Karl Jaspers has said that "the essence of philosophy is not the possession of truth but the search for truth . . . ."1 Admittedly the pursuit of truth must go on, but how can we know when to stop and take possession of truth that we think we have cornered. What is truth? We have already accepted a tentative definition of knowledge as the acceptance of a proposition or statement as correct for the best of reasons. Knowledge, or knowing implies the truth of what is known. But defining truth is not only difficult, but the feeling of our age is contrary to a sharp definition of truth. The virus of relativism has infected many disciplines and philosophy is not immune to this disease. Nevertheless, if a definition of truth is to mean anything it will have to go in the direction of an unchanging absolute. "Truth is never created; it is found, partly by the senses, partly by the intellect. A proposition that was not true before it was discovered could never become true by being discovered."2 Hence truth is an ideal at the base of all search and research. One may freely admit that many beliefs in science have changed in the last fifty years, but in the admission there is the tacit assumption that the beliefs of the present are "better" truths than those of the past. Admittedly, some of the "better" truths of the present may need revision in the future, but the revision will be on the basis of a closer approximation to the "truth." We are saying then that our beliefs--however justified in them we feel--do vary from time to time, but "the truth does not vary in this way."3
Setting forth an ideal in truth must not imply that we know that ideal. Truth can exist without its being known. Truth will not change--if it is truth--with the passing of time. Unchangability is one of the necessary characteristics of truth without which it would not be what it is. In this context, truth is opposed to changing opinion.
As an example, one may look at the death of Hitler. Hitler presumably died near the Brandenburg Gate in a bunker in l945. There was a series of events involved in his death. The actual series of events will be unchanging regardless of how reconstructions take place by historians as time goes by. We will have changing theories about his death, but this simply means we do not know the
Rene Descartes, 1596-1650. Born in La Haye, a small town in Touraine, France, Descartes is one of the founders of modern philosophical thought. Descartes' Meditations are among his most famous works. The phrase, "I think, therefore, I am" is probably the most often quoted phrase of Descartes.
actual truth of the series. We may never be able to corroborate our theories, but the actual events will not change. If we could know the actual series of events, we would call that "the truth about Hitler."
If the reader is offended at the notion of an absolute truth toward which men work, the term of an "objective truth" may pacify. But in either case, the aim is the same. The historian searches for an account of the past that will stand any future investigation. The scientists hope for a discovery that will stand against any future challenge, and unless both of these disciplines have this as their goal, there is little use in pursuing research of any kind. Truth is not invented, but discovered. It is in contrast to what is fictitious, imaginary, counterfeit, simulated, or pretended. Even these terms imply the status of truth in that we know these things to be less than truth.
Truth must be distinguished in its nature from the means of finding it out. It may be said that truth is a relationship between what is,4 or is intended, and what I know about it, or a correct understanding of what is. There may be many ways of testing my understanding, but there is only one truth. It is to these ways of testing truth that we now turn.
A. The Test of Correspondence
The test of correspondence has been most succinctly stated by Aristotle. He wrote: "To say what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true."5 A contemporary writer has expounded the correspondence theory in the following way:
A belief or assertion is true provided, first, that it is a belief of assertion with response to a certain state of affairs that that state of affairs exists, and provided, secondly that that state of affairs does exist; and a belief or assertion is false provided, first, that it is a belief or assertion with respect to a certain state of affairs that that state of affairs does not exist. It is true that a given state of affairs exists provided that that state of affairs exists; and it is false that a given state of affairs exists provided that that state of affairs does not exist. And a truth, finally, is a state of affairs that exists.6
Very simply put, this theory is a test between what I believe about certain facts and the facts themselves. Do they correspond? Is my belief a correct summary of the fact, event, or idea? If I say "I believe it is raining" outside my window, and it is raining, then I have adequately described the events--as far as the water falling--and hence I described it truthfully.
One may see that the correspondence theory follows an empirical emphasis of comparing what is said with what is seen, or experienced sensually.
The theory of correspondence is disarmingly simple and appealing, but critics have raised a variety of objections against it. First, how can one test a correspondence in a sentence like "all centaurs have human-like heads." Since centaurs exist only in fiction, how can it be judged whether they have human-like heads or not? The problem of the nonexistent poses serious questions for the correspondence theory. Second, everyone agrees that 2 plus 2 equals 4, but how can this idea be tested by comparing it to reality? There are other concepts of the mind that have no corresponding reality. Hence, it seems that the theory is inadequate as a test for all kinds of truth. Third, how can one test the theory itself as a test of truth? An assumption must be made that correspondence is a true test of truth. Fourth, it has been objected concerning correspondence that an individual cannot compare his idea with reality.7 This anticipates a problem concerning the status of knowledge, but it means that one knows only his own ideas and experience of the world "out there" and thus cannot "step aside" to compare the idea in one's mind with the world "out there."
Correspondence has been attacked additionally for its implying that there is a fact for every statement about a fact. This means that every statement must have a correspondence attached to it. This is not so. Statements of fact about mathematics, ethics, religion, and many other ideas do not have visible corresponding things. Correspondence appears to be limited to the sense experience elements of truth.
Modern defenders of the correspondence theory enlarge the scope of the position. "To say that a statement corresponds to the facts is to say that the statement conforms to whatever standard of objective truth is applicable."8 Chisholm doesn't talk merely about facts, but "states of affairs that exist" and "states of affairs that do not exist."9
Correspondence does get at a test that cannot be overlooked although its past defenders may have been too narrow in their application. Correspondence may still be too narrowly defined to omit application to a variety of truths. If truth can be defined as a correct understanding of what is, then a statement should seek to correspond to reality as nearly as it can be understood.
The criticisms are not destructive to the theory and the possibility of using it. Some of the criticisms assume too much. Obviously, the objection centering on the illustration "all centaurs have human-like heads" seems to be difficult, but there is a question before this: "are there centaurs?" Since nothing corresponds in space or reality to that prior sentence then the second sentence makes no sense. If intention rather than fact is used concerning some statements, then we would understand that centaurs with human-like heads have real meaning in fiction but not in fact.
The objection that we can't get beyond the concepts of our mind is no serious objection if we recognize that advocates of other theories cannot get beyond their concepts either. But since it is possible to compare my thinking and ideas with other minds as they reflect experienced reality, then we can take courage in the mutual problem that any test of truth would have.
A problem of many theories is that the advocates tend to be reductionistic: this theory is the only way. Correspondence seems to have a field day in certain types of issues and questions, but weaknesses in others. Must there be only one test of whether something is truth? Cannot there be complementary tests? Experience would led us to believe it to be true.
B. The Test of Coherence
Coherence has been advocated in modern philosophy by Hegel and the idealist tradition. A number of idealists have defended the view in recent times.10 Coherence as a theory "looks beyond the mere self-consistence of propositions to a comprehensive, synoptic view of all experience . . . Any proposition is true, if it is both self-consistent
and coherently connected with our system of propositions as a whole."11
It is admitted by coherence advocates that one cannot attain absolute coherence, but as one presses on toward that ideal the presumption is that better truth will be had.
There was a key word in Brightman's definition above that needs further amplification: "comprehensive." This word has two references. First, it has important reference to experience. Coherence applies in a comprehensive way both internally (in a mental way) and externally. If I omit the empirical from a proper understanding of the comprehensive, I am not comprehensive.12
The second reference of comprehensive is that of the "whole." Coherence has been regarded as a way of understanding all of existence, not only as a criterion of truth, but an important ingredient of nature. Coherence need not refer to a "transcendent metaphysical entity" as it frequently is, but "the 'whole' as a criterion is only the whole of our previous experience, knowledge, and belief."13 Coherence advocates maintain that coherence cannot be rejected without its being affirmed. This is not a mere formal, barren way of getting agreement to a criterion; it is fundamental to a way of human thinking and living. One is not happy with a new bit of information until it is "married" to other information.
The arguments raised against coherence as a test of truth border on misinterpretation and outright defamation. It is true that some coherence advocates are more radical and extreme than others in their use of the theory, but one must not take the bad examples only for refutation. The arguments used against coherence are as follows: (l) Coherence is regarded as unintelligible since it is a "system of interdependent judgements without a beginning or end."14 If coherence were this, the objection could stand, but experience built upon empirical learning and reason has a beginning. As a child one learns that matches can be dangerous. This knowledge may then be the basis of directing new experiences in the future. A child who knows that fire burns will not accept without great questioning the proposition that fire does not burn. As for having no end, coherence doesn't, but this is only to say that neither coherence, correspondence, nor any other theory has an absolute grasp on all truth.
(2) Objection is raised by declaring that sometimes two or more coherence systems vie for acceptance as truth. What do you do then? This objection is not insurmountable. One may have to wait until the more coherent emerges. This is not less than the problem in correspondence of waiting until the best theory comes along to fit the facts, or of waiting to know what the facts really are, as in the death of Hitler. How do we know which is the more coherent? By comparing the new system with the old.
(3) The so-called "degrees" of truth involved in coherence is regarded as the main problem of coherence by some philosophers.15 It is charged that one is always dismantling the knowledge structure that has been erected to make room for new "truths" that are now more "coherent" than the old ones. Moreover, this process will go on and not only is relativism a result, but no truth appears to be settled or final.
But in rebuttal, the re-ordering of our thinking, or accepting the "degrees" of truth does not mean that the entire superstructure is torn down to the bare foundations. Many things are certain such as 2 plus 2 equals 4. Many "truths" have stood the test of time and will not be changed but there are other "truths" that show up to be no truths at all. Correspondence is in no better position at this point. The view that the sun revolves around the earth corresponds to our visual experience. This was believed for a period of time and it still fits our visual experience. It was rejected for a better theory--that of Copernicus--not because our sense perception changed, but because a better theory was, pardon the phrase, more coherent with everything else we know about the cosmos. Theories involving correspondence must be updated sometimes as well as the coherent theory.
(4) Perhaps one of the more interesting objections is that coherence involves correspondence.16 As long as correspondence means having a relationship to perception and experience, this is true. Coherence as it has been defined here cannot be isolated from experience. Hence the real question is whether it improves on correspondence or not. It may also be asked: are they really two different theories at all? Has there not been a misunderstanding of what is involved in the two different emphases? Correspondence really acquires and presupposes some measure of coherence: coherences requires and presupposes some measure of correspondence. As long as coherence is defined in a way to include correspondence--the empirical data--then it improves on correspondence by incorporating the area of experience, or the totality of one's experience.
C. The Pragmatic Test
Pragmatism, according to William James, is derived from the Greek word pragma, which means action and serves as the basis of our English words practical and practice. James credits Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) with originating the movement by means of an article "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" published in the Popular Science Monthly for January of 1878. Peirce's ideas about pragmatism are sufficiently different in emphasis from the later popularizations of James. Because of this difference Peirce rejected the term pragmatism for "pragmaticism."17
Peirce used pragmatism first as a theory of meaning. The theory may be pointed up by asking: how can you make an idea clear in its meaning? He summed up a principle for clarifying the meaning of ideas: "Consider what effects which might conceivably have practical bearings we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."18 He illustrated this by the idea of hardness. A thing is hard if it is not scratched or mutilated by other substances. One could hardly call a diamond hard if at a slight tap it would be shattered to bits when it was dropped to the floor.
Truth for Peirce is not the popular ideas associated with later pragmatism, i.e., truth is that which leads to action or works. Carefully, Peirce asserts, "the pragmatist does not make the summum bonum to consist in action . . . ." Truth is not made as James asserts. Peirce said, "The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is real."19
As we turn to consider the better known pragmatist of the early movement, William James (1842-1910), we can see how the movement drew from Peirce, but turned in a different direction. William James popularized the idea of Pragmatism along with F.C.C. Shiller of England, and John Dewey of America.
What is the truth for James? "The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons."20 James develops this to include that promoting life, health, happiness, unless it conflicts with "other vital benefits."21 In an essay on the conception of truth, James declares that "true ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot."22 Intending to reject the idea that truth is static, James asserts that "truth happens to an idea. It becomestrue, is made true by events."23 He illustrates this by a man who is lost in the woods and is starving. He sees a cow path and reasons that it should lead to a farmer's house. If it does, he saves himself. For James the idea has practical results. (One may question whether this is not a better illustration for coherence since a conclusion is drawn about the cow path that is based upon previous experience and when the man follows the path his action is consistent with past experience and the reasoning based upon it.)
The fluidity of truth's nature is expressed further in James words: "Truth for us is simply a collective name for verification processes, just as health, wealth, strength, etc. are names for other processes connected with life, and also pursued because it pays to pursue them. Truth is made, just as health, wealth, and strength are made, in the course of experience."24
Perhaps one of the most controversial statements of James is that "we have to live today by what truth we can get today, and be ready tomorrow to call it falsehood."25 This sounds like sheer relativity, but in its most acceptable sense James means no more than what is implied in coherence or correspondence. We have progressed beyond Babylonian astrology, Ptolemaic astronomy, Newtonian physics, and we have come now to Einstein's theory of relativity. It may be that this will have to be discarded--in the future--for a better truth, or a better description of the facts. However, a more critical interpretation, of the Jamesian sentence above regarding pragmatism, brings the conclusion that pragmatism supports a relativity of truth position.
Looking at the opposite of truth, falsehood, James declares that "untrue beliefs work as perniciously in the long run as true beliefs work beneficially."26
The stress that James placed on verification must not go unnoticed although one must not conclude that pragmatism has a monopoly on verification. Verification was important for James' theory of truth. In contrast to the traditional theories of truth involving knowing, reality, and truth, the pragmatic approach reduces this to two: reality and verification. When something is verified, it is known and it is truth.27
Before assessing pragmatism, a brief look must be taken at John Dewey who preferred to call his version instrumentalism. John Dewey (l859-l952) did not like the term truth and used the term "warranted assertability." This means that any statement or judgement made now will stand the test of either past, present, or future inquiry. Thus an idea "is true which works in leading us to what it purports."28
Dewey follows James in saying that truths must be made. This does not mean that I can declare truth to be what I want it to be, but it is more like an investigation that works to solve some great problem or need. Truth for Dewey is also that which works. But not just any working truth is involved in the idea. Truth is that which satisfies the condition of inquiry.
The final basis of warranted assertability for Dewey is verifiability. This corresponds to the sense that "a key answers the conditions imposed by a lock . . . or a solution answers the requirements of a problem."29 Dewey accepted Peirce's idea that truth is the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate . . . ."30
What may be said about pragmatism's view of truth? A number of objections have been raised but not all of them have the same validity. For instance, relativism is a great charge against James' comment that we have to live by today's truths and call them falsehoods tomorrow. A literal interpretation of this sentence does an injustice to the reality of the statement that many changes have come in what we regard as truth, but this change has not invalidated everything we have regarded as true. The same charge of relativism can be made against the other standards of truth. Yet if we must discard the truths of yesterday, why do we do it? Several answers come. First, what we thought was truth wasn't. They were beliefs that had some truth in them, but we misnamed them truth instead of beliefs. Second, if we discard the old "truths" or beliefs, it is because we claim a more cogent explanation than the previous ones. These explanations are closer to what we know as facts, or they are more coherent with everything else we now know. So underlying James' claim to discard "truths" of yesterday is the standard of truth which seeks to escape relativism.
More serious is the question of usefulness. A truth can be useful, and workable, but not necessarily verified. Some so-called "truths" have worked for a long time and eventually were declared false. How long does a theory have to work to be true? By all reasonable standards it should always work. It is argued that Hitler used the Nordic myth for mobilizing a country and this had a workable useful place in his scheme. It worked in varying degrees from the l920s to l945. Was it true before l945 and false afterwards? Its workability and usefulness are not related to verification.
Verification was indeed defined by James in these terms: if it works, it is true. However, verification generally means the workability of something without regard to time or persons involved. James' particular expression has serious problems. First, there is the problem expressed in the previous criticism that some things work for a while, but this would not pass muster as verification. A second problem is in whose eyes something is verified.31 For example, my wife "tries" to start the flooded car and fails. I "try" to start the same flooded car and succeed. Why could she not have done it? Two things are pointed up: "trying" something means different things to different people and may involve unobserved and unknown ways of doing it. The other thing relates to the length of trying. One may try to break a small cable by rapidly bending it back and forth and fail, while another man may try it longer and succeed. How long does one have to try an idea or project before truth or falsity can be pronounced on it? It is said that Mussolini believed that democracy was a failure in Italy before he came to power. Had democracy been tried long enough and intently enough?
Another question relates to the statement: "true ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify." This seems to draw on coherence for the matter of assimilating and corroborating, and on correspondence for verifying and validating. Is pragmatism just a sophisticated form of correspondence and coherence?
Although pragmatism and instrumentalism protest against truth as being static, some norm must always creep back into the issue, even though it may be called by some other name. Obviously, there are more warrantable assertions than others, and the reason being that some statements are more true than others. Why is this? What is the nature of the truth that is being approached? Instrumentalism seems to evade this in opting for warranted assertability. This question helps to point out a distinction that pragmatism seems to ignore--the nature of truthversus how we find it out. Pragmatism is more efficient in discerning what a specific truth is as opposed to giving an answer to the nature of truth. Another way of looking at it is that the pragmatist re-defines truth in a way different from coherence or correspondence.
Although we have tried to interpret James' remarks about changing truth in the best context, there is yet a real question about the firmness of truth. The lack of firmness has led to the question of whether one can rightfully speak of a theory of truth at all in James.32 Even its emphasis on experimentalism requires that certain things be permanent and stable. An experiment without certain elements as unchanging would be incapable of producing anything. So in the growth of knowledge there must be some things that are established upon which one can build. If there is not some permanence in the learning system one would be driven both psychologically and intellectually into skepticism.
D. The Test of Verification
A related but justifiably different approach to the issue of truth comes from the logical empirical movement which has focused upon the idea of verification. We will see something of the approach of this movement later but for our purposes here we are looking at its approach to truth.
For sake of brevity of expression we will use the term "positivist" to speak of this position. Positivists have attempted to analyze the use of language and concluded that there are two kinds of propositions: analytic and synthetic. The analytic can be tested in terms of logic. The familiar 2 plus 2 equals 4, or "all bachelors are unmarried" kind of things make it obvious they are seen to be true on the basis of logic. The synthetic is more difficult to deal with. The synthetic refers to the sense experience world. For example, "I see a pin oak tree" is a sense experience. I am saying that if you look out that direction from my house you will see a pin oak. You can reproduce the same experience. Speaking of a pin oak tree is easy, but what about a statement like: "the world is mental." This is certainly not an analytic statement. Since I am not able to see with my eyes the mentalness of the world, what can I say about this statement? If there is anything that corresponds to "mental reality?"
The positivist have their answer for this. But before we look at it, it should be noted that the traditional test of "what is truth?" is rejected by some positivists. We have been pointing up the distinction between the nature of truth and how one finds it out. For positivists, there is no "nature of truth" where one attempts to understand the statement about something and the agreement or coherence. Something called the "nature of truth" is never seen anymore than "mental-reality" is seen by the eyes. The nature-of-truth question, therefore, is regarded by positivists as an ill-conceived and meaningless question. What philosophers have really been trying to learn, says the positivists, is the answer to the question: "what makes a proposition true or false?"33 Or, "in other words, it is a way of asking how propositions are validated."34
How is this done? Ayer answers:
The answer is that we test the validity of an empirical hypothesis by seeing whether it actually fulfills the function which it is designed to fulfill. And we have seen that the function of an empirical hypothesis is to enable us to anticipate experience. Accordingly, if an observation to which a given proposition is relevant conforms to our expectations, the truth of that proposition is confirmed.35
Ayer admits that there is no certainty in this operation. If the experiment comes off according to expectations then creditability has been enhanced. There is no question that it will be repeated. If it does not, then questions about the experiment may be raised; if it is successful again, greater probability of being true is attached to the statement.
Ayer holds out the possibility of a new test of rationality in the future, but since science has been so successful with verification, it appears to be the best way for now.36
Since there is much in common with pragmatism and its view of verification and positivism we will not rehash the problems and difficulties of verification as a single criterion of truth. Moreover, more will be said about it in the chapter on Science, Philosophy and Religion.
E. The Performative Theory of Truth
The performative theory refers to the experience of agreeing with someone who has made a statement. It is not a statement about a statement as in "It is true . . ." "that the car is green." When I say that "it is true" I may be agreeing, accepting, endorsing, granting, admitting that someone has said, encouraging, answering, reminding someone, warning or reproving someone. Thus "it is true" may mean many things other than as a test of truth.
The correspondence theory of truth has been the most widely accepted theory of truth in this century. But is has come under attack from certain people, notably, P.F. Strawson (1919--) a prominent British philosopher associated with what has been described as "Oxford Philosophy."
Strawson attacked the correspondence theory as needing "not purification but elimination."37
Strawson attacked the traditional correspondence theory on the following grounds: (l) Correspondence does not apply to many kinds of statements. "It does not apply to negative, general and existential statements, nor straight-forwardly, or hypothetical and disjunctive statements."38 An example of a brief sentence for which true does not apply is "Bring me an orange." Yet another kind would be "Do you like to play the piano?" There is no object called "like to play" that is objective for a checkup with correspondence.
(2) Correspondence requires a statement with something to which it refers in the world. Strawson wrote, "And it is evident that the demand that there should be such a relatum is logically absurd; a logically fundamental type-mistake."39 He goes on to say:
For while we certainly say that a statement corresponds to (fits, is borne out by, agrees with,) the facts, as a variant on saying that it is true, we never say that a statement corresponds to the thing, person, etc., it is about. What "makes the statement" that the cat has mange "true" is not the cat, but the condition of the cat, i.e., the fact that the cat has the mange. The only plausible candidate for the position of what (in the world) makes the statement true is the fact it states; but the fact it states is not something in the world.40
Strawson further noted that when one says "that's a fact" one is also saying "that's true." One would not continue to say "that's true, it is a fact." If we continue to examine a statement like "I am alarmed by the fact that kitchen expenditure has risen by 50 per cent in the last year," it becomes apparent that it is not a question of truth criteria that is being set forth, but the attempt to convey a feeling and alarm for securing sympathy in the matter, or relief from inflation.
Another example is that of the welfare state in which there is only a hypothetical consideration. "It is true that the general health of the community has improved (that p), but this is due only to the advance in medical science."41 That kind of statement is meaningful and performs a function in discourse, but one does not have a statement-with-reference as the correspondence theory requires.
Strawson's essay on Truth points up some of the weaknesses of the correspondence theory. But to call for its elimination may be extreme. It seems to have application to some kinds of statements and may need better description concerning its application. The simple experience of checking a statement with the fact is what has given it a continuing appeal. Theorists who claim a universality for it on all kinds of statements make it vulnerable.
Application and Conclusion
We have looked at several ways of testing whether a statement is true. The first two, correspondence and coherence, deal more precisely with the nature of truth. Pragmatism and verification deal more with the tests of certain kinds of statements, or the application of the statements. The performative view describes the function of the word "true" in some of its usages, but not its nature.
For Further Reading
Ayer, A.J., Language, Truth and Logic, New York: Dover Publications, 1936.
Brightman, Edgar, Introduction to Philosophy, Third Ed., New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1963.
Hill, Thomas E., Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, New York: Ronald Press, 1961.
Jaspers, Karl, Way to Wisdom, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954.
Scriven, Michael, Primary Philosophy, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966.
Titus, Harold, Living Issues in Philosophy, Fifth Ed., New York: Van Nostrand, Reinhold Co., 1970.
Trueblood, Elton, General Philosophy, New York: Harper and Co., 1963.
1Karl Jaspers, Way to Wisdom, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954, p. 12.
2The Ways of Knowing, p. 125.
3Michael Scriven, Primary Philosophy, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., p. 1966, p. 17.
4Some confusion abounds in distinguishing the nature of truth as what is and a correct understanding of it, from the correspondence theory which seems to say the same thing. But the correspondence theory is a comparison between my belief and what is. The first one may be truth and the second a statement about the truth.
6Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, op. cit., pp. 103-104.
7Edgar Brightman, Introduction to Philosophy, Third Ed., New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963, p. 67.
8Hamlyn, op. cit., p. 140.
9To which objection is made. Cf. Capaldi, p. 100.
10Brand Blanchard, Edgar Brightman, F.R. Bradley, Bosanquet, A.C. Ewing, etc.
11Brightman, op. cit., p. 77.
12C.F. A.C. Ewing, "If we take coherence as meaning mere internal coherence irrespective of experience, then it is inadequate as a criterion, but that is not what is meant by the leading advocates of the theory." Idealism, Strand, Eng.: Methuen and Co., p. 243.
13Ibid., p. 247.
14Capaldi, op. cit., p. 102.
15Elton Trueblood, General Philosophy, New York: Harper and Row, 1963, p. 65.
16Capaldi, op. cit., p. 102.
17Cf. his essay "What Pragmatism Is" in Pragmatism, ed. by H. Standish Thayer, New York: Mentor Books, 1970, pp. 101-120.
18Ibid., p. 88.
19Ibid., p. 97.
20Essays in Pragmatism, edited by Alburey Castell, New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1959, p. 155.
21Ibid., p. 156.
22Ibid., p. 160.
23Ibid., p. 161.
24Ibid., p. 168.
25Ibid., p. 170.
26Ibid., p. 174. For other grave criticisms of pragmatism one may consult F.H. Bradley's Essays on Truth and Reality, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1914, pp. 65-149.
27Cf. Thomas E. Hill, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, New York: Ronald Press, 1961, p. 307.
28Ibid., p. 304. (Quotes from Dewey's Essays in Experimental Logic.)
29Ibid., p. 343. (Quotes from Problems of Man, p. 343.)
30Pragmatism, p. 97.
31Cf. the problem of verification in Chapter V, Science, Philosophy, and Religion.
32Cf. Hill, op. cit., p. 318.
33A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, New York: Dover Publications, 1936, p. 90.
35Ibid., p. 99.
36Ibid., p. 100.
37P.F. Strawson, "Truth," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. XXIV (1950), pp. 129-156; reprinted in An Introduction to PHilosophical Inquiry, edited by Joseph Margolis, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968, p. 557.
38Ibid., p. 573.
39Ibid., p. 560.
40Ibid., pp. 560-61.
41Ibid., p. 558.