It is actually a good question and a major problem as the United States tries to convert significant tactical effort on multiple fronts into a workable long-term strategy. As we approach the one-year anniversary of the US-led international effort to "degrade and ultimately destroy" IS, just how effective the coalition has been remains unclear.
Former CIA Deputy Director John McLaughlin, during the recent Aspen Security Forum, compared the current situation in the Middle East to Europe's Thirty Years War, a series of conflicts that devolved into a broader, devastating war that greatly altered the structure of Europe.
There are major conflicts going on in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Libya, said McLaughlin, involving Sunni, Shia, Persians, Arabs, regimes, militants, reformers and traditionalists. In one form or another, they are all shooting at each other.
The consequent flows of refugees and displaced persons challenge the future viability of the states in direct conflict, but also the populations and ultimately the politics of neighbouring states such as Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey.
Over the past year, the US has cobbled together a coalition of 62 countries to fight against the one common denominator across all these conflicts and players - IS.
On the plus side, IS controls roughly 25% less territory than it did a year ago. Taking back territory is fundamental to de-legitimising IS and eliminating the aura surrounding its Caliphate.
To date, IS has tasted far more success than failure. Flipping that equation is essential to its defeat.
On the negative side, the US has not yet achieved what the military calls "unity of effort", which is crucial to success. One reason is the conflict's complex mix of "enemies of enemies" - Saudi Arabia, Iran, the al-Nusra Front, Hezbollah, Bashar al-Assad and the Kurdish YPG - that are all fighting Islamic State.
But their presence and cross purposes make a comprehensive solution almost impossible to envision at the present time. Many of these competing interests intersect in Turkey.
Turkey and the US have agreed to cooperate more deeply to secure the border between Turkey and Syria. This is potentially significant. The flow of fighters, supporters, financing, supplies and oil across the Turkish border has been a major concern.
Turkey is part of the "Assad first" camp that considers the Syrian civil war as fundamental to the conflict. Until recently, Turkey has turned a blind eye to IS smuggling to weaken Assad's grip on power. Ankara believes IS is a second order problem that will disintegrate once the Syrian regime falls.
However, after recent IS attacks within Turkey, its interim government (Turkey is still trying to form a new government following elections in June) may be reassessing that posture.
But even if Washington and Ankara are reading from the same book, they are not yet on the same page.
Soon after Ankara and Washington announced new joint efforts against IS, Turkey launched an assault against the Kurdish Workers' Party or PKK. It included a strike against its Syrian affiliate, the YPG, which has been a pivotal force fighting IS in northern Syria.
The PKK is a designated terrorist organisation engaged in a long struggle against Turkey. The Erdogan government has had an on again-off again negotiations with the PKK to try to end the conflict. Safe to say it is now off again.
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Turkish government officials suggest there is agreement with Washington on the establishment of a narrow "safe zone" that might enable the moderate opposition to establish a presence in Syria.
Eventually, the officials say, it could allow those displaced in Syria and refugees beyond - including up to two people million in Turkey - some hope of returning home.
If there is such an understanding, the Obama administration has yet to say so.
Turkey has long pressed the United States to provide air cover for a safe zone in Syria as a means of increasing pressure on the Assad government. Ankara rightly believes that there is no solution to the larger conflict unless and until Assad steps down.
The US, while agreeing Assad is an essential part of the problem, does not yet see a viable political path to that end without the agreement of Iran and Russia, who thus far continue to prop him up. Washington continues to consider the safe zone idea, but has yet to overcome conceptual problems on the ground.
Close air support for the moderate opposition might also mean air cover for al-Nusra or Hezbollah, enemies of enemies that America still considers foes. This is one reason the Obama administration has been focused on Iraq first. Even with Iran on the front lines, the existing order of battle there is a lot more clear.
As a practical matter, while the US has established a training programme for the moderate opposition, the graduation rate has been so modest that it is likely to be months if not years before those forces can make a difference.
Sadly, there is probably time. If the analogy of the Thirty Years War is accurate, this complex Middle East conflict is far from over.
PJ Crowley is a former Assistant Secretary of State and now a fellow at The George Washington University Institute for Public Diplomacy & Global Communication.
As journalists quizzed US state department spokesman John Kirby earlier this week about the fight against the so-called Islamic State, one simply asked, "Who is shooting at whom?"