And perfection in repeated common interest games
UNSPECIFIED. (1997) And perfection in repeated common interest games. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 18 (2). pp. 141-158. ISSN 0899-8256Full text not available from this repository.
We consider a wide class of repeated common interest games perturbed with one-sided incomplete information: one player (the informed player) might be a commitment type playing the Pareto dominant action. As discounting, which is assumed to be symmetric, and the prior probability of the commitment type go to zero, it is shown that the informed player can be held close to her minmax payoff even when perfection is imposed on the equilibrium. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions|
|Journal or Publication Title:||GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR|
|Publisher:||ACADEMIC PRESS INC JNL-COMP SUBSCRIPTIONS|
|Number of Pages:||18|
|Page Range:||pp. 141-158|
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