The historical effectiveness of Wahhabism has weakened because of the proliferation of rival Islamic currents like the Muslim Brotherhood.
Wahhabism’s Waning Political Value
David Commins is professor of history at Dickinson College. He is the author of "The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia."
March 14, 2011
The wave of protests sweeping the Arab world has reached Saudi Arabia, inspiring a petition drive for constitutional monarchy and sparking demonstrations by Shiites calling for equality. Whether Saudi-style people power will produce a widespread movement for reform remains an open question. Much depends on the ability of the liberal camp, the Shiites and the Sunni opposition to find common ground in the face of a government that has a long record of surviving internal and external challenges.
One resource Saudi rulers have relied on for more than two centuries is the religious legitimacy they enjoy thanks to support from Wahhabi religious authorities, who remind the Saudi people that they owe obedience to the rulers, and that when rulers go astray, the correct course is to offer discreet counsel, not to mount public protest.
It is often said that loyalty to Wahhabism is deeply engrained in Saudi Arabia’s conservative culture. But how can we know that is true when conformity to Wahhabi tenets is enforced by the government in public places, taught in schools, and upheld in religious law courts? Would most Saudis behave the same way if they had a choice?
One can only guess, but Friday’s show of strength by security forces in Riyadh suggests the royal familybelieves that Wahhabi teachings alone are not enough to keep the lid on the mood of protest.
Even if Wahhabism remains pervasive as a religious outlook, many believers consider the official religious scholars too tarnished by proximity to royal power to deserve respect as spokesmen for the kingdom’s Islamic principles. Support for Wahhabism does not necessarily amount to political loyalty. In fact, the historical effectiveness of Wahhabism in solidifying loyalty to the Saudi dynasty has weakened because of the proliferation of rival Islamic currents like the Muslim Brotherhood, which revived the potential for religious defiance dormant since the 1920s.
The mix of religious and political ideas is just one variable influencing Saudi politics along with economic distress, the youth bulge, and the impact of modern communications. If petitions and protests do turn into a mass movement, it will be a sign of Wahhabism’s diminishing value as a political asset.