Prices, Quantities, and Correlated Externalities
This paper provides an answer to the question, are emission taxes an efficient and self-enforcing mechanism to control correlated externality problems? By “correlated externality” we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but which cause differentiated regional and global externalities. By “self-enforcing” we mean mechanisms that account for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions. We find that, unlike joint domestic and international tradable permit markets, joint emissions taxes are neither efficient nor self-enforcing.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://apec.usu.edu/Email: |
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:usu:wpaper:2003-08. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John Gilbert)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.