There is no question that Americans are on average considerably more religious than Europeans; the only major exception is Poland, which remains a bastion of Catholicism. Other major Catholic countries in Europe, such as Ireland, Spain, Italy, and Austria, have low levels of church attendance and adherence to church doctrines. Countries like the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, and (above all) the Scandinavian countries, rank very low on the scale of religiosity. There is some suspicion, however, that the differences in religious observance between the United States and Europe are smaller than public opinion polls reveal, because Americans are reluctant to acknowledge that they don’t attend church regularly—but of course this is a clue to the hold that religion has over the American mind. No one could be elected President of the United States who did not profess to believe in God, whereas the question of religious belief does not arise for aspirants to become European heads of state.
The United States has a much higher level of religious belief than Europe as well as of church attendance and religious observance. More than 50 percent of Americans consider religion very important to their lives, a figure more than twice that in most European countries. Furthermore, while in general the religiosity of a country is inverse to its per capita income, the United States has a level of religiosity similar to that in much less prosperous countries. Finally, religious observance and belief have been declining in Europe since at least the 1960s but increasing in the United States during the same period, though recently there have been signs of reduced observance and belief in the United States as well. A loosening of the grip of religion in America is suggested by the rapidly increasing tolerance for cohabitation outside of marriage, of births out of wedlock, and of same-sex relationships and even same-sex marriage.
The prevalent economic explanation for American religiosity, which derives from eighteenth-century writings by David Hume and Adam Smith, is that established churches, like other monopolists, reduce output, though by a somewhat different route from business monopolists. An established church normally is supported in significant part by taxes, enabling church leaders and other church personnel to spend less time in proselytizing because they have a pecuniary advantage in competing with other churches. The “quiet life” theory of monopoly (John Hicks) is not widely accepted in regard to commercial markets because a monopolist that does not strive to minimize its costs is sacrificing profits, just like a competitive firm though with less dire consequences for survival. But because most churches, and certainly established churches, are not for-profit enterprises, profit maximization is not feasible and church leaders may take rents in the form of luxurious buildings and art, elaborate staff, and leisure, instead of in money.
Furthermore, whereas a commercial monopoly can offer a diversity of products or services, that is difficult for a religious organization to do—it can hardly offer one set of religious beliefs that allow parishioners’ pets to go to heaven and another set that reserves heaven for the souls of human beings, or a set that includes Satan and Hell and a set that eliminates those unpleasant features of conventional religion. Committed to a single set of rituals and beliefs, an established church is bound to lose the support of many people, who however may find only limited alternatives if competing churches are at a significant competitive disadvantage because of the established church’s governmental backing.
Although the United States had quasi-established churches in New England at the founding of the nation, the First Amendment to the Constitution (1787) forbade the federal government to establish a church, and the state establishments soon crumbled as well. The Fourteenth Amendment (1868) was eventually interpreted to forbid states to establish churches, and the Supreme Court continues to enforce a high degree of “separation” between church(es) and state even today, despite the nation’s increased religiosity. As a result, there is vigorous competition among religious sects in the United States, notably including competition in observances and doctrines. As a result of this greatly increased religious variety (compared to Europe, which has long had, and continues to have, established churches in most of its countries), there is a much greater likelihood of a given individual’s finding a religious sect that is to his liking in the United States than in Europe.
It does seem also that Americans are more credulous on average than Europeans—less matter of fact, less inclined to accept the authority of science (notably in regard to evolution, and geological phenomena related to evolution, such as the age of the earth), more superstitious. But it is unclear whether this is cause or consequence of the greater religiosity of Americans compared to Europeans. What seems more clearly causal is Americans’ individualism and spirit of independence. The vast majority of American Catholics reject Catholic doctrine on contraception (that only the unreliable “rhythm” method is permissible) while considering themselves good Catholics and continuing to attend church and make donations. And Americans are continually breaking away from existing sects and joining or founding new ones.
Another plausible causal factor in American religiosity is the size of the United States and the mobility of its population. A church provides a locus for forming community ties in a new city or suburb to which a family has moved. There is less population mobility within European countries, let alone among those countries, so less need to be a member of a community that exists everywhere that one might move to.
Finally, an interesting and at first sight paradoxical aspect of American religiosity is the very high level of tolerance for other people’s religions. There are two major exceptions. There is limited tolerance for Islam because of the strongly Muslim character of al Qaeda and related terrorist movements. And there is a surprisingly strong antipathy to Mormonism—public opinion polls show that while only a few percent of respondents would be reluctant to vote for a Jewish candidate for President, 20 percent would be reluctant to vote for a Mormon. This reluctance appears to be attributable in part to a lingering association in many people’s minds of Mormonism with polygamy, and in part to Mormon beliefs that other Christians consider deeply heretical, such as the belief that Jesus Christ visited North America during his lifetime and that human beings after death eventually become gods, and the rejection of the Trinity. Indeed some Mormons while venerating Christ do not consider themselves Christians.