Drs. Shermer and Sulloway presented the question, "Why do other people believe in God?" to ten thousand Americans in 1998. The results lead them to formulate what they have entitled the intellectual attribution bias. In this series on metacognitive awareness and regulation, we now turn to the role of intellectual attribution bias.
The results of the Shermer and Sulloway query lead to the observation that the two most common reasons given for other peoples' belief in God were personal comfort ("comforting, relieving, consoling") and social comfort ("raised to believe"). Of great significance is the observation that the opposite was true for the reasons given to the question, "Why do you believe in God?" Most people answered that their personal belief in God was based on "good design, complexity, or beauty in nature" or "personal experience of God." It is alarmingly interesting that the reasons for personal belief are quantified in the opposite order of the reasons given for others' belief in God. In contrast to the personal comfort and social comfort attributions given for others' beliefs, personal belief was generally justified on the basis of intellectual reasons such as the appearance of design and personal experience.
The poll posted on this blog earlier today asked the same question and came up with similar results. Of all voters, 54% voted in favor of attributing others' belief in God to "comfort, consolation, meaning, and purpose." Another 44% of those who voted included a vote in favor of upbringing. Of the nine voters, only 11% cast a vote for the "good design, complexity, or beauty of nature." Those these categories are intentionally limited and overlapping, the majority vote falls in favor of personal comfort and social comfort ascriptions for how people view others' belief in God. A similar ascription would be predicted for describing why someone is a Republican, a Democratic, or a fan of the Green Party, and often, these ascriptions seem to be used for others of one's same persuasion.
Shermer states the following regarding his findings: "...these results are evidence of an intellectual attribution bias, in which people consider their own beliefs as being rationally motivated, whereas they see the beliefs of others as being emotionally driven" (Shermer, 2006, p. 38). Shermer (2006) also notes that the same bias is reflected in other fields of disagreement such as politics (p. 38).
Metacognitive awareness of the intellectual attribution bias could be displayed in an acknowledgment that one's beliefs and opinions are not always the result of objective thinking, intellect, and experience that we vaunt them to be. How often is such a bias illustrated in discussions between parties on different ends of any given area of disagreement? For example, atheists often attribute the beliefs of theists to personal comfort and social upbringing, not acknowledging that theists disagree with this attribution. However, theists likewise attribute the non-belief of atheists to subjective holdouts like bitterness, bad experiences with "those in the church," or lack of faith. In reality, each feels that she has more than reasonable justification for belief or lack of belief.
Metacognitive recognition of the intellectual attribution bias can manifest in multiple venues. For one, consider it worth noting that if the beliefs or ideas of someone else seem absolutely ridiculous or unfounded, there is a significant chance that you do not understand the beliefs or ideas. This is not to say that the other ideas or beliefs are correct, or that people are unqualified to assess other peoples' ideas or beliefs. This is to say that is is worth considering how well you understand the other before you reject it out of hand.