"A Puzzle About Fear (And Suspicion, And Memory, And...)"Abstract: "Consider the following pair of sentences:
(1a) Russell believed the proposition that mathematics reduces to logic.
(1b) Russell believed that mathematics reduces to logic. These two sentences cannot diverge in truth value: for any circumstance in which both sentences are evaluated, (1a) is true iff (1b) is.
By contrast, the following pair of sentences may well have different
(2a) Amy remembers the proposition that first order logic is undecidable.
(2b) Amy remembers that first order logic is undecidable.
Suppose that Amy took a class that covered decidability results. She may well remember what first order logic is and what it is to be decidable, and so remember the claim that first order logic is undecidable. So (2a) is true. But Amy may well have forgotten whether this claim is true or false. She recalls it being discussed, but canít remember if it or its negation was proved. Then (2b) is false.
Let us call the phenomenon illustrated by the sentence pairs substitution failure. The puzzle I wish to address is: why do we get substitution failure with sentences involving some verbs of propositional attitude but not others?"
"'Five O'clock on the Sun': A Reply to J.L. Mackie."
Analysis (March 1982), 42(2):77.
"On J.L. Mackie's "Five O'clock on the Sun." Analysis (June 1981), 41(3):113-114.
(with Michael Liston.) "Explaining Donnellan's Distinction."
Analysis (January 1984), 44(1):13-14.
On D.E. Over's "Effective and Non-effective Reference." Analysis (March 1983), 43(2):85-91.
"A Formal Semantics for Some Discourse Anaphora."
PhD Dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 1985.
Abstract in Dissertation Abstracts International (December 1985), 46(6A):1646-A.
Abstract: "The dissertation is an attempt to provide a formal semantics for occurrences of (singular) anaphoric pronouns and definite descriptions whose quantifier antecedents occur in sentences other than those in which the anaphoric pronouns and descriptions themselves occur, (henceforth 'q - terms'). The predominant view of anaphoric pronouns whose quantifier antecedents occur in the same sentence as they do is that they function as bound variables (though this view is subject to certain well-known difficulties). Chapter 1 of this dissertation is constituted by a series of arguments against a bound variable treatment of q - terms and the observation that the semantic behavior of q - terms is similar to that of certain singular terms in English arguments. Given the similarity of semantic behavior between the latter and q - terms, it seems plausible to suppose that a theory of the semantic behavior of these singular terms in English arguments would provide a model for the eventual production of a semantic theory of q - terms. In Chapter 2, a formal semantics for these singular terms in arguments is produced. In Chapter 3, a formal semantics for q - terms is produced, on the model of the semantics in Chapter 2. Finally, in Chapter 4 it is shown that the formal semantics of Chapter 3 can be extended to handle pronouns in discourses containing verbs of propositional attitudes such as 'wants', 'dreams' etc. It is also shown that some occurrences of sentences containing q - terms have truth conditions not expressible by any quantified first order sentence. One must use finite partially ordered quantifiers to express the truth conditions of such occurrences of sentences. The dissertation contains two appendices: the first is a technical discussion of the formal semantics of Hans Kamp ('A Theory of Truth and Semantic Representation') which shows that his theory cannot accomodate the linguistic data mine is designed to handle. The second examines the views of Gareth Evans, Charles Chastain and Keith Donnellan on certain anaphoric pronouns."
"Pronouns, Descriptions and the Semantics of Discourse." Philosophical Studies (May 1987), 51(3):341-363.
"Are Indefinte Descriptions Ambiguous?" Philosophical Studies (May 1988), 53(3):417-440.
"Instantial Terms, Anaphora and Arbitrary Objects." Philosophical Studies (March 1991), 61(3):239-265.
"Intentional Identity Generalized." Journal of Philosophical Logic (February 1993), 22(1):61-93.
"Anaphora and Operators." In James E. Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives, 8: Logic and Language, 1994, pp. 221-250. Ridgeview, CA: Atascadero, 1994.
"Can Propositions be Naturalistically Acceptable?" Midwest Studies in Philosophy (1994), 19:53-75.
"Structured Propositions and Complex Predicates." Nous (December 1995), 29(4):516-535.
"Structured Propositions and Sentence Structure." Journal of Philosophical Logic (1996), 25(5):495-521.
"Propositions Even a Rationalist Can Beilieve In." In Dunja
Jutronic, ed., The Maribor Papers in Naturalized Semantics.
Maribor: Maribor : Pedagoska fakulteta Maribor, 1997.
Papers presented at a conference held June 10-15, 1996, Maribor, Slovenia, "mainly dedicated to Michael Devitt's Coming to our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism.
"The Source(s) of Necessity." Journal of Philosophical Logic (1996), 25(5):495-521.
"What Is a Philosophical Analysis?" Philosophical Studies (May 1998), 90(2):155-179.
"Are Complex 'That' Phrases Devices of Direct Reference?" Nous (June 1999), 33(2):155-182.
"On the Possibility of Correct Apparently Circular Dispositional Analysis." Philosophical Studies (April 2000), 98(3):257-278.
Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account.
Contemporary Philosophical Monographs, 2. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
UCI Main Lib P299 D46 K56 2001
"Day Designations." In James E. Tomberlin, ed., Metaphysics, 2001, pp. 291-333. Philosophical Perspectives, 15, A Supplement to Nous. Boston, Mass.: Blackwell, 2001.
"Two Sorts of Claim about 'Logical Form'." In Gerhard Preyer and George Peter, eds., Logical Form and Language, pp. 118-131. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
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