Science of Science Communication 2.0, Session 3.1: Science comprehension: who knows what about what—and how?
Okay, this is "session 3" post for virtual "Science of Science Communication 2.0." The real space version got snowed out!
But the discussion I was hoping for (based on these readings) was mainly one on how group affinities contribute to transmission of scientific knowledge.
"Cultural cognition" is normally associated with idea that such affinities distort such transmission.
But my hunch is that cultural cognition is in fact integral to citizens' reliable apprehension of what is known to science; that the sorts of pathologies that we see in which people with different cultural identities use their reason to form and persist in opposing views on risks and related facts is a consequence of a polluted science communication environment that disables the normally reliable reasoning strategies people use (including observation of what others who know what's what about what are doing and saying) to figure out what is known...
But I admit to being uncertain about this! Indeed, I readily admit to being uncertain about everything, including the things I am most confident that I think I understand; certainly I am committed (I hope able) to revise anything I blelieve on the basis of any valid evidence I encounter.
But here I am not even as confident as I'd like to be about the state of the evidence on my conjecture -- that cultural cognition is not a bias, but is integral to the normal process by which diverse people usually converge on the best evidence. And so I was & remain eager for reflections by others!
Below are the questions I posed to motivate student reading & orient discussion for this session. Next session, in which we'll be doing "double time" to make up for lost class, will feature trust in/of science...
- What is the relationship between the sort of critical reasoning proficiency featured by Baron’s “actively open-minded thinking” and Dewey’s understanding of “scientific thinking”?
- Is critical reasoning proficiency essential for science comprehension on the part of a non-scientist, either in her capacity as personal decisionmaker, member of civil society, or democratic citizen?
- Are conflicts over policy-relevant science plausibly attributable to deficits in critical reasoning proficiency?
- Does the effective use of scientific knowledge by non-scientists—in the various capacities in which their decisions should (by their own lights) be informed by it—depend on their being able to comprehend what it is that science knows?
- Is it possible for citizens to reliably recognize who knows what is known by science without being able to comprehend what it is those individuals know? If so, how? Does their ability to do that depend on their possessing the sort of reasoning proficiency emphasized by either Baron or Dewey? If not, what does it depend on?
- How does Popper’s understanding of the transmission of scientific knowledge relate to Miller’s, Dewey’s, and Baron’s?
- Do group affinities—ones founded on common outlooks and values—promote transmission of scientific knowledge or inhibit it? In either case, how?