The Duty Requirement: Nonphysical Harm
In this chapter we deal with protection against non-physical harms. The focus
will be on the types of harm that plaintiffs suffer. The common law has distinguished
situations in which the only harm suffered was psychic or economic from the classic
physical injury, and has developed limited or no-duty rules for reasons that we will
explore. We begin with a type of harm generically referred to as "emotional harm."
Historically, this type of harm was far less widely protected than the interest in being free
from physical harm. Nonetheless, by the early twentieth century some courts had begun
to protect plaintiffs against intentional extreme and outrageous conduct that produced
"only" this type of harm. We explore that subject in Chapter XII. Here, we consider the
circumstances in which the courts protect non-physical interests against negligent
A. Emotional Harm
FALZONE v. BUSCH
Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1965.
45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12.
The question before us on this appeal is whether the plaintiff may recover for
bodily injury or sickness resulting from fear for her safety caused by a negligent
defendant, where the plaintiff was placed in danger by such negligence, although there
was no physical impact.
The complaint alleges in the first count that the plaintiff, Charles Falzone, was
standing in a field adjacent to the roadway when he was struck and injured by defendant's
negligently driven automobile. The second count alleges that the plaintiff, Mabel
Falzone, wife of Charles, was seated in his lawfully parked automobile close to the place
where her husband was struck and that the defendant's negligently driven automobile
“veered across the highway and headed in the direction of this plaintiff,” coming “so
close to plaintiff as to put her in fear for her safety.” As a direct result she became ill and
required medical attention. [The trial court granted summary judgment for defendant on
the second count,] holding that it was constrained to follow the existing New Jersey rule
that where there is no physical impact upon the plaintiff, there can be no recovery for the
bodily injury or sickness resulting from negligently induced fright. We certified the
plaintiffs' appeal before it was considered by the Appellate Division.
Neither this Court nor the former Court of Errors and Appeals has considered a
case directly presenting this question. However, since a decision of our former Supreme
Court in 1900, Ward v. West Jersey & Seashore R.R. Co., [ ], it has been considered
settled that a physical impact upon the plaintiff is necessary to sustain a negligence
action. [ ]
. . . Three reasons for denying recovery were set forth in [Ward]. The first was
that physical injury was not the natural and proximate result of the negligent act:
The doctrine of non-liability . . . rests upon the principle that a person is legally
responsible only for the natural and proximate results of his negligent act. Physical
suffering is not the probable or natural consequences of fright, in the case of a person of
ordinary physical and mental vigor; and in the general conduct of business, and the
ordinary affairs of life, although we are bound to anticipate and guard against
consequences, which may be injurious to persons who are liable to be affected thereby,
we have a right, in doing so, to assume, in the absence of knowledge to the contrary, that
such persons are of average strength both of body and of mind. [ ]
Second, the court concluded that since this was the first action of its kind
in New Jersey, the consensus of the bar must have been that no liability exists in the
absence of impact. [ ]. The third reason was 'public policy' which the court explained by
quoting with approval from Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., [45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896)]:
If the right of recovery in this class of cases should be once established, it would
naturally result in a flood of litigation in cases where the injury complained of may be
easily feigned without detection, and where the damages must rest upon mere conjecture
and speculation. The difficulty which often exists in cases of alleged physical injuries, in
determining whether they exist, and, if so, whether they were caused by the negligent act
of the defendant, would not only be greatly increased, but a wide field would be opened
for [fictitious] or speculative claims. [Ward]
We think that the reasons assigned in Ward for denying liability are no longer
tenable, and it is questionable if they ever were. The court there first stated that it is not
'probable or natural' for persons of normal health to suffer physical injuries, when
subjected to fright, and that since a person whose acts cause fright alone could not
reasonably anticipate that physical harm would follow, such acts cannot constitute
negligence as to the frightened party. It appears that the court decided as a matter of law
an issue which we believe is properly determinable by medical evidence. . . .
And even in Spade v. Lynn & B.R. Co., [47 N.E. 88, 89 (Mass. 1897)]
(relied upon in Ward), where recovery was denied for the physical consequences of
fright, the court recognized that:
Great emotion, may, and sometimes does, produce physical effects * * * A physical
injury may be directly traceable to fright, and so may be caused by it. We cannot say,
therefore, that such consequences may not flow proximately from unintentional
negligence; * * *
Moreover, medical knowledge on the relationship between emotional
disturbance and physical injury has steadily expanded, and such relationship seems no
longer open to serious challenge. [ ]
New Jersey courts have not generally adhered to the notion that fright
cannot be the proximate cause of substantial physical injury, and three rules of law
inconsistent with the Ward doctrine have developed. It has been held that where a person
is injured attempting to avoid a hazard negligently created by another, he may recover for
the physical consequences of fright even though the immediate injury suffered was slight
and was not a link in the causal chain. Thus, in Buchanan v. West Jersey R.R. Co., 19 A.
254 (N.J.L.1890), cited with approval in Ward, a woman standing in a railroad station
threw herself to the platform to avoid being struck by a protruding timber on a passing
train. “By reason of the shock to her nervous system occasioned by this peril, her health
was seriously impaired.” [ ] The court allowed recovery even though her fright, and not
the injury, if any, sustained in the fall, caused her physical suffering. [ ] Our courts have
also been willing to allow recovery for physical injury traceable directly to fright when
there is any impact, however inconsequential or slight. Porter v. Delaware Lackawanna &
W.R.R. Co., 63 A. 860 (N.J.L.1906); [ ]. The application of this rule was illustrated in
[Porter] where a woman became ill as the result of her shock at seeing a railroad bridge
fall near the place where she was standing. She testified that something fell on her neck
and that dust entered her eyes. In allowing recovery for the physical consequences of her
fright, the court said either the small injury to her neck or the dust in her eyes was a
sufficient “impact” to distinguish the case from Ward. And third, recovery has been
permitted where physical suffering resulted from a wilfully caused emotional
disturbance. [ ]
The second reason given in Ward for denying recovery was that the
absence of suits of this nature in New Jersey demonstrated the concurrence of the bar
with the rule of no liability. We do not believe the court meant to imply that it would
deny recovery because of opinions held by lawyers on the legal question presented. And
if the court intended to bar the cause of action because of a lack of precedent in this State,
a sufficient answer is that the common law would have atrophied hundreds of years ago if
it had continued to deny relief in cases of first impression. [ ]
Public policy was the final reason given in Ward for denying liability. The
court was of the opinion that proof or disproof of fear-induced physical suffering would
be so difficult that recovery would often be based on mere conjecture and speculation,
and that the door would be opened to extensive litigation in a class of cases where injury
is easily feigned. We realize that there may be difficulties in determining the existence of
a causal connection between fright and subsequent physical injury and in measuring the
extent of such injury. However, the problem of tracing a causal connection from
negligence to injury is not peculiar to cases without impact and occurs in all types of
personal injury litigation. [ ] As Judge Burke said for the New York Court of Appeals in
dealing with the same problem:
In many instances, just as in impact cases, there will be no doubt as to the
presence and extent of the damage and the fact that it was proximately
caused by defendant's negligence. In the difficult cases, we must look to
the quality and genuineness of proof, and rely to an extent on the
contemporary sophistication of the medical profession and the ability of
the court and jury to weed out the dishonest claims. Battalla v. State, [176
N.E.2d 729 (N.Y. 1961)].
In any event, difficulty of proof should not bar the plaintiff from the opportunity
of attempting to convince the trier of fact of the truth of her claim.
As to the possibility of actions based on fictitious injuries, a court should not deny
recovery for a type of wrong which may result in serious harm because some people may
institute fraudulent actions. Our trial courts retain sufficient control, through the rules of
evidence and the requirements as to the sufficiency of evidence, to safeguard against the
danger that juries will find facts without legally adequate proof. [ ] Moreover, the
allowance of recovery in cases where there has been an impact, however slight, negates
the effectiveness of the no impact rule as a method of preventing fraudulent claims. . . .
Ward also asserts that public policy demands denial of recovery in no
impact cases to prevent a “flood of litigations.” However, there is no indication of an
excessive number of actions of this type in other states which do not require an impact as
a basis for recovery. And, of more importance, the fear of an expansion of litigation
should not deter courts from granting relief in meritorious cases; the proper remedy is an
expansion of the judicial machinery, not a decrease in the availability of justice.
The many eminent legal scholars who have considered the rule denying
recovery in the absence of impact are virtually unanimous in condemning it as unjust and
contrary to experience and logic. [The court cites several law review articles and also
notes that both England and New York have repudiated the requirement of “impact.”] A
great majority of jurisdictions now hold that where physical injury results from
wrongfully caused emotional stress, the injured person may recover for such
consequences notwithstanding the absence of any physical impact upon him at the time
of the mental shock. [ ] Indeed, Dean Prosser has recently written that the impact
requirement 'is almost certainly destined for ultimate extinction.' Prosser, Torts § 55, p.
351 (3d ed. 1964).
Our conclusion is that Ward should no longer be followed in New Jersey. We are
not dealing with property law, contract law or other fields where stability and
predictability may be crucial. We are dealing with torts where there can be little, if any,
justifiable reliance and where the rule of stare decisis is admittedly limited. [ ] We hold,
therefore, that where negligence causes fright from a reasonable fear of immediate
personal injury, which fright is adequately demonstrated to have resulted in substantial
bodily injury or sickness, the injured person may recover if such bodily injury or sickness
would be regarded as proper elements of damage had they occurred as a consequence of
direct physical injury rather than fright. Of course, where fright does not cause substantial
bodily injury or sickness, it is to be regarded as too lacking in seriousness and too
speculative to warrant the imposition of liability.
We recognize that where there is no impact a defendant may be unaware of the
alleged incident and thus not forewarned to preserve evidence upon which he might base
his defense. However, this consideration should not be sufficient to bar a meritorious
claim. Rather, it is appropriate that the trial judge charge the jury that an undue delay in
notifying the defendant of the incident and the resulting injury may weigh heavily in
determining the truth of the plaintiff's claim. It is unnecessary to decide here whether an
undue delay short of the statute of limitations would justify a dismissal by the trial court.
The plaintiffs should be given the opportunity of submitting proof that Mrs.
Falzone suffered substantial bodily injury or sickness and that such bodily injury or
sickness was the proximate result of the defendant's negligence.
For reversal: Chief Justice WEINTRAUB and Justices JACOBS, FRANCIS,
PROCTOR, HALL, SCHETTINO and HANEMAN--7.
For affirmance: None.
Notes and Questions
1. Notice that two separate questions could be raised here: (1) whether any
physical impact is required to recover for emotional distress and (2) whether that
emotional distress must produce “physical injury” or “physical consequences” or
“physical manifestations.” The court does not deal with the second since the plaintiff has
alleged that she became ill and required medical attention as the result of the episode.
2. As to the first question why does the court not require impact? Are the court‟s
responses to Ward‟s three rationales persuasive? To the extent that one of the concerns
has been the lack of notice to the defendant that a claim might be forthcoming, how
persuasive if the court‟s resolution? If you walked out of class today and were served
with a complaint alleging that you drove carelessly a year ago and caused plaintiff to fear
for her safety, how would you defend yourself?
3. In the cited Mitchell case a team of horses ran out of control and were brought
to a halt so that plaintiff pregnant woman was situated between the two horses—but
apparently untouched by either of them. She soon had a miscarriage. The court denied
recovery. In the cited Battalla case, defendant negligently failed to secure plaintiff in her
ski chair lift. In allowing an action for her fright engendered by such a situation, the court
4. The requirement of impact has virtually disappeared today. For a rare
insistence on impact, see R.J. v. Humana of Florida, Inc., 652 So.2d 360 (Fla.1995), in
which plaintiff alleged that due to defendants' negligence he was diagnosed as HIV
positive and remained under that impression until he was retested 18 months later. The
court held that plaintiff would be able to state an actionable claim only if treatments or
injections had harmed him. How might a Florida court analyze Falzone? What if the car
in Falzone had brushed the plaintiff at two miles per hour?
5. Although the court notes that plaintiff‟s husband was hit by the same car, this
event plays no apparent part in the analysis of the wife‟s claim. As we shall see shortly, at
the time of this case it was not possible for a plaintiff to claim damages for suffering
emotional distress from witnessing an injury to a family member. How might the wife
here prove meet the defendant‟s argument that at least a large part of her emotional
distress was brought about by concern for her own safety and not by what she observed
happening to her husband at the same time? We return to this issue later in this section.
6. Is tort law sufficiently different from contract law to support the court‟s
position that the importance of stare decisis differs between the two? Is the court‟s
approach consistent with its discussion of the development of the common law in its
response to Ward‟s second point?
7. Spectators on the ground. In Lawson v. Management Activities, Inc., 81
Cal.Rptr.2d 745 (App. 1999), a group of plaintiffs who reasonably feared that a falling
airplane would hit them--it did not--were denied recovery for their emotional distress.
The court, 2-1, concluded that most of the California duty factors pointed against an
[It takes] no imagination to realize that people on the ground who are close to an
airplane crash are going to be very scared. By the same token, while it is
foreseeable that the fright will be intense, it is also foreseeable that the actual
fright itself will be short lived. What is not foreseeable is the severity of people‟s
psychological reactions to the crash. Emotional distress is a murky cauldron of
actuarial imprecision, inherently limitless. It is also an area of remarkable
individual idiosyncrasy, with great extremes at either end.
The court thought that the “certainty” of injury “squarely weighs against liability”
because of the “loosey-goosey nature of a pure emotional distress claim. . . .
Psychological symptoms are much more susceptible to being faked than more palpable
effects.” On the factors of preventing future harm and blame, the risk of death in an air
crash is a good guard against “moral indifference to the possibility of injury. Nothing is
to be gained by extending the liability attendant upon air crashes to the emotional distress
of ground spectators.” Moreover, “there is the regulatory apparatus devoted to air safety
which, in quality and intensity of care, is already disproportionate to the safety apparatus
which regulates automotive traffic.” The final two factors—the burden on defendant and
the social consequences--both cut against liability. It quoted another court saying that to
“hold airlines responsible for the possible emotional injury for such a large and
indeterminate group of people would be to expose airlines to „virtually limitless . . . tort
liability.‟” Further, the court stated that the “actual unpredictability of emotional distress
damages could add significantly to the cost of insuring air transportation.” In sum, the
“law can hardly permit a major tort suit for unpredictable emotional distress damages for
every near-miss and otherwise uneventful unsafe lane change.”
The dissenter in Lawson rejected the majority‟s approach and concluded that the
majority justices were simply uncomfortable with the concept of emotional distress; they
“are just unimpressed with „weak‟ people . . . . If they had their way, we would all be
certified war heroes. We certainly would not reward those who succumb to fear as a
result of someone else‟s negligence.” The two opinions also disagreed about whether
“tort law could countenance” an “eggshell psyche.” That term alludes to the “eggshell
plaintiff”—one who suffers from an abnormally sensitive physical condition, such as
hemophilia or brittle bones. We will explore this subject in Chapter V.
Are near-misses from cars different from near-misses from airplanes? In Wooden
v. Raveling, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 891 (App.1998), the court allowed plaintiff property owner to
recover for her emotional distress when defendant‟s negligently driven car came up onto
her property and nearly hit her. Should the land aspect be essential in limiting cases like
Falzone? What other possible distinctions might be drawn?
8. Airplane passengers. Falzone involves fear of imminent harm that does not
occur. Other examples occur in airplane crises. In Quill v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
361 N.W.2d 438 (Minn.App. 1985), the court upheld an award of $50,000 to a passenger
in an airplane that plunged 34,000 feet in an uncontrolled tailspin before pilots regained
control, and then continued to shake and shudder for 40 minutes until it could be brought
to a safe emergency landing. The plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress was grounded in the severe anxiety he experienced whenever he took an airplane
flight after the accident. The court held that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case:
[T]he unusually disturbing experience plaintiff endured combined with his
physical symptoms assure that his claim is real. There can be few experiences as
terrifying as being pinned to a seat by gravity forces as an airplane twists and
screams towards earth at just under the speed of sound.
Five other passengers on the same plane settled with the airline for amounts
ranging from $2,000 to $70,000, with the highest awards going to passengers who
claimed they were no longer able to fly as a result of the incident. See Leebron, "Final
Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death," 64 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 256, 299
(1989). How might Quill be analyzed in an impact state?
In late 1999 a jury awarded sums between $150,000 and $200,000 to each of 13
plaintiffs who sued for emotional distress after their American Airlines flight hit
unannounced turbulence and either they or their children were thrown around the cabin.
(Small claims for physical injury were involved in some of the cases but did not cause the
claimed psychological harm.) The plaintiffs‟ attorney is quoted as saying that the case
had to go to trial because the airline‟s settlement offers “were insulting, from $5,000 to
$20,000.” Benjamin Weiser, Airline Liable for Distress Linked to Turbulent Flight,
N.Y.Times, Oct. 8, 1999 at A27. Is it relevant that the time of the turbulence was
somewhere between five and 28 seconds?
9. Death Cases—Damages in Survival Actions. As noted in Chapter I, states have
adopted “survival” statutes that generally permit the decedent‟s estate to proceed with
any claims that the decedent might have brought but for the death. (The measurement of
lost income and medical expense from the injury to the death and for accompanying pain
and suffering will be considered in detail in Chapter X.) Should these fears be
compensated in cases where the harm caused death?
A common situation is the airplane crash. Most courts have allowed recovery
where plaintiff was aware of impending death or injury even if the period of time has
been very short. See e.g., Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777 (5th Cir.1976), cert.
dismissed 434 U.S. 801 (1977)(claim for passenger in plane that was running low on fuel
over the open sea and was never seen again). These cases are quite fact-specific.
Compare Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 727 F.2d 202 (2d Cir.1984)(insufficient
evidence to show that passenger on right side of plane was even aware of impending
disaster until just before the crash) with Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742
F.2d 45 (2d Cir.1984)(upholding judgment of $10,000 for pre-impact fright for passenger
in seat over left wing on same flight where jury might reasonably have found that the
passenger saw "the left engine and a portion of the wing break away at the beginning of
the flight, which lasted some thirty seconds between takeoff and crash").
In Yowell v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 703 S.W.2d 630 (Tex.1986), the court upheld
an award of $500,000 to the estates of each of four decedents for mental anguish suffered
as a result of their airplane‟s mid-air break-up. The award was for the time from the
break-up, at 10,000 feet, to the time the plane hit the ground.
The phenomenon of pre-impact fright is not limited to airplane cases. In Nelson
v. Dolan, 230 Neb. 848, 434 N.W.2d 25 (1989), the court permitted such a recovery in a
case in which defendant motorist negligently collided with plaintiff motorcyclist in such a
way that the vehicles interlocked and plaintiff's motorcycle was carried 268 feet before he
was killed when his motorcycle hit a light post and went under the automobile. The court
estimated that five seconds had passed between the original collision and the death.
For an extended consideration of the issue, see Beynon v. Montgomery
Cablevision Limited Partnership, 718 A.2d 1161 (Md.1998), in which the court, 4-3,
upheld an award for decedent‟s “pre-impact fright” which was shown to exist by 71.5
feet of skid marks. After the jury had awarded $1 million for this item, the trial judge,
acting under a statute setting a cap on awards for nonphysical injury, cut the award to the
maximum $350,000. Affirming, the majority noted that had decedent survived he would
have had an action under state law. Given that fact, it “would be illogical” to deny the
item where the feared harm came to pass. As to the very short time frame:
A jury reasonably could have inferred from that evidence that the decedent was
aware of the impending peril, that he was going to crash, and attempted an
evasive maneuver to avoid it. The jury equally reasonably could have concluded
that the decedent suffered emotional distress or fright during that period before
the crash, after he became aware of the imminent danger and began braking. This
is not rank speculation.
One dissenter noted that at the speed plaintiff was traveling when he hit the
brakes, the fright lasted between 1.5 and 2.5 seconds. Even under the reduced award, that
was at least $140,000 “per second of assumed fright.” The dissenter agreed that the action
should be recognized but saw no evidence of distress in this case. It was “rank
speculation to conclude that [decedent] was consciously thinking about anything other
than stopping his vehicle, or, indeed, that his mind and body were engaged in anything
but an instinctive reaction directed entirely at self-preservation, requiring little or no
ideation at all.”
But see Ghotra v. Bandila Shipping Co., 113 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1997), in which the
evidence showed that the victim was conscious and survived for ten seconds after the
accident. Earlier cases had said that the court would “not adopt a stop watch” approach to
the question but would require “an appreciable length of time.” That was not satisfied here.
There was no evidence showing that this period of consciousness “differs from the periods
of insensibility which sometimes intervene between fatal injuries and death” or that the
decedent “experienced a period of „heightened awareness‟ following his injuries.”
Sometimes the distress extend for far longer periods of time. In Sander v. Geib,
Elston, Frost, P.A., 506 N.W.2d 107 (S.D.1993), defendant‟s negligence in reading a pap
smear test led to a failure to detect cervical cancer until it was too late to save decedent.
The award for her death included $1 million that the court assumed was for her emotional
distress. In rejecting a claim of excessiveness, the court responded:
[Decedent] greatly suffered many faces of pain during the year following the
realization that she would die from the very disease which the pap smear was
designed to detect. The enormity of [decedent‟s] knowledge of her impending,
unalterable doom, her confusion, fear, misery, depression, helplessness, physical
pain and mental terror, her sure knowledge that she would never live to witness
the adulthood of her children or old age with her husband, all were proper
considerations for the jury and surely had a powerful influence upon it.
If there had been no physical pain whatever before the death how large an award could be
justified? What if the jury had returned a verdict on this item of $3 million? The
defendant‟s strategy was to focus on denying liability. As a result it “did not argue
damages in closing arguments to the jury.” Was this a mistake?
Whatever your views on emotional distress where the person survives, why, when
the victim dies, is this money paid to the estate and, ultimately, usually to relatives who
did not suffer that distress? In Chapter X, we explore whether the survivors of a personal
injury victim should recover damages for the victim‟s pain and suffering. Is there a
difference between recovering for the decedent‟s emotional distress at forthcoming death
and for the decedent‟s pain and suffering from the injury that caused the death?
10. After the abrogation of the impact rule, what new criteria should be developed
for imposing liability? Should a new rule allow recovery in certain types of factual
situations and not in others? What are the parameters adopted in Falzone? Are they well-
designed to ensure proof of injury and prevent a flood of litigation? These issues are
addressed in the next case and later in the chapter.
METRO-NORTH COMMUTER RAILROAD COMPANY v. BUCKLEY
Supreme Court of the United States, 1997.
521 U.S. 424, 117 S.Ct. 2113, 138 L.Ed.2d 560.
Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The basic question in this case is whether a railroad worker negligently exposed
to a carcinogen (here, asbestos) but without symptoms of any disease can recover under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA or Act), for negligently inflicted emotional
distress. We conclude that the worker before us here cannot recover unless, and until, he
manifests symptoms of a disease. [The Court also considered a claim for medical
monitoring costs, which we explore in Chapter X. Discussions of this aspect of the case
have been deleted.]
Respondent, Michael Buckley, works as a pipefitter for Metro-North, a railroad.
For three years (1985-1988) his job exposed him to asbestos for about one hour per
working day. During that time Buckley would remove insulation from pipes, often
covering himself with insulation dust that contained asbestos. Since 1987, when he
attended an "asbestos awareness" class, Buckley has feared that he would develop
cancer--and with some cause, for his two expert witnesses testified that, even after taking
account of his now-discarded 15-year habit of smoking up to a pack of cigarettes per day,
the exposure created an added risk of death due to cancer, or to other asbestos-related
diseases, of either 1% to 5% (in the view of one of plaintiff's experts), or 1% to 3% (in
the view of another). Since 1989, Buckley has received periodic medical checkups for
cancer and asbestosis. So far, those check-ups have not revealed any evidence of cancer
or any other asbestos-related disease.
Buckley sued Metro-North under the FELA, a statute that permits a railroad
worker to recover for an "injury ... resulting ... from" his employer's "negligence." 45
U.S.C. § 51. He sought damages for his emotional distress and to cover the cost of future
medical checkups. His employer conceded negligence, but it did not concede that
Buckley had actually suffered emotional distress, and it argued that the FELA did not
permit a worker like Buckley, who had suffered no physical harm, to recover for injuries
of either sort. After hearing Buckley's case, the District Court dismissed the action. The
court found that Buckley did not "offer sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find that he
suffered a real emotional injury." [ ] And, in any event, Buckley suffered no "physical
impact"; hence any emotional injury fell outside the limited set of circumstances in
which, according to this Court, the FELA permits recovery. [ ]; see Consolidated Rail
Corporation v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994). . . . [The Second Circuit reversed.]
The critical question before us in respect to Buckley's "emotional distress" claim
is whether the physical contact with insulation dust that accompanied his emotional
distress amounts to a "physical impact" as this Court used that term in Gottshall. In
Gottshall, an emotional distress case, the Court interpreted the word "injury" in FELA §
1, a provision that makes "[e]very common carrier by railroad ... liable in damages to any
person suffering injury while ... employed" by the carrier if the "injury" results from
carrier "negligence." [ ] In doing so, it initially set forth several general legal principles
applicable here. . . . It pointed out that the Act expressly abolishes or modifies a host of
common-law doctrines that previously had limited recovery. [ ] It added that this Court
has interpreted the Act's language "liberally" in light of its humanitarian purposes. [ ] But,
at the same time, the Court noted that liability under the Act rests upon "negligence" and
that the Act does not make the railroad " 'the insurer' " for all employee injuries. [ ] The
Court stated that "common-law principles," where not rejected in the text of the statute,
"are entitled to great weight" in interpreting the Act, and that those principles "play a
significant role" in determining whether, or when, an employee can recover damages for
"negligent infliction of emotional distress." [ ]
The Court also set forth several more specific legal propositions. It recognized
that the common law of torts does not permit recovery for negligently inflicted emotional
distress unless the distress falls within certain specific categories that amount to
recovery-permitting exceptions. The law, for example, does permit recovery for
emotional distress where that distress accompanies a physical injury, see, e.g., Simmons
v. Pacor, Inc., [674 A.2d 232, 239 (Pa.1996)]; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 924(a)
(1977), and it often permits recovery for distress suffered by a close relative who
witnesses the physical injury of a negligence victim, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, [441 P.2d 912
(Cal.1968)]; [ ]. The Court then held that FELA § 1, mirroring the law of many States,
sometimes permitted recovery "for damages for negligent infliction of emotional
distress," [ ], and, in particular, it does so where a plaintiff seeking such damages satisfies
the common law's "zone of danger" test. It defined that test by stating that the law
permits "recovery for emotional injury" by
"those plaintiffs who sustain a physical impact as a result of a defendant's negligent
conduct, or who are placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that conduct."
The case before us, as we have said, focuses on the italicized words
"physical impact." The Second Circuit interpreted those words as including a simple
physical contact with a substance that might cause a disease at a future time, so long as
the contact was of a kind that would "cause fear in a reasonable person." [ ] In our view,
however, the "physical impact" to which Gottshall referred does not include a simple
physical contact with a substance that might cause a disease at a substantially later
time--where that substance, or related circumstance, threatens no harm other than that
First, Gottshall cited many state cases in support of its adoption of the
"zone of danger" test quoted above. And in each case where recovery for emotional
distress was permitted, the case involved a threatened physical contact that caused, or
might have caused, immediate traumatic harm. [citing cases that involved a car accident,
a gas explosion, a train striking a car, clothing caught in an escalator choking victim, and
intruder assaulting plaintiff‟s husband].
Second, Gottshall' s language, read in light of this precedent, seems
similarly limited. [ ]; id., at 547-548 (quoting Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for
Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm--A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34
U. Fla. L.Rev. 477, 488- 489 (1982)) (" '[T]hose within the zone of danger of physical
impact' " should be able to " 'recover for fright' " because " 'a near miss may be as
frightening as a direct hit' ").
Taken together, language and cited precedent indicate that the words
"physical impact" do not encompass every form of "physical contact." And, in particular,
they do not include a contact that amounts to no more than an exposure--an exposure,
such as that before us, to a substance that poses some future risk of disease and which
contact causes emotional distress only because the worker learns that he may become ill
after a substantial period of time.
Third, common-law precedent does not favor the plaintiff. Common-law
courts do permit a plaintiff who suffers from a disease to recover for related negligently
caused emotional distress, [ ], and some courts permit a plaintiff who exhibits a physical
symptom of exposure to recover [ ]. But with only a few exceptions, common-law courts
have denied recovery to those who, like Buckley, are disease and symptom free. [ ];
[Simmons v. Pacor, Inc.]; [ ]; see also Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., [863 P.2d
795 (Cal. 1993)] (no recovery for fear of cancer in a negligence action unless plaintiff is
"more likely than not" to develop cancer).
Fourth, the general policy reasons to which Gottshall referred--in its
explanation of why common-law courts have restricted recovery for emotional harm to
cases falling within rather narrowly defined categories--militate against an expansive
definition of "physical impact" here. Those reasons include: (a) special "difficult[y] for
judges and juries" in separating valid, important claims from those that are invalid or
"trivial," [ ]; (b) a threat of "unlimited and unpredictable liability," [ ]; and (c) the
"potential for a flood" of comparatively unimportant, or "trivial," claims, [ ].
To separate meritorious and important claims from invalid or trivial claims
does not seem easier here than in other cases in which a plaintiff might seek recovery for
typical negligently caused emotional distress. The facts before us illustrate the problem.
The District Court, when concluding that Buckley had failed to present "sufficient
evidence to allow a jury to find ... a real emotional injury," pointed out that, apart from
Buckley's own testimony, there was virtually no evidence of distress. [ ] Indeed, Buckley
continued to work with insulating material "even though ... he could have transferred"
elsewhere, he "continued to smoke cigarettes" despite doctors' warnings, and his doctor
did not refer him "either to a psychologist or to a social worker." [ ] The Court of
Appeals reversed because it found certain objective corroborating evidence, namely,
"workers' complaints to supervisors and investigative bodies." [ ] Both kinds of
"objective" evidence--the confirming and disconfirming evidence--seem only indirectly
related to the question at issue, the existence and seriousness of Buckley's claimed
emotional distress. Yet, given the difficulty of separating valid from invalid emotional
injury claims, the evidence before us may typify the kind of evidence to which parties
and the courts would have to look.
More important, the physical contact at issue here--a simple (though
extensive) contact with a carcinogenic substance--does not seem to offer much help in
separating valid from invalid emotional distress claims. That is because contacts, even
extensive contacts, with serious carcinogens are common. [ ] (estimating that 21 million
Americans have been exposed to work-related asbestos); [ ] (3 million workers exposed
to benzene, a majority of Americans exposed outside the workplace); [ ] (reporting that
43% of American children lived in a home with at least one smoker, and 37% of adult
nonsmokers lived in a home with at least one smoker or reported environmental tobacco
smoke at work). They may occur without causing serious emotional distress, but
sometimes they do cause distress, and reasonably so, for cancer is both an unusually
threatening and unusually frightening disease. See [ ] (23.5% of Americans who died in
1994 died of cancer); [ ] (half of all men and one-third of all women will develop cancer).
The relevant problem, however, remains one of evaluating a claimed emotional reaction
to an increased risk of dying. An external circumstance--exposure--makes some
emotional distress more likely. But how can one determine from the external
circumstance of exposure whether, or when, a claimed strong emotional reaction to an
increased mortality risk (say, from 23% to 28%) is reasonable and genuine, rather than
overstated--particularly when the relevant statistics themselves are controversial and
uncertain (as is usually the case), and particularly since neither those exposed nor judges
or juries are experts in statistics? The evaluation problem seems a serious one.
The large number of those exposed and the uncertainties that may
surround recovery also suggest what Gottshall called the problem of "unlimited and
unpredictable liability." Does such liability mean, for example, that the costs associated
with a rule of liability would become so great that, given the nature of the harm, it would
seem unreasonable to require the public to pay the higher prices that may result? [ ] The
same characteristics further suggest what Gottshall called the problem of a "flood" of
cases that, if not "trivial," are comparatively less important. In a world of limited
resources, would a rule permitting immediate large-scale recoveries for widespread
emotional distress caused by fear of future disease diminish the likelihood of recovery by
those who later suffer from the disease? [ ]
We do not raise these questions to answer them (for we do not have the
answers), but rather to show that general policy concerns of a kind that have led
common-law courts to deny recovery for certain classes of negligently caused harms are
present in this case as well. That being so, we cannot find in Gottshall's underlying
rationale any basis for departing from Gottshall's language and precedent or from the
current common-law consensus. That is to say, we cannot find in Gottshall's language,
cited precedent, other common-law precedent, or related concerns of policy a legal basis
for adopting the emotional distress recovery rule adopted by the Court of Appeals.
Buckley raises several important arguments in reply. He points out, for
example, that common-law courts do permit recovery for emotional distress where a
plaintiff has physical symptoms; and he argues that his evidence of exposure and
enhanced mortality risk is as strong a proof as an accompanying physical symptom that
his emotional distress is genuine.
This argument, however, while important, overlooks the fact that the
common law in this area does not examine the genuineness of emotional harm case by
case. Rather, it has developed recovery-permitting categories the contours of which more
distantly reflect this, and other, abstract general policy concerns. The point of such
categorization is to deny courts the authority to undertake a case-by-case examination.
The common law permits emotional distress recovery for that category of plaintiffs who
suffer from a disease (or exhibit a physical symptom), for example, thereby finding a
special effort to evaluate emotional symptoms warranted in that category of
cases--perhaps from a desire to make a physically injured victim whole or because the
parties are likely to be in court in any event. In other cases, however, falling outside the
special recovery-permitting categories, it has reached a different conclusion. The relevant
question here concerns the validity of a rule that seeks to redefine such a category. It
would not be easy to redefine "physical impact" in terms of a rule that turned on, say, the
"massive, lengthy, [or] tangible" nature of a contact that amounted to an exposure,
whether to contaminated water, or to germ-laden air, or to carcinogen-containing
substances, such as insulation dust containing asbestos. But, in any event, for the reasons
we have stated, we cannot find that the common law has done so.
[The opinion turned to the cost of medical monitoring, discussed in
Chapter X. It then reversed the decision of the Second Circuit and remanded the case.]
Chief Justice REHNQUIST, and Justice O‟CONNOR, KENNEDY, SCALIA, SOUTER
and THOMAS concurred.
Justice GINSBURG, with whom Justice STEVENS joins, concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
Buckley's extensive contact with asbestos particles in Grand Central's
tunnels, as I comprehend his situation, constituted "physical impact" as that term was
used in Gottshall. Nevertheless, I concur in the Court's judgment with respect to
Buckley's emotional distress claim. In my view, that claim fails because Buckley did not
present objective evidence of severe emotional distress. [ ] Buckley testified at trial that
he was angry at Metro- North and fearful of developing an asbestos-related disease.
However, he sought no professional help to ease his distress, and presented no medical
testimony concerning his mental health. [ ] Under these circumstances, Buckley's
emotional distress claim fails as a matter of law. Cf. [Gottshall] (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(describing as "unquestionably genuine and severe" emotional distress suffered by one
respondent who had a nervous breakdown, and another who was hospitalized, lost
weight, and had, inter alia, suicidal preoccupations, anxiety, insomnia, cold sweats, and
[Justices Ginsburg and Stevens dissented on the monitoring question.]
Notes and Questions
1. Although the Supreme Court applies the FELA in this case, it draws principles
from the common law into the Act, and engages in a lengthy discussion of common law
precedent. What does the majority mean by saying that courts must consider general
liability rules rather than simply recovery in an individual case? How does the majority‟s
attitude towards the development of the common law compare with that of the Falzone
court? Are the two cases consistent in outcome?
2. The Court enumerates several categories of cases where recovery would be
permitted. Among these it included the situation in which the plaintiff was placed in a
“zone of danger.” The Gottshall court explained the “zone of danger” test by suggesting
that it involved “immediate risk of physical harm.” Is the majority‟s distinction between
immediate harm and exposure convincing? Might it matter if the exposure was sudden
rather than gradual? Other courts have employed the “zone of danger” approach in HIV-
exposure cases, treated in note ___, infra. Is the distinction between being exposed to
carcinogens and being put at risk of contracting HIV sound?
3. Should the validity of a plaintiff‟s emotional distress claim in this area be
determined categorically, as the Metro-North majority seems to suggest, or should it be
decided according to the “objective evidence” in each case, as the dissent urges? If the
case had been decided by one of the minority of the courts that would allow Buckley to
recover, how might that court deal with the concern that a flood of emotional distress
litigation might bar recovery by later plaintiffs who had actually contracted a disease?
For more discussion of this issue, see materials on the increased risk of future harm in
4. HIV cases. Litigation over fear of getting HIV has arisen in almost every state
court. Where the plaintiff is concerned because he or she was given an injection with a
dirty needle or was pricked by a needle that should have been sheathed in trash, the
courts have tended to require the plaintiff to show that the needle in question actually
contained the virus. See K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1995). Although that
court had earlier abandoned the impact rule, it now adhered to the “zone of danger” test,
which it described as “encompass[ing] plaintiffs who have been in some actual personal
physical danger caused by defendant's negligence.” Does the word “actual” alter the test
from that used in Metro? According to Benson “whether plaintiff is within a zone of
danger is an objective inquiry.” Then:
Thus, cases permitting recovery for negligent infliction of emotional
distress are characterized by a reasonable anxiety arising in the plaintiff, with
attendant physical manifestation, from being in a situation where it was
abundantly clear that plaintiff was in grave personal peril for some specifically
defined period of time. Fortune smiled and the imminent calamity did not occur.
Here, the situation is quite different. The facts as alleged by T.M.W. indicate that
Dr. Benson's actions never did place T.M.W. in "apparent, imminent peril" of
contracting HIV because she was not actually exposed to the AIDS virus. [ ]
Transmission of HIV from Dr. Benson to plaintiff was, fortunately, never more
than a very remote possibility.
Is the peril not “apparent” when plaintiff did not think peril was imminent? When a
reasonable person would not think it imminent? When in fact it was not imminent since
the risk was very remote?
Is there a difference between asking whether the needle or other source of contact
was actually infected and whether the contact between the needle or other source was
sufficient to constitute exposure?
Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14 (N.J. 1997), expressed concern about
promoting AIDS paranoia, but reached a different result from Benson. Plaintiff trash
collector was stuck by a used needle that defendant physicians had negligently discarded.
The court rejected a requirement of actual exposure to HIV in favor of asking what
reasonable well-informed citizens might fear. The court said it wanted to use tort law to
help reduce ignorance about AIDS—and thus would not accept the actual level of
awareness in the community since that would encourage ignorance. But neither would the
court follow Benson because that case denies the reality of the distress caused by
negligence without increasing citizen awareness. The court concluded that plaintiff
should be able to recover damages for serious and genuine distress “that would be
experienced by a reasonable person of ordinary experience who has a level of knowledge
that coincides with the then-current, accurate, and generally available public information
about the causes and transmission of AIDS.”
Consider these possibilities in analyzing Williamson: (1) medical science
determines that there is virtually no risk to the public from some substance but the
findings have not yet been widely publicized; (2) the findings have been widely
publicized but are not accepted by the general public; (3) the findings have been accepted
by the mass of the public but some significant pockets of the public remain unconvinced;
and (4) virtually the vast majority of the public is persuaded but a jury could reasonably
find that the plaintiff in their case honestly and intensely feared the substance.
A few courts allow recovery for the “window” between the event that creates the
concern and the results of tests showing that infection did not occur. See Fama v.
Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993). But can this analysis be limited to the “window”? In
Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196 (Alaska 1995), plaintiff alleged that defendant
physician incorrectly and negligently informed her that she was HIV positive and that
this news had caused severe emotional distress. The court upheld an action in this
situation. Is there impact? Is there a risk to plaintiff's safety? The court also concluded
that the harm in this type of case may well last past the date on which she learns that she
is negative. Is there a difference between being told you are HIV positive and being stuck
by a needle that you think is or may be infected with the virus?
5. Another "window" situation involves fears induced by negligent acts affecting
pregnant women. See Jones v. Howard University, Inc., 589 A.2d 419 (D.C.App.1991),
upholding a mother's claim for the mental distress she suffered as a result of defendant
hospital's negligence in giving her an x-ray exam while she was pregnant. The mother
alleged that she suffered emotional distress during her pregnancy term due to the
possibility that the radiation had harmed her unborn twins and the chance that she might
experience severe pregnancy complications. See also Harris v. Kissling, 721 P.2d 838
(Or.App.1986)(upholding mother's verdict for emotional distress suffered during
pregnancy as a result of hospital's negligent failure to conduct Rh blood tests). Does the
existence of finite periods of distress make it easier or more difficult to recognize this
type of claim?
6. Emotional distress from enhanced likelihood of physical harm. In Potter v.
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993), plaintiffs were exposed to
carcinogens over a prolonged period due to defendant's dumping of toxic wastes into a
landfill near its plant site. Although none of the plaintiffs suffered from any current
condition they faced "an enhanced but unquantified risk of developing cancer in the future
due to the exposure." The court held that:
. . . in the absence of a present physical injury or illness, damages for fear of cancer
may be recovered only if the plaintiff pleads and proves that 1) as a result of the
defendant's negligent breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff, the plaintiff is exposed
to a toxic substance which threatens cancer, and 2) the plaintiff's fear stems from a
knowledge, corroborated by reliable medical or scientific opinion, that it is more
likely than not that the plaintiff will develop the cancer in the future due to the toxic
The court went on to add that the plaintiff must further show "a serious fear that the
toxic ingestion or exposure was of such magnitude and proportion as to likely result in the
feared cancer." Since the claim in these cases is based on emotional distress, not the
likelihood of actually contracting cancer, why shouldn't this "serious fear" requirement be
the exclusive test for liability?
The Potter court offered a number of reasons for its holding--that "all of us are
exposed to carcinogens every day;" that wider liability would have "an unduly detrimental
impact" on the health field; that wider liability would have a detrimental impact on the
likelihood of recovery for those who actually develop cancer or other physical injuries later
on; and that any other test would lack the certainty of the more-likely-than-not standard.
Are these reasons persuasive? (The court also held that if plaintiff could establish
"oppression, fraud or malice"--the California standard for punitive damages--then a showing
that the plaintiff's fear is "serious, genuine and reasonable," would suffice.)
7. Recall that Falzone said it would require a showing of "substantial bodily
injury or sickness" to support the action. Other courts, such as Benson, involving fears of
HIV exposure, require "attendant physical manifestations" as one element of plaintiff's
claim? Why might that be?
In Roling v. Daily, 596 N.W.2d 72 (Iowa 1999), plaintiff trucker‟s thumb was
fractured, his ribs were cracked or fractured, and he sustained other bumps and bruises
when an oncoming car with two people swerved onto his side. Both were killed instantly.
Plaintiff suffered great and continuing emotional distress from the “horrific” accident.
Iowa had previously insisted on physical injury in this type of distress case and that was
amply established here. The crucial issue was whether that physical injury had to be the
cause of the emotional distress that was the basis of the suit. The court held that it was
not necessary that the plaintiff‟s physical injuries have caused his distress. Expert
evidence was required to establish the connection between defendant‟s negligence and
plaintiff‟s emotional distress. Although the court permitted a recovery, it noted that it was
not doing so simply because plaintiff “experienced a horrific event, no matter how
wrenching. The recovery is not for the event itself, but for the impact the event is shown
to have had in terms of the later emotional condition of the claimant.” The court
distinguished “physical injuries” from “physical manifestations” by noting that the latter
“are those that must flow from the emotional distress” while the former “are those that
result directly from the accident.” Should a court require either or both of these?
8. What if the emotional distress comes without any real fear of injury to
plaintiff? In Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn. 1996), plaintiff truck driver on the
favored road sued when defendant car driver, who had stopped at a stop sign,
unexpectedly pulled onto the road, drove into the truck‟s path and was killed instantly.
The plaintiff testified that he never had any fear whatever given the comparative sizes of
his truck and the car and the speeds. He had no physical manifestation but did claim
emotional distress from the sight of the accident. The court overruled earlier cases that
had required impact and physical manifestations, but did require expert testimony about
the severity of the distress. The zone of danger approach would not work here because
the plaintiff denied any fear.
9. On the variety of issues discussed in the preceding notes, see generally, Wells,
The Grin Without a Cat: Claims for Damages from Toxic Exposures, 18 Wm. & Mary J.
Envtl. L. 285 (1994). See also, Comment, Curing Cancerphobia: Reasonableness
Redefined, 62 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1113 (1995), rejecting judicial requirements of "physical
injury," "physical manifestation of cancerphobia," "traditional 'reasonableness,' " and the
"more-likely-than-not" standard of Potter. With 14 million workers who have been
significantly exposed to asbestos, plus other situations giving rise to fear of cancer, some
screening device is needed in cancerphobia cases. The author argues that each of the listed
traditional approaches is unsatisfying as a screening device, and urges a "substantial
probability" standard--one that emphasizes the increased risk to plaintiff "over the societal
rate based on general levels of exposure."