On this basis, courts denied motions to compel arbitration in antitrust cases, see, e.g., Applied Dig. Tech. Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 576 F.2d 116, 117 (7th Cir. 1978); Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 828 (2d Cir. 1968), securities cases, see, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953), pension disputes, see, e.g., Lewis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 271, 277 (E.D. Pa. 1977), and patent disputes, see, e.g., Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 593–94 (D.C. Cir. 1976), superseded by statute, Act of Aug. 27, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-247, sec. 17, § 294, 96 Stat. 317, 322 (1982), as recognized in Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 892 F.2d 1066, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1990). However, since the 1980s, the Supreme Court has embraced a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration," which has eventually resulted in the wide enforceability of arbitration clauses in a variety of public law contexts.