New Horizons for
Since its inception in the early 1980s,
strategic cooperation has become a cornerstone of the larger “special
relationship” between the United States and Israel, and one of the main prisms
through which both nations have approached the volatile politics of a turbulent
Middle East. But over the past decade, the partnership first formalized by
President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Menachem Begin has struggled,
buffeted by post-Cold War regional changes, and by a growing divergence of
policy priorities between Washington and Jerusalem.
All that is now changing. In the aftermath
of September 11th, strategic ties between the two countries are
entering a new era, one defined by a fundamental transformation of American
strategy – and by new principles for the strategic partnership.
The Post-Cold War Partnership Adrift
The 1990s were not a good decade for the
US-Israeli alliance. The strategic bonds forged during the latter half of the
Cold War – which, by the mid-1980s had become a centerpiece not only of Israeli
security doctrine, but of the Reagan administration’s “strategic consensus” in
the Middle East as well – were fundamentally altered with the implosion of the
In the aftermath of the USSR’s collapse,
policymakers in both countries had rushed to reaffirm the continued relevance of
their union. And, in fact, common concerns over a range of threats – from
terrorism to proliferation to ballistic missiles – did provide a continuing
basis for cooperation. But the post-Cold War international environment also
inserted new variables into the traditional strategic equation between
Washington and Jerusalem.
Foremost among these was the intrusion of
politics into the Israeli-American strategic dialogue. During the Cold War, the
durable, insulated nature of military and defense ties allowed the two countries
to successfully weather significant turbulence in their larger relationship. As
a result, events like the infamous 1985 Pollard Affair – and a succession of
defense-industrial scandals1 – did little to
dampen the evolving bilateral dialogue.
The commencement of the Middle East peace
process, however, changed everything. The 1991 Madrid Conference, and the
signing of the Declaration of Principles by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO
Chairman Yasser Arafat two years later, embroiled Israel in the most extensive
diplomatic exercise in its history.
The effects on the strategic relationship
were dramatic. Previously seen as both a strategic asset and a force multiplier,
Israel suddenly found its role in American security policy subordinated to the
vagaries of Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. Military and defense priorities
increasingly took a back seat to politics, leading to diplomatic and territorial
concessions that gradually diminished Israel’s standing as a strategic asset –
thereby weakening the very rationale for the relationship.
The peace process was hardly the only
problem, however. The very nature of America’s engagement in the Middle East had
changed dramatically with the USSR’s demise. Instead of the strategic deterrence
of the Reagan era, policymakers in Washington now emphasized the need for broad
international engagement. This shift became visible soon after the Soviet
collapse, when the Bush White House put great effort into cobbling together a
broad coalition against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – one that effectively sidelined
Israel, at great cost to the Jewish state and its citizens.
In the war’s aftermath, “containing” Iran
and Iraq – and providing security assurances to those countries living in the
shadow of Baghdad and Tehran – led the United States to ratchet up its
cooperation with the countries of the Persian Gulf. The resulting military
contacts and sophisticated technology transfers to countries like Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain and Qatar steadily narrowed the capabilities gap between Israel and its
hostile neighbors, eroding one of the central pillars of the strategic
partnership between Jerusalem and Washington – the “qualitative edge” of
Israel’s military over any combination of regional adversaries.2
By the end of the decade, these changes had
profoundly altered the underlying principles of US-Israeli cooperation. Then
came September 11, 2001, and with it a fundamental reordering of American
strategic planning and security priorities.
The Transformation of American Strategy
To be sure, even before the Bush
administration took office in January of 2001, a multitude of indicators had
suggested the United States faced new, and dramatically different, threats from
terrorist groups, rogue states and rampant international proliferation. These
signs did not go entirely unnoticed; an array of blue-ribbon panels – from the
1998 Rumsfeld Commission to the 2000-2001 Hart-Rudman Commission – warned of
such dangers. But it was not until the terrorist attacks on New York and
Washington that these realities were brought into focus.
The American response, embodied in part in
the Bush administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy, has entailed a
dramatic change in how the United States uses force, how it defines defense, and
how it approaches proliferation.
Most directly, the Bush administration has
moved to adapt the use of force to respond to the rapid pace and asymmetric
nature of contemporary threats. As President Bush outlined in his now-famous
June 2002 commencement address at West Point, “[t]he gravest danger to freedom
lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of
chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile
technology… occurs even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic
power to strike great nations.”3 The 2002
National Security Strategy therefore argues that “the capabilities and
objectives of today’s adversaries” must become the overriding criteria for the
evaluation of threats.4 This understanding has
enshrined a preventive posture, one aimed at responding to such gathering
dangers, in American doctrine.
A corresponding conceptual reorientation
has taken place in US military posture. Discarding the traditional,
adversary-based model that dominated the Cold War and the 1990s, new American
defense directives have outlined the need for a capabilities-driven approach
designed to achieve assurance, dissuasion, deterrence and defense against any
potential adversary in any environment at any time.5
As part of this focus, the Bush administration has given high priority to the
creation of a layered global system capable of defending the United States, its
allies and deployed forces from ballistic missile attack, and has moved ahead
with both an “initial deployment” of theater, ground- and sea-based antimissile
capabilities and with substantial international efforts to engage allies in
Europe, Asia and the Middle East on the creation of a layered international anti-missile
Lastly, the United States has dramatically
altered its approach to proliferation. During the Cold War, efforts to arrest
the steady bilateral accretion of American and Soviet strategic arsenals, and to
prevent the spread of such weapons into the Third World, yielded an elaborate
system of international arms control measures. The inadequacy of this system in
curbing the post-Cold War ambitions of aspiring regional powers, however, has
led the Bush administration to emphasize the centrality of active
countermeasures to the prevention of contemporary nonproliferation. Thus,
programs like the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), as well as
bilateral endeavors with allies in Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Central
Asia, have begun to adapt Cold War-era arms control to include proactive
Mirroring this tripartite security
transformation, the United States has embarked on an ambitious effort to remake
the Middle East as part of its global war on terrorism. This drive, entailing
the introduction of sweeping regional reforms, democratization and the rule of
law among countries in the region, is intended – in the words of the National
Security Strategy – to eliminate regional threats through the creation of a
“balance of power that favors freedom.”6
The resulting security agenda now
preoccupying policymakers in Washington suggests a new, reinvigorated role for
the US-Israeli partnership.
Such an adaptation is made possible by the
nature of strategic ties between the two countries. Since its beginnings, the
US-Israeli entente has not been defined by formal alliance. Rather, the
strategic bonds between Jerusalem and Washington have historically drawn much of
their strength from their fluidity and informal nature. In lieu of a rigid
union, the strategic partnership is driven by converging capabilities and shared
This realization has served to defeat
repeated impulses to codify a formal defense pact. Most recently, a proposal for
just such an alliance floated as part of the year 2000 round of peace
negotiations between Jerusalem and Damascus was ultimately discarded, based on
Israeli fears that such a bargain would negate the core logic for the
relationship by constraining Israeli freedom of military action and fostering a
corrosive dependency on the United States to guarantee fundamental security
Such sentiments have been echoed in
Washington, where concerns persist over the impact of a formal union on US
resources, and on American ties with countries in the Middle East.8
And this stance has only been reinforced since September 11th. With
the advent of the war on terrorism, the United States has placed growing
emphasis on issue-dominated partnerships in lieu of fixed alliances. As American
officials have made clear, “In this war, the mission will define the coalition –
not the other way around.”9
For Israel, the resulting post-September 11th
paradigm holds profound implications. During the Cold War, the Reagan
administration’s “strategic consensus” had emphasized the Jewish state’s
potential as a hedge against Soviet expansionism and hostile Soviet-backed
regional actors. Congruent interests in containing rogue states like Iraq and
Iran, and in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
managed to sustain the partnership to some degree following the fall of the
Soviet Union. But Israel’s status as a strategic asset, one both willing and
able to further American regional objectives, has steadily declined. Now, Israel
once again has the opportunity to reclaim its position in American strategy on
dialogue on the issue of terrorism has long been a part of US-Israel ties,10
a true counterterrorism partnership between Washington and Jerusalem is a
relatively new phenomenon. The events of September 11th
served to narrow the gap between American and Israeli perceptions of the global
threat posed by international terrorism, and to infuse the United States with a
greater understanding of (and support for) Israel’s own war on terrorism –
albeit one not always consistently applied.
This has paved the way for an expanded
Israeli role in US counterterrorism efforts. By virtue of its strategic location
in the region, its intimate familiarity with the doctrine and methodologies of
radical Middle Eastern movements, and its robust intelligence capabilities,
Israel is emerging as a vital – if often tacit – ally for US regional efforts.
Both in Iraq and in
Afghanistan, the United States now faces a new type of conflict, one defined by
urban warfare, low intensity conflict and counterinsurgency. Israel’s ongoing
experiences in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as the lessons of its
long-term (1978-2000) presence in southern Lebanon, make it an invaluable
resource. From tactics and training to critical infrastructure protection,
Israel has the ability to provide a major contribution to the evolving American
strategic agenda by assisting the United States to adapt to new military
Indeed, such cooperation is already
becoming visible. Military-to-military contacts between Washington and Jerusalem
–a traditional component of strategic ties – have begun to be bolstered by
interaction between the law enforcement, first responder and homeland security
professionals of the two countries.11 Advanced
Israeli technology and weaponry, meanwhile, have become an increasingly
important component of equipment and tactics for American special operations
forces, now active in both Iraq and Afghanistan.12
A similar synergy
is visible on the issue of missile defense. Israel’s deep involvement in
American efforts dates back to the mid-1980s, when growing worries of
vulnerability to missile attack from its Arab neighbors led Jerusalem to enlist
as an international partner in Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative.
Over the two decades since, the resulting dialogue has grown to encompass
substantial work not only on the jointly-funded Arrow Theater Missile Defense
system, but on next-generation concepts like high-energy lasers and boost-phase
interception as well.
This interaction is poised to take center
stage in the post-Saddam Middle East. Despite the recent removal of Iraq as a
strategic adversary, mounting regional threats have led to a renewed Israeli
focus on missile defense – one that entails the deployment of additional radars,
the creation of a comprehensive national missile defense command, and plans for
a naval component to the country’s missile defense infrastructure.13
Officials in Jerusalem have also made clear their intention to commence advanced
testing for the Arrow in the near future as part of efforts to enhance the
sophisticated system.14 The Israeli Defense
Ministry has even made overtures to the Pentagon regarding participation in the
advanced concept High Altitude Airship program – a project aimed at creating a
solar-powered, unmanned high-altitude airship for long-term surveillance and
threat detection – as a means to monitor regional threats, including Iran’s
“Shihab-3” medium-range missile.15
Over the past
decade, Israel has made major strides in its traditional quest for “peripheral”
alliances in the Middle East and South Asia. From initial overtures in 1993 and
1994, Israel’s relations with Turkey have blossomed into a major geopolitical
alliance, one defined by joint trainings, missile defense dialogue, intelligence
sharing and even mutual military cooperation with the new republics of the
Caspian and Caucasus. Indo-Israeli ties have similarly evolved into a broad
defense dialogue, complete with routine military-to-military contacts and
extensive defense-industrial cooperation, since their start in 1992.
For Israel, the importance of these unions
has increased with the erosion of its qualitative edge by asymmetric regional
threats (ranging from the possibility of guerrilla attacks from nearby Arab
states to the burgeoning ballistic missile capabilities of hostile neighbors).
For the United States, these parallel partnerships – driven by the common
threats posed by international terrorism, rogue states and proliferation – hold
enormous value as ready complements to American counterterrorism,
counterproliferation, missile defense and regional security initiatives in the
greater Middle East.
The Partnership Beyond the Peace Process
Without a doubt, central to any discussion
of these dynamics is the Palestinian question. For decades – and particularly
since the start of the Middle East peace process in 1993 – Israel’s long-running
conflict with the Palestinians has bedeviled American policymakers. And as that
crisis has grown in scope and profile, it has increasingly dominated even the
strategic dimension of Jerusalem-Washington ties. Reflecting this reality, the
joint statement issued by then-President Bill Clinton and then-Prime Minister
Ehud Barak in July of 1999, upon codification of a new Memorandum of
Understanding on military and defense cooperation, explicitly linked the
strategic relationship between the two countries to their joint effort to
“achieve a comprehensive peace in the Middle East.”16
By contrast, the Bush administration has
muted the urgency of such a settlement. To be sure, the quest for a solution to
the Israeli-Palestinian question has hardly been abandoned in Washington.
Indeed, for all their corrosive effects on Israeli security, diplomatic
initiatives intended to resuscitate the moribund Israeli-Palestinian dialogue
(like the 2001 Mitchell Plan and the 2002 “Road Map” for Middle East peace)
continue to figure in American policymaking.
Nevertheless, these efforts have
progressively been overshadowed by a broader focus in Washington on democracy
and security in the Middle East. Thus, when the White House has addressed the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict directly, as in President Bush’s June 2002 Rose
Garden address, it has increasingly predicated US support for a Palestinian
state on “new leaders, new institutions and new
security arrangements” capable of guaranteeing Israel’s defense.17
While this set of priorities has fanned fears in some quarters of a
larger American disengagement,18 it in fact
reflects a mature understanding of the proper position of the
Israeli-Palestinian issue on the American regional agenda, and a recognition
that the peace process remains tangential to Israel’s true worth to the United
States – as a regional asset both willing and able to supplement American
That utility is now growing. After more
than two decades, the core fundamentals of the Israeli-American strategic
relationship remain intact. Indeed, Israel’s stable, pro-Western and democratic
character, its robust defense infrastructure and modern military, and its
strategic location in the volatile Middle East have only grown in importance to
the United States since September 11th.
Effectively adapting the partnership to
respond to contemporary regional realities, however, requires an awareness on
the part of both countries of the new principles now animating strategic
cooperation – and of the strategy driving them.
Of these, the most notable was the “Dotan Affair” of the late
1980s. Named after Israeli Air Force General Rami Dotan, the scheme involved
the diversion of tens of billions of dollars in US foreign military aid
through subcontracts to front companies by Israeli citizens and US military
That principle, predicated on the possession of superior
equipment, tactics and troops, became a building block of US-Israeli ties in
the late 1960s, following Israel’s victory in the 1967, Six Day War.
President George W. Bush, remarks at West Point, New York,
June 1, 2002.
National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, September 2002, p. 12. Found
Ibid., p. 29.
Ibid., p. 5.
Ha’aretz, February 14, 2000.
Defense News, April 17, 2000.
See, for example, Donald H. Rumsfeld, “A New Kind of War”,
New York Times, September 27, 2001.
Though sporadic contacts on terrorism-related issues can be
traced back to the 1970s and 1980s, these links were institutionalized in
1994 with the establishment of an International Program in the US State
Department’s Counterterrorism Technical Support Working Group, and by a
subsequent 1996 Memorandum of Understanding formally creating a bilateral
Joint Counterterrorism Group between the United States and Israel.
One such initiative is the Jewish Institute for National
Security Affairs’ Law Enforcement Exchange Program (LEEP), which regularly
brings US law enforcement officials to Israel to learn counterterrorism
techniques from their Israeli counterparts.
Defense News, March 29, 2004.
Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 22,
Flight International, November 11,
Defense News, July 14, 2003.
Joint Statement President Clinton and Prime Minister Barak,
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, July 19, 1999.
President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership, White
House, Office of the Press Secretary, June 24, 2002.
See, for example, Aluf Benn, “The American Disengagement
Plan”, Ha’aretz, January 22, 2004.