And Third, to make Kyiv, without its own transit leverage or transit fees, more dependent on the Russian Federation. To that end, the Russian state had come up with plans for endless pipeline development, many of which have failed to launch—see South Stream and the Yamal II pipeline—and some of which have succeeded, such as Nord Stream 1. What Gazprom and the Kremlin feared was that at some point, the EU would bring its open market liberalization rules to bear. If that happened, Gazprom would lose control of the pipeline and be subject to significant regulatory audit and market pricing obligations. This past Friday, Gazprom's worst fears appear to have been finally realized, when a proposed amendment to the EU's 2009 Gas Directive passed through the European Council. If the European Parliament, which has already approved a similar proposal, agrees on the terms of the legislation, Gazprom's entire external pipeline strategy, with Nord Stream 2 at its center, will come under significant pressure.