Size of British force in Afghanistan is limiting what it can do
While Gordon Brown was off doing exciting things on the frontline of the war with the Taliban, the travelling press following him were left largely to our own devices at Camp Bastion, the weird, desolate moon-base-with-a-Pizza-Hut centre of UK operations in Helmand.
After passing the morning with a few of the people leading Task Force Helmand and implementing its will on the ground, I'm left with several thoughts and impressions.
The first is how positive the officer class is about the largely under-reported aspects of their mission, the non-kinetic work, if you adopt the jargon.
The biggest single thing the international mission has to do in Afghanistan is construct a viable Afghan state, starting from the local level. That means local governors who are popular, legitimate and effective, backed by both security forces and public opinion. It's almost an alien concept in Afghanistan, but the Brits insist it's getting better. They have genuinely high hopes for some of their local allies, including some former Taliban members.
They talk positively too of attempts to establish alternatives to the drug trade. High global wheat prices are helping, though who knows what would happen when and if they fall again?
There are some good stories of local populations actively helping the Nato forces: the tip-off that led British troops to $1.5 billion (yes, billion) worth of opium. Or the assassination attempt on a local governor that was foiled because locals told him and the British about the Taliban's intent.
And there is satisfaction about that with greater numbers and resources, and greater capacity among the Afghan army and police, the British can not only drive the Taliban from a given area, but hold that area afterwards. Soldiers are unabashed about admitting that in earlier years, UK troops were simply cleansing an area of Taliban then moving on, letting the Taliban return.
And yet, and yet. Of course, there's a "but" here, and it's a big one. Notwithstanding the extra 300 troops quietly sent to Afghanistan in recent weeks, the British force there is reaching the limits of what is possible for a force of this size. Although we always quote the headline figure of 8,000-odd UK troops in Afghanistan, only 5,500 or so are actually working the Helmand; the rest are at Kandahar air station.
And with 5,500 or so troops, there are limits to what you can do. You pick your spots and you focus your efforts on them, which by necessity means neglecting others. Yes, a town-by-town, region-by-region approach could push the enemy out, but it will take time (two years at least just in upper Helmand). And it runs the risk of local reverses that threaten the entire step-by-step strategy.
So over the horizon comes Uncle Sam. The US is going to send many more troops to Helmand, maybe 10,000. They will allow a different, wider approach, and is likely to mean greater, quicker victories. But unless the UK makes a substantive increase in its troop numbers in Afghanistan, they will be American victories.
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