Public choice analysis applies the methodology of economics to issues in political science and the policy process. The readings in this anthology cover topics in both institutional political economy and social choice theory and are comprehensible to nonspecialists and advanced undergraduates with a background in basic economic theory. Readings are taken from academic journals and book chapters and are reproduced in their entirety. They are selected to ensure they contain a minimal amount of notation and are free of advanced econometrics.
The anthology contains two to three readings each to explore the areas of rent seeking, collective action, bureaucracy, elections and the economy, choosing decision rules, majority rule, alternative voting procedures, and the calculus of voting. Each part contains a brief introduction to the general theme, and questions are presented as a guide to each reading. Additional suggested readings are provided to develop these concepts further.
"Twenty-two papers from the field of public choice, including overview readings and theoretical and empirical extensions, compose a core of readings around which public choice instructors could construct a course."
—Journal of Economic Literature