Metaphysical Basis of Jaina Ethics
DEPENDENCE OF ETHICS ON METAPHYSICS:
According to Jainism,
ontological discussions necessarily determine ethical considerations.
The ethical inquiry derives its meaning from the metaphysical
speculation. Our conduct and behavior are conditioned by our
metaphysical pre�suppositions. The incentive to the progress of moral
consciousness emerges from a deep and sound metaphysical theory which
requires proper application of logic to experience. Samantabhadra argues
that the conceptions of bondage and liberation, Punya and Papa, heaven
and hell, pleasure and pain and the like lose all their relevancy and
signi�ficance, if we exclusively recognise either permanence or
momentariness as constituting the nature of substance.' This statement
clearly points to the dependence of ethics on metaphysics. Again, the
affirmation that the momentary disintegration of all things renders
impossible the financial transactions, the fact of memory, and the
commonplace relations of the husband and the wife, the teacher and the
taught and the like also indicates the subservience of ethical problems
to the nature of being'. In the following pages, therefore, it is
proposed to dwell, in the first place, upon the general nature of
reality; and, secondly, upon the mode
Brhatkathakosa, Intro. p. 12, aslo Pravacansara. Pref. pp. 12-13.
2Apta-mimamasa,40-41,Yuktyanusasana.8-15, Ct. Syadvadamanjuri.27
comprehension and representation, as it has a close bearing on our
ethical discussions. Thirdly, the classification of substances along
with a brief account of each one of them will be dealt with; and lastly,
there will be represented the diverse ways of expressing the nature of
the ethical ideal.
GENERAL NATURE OF REALITY:
According to Jainism,
metaphysical reality, objectively considered, embraces within its fold
contradictions, but only in an apparent fashion; they point
just to the incompetence and inadequateness of human expression in
language.' It has been considered as existent and non-existent,2
one and many,3 permanent and changing' etc. It is this aspect
of Jaina philosophy which con�founds those philosophers who are
habituated to think in an abstract way and apart from experience.
Owing to the predilections fostered by a priori logic, they represent
the Jaina view of reality as incongruent, and so end either in the
formulation of the absolutist doctrine of universal externalism or
universal nihilism. Jainism takes leave of such an inveterate habit of
mind and adheres to the testimony of experience for solving metaphysical
problems. Thus the Jaina differs from all absolutists in their approach
to the unfoldment of the inner nature of reality. Jainism weaves the
fabric and structure of reality on the authority of indubitable
experience and is not swayed in the least by the fascinations of a
priori logic. Owing to this deep-rooted abhorrence of the abstract way
of philosophising, the Jaina evaluates what is given in experience, and
consequently advocates change to be as much ontologically real as
permanence. Both are separable but only in logical thought. Being
implies becoming and vice versa. Inconsistent as it may appear at the
inception, there is no doubt that experience enforces it and logic
confirms it. This conception of reality reminds us of the Greek
philosopher Promenades who regarded `Being' as the sole reality wholly
excluding of all becoming, as also of Heraclitus, for whom, permanence
being an illusion, `Becoming' or perpetual change constitutes the very
life of the universe. It also makes us reminiscent of the Buddhist
philosophy of universal flux and of the unchanging, static, permanent
absolute of Vedanta. But all these point to the one sided evaluation of
experience. It may be said that "if the Upanisadic thinkers found
the immutable reality behind the world of phenomena and plurality,
Yuktanusasana, 49. 2 Aptamimamsa, 15.
Ibid, 34. 4 Ibid., 56.
and the Buddha
denounced everything as fleeting and sorrowful and pointed to the
futility of all speculation, Mahavira adhered to the common experience,
found no contradiction between permanence and change, and was free from
MEANING OF THE TERM 'EXPERIENCE':
It will not be out of place t0 mention
the comprehensive meaning of the term `experience' adopted by the Jaina
philosophers. The term `experience' has been construed in its
comprehensive denotation as including all the five types of know�ledge,
namely, Mati (Sensuous), Sruta (Scriptural), Avadhi (Intuition of
material objects, or Clairvoyance), Manahparyaya (Intuition of mental
modes) and Kevala (Perfect knowledge or Omniscience). The first two come
under Paroksa, since they need external sense-organs and mind for their
birth and the other three are classified under Pratyaksa, inasmuch as
they are born independently of the sense-organs and mind. The last three
types of knowledge are the privilege and prerogative of some selected
few, namely, Yogis; but Mad and Sruta are given to all. Mati includes
inference, memory, recognition etc. ; and experience includes Pratyaksa
and Paroksa types of knowledge. Thus, Sensuous and In�tellectual
knowledge are as much a part of `experience' as the transcen�dental one.
Sensuous and intellectual experience are also real, though they do not
possess the clarity of the transcendental one. Intuitive experience does
not contradict the intellectual one, but only surpasses it in scope,
extension and clarity.
another way of understanding the meaning of the term, `experience'.
Experience should not be understood to mean narrow em�piricism or
sensationalism in the Lockian sense, nor mere rationalism in the
Descartian sense, but it should be understood in antagonism to the
Kantian sense. To make it more clear, according to Kant, "the
understanding has different forms of conceiving or relating or
connecting percepts ; they are called pure concepts or categories of the
understand�ing, because they are a priori and not derived from
experience".' But, according to the Jaina, the categories or the pure
concepts are not only mental phenomena, but are also trans-subjective in
character. In other words, they are both subjective and
objective. Again, in accordance with Kant, "sensibility furnishes us
with objects or percepts, empirical intuitions as he sometimes calls
them".' and the universal forms are
Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 18.
History of Philosophy (Indian edition 1949)pp. 364,365.
by thought or the understanding. But the Jaina does not accept this view
and argues that the universal and the particular are given together in
experience. In the words of Prof.
SATXAXI MOOXEXJEE, "experience furnishes unanalysed data with the
universal and the parti�cular rolled into one. Reflection only
distinguishes the two elements, and this has been misconstrued to be the
original contribution of thought"' It is in this extensive meaning that
the term `experience' should be taken whenever used in the later course
of our discussion.
DEFINITION OF SUBSTANCE:
In consonance with the
perspective adopted by the Jainas in their metaphysical speculation,
substance is that which exists or that which is characterised by
simultaneous origination, destruction and persistence, or that which is
the substratum of attributes and modes'. At the outset these definitions
of substance may sound as absolutely different from one another, but it
may be noted that every one of these definitions is inclusive of the
rest, since existence implies change and permanence from the view point
of experience.3 Permanence signifies persistence of substance
along with attributes, and change refers to fluctuating modes along with
the emergence of the new modes and the disappearance of the old ones at
one and the same time'. To illustrate, gold as a substance exists with
its modifications and qualities. Now after making an ornament, gold as a
substance is existent along with its attributes and what changes is the
mode. Thus existence which is inseparably bound up with
substance (gold) accompanied by its attributes and modes necessitates
the production of a new form, the cessation of the old one, and
continuation of gold as such simul�taneously. In other words, substance,
as inherently and essentially associated with endless qualities and
modifications, is out and out in�conceivable without at the same time
implying existence which in turn is endowed with the trio of
simultaneous origination, destruction and persistence. The denial of the
different aspects of the Jaina view of substance will lead us either to
the Buddhist philosophy of universal change which disregards the
underlying permanent being, or to the Vedantic monism which declares the
accompanying change as appearance or illusory. Thus "the Jaina
conception of reality avoids the Scy11a of
Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism, p.3.
Panca, 10 , Prava, II, 3-4, Tasu. V. 29,30,38.
Panca. comm. Amrta. 10.
the Charybdis of illusionism"'. Thus nature of substance may now
oblige us to think that things both material and mental are
everlastingly existent. Such a view of things cannot even pretend
to conceive without falling into inconsistency the intervention of any
eternal and self-subsistent maker, either personal or impersonal, for
bringing into existence the diverse things of the world.
SUBSTANCE AND QUALITY:
Substance as different
from the general and specific qualities and modifications is not worthy
of being so called. Things devoid of attributes and modifications are
nothing but abstractions, and are unthinkable. Qualities are incapable
of being existent by themselves even for a moment. They necessitate the
simultaneous existence of substance, and are denied any isolated
character; and they are themselves bereft of qualities.' "Qualities do
not fly loose as abstract entities, and substance does not exist as an
undetermined somewhat, a mere `that' to which they are afterwards
attached. The idea of substance is the idea of qualities as unified and
systematised"'. As regards the relation between them, we may say that
they are non-separate and non-identical. Non-separateness results owing
to their subsistence in the same spatial existences, and non-identity
issues because of the fact that one is not the other. The assertion that
substance is not quality and that quality is not substance serves only
to emphasize the non�identical character of both substance and quality.
It does not mean the absolute negation of substance in quality and
vice-versa.' Thus the relation between Dravya and Guna (substance and
quality) is one of identity-in-difference. The difference
between them is only the difference in point of nomenclature, number,
characterizations, and purpose' and not difference with reference to
spatial expense. "Neither being found without the other, they both stand
in the relation of invariable concomit�ance or simultaneity with one
another instead of being in relation of antecedence and consequence in
time"'. In other words, "the relation between substance and quality
is one of coeval identity, unity, insepara�bility, and essential
simplicity, the unity of substance and quality is not the result of
union or combination'."
Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism. p. 72 2 Tasu. V. 41.
Idea of God.p.159. Cf. Sarvartha p. 310 4 Prava. II. 16.
Aptamimamsa. 72. 6 Epitome of
Indian Philosophy. Vol. I. p. 314.
SUBSTANCE AND MODIFICATION: Having considered the Jaina view of
qualities, we now turn to the conception of Paryaya in Jainism. The
notion of Paryaya is peculiarly Jainal. In conformity
with the nature of substance as permanence in mutability, Paryaya
alludes to the variable aspect of a thing which is due to the external
and internal inducements. Every quality transmutes its state every
moment; and this mode of being is called Paryaya which is incessantly
transforming itself into the next, though the quality as such is never
abrogated. It is on this account alleged that substance is in a state of
perpetual flux. However incessant and infinite the
transformations may be, the underlying subs�tantiality and permanency
can never part with existence. Substance and Paryaya are not to be
distinguished like two different things, for it is substance through
qualities which because of its flowing nature attains the qualification
of Paryaya. Substance and modes are neither exclusively identical nor
exclusively different, but the relation is one of
identity-in�difference, which is in perfect harmony with the
non-absolutistic attitude upheld by the Jaina. Thus origination and
destruction are applicable to Paryayas, and persistence to qualities
along with substance. It may be pointed out here that Paryaya also
refers to the mode of the existence of substance. Therefore,
mode of existence and mutability constitute the meanings of Paryaya.
As a matter of fact, mutability is incapable of transgressing the mode
of existence and vice versa. Hence Paryaya refers to both the meanings
at one and the same time. Thus there is no substance (Dravya) without
modification, and modification is inconceiv�able without substance.'
According to Kundakunda, origination, destruction and continuance are in
modifications and the latter are in substance. Therefore substance is
the basis of these all.
JAINA CONCEPTION OF PERSISTENCE AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GUNA AND
PARYAYA : The Jaina conception of persistence is defined as that which
accounts for recognition in the form of the proposition `This is the
same". This is consequent on the fact that the essential nature of
substance or quality, notwithstanding its mobility, is eternal and
unchangeable.' Thus the continuously flowing nature of quality does not
annihilate the quality itself, which, if admitted, would fail to account
for memory and in consequence run counter to all our daily commonplace
transactions. Continuance devoid of variability stands in direct
antagonism to experience. Hence permanence is not the denial of change,
but includes it as its necessary aspect. In the same way, qualities in
the absence of modifications are incapable of being conceived. To
distinguish Guna from Paryaya, in the first place, the infinite
attributes of a simple and non-discrete substance are ever
simultaneously present, but the inexhaustible modulations do not appear
simultaneously, but only in succession. Secondly, qualities render the
judgement of same�ness possible, while the judgement `This is not the
same' is accountable only by making allusion to modifications. Thirdly,
Gunas as such are to be interpreted as immutable in contrast to Paryayas
which are regarded as mutable. In other words, attributes of a
substance are credited with the nature of perpetuation, while the
originative and decaying designations are accorded to Paryayas.
KINDS OF MODIFICATION:
Paryayas may be
classified into essential modifications and non-essential ones.' The
former imply pure modifi�cations of a substance and the latter are
indicative of the impure modifi�cations of a substance. Vasunandi2
speaks of Paryayas as Arthaparyaya and Vyaiijanaparyaya. The former
refers to the continuously flowing nature of a substance', while the
latter signifies mode of existence of a substance.' Both the
implications are quite consistent with the twofold meanings of Paryaya
as already mentioned. Each of these two kinds of Paryaya may be
essential and non-essential. Thus Dharma, Adharma, Space and
time possess only essential Arthaparyaya and essential Vyan�janaparyaya,
while Jiva and Pudgala possess all the four types of Paryayas, namely,
essential Arthaparyaya and essential Vyanjanaparyaya, non�essential
Arthaparyaya and non-essential Vyanjanaparyaya. The state�ment of
Vasunandi and Devasena that the four substances, namely, Dharma, Adharma,
Akasa and Kala possess only Arthaparyaya and not Vyafijanaparyaya
probably implies the presence of essential Artha�paryaya and essential
Vyanjanaparyaya and the absence of non-essential Vyafijanaparyaya and
non-essential Arthaparyaya in them.' To illustrate the Paryayas of Jiva
and Pudgala, the non-essential Vyaftjanaparyaya of Jiva alludes to its
transmigratory existence which is of four kinds: human, hellish,
celestial and sub-human. The non-essential Artha�paryaya of Jiva refers
to the impure psychical states which are continuous�
Alapapaddhati, p 20.@ Niyama. 14 2 Vasunandi
Vasunandi Srava, 25.
Vasunandi Srava, 25.
Srava, 27.: Alapapaddhati, p. 27.
place in the self in mundane form. The essential Vyanjana�paryaya of
self is manifested in the disembodied state of existence and the
essential Arthaparyaya signifies the flowing nature of pure states of
self in the transcendental form. Similarly, Pudgala possesses these four
kinds of Paryaya namely Skandha-form and the flowing nature in this
form, Anu-form and the flowing nature in this form respectively.
SUBSTANCE AND EXISTENCE:
Of the infinite
characteristics per�taining to a substance, the most comprehensive is
existence. It com�prises all other characteristics within its purview.
Judged from the standpoint of wholeness, substance, in a summary way, is
existential in nature.' It is thus obvious that substance is
indubitable, self-evident, therefore, existent from all eternity'. It is
self-supported and complete in itself. Besides, it transcends our
imperfect knowledge. In other words, it is unfathomable by our limited
conceptions, since it has infinite characteristics 3.
It is of capital importance to note that if the nature of
substance is comprehended otherwise, i.e., if existence is not regarded
as its essential characteristic, substance will be either non-existing
or isolated from existence. In the former case, the conclusion will be
the the total extinction of substance, and in the latter case, the
ascription of existence as such will be purposeless, inasmuch as
substance gets capability of possessing its essential nature independent
of, and in isolation from, existence, hence the inevitable result will
the annihilation of existence.' Apart from this, the denial of the
existential nature of things would lead us to acknowledge the emergence
of things either from non-existence or from other sources which in turn
require others and so on endlessly.' Hence substance and existence are
indissoluble related like heat and fire, though they differ in
nomenclature, number, characterisation etc. In other words, they have
Anyatva (non-identity) and not Prthaktva (sepa�rateness). The former
implies that neither the nature of substance is identical with the
nature of existence, nor the nature of existence is identi�cal with the
nature of substance. And the latter means that substance and
existence are not separate in respect of Pradesa or space-points, just
as two separate things possess difference of Pradesa or space-points.'
They have not difference of Prade'sa (Prthaktva) but difference of
I. 8. ; Tasu. 29.' Prava. II. 6,
I. 8.; Prava. II. 6
Prava. II. 13 and Comm. Amrta.
I. 10, 11.
6 Prava. II. 14 and Comm. Amrta.
To explain the difference of characterisation' (Anyatva), existence
requires substance as its support, is devoid of other qualities, is
itself one adjective out of other infinite adjectival characterisations
of substance, is constitutive of substance, and is of the nature of
origination, destruction and continuance. On the contrary, substance is
bereft of any substratum, is accompanied by other illimitable
characteristics, is a substantive with countless adjuncts, and is the
subject of origi�nation, destruction and continuance.' Thus if any
legitimate concept is requisite to reveal the relation between the two,
it is identity-in-difference. The former refers to Pradesas and the
latter, to characterisations. The relation is unique, primary
PRAMANA, NAYA, AND SYADVADA:
After dwelling upon the
onto�logical nature of reality as expounded by the Jaina philosophers,
we now proceed to its source of knowledge and expression in brief. It
may be contended that, if the Anekantic reality is indescribable
altogether, the path of liberation will be blocked, as nobody will be
able to preach and propound'. According to Jainism reality is cognised
by Pramana and Naya.4 Pramana refers to the grasping of
reality in its wholeness, while Naya points to an aspect of
infinitely-phased reality illumined by Pramana, thus the latter takes
into consideration only a fragment of the totality.' A thing
embellishes itself with illimitable characteristics." The emphasis on
the one and the cancellation of the other would irresis�tibly lead us to
the biased estimation and Ekantic view of reality, which would affect
our ethical conclusions as we have elsewhere said.' Pramana assimilates
all the characteristics at once without any contradiction and animosity
between one characteristic and the other, for instance, between one and
many, existent and non-existent etc. Of the unfathomable
cha�racteristics, Naya chooses one at one moment, but keeps in view the
other characteristics also. We may point out here that, though
corres�ponding to the countless characteristics, there are countless
Nayas, which, if summed together, are incapable of imparting knowledge
as is given by Pramana. In other words, the aggregation of all the Nayas
for constru�ing the notion of Pramana is inadequate. It is, therefore,
to be admitted that the acquisition of knowledge by Pramana is an
Ibid. 2 Prava. Comm.
Amrta. II. 14.
Yuktyanusasana, 43. 4 Ta. su I. 6.
1-6 .; Rajava. I. 6*33. 6 Syadvadamanjari, 22.
7 Ibid. 27
the human mind. We can thus say that both Pramana and Naya are essential
for the proper understanding of the nature of reality. Reality being the
repository of infinite attributes, the apprehension of it from a
particular angle of vision, i.e., Naya, which is objectively given and
not subjectively contemplated, does not exhaust the whole of the
multiphase reality. So, in order to avoid the possible misunderstanding
that reality is exhausted by the employment of a particular Naya, every
predication should be preceded by the word
in order to make us
aware of the possibility of other alternative predications. Hence it is
known as the doctrine of Syadvada. Syadvada is no doubt the
logical outcome of Anekantavada, the doctrine of the multiple nature of
reality. It is simply the mode of predication or communication envisaged
by the Jaina to convey the knowledge of the multiphased reality. Thus
Syadvada is the mode of expression, Anekantavada or Nayavada is the mode
of cogni�tion. Syadvada is the expression of Anekantavada in language.
We can�not do better than quote Prof. A. N. Upadhye for exposing the
relation between Syadvada and Nayavada, "Syadvada is a corollary of
Nayavada: the latter is analytical and primarily conceptual and the
former is synthetically and mainly verbal. Syadvada will certainly look
lame in the absence of Naya doctrine. Naya doctrine without Syadvada has
no practical value. Syadvada in course of the process of assertion curbs
down and harmonises the absolute views of individual Nayas.l"
Jaina philosophers unanimously hold that in order to apprehend an aspect
of a whole in its completeness or to do full justice to it, only seven
(neither more nor less) forms of judgement are requisite, hence it is
known as the doctrine of Saptabharlgi Vada.'�
CLASSIFICATION OF SUBSTANCE:
Jainism takes experience as its guide and resolves the whole of the
universe of being into two everlasting, uncreated, co-existing, but
independent categories of Jiva and Ajiva. The Ajiva is further
classified into Pudgala (matter), Iharma (principle of motion), Adharma
(principle of rest), lakes (space) and Kala (time). Hence reality is
dualistic as well as pluralistic. But, according to the Jaina,
plurality, considered from the synthetic and objective point of view of
one existence, entails unity also. According to Kundakunda, in spite of
the unique characteristics possessed by the different substances,
exis�tence has been regarded as an all-comprising characteristic of
Intro. LXXXV. 2 Saptabhangitaranginil,
all distinctions.' The Kdrttikeyanupreksd recognised that all
substances are one from the stand-point of substance, while they are
dis�tinct and separate from their characteristic differences.'
Samantabhadra also endorses this view by affirming that in view of the
conception of one universal existence all are one, but from the point of
view of substances distinctions arise.' Padmaprabha Maladharideva
pronounces that Maha�satta pervades all the things in their entirety,
but it is always associated with Avantarasatta which pervades only the
particular objects.' In a similar vein, Amrtacandra speaks of the two
types of Satta, namely, Sva�rnpasatta and Sadrasyasatta. The latter is
the same as Rimanyasatta.5 In his
Vimaladasa discusses the problem of unity and plurality of existence in
detail, and concludes that both the postula�tion of existential identity
and the articulation of differences from the stand-point of different
substances are logically necessary and justifiable." Thus Jainism gives
credence to the recognition of existential oneness but not exclusively,
since it is always bound up with plurality. This is quite consistent
with the Anekantatmaka view of reality propounded by the Jaina
philosopher. The sole warrant for the existence of one and many, unity
and diversity, is experience which vouches for such a character of
reality. Thus, Mahasatta will be associated with its opposite, namely,
Avantarasatta. It may again be pointed out that this Mahasatta is not an
independent something as may be conceived, but is invariably
accom�panied by its opposite.' Kundakunda holds the nature of existence
as one, immanent in the totality of substances constituting the
universe, comprehending and summarizing the universe, having infinite
modifica�tions, indicative of the triple characteristics of origination,
destruction, and persistence and in the last as associated with the
characteristics oppo�site to those mentioned above.' Hence unity,
duality, and plurality-all are inseparably and inevitably involved in
the structure of reality.
MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM AS THE TWO EXTREMES: By recognizing both Jiva
and Pudgala as substances Jainism steers clear of the two extremes of
materialism and idealism which are radically opposed to each other.
Materialism considers the universe as rooted in matter,
Comm. Amrta. II-5. 2 Kartti. 236.
Aptamimamsa. 34. 4 Niyamja. Comm. Padmaprabha.
Comm. Amrta. II, 3, 5. 6 Saptabhangitarangini. P. 78.
Comm. Amrta. 8. 8 Pancadhyayi. I. 15.
9 Panca. 8.
idealism imagines the mind or spirit to be fundamental and primary. The
former lays stress on the recognition of the reality of matter and
considers the mind to be an incident or accompaniment; the latter
affirms that mind or spirit is to be reckoned as real and matter just an
appear�ance. But according to Jainism, both matter and spirit are
equally true, and either is warrantable if experience is allowed to be
robbed of its significance.
GENERAL NATURE OF SUBSTANCES:
mutual interpenetrating of the six Dravyas and the accommodative nature
of each, they never part with their original nature.' This statement is
indicative of the fact that these Dravyas are incapable of transgressing
their fixed number which is six. Therefore their reeducation or
multiplication is an impossibility.' With the solitary exception of Kala
Dravya, the remain�ing five are termed Pancastikaya for the simple
reason of possessing many Pradesas.3 The word 'Kaya' should
be understood only to connote `many' Pradesas.4 Jiva, Dharma,
and Adharma own innumerable Pra�desas; :1ka"sa possesses infinite ones;
Kala, one; but Pudgala possesses numerable, innumerable and infinite
Pradesas.5 All the Dravyas except Pudgala are regarded as
bereft of material qualities of touch, taste, smell and colour, and only
Jiva is said to possess consciousness. Hence Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and
Kala, are destitute of consciousness, and also of material qualities.
Thus they should not be misapprehended as being comprised under the
category of matter, but they come under a different category of
non-sentiency-cum-non-inateriality. As for Dharma, Adhar�ma and Lukas,
each of them is considered to be one, while Jiva and Pud�gala are
infinite; and Kala is innumerable." Besides, Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and
Kala are by nature non-active, and the remaining two are active.'
NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF PUDGALA:
Having discussed the
gener�al nature of six substances, we now proceed to deal with their
specific nature. We start with Pudgala (matter). Matter, according to
Jainism, is not something formless, indefinite, and absolutely
featureless as conceived by Anaximander, nor is it to be regarded as
non-being in the Platonic
Ibid. 2 Sarvartha. V. 4.
Panca. Comm. Amrta. 22; Panca. 102.; Prava.
II. 43. ; Niyama. 34. The space occupied by one atom is called a Pradesa.
V. 1. 5 Dravya. 25,; Ta.su. V. 8,9, 10..; Niyama. 35, 36.
6 Gomma. Ji.
587.; Ta.su. V. 6. 7 .; Panca. 98.
as "a secondary, a dull, irrational, recalcitrant force, the un�willing
slave of mind".' Nor does it admit of its being considered to be a
sensation-complex, or a collection of ideas as signified by the
subjective idealism of Barkeley. Apart from this, it is to be
distinguished from the Prakrti of Samkhya. Jainism propounds matter in
the realistic sense, and so its cognizance is based on its
characteristic sense-qualities of touch, taste, smell and colour, which
are in the relation of invariable concomitance, i.e., one quality is
never found in isolation but always, in a group of four, though in
varying degrees of intensity.' The conception of matter is so
comprehensive as to comprise under it the five substances of earth,
water, air, light and Dravya-mind out of the nine substances admitted by
the Vaisesika. Hence these five substances are easily assimil�able in
Pudgala,3 since they emerge out of material atoms by varying
combinations. The aforementioned four qualities of atom admit of
numerable, innumerable and infinite classifications; but the principal
kinds are regarded as twenty; namely, eight kinds of touch (soft, hard,
heavy, light, hot, cold, viscous, and rough,' five kinds of taste
(bitter, pungent, sour, sweet, and astringent);' two kinds of smell
(fragrance and the reverse);' and five kinds of colour (blue, yellow,
white, black and red).' The functions of Pudgala are: the five types of
body,' the speech, the mind, the Karmic particles, the breathing
including exhaling and inhaling, pleasure and pain, life and death, and
the five senses.'
KINDS OF PUDGALA : The principal forms in which Pudgala (matter) exists,
are Anu (atom) and Skandha (aggregate)." Binary to infinite aggregates
are included in Skandha.ll An atom consists of only one
Pradesa, is the terminus of divisibility of matter, is by itself without
begin�ning, end or middle, is destitute of sound and is coupled with the
qualities of taste, touch, smell and colour." Besides, it is
indestructible and eternal, is responsible for the disruption of
Skandhas by virtue of its segregation from them, is also the substantial
cause of them and is the measure of time. 13 Again it is devoid of
sound, but is the cause of sound; i.e., the combination of atoms may
produce sound when they strike against other
1 History of
Philosophy ( Edition 1949) p. 59.
2 Ta.su. V.
23, ; Sarvartha. V. 5.14.
Sarvartha. V. 3.
Five types of body are; audarkika
(physical), vaikriyika (fluid), aharaka 9assimilative), taijasa
(electric) and Karmana (karmic), see Ta. su. II. 36.
Panca. 82, ; Sarvartha. V. 19. 20.
Ta/ si/ V/ 25. ' Moua,a/ 20.
Sarvartha. V. 26.
of atoms.' It possesses any one colour, any one taste, any one
smell, but a pair of such touches as are not of contradictory nature;
namely, cold and viscous, or cold and dry, or hot and viscous, or hot
and dry.' The remaining touches, namely, soft and hard, light and heavy,
are only manifested in the Skandha state of matter, and thus are not
present in its atomic state. The qualities of viscousness
vary in degrees of intensity extending
from the lowest limit to the highest, from one point to infinity.' The
variations in the degrees of intensity may be ordinarily witnessed in
the milk of she-goat, cow, buffalo, and she-camel in point of
viscousness, and in dust (parilsu), gross-sand
(kanika), and sand
in respect of dryness.' Hence
atoms are capable of existing with infinite variability in these two
charac�teristics. These are responsible for atomic linking.' Thus, for
explaining the combination of atoms this assumption excludes God or
Adrsta as recognised by the Nyaya-Vaisesika school of thought, as also
the primor�dial motion of atoms as advocated by Democritus. Though,
according to the Jaina, atoms are active,' activity is not the cause of
combination. It will not be amiss to say that those atoms which are at
the lowest in the scale of viscousness and dryness are not given to
combination either with one another or with other intensification's.'
Besides, atoms which have equal degrees of viscousness and dryness also
refuse to combine with one another.' But atoms which hold two degrees of
viscousness and dryness in excess are given to interlining; i.
e., atoms with two degrees of visc�ousness and dryness are interlinkable
with four degrees of the same in all respects. Similarly, this law holds
good for other interlinkings.9 Be�sides, atoms which
possess four degrees of viscousness or dryness are capable of
transforming atoms having two degrees of viscousness or dry�ness into
their own nature. l� Similarly, this holds good for all those atoms
which have a difference of two degrees of viscousnss or dryness. This
theory thus avoids mere conjunction of atoms, but propounds their
proceed to Skandha. The aggregates of atoms exist in six different
forms; namely, 1) gross-gross 2) gross 3) gross-fine 4) fine�gross 5)
fine and lastly 6) fine-fine." 1) The class of matter which, when
1 Panca. 78,
79, 81. 2. Ibid. 81., Niyama. 27. Comm. Amrta.
3 Sarvartha. V.
33. 4 Ibid. 33. 5 Gp,,a/ Ko/
6 Panca. Comm.
Amrta. 98. 7 Sarvartha. V. 34. 8 Ibid. V. 35.
9 Ibid V.
36. 10. Ibid. V. 37. 11 Ibid. V. 37.
12 Niyama. 21 to
cannot restore its original state without any extraneous help is termed
gross-gross. The examples of which are wood, stone, and the like. 2)
That which can be reunited on being divided without the intervention of
a third something is called gross, for example, water, oil, etc. 3)
Shadow, sunshine, etc. which are incapable of disintegration and grasp
are subsumed under gross-fine. 4) The objects of touch, taste, smell and
hearing are called fine-gross. 5) The Karmic matter etc. which are
imper�ceptible by the senses are included into the category of fine. 6)
The binary aggregates and the Skandhas smaller than the Karmic matter
come under the next category of fine-fine. As we have said, the
generation of sound is effected by the striking of Skandhas against one
another. Thus Jainism takes exception to the view of Nyaya-Vaisesika
which calls sound the quality of Akasa, inasmuch as it is capable of
being sensed, which would not have been possible, had it been the
quality of Akasa.
Next comes the reality of Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and Kala. None of the
philosophical systems originated in the east and the west postulated the
independent existence of the principle of motion (Dharma) and the
principle of rest (Adharma). Besides, the idealistic thinkers have
unhesitatingly brushed aside the reality even of space and time, since
they find themselves in the meshes of irreconcilable contradictions.
Kant regarded them as the forms of perceptions, which are imposed by
sensi�bility upon things. Hence on account of the glasses of space and
time attached to sensibility, the nominal reality escapes our grip and
its attainment becomes a wild goose-chase. But the Jaina who relies upon
the findings of experience absolves us from the creations of a priori
logic by positing the reality of Dharma, Adharma, Kasai and Kala
answering to the experienced motion, rest, allowance of room, and change
shall now throw some light on the nature of motion. All the idealists
are one in rejecting the reality of motion and in designating it as mere
appearance, phenomenal, and unworthy of being intelligibly applied to
thing-in-itself. The Elliptic philosopher Zeon was the first to raise a
voice against the possibility of motion. But Jainism recognises the
reality of motion. It is defined as the modification originating from
the external and internal inducements, which make possible the
traversing from one point of space to another.' The substances like
V. 7.; Panca. Comm. Amrta. 98.
Akasa and Kala are non-active and motionless in this sense, but Jiva and
Pudgala are said to be the authors of motion; that is, these two Dravyas
are capable of being active to the exclusion of others.' Activity is not
a different, independent category, but a special modification of these
two substances due to the external and internal causes.' Besides, it
should be distinguished from the Arthaparyaya, which means motionless
change possessed by all the six Dravyas, as has already been explained.
The activity of Jiva is due to the external causal agency of Karman.
Thus Siddhas, who have reached liberation, are non-active on account of
the absence of Karman.3 The activity of Pudgala is due to the
external agen�cy of Kala. It will remain perpetual, since unlike Karmic
particles Kala can never be absent at any time. Thus the Pudgala unlike
the Siddhas cannot be non-active.�
AKASA: That extent of space which is replete with matter,
souls, time, principle of motion, and principle of rest is labelled
Lokakasa or world space. This distinguishes it from Alokakasa or empty
space where in none of the five substances abides.' Thus the former is
recognised as being capable of providing accommodation to Jivas, Pudgala
and to the rest of the Dravyas. That space is its own base and support,
and does not call for any other substance to accommodate it is evident
from the fact that there is no other substance of more vastness than
this which may provide room to it. And even if it is conceded, it will
implicitly lead us to the fallacy of
regress ad infinitum.'
Besides, it is imperative to note that, considered from the point of
view of the thing-in-itself, all substan�ces exist in themselves. It is
only said from the commonplace point of view that all substances are
subsisting in space.' The principles of motion and rest are immanent in
the entire physical space (Lokakasa) like the permeation of oil in the
seed.' Despite the omnipresence of Dharma and Adharma in the Lokakasa
and the existence of Jiva, Pudgala, and Kala therein, they never forfeit
their respective specific nature.'
DHARMA AND ADHARMA : Dharma and Adharma are the indifferent
conditions of movement and rest respectively. Dharmastikaya is
itself incapable of migration and of generating motion in other things,
V. 7. ; 2. Rajava. V. 7/4, 2.
3 Panca. Comm.
Amrta. 98. ; Rajava V. 7/14 to 16.
4 Panca. Comm.
Amrta. 98 ; 5 Dravya. 20. ; Sarvatha. V. 12, Panca 90,91/
6 Rajava. V. 12/2
to 4. 7 Rajava. V. 12/5 to 6.
8 Sarvartha. V.
13. 9 Rajava. V. 16/10.
sine qua non of the
movement of Jivas and Pudgala by its mere exist�ence, just as water
assists in the spontaneous movement of fish by its mere presence and not
as the wind which has the capability to develop activity in certain
things.' Similarly, Adharmastikaya does not persuade Jiva and Pudgala in
motion to stand still, but becomes the passive condi�tion when they of
their own accord discontinue to move, just as the shadow of a tree does
not persuade a traveler to take rest under it.' Thus neither
Dharmastikaya originates motion, nor Adharmastikaya stops it. Both of
them are non-active conditions. Besides, these two principles are also
responsible for the demarcation' of Lokakdsa and Alokakasa, inasmuch as
they make possible the existence of Jiva and Pudgala only in Lokakasa.
Besides, the residence of the Siddhas at the summit
of the world also proves
that space cannot account for motion and rest and the different
principles like Dharma and Adharma must needs be assumed.'
KALA : We have frequently made reference to the underlying
as�sumption of the whole
Jaina philosophy that, though reality is incessantly subject to
mutation, it sustains its identical character. Thus everyone of the
substances without exception is credited with origination, destruc�tion
and persistence. In the substances like Dharma, Adharma, Akasa,
liberated soul and an atom of
matter, the qualities are continuously changing in
themselves.' The experience of change, however, in the mundane soul and
in the gross matter is omnipresent and this is of neces�sity to be
accounted for and should not be speculatively condemned as mere
illusion. In view of this, the Jainas realistically confer an
existenti�al status on `time', and calls it substance to answer for the
experienced change,' just as Dharma, Adharma and Akasa are calculated to
-throw light on what may be called motion, rest and the providing of
room.' Kant's statement is worthy to be noted when he affirms that it is
impossi�ble to emancipate ourselves from the spatial and temporal ways
of think�ing and speaking despite our best endeavors; but the Jaina,
though honoring his thesis, refuses to acquiesce in the fact that space
and time are contri�buted by sensibility, since according to him they
are revealed in experience and are objectively ontologically true.
Just as space is its own support, so real time is conceived to be
assisting its own change or modification
85,88 and Comm. Amrta. 2. Ibid 86.
3 Panca. 87.
4 Ibid. 92, 93 and Comm.
5 Prava. Comm.
Amrta. II. 1. 6 Niyama. 33. 7 Niyama. 30.
along with its
being the condition of change in other substances constitut�ing the
universe. Kala may be classified into real time (Parmartha Kala) and
conditioned time (Vyavahara Kala).1 The former is the
substance proper;' and Samaya, -wall are conditioned varieties of time.'
The function of Parmartha Kala is Vartana; i.e., it passively helps the
self�changing substances; and the functions of conditioned time are
change, motion and the feeling of one's being young and old.' As has
already been pointed out, Kala Dravya is deprived of the designation, `Kaya',
inasmuch as it has only one Pradesa in the form of Kala Anu. These Kala
anus are innumerable, and exist separately on each Pradesa of Lokakasa
without being mixed with one another.' The unit of condi�tioned time is
called `Samaya', which may be defined as the period required by the
primary material atom to traverse with slow pace from one Pradesa of
Akasa to the immediately next." It is practically incon�ceivable in
life. It should be borne in mind that innumerable `Samayas' lapse in the
opening of an eyelid.
JIVA (SELF): The problem of self is the most
fundamental problem in the domain of philosophy. Since the dawn of
philosophical speculation down to the present time, it has vexed, great
philosophers and led them to formulate different conceptions consistent
with the metaphysical outlook upheld by them. With Jainism though the
probing into the nature of self is not a new enterprise, the special
point of the Jaina view consists in substantiating the notion of self
with�out blinking the loftiest mystical heights on the one hand and
without condemning the unobstructed experience as sheer illusion on the
other. The self, as an ontologically underived fact, is one of the six
substances subsisting independently of anything else. The experience of
knowing', feeling' and willing' immediately proves the existence of
recognise that the self is to be regarded as possessing supreme
significance among the substances and as having the highest value among
the Tattvas. It is the repository of excellent characteristics.'-1
It is the internal Tattva. It is to be distinguished from the other
substances which are merely external since they are without any
knowledge of things to be renounced and accepted. " Kundakunda in the
calls it Muhartha (a great objectivity)." It is neither merely an
V. 22. 2. Ta.su. V. 39.
31. 4 Sarvatha. V-22.
5 Dravya 22.;
Niyama. 32. 6 Prava. II. 47.
7 Acaranga. 1. 5.
5, p. 50. 8 Kartti. 183.
184. 10. Kartti.
Ibid. 12 Kartti. 205.
13. Prava. II.
as advocated by the Vedanta , the Samkhya-Yoga and the NayaVaiseika, nor
merely a momentarily transmutable series of psychical states as
recognised by the Buddhist. But, according to the Jaina, it is a
synthesis of permanence and change. Consciousness, according tot him, is
its essential and distinguishing feature. The Jaina, therefore,
diversiform the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Purva-Mimamsa which regard
consciousness as an adventitious attribute, as also from the Carvaka
system which envisages consciousness as an epiphenmomenon of matter,
something like the inebriating power emerged from the mixing of certain
ingredients. The systems of thought like the Samkhya- Yoga and the
Vedanta of Samkara and Tamanuja betray a fairer resemblance to the
consideration is intrinsically associated with the self.
the Jaina writings we are confronted with the conception of self as
variously dealt with. We may comprise these various ways under two
objective points of view. First, there is the trancwcedetal view which
represents the nature of self in its unadulterated state of existence;
and secondly there is the empirical view which describes the nature of
self in its corrupted form. At present, we propose to discuss the nature
of self from the empirical stand-point. We postpone the discussion from
the transcendental view tot a later stage.
NATURE OF EMPOIRICAL SELEF: First, the empirical self has been in a
state of transmigration since an indeterminable past. It is on this
account contended that the self originates and decays. But this is valid
only from the Paryayaarthika point of view and not from the Dravyarthika
one, which lays down indestructibility and unproductively of the self.
1 Secondly, as we have said, the empirical self is in possession of
non-essential Vyanjanaparyya and non-essential Arthaparyaya. It
illumines the whole body by pervading in it just as the lotus-hued ruby
illumines a cup of milk. 2 Thirdly the empirical self is considered
by the Jaina as the doer of evil and good actions. Fourthly, it is also
the enjoyer. To sum up the empirical self is bound by Karmas from an
indefinite past, is the enhoyer of the self-performed good and bad
actions, is the knower and the seer, and is associated with the triple
nature of origination, destruction and continuance. Besides it possesses
the narrowing and dilating characteristics, extends up to the limit of
bodily dimensions and owns its specific characteristics of knowledge,
bl9iss etc. 3 It may be otter here that Jainism recognises the
metaphysical reality of infinite selves. We may point out in passing
that the relation between the empirical self and the transcendental one
is one of identity- cum difference; i.e there is metaphysical identity
between the two states (empirical and superempieical) of the same self,
but the difference is also undeniable in respect of Upadhis which have
been persisting since an infinite past. The empirical self is
potentiality transcendental, though this nominal state of existence is
not actualised at present; hence the distinction is incontrovertible.
KINDS OF EMPIRIAL SELEF, ONE SENSED EMPIRICAL SELVES: The empirical self
is recognised by the Pranas which it owns. The minimum number of Pranas
possessed by the empirical self is four (one sense, one Bala, life-limit
and breathing), and the maximum bumper is ten (five senses, three Balas,
and breathing) 1 However encumbered with the cruel matter a self may
be, it cannot obstruct the manifestation of consciousness to the full,
just as even the most dense cloud cannot interrupt the light of the sun
to its farthest extreme. The lowest in the grade of existence are the
one-senesced Jivas. They possess four Pranas To make it clear, of the
five senses, namely, the sense of touch, taste smell, colour and sound
the one- senses Jivas possess obey the sense of touch; and of the three
Balas, namely, the Bale of mind, body and speech, they have Olay the
Bala of body, and besides they hold life-fold classification; 2 namely,
the earth-bodied water-bodied fire-bodied, airbodied and lastly,
vegetable bodied souls. The recognition of these one- sensed souls is
fraught with great difficulty, since the four Pranas are to explicitly
manifested, just as the Pranas of a man in the state of nimbuses, or
just as the Pranas of a growing soul in the egg of a bird or in the
embryonic state cannot be recognised owing to the lack of their explicit
TWO �SENSED TO FIVE-SENSED EMPIRCAL SOULS : Having pointed out the
various forms of existence of the one-sensed Jivas and the number of
Pranas upheld by them, we now proceeded to the higher grades of
existence. The two-sensed Jivas possess six Proceed to the higher grades
of existence. The two sensed Jivas possess siv Pranas, i.e. in addition
to the four Pranas of oe-sensed souls, they have two Organs more;
namely, the sense of taste, and the Bala of speech: the three sensed
souls have the sense of smell additionally: the four-sensed souls have
the sense of colour besides the above; and lastly, the five sensed souls
which are mindless are endowed with the sense of hearing in addition;
and those with mind possess all the ten Pranas. 1 Thus the nimbers of
Pranas possessed by one-sensed to five-sensed souls are four, six seven
eight nine and ten respectively. The illustrations of the two-sensed
souls are sea-snail, cowrie �shell �fish, conch-shell fish, earth- worm
etc; of the three �sensed souls are louse, bug ant, 3 etc. of the four-
senesced sound are gadfly, mosquito fly, bee, beetle dragon fly and
butter fly; 4 of the five �sensed souls with ten Pranas are clestatil,
hellish and human beings and some subhuman souls 5 and of the five-senseds
souls with nine Pranas are old sensed ones are designated as
non-rational or mindless (Asamijani) whereas the five-sensed sub �human
beings may be rational or non-rational, but the celestial, hellish and
human beings are necessarily rational. 7 The rational souls may be
recognised by the capability of beings preached, of receiving
instruction, and of voluntary action. 8
Having dealt with the nature and kinds of the empirical self, we now
proceeds to discuss the nature of the ethical ideal, the Summum Bonum of
human life. This will also make clear the nature of the transcendental
self. Just as the validity of the existence of self is incapable of
being impugned, so the existence of the highest good is unquestionable
The empirical souls from the one-sensed to the four- sensed, as also
some substrate of existence. They are not endowed with that type state
of existence. They are not endowed with that type of understanding which
may assist them in absolving themselves from the thralldom of Karman.
Such being the overwhelming effect of Karman, their progress to the
higher grades of existence is decided by 'time' But the human souls,
being possessed of mind, can ponder over the objective to be aimed at
for their beefcake and can achieve the highest good the possibility of
the relisation of supermen good is the possibility of a free, sacred,
immortal, human life which ends the transmigratory existence and its
attendant evils. The Tirthamakaras are the concrete examples of such
II-14 2. Panca. 114. 3. Ibid. 115
116. . Panca. 17 and Comm. Amta.
6. Ibid. (In all
thee eferences from 2 to 6 vide Chakravarti's translation of Pancastikaa.)
7 Panca. Comm. Amrta. 117 8 Gomma. ji. 660.
the ethico-religio-philosohical- works of the Jainas the highest good is
diversely formulated. Fed up with the kaleidoscopic transformations of
the world, the Jaina acaryas have dived deep into the inert hidden
regions of the spirit, and have expressed the highest good in different
ways. But it may be noted here that all the formulations of the highest
good convey identical meeting.
LIBERATION SYNCHROOUS WITH THE DESTRUCTION OF KARMAS AS THE ETHICAL
IDEAL : First, the deliverance of self is deemed to be the highest
good. Every Houma being ought to trended strenuous efforts to seek his
own salvation from the miseries of the world. All the systems of Indian
philosophy with the solitary exception of Carvaka acquiesce in
recognising liberation as the ethical ideal, though they differ in the
nature of ralisation. From the view point of the Jaina, it is not the
identification of self with the Brahman, as contemplated by the Vedantin,
but it is the attainment of Siddhahood wherein self- individuation is
sustained. The Isutrakaranaga Items us that liberation is the best
thing, just as the moon is the best among the stars 1 The Acaranaga
pronounces that liberation is a thieved by a ma who does not feel
disinterested in Self-denial 2 just as fire immediately burns the dry
sticks, so the self established in itself forthwith annuls the filth of
Karmas. 3 in the sate of final liberation the empirical self is
metamorphosed into transcendental, permanent existence. 4 again, having
totally annihilated the eight types of Karaman, and having experienced
the supersensuous bliss that passes understanding, the empirical self
becomes completely bereft of any collyriumi that may again cause
bondage, and as such abides at the summit of the world without having
abandoned anything to be accomplished. 5
PARAMANTMAN AS THE SUMMUM Bonum : Secondly, the ideal is also described
as the attaint of Paramatman after one's passing through the state of
Antaratman and renouncing the state of Bahiratman. 6 These three states
of the same self may very well be compared with the three types of
attitudes as recognised by Dr. CAIRD: " Man looks outward before he
looks inward and he looks a inward before he looks a upward" 7
1 Skrya Kr.
I. 11, 22. 2. Acara. 1, 2, 2, p. 17.
3 Acara, 1, 4, 3,
p. 39. 4 Gomma. Ji. 68.
Ibid. 6 Mo. Pa. 7.
7 Evolution of
Religion, II. 2. ( vide, Constructive survey of Upanisadic philosophy,
Bahiratman sees outward; when it becomes Antaraman, it sees inward; and
when it becomes Paramantaman, it is said to see upward. Thus the
ralisation of the Paramantma amounts to the relisation of the highest
good. Kundakunda, Yogindu and Pujyapadas the great proponents of the
Jaina thought, converge on this point. They frequently speak of the
realisation of Paramatman as the highest good. Here a word of caution is
necessary the words Paramatman and Brahaman are synonymously used in the
Jaina philosophical texts, but they should not be confused with the
Upanisadic Brahman which is the cosmic principle. The Jaina gives
credence to the existence of infinite Bhrahamans i.e. Oaranmatamans
which are the consummately stages of spiritual evoaccording tot Janis,
are identical, inasmuch as they are the two stages of the same entity.
Thus every soul is potentially divine, and the manifestation of divinity
is called Paramatmanhood. If this connotation implicit in the Jaina view
of Paramantma is not conceded, that would constitute a virtual
abandonment of the ontological pluralism of selves which it champions.
Though Brahaman of the Upanisasds and Brahaman of the Jainas exhibit
many resemblance's, yet they differ enormously In laying stress on this
conception of Paramatman as the Summum Bouum, the goal of all human
pursuance, we are committed tot the view that the religious ideal and
the ethical ideal coalesce. The spiritual values and the ethical values
NISCAYA NAYA AS THE ETHIAL IDEAL: TRANSCENDENTAL EXPERIENCE TRANSCENDS
THE CONCEPTUAL POINTS OF VIEW WHERTHER NISAYA OR VYAVAHARA: Thirdly, we
encounter a different mode of exmpressig the ethical ideal. The Jails in
order to expound this speak in the language of Nyayas. Kundakunda, the
outstanding ethic-religious philosopher of the first century A.D. is
conspicuous for using Niscaya Naya (Transcendental view) and Vyavahara
Naya (Empirical view) as the language of spiritualism to make out the
ethical ideal. The Niscyaya Naya which grapes the soul in its undefiled
state of existence may very well sere as the ethic ideal to achieved in
contradistinction to the Vyavahara Naya which describes the self as
bound, impure and the like. No doubt, we are in the corrupt form of
existence from begin ingress past, but the Niscaya Nyaya reminds us of
our spiritual magnificence and glory. It prompts the sullied self to
behold its spiritual heritage. It endeavors to infuse and instill into
our minds the impressiveness of Suddha Bhavas after abundantly showing
us the empirical and evanescent character of Subha and Asubha Buhavas
that bid the soul to mundane existence. It does not assert that the soul
is at present perfect but simply affirms that the self ought to attain
the height illumined buy it has the force of 'ought' and not of 'is' but
this force is vaikd for empirical selves. In the opening chapter of the
Samayasara Kundakaunda summarises the implication of the aforementioned
rowed Nayas by saying the every self has heard about, obscured and
experienced the worldly enjoyments and consequential bondage, but the
nature of the highest self has never been conprehended.1 Hence the
former is Vyavaharanaya, while the latter is a allied Niscayanaya, which
points to the potentiality of the empirical self to become pure and
enjoy its unalloyed status. It is therefore averred that when the self
has elevated itself to the domai of spiritual em-erence, the vyabahara
Baya becomes false and the Niscaya Naya is seen to be genuine. In other
words, we achieve the right to renounce the Vyahaara Naya only when we
have accomplished the loftiest height of mystical experience. If we
regard the yaahara Naya as untruthful at a low stage, Punya, Papa,
bondage, and the necessity to do strenuous effort to achieve liberation
would be of o avail. It may be noted here that the falsity of the
Vyaahara Baaya aggects neither the existence of external objects nor the
omniscience of the trancscedndental self which reflects the differences
of the world as they are. In explaining the nature of the ethical ideal
in terms of Byay Kundakunda advances a step further, and affirms that
the transcendental experience surpasses all the conceptual points of
view whether Niscaya or Vyavahara .2 The former represents the self as
unbound and untouched by Karma's, while to latter, as bound and touched
by the, but he who transcends these herbal points of view is allied
Samayasara,3 the goal to be achieved. The self becomes pure
consciousness, bliss and knowledge.
may be toed here that like the Paramaratha and Vyavahara Nayas
enunciated by Kundakunda, Samukaraaraya, the great eminent of the
Advaita doctrine, makes use of the Paramarathika and Vyaaharika
view-points as the corner stones of his philosophy. But the two
differwidely. The paramarthika view as advocated by Samkara negates the
Paramarthika existence of other material and non-material objects of the
world which in the view of the Jaina, here their own independent
4. 2. Samaa. 144.
3 Ibid. 141, 142.
The Vyayahara Naya of the Jainas simply points to our slumbering state
in the domai of spiritualism, and does not in the least touch the
existential aspects of things. The Nisaya or Paramartha Naya simply
seven to awaken the slumbering soul to attain its spiritual heritage. It
does not pretend annul the external things by merespirital outlook.
SVASMAYA AS THE TRANSCENDENT OBJECTIE: Fourthly, there is witnessed a
different expression of the Summon Bonum. 'Svasmaya' is the sublime
ideal to be aimed at it is the transcendent objective to be achieved.
That self which is absorbed in the mundane modifications referring tot
he four indo of transmigratory existence, and which does not believe
that the substance is established is' Svasamaya' 1 The interminable
stay of the self in Darsana (intuition) Jnana (Knowledge), and Caritra
(Conduct also explains the implication of the term Svasamaya, which may
be discriminated from Para-samaya wherein the self identifies itself
with the body and the foreign psychical states of attachment and
aversion and the like 2 in other words, Sa-samaya is the non-conceptual
state of existence, the state in which all differenctiatons caused by
the infinite characteristics disappear. It is the Advaita state of
existence The Tattvanusamana elucidated Advaita by pointing out
that the recognition of the soul as associated with something other is
duality; while non-duality is relised by those who see their own self
quite unattached to anything whatsoever 3 But this Adaita of Jainism
should be trenchantly distinguished from the Advaita of Vedanta, wherein
everything disappears except the Brahaman. The contention of the Jaina
is that the existence of other substances is incapable of counter acting
the mystic experience of the self; only the self must not experience
conceptual duality or the plurality of finite characteristics inherent
in it. The self submerges in itself after transcending all conceptual
differcnceds of infinite attributes in the domain of spirit it is
experiential, intuit, mystical state; and so escapes and eludes our
conceptual discussions. Thus Joins has arrived at the conception of
Advaita, though to of the Vedantic type, by proceeding from a different
side and ackowledgeigng a different conception of reality.
SUDDHA UPAYOGA AS THE GOAL: Fifthly, the attainment of Suddhopayoga is
the goal of human pursuance. Therein the self synchronically
1 Prava. II
2, 6. 2. Samaya. 2.
omniscience and happiness which are its cognate and adjective potencies
receptively. We have seen that consciousness is the discriminative
characteristic of the soul. It manifests itself in Upayoga, which flows
from consciousness as the conclusion from premises. The Upayoga is of
three kinds, namely Subha () auspicious , Asubha (inauspicious ) and
Suddha ( pure) the self is said to possess auspicious Upayoga when it is
absorbed in the performance of meritorious deeds of moral and spiritual
nature. Hence the self acquires celestial births which it may be noted,
are also a part and parcel of worldly career. Besides, when the self
entangles it self in demertorous actions of violence, sensual pleasure,
and the like, it is said to possess inauspicious Upayoga Ghence the self
is led to the sub-human and hellish births. Both these auspicious and
inauspicious Upaygas will again continue to activate the self in the
never-ending wheel of misery Consequently, the assignment of the two
Upayogas can nerve function as the Summum Bonum of human life. The Jaina,
there fore makes an explicit pronouncement that so long as the self is a
mated with these two types of Upayoga, it will been unfruitful
dissipating its energies in pursuit of an mirages; and so the highest
good will ever remain shrouded in mystery. But as soon as the self
partsa company with these auspicious and inauspicious Upayogas, it joins
hands with suddha upayoga. In other words, the experience of Suddha
Upayoga automatically lobelias the Asuddha Udayoga (Subha ad Asubha ) to
disappear, with the consequence that the transmigratory character of
self evaporated in totality. Spiritually considering, we may say that
both the impure Upayogas in the form of virtue and vice prevet the soul
from attaining the loftiest mystic heights, hence they should be equally
condemned as unwholesome for the healthiest development of the spirit.
But if the empirical self finds that it is difficult to rise to mystical
heights, it should perform auspicious activities so as to achieve at
least heavenly happiness but with the car knowledge that these
performances however intensely and carelessly conducted will in no way
enable it to relish the pure Upayoga. The inauspicious activities should
by al means be disported, inasmuch as they will bring about thousands of
hurt rending miseries. The pure consciousness which relinquishes the
impure Upayogs associated with the empirical consciousness realises
omniscience and such happens as is transcendental born of the self,
supersensuous ,incomparable, infinite and indestructible 1. This
Transcendent self as the transcendental ideal may also be designated as
'Svayambhu' 2 To make it clear, it is a state of self-sufficiency which
requires no other foreign assistance to sustain itself. It is itself the
subject, the object, the means for its achievement, it achieves for
itself, destroys the extraneous elements and is the support of its
infinite potencies. Hence the self manifests it original nature by
transforming itself manifests it original nature by transforming sitself
into six cases; it is at once the ammonite, the accusative, the
instrumental , the dative, the ablative and the locative case
respectively 3 The whole of our discussion may be summarised by saying
that the ideal consists in the full manifestation of cognitive,
affective and contain potencies inherent in the full manifestation of
the cognitive, affective and contain potencies inherent in the soul we
he of soar dwelt upon the former two, and now we shall turn to the last
AGENCY OF PURE BHAVAS AS THE IDEAL: Sixthly, the ideal may be expressed
in terms of activity. Kundakunda, the prominent exponent of Jina
spiritualism has bequeathed to us the philosophy of doer and the deed.
He proclaims that in whatever deeds the self may get itself engaged in
the world, they are not the representatives of the self in its pure,
undefiled and transcendent nature. The self in its real nature is Even
the empirical self is not the doer of material Karams; it is simply the
doer of impure dispositions(Asuddha Bhavas), by which the material
particles transform themselves into various Karmas. No substance is
capable of dog a things foreign to its nature. And since these impure
dispositions do not pertain t the self in its original natural and are
the results of Karmic association, the transcendent sled is denied the
agency even of these empire dispositions. The denial of authorship
material Karma's, nay, eve of asupisious and auspicious psychical states
points to the supermundane, uncontaminated stetted of the self. There is
o denying the fact that the empirical self has been the doer of impure
dispositions since an indeterminable past; so it is the author of these
dispositions. If this is to granted, it will make the position of the
Samkhya which imputes al actions to the material Buddhi, and regards the
principle consciousness as immutable. When the Jaina says that the
empririal self is not the agent of impure dispositions, he simply
1 Prava. I.
19, 13.; Siddha Bhakti. 7. 2. Pragva. I. 16.
3 Prava. Comm.
self to look behind the Karmic veil. Hence here the chief point of
reference is the self I its pure nature. The Jaina reads no
contradiction in affirming that the enlightened self which has become
familiar with its true nature manifests the pure modes and thereby
becomes the substantial agent of those modes, and in affirming that the
ignorant self because of its erroneous indentifiation with the alien
nature develops injure depositions, and there by it allied their agent.
1 Just as from gold obey golden things can be produces pure
modifications and the ignorant self produces impure ones. 2 When the
ignorant self becomes enlightened, it starts generating pure
modifications without any discongruity. Thus the self is simply the doer
of its won states ad to the doer of anything else whatsoever. The
empirical self is the author of impure psychic states on account of its
association with the Karmas. But if we advance a step further and
reflect transcendentally, we arrive at the inevitable conclusion that
the pure self cannot be the author of these impure psychical states
because they are foreign to its association with the Karmas. But if we
advance a steep further and reflect transcendentally, we arrive at the
inevitable conclusion that the pure self cannot be the author of these
impure psychical states because they are foreign to tits nature. Thus
the transcendental self is the doer of transcendental Bhavas. Besides it
is also their enjoyer. Consequently it may be asserted that the
manifestation of cognitive potencies is the manifestation of the genuine
nature of self, which is the same as the realisation of the ideal.
REALISATION OF SVARUPASATTA AS THE TERMINUS OF SELF-DEVELOPMENT:
Seventhly, the ethical ideal may also be expressed in metabphsical
terms. The realisation of the self's Svarupasatta, or the manifestation
of intrinsic characteristics and modification of the self, or the
expression of the self's original origination' destruction and
continuance is the ethical ideal no doubt, the self or the expression of
the self's ogigial origination' destruction and continuance is the
ethical ideal. No doubt, the self is existent, but its existence is
mundane and corrupt from the beginning's past. The self is to acquire
existence, but what is to be acquired is simply the purity of existence.
Drama, Adharma, Akasa and Kala are the pure existents. Pudgala in the au
form is pure and in the Skandha form is impure, but the self exists in
the defiled state of existence. It is, in the empirical state,
cahracterising itself with impure modification and qualities, and
consequently impure, but the self exists in the defiled sate of
existence, it is in the empirical sate, quintile impure origination,
destruction and continuance originate. Bu its won strenuous efforts
transcendental modifications and qualities , and pure origination,
destruction and continuance are to be revealed . In this
128, 129. 2. Ibid. 130, 131
self realises its true substantiality. This again is the same as the
Siddha state, Paramatmanhood, disembodies liberation, Sa Samaya etc;
hence the metaphysical ideal, the ethical ideal and the religious idea
are perfectly identical.
PANDITA-ANDITA MARANA AS THE ETHICAL SUMMUM BONUM: Eighthly, the Jainas
also proclaim the ideal in terms of death in order to reveal the nature
of the ethical Summum Bonum. According to them the goal of the
aspirant's one-pointed endeavor ought to be the attainment of the
Pandita-pandita Marana (sublime death) to the utter exclusion of Pardita
Marana, the Bala-Pandita Marana, the Bala Marana and the Bala-Bala Marna.
These five types of death 1 have been enumerated by keeping in view the
different stages. 2 of spiritual advancement. The lowest and the most
detestable kind of death (Bala-Bala Marana) occurs to that man who leads
the life of utter perversion 3 The highest sort of demise (Pandita-Pandita
Marana) is exemplified in the consummate lives of embodied omniscient
beings when they part with their body 4 Those souls which havecrowned
themselves with spiritual conversion, bt have remained incapable of
observing patria owes in their life-time succumbed to Bala Marana.5
This is to be distinguished from the Bala-Pandita Marana 6 which is the
destiny of those who give themselves to patria vows gate beings
spiritually obverted. The saints observing complete vows enjoy Pandita
Mara.7 All these types of death except the Pandita- Pandita Marana are
pregnant with future possibility of birth; hence they may be designated
as emporia deaths. And these are required to bediatinguishe from the
death of transcendent type or the Pandit-Pandita Marana wherein the
mundane life is cast aside Thus this latter tube departure is a of the
happiest kind, and consequently it requires or paramount devotedness.
This sort of soul's release from bodily confinement appears before us as
an illustration of Chula to death Here the inevitability of death has
been proerlyment with.
AHIMSA AS THE GOA: Ninthly, the ethical highest good also finds its
expression in the realisation of perfect Ahimsa. Ahimsa is so center in
Jaime that it may be incontrovertibly called the beginning
1 Bhaga. Ara.
2. We shall
deal with the stages of spiritual advancement in the sixth chapter.
3 Ibid. 30.
4 Bhaga. Ara. 27.
5. Ibid. 30. 6 Ibid. 2078 7 Ibid. 29.
and end of
Jaina religion. The statement of Samantabhadra that Ahimsa of all living
beings is equivalent to the relisation of Parama Brahama sheds light on
the paramount halter of Ahimsa .1 The whole of the Jana Acara is a
derivation of this principle All is are the illustrations of Himsa. The
Sutrakritanga exhorts us to regard Ahimsa as the quintessence of
wisdom 2 Since Nirvana is not other than Ahimsa, one should cease to
injure all living beigs.3 The Aaranaga produces that one should
neither deprive any liking beings of life, nor rule over him not torment
him bore exit him 4 This is tantamount to saying that Ahimsa is the
pure and eternal Dharama 5 All living beings from the one �sensed to the
five-sensed are basically like our owe self 6 Hence it is not
justifiable to injure them, to rule over them, and to torment them 7
All this is from the Vyabahara point of view. The Niscaya view tells us
that the Atma which is Apramatta is Ahimsa the appearance of any sort of
passion of surface of self is Himsa, and the self in its pure form is
Ahimsa 9 The perfect and the absolute Ahimsa is possible oly in
mystical relisation which is further identified with the terminus of all
KNOWLEDGE-CONSCIOUSNESS AS THE END: Lastly, the attainment of
knowledge-consciousness (Jnaa Cetana) ought to be the end of aspirant's
endeavors in contrast to action-consciousness (Karma Cetana) and result
consciousness (Karamaphala Cetana) 10 The attribution of consciousness
to the auspicious and inauspicious psychical assets occasioned by Karmas
is called action-consciousness; and the confusion of consciousness with
enjoyment of the duality of pleasure and pain is termed result-of the
misunderstanding regarding the inherent nature of things. Hence they
need by abjured in the interest of ascending the supraethica plane of
life. The five type of one sensed souls are the illustrations holding
result-consciousness; the two- sensed to five-sensed souls exemplify
those having predominantly action-consciousness; ans. the sold devoid of
ten Pranas experience
17. 2. Sutra. Kr. 126.96.36.199.; 1.11.10.
3 Sutra. Kr.
1.11.11. 4. Acara. 1.4.1. p. 36. 5. Ibid.
6. Dasavaika. X.
5. 7. Acara. 1.5.5. p. 50.
Astaka. 7 (vide. Muni Nathamal : Ahimsa Tattva Darsana. p. 4. )
44 10. Panca. 38.; Prava. II. 31. 11. Prava.
consciousness. 1 Thus knowledge-consciousness is the full-fledged ad
legitimate manifestation of consciousness. The Arhat or Siddha state is
the state of knowledge-consciousness, the state of omniscience and
PROGRAESSIVE REALISATION OF THE END : We shall end this chapter by
saying that the ideal is realised progressively. The first step consists
in the development of the firm conviction as to the distinctness of the
self and body. In other words, the resolute belief convinces the
aspirant that he is essentially the pure self as absolutely different
from the bodily or sensuous vesture and the dual psychical states. In
the second step, after the emergence of right belief and right
knowledge, he proceeds to wipe out the obstructive elements to the full
which hamper the realisation of the pure self. The third step slows as a
logical consequence of the second; namely the pure self is realised and
not only believed as different from the not- self thus, the achievement
of right, belief, right knowledge and right conduct is same as the
realisation of the Atman, 3 which is regarded summarily as the ethical
Summum Bonum. The next hatter will be devoted tot he exposition of the
nature of the first step. The rest of the steps of experience will be
dealt with in the fourth, fifth and sixth chapters respectively.