Long-range scenario analysis, like that done by the Global Business Network, is a great way to understand how the interplay of multiple interrelated factors shape the future. Unfortunately, this analysis almost always misses major innovations that change the underlying assumptions by which the world works. Examples of innovations like this in the technology industry: the PC and the Internet. Examples in warfare: nuclear weapons, armored warfare, and soon global guerrilla warfare. These innovations usually invalidate the scenarios developed through this technique. However, within the context of an innovation like the development of global guerrilla warfare, descriptive scenario development is an excellent way to demonstrate how it impacts the future.
Here is a scenario for how early forms of global guerrilla warfare would disrupt Saudi Arabia. It is an inexpensive operation (less than ~$1 million) that would generate well over $1 trillion in economic damage. Specific points of comparision: 9/11 cost ~$250-500,000 and resulted in ~$80 billion in damage (although, in contrast to the operations in this scenario, it was high risk). The recent attack on Iraq's pipeline cost <$10,000 and resulted in ~$500 million in economic damage (it was low risk).
A Change in Leadership
The death of Abdulaziz al-Muqrin and other senior leaders of al Qaeda's Saudi Arabian operation created the opportunity for a change in approach. Due to the vacuum in leadership, former members of al-Zarqawi's operation in Iraq moved into leadership positions within the Saudi network. With them, they brought a deep appreciation for the success achieved through infrastructure disruption in Iraq and the techniques needed to accomplish it.
During the transition period during the summer of 2004, few operations were conducted except for two well planned assassinations of western expatriates. These operations served their purpose. The exodus of western expertise continued as tens of thousands failed to return to the Kingdom after the summer holiday. Most of the guerrilla's effort was spent on collecting intelligence about the Kingdom's infrastructure.
The three main cells were given different areas of coverage: oil, electricity, and water. The cells mapped the infrastructures, established the position and response times of emergency forces, and the viability of entrance/exit routes. The subsequent network analysis done by a central planning group determined the most vulnerable sections of the infrastructures with the greatest potential for cascading system failure. The planning group followed a golden rule of global guerrilla warfare: use the network as your weapon. The final list of potential targets were sent back to the operational cells for final target selection, additional intelligence collection, operational planning, and execution.
The attacks begin
The electricity cell was the first to take action with an attack on one of the two high voltage power lines from the Ghazlan power complex. Since Ghazlan provides over 40% of the power in the eastern province and the electrical network is sparse (and except for a single connection to the central region, isolated), this attack caused over voltages that resulted in a system wide blackout that lasted two days. Oil production from the province was cut in half as systems (refineries, pumping stations, port facilities, etc.) that supported the huge Ghawar oil field were unable to acquire the power necessary for full production. Oil prices shot up to $53 a barrel as a result of the attack. Al Qaeda financing units, with full knowledge that the attack was about to occur, were able to generate $15 m in profits from relatively small but highly leveraged positions taken by confederates with market access.
The Saudi government reacted by increasing security on the electrical grid. However, the scale of the problem -- thousands of miles of high voltage lines -- prevented any measurable increase in the effectiveness of the security effort. Al Qaeda's electricity cell was able to continue with a major attack on the al Fahdli high voltage substation in its second attack. The damage done by this attack took three weeks to repair and caused blackouts and brownouts that rippled through the eastern province for days. The lack of casualties during these attacks led the group to keep up their effort unopposed with a new attack every month.
Just after the second attack, the water group attacked their first target. It was one of the three major seawater pipelines feeding the water injection systems of Ghawar. Since seawater is injected into oil fields to maintain positive pressure, the loss of one of the major sources of water caused engineers to shut down oil production. This was due to the fear that asymmetrical water flows in the field could result in the flow of oil into unrecoverable pockets. At this point oil surged again to $75 a barrel. Al Qaeda financing units were able to generate an additional $30 m in short term positions. Saudi government forces, caught unaware by this new attack, were immediately dispatched to the seawater pipelines. Again the length of the pipelines prevented adequate security.
With a large proportion of its meager security forces allocated to the defense of western workers, electricity infrastructure, and water conduits the defense of oil infrastructure suffered. The attacks on the eastern province also resulted in the full utilization of the east-west oil pipeline called the Petroline. The oil cell took advantage of this by attacking the #5 pumping station on the pipeline. As part of the attack it damaged the adjacent natural gas liquids pipeline. The resulting explosion burned for three days and took two weeks to repair. The long length of the pipeline, at 1,200 km, allowed the oil group to safely make three additional attacks over the next year with the same level of impact.
The combination of these attacks reduced Saudi oil production by 1/3 over the first year of action (a loss of over 3 m barrels a day). In combination with continued losses in production in Iraq, oil was now trading at $90 a barrel. Saudi Arabia was able to generate as much revenue from its limited production as it did before the attack started but the vast majority of the profits from this price increase went to multinational hedge funds. The global economy entered a recession and many developing nations were put onto the ropes. The Chinese economy, in particular, was extremely hard hit and suffered its first quarter of negative growth in this century.
The record of low casualties among attackers, only one team of three people had been killed subsequent to an attack, and the drastically increased funding generated through market-based methods, allowed al Qaeda to hire mercenaries to expand their operations. The operational tempo was up to five organized attacks a month on different portions of the Saudi infrastructure by the fall of 2005. In addition to these larger attacks, al Qaeda's call for the greater participation and the general distribution of plans for how to do this, was able to generate three small attacks on random portions of the infrastructure each month.
The Saudi government was in crisis. Both internal and external pressure to resolve the crisis was intense. It was unable to raise funds for new infrastructure development from international capital markets needed to meet demands from population growth. In a sign of things to come, demonstrations were held in several cities to protest the inability of the government to keep services working. These demonstrations were brutally put down which further increased the tension and improved al Qaeda recruitment. With its hands full in Iraq, which had not calmed down despite great efforts during 2005, the US was unable to provide support to the Kingdom in any meaningful way even if they had asked for it.
The realization had finally arrived. The epochal war of the 21st century had arrived.