to saying that the group "loves other people," or that the group "was killing other people."
What Belleville fails to distinguish, however, is that sometimes everybody in the group does something to everybody else (loving one another, for example), and sometimes some people in the group do the action to others in the group (killing one another, when some are killing and others are being killed). In English we use "one another" for both senses, and we say they were "loving one another" or they were "killing one another." In Greek likewise, the term allēlōn can be used in both cases. The kind of activity involved determines the exact sense of reciprocal allēlōn that is intended.
My argument for Ephesians 5:21 is that "being subject" to someone in the sense intended by Greek hypotassō is a one-directional activity. In that sense it is like the action of "killing one another" - in the nature of the action of killing, one person kills and the other is killed. The dead person does not rise from the dead after a few minutes and kill the other person, nor could every single person kill every single other person. Killing one another rather has the sense "some to others," in that some were killing others. Trampling on one another is a similar example: some trample on others, so the group can be said to be "trampling on one another." Waiting for one another when some people are late is the same idea: some wait, and some are waited for.
- Belleville says she is unable to understand this distinction in meaning, and therefore she rejects it as a possibility. She says,
Wayne Grudem's claim that allēlous ... in Ephesians 5:21 takes the "common" meaning "some to others" ... boggles the lexical imagination.... And how exactly Galatians 6:2 ("Carry each other's burdens"), 1 Corinthians 11:33 ("When you come together to eat, wait for each other"), and Revelation 6:4 ("To make the people [on earth] slay each other") support such a "common meaning" is likewise incomprehensible.14
But is it really that difficult to understand that Paul in Galatians 6:2 did not want every single person in the churches of Galatia to carry every other person's burden (each person would be carrying hundreds of burdens!), but that he wanted some to help others as they had need? Is it really "incomprehensible" that in 1 Corinthians 11:33, Paul wanted some (who were on time) to wait for others (who were late), not that those who were late should wait for those who were on time? And is Belleville really unable to understand that in Revelation 6:4 some were killing and some were being killed (rather than the impossible idea that every single person was killing every single other person)? These are straightforward understandings of these passages. Belleville's only objection is to say that she finds them "incomprehensible."
Now with respect to Ephesians 5:21, our conclusion is (1) that allēlōn often takes the sense of "some to others" within a group, when the activity described is by nature a one-directional activity, and (2) that hypotassō always indicates a one-directional submission to an authority. Therefore we do not need to invent a new, unprecedented meaning for hypotasso in Ephesians 5:21. It takes a common, ordinary meaning, "be subject to an authority," and allēlōn takes a common, ordinary meaning, "some (in the group) to others (in the group)."
- To return to the original question, it is significant that Belleville has brought forth no counterexamples for this sense of hypotassō as one-directional submission to an authority.
But Belleville's point is that Christianity introduces this concept of reciprocity. It is significant that there is no command in the Christian scriptures to use or have authority one over the other, except in an reciprocal situation.
While one cannot prove reciprocity in submission from a direct quote, one can most certainly prove reciprocity in authority. Since the complementarians themselves set up an authority-submission paradigm, I would think that this would satisfy them as proof. 1 Cor. 7:3-5,
- The husband should give to his wife her conjugal rights, and likewise the wife to her husband. 4For the wife does not have authority over her own body, but the husband does. Likewise the husband does not have authority over his own body, but the wife does. 5(C) Do not deprive one another, except perhaps by agreement for a limited time, that you may devote yourselves to prayer; but then come together again,(D) so that Satan may not tempt you because of your lack of self-control.
If authority can be given mutually to each over other, then likewise submission. That is the mystery of Christianity. How sad to see this message is missed by some.