PLO chief Yasser Arafat now seems inclined to accept United Nations Resolution 242, implying recognition of Israel, but his apparent reversal is tragically irrelevant. During all those years when his opinions on 242 actually mattered, he unwisely resisted both logic and common sense. He played his trump card too late to win the game or perhaps to even remain in it. Sadly, yet perhaps predictably, for the Palestinian people, the tides of history seem to have once again passed them by. The failure to attain their most minimal objectives is a triumph of romantic ideology over political realism.
The Palestinians, under the tenuous leadership of Arafat, have repeatedly missed opportunities to advance their cause. Some observers felt the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon was excessive, at best, and a thinly veiled attempt to create a Lebanese client-state, at worst. Outrage over the Sabra-Shatila massacres gave the Palestinians unprecedented international sympathy. An effective leadership would have adroitly translated this into tangible political results. Yet Arafat exhausted the bulk of his political capital, ensuring only his safe conduct out of Lebanon.
Though various administrations have resisted the notion, few observers have doubted that Washington holds the major cards when it comes to Arab-Israeli peace. Indeed, the late Anwar Sadat of Egypt never wavered from two convictions: that only America had the power to extract Israeli concessions and that the Palestine Liberation Organization should represent the Palestinians in any negotiations. Until his death, Sadat urged America to disavow the ``Kissinger Agreement`` giving the Israelis a veto over American efforts to deal directly with the PLO.
Yet, notwithstanding the American conditions, Sadat continually urged Arafat to take measures such as declaring his organization a government-in-exile. This would have had legal as well as symbolic significance in the effort to prod America into dealing with him directly. Instead, Arafat stood on ``principle,`` meanwhile gaining only the dubious support of peripheral groups like the Organization of African Unity and the nonaligned nations. If nothing else, the Reagan administration`s attack on Libya showed the ineffectuality of such ``support`` in the face of armed force employed by a powerful adversary.
More tragic than the political inastuteness of Arafat is his continuing support among West Bank Palestinians. A recent poll found that vast majorities of them supported the PLO`s most extreme positions, such as the elimination of Israel as an ``ultimate`` solution. Results like that illustrate another of Arafat`s most glaring weakneses, his failure as a moral leader.
Throughout recent history, leaders as diverse as Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Desmond Tutu and Corazon Aquino have recognized the need to suppress their followers` most violent passions, while keeping their enthusiasm high enough to achieve political objectives.
Sadat`s major contribution was attempting to change the psychological climate of the region. The cold peace between Israel and Egypt is imminently preferable to the visceral hatreds existing in Libya or Iran. Arafat`s failure to lead his people in a moral sense made his political task more difficult, since any concessions seemed treasonous to his more fanatical followers.
This partially explains the effective dissolution of the PLO. Paradoxically, Arafat`s desire to avoid just such a split made him resist political gestures moderate Arab leaders urged upon him for years. Given the militant irredentism of his critics, a split was inevitable and should have been made long ago. At that time, certain political benefits were arguably within his reach. His belated expression of political realism represents the worst of all possible worlds: His critics see proof of treachery, and the Israelis, cognizant of his weakened position, feel no need to respond.
The imminent return to power in Israel of Likud hardliners makes peace prospects in the region unlikely. The collapse of oil prices has ended any semblance of petro-diplomacy. So there seems no realistic basis to expect a surge of diplomatic activity from Washington soon.
Though it is easy to criticize Arafat for his egregious failures of leadership, it is important to keep in mind American failures as well. Some American specialists argue that not since the Eisenhower administration has the United States had a truly balanced Middle East policy. Our reluctance to embrace Palestinian self-determination has had two principal effects, both of them extremely negative.