Journal of Buddhist Ethics
chapter eight on meditation of the equality of oneself and others, andthe exchange of oneself and others, and chapter nine on wisdom.
Many of the other Tibetan lamas now living in exile follow up this lineof interpretation.Recently, however, Paul Williams has published a book entitled
Altruism and Reality: Studies in the Philosophy of the Bodhicary
(4) Surprisingly, he argues that
ntideva attemptedto establish a foundation for the
path on the basis of areductive conception of the person along the lines of the Vaibh
ikaAbhidharma School. This entails a number of absurd consequencesthat have the net effect of undermining the
project.The title of the concluding section of the book is "How
ntidevadestroyed the bodhisattva path." Williams bases his conclusion on asomewhat selective reading of the text. He works mainly on five of
ntideva's 912 verses, without paying much attention to their context.The main arguments for this conclusion are given in chapter five,where he discusses
8: 101-103. Further support is given inchapter two, where he discusses
8: 97-98.Williams's interpretation appears to be oriented toward thefollowing question, which he states on page 30:Put more pointedly, why should we care if other peopleare suffering? What does it matter to us? The point israised by
ntideva's opponent, and it might be thoughtto be the very foundation question for a construction of an ethical system.I agree that this is a good question to have in focus when reading
ntideva's text. It may be, however, that the question should bereformulated in a somewhat more general way: Should we beconcerned about the welfare of others, and if so, why? This can bespecified in two aspects — concern for the suffering of others, andconcern for the happiness of others.