CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS. By Philip A. Crowl. (1960, 1985, 1989; 505 pages, 2 tables, 2 charts, 34 maps, 89 illustrations, bibliographical note, glossaries, index, CMH Pub 5-7.)
Campaign in the Marianas tells the story of the capture of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam in the Central Pacific in mid-1944, together with the strategic and tactical planning that preceded the fighting, the supporting operations by air and sea forces, and the final exploitation of these islands as bases. The Marianas victory was one of the key actions in the Pacific; the U.S. invasion of the Marianas provoked the Japanese Fleet into a major and unsuccessful engagement, and the Marianas provided the bases from which the Army Air Forces later immolated the cities of Japan.
All Central Pacific operations shared certain characteristics. They were joint amphibious operations conducted under the principle of unity of command over all air, sea, and ground forces. They had as objectives potential air and naval bases which were to be seized by ground troops who were carried forward and supported by warships and airplanes. Their accomplishments involved hard fighting and relatively heavy casualties.
Because the number of Army troops in the Marianas was relatively small, much
attention is devoted to small-unit actions, with the spotlight often falling on the rifle company. This account, like others in the Pacific subseries, also contains instructive examples of the coordination of naval gunfire, artillery, and air strikes, providing an exceptional opportunity to study the coordination of ground, air, and sea forces.
The Marianas invasions again demonstrated the soundness of U.S. amphibious doctrine and tested the principle of unity of command. This volume sheds light on interservice command and cooperation, treating frankly some of the bitter interservice controversies between the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps which emerged at the local level.
1. Strategic background of the operations (Ch. I).
2. Tactical planning for amphibious operations (Chs. III, XIII, XV).
3. Troop training for amphibious operations (Chs. III, XV).
4. Logistics of amphibious operations (Chs. III, VII, XV).
5. Command relationships and interservice cooperation and controversy in joint operations (Chs. III, VII, X, XV).
6. Amphibious landings on defended beaches (Chs. V, XVII).
7. Small-unit actions in island warfare (Chs. V, VI, VIII, IX, XI, XII, XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX).
8. Naval gunfire support in amphibious operations (Chs. V, VII, XIV, XV, XVII).
9. Employment of artillery (Chs. VII, XII, XIII, XIV).
10. Air support (Chs. V, VII, XIV, XV, XVII).
11. Employment of amphibian vehicles in landing operations (Chs. V, XIII, XIV, XVII).
12. Japanese defenses (Chs. IV, IX, XIII, XVI).
13. Japanese counterattacks (Chs. VI, XII, XIV, XVII, XVIII).
14. U.S. and Japanese fleet operations (Ch. VII).
15. Movement of supplies over beaches in amphibious operations (Chs. V, VII, XIV, XVII).
16. Army versus Marine Corps (Chs. IX, X).
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