This project had to be lodged within an evolutionary frame due to: (1) the evidence of dramatic encephalization found in the fossil record of extinct human ancestors, and the fact that cultural variation was conceived as the primary mode of human adaptation (see Evolutionary neuroscience). We thus explored the different areas of the nervous system that seem to have evolved during the course of hominid encephalization and that produce the distinctly human quality of mentation, learning, communication, and social action characteristic of our species today (see Human Evolution).
The group's first book presented some general concepts which were later refined and used in other studies. One important concept was neurognosis, a term coined to label the inherent, rudimentary knowledge available to cognition in the initial organization of the pre- and perinatal nervous system (see Pre- and perinatal psychology). A human baby was conceived as taking its first cognitive and perceptual stance toward the world from the standpoint of a system of initial, genetically predisposed neurognostic models that come to develop in somatosensory interaction with the world.
The principal function of the human nervous system at the level of the cerebral cortex is the construction of a vast network of these models. This network of neural models in each individual is called the cognized environment, contrasted with the actual operational environment that includes both the real nature of that individual as an organism and the effective external environment (see Laughlin and Brady 1978:6, d'Aquili et al. 1979:12, Rubinstein et al. 1984:21, Laughlin, McManus and d'Aquili 1990). The notions of cognized and operational environments were borrowed by the biogenetic structuralist group from Roy Rappaport who coined the terms in his 1968 classic, Pigs for the Ancestors (see Rappaport 1968, 1979, 1984, 1999). The perspective began to take on a more developmental perspective as it incorporated the works of Jerome Bruner, Jean Piaget and others. Biogenetic structural theory now holds that not only the initial organization of the baby's cognized environment is essentially neurognostic, but so too is the course of development of those models and patterns of entrainment of models -- a view not dissimilar to Carl Jung's notion of archetype (see Laughlin 1996 on archetypes and the brain).
Another major focus of biogenetic structural analysis has been what the group calls the symbolic function -- that is, the process by which meaning and form are integrated to become symbols in the brain (see Laughlin, McManus and Stephens 1981, Laughlin and Stephens 1980, MacDonald et al. 1988, Young- Laughlin and Laughlin 1988). The group has been particularly interested in how sensory stimuli as symbols are able to penetrate (i.e., find their way) to those neurocognitive models mediating meaning and signification, and how models express themselves in symbolic action and cultural artifacts. Among other things, the biogenetic structuralists developed a theory of the evolution of the symbolic function that proceeds from primordial symbol, through cognized SYMBOL systems to sign systems, and finally to formal sign systems, any or all of which may operate at any moment in adult human cognition (Laughlin, McManus and Stephens 1981).
There have been several recent trends in biogenetic structuralism that are of interest to anthropology:
One trend is toward a greater attention to transpersonal experience (see also transpersonal and transpersonal anthropology) as data relevant to the study of ritual; that is, to extraordinary experiences and states of consciousness, and the relation of these to patterns of symbolism, cognition and practice found in religions and cosmologies cross-culturally (see d'Aquili 1982, Laughlin 1985, 1988a, 1988c, Laughlin et al. 1986, Laughlin McManus and Shearer 1983, Laughlin, McManus and Webber 1984, MacDonald et al. 1988, Webber et al. 1983). Taking their inspiration from William James, the group has tracked the greatest range of human experience and related this to transformations in neurocognitive, autonomic and neuroendocrine entrainments. By expanding their scope to include all possible human experience, they hope to understand:
Another trend in biogenetic structural theory has been to extend the age at which society influences neurocognitive development back into very early life. There is now sufficient evidence from clinical psychology and developmental neurobiology that experiences occurring in pre- and perinatal life (in the womb, during birth and during early infancy) are formative on later patterns of neurocognitive entrainment and adaptation. The methodological import of this view is that anthropologists and others interested in the ontogenesis of cognitive systems and cultural patterns need to look more carefully at how society conditions the environment of the human being during that early formative period (see Laughlin 1989a, 1990).
Another recent interest has been in making a case for the importance of a neurophenomenology to the study of brain, consciousness and culture -- an approach that is often considered to be antithetical to the anti-introspectionist bias of positivist science, and particularly to some schools of cognitive science (Laughlin, McManus and d'Aquili 1990). Phenomenology (a la Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Aron Gurwitsch, and others, as well as eastern mystical and cross-cultural shamanistic traditions) is the study of the invariant processes of consciousness (i.e., essences) by the practice of mature contemplation. Neurophenomenology is thus the attempt to explain such processes by reference to what is known about the brain. Two recent studies by the group exemplify this merging of contemplative and neuroscientific perspectives. One study discusses the wired-in intentionality of consciousness (noted in fact by all phenomenologies) in terms of a systemic dialectic between prefrontal cortex and sensory cortex (Laughlin 1988b). Another study suggests the relationship between invariant temporal patterns of perceptual sequencing and the neuropsychological literature available on "perceptual framing" (Laughlin 1992).
Because biogenetic structural theory rejects any disembodied account of consciousness or culture, it was quite natural for the group to consider the implications of the direct interfacing of information processing technologies (e.g., computers) and the development and evolution of the brain -- an inevitable outcome considering the modern research intended to bring that eventuality about. These considerations led to studies in the area of what has been called cyborg anthropology and cyberculture. A cyborg, short for "cybernetic organism," is a being that is part cybernetic machine and part organism, a term coined by two NASA scientists, Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline (1960, reprinted in Gray 1995). These men suggested some of the advantages for space exploration of altering the human body with machines.
The group's analysis of the cyborg is grounded in the findings of modern neuroscience. The perspective is grounded upon the presumption that human consciousness and culture are functions of the human nervous system. In other words, consciousness is as much the function of the brain as digestion is the function of the stomach and grasping the function of the hand. Their reasoning and research led ultimately to a four stage account of the evolution of the cyborg -- a natural, but special case of the evolution of technology as a whole. The group hypothesizes that the emergence of the cyborg is following these stages:
Of course, this model is an over-simplification of the unfolding of the cyborg process, but it has the advantage of letting one see the progressive complexity involved. Stage I cyborg is equivalent to the external extension of the hands with a hammer, knife or other primitive tool. It essentially replaces or augments the skeletal physiology of the limbs. Thus the wooden leg and hook as prosthetic devices represent the more primitive innovations leading to the process of cyborg transformation. Portions of the nervous system have been eliminated with the loss of the amputated appendage.
Stage II cyborg sees the technical replacement or augmentation of both skeletal and muscle systems in the body. This stage is equivalent to the external replacement of muscles with engines. The hand is replaced with a movable machine, perhaps manipulated by servomechanisms that are triggered by movements of particular muscle groups. The diseased heart valve is replaced by a mechanical valve. The lens of the eye is replaced by a synthetic lens, and so on. Such mechanisms depend upon intact neuro-muscular systems for their control.
At Stage III cyborg, technical penetration reaches the nervous system and replaces or augments neural structures in the peripheral, autonomic or endocrine systems involved in the regulation of internal states. This stage is equivalent to simple regulatory systems in the external world, such as the thermostat controlling the temperature of a heater. Clynes and Kline addressed their original cyborg paper to problems in space exploration that might be solved by Stage III cyborg measures. The "bionic" arms and legs of the Six Million Dollar Man are fictional examples of Stage III developments, as is the more realistic contemporary heart pacemaker.
Finally, Stage IV cyborg produces the replacement or augmentation of structures in the central nervous system. This stage is equivalent to the supplementation or replacement of human brain power with computers in industry. This stage may involve modification of structures mediating the cognitive aspects of emotion, as well as imagination, intuition, perception, rational thought, intentionality, language, etc. -- all of which require higher cortical processing. Examples of developments at this stage are technologies such as the miniature video camera "eyes" wired to an electrode array implanted in the visual cortex of certain blind people. And rumor has it that the United States Air Force underwrites research on technologies that would allow direct brain to aircraft interfacing for fighter pilots. Scientists at Tokyo University have fitted microprocessors to the nervous systems of cockroaches using electrodes, and are able to control the roaches’ behavior via computer link.
The point to emphasize in all of this is that the emergence of the cyborg is a process of progressive technological penetration into the body, eventually replacing or augmenting the structures that mediate the various physical and mental attributes that we normally consider natural to human beings, including emotion, sensory modes, imagination and rational thought, the organization of intentional acts, etc. Clearly then, progressive penetration into the cortex of the brain will inevitably result in the technical alteration of human consciousness (Laughlin 1997), its optimal functioning and development in childhood (Laughlin 2000).
The group's most recent work has focused upon developing a cultural neurophenomenology (see Laughlin & Throop 2001, 2006, 2007, Throop & Laughlin 2002, 2003). Cultural neurophenomenology is the view that the most productive research strategy for discovering the invariant properties of consciousness is trained introspection. After all, they argue, our own experience and awareness are the only ones we have direct access to. Anti-introspectionist positions in science are claimed by its adherents to be primarily due to pre-scientific cultural hangovers from Church rulings against direct spiritual exploration -- stemming historically from the so-called gnostic heresy. They consider behaviorist reaction to Wilhelm Wundt's introspectionism in psychology to be merely a legitimation of these cultural attitudes.
Edmund Husserl taught a different approach to the study of consciousness. He argued that in order to differentiate in experience between what is given by the world and what is added by our own minds in the constitution of experience, we must cultivate a trained introspection. When we do so (in Husserl's terms, when we master the "phenomenological reduction") we discover there are invariant properties of mind that condition and order our experience. For instance, we generate a sense of time by retaining recently past experience ("retention") and anticipating the near future ("protention") and combining these with the actual, on-going "now point" arising and passing in our sensorium. Once we come to understand that this is how our mind works, the question then naturally arises, what is "real" time in the sense of time existing in extramental reality, independent of our experience and our knowledge? Also, how does the structure of our nervous system mediate this time sense, and how does culture impact upon our interpretations of temporality?
The group is now examining a variety of issues regarding experience. Thus far they have utilized this framework to explore the cross-cultural and neuropsychological factors in the experience of emotion, including the emotional aspects of higher states of consciousness, the role of myth and cosmology in "trueing-up" the relationship between experience and reality, the importance of altered states of consciousness in bolstering the veridicality of experience, the interpenetration of experience and extramental reality, and a modern re-interpretation of Emile Durkheim's "collective effervescence."