A norm is a group-held belief about how members should behave in a given context. Sociologists describe norms as informal understandings that govern individuals' behavior in society, while psychologists have adopted a more general definition, recognizing smaller group units, like a team or an office, may also endorse norms separate or in addition to cultural or societal expectations. The psychological definition emphasizes social norms' behavioral component, stating norms have two dimensions: how much behavior is exhibited and how much the group approves of that behavior.
Norms running counter to the behaviors of the overarching society or culture may be transmitted and maintained within small subgroups of society. For example, Crandall (1988) noted that certain groups (e.g., cheerleading squads, dance troupes, sports teams, sororities) have a rate of bulimia, a publicly recognized life-threatening disease, that is much higher than society as a whole. Social norms have a way of maintaining order and organizing groups.
- 1 Social control
- 2 Sociology
- 3 Emergence
- 4 Transmission
- 5 Deviance from social norms
- 6 Focus Theory of Normative Conduct
- 7 Other types
- 8 Mathematical representations of norms
- 9 See also
- 10 References
- 11 Further reading
- 12 External links
Although not considered to be formal laws within society, norms still work to promote a great deal of social control. Social norms can be enforced formally (e.g., through sanctions) or informally (e.g., through body language and non-verbal communication cues.) Because individuals often derive physical or psychological resources from group membership, groups are said to control discretionary stimuli; groups can withhold or give out more resources in response to members' adherence to group norms, effectively controlling member behavior through rewards and operant conditioning. Social psychology research has found the more an individual values group-controlled resources or the more an individual sees group membership as central to his definition of self, the more likely he is to conform. Social norms also allow you to assess what behaviors the group deems important to its existence or survival, since they represent a codification of belief; groups generally do not punish members or create norms over actions which they care little about. Norms in every culture create conformity that allows for people to become socialized to the culture in which they live.
As social beings, individuals learn when and where it is appropriate to say certain things, to use certain words, to discuss certain topics or wear certain clothes, and when it is not. Thus, knowledge about cultural norms is important for impressions, which is an individual's regulation of their nonverbal behavior. One also comes to know through experience what types of people he/she can and cannot discuss certain topics with or wear certain types of dress around. Typically, this knowledge is derived through experience (i.e. social norms are learned through social interaction). Wearing a suit to a job interview in order to give a great first impression represents a common example of a social norm in the white collar work force.
For Talcott Parsons of the functionalist school, norms dictate the interactions of people in all social encounters. On the other hand, Karl Marx believed that norms are used to promote the creation of roles in society which allows for people of different levels of social class structure to be able to function properly. Marx claims that this power dynamic creates social order.
Groups may adopt norms through a variety of ways. Norms can arise formally, where groups explicitly outline and implement behavioral expectations. Laws or club rules serve as an example of this. A large number of these norms we follow 'naturally' such as driving on the right side of the road in the US and on the left side in the UK, or not speeding in order to avoid a ticket. Many formal norms serve to provide safety to the general public.
However, social norms are much more likely to develop informally, emerging gradually as a result of repeated use of discretionary stimuli to control behavior. Not necessarily laws set in writing, informal norms represent generally accepted and widely sanctioned routines that people follow in everyday life. These informal norms, if broken, may not invite formal legal punishments or sanctions, but instead encourage reprimands, warnings, or othering; incest, for example, is generally thought of as wrong in society, but many jurisdictions do not legally prohibit it.
Finally, individuals may also import norms from a previous organization to their new group, which can get adopted over time. Without a clear indication of how to act, people typically rely on their past history to determine the best course forward; what was successful before may serve them well again. In a group, individuals may all import different histories or scripts about appropriate behaviors; common experience over time will lead the group to define as a whole its take on the right action, usually with the integration of several members' schemas. Under the importation paradigm, norm formation occurs subtly and swiftly whereas with formal or informal development of norms may take longer.
Groups internalize norms by accepting them as reasonable and proper standards for behaviour within the group. Once firmly established, a norm becomes a part of the group's operational structure and hence more difficult to change. While possible for newcomers to a group to change its norms, it is much more likely that the new individual will adopt the group's norms, values, and perspectives, rather than the other way around.
Deviance is defined as "nonconformity to a set of norms that are accepted by a significant number of people in a community or society." More simply put, if group members do not follow a norm, they become labeled as a deviant. In the sociological literature, this can often lead to them being considered outcasts of society. What is considered “normal” is relative to the location of the culture in which the social interaction is taking place. In psychology, an individual who routinely disobeys group norms runs the risk of turning into the "institutionalized deviant." Similar to the sociological definition, institutionalized deviants may be judged by other group members for their failure to adhere to norms. At first, group members may increase pressure on a non-conformist, attempting to engage the individual in conversation or explicate why she should follow their behavioral expectations. Especially with new members who perhaps do not know any better, groups may use discretionary stimuli to bring an individual's behavior back into line. Over time, however, if a member continues to disobey, the group will give up on him as a lost cause; while the group may not necessarily revoke his membership, they may give him only superficial consideration. If a worker is late to a meeting, for example, violating the office norm of punctuality, a boss or other co-worker may wait for the individual to arrive and pull him aside later to ask what happened. If the behavior continues, eventually the group may begin meetings without him since the individual "is always late." The group generalizes the individual's disobedience and promptly dismisses it, thereby reducing the member's influence and footing in future group disagreements.
Group tolerance for deviation varies across membership; not all group members receive the same treatment for norm violations. Individuals may build up a "reserve" of good behavior through conformity, which they can borrow against later. These idiosyncrasy credits provide a theoretical currency for understanding variations in group behavioral expectations. A teacher, for example, may more easily forgive a straight-A student for misbehaving—who has past "good credit" saved up—than a repeatedly disruptive student. While past performance can help build idiosyncrasy credits, some group members have a higher balance to start with. Individuals can import idiosyncrasy credits from another group; childhood movie stars, for example, who enroll in college, may experience more leeway in adopting school norms than other incoming freshmen. Finally, leaders or individuals in other high-status positions may begin with more credits and be appear to be "above the rules" at times. Even their idiosyncrasy credits are not bottomless, however; while held to a more lenient standard than the average member, leaders may still face group rejection if their disobedience becomes too extreme.
Focus Theory of Normative Conduct
Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren developed the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct to describe how individuals implicitly juggle multiple behavioral expectations at once; expanding on conflicting prior beliefs about whether cultural, situational or personal norms motivate action, the researchers suggested the focus of an individual’s attention will dictate what behavioral expectation they follow. They define a 'Descriptive Norm' as people's perceptions of what is commonly done in specific situations; it signifies what most people do, without assigning judgment. The absence of trash on the ground in a parking lot, for example, transmits the descriptive norm that most people there do not litter. An Injunctive norm, on the other hand, transmits group approval about a particular behavior; it dictates how an individual should behave. Watching another person pick up trash off the ground and throw it out, a group member may pick up on the injunctive norm that he ought to not litter. Descriptive norms depict what happens while injunctive norms describe what should happen.
Prescriptive and proscriptive
Unwritten rules that are understood and followed by society, prescriptive norms indicate what we should do. Expressing gratitude or writing a Thank You card when someone gives you a gift represents a prescriptive norm in American culture. Proscriptive norms, in contrast, comprise the other end of the same spectrum; they are similarly society's unwritten rules about what one should not do. These norms can vary between cultures; while an acceptable greeting in some European countries, kissing a stranger on the cheek constitutes a proscriptive norm in the United States.
Subjective norm is determined by beliefs about the extent to which important others want them to perform a behavior. Social influences are conceptualized in terms of the pressure that people perceive from important others to perform, or not to perform, a behavior.
Mathematical representations of norms
Over the last few decades, several theorists have attempted to explain social norms from a more theoretical point of view. By quantifying behavioral expectations graphically or attempting to plot the logic behind adherence, theorists hoped to be able to predict whether or not individuals would conform. The Return Potential Model and Game Theory provide a slightly more economic conceptualization of norms, suggesting individuals can calculate the cost or benefit behind possible behavioral outcomes. Under these theoretical frameworks, choosing to obey or violate norms becomes a more deliberate, quantifiable decision.
Return Potential Model
Developed in the 1960s, the Return Potential Model provides a method for plotting and visualizing group norms. In the regular coordinate plane, the amount of behavior exhibited is plotted on the X-axis (label a in Figure 1) while the amount of group acceptance or approval gets plotted on the Y-axis (b in Figure 1). The graph represents the potential return or positive outcome to an individual for a given behavioral norm. Theoretically, one could plot a point for each increment of behavior how much the group likes or dislikes that action. For example, it may be the case that among first-year graduate students, strong social norms around how many daily cups of coffee you drink exist. If the return curve in Figure 1 correctly displays the example social norm, we can see that if someone drinks 0 cups of coffee a day, the group strongly disapproves. The group does not approve of member behavior until someone hits four cups of coffee a day; the graduate students (as represented by the return curve) find it excessive to drink more than seven cups, however, as the approval again dips below zero. As exhibited by the coffee example, the return potential model displays for each increment of behavior how much group approval one can anticipate.
- Point of Maximum Return. The point with the greatest y-coordinate is called the point of maximum return, as it represents the amount of behavior the group likes the best. While c in Figure 1 is labeling the return curve in general, the highlighted point just above it at X=6, represents the point of maximum return. Extending our above example, the point of maximum return for first-year graduate students would be 6 cups of coffee; they receive the most social approval for drinking exactly that many cups. Any more or any fewer cups would decrease the approval.
- Range of Tolerable Behavior. Label d represents the range of tolerable behavior, or the amount of action the group finds acceptable. It encompasses all the positive area under the curve. In Figure 1, the range of tolerable behavior extends is 3, as the group approves of all behavior from 4 to 7 and 7-4=3. Carrying over our coffee example again, we can see that first-years only approve of having a limited number of cups of coffee (between 4 and 7); more than 7 cups or fewer than 4 would fall outside the range of tolerable behavior. Norms can have a narrower or wider range of tolerable behavior. Typically, a narrower range of behavior indicates a behavior with greater consequences to the group.
- Intensity. The intensity of the norm tells how much the group cares about the norm, or how much group affect is at stake to be won or lost. It is represented in the Return Potential Model by the total amount of area subsumed by the curve, regardless of whether the area is positive or negative. A norm with low intensity would not vary far from the x-axis; the amount of approval or disapproval for given behaviors would be closer to zero. A high-intensity norm, however, would have more extreme approval ratings. In Figure 1, the intensity of the norm appears high, as few behaviors invoke a rating of indifference.
- Crystallization. Finally, norm crystallization refers to how much variance exists within the curve; translated from the theoretical back to the actual norm, it shows how much agreement exists between group members about the approval for a given amount of behavior. It may be that some members believe the norm more central to group functioning than others. A group norm like how many cups of coffee first years should drink would probably have low crystallization, since a lot of individuals have varying beliefs about the appropriate amount of caffeine to imbibe; in contrast, the norm of not plagiarizing another student's work would likely have high crystallization, as people uniformly agree on the behavior's unacceptability. Showing the overall group norm, the Return Potential Model in Figure 1 does not indicate the crystallization. Another Return Potential Model, however, that plotted individual data points alongside the cumulative norm, could demonstrate the variance and allow us to deduce crystallization.
A norm gives a person a rule of thumb for how they should behave. However, a rational person only acts according to the rule if it is optimal for them. The situation can be described as follows. A norm gives an expectation of how other people act in a given situation (macro). A person acts optimally given the expectation (micro). For a norm to be stable, people's actions must reconstitute the expectation without change (micro-macro feedback loop). A set of such correct stable expectations is known as a Nash equilibrium. Thus, a stable norm must constitute a Nash equilibrium.
From a game-theoretical point of view, there are two explanations for the vast variety of norms that exist throughout the world. One is the difference in games. Different parts of the world may give different environmental contexts and different people may have different values, which may result in a difference in games. The other is equilibrium selection not explicable by the game itself. Equilibrium selection is closely related to coordination. For a simple example, driving is common throughout the world, but in some countries people drive on the right and in other countries people drive on the left (see coordination game). A framework called comparative institutional analysis is proposed to deal with the game theoretical structural understanding of the variety of social norms.
||This "see also" section may contain an excessive number of suggestions. Please ensure that only the most relevant suggestions are given and that they are not red links, and consider integrating suggestions into the article itself. (July 2013)|
- Breaching experiment
- Convention (norm)
- Cool (aesthetic)
- Intercultural competence
- Norm (philosophy)
- Norm of reciprocity
- Normality (behavior)
- Peer pressure
- Personality psychology
- Rule complex
- Social norms marketing
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